Tajikistan

Last Updated: 02 November 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures 

Existing law deemed sufficient but efforts underway to modify

Transparency reporting

7 March 2011

Policy

The Republic of Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. In late 2007, the Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TMAC) submitted three draft amendments to the national parliament aimed at harmonizing national laws with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty.[1] Tajikistan has not reported any progress since that time.  In the past, the government said that new legislation to implement the treaty domestically was unnecessary, as it relied on its criminal code to punish violations of the treaty.[2]  

Tajikistan submitted its ninth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, dated 7 March 2011, covering calendar year 2010.

Tajikistan attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011 where it gave an update on its mince clearance efforts.

Tajikistan has continued to promote the Mine Ban Treaty in its region, calling for a “Central Asia region free of mines,” and a “Mine Action Regional Coordination body in Central Asia.”[3] It also hosted the Dushanbe Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Central Asia on 7 and 8 July 2009, the third in a series of regional conferences.[4]

Tajikistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Tajikistan is also party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It has never submitted annual national reports as required by the protocols.

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and seizures

Tajikistan has reported that it never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[5] The most recent use of mines in Tajik territory occurred in 2000 and 2001, when Russian and Uzbek forces placed mines at various border locations inside Tajikistan.[6]

Between 5 May 2002 and 31 March 2004, Tajikistan destroyed its stockpile of 3,084 antipersonnel mines it inherited from the Soviet Union.[7] It retains no mines for training or development purposes, as it consumed the last of these in 2007.[8]

In 2009, Tajik authorities seized a total of 16 PMN-2 blast mines during “anti-criminal operations” and subsequently destroyed the mines.[9] In 2008, Tajikistan reported two instances where mines were “confiscated or detected…as a result of counter-terrorism activity.”[10]

Tajikistan reported in 2008 that a total of 49,152 PFM-1S remotely-delivered blast mines[11] and 100 “blocks” of POM remotely-delivered fragmentation mines[12] were transferred by Tajik border protection forces to Russian forces in Tajikistan sometime in 2006 for destruction after being discovered following the completion of its stockpile destruction program.[13] These stocks were destroyed in October 2006 by the order of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service.[14] 

Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party to the treaty. It reported that approximately 18,200 antipersonnel mines of various types are stockpiled with Russian Ministry of Defense units deployed in Tajikistan.[15] These stockpiles are not under the jurisdiction or control of Tajikistan.[16] In each of its Article 7 reports since 2003, Tajikistan has reported that intergovernmental talks are “currently underway” to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian mines.[17]

 



[1] Interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, TMAC, Dushanbe, 5 February 2008. The amendments are to the following laws: “On State Armaments Order,” “On Circulation of Explosive Materials for Civil Purposes,” and “On Arms.” The amendments resulted from a project started in 2006, in cooperation with the Tajik NGO Harmony of the World. The ICRC provided funding for the project, but did not review the recommendations. Email from Eve La Haye, Legal Adviser, Arms Unit, ICRC, 29 July 2008.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 14 March 2005. The 1996 Law on Weapons expressly regulates all issues related to the registration, shipment, transport, acquisition, transfer, and storage of armaments and munitions on the territory of Tajikistan. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 February 2003.

[3] Statement by Bakhtiyor Khudoyorov, Minister of Justice, Second Review Conference, Mine Ban Treaty, Cartagena, 3 December 2009.

[4] Five states from the region participated along with eight donor states and several international and national NGOs. The workshop also included a parallel program for victim assistance experts from Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 3 February 2003.

[6] Ibid, Form C.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 14 March 2005. The text in Forms A, D, and F cite a total of 3,029 mines destroyed, but the detailed listing in Form G adds up to 3,084. This includes: 1,591 POMZ-2; 633 PMN; 436 OZM-72; and 424 MON-100 mines.

[8] Tajikistan initially retained 255 antipersonnel mines, and had indicated it would use these until 2010 when their shelf life expired.  Tajikistan consumed 30 mines in 2005, 120 mines in 2006 and 105 mines in 2007. The mines were used for refresher training of survey and demining personnel. For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 662–663.

[9] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B2, 30 April 2010.

[10] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B2, 3 February 2008.

[11] TMAC has confirmed that this is the number of individual mines. It likely represents 768 canisters each containing 64 individual mines.

[12] According to the form “each block [of POM mines] has several clusters [canisters] and each cluster has several mines. We have not determined the number of clusters that each block includes. This means, that each block has several mines.” Typically, a KPOM-2 canister has four mines, but it is unclear how many canisters are in a block.

[13] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2008. Tajikistan used the optional form B2.

[14] Order #21/6/8-5609, dated 1 September 2006. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B2, 3 February 2008.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2003.

[16] Interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, then-Deputy Head of the Board of Constitutional Guarantees of Citizens Rights, Executive Board of the President, in Geneva, 5 February 2003. In another interview in Geneva on 13 May 2003, he stated that Tajik forces are under a separate command-and-control structure and would refuse orders by Russian forces to lay mines.

