Ukraine

Last Updated: 30 November 2014

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures

None reported

Transparency reporting

1 April 2014

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

Ukraine has not enacted national legislation, including penal sanctions, to enforce the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty domestically as required in Article 9. It has reported existing regulations under national implementation measures as well as a 2012 law to ratify an agreement with a NATO agency to destroy stockpiles.[1]

Ukraine submitted its eighth Article 7 transparency report on 1 April 2014, for the period 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2014.

Since the Second Review Conference in 2009, Ukraine has attended almost all treaty meetings, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013, where it gave an update on its stockpile destruction efforts.[2] It made statements on compliance and stockpile destruction at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in April 2014.[3] Ukraine did not attend the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014.

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). It submitted a national annual report for Amended Protocol II, but has not submitted a national annual report for Protocol V.

Production and transfer

Ukraine has declared that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[4] It has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence.[5] Ukraine is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Its 1999 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, formally in place through 2003, in practice stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

Landmines appear to be a part of the conflict between government forces and Russian-backed separatists that erupted in early 2014 initially in Crimea, then in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. There is significant evidence present at different locations that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s are available to combatants and unconfirmed reports of emplaced antipersonnel mines being found in the field. Ukraine has accused Russian forces of laying antivehicle and antipersonnel mines on Ukrainian territory. However, it is not possible as of October 2014 to determine the use by any party of antipersonnel mines, or other devices prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty such as victim-activated booby-traps.

There have been numerous media reports of MON-series directional fragmentation mines and OZM-72 mines being seized from or recovered by separatists in Donetsk province. These multi-purpose antipersonnel munitions can be emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode, they are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

It appears that pressure-activated antivehicle mines were used at several locations in eastern Ukraine in July–August 2014.

It also appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea were actually either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip flares.[6]

In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Ukraine stated that its MON-series and OZM-72 mines could be used in command-detonated mode in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, but declared the stockpiled mines as excessive and not suitable for use, indicating that they would be destroyed.[7] The Article 7 report provided in 2009—the most recent year of reporting on the stocks—lists 296,288 OZM-72 mines and 57,935 MON-series mines in the stockpile.[8]

Crimea

On 8 March 2014, a photographer for the Russian investigative publication “Novaya Gazeta,” Evgeny Feldman, visited a checkpoint that Russian military forces established near the town of Chongar, a few kilometers north of the Crimean peninsula in Kherson province in Ukraine. Feldman photographed an apparent minefield near a Russian military encampment laid near a road leading into the Crimean peninsula and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a field and “Danger Mines” warning signs.[9]

A freelance photojournalist, George Henton, shared a series of photos with Human Rights Watch (HRW) that he took of the area near Chongar that was marked with “Danger Mines” signs next to holes dug apparently for fence posts to demarcate the new border.[10] The photos show at least five men holding Ukrainian flags in an area marked as mined. The photos show a stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated flare in the ground, also called a “signal mine” in Russian. Another photo shows one of the men handling a trip-flare or signal mine.[11] None of the men who entered the area marked as mined were injured by antipersonnel mines and none saw any mines—antivehicle or antipersonnel—in the field.

On 1 April at a meeting of the CCW in Geneva, Ukraine made a statement that alleged Russian use of TM-62 antivehicle mines and unidentified antipersonnel mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea. It said the mine-laying was witnessed by Ukraine Ministry of Defense officials and by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) military observers. The Ukraine statement included a quote from a resident of Kherson province, stating that “fields on the border with the Crimea [are] mined. Some farmers say that there are flares, others that there are real mines. But out on the field all [are] afraid. My friend refused to sow wheat. This year it will stand [as an] empty field…” In a subsequent meeting with the ICBL, Ukraine said they could not provide any more information about the landmines it believes were laid in Kherson province. A 31 March letter received by an ICBL member from a Ukrainian diplomatic representative stated that the minefield in Kherson province contains antivehicle mines and that antipersonnel mines “cannot be excluded.”[12]

