Syria

Last Updated: 30 November 2014

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State not party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on Resolution 68/30 in December 2013

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Last participated in a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in 2006

Key developments

Government forces are using antipersonnel landmines in the internal conflict that began in 2011, while opposition forces are using victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Syria has articulated the same position on the ban treaty for years without change: it is concerned with the plight of mine victims, but views antipersonnel mines as necessary weapons as shown by its use of the weapons since 2011. Syria also considers Israel’s continued annexation/occupation of part of the Golan Heights as a key reason for not joining the treaty.[1]

The ICBL welcomed Syria’s 14 September 2013 accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and urged it to join the Mine Ban Treaty and destroy its stockpile of antipersonnel mines.[2]

Syria last participated as an observer in a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in 2006.[3] It has rarely made any public statements on its landmine policy or participated in meetings of the ban treaty.

Since 1996, Syria has abstained from voting on every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on landmines, including UNGA Resolution 68/30 in December 2013.

Syria is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

On 5 June 2014, two Kurdish non-state armed groups in Syria—the People’s Protection Units  and the Women’s Protection Units (YPG-YPJ) and the Democratic Self-Administration in Rojava—signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines.[4] Geneva Call described the YPG-YPJ as “the dominant military force” in Kurdish-populated Syria and said it has been mainly fighting Islamist armed groups active in Syria, notably the Islamic State  and the Al-Nusra Front, since government forces largely withdrew from the areas in 2012. The Democratic Self-Administration in Rojava was formed in January 2014 and is the de facto governing authority in the Kurdish areas.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Syria is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

The size and origin of Syria’s mine stockpile is not known, but it is believed to be large and consist mainly of Soviet/Russian-manufactured mines including PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines.

Use

Prior to the current armed conflict that began in 2011, Syria was last believed to have used landmines in 1982 during the conflict with Israel in Lebanon. Little was known about the extent of its landmine problem, but the most significantly mined areas were in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights, in the southwest of the country, in addition to its borders.

Since late 2011, the first reports of government mine use emerged in the country’s border areas.[5] A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”[6]

Government use of Soviet-manufactured PMN-2 antipersonnel mines was reported in March 2012 on the Turkish border near Hasanieih (PMN-2 mines), Derwand, Jiftlek, Kherbet al-Joz(toward Alzouf and al-Sofan), Armana, Bkafla, Hatya, Darkosh, Salqin, and Azmeirin.[7] Before government forces abandoned a position at Kharbit al-Jouz near the border in October 2012, they emplaced up to 200 antipersonnel mines that subsequently injured local civilians.[8]

Government mine use on the Lebanese border was reported in June 2012 at al-Buni,[9] Tel Kalakh,[10] Kneissi,[11] Heet (PMN-2 and TMN-46 mines),[12] and Masharih al-Qaa.[13] Government forces reportedly used antipersonnel mines in June 2013 near Qusair on the border with Lebanon.[14]

In April 2014, the use of Type 84 landmines was recorded in Sawaysa, Quneitra in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights.[15] The antivehicle mines are delivered by unguided surface-to-surface 122mm rockets with a range of up to seven kilometers. Due to its sensitive magnetic fuze that also functions as an anti-disturbance measure, the Chinese-manufactured mine can detonate from changes in its immediate magnetic environment, including proximity to a vehicle or a person wearing or carrying a sufficient amount of metal, such as military equipment or even a camera. Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that explode from an unintentional or innocent act are considered antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty and are therefore prohibited.

A September 2014 video posted on YouTube shows antivehicle mines on a road near al-Hamaydia in Quneitra governorate that opposition forces said were emplaced by government forces.[16] A video uploaded in April 2013 shows antivehicle mines on a road in al-Raqqa governorate that opposition forces said were laid by government forces.[17] In August 2014, Reuters reported that Islamic State forces were killed by landmines during an attack on a Syrian government airbase at Tabqa, near the city of Raqqa.[18]

Production and use by rebel forces

Landmine use by opposition forces has also been recorded in the armed conflict, particularly IEDs.

In August 2014, the Lebanese Army reported that it had encountered explosive booby-traps laid by Syrian insurgents (from the Nusra Front and from the Islamic State) who had crossed from Syria into the Lebanese town of Arsal.[19]

In June 2014, government troops who entered Latakia after retaking it from rebel forces claimed to encounter antipersonnel mines and booby traps laid by opposition groups.[20] In March 2014, government troops who entered Yabroud were reported to be clearing booby-traps and bombs laid by opposition groups.[21] In January 2014, Israeli troops shot at two persons in Syria who were believed to be collecting and stealing mines from the Israeli minefield on the border.[22]

In December 2013, Kurdish militia stated that they encountered numerous mines and booby-traps laid by Jabhat Al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Ras Ai-Ain.[23]

Previously, there were several reports of Syrian non-state armed groups manufacturing and using IEDs, primarily remotely-detonated roadside bombs but also victim-activated devices.[24]

Victim-activated IEDs are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty’s definition of an antipersonnel mine.