[17] See Form B of each Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report.


Last Updated: 23 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

The Republic of Tajikistan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In December 2013, government representatives informed the CMC that due to a change in leadership the decision-making process on the matter of Tajikistan’s accession to the convention had to start again.[1] Representatives confirmed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no objections to joining the treaty.

Tajikistan has said several times that it is studying its position on accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2] In its last public statement on the convention, in September 2012 Tajikistan informed States Parties that the government was still considering its position on joining.[3] In September 2011, a representative said that full consideration of the convention had been delayed by a number of internal and organizational issues involving different ministries.[4]

Tajikistan participated in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and endorsed both the Oslo Declaration (committing to the conclusion of an international instrument banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians) and the Wellington Declaration (committing to negotiate a convention banning cluster munitions based on the Wellington draft text). However, Tajikistan did not participate in the formal negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008, even as an observer, and did not attend the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008.[5]

Since 2008, Tajikistan has continued to engage in the Convention on Cluster Munitions despite not joining. Tajikistan has participated as an observer in every meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Tajikistan participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011 and 2012, but did not attend intersessional meetings in 2013 or April 2014.

Tajikistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Tajikistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Tajikistan has stated several times that it does not use, produce, transfer, or stockpile cluster munitions.[6]

Cluster munitions were used in Tajikistan during its civil war in the 1990s. ShOAB-0.5 and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley.[7] It is not known what forces used the weapons.

In May 2011, the Ministry of Defense said that Tajik forces had never used cluster munitions.[8] A representative of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Interior said that cluster munitions were used by Uzbek forces in the 1990s in Rasht Valley as well as Ramit Valley, but Tajik forces had no capacity to use the air-delivered cluster munitions.[9]

In 2011, the Ministry of Defense informed the CMC that a check of weapons stocks had not found any stockpiled cluster munitions and an official letter confirming no stockpiles of cluster munitions was sent to the Office of the President.[10]

 



[1] Meeting with the Tajikistan delegation to the Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 2013. Notes by the CMC.

[2] Statement of Tajikistan, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 8 June 2010; and statement of Tajikistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011. In May 2011, a CMC delegation visited Tajikistan and met with a range of government officials from the Office of the President, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, and the Ministry of Interior. ICBL-CMC, Report on Advocacy Mission to Tajikistan: 23–27 May 2011.

[3] Statement of Tajikistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012.

[4] Interview with the delegation of Tajikistan to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011. Notes by the CMC.

[5] For details on Tajikistan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 244–245.

[6] Statement of Tajikistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012; statement of Tajikistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012; statement of Tajikistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 13 September 2011; statement of Tajikistan, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 8 June 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence/Human Rights Watch; and Letter No. 10-3 (5027) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, 22 April 2008.

[7] Tajikistan Mine Action Center, “Cluster munitions in Gharm,” undated, but reporting on an April 2007 assessment.

[8] CMC meeting with Gen. Maj. Abdukakhor Sattorov, Ministry of Defense, Dushanbe, 25 May 2011.

[9] CMC meeting with Col. Mahmad Shoev Khurshed Izatullovich, Commander of Special Militia AMON (SWAT) antiterrorist unit, Ministry of Interior, Dushanbe, 26 May 2011.

[10] CMC meeting with Gen. Maj. Sattorov, Ministry of Defense, Dushanbe, 25 May 2011.


Last Updated: 24 August 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: AVERAGE[1]

Performance Indicator

Score

Problem understood

6

Target date for completion of clearance

4

Targeted clearance

6

Efficient clearance

5

National funding of program

4

Timely clearance

4

Land release system

7

National mine action standards

6

Reporting on progress

5

Improving performance

3

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE

5.0

Mine contamination in the Republic of Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were mined by Russian and Uzbek forces in 1991–1998 while the central region of the country was contaminated as a result of the 1992–1997 internal conflict. A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated the area of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination at 50km2.[2]

As of January 2013, the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) had reduced total suspect hazardous area (SHA) to 7.2km2 through non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), and clearance, of which 4.9km2 of SHAs were along Tajikistan’s Afghan border and almost 2.3km2 were in the central region.[3] In September 2013, however, TMAC unexpectedly revised its estimate of remaining contamination to almost 11.7km2 of contaminated land: 9.3km2 of mined area and almost 2.4km2 of battle area.[4] The basis for this new estimate was unclear.