At the CCW meeting in Geneva on 1 April, Russia denied Ukraine’s statement that Russian Armed Forces had laid landmines in Kherson province and said “the Self Defense forces of Crimea, before the referendum, placed the minefields with relevant markings, around Chongar.” Russia said “they placed only signal mines and put proper signage around the fields.” In a meeting with the ICBL, the Russian delegation said that the Ukraine “selfdefense forces” used “signal” mines and not “combat” mines. They indicated “combat” mines—presumably antipersonnel and antivehicle—were not used as it was considered unnecessary and because the Chongar area in Kherson province is “densely populated” and “friendly” towards Russia. The delegation said that the signal mines are “not military means and are not prohibited.” The delegation said the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense had not ordered clearance of the area indicated that are no real minefields in place. The delegation said it did not know what would be done with the fences, signs, holes, and signal mines, stating it will depend on how the situation develops.[13]

At the CCW meeting on 1 April, several states expressed concern at the reported landmine use in Ukraine. Canada said it was “deeply concerned by what we regard as credible reports of use of mines by Russia on Ukrainian territory, especially antipersonnel mines” and called on Russia to remove any landmines emplaced in Crimea. The United States said it was aware of reports of emplacement of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in Crimea and called on Russia to abide by the CCW’s Amended Protocol II on landmines. Norway also expressed concern at the placement of mines in Crimea, in particular antipersonnel mines, and called on those responsible to clarify on the steps taken in compliance with the CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[14]

Donetsk and Luhansk provinces

On 11 October 2014 on the grounds of the primary school in the city of Ilovaisk in Donetsk province, HRW researchers encountered four fuzeless OZM-72 mine bodies that had been ejected from a vehicle attacked while parked on school grounds weeks earlier, in late August. Separatist authorities clearing unexploded and abandoned ordnance from former battle areas removed the four mine bodies and indicated they would be added to their stockpiles. The separatists showed the researchers another undamaged fuzeless OZM-72 mine already in their possession in their vehicle.

Other reported but unconfirmed incidents of the seizure of landmines or claims of attacks involving landmines include:

·         In late August 2014, there was a media report that Ukrainian forces were reinforcing the city of Mariupol (Donetsk province) against possible attack, with engineer units actively laying mines to prevent entry into the city.[15]

·         In a 6 August 2014 media report, separatist representatives claimed that their forces had ambushed a large armored convoy in a minefield near the villages of Latysheve and Rozsypne southeast of Snizhne (Luhansk province), destroying several vehicles.[16]

·         Photos and information released on 9 July 2014 by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense shows two truckloads of weapons including TM-62 antivehicle mines as well as MON-50 and MON-90 mines that it said were seized from the former headquarters of pro-Russian separatists in Sloviansk, Donetsk province. [17]

·         On 7 July 2014, Dmytro Tymchuk, the head of the Centre for Military-Political Studies and coordinator of the “Information Resistance” blog, reported that a tractor drove on a mine in Krasnopartizansk in Luhansk province, killing its driver, a 30-year-old local man. According to Tymchuk, locals saw pro-Russian separatists emplace mines on the road.[18]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines and has therefore been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty ever since.[19] The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-type antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.[20] For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpiles.[21]

The types and quantities of antipersonnel mines Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest total of 6,664,342 mines of nine different types was detailed in Landmine Monitor Report 2006.[22]

In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2013, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 5,584,949 antipersonnel mines: 5,435,248 PFM-type and 149,096 POM-2 remotely-delivered mines, and 605 OZM-4 hand-emplaced bounding fragmentation mines.[23] Ukraine also reported the destruction of 332,352 PFM mines in 2013.[24] It declared the destruction of 22,604 mines in 2012 and 9,890 mines in 2011.[25] Since 1999, Ukraine has destroyed significant quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines using both its own resources and international assistance.[26] At the May 2013 intersessional meetings, the ICBL urged Ukraine to explain the status of destruction plans for the stockpiled POM-2 mines.[27]