In August 2012 after a Syrian rebel told the media that they intended to re-use government antipersonnel mines that have been removed from the ground, the ICBL called on all parties to the conflict in Syria to forbid their combatants from using landmines.[25] It is not known if opposition forces have used landmines acquired or recovered from government forces.

Opposition forces reportedly used antipersonnel mines at Qusair in the year before the city fell to government forces in early June 2013.[26]

In January 2014, the Syrian Red Crescent reported that unknown rebels had placed landmines on a highway near Damascus. The type was not specified but appeared to be antivehicle mines.[27]

Previously, some opposition use of antivehicle mines was recorded in 2013.[28]

Hezbollah claimed that its forces discovered landmines in Yabroud in March 2014 after the city fell from Jabhat al-Nusra control to government forces.[29]

In June 2014, a former child soldier interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that he laid explosive devices on behalf of opposition rebels at a government facility in Aleppo governorate.[30]

International response

Several states have condemned Syria’s use of antipersonnel mines since early 2012, including Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the United States, as well as the European Union. More condemnations of landmine use in Syria were made at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013 by the UN Secretary-General and the European Union.

 



[1] Telephone interview with Milad Atieh, Director, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 January 2008; and interview with Mohd Haj Khaleel, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Damascus, 25 February 2007. See also, statement of Syria, Seminar on Military and Humanitarian Issues Surrounding the Mine Ban Treaty, Amman, 19–21 April 2004.

[3] A Geneva-based Syrian diplomat attended as an observer the Seventh Meeting of State Parties in Geneva in September 2006.

[5] ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines,”, 2 November 2011.

[6]Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” The Associated Press, 1 November 2011.

[8] Stephanie Nebehay, “Syria using mines and cluster bombs on civilians: campaigners,” Reuters, 29 November 2012.

[10] See testimony of 15-year-old boy from Tal Kalakh who lost his right leg to a landmine. “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines: Witnesses Describe Troops Placing Mines Near Turkey, Lebanon Borders,” HRW, 13 March 2012.

[11] “Syrian farmer killed in mine explosion at Lebanon border,” The Daily Star, 17 December 2011.

[12] On March 9, The Washington Post published a photo of dirt-covered PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines that it reported were planted by the Syrian army on the outskirts of the Syrian village of Heet.

[13] “Syria plants mines along Lebanon border,” The Daily Star, 13 June 2012. For information about an injury at an unidentified location on the Syria-Lebanese border, see “Lebanon-Syria border blast wounds 3,” Agence France-Presse, 29 July 2012.

[14] Email from HRW employee, 5 June 2013.

[15] Mark Hiznay, “Remotely Delivered Antivehicle Mines Spotted in Syria,” Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog, 25 April 2014.

[18] Tom Perry, “Syria Reinforces Air Base Under Islamic State Attack: Monitor,” Reuters, 22 August 2014.

[19] Mariam Karouny, Tom Perry, and Samia Nakhoul, “Saudi Arabia grants $1 billion to Lebanon's army in battle against Syrian rebels,” Haaretz, 7 August 2014.

[20] Lucas, Ryan, “Kobane Kurds stranded on landmine-ridden border,” Daily Star (Associated Press, Lebanon) 15 June 2014; and “Syrian army crushes rebel push near Turkish border,” Daily Star (Associated Press), 15 June 2014.

[21] Albert Aji, Diaa Hadid, “Syrian government forces capture key rebel town near Lebanon border,” Christian Science Monitor (Associated Press), 16 March 2014.

[22] IDF Shoots at Landmine Thieves,” the Jewish Press, 13 January 2014.

[23] Hannah Lucinda Smith, Land Mines in Ras Al-Ain,” Asharq Al Awsat, 7 December 2013.

[24] In July 2013, Wired published a profile on rebel arms manufacturers in Aleppo, including one manufacturer who showed a reporter victim-activated IEDs (using a pressure plate) that he was working on. The metallic devices looked like “old-fashioned fire-alarm bells.” See also: “IED bombs new Syrian rebel strategy,” BBC, 23 June 2012; CJ Chivers, “Syrian Rebels Hone Bomb Skills to Even the Odds,” The New York Times, 18 July 2012; Luke Harding and Ian Black, “Syria’s rebels add explosives expertise to guerrilla tactics,” The Guardian, 1 August 2012; and Christopher John Chivers, “Syria’s Dark Horses, With Lathes: Makeshift Arms Production in Aleppo Governorate, Part I,” The New York Times At War blog, 19 September 2012.