In March 2014, TMAC reiterated its estimate of contaminated area of 11.7km2, but claimed that 8.9km2 contained mines while 2.8km2 contained ERW. No cluster munition-contaminated area is now reported by TMAC.[5] The estimates did not, however, include area covered by 110 minefield records that were made public for the first time by TMAC in September 2013.[6] According to TMAC, survey of the areas covered by these records would take place in 2014.[7] The 110 records concern areas where security constraints have prevented survey activities in the past.[8]

In 1992–2012, TMAC recorded 846 mine/ERW casualties (368 killed, 478 injured). Of that total, almost 30% were children (101 killed and another 142 injured) and 88 were women.[9]

Mine Action Program

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) is Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government’s socio-economic development policies.[10]

In June 2003, the government of Tajikistan and UNDP established the TMAC with the intention that it would become a nationally-owned program in the near future.[11] TMAC was made responsible for coordination and monitoring of all mine action activities.[12] Since then, TMAC has acted as the executive body of the CIIHL to which it reports.[13]

Tajikistan’s mine action program is not yet fully nationally-owned.[14] TMAC has no legal status and does not report directly to a government ministry. Lack of legal recognition has presented problems for TMAC.[15] For example, without legal status, TMAC cannot open a bank account to receive and disburse funds.[16] The importance of clarifying TMAC’s status was also highlighted in the 2012 evaluation of UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan.[17] The Ministry of Justice is leading the government effort in nationalizing TMAC, and a commission has been established to study the issue and make recommendations on the structure of the center. A decision was expected sometime in 2014.[18]

The Ministry of Defense plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption by the Ministry of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–2016) in July 2013, the ministry focuses on three main objectives: to further support humanitarian demining; enhance national capacities; and create the conditions for a sound national mine action program.[19]

Following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009, the ministry established a Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU). Since 2010, the OSCE has supported the HDU via the Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST). The UST was contracted by the OSCE in order to provide project management and administrative support to the HDU in 2010–13.[20]

FSD and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. FSD started its operations in 2003. Since then, it has conducted surveys (in 2004–2005 and 2007–2009) and clearance; provided technical assistance to TMAC; and, by November 2012, supported the development of UST’s capacity.[21] NPA started operations in Tajikistan after signing an MOU with the government in 2010. NPA’s arrival significantly increased the demining capacity of Tajikistan’s mine action program and made a positive impact on clearance output.[22]

The OSCE Office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: supporting national capacity building in humanitarian demining and fostering regional cooperation in borders management and security issues.[23] Its work focused on supporting the government in cooperation with neighboring states and fostering dialogue through a regional mine action cooperation project in Central Asia.[24]

Strategic planning

In May 2011, the national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) for 2010–2015 was approved by the government.[25] Among the plan’s specific objectives, TMAC was to ensure that all priority areas—7.5 km² of SHAs—are cleared by the end of 2015; that survey activities could initiate along the Tajik-Uzbek border; and that a plan for nationalization of TMAC is established.[26] According to the NMASP, TMAC was to be fully nationalized by the end of 2011. As of April 2014, however, TMAC was still not established as a national entity, remaining a nationally-executed UNDP project.[27]

During the Mid-Term Review workshop (MTR) on the NMASP in Dushanbe in June 2013, nationalization of Tajikistan’s mine action center was discussed at length. As a consequence of the review, a revised national strategic plan was expected, with a clear and definite plan for TMAC’s nationalization.[28] As of April 2014, however, a revised national strategy was still awaited.

In collaboration with the EU and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), TMAC organized an Article 5 completion workshop in Dushanbe in September 2013. The aim was to clarify the extent of remaining contamination, and to agree on a work plan to achieve Tajikistan’s Article 5 clearance deadline in 2020. TMAC committed to revise its completion work plan (2014–20).[29]As of April 2014, the plan was still under development.[30]

According to the GICHD, there is little commitment from the government to assume ownership of the mine action program.[31] Unless UNDP acts effectively, the GICHD sees a real risk of no real progress in the nationalization process in the near future.[32]

Land Release

Survey in 2013

No areas were cancelled by NTS in 2013.[33] Following an operational efficiency assessment in June 2013, the GICHD recommended NTS in the districts bordering Uzbekistan. Survey activities were conducted by FSD to confirm if SHAs were on Uzbek territory.[34] Survey was completed at the end of 2013. FSD, jointly with TMAC, concluded that no contaminated areas were located in Tajikistan.[35]

Clearance in 2013

In 2013, FSD, NPA, and the Ministry of Defense’s HDU released 47 contaminated areas covering 2.97km2 of land. During clearance operations, 22,486 antipersonnel mines, 3 antivehicle mines, and 872 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed. Of the 2.97km2 of land released, 2.01km2 were released by clearance and 0.94km2 by TS. No battle area clearance (BAC) was conducted in 2013.[36]

Release of mined area in 2013

Operator

Areas released

Area canceled by NTS (km2)

Area released by TS (km2)

Area cleared (km2)

Total area released (km2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

FSD

33

0

0.70

1.32

2.00

4,882

3

NPA

11

0.066

0.22

0.41

0.70

10,994

0

UST/MoD

3

0

0.02

0.26

0.27

6,610

0

Total

47

0.066 

0.94

1.99

2.97

22,486

3

Note: MoD = Ministry of Defense

TMAC had planned to release 2km2 of contaminated land in 2013. It expected to release another 2km2 of contaminated land in 2014.[37] In 2014, demining activities were planned to be concentrated in the central region.[38]

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 6.75km2 of mined area.

Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km2)

Year

Area cleared

2013

2.01

2012

1.10

2011

1.60

2010

1.88

2009

0.16

Total

6.75

Capacity

As of April 2014, three demining operators in Tajikistan comprised capacity of one survey team, thirteen manual demining teams, five mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and three mechanical demining machines.[39]

From 2012 to 2014, FSD capacity decreased from seven to two manual demining teams. Due to lack of funding, it was expected that FSD would close its program in Tajikistan by the end of 2014 after handing over its capacity to a local NGO.[40] In the same period, NPA capacity increased from six to eight manual demining teams. In addition, in April 2014 NPA deployed an additional demining team consisting entirely of women.[41] Due to the type of contamination in Tajikistan, the NPA’s MDD team (10 dogs) was cancelled.[42]

In 2013, the OSCE financed the operational costs of the HDU’s Mini MineWolf, which was procured and delivered by the United States (US) Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing program in 2012.[43] Between 2012 and 2013, the HDU increased its demining capacity by adding a manual demining team, which has been financed by the US’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and by Luxembourg via the OSCE Office in Tajikistan.[44]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020.

In granting the request, the States Parties noted that, while no demining had taken place until more than four years after entry into force, since that time significant progress has been made, particularly by release of land through resurvey. The States Parties further noted that use of mechanical demining assets might enable Tajikistan to “find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested.” The Analysing Group mandated to analyze extension requests under Article 5 of the treaty had also noted shortcomings in Tajikistan’s original estimate of the size and locations of mined areas and recognition by Tajikistan of the need for resurvey.

More recently, the extent to which Tajikistan is making best efforts to complete its Article 5 obligations is unclear, in particular given the significant increase in suspected mined area in 2013.

Support for Mine Action

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2010–15 was estimated at US$30 million.[45] In 2012, international contributions came from five states, UNDP, and the OSCE for a total of US$6.6 million. Germany, Norway, and the US provided two-thirds of the funding while NPA and FSD were the main recipients of support.[46] In 2012, Tajikistan reported contributing US$700,000 toward its mine action program.[47]

In 2012, the US Department of State PM/WRA provided US$1.7 million to Tajikistan for mine action and conventional weapons destruction activities. These funds were channeled through international organizations, namely, FSD, NPA, and the OSCE.[48] In addition, through the US Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense received the Mini MineWolf, currently operated by the HDU.[49]

 In 2013, the mine action sector in Tajikistan received almost US$3 million less than the previous year. Total international funding decreased from US$7.3 million in 2012 to US$4.5 million in 2013. The government of Tajikistan provided to its national mine action program only technical contribution but not financial support.[50] Germany and Norway were the major donors in 2013, contributing more than half of the total funding between them. As in 2012, NPA, FSD, and TMAC were the main recipients of funds.[51] Additionally, in 2013 the OSCE office in Tajikistan channeled funds for US$681,010 directed to mine action, capacity building, regional cooperation, and borders management.[52]

In 2014, TMAC was expecting to receive less funding. As of March 2014, committed funding was about US$3.4 million. Germany was providing FSD with €300,000 for handover of capacity to a local NGO.[53] But donors had not committed to support Tajikistan’s MDD and mechanical demining teams. TMAC feared lack of funds would affect land release in 2014 and that its target of releasing 2km² might not be achieved.[54]

In 2014, NPA was expecting to receive less funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of State PM/WRA.[55]

The OSCE in Tajikistan was expecting to receive more funding for 2014.[56] Funding allocated by the OSCE Unified Budget for 2014 was estimated at US$360,000, while extra funds are planned via the OSCE extra-budgetary projects estimated at about US$560,000.[57]

Recommendations

·         Tajikistan should survey the new 110 minefield records as soon as possible so as to clarify the actual extent of mine/ERW contamination.

·         It should then revise its Article 5 completion work plan and its mine action strategic plan for the period 2014–20 with precise and clear milestones.

·         In order to improve operational efficiency and strategic planning, TMAC and the Tajik government must enhance their commitment to assume full ownership of the national mine action program.

 



[1] See “Mine Action Program Performance” for more information on performance indicators.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdulmain Karimov, Information Officer, TMAC, 11 June 2013.

[4] Presentation by TMAC at the European Union/Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (EU/GICHD) Workshop, “Humanitarian Demining in Tajikistan: Towards Completion,” Dushanbe, 17–18 September 2013.

[5] Email from Parviz Mavlonkulov, Operations Manager, TMAC, 6 March 2014; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimov, Director, TMAC, 19 March 2014.

[6] Presentation by TMAC at the EU/ GICHD Workshop, “Humanitarian Demining in Tajikistan: Towards Completion,” Dushanbe, 17–18 September 2013.