A solid waste incinerator capable of destroying PFM mines is located at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. Ukraine received US$1 million from Norway to purchase new equipment (dry ceramic filters and a cooling system) to improve the facility and bring it up to European safety and environmental standards.[28] In December 2011, Ukraine announced that the equipment was installed and the facility was in operation with the capacity to destroy 1.1 million PFM mines per year.[29]

In a May 2013 presentation, Ukraine stated that the deadline for destroying the stockpile will depend on funding from the European Union (EU) and noted that “since 2010” Ukraine has been waiting for the EU funds to be dispersed.[30] However, the incinerator and destruction process currently in place at Pavlograd can only be used to destroy PFM-1 and PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in “cassettes” and “blocks” for the KMG-U aerial dispenser. A significant amount of Ukraine’s remaining stockpile consists of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm rocket warheads, approximately 3.19 million mines, and the destruction of theses mines will require different disassembly procedures.[31] Ukraine has not provided clear information on plans to destroy the PFM mines contained in 220mm rocket warheads not covered by its agreement with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 April 2014.

[2] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013.

[3] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 9 April 2014; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 11 April 2014.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, 1 April 2014.

[5] For example, in May 2009 Ukraine said it “did not produce APL [antipersonnel landmines] in the past, doesn’t produce at present, and will not produce them in the future.” Presentation by Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II defines it: “‘Phoney minefield’ means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Article 2, paragraph 8.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form B, 11 April 2007, 20 April 2008, and 20 April 2009. The report submitted in 2009 stated that these mines “are considered to be used in their controlled model. They do not fall under the provisions of the Ottawa convention. However, we have an excessive amount of them and they are planned to be destroyed.” The report submitted in 2008 said the mines “are unsuitable for use” and will be destroyed. The report submitted in 2007 said these mines “are approved for usage in controllable variant, and are not covered by MBT, but they are not usable and planned for destruction.” Presumably this means that the mines are in unsafe condition or beyond their shelf-life and will be destroyed.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 April 2009.

[9] “Между Крымом и Украиной уже минные поля, армейские лагеря и бронемашины” (“Between Crimea and Ukraine there are already minefields, armoured vehicles and army camps”), Novaya Gazeta, 8 March 2014.

[10] Email from George Henton to HRW, 10 March 2014.

[11] These devices are used to alert troops when an area has been entered by illuminating it for a short period of time, as the flares burn harmlessly. Such devices are not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty.

[12] Presentation by Dr. Kateryna Bila, Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Implementation of the Protocol II by Ukraine,” in Geneva, 1 April 2014

[13] Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Geneva, 1 April 2014. Notes by ICBL/CMC.

[14] Audio recording available here.

[15]Government forces mine approach roads to Mariupol,” Ukrinform (Kiev), 29 August 2014.

[19] On 18 May 2010, Ukraine officially informed States Parties in a note verbale that “it will be unable to comply with its Article 4 obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines by 1 June 2010 deadline.” At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010 after Ukraine missed its deadline, Ukraine’s representative noted that this is not “unexpected information to States Parties” and that “Ukraine remains open for the fruitful cooperation with States Parties and potential donors and hopes for the practical assistance to make Ukraine territory free from [antipersonnel mine] stockpiles of PFM-type as soon as possible.” See statement by Amb. Oleksandr Nykonenko, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 21 June 2010.

[20] PFM mines contain a liquid explosive filling (VS6-D) that makes them dangerous and difficult to destroy, and requires sophisticated pollution control measures. In mid-2003, a European Commission (EC) technical study determined that the condition of Ukraine’s PFM stockpiles was good. The mines were consolidated into two sites, from a previous total of 13 storage locations. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 765.