[25] ICBL Press Release, “Syrian opposition forces urged not to use landmines,” 2 August 2012. In an interview, an unidentified Syrian rebel stated, “We defuse the mines planted by the Assad army and we will plant these mines for his soldiers.” Jane Ferguson, “Syria rebels to reuse regime landmines,” Al Jazeera, 1 August 2012.

[26] According to the Associated Press, in the year prior to the defeat at Qusair “rebels holding the town had heavily fortified it with tunnels, mine fields, and booby traps.” Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian rebels reeling from loss of Qusair,” Associated Press, 11 June 2013. According to the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, Hezbollah and Syrian Army units conducting mine clearance in Qusair found dozens of mines provided by Hezbollah to Hamas in 2007–2008. Sources hinted that Hamas may have provided the mines to Syrian rebels. The report has not been confirmed by Hezbollah’s leadership. Roi Kais, “Report: Mines found in Qusair provided by Hezbollah to Hamas,” Ynet, 10 June 2013. See also: “SYRIA Fsa Rebel deploying Anti personnel mines Pretending to be Clearing Them Syria War 2013,” YouTube, 19 September 2013.

[27] Sam Dagher and Nour Malas, “In Fight for Syria, Food and Medicine Are Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, 21 January 2014.

[29]Hezbollah Reorganizes Ranks in Light of Leaks,” The Daily Star, 1 April 2014; and “Syrian Army Captures Strategic Border Town,” Al Jazeera, 17 March 2014.

[30] HRW Video, “Syria: Armed Groups Send Children into Battle,” YouTube, 22 June 2014.


Last Updated: 16 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Syrian government made its first and last statement on the matter of accession in September 2011, when a representative informed a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that Syria views cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity” and said “we appreciate the international effort to ban these weapons but cannot sign due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]

Syria did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Since 2008, it has attended just one meeting of the convention, when it participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in 2011.

Syria is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Syria is not known to have produced cluster munitions.

Based on evidence of cluster munition use by government forces in the period since in 2012, Syria has imported or received at least seven types of cluster munitions made by two countries:

·         Six types of cluster munitions manufactured by the Soviet Union (now Russia): air dropped RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M, RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh, and RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 bombs, as well as ground-launched 9M55K 300mm Smerch rockets containing 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, 9M27K 220mm Uragan rockets, and KMGU dispensers containing PTAB-2.5KO bomblets.[2]

·         122mm surface-fired rockets produced by Egypt that contain dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[3]

In addition, the use of a DPICM-type submunition of unknown delivery method and origin called “ZP-39” on the basis of its markings was documented in the first half of 2014.

It is not known when Syria imported the cluster munition stockpile or in what quantities.[4]

Use

From July 2012 until July 2014, at least 249 cluster munitions have been used in multiple locations across 10 of Syria’s 14 governorates, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).[5] This analysis provides an indication of the scale of cluster munition use, but the data is incomplete as not all remnants are likely to have been recorded and the actual number of cluster munitions used in Syria is most probably much higher. At least seven types of cluster munitions have been used in the Syria conflict, including air-dropped bombs, dispensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets, and at least nine types of explosive submunitions, as shown by the following table.[6]

Cluster munitions used in Syria (July 2012–June 2014)

Type of cluster munition

First use

RBK-250-275 cluster bomb, each containing 150 AO-1SCh submunitions

July 2012

RBK-250 cluster bomb, each containing 30 PTAB-2.5M fragmentation submunitions

August 2012

122mm SAKR surface-to-surface rockets, each containing either 72 or 98 submunitions

December 2012

RBK-500 cluster bomb, each containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 submunitions

March 2013

BKF cartridges containing 96 PTAB-2.5KO submunitions

May 2013

AO-2.5RT submunitions (delivery system not known)

June 2013

9M55K 300mm rockets, each containing 72 9N235 fragmentation submunitions

February 2014

9M27K-series 220mm rockets, each containing an unknown submunition

February 2014

“ZP-39” DPICM-like submunition (delivery system not known)

April 2014

Initial reports of cluster munition use emerged in mid-2012 and then increased sharply in October 2012 as the government intensified its air campaign on rebel-held areas with the use of RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets.[7] The Syrian government continued to use air-dropped cluster bombs in 2013 and 2014, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. Use of AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions was also recorded, but the delivery system was not clear.[8]