[7] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.

[8] Statement of Tajikistan, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 2013, p. 6; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, Victim Assistance Advisor, TMAC, 1 May 2013.

[12] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 1; and TMAC, “About TMAC,” 2012, accessed 10 March 2014.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdulmain Karimov, TMAC, 11 June 2013.

[17] Ibid., pp. 27–29.

[18] Presentation by TMAC at the EU/GICHD Workshop, “Humanitarian Demining in Tajikistan: Towards Completion,” Dushanbe, 17–18 September 2013.

[19] Tajikistan Ministry of Defense, “Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining 2013–2016,” Dushanbe, 17 July 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, Mine Action Office, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[20] Email from and telephone interview with Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 18 March 2014; and response to Monitor questionnaire, 8 April 2014.

[21] GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” Geneva, October 2013, p. 3; and FSD, “The First MoU signed between the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action and the Union of Sappers in Tajikistan,” November 2012.

[22] GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” Geneva, October 2013, p. 4.

[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[24] Ibid.

[25] GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” p. 4.

[26] Republic of Tajikistan, “Tajikistan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010-2015,” Dushanbe, September 2010, p. 8; and GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” p. 4.

[27] GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” Geneva, October 2013, p. 16.

[28] Ibid., p. 18.

[29] Ibid., p. 6.

[30] Ibid., p. 7.

[31] Ibid., pp. 18–19.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

[34] GICHD, “Strategic Planning in Mine Action Programmes: Tajikistan,” p. 2.

[35] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.

[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

[37] Statement of Tajikistan, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 2013.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid. FSD will remain in Tajikistan with a small advisory capacity to assist the local NGO.

[41] Email from Resad Junuzagic, Country Director, NPA, 18 March 2014.

[42] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 17 March 2014.

[43] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[44] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014; and Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[45] “Tajikistan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010-2015,” Dushanbe, September 2010, p. 8.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington DC, August 2013; and email from Luka Buhin, OSCE, 29 May 2013.

[47] Email from Ahad Mahmoudov, Program Officer, TMAC, 24 June 2013.

[48] US Department of State, “To walk the Earth in Safety,” Washington DC, August 2013, pp. 26–27.

50 Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE, 8 April 2014. Average exchange rate for 2013: €1=US$1.3281. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2014.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

[55] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 17 March 2014.

[56] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE, 8 April 2014.

[57] Ibid.


Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary Findings

·         A national victim survey by the ICRC, used as a basis for micro-grant initiatives, improved the economic inclusion of survivors

·         The program for victim assistance run by the Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TMAC) became a Disability Support Unit, recognizing a broadening of its mandate and reinforcing the understanding that victim assistance is inclusive of other persons with disabilities

·         Due to a staffing shortage, the quality of physical rehabilitation services required improvements through training and restructuring

·         Harnessing sustainable financial resources for victim assistance was the major constraint to full implementation of annual planning

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Tajikistan is responsible for a significant number of survivors of landmines, cluster munitions, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Tajikistan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2012

846 mine/ERW casualties (368 killed; 478 injured)

Casualties in 2012

12 (2011: 6)

2012 casualties by outcome

4 killed; 8 injured (2011: 2 killed; 4 injured)

2012 casualties by device type

7 ERW; 5 antipersonnel mines

TMAC recorded 12 mine/ERW casualties for 2012. Seven casualties were civilian; most civilian casualties (five) were children (four boys and one girl); there was also one woman and one man injured. There were three casualties among deminers (all were injured), and two military border guards were killed.[1]

TMAC reported six casualties for 2011; including three casualties among deminers.[2]

TMAC registered 846 mine/ERW casualties (368 killed; 478 injured) for the period from 1992 to the end of 2012. Of the total known casualties, almost 30% were children (101 children were killed and another 142 injured) and 88 were women.[3]

Cluster munition casualties

At least 164 casualties from unexploded submunitions were reported in Tajikistan through 2007. Most incidents occurred in the Rasht valley area. The exact timeline of incidents is not known.[4] No casualties from cluster munition remnants have been reported in Tajikistan since 2007.

Victim Assistance

Tajikistan is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW. Tajikistan has made a commitment to ensure victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty. The total number of known mine/ERW survivors in Tajikistan is 478.[5]

Victim assistance since 1999[6]

Since the beginning of Monitor reporting, victim assistance improved in Tajikistan with its inclusion in the national mine action strategy in 2004, the recruitment of the Victim Assistance Officer in 2006, and the subsequent development and implementation of a national victim assistance program through the coordination of the national mine action center. From the beginning of Monitor reporting in 1999 until 2004, there were no dedicated programs assisting mine/ERW survivors in Tajikistan.

A TMAC needs assessment in 2008 identified the needs of the large majority of survivors. The national Victim Assistance Program was adjusted based on these needs.