[21] In 2002, the EC launched a project to finance the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM mines, but a contract awarded in December 2005 was cancelled in April 2007. In 2008, Ukraine said it had decided to make a national financial contribution toward destruction of about 1.6 million of the PFM mines, and also requested a renewal of European Union (EU) assistance. In 2009 and 2010, Ukraine said on multiple occasions that it was unlikely to meet its stockpile destruction deadline. It appealed to States Parties in May 2009 to find a “joint solution” to the problem and to come up with an option that would “prevent Ukraine from violating the Article 4 deadline” including international financial assistance to modernize destruction facilities and to acquire additional equipment. In a statement at the Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference in Cartagena on 2 December 2009, Amb. Nykonenko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Ukraine could destroy one million mines per year if the destruction facility was upgraded and that with additional assistance the timeframe might be reduced to three years.

[22] For a chart showing the changes on the quantities and types of stockpiled antipersonnel mines from 2006–2009, see Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 774.

[23] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 April 2014.

[24] Ibid., Form G.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2012 and 1 April 2014.

[26] In a November 2008 presentation, Ukraine indicated it had destroyed its entire stock of 238,010 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M mines, as well as all 8,060 PMD-6 mines. It also destroyed more than 400,000 PMN mines in 2002 and 2003. Ukraine also destroyed 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999. In June 2008, Ukraine reported that between 2005 and 2007, an experimental program to partially dismantle and destroy 8,000 POM-2 mines was carried out at the Donetsk Chemical Plant, and a further 48 POM-2 mines were destroyed at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Ukraine also noted that while its MON-type and OZM-type antipersonnel mines can be used in command-detonated mode in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, these stockpiled mines are excessive and not suitable for use, and it has plans to destroy them.

[27] Statement of the ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 27 May 2013.

[28] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010. On 21 September 2011, Ukraine and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) signed an agreement to implement a project to destroy 2.7 million PFM mines in cassettes and blocks using €2.35 million (US$1.27 million) in funding coming from the EU through a NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund over a period of three years. The agreement is Phase II of a broader €25 million ($35 million) demilitarization project being conducted under the auspices of NATO/PfP and numerous NATO member states. Interview with NAMSA Representative, Kiev, 8 November 2011; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011. Average exchange rate for 2011: €1=US$1.3931. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.

[29] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011.

[30] Presentation of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 27 May 2013. Notes by the ICBL.

[31] The technical challenge with the destruction of PFM-1S mines occurs when they are removed from the rocket warhead; the mines must get into the incinerator within 30 minutes because it is not possible to scientifically predict whether handling the mines during disassembly of the warhead section will activate the mine’s self-destruct system. ICBL interviews with management and technical staff at Pavlograd Chemical Plant, Ukraine, 9 November 2011. See also briefing materials from State Enterprise Research-Industrial Complex Pavlograd Chemical Plant, “Execution of Works on Disposal of Antipersonnel PFM Mines,” 9 November 2011.


Last Updated: 23 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Ukraine last commented on the matter of accession in an April 2012 letter to the Monitor that stated it “considers cluster munitions to be legal weapons which remain an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[1] Ukraine has acknowledged that cluster munitions have long-term and deadly consequences for humanity and in 2008 said the weapons should be dealt with “urgently.”[2] It has called for a moratorium on the use of “inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions.”[3]

Ukraine has expressed a preference for cluster munitions to be tackled through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to which it is a party, in order to achieve “balance” between “military and humanitarian…considerations.”[4] It has not changed or reviewed this position since the CCW’s failure in 2011 to agree on a draft protocol on cluster munitions, effectively ending the CCW deliberations on the matter and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument to address cluster munitions.

Ukraine has also stated that, if using its own resources alone, it would not be able to destroy the large stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the Soviet Union within the eight-year stockpile destruction deadline required by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] (See Stockpiling and destruction section below.)

Ukraine participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 as an observer.[6]

Since 2008, Ukraine has shown limited interest in the convention. It participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties held in 2010 and 2011, but was absent from the 2012 and 2013 Meetings of States Parties. Ukraine has not attended any of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, such as those held in April 2014.