At the end of 2012, the first use of ground-launched cluster munitions was recorded when Syrian government forces used multi-barrel rocket launchers to deliver Egyptian-made 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM-like submunitions with distinctive white ribbons.[9] In early 2014, the use of 9M55K and 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms was first documented.[10] HRW attributed the use to the Syrian government.[11]

Video footage of another DPICM-like submunition with a red ribbon was reportedly filmed in the village of Maliha in rural Damascus in early April 2014 and again in the town of al-Waziyeh southeast of Homs on 22 July 2014.[12] From its markings, arms experts have called the weapon as a “ZP-39” submunition, but its origin and the delivery system used are not known. Markings on the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993, making them more recently produced than the RBK-series cluster bombs, but still old stock at more than 20 years of age.[13]

The Syrian military initially denied possessing or using cluster munitions and the government has continued to deny its use of the weapons.[14] As of July 2014, it does not appear that cluster munitions have been used by opposition rebel groups, but there is some evidence of unexploded submunitions being used as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by some rebel groups.[15] The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage and public outcry. By 1 July 2014, a total of 142 states had condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions in national statements and/or by supporting joint statements or resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and others.[16]

At least 33 of these states have made national statements to express concern and condemn the use, including foreign ministers from Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Norway, and UK.[17]

Almost all of these countries and another 113 states have expressed concern at the cluster munition use by voting in favor of UNGA resolutions on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic during 2013 that included specific references to the use of cluster munitions in Syria:

·         On 18 December 2013, the UNGA adopted Resolution 68/182, expressing “outrage” at the “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights” in Syria “including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.” Drafted by Saudi Arabia, Resolution 68/182 was passed by 127 votes in favor, 13 against, and 47 abstentions.[18]

·         On 15 May 2013, a total of 107 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 67/262 that included a strong condemnation of “the use by the Syrian authorities of...cluster munitions.”[19]

At the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2013, the matter of Syria’s continued cluster munition use was a key concern. During the meeting, 31 countries, in addition to the European Union (EU) and the UN, made statements expressing concern or condemning the cluster munition use in Syria, including Ghana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Togo for the first time.[20] The meeting adopted the Lusaka Progress Report, which found that “Reactions have been particularly vocal with regard to the sustained use of cluster munitions in the Syrian Arab Republic” and noted the “large number of States Parties and States not Parties have condemned or otherwise expressed concern with the use of cluster munitions in Syria in 2012 and 2013.”[21]

Norway, as the President of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, made multiple statements condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including in September 2013, when it welcomed the widespread condemnations of use and said that the condemnations “underline the extent to which the use of cluster munitions today is considered illegitimate, and unbecoming of responsible members of the international community.”[22]

At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013, the EU and several states expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in their national statements, including Ireland, France, Netherlands, Lithuania, Portugal, and the UK,. 

A meeting of the “London 11” group of the “Friends on Syria” on 22 October 2013 issued a communiqué calling on the Syrian regime to “end the siege of urban areas and the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, in particular through air bombardment and the use of ballistic missiles, cluster bombs and explosive barrels.”[23]

At the April 2014 intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several states expressed their concern at the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, including New Zealand, Netherlands, and Norway. The CMC said it was “deeply concerned by continuing use of cluster munitions by Syrian government forces and the resulting toll of civilian casualties” and again called on Syria to immediately halt use, clear contaminated land, and join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[24]

 



[1] Statement of Syria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011.

[2] Additionally, AO-2.5RT submunitions have been identified, though it is unclear whether these were delivered by RBK-series bomb or KMGU dispensers.

[3] It is not known if Syria was the source for Chinese Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets fired by Hezbollah into northern Israel from southern Lebanon in July–August 2006.

[4] A review by Human Rights Watch (HRW) of the markings on the RBK-series air-dropped bombs and the submunitions contained inside them, as well as a comparison with the Soviet manuals for the weapons, show that they were manufactured at Soviet state munitions factories in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 9M55K 330mm cluster munition rocket was designed and initially manufactured by the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and then manufactured and exported by the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise “SPLAV State Research And Production Association” from 1991 onward. A decade ago, Jane’s Information Group listed Syria as possessing some of the RBK-series air-dropped bombs as well as the KMGU dispensers, indicating that the stocks used after 2012 were not newly-manufactured. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 846.

[5] Since 2012, HRW has systematically researched, recorded, and documented the use of cluster munitions in Syria. The information contained in this Monitor profile updates information previously provided in an April 2014 briefing note. See HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 4 April 2014.