Improvements in medical care have been reported since 2004 when medication and supply shortages were chronic and most facilities were said to be in poor condition. Particularly in mine/ERW-affected areas, infrastructure remained poor due to under-funding and the mountainous terrain severely hampered access to existing services in the capital.

Between 2005 and 2009, the government gradually took on more responsibility for the State Enterprise Orthopedic Plant (SEOP);[7] it was handed over to full government management by the beginning of 2009. Adequate psychological support was mostly unavailable for survivors through the existing system. In response, the Victim Assistance Program held regular camps to begin to address those needs. Increasingly, economic reintegration projects were carried out and accomplished based on the needs identified in the survivor assessment survey, but the activities were not able to be implemented to the extent planned for most of the period due to funding constraints. The need for sustained funding was highlighted as a key challenge to ensuring that the victim assistance capacity which had been developed continued to benefit survivors.

New disability legislation that was developed to be in line with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was adopted at the end of 2010.

Victim assistance in 2012

From January 2013 the Tajik Victim Assistance Program was “rebranded” as the Disability Support Unit (DSU) to reinforce the understanding that efforts to assist landmine/ERW survivors are part of broader disability and development frameworks.

The quality of prosthetics services decreased due to the continuing departure of trained staff; and the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) assisted with planned improvements to the rehabilitation structure.

Assessing victim assistance needs

TMAC maintained a database on mine/ERW casualties in Tajikistan. In 2012, TMAC, in cooperation with the ICRC, started a needs assessment survey which included the collection of new data and clarifying previously stored data. ICRC continued data collection in 2013, having surveyed 140 survivors and family members by May.[8]

Victim assistance coordination[9]

Government coordinating body/focal point

TMAC

Coordinating mechanism

Victim Assistance Coordination Group

Plan

Annual victim assistance work plan, linked to the five-year Mine Action Strategy 2010–2015

At a workshop in September 2012, members of TMAC’s Inter-ministerial Technical Working Group recommended that TMAC’s program for victim assistance broaden its focus in the period 2013–2015 to be more inclusive of all persons with disabilities. To reflect this change and to reinforce the understanding that efforts to assist mine/ERW survivors should be part of broader disability and development frameworks, from January 2013 the Victim Assistance Program was transformed into the DSU. The DSU operates as a Nationally-Executed UNDP Project.[10]

TMAC, through its Victim Assistance Program, worked in close collaboration with partners to implement the victim assistance plan and to mobilize donor support. TMAC was involved in the monitoring of the annual victim assistance work plan together with Technical Working Group members; the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population (MLSPP); Ministry of Health; State Enterprise Orthopedic Plant; National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Disabled People; National Union and Society of Disabled People (NUDP); ICRC; Tajikistan Red Crescent Society (TjRCS); Handicap International (HI); Tajikistan Centre to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munitions (TCBL&CM); and mine/ERW survivors’ networks. One of the main obstacles to the implementation of the annual plan was limited funding and resources.[11]

Responsibility for the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities was shared by the Commission on Fulfillment of International Human Rights, the NUDP, and local and regional governmental structures.[12]

Tajikistan’s Victim Assistance Program, guided by the Cartagena Action Plan, aimed to ensure that all mine survivors have equal access to adequate gender- and age-appropriate victim assistance services as well as legal assistance. In this regard, the Tajikistan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010–2015 includes an objective for implementing victim assistance, ensuring the rights of survivors, and advocating for Tajikistan to join the CRPD.[13]

On 31 December 2011, the Coordination Council for Social of Persons with Disabilities (DCC) was formally established with the purpose of coordination of the work of the ministries, government establishments, and civil society organizations for implementation of government policy on the social protection of people with disabilities. The TMAC director is a member of DCC and represented the interests of victim assistance. The DCC is mandated to meet on a quarterly basis. Three meetings were held in 2012 starting in July, and meetings continued into 2013.[14]

Tajikistan provided detailed, updated information on all aspects of victim assistance in reporting at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties and the 2013 intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.[15] Tajikistan also reported on victim assistance in its Article 7 reporting for calendar year 2012.[16]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors were involved in the provision of victim assistance services by the government in 2012, including through the SEOP, where the majority of employees are persons with disabilities. Survivors and their representative organizations contributed to the preparation of government transparency reports and/or statements to be presented at international meetings and shared input for data collection and presentations. A landmine survivor, the assistant to the Victim Assistance Officer of TMAC, participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2012 and in the international technical working group on psychosocial rehabilitation for persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2012.[17]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[18]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2012

TMAC

Governmental/UNDP

Coordination, economic inclusion projects; advocacy; and psychosocial support—including summer rehabilitation camps; awareness-raising; resource mobilization

Ongoing

National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Disabled People (NRIRDP)

Governmental

Rehabilitation assistance for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors

Ongoing

SEOP

Governmental

Physical rehabilitation services; free transportation, accommodation, and meals and repairs at satellite workshops in Khorugh, Khujand, and Kulob