Ukraine voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which condemned Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights” including the use of cluster munitions.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use

In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine would not use cluster munitions except to defend itself from outside aggression.[8]

In early July 2014, evidence emerged that strongly indicates ground-launched cluster munitions were used in recent weeks in two separate locations in eastern Ukraine during fighting between Ukrainian government forces and armed insurgents.[9]

On 3 July, the remnants of a 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rocket and a 9N235 fragmentation submunition were identified from photographs reportedly taken at Kramatorsk in eastern Ukraine.[10] A total of 72 individual 9N235 submunitions are contained in each 9M55K rocket, which is fired from the 9K58 Smerch multiple-barrel rocket launcher over a maximum range of 90 kilometers.

On 11 July, photographs taken by the Associated Press at an insurgent base at Slavyansk, which was abandoned during the Ukrainian governments early July take-back of the town, show the remnants of at least eight 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets and at least three fragmentation submunitions that are all either 9N210 and 9N235.[11] These rockets are fired from the 9K57 Uragan multi-barrel rocket launcher, which has a maximum range of 35 kilometers. According to the Associated Press, the remnants at Slavyansk were collected and destroyed by Ukrainian government explosive ordnance disposal teams. A photograph of the 9N210 submunitions shows that some failed to self-destruct and were disassembled manually.[12]

The government of Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied using cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine.[13]

On 4 July 2014, Russias Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions against civilians.[14] On 25 July 2014, a senior commander of the Russian General Staff expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[15]

The CMC has expressed concern at the oncern that Ukrainian forces were using cluster munitions inne and urged the government of Ukraine to confirm or deny the use allegations.[16]

Production and transfer

Ukraine is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. In November 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine was not producing new cluster munitions, and would not export or import the weapons from any other country.[17]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions from the break-up of the Soviet Union. During a CCW meeting on cluster munitions in April 2011, Ukraine provided information on the types of its stockpiled cluster munitions.

Cluster Munitions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine[18]

 

Cluster Munition Name

Surface-to-surface rocket

220mm Uragan 9M27K

300mm Smerch 9M55K

Tochka-U (SS-21)

Aircraft dispenser

KMGU containing BFK-AO2.5, BFK-ODC, BFK-PTAB, BFK-AP cartridges of submunitions

Air-dropped bomb

RBK-500-375

RBK-500-AO

RBK-500-255

RBK-500-SP-B7

RBK-500-ZAB

RBK-250-275

RBK-250-ZAB

Ukraine stated that cluster munitions constitute 35% of its stockpile of conventional weapons totaling two million tons of ammunition. Of these cluster munitions, 34% were produced before 1980. Another 36.18% were produced between 1981 and 1992 and “are planned to be stockpiled and might be used.” The remaining 29.82% contain antivehicle landmines.[19]

Ukraine also reported a yearly average destruction of 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions, and concluded that under present conditions, it would take 60 years to destroy the stockpiles that are currently slated for destruction.[20]

 



[1] Letter No. 4132/36-196-771 from Amb. Yuriy A. Sergeyev, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 23 April 2012; and Letter No. 181/017 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 29 April 2010.

[2] Statement of Ukraine, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, 8 April 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[3] Letter No. 181/017 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 29 April 2010. It first called for such a moratorium in April 2008; and statement of Ukraine, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, 8 April 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[4] Letter No. 4132/36-196-771 from Amb. Sergeyev, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 23 April 2012.

[5] In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine’s “negative experience” with respect to securing international funding for the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty influences how it views the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to the official, once Ukraine has fulfilled its Mine Ban Treaty obligations, it will consider accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Deputy Director-General, Directorate General for Armaments Control and Military Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[6] For details on Ukraine’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 249–250.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 68/182, 18 December 2013. Ukraine did not vote in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[8] CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[9] Violence erupted in eastern Ukraine following the February 21, 2014 ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich. By mid-March, armed groups initially calling themselves “self-defense units” seized and occupied administrative buildings in several cities, towns, and villages in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Their demands ranged from making Ukraine a federation, to separation of their regions from the rest of Ukraine, to joining Russia. The Ukrainian government’s counter-insurgency operations in these regions has intensified since the country’s 25 May 2014 presidential elections and were continuing as Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 went to print.