[6] In addition, ZAB incendiary submunitions delivered by RBK bombs have been used by government forces, but this weapon is not accounted for by the Monitor as it is not considered to be an explosive submunition covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. An incendiary weapon, the ZAB submunitions ignite after release from its container instead of detonating on, before, or after impact. For further information on Syria’s use of incendiary weapons, see HRW memorandum to CCW Delegates, “Syria Use of Incendiary Weapons,” November 2013.

[7] The 250-kilogram class RBK-series cluster bombs can be delivered by jet aircraft as well as rotary wing aircraft, such as Mi-24 and Mi-8 series helicopters. Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012; and HRW press release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” New York, 12 July 2012.

[8] AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions are capable of being loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers. The AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by the RBK-500 cluster bomb.

[9] It is not known if the 122mm rockets are SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. The design of the fuze system in this type of submunition makes it very sensitive and submunitions that fail to explode on initial impact are liable to detonate if disturbed. HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” New York, 14 January 2013.

[10] Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014.

[11] HRW stated, “It is highly unlikely that rebel forces could acquire the eight-wheeled, 43,700 kilogram launch vehicle or operate its sophisticated fire control system without significant training or time to conduct practice drills. There is no video evidence or written claims that any rebel group controls any BM-30 launchers, its similarly sized re-supply vehicle, or any 300mm surface-to-surface rockets like the 9M55K rocket.” HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014.

[12] Collective Awareness to UXO blog, “AP-39 Syria Unidentified Submunition,” undated. See also videos posted by Syrian activists at youtu.be/rRGRVM4qaC8 and youtu.be/kdpgLV5FKCE.

[14] According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affair ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.

[15] A video uploaded to YouTube on 26 March 2014 reportedly of arms captured by government forces from rebel groups shows submunitions prepared for use as IEDs.

[16] The countries that have expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria come from 91 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovia (BiH), Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia FS, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen). The Monitor does not count signatories to the Lome regional meeting declaration of May 2013, which expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in general and was endorsed by 36 African states including Angola, Congo Rep, Eritrea, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[17] National statements have also been made by States Parties and signatories Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, and Togo, as well as by representatives from states not party Cambodia, Qatar, and the United States. See also, CMC, “Cluster munition use in Syria,” undated, but 2014.

[18] The 127 countries that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 68/182 were from 78 states parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, France, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 49 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, FS Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen). “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013.

[19] The 107 countries that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 67/262 were from 69 states parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, CAR, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, France, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the UK) and 38 non-signatories (Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, FS Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, UAE, Vanuatu, and Yemen). “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/67/L.63, 15 May 2013.

[20] Albania, Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, Togo, and the UK. Notes by HRW.

[21] Lusaka Progress Report adopted by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, September 2013.

[22] See, for example: statement of the President of the Third Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Continued use of cluster munitions in Syria,” 22 March 2013.

[23] The London 11 Core Group of the Friends of Syria that met in London on 22 October 2013 to discuss Syria was comprised of 11 countries: four States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK), and seven states not party (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States). London 11 Final Communiqué.

[24] Statement of the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 7 April 2014.


Last Updated: 09 October 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants, a legacy of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 and the ongoing armed conflicts.

The scale and intensity of conflict involving heavy, indiscriminate weapons in Syria has tended to eclipse landmine use and casualties since 2012. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) maintains a database of clashes but did not record specific instances of mine laying in 2013.[1] However, media and other reports by groups monitoring or involved in the conflict point to continued use of mines by both sides. Video clips posted on the internet by opposition supporters have described scattered incidents of mine use by government troops in 2013 but these could not be independently confirmed.[2] Rebel groups have reportedly made use of mines along with improvised explosive devices and have in the past said they would re-use government-laid mines they recovered.[3]

Syrian refugees and opposition combatants arriving in neighboring Lebanon and Turkey in 2012 and 2013 related experiences with landmines, some of them documented by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the media.[4] Turkish authorities reportedly stated that between 613,000 and 715,000 landmines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces, but media reports gave no further details.[5] In 2012, HRW identified mine use on the Turkish border near Hasanieih (PMN-2), Derwand, Jiftlek, Kherbet al-Joz toward Alzouf and al-Sofan, Armana, Bkafla, Hatya, Darkosh, Salqin, and Azmeirin.[6] Landmine use has also been reported on the Lebanese border in al-Buni,[7] Tel Kalakh,[8] Kneissi,[9] and Heet.[10] Civilian casualties have been recorded from this mine use.

Mine Action Program

There is no functioning mine action program in Syria and no national mine action authority or mine action center.