Increased the number of prosthesis produced

National University

Governmental

Psychological support and social inclusion

Ongoing

NUDP

National NGO

Economic reintegration; social inclusion; advocacy

Ongoing

TCBL&CM

National NGO

Advocacy; economic inclusion; awareness-raising and peer support

Increased training and work placement services and peer support activities; expanded program to Rasht

TjRCS

National NGO linked to international organization

Economic reintegration projects and first-aid training

Ongoing

Takdir

National NGO

Survivor run: awareness-raising on rights of persons with disabilities; provision of support to mine survivors; based in Dushanbe

Ongoing

Union of survivors of Mines and other Explosives

National NGO

Legal, psychological support; awareness-raising through mass media including campaign on mines problem. Administrative support to survivors to apply for disability pensions; based in Sugd region with regional coverage

Ongoing

ICRC/ICRC SFD

International Organization

Economic inclusion through a Micro Economic Initiatives (MEI) program; support to the SEOP

Ongoing

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

The number of prosthesis produced at the SEOP increased in 2012.[19] However, the quality of services at the center was affected by staffing issues. There had been a gradual deterioration of the quality of services at the SEOP caused by a low level of expertise following the departure of all the formally trained technicians and weak managerial capacity. Of the eight trained technicians initially employed at the SEOP, six had left the center by 2008 and the other two by the beginning of 2012. Although the SEOP had introduced better salaries, staff mostly left for financial reasons. In order to address the loss of expertise, the SFD sponsored two prosthetic and orthotic technicians to attend an upgrade course, provided further on-the-job training, and offered recommendations on physiotherapy and logistics management. Three technicians sponsored for International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO) category II training in Vietnam were on the second year syllabus in 2012.[20]

A project review in April 2012 resulted in an SFD decision to post a full-time expatriate to help SEOP reorganize and decentralize its work and to increase the quality of its services. Following the project review, and discussions with SEOP staff and MLSP leadership, the SFD developed a three-year action plan and strategy to address weaknesses in rehabilitation services. The strategy is designed to restore quality standards of SEOP services. It also includes a plan for decentralizing services and equipping the satellite rehabilitation center in Khujand, the second largest city in Tajikistan.[21]

The MLSPP, with support from the European Commission Budgetary Support Programme, covered costs of the SEOP and paid the expenses for transport and accommodation of patients attending the center from remote areas. However, for many people, especially for patients from remote regions in need of regular follow-up visits and renewal of devices, access to treatment remained difficult owing to the centralized provision of services. As in previous years, the SEOP had a long waiting list for prostheses.[22]

Economic and social reintegration

A lack of appropriate economic inclusion opportunities, psychological support, including peer-to-peer support was identified as a significant challenge for 2012.[23] During 2012, approximately three-quarters of mine/ERW survivors and their family members received various socioeconomic support, via mainstreaming of victim assistance programming into the socioeconomic activities of other organizations, agencies, and governmental programs. More than 644 mine survivors and family members received social and economic assistance or had improved access to microfinance.[24]

The ICRC provided micro-grants for economic inclusion activities through its MEI program, to families identified through the mine/ERW survivor survey.[25]

With the support of the ICBL-CMC Survivor Network Project, TCBL&CM provided employment training activities for survivors and family members. Most graduated students found gainful employment following the course.[26]

Psychological assistance

In 2013, TCBL&CM organized peer-to-peer support training for survivors in Rasht, Kurgan-Tube, and Khujand to become peer supporters, funded by UNDP. In 2013, TMAC, in cooperation with TCBL&CM, continued peer support project activities. Several international NGOs were implementing pilot small-scale community-based rehabilitation (CBR) projects. Landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities also participated in the annual Rehabilitation Camp, which included participants from Afghanistan in 2012. TMAC, in cooperation with the Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO), conducted a pilot peer-to-peer support project during the camp.[27]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD), in partnership with TMAC, implemented a victim assistance project with psychosocial training for medical staff. The NGO Psychosocial Support Center was recruited to develop the modules and conduct trainings for doctors and nurses from surgery, trauma, and anesthesia departments of mine affected districts.[28]

Regional cooperation and exchanges between Afghanistan and Tajikistan to build capacity in psychological and peer support continued in 2012.[29]

Laws and policies

Tajikistan’s 2010–2012 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper contains provisions for improvements in areas relevant to mine survivors and other persons with disabilities, including the quality of healthcare services, the pension system, the quality of prosthetic and orthopedic devices, access to social institutions, training of prosthetic/orthotic technicians, and access to vocational training for vulnerable groups.[30]

In 2012, changes to the legal framework relevant to protecting and promoting the rights of survivors were included in newly approved policies on pensions and social welfare.[31] The December 2010 Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities, which includes standards similar to those of the CRPD,[32] guarantees the physical accessibility of infrastructure for social life and to public transportation. Any planning, construction, or reconstruction that does not follow the law is prohibited and penalties can be applied.[33]

In September 2012, TMAC, through the FSD, began implementing a year-long pilot project to introduce physical accessibility solutions and tools in two sites in Dushanbe: a children’s health center and the Dushanbe central mosque. Also in 2012, the building of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population was made accessible to persons with disabilities, as were the national library and some new buildings. Over the past three years, there have been small-scale projects to improve accessibility in some rural areas, mostly led by international organizations.[34]

Advocacy activities for the CRPD intensified in 2012, including training on advocacy strategies, rights of persons with disabilities in the framework of national disability legislation, and international conventions and several advocacy round-table meetings.[35]

Tajikistan had not signed the CRPD as of 1 June 2013.