[10] Armament Research Services blog, “9M55K cargo rockets and 9N235 submunitions in Ukraine,” 3 July 2014.

[11] 9M27K-series rockets have different submunitions payloads depending on the configuration. The 9M27K contains the 9N210 submunitions, while the 9M27K-1 contains the 9N235 submunition. Visually, the 9N210 and 9N235 look the same and weigh almost the same, but internally the size of the fragments is different as is the timing on the self-destruct feature. See Szlanko, Balint (balintszlanko), "Cargo rockets, 220mm 9M27K or 300mm 9M55K. Abandoned rebel base in #Slavyansk, prob. fired by Ukrainians. #Ukraine. http://t.co/r7xjG4gwgg" 11 Jul 2014, 07:39 UTC, tweet; and Armament Research Services blog, “9M27K series cargo rockets used in Ukraine”.

[13] In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told CMC representatives that Ukraine would not use cluster munitions except to defend itself from outside aggression. CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[14] David McHugh, “Troops in Ukraine strike back at rebels; Putin pushes truce,” Associated Press, 5 July 2014.

[16] CMC web post, “Worrying evidence of cluster munition use in Ukraine,” 3 July 2014; and letter from Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC to Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 16 July 2014.

[17] CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[18] Presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, Slides 3–4.

[19] Ibid., Slide 2.

[20] Ibid.


Last Updated: 19 October 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Ukraine is affected by mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from World War I. Ministry of Defense engineering units completed partial clearance of affected areas in the mid-1970s, but demining operations continue to this day. The precise scope of any residual mine problem is not known. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Ukraine has declared no known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control.[1]

In the first half of 2014, escalating violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and armed insurgents in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country.[2] The full extent of contamination from explosive remnants of war and other ordnance will remain unclear until the cessation of hostilities.

Mines

In March 2014, Ukraine reported that Russian Armed Forces had laid minefields in the Crimea and the neighboring region of Kherson. Ukraine claimed that between 7–9 March 2014, an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) inspection team “observed preparations for fencing, survey sticks of post holes and mine warning signs.” Mines were claimed to have been laid at the “entry points between the continental part of Ukraine and Crimean peninsula, namely at the Isthmus of Perekop/Crimea and the settlement of Chongar,” including type TM-62 antitank mines and antipersonnel mines. It was further claimed that 605 anti-personnel mines type OZM-4 had been seized from a “Ukrainian military depot in the Saki region of Crimea.”[3]

Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war

In July 2014, evidence emerged that indicated ground-launched cluster munitions were used in two separate locations, Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, in eastern Ukraine. It is unclear who is responsible for the use of cluster munitions.[4]

Despite continuing clearance operations, Ukraine is affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW)—both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance—resulting from World War I, World War II, and Soviet military training, across “large areas in remote places.”[5] Casualties continue to occur from ERW. In 2012, 22 ERW casualties were identified in Ukraine—of whom, all were civilians, including six children.[6]

The ERW problem includes World War II ammunition storage areas, particularly around the towns of Kerch and Sevastopol, where munitions were stored in “adits,” horizontal passageway tunnels in hills or mountainsides. These tunnels were used as munitions depots by the Soviet Army during World War II and were blown up in 1942 before the Soviet Army left the area. Clearance of the adit tunnels is expected to take between 10 and 20 years to complete.[7] Jankoy, Krasnoperekopsk, and Leninsky districts are also said to be highly affected.[8] As of April 2014, Ukraine estimates that 34 former military sites of a total area of 153,000 hectares (1.53km2) remained to be cleared.[9]