In March 2012, UNMAS established an office in Damascus, initially as part of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), but this was closed in August 2012 and UNMAS does not currently have a presence in Syria. An UNMAS risk education project was included in the Syrian humanitarian response plan proposed for 2014 but Syrian authorities have not approved any visas for staff to implement it. To assist humanitarian relief agencies and eventual reconstruction, UNMAS has maintained a database based largely on open source material recording locations of armed clashes.[11] 

Land Release

No formal demining program is conducted in Syria but clearance is reportedly conducted by government and rebel troops and by some civilians on an ad hoc basis. Media reported the death of two Syrian Army engineers in the course of conducting “demining” in Homs Old City after the evacuation of rebels in May 2014, but it was unclear if they were engaged in clearing mines or in explosive ordnance disposal.[12] As an example of spontaneous clearance by local inhabitants, a video posted online by HRW in March 2012 reported that a team of five local people had removed 300 antipersonnel mines from the village of Hasanieih near the border with Turkey.[13]

Turkish Defense Minister Ismat Yilmaz was quoted by media in 2013 as saying that 1,734 mines had been removed from the Syrian-Turkish border but gave no details.[14]

Kurdish groups in the north eastern town of Ras al-Ain reported removal of some 60 tripwire-activated mines placed by jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham in the nearby town of Tel Halaf.[15]

 



[1] Email from Flora Sutherland, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, New York, 28 May 2013.

[2] See, for example, “Syria/Assad-forces lay mines btw these 2 checkpoints in outskirts of DeirEzzor,” Yallasouriya, 23 October 2013; and “Syria, landmines planted by regime before leaving Tafas, have been dismantled,Yallasouriya, 28 October 2013, accessed 21 May 2014.

[3] See, for example, “Rebels targeting regime checkpoints in Idlib,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 3 February 2014; “Human losses and violent conflict are ongoing in Aleppo,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 9 November 2013; C. J. Chivers, “Starved for arms, Syria rebels make their own,” New York Times, 12 June 2013; and Associated Press, Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” quoted in Haaretz, 1 November 2011.

[4]Syria: Army planting banned landmines,” HRW, 13 March 2012.

[5]Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border,” Middle East Monitor, 21 November 2013.

[8] See testimony of 15-year-old boy from Tal Kalakh who lost his right leg to a landmine: “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines: Witnesses Describe Troops Placing Mines Near Turkey, Lebanon Borders,” HRW, 13 March 2012.

[10] On 9 March 2012, The Washington Post published a photo of PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines that it reported were planted by the Syrian Army on the outskirts of the Syrian village of Heet.

[11] Email from Flora Sutherland, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, New York, 28 May 2013.

[13] HRW, “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines,” 14 March 2012.

[14]Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border,” Middle East Monitor, 21 November 2013.

[15] Hannah Lucinda Smith, “Land mines in Ras al-Ain,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 7 December 2013.


Last Updated: 20 December 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

917 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (433 killed; 472 injured; 12 unknown)

Casualties in 2013

201 (2012: 37)

2013 casualties by outcome

201 killed; unknown injured (2012: 6 killed; 29 injured; 2 unknown)

2013 casualties by item type

9 cluster submunition; 27 ERW; 165 unspecified mine types

(see more details below on 1,001 cluster munition casualties)

In 2013, 201 fatalities were identified due to mines, cluster submunitions, and other ERW in the Syrian Arab Republic.[1] Detailed data on fatalities was collected and disaggregated according to the weapons involved by the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).[2] The SNHR also documented the number of people injured by cluster munitions, many of whom were wounded by unexploded submunitions that are scattered widely throughout many areas of the country.[3] Persons injured were not, however, disaggregated in the data.

Since internal conflict began in 2011, the numbers of casualties identified annually in Syria represent a significant increase from previous years. In 2010, no casualties were identified in Syria, and in 2009 a single antivehicle mine casualty was reported.[4]

In addition to the casualties reported in Syria, included in the total of mine/ERW casualties for Turkey for 2013 were six mine casualties from Syria (two killed and four injured) in incidents in the Turkish border minefields while crossing from Syria to Turkey.[5] Eight casualties among people fleeing from Syria to Turkey were recorded in 2012.[6] As of November 2014, at least nine Syrian casualties were reported in Turkish border minefields, making up almost half of the total casualties recorded in Turkey in the first 11 months of the year (19). As in 2013, all were reported to be civilians, with three civilians killed and another six injured by landmines at the Turkish-Syrian border while escaping from the conflict in Syria. At least four of the Syrian border casualties in Turkey 2014 were children.[7]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in Syria between 1967 and the end of 2013 is at least 917 mine/ERW casualties (433 killed; 472 injured; 12 unknown).[8] In the absence of a national casualty data collection mechanism, it is probable that there were also unrecorded casualties before the beginning of internal armed conflict in 2011.