In April 2013, a recommendation for Tajikistan to ratify CRPD was included in the government’s National Plan of the Republic of Tajikistan to implement the recommendations of the UN member states to the universal periodic review of the Republic of Tajikistan on Human Rights for 2013–2015.[36]

 



[1] Emails from Reykhan Muminova, Disability Support Unit Officer, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013 and 17 July 2013.

[2] Data provided by Reykhan Muminova, (then) Victim Assistance Officer, TMAC, in Geneva, 22 May 2012. By mid 2012, TMAC had reported seven casualties for 2012: four injured and three killed (including two children). Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 22 June 2011.

[3] Statement of Tajikistan, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011; email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 29 March 2011; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[4] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 90; and email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 30 October 2012.

[5] Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 29 March 2011; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[6] See previous country reports and country profiles at the Monitor, www.the-monitor.org; and HI, Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance, (Brussels, HI, September 2009), p. 193.

[7] The SEOP was previously called the National Orthopedic Center (NOC).

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013. See also, UNDP, “Tajikistan Annual Work Plan for 12,” January 2012, p. 4, www.undp.tj/files/project_library/AWP_2012-00073922.pdf.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[12] United States (US) Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tajikistan,” Washington, DC, 17 April 2013.

[13] UNDP, “International Consultant on situational assessment of disability issues and development of PwD agenda for UNDP Tajikistan” (Individual Consultant Procurement Notice), 23 April 2012; and presentation by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, HI Central Asia Regional Victim Assistance Workshop, Dushanbe, 24 May 2011.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[15] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012; and statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2012), Form J.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[18] Ibid.; statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012; statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2013; and ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, 2013, pp. 31–32.

[19] From 340 prostheses for 306 persons in 2011 to 381 prostheses for 320 persons in 2012. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[20] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, 2013, p. 31–32.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 24 May 2012.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[25] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[29] Ibid.; statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012.

[30] UN Tajikistan, “Tajikistan PRS 2010–2012,” www.untj.org.

[31] The decree “On the procedure and amount of the provision of social services to the population” was passed in December 2012. Also adopted during the year were the “Welfare of population Improvement Strategy,” “The Law on Compulsory Social Insurance,” and “The Law on Insurance Pensions.” Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[32] Tajikistan, “Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities” (in Tajik); and telephone interview with Esanboy Vohidov, Head, NUDP, 25 March 2011.

[33] Tajikistan, “Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities,” Article 25.

[34] Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 29 May 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 1 May 2013.

[35] Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 30 October 2012.

[36] Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 29 May 2013.


Last Updated: 16 December 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, international mine action contributions from five governments, UNDP, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the Republic of Tajikistan totaled US$6.6 million. Germany, Norway, and the United States (US) provided two-thirds of the funding. Norwegian People’s Aid and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action were the main recipients of the support.[1]

In 2012, Tajikistan reported it contributed $700,000 toward its own mine action program.[2]

International government contributions: 2012[3]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount ($)

US

Clearance

$1,691,000

1,691,000

Norway

Clearance, victim assistance

NOK9,572,152

1,645,237

Germany

Clearance

€831,866

1,069,696

UNDP

Clearance

$982,893

982,893

Canada

Clearance

C$567,686

567,970

OSCE

Clearance

€343,000

441,064

Japan

Clearance

¥19,010,969

238,173

Total

 

 

6,636,033

 

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[4]

Year

National

International

Total

2012

700,000

6,636,033

7,336,033

2011

1,000,000

5,448,508

6,448,508

2010

700,000

6,476,545

7,176,545

2009

650,582

3,483,331

4,133,913

2008

574,000

1,863,366

2,437,366

Total

3,624,582

23,907,783

27,532,365

 

 



[1] Germany, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Amended Protocol II, Form B, 22 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; Japan, CCW, Amended Protocol II, 28 March 2013; Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington DC, August 2013, email from Luka Buhin, Mine Action Officer, OSCE, Dushanbe, 29 May 2013.

[2]Email from Ahad Mahmoudov, UNDP TMAC Programme Officer, 24 June 2013.

[3]Average exchange rate for 2012: €1=US$1.2859; ¥79.82=US$1; NOK5.8181=US$1; C$0.9995=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.