Cluster munition casualties

For 2013, the Monitor received reports of at least 1,001 cluster munition casualties in Syria; at least 151 people were recorded as killed and some 850 people were injured. Among those people who died, 142 were killed by cluster munition air strikes and shelling (direct use of cluster munitions) and another nine fatalities were recorded from incidents involving unexploded submunitions.

The number of casualties due to strikes and unexploded submunitions is likely much higher. Collection of data was ongoing and efforts to gather details on casualties were hampered by the intensity of the continuing conflict. The SNHR reported that the number of casualties was believed to be far higher than presented in the available statistics.[9]

In 2012, according to data from VDC and SNHR,[10] 113 people were reported as killed (including four due to unexploded submunitions) and some 470 people injured by cluster munitions.[11]

At least 15 casualties from unexploded submunitions have been recorded from the 1970s through the end of 2013, including one in 2012 and nine in 2013.[12]

The SNHR updated reporting of cluster munition casualties for 2014 through September, finding that at least 49 persons were killed and 250 injured during cluster munition strikes; another 15 people were killed by cluster munitions remnants. The SNHR reporting includes several detailed accounts of cluster munition use.[13]

Victim Assistance

There is no current estimate of the total number of mine/ERW survivors living in Syria.

Handicap International (HI) noted “a patent lack of immediate rehabilitation and psychosocial relief” despite the rising number of conflict-injured people within Syria and those fleeing to neighboring countries.[14]

Insecurity and conflict in Syria affected access to essential medical interventions and medical equipment. There were severe shortages of medicine and medical supplies, as well as the inability of many health workers to access their workplaces. These difficulties were exacerbated by overall disruptions to the health system. A lack of fuel and cuts in electricity forced many hospitals to operate at reduced capacity. A continuously growing number of patients also strained the limited health resources available.[15] Medical personnel and hospitals were deliberately targeted and access to medical services was denied. The attacks on hospitals and clinics further reduced the provision of basic assistance to injured persons.[16] According to reports by the Ministry of Health, 57% of public hospitals were affected, of which 20% were damaged, and 37% were out of service. Trauma injuries remained high-priority needs.[17]

The ICRC reported that health ministry hospitals and other health facilities, particularly the National Red Crescent Society’s mobile health units, provided emergency medical care, inpatient treatment, and primary healthcare to injured people using ICRC-donated medical supplies. However, support for casualty care reached areas under the control of armed groups on only four occasions because of Syrian government restrictions as well the constant insecurity due to the conflict.[18]

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor is responsible for assisting persons with disabilities and worked through dedicated charities and organizations to provide assistance. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and seeks to integrate them into the public sector workforce.[19]

Syria ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009. In September 2013, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities gave a statement with regard to Syria’s need to fulfill its obligations under the CRPD while calling for humanitarian agencies to be “allowed to operate without restrictions throughout Syria” to assist persons with disabilities “including measures for those persons with disabilities among refugees and the internally displaced.”[20]

Assistance to Syrian refugees

In Iraq, healthcare centers and hospitals in the Kurdistan region were “overwhelmed” by the number of refugees in need entering from Syria during 2013.[21] In Lebanon, “the influx of Syrian refugees to different Lebanese territories including the contaminated areas results in an increase in mine/ERW incidents.”[22] A number of UN agencies, as well as national and international NGOs, have initiated programs and interventions that directly support the Ministry of Public Health “to try and relieve some of the burden on Lebanon’s health system.”[23]

HI’s emergency coordinator for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan reported a high ratio of injuries leading to amputation and also spinal cord injuries, “approximately double the ratio that what HI are used to seeing in other crises.”[24] HI also reported that 88% of the Syrian refugees interviewed with injuries related to the conflict, who received services from HI, reported that before receiving HI assistance they had not had adequate access to rehabilitation.[25]

Initial emergency medical care for Syrian refugees injured on the border with Turkey was provided in the Suruç Public Hospital. Depending on their medical needs, in some cases refugee mine survivors were also be transferred to the Şanlıurfa Mehmet Akif İnan Training and Research Hospital.[26]

Beginning in June 2013, Bulgaria experienced a large number of Syrian refugees seeking entry into the EU via Turkey. Bulgaria's immigration authorities were ill-prepared and severely underfunded to cope with the demand.[27] Bulgaria has a responsibility to ensure access to medical and psychological care for asylum seekers, including specialized care for people with disabilities. However, such care was not systematically provided for Syrian asylum seekers.[28]



[1] Email from Amir Kazkaz, Database Management Division, Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC), 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, Director, Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 28 April 2014.

[2] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014.

[3] According the SNHR “most of the injured were wounded by the cluster bombs when they passed near it, touched it…some of them were injured while trying to disarm it.” Email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 25 July 2014.

[4] Email from Dr. Hosam Doughouz, Health Officer, Quneitra Health Directorate, 12 May 2010.

[5] These casualties were included in the 2013 annual total for Turkey, not in the total for Syria. See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Turkey: Casualties and Victim Assistance,” 2 December 2014.

[6] These casualties were included in the 2012 annual total for Turkey, not in the total for Syria. See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Turkey: Casualties and Victim Assistance,” 25 November 2013.

[7] Casualty data from media scanning for January to September 2014. Sent by email from Muteber Öğreten, Initiative of a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT), 25 November 2014.

[8]Citizen Injured from Israel Left-over Mine Explosion in Quneitra,” SANA (Quneitra), 6 May 2011. In the article, Omar al-Heibi, head of the board of the General Association for Rehabilitation of Mine-caused Injuries, states that there have been a total of 660 mine casualties (220 killed; 440 injured) as of May 2011, including a man injured in 2011.

[9] “Despite the great difficulty in even getting an approximate number of people injured by the use of cluster munitions by the government forces, the estimates of the team of SNHR refer to more than 1470 people injured.” SNHR, “Victims of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 2 February 2014, p. 6; SNHR, “Three Year Harvest,” 31 March 2014; and casualty data by sent email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014.

[10] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014. The two data sets were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[11] Previously through media monitoring, the Monitor had identified 165 casualties from cluster munitions strikes for 2012.

[12] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 132.

[13] SNHR, “The Syrian Regimes Cluster Attacks in 2014 (25 January–25 September 2014),” 18 October 2014.

[15] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Syrian Arab Republic: Health Sector Update (September 2013),” 9 September 2013; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 506.

[17] UN, “Syrian Arab Republic Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) January - December 2013 (Revised),” prepared in coordination with the Syrian Government, UN System, and other humanitarian actors in Syria, 5 June 2013, p. 24.

[18] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 504.

[19] United States Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Syria,” Washington, DC, 17 April 2013.

[20] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Persons with disabilities ‘forgotten victims’ of Syria’s conflict,” Geneva, 17 September 2013.

[21] Cathy Otten, “Syrian refugees suffer as aid agencies in Iraq grapple with sudden influx,” IRIN (Sulaymaniyah),

21 August 2013.

[23] World Health Organization, “Increasing health vulnerability with over 780 000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon,” 14

October 2013.

[24] HI, “Injured and disabled people forgotten in ‘highly disabling’ Syria crisis,” 3 December 2013.

[25] HI, “New study shows legacy of disability from explosive weapon use in Syria,” January 2014.

[26] Interview with Reşit Doğru, Chairperson of Suruç Branch of the Trade Union for Public Employees in the Health Sector, Suruç, 18 November 2014.

[27] Migration Policy Centre, "Bulgaria: Stories from  the Voenna Rampa camp," undated.

[28] Medicins Sans Frontieres, “Bulgaria: Syrian Refugees Face Appalling Conditions,” 21 November 2013.


Last Updated: 22 November 2013

Support for Mine Action

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants, a legacy of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 and the ongoing armed conflict. The fighting has involved extensive use of indiscriminate weapons, which cause both immediate and long-term damage as they result in high levels of contamination of ERW.[1] The Syrian conflict has been marked by a severe lack of access to affected populations, including mine action activities.

In 2012, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that it received US$1.4 million from the UN Supervision Mission in Syria for initial operations in Syria. Also in 2012, Sweden contributed SEK7.26 million ($1.07 million)[2] to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) to provide three technical experts to support emergency operations planning and training with UNMAS.[3]

In June 2013, UNMAS had reduced its budget requirements for 2013 from $5 million to $800,000, largely because of restricted access in Syria, but still remained unfunded for the year as of June 2013.[4] Sweden provided MSB with $425,401 from January–June 2013.[5]

 



[1] Global Protection Cluster, “Syria Situation Update,” 20 February 2013; and UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “Syria,” August 2013.

[2] Sweden, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 March 2013. Average exchange rate for 2012: SEK6.7721=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[3] UNMAS, “UNMAS 2012 Annual Report,” p. 9; and “MSB operations as a result of the conflict in Syria,” MSB International Operations Magazine, June 2013, p. 11.

[5] Financial Tracking Service, “Humanitarian Aid for Syria Crisis,” 25 July 2013.