Underwater munitions, including naval mines from World War II, have been found in near Kerch on the Azov Sea, and near Odessa and Sevastopol on the Black Sea.[10] Clearance operations in these areas were suspended in 2014 due to the ongoing conflict.[11]

Mine Action Program

 Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 April 2014

National Mine Action Authority

None, although an interministerial working group continues to operate

Mine action center

None, although the Ministry of Defense has a training center

International operators

None

National operators

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Emergency Situations (GSCHS)

Border Guard Service

Ukroboronservice (commercial company)

There is no formal national mine action authority (NMAA) in Ukraine, although an interministerial working group was set up by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2006. On 25 December 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued an order that tasked the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Ukroboron service to put forward proposals by mid-April 2010 regarding the establishment of a national body for demining.[12] In April 2014, it was reported that Ukraine had “performed activities” to establish an NMAA within the Ministry of Defense.[13]

The GSCHS is generally responsible for clearance of affected territories, with the exception of those allocated to the other ministries and bodies. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for all areas where military units, educational institutions, companies, or organizations belonging to the armed forces are permanently located. The Engineering Division of the Ministry of Defense conducts UXO spot tasks. Ukroboronservice acts as a subcontractor for both ministries in survey and disposal of ERW as well as conducting survey and clearance of construction sites. The national Border Guard Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.

In 2001, the armed forces set up a demining center for the training of deminers at the Military Engineering Institute of Podolsk Agrar Technical University in Kamenez-Podolskiy. Since 2007, the center has been collecting and analyzing data on explosive hazards and demining and functioning as a separate military entity.[14]

In 2013, the Demining Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine employed 48 full-time demining teams as well as three “special teams” which constitute part of the Engineers Division of the Armed Forces. In addition, the GSCHS formed 40 demining teams with a total of 490 personnel.[15]

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014.[16] The program foresees clearance of 15km2 over five years with the destruction of 500,000 ERW. Mine clearance is carried out in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Land Release

Ukraine did not report any release of mined areas or areas contaminated by cluster munitions in 2013.

Clearance of explosive remnants of war in 2013

In 2013, Ukraine reported clearance of a total of 594 hectares (5.94km2) of area contaminated with ERW, destroying in the process 100,000 “explosive devices.” Clearance of one former artillery base accounted for almost 38% of the total area cleared.[17]

In 2012, demining units of the GSCHS conducted 380 tasks destroying more than 220,000 items of ERW, including 2,143 aircraft bombs, and reportedly cleared an area of over 1,840 hectares (18.4km2).[18]

Article 5 Compliance

Ukraine has declared no known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control.[19]

In the case of the discovery of new antipersonnel mined areas in Ukraine as a result of the ongoing hostilities, under the process agreed by States Parties at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention in December 2012, Ukraine should inform States Parties of their discovery and location and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in the mined areas as soon as possible.[20] In addition, Ukraine would be required to submit an extension request for no longer than 10 years.

 



[1] See for example, Ukraine’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form C. Ukraine’s national reports under Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II list information on mined areas as “missing” (see CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, for the year 2013).

[2] Violence erupted in eastern Ukraine following the February 21, 2014 ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich. By mid-March, armed groups initially calling themselves “self-defense units” seized and occupied administrative buildings in several cities, towns, and villages in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Ukrainian government’s counter-insurgency operations in these regions have intensified since the country’s 25 May 2014 presidential elections and were continuing as of August 2014.

[3] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Compliance, Geneva, 9 April 2014.

[4] For more information, see the Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile on the Monitor website.

[5] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Compliance, Geneva, 9 April 2014.

[6] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form C, 27 March 2013.

[8] Ministry of Emergency Situations (Crimea), “Explosive Snowdrops,” 12 March 2009.

[9] Statement of Ukraine, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 3 April 2014 (audio only).

[10] See for example, UN, “United Nations Mine Action Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Ukraine, 12–17 December 2005,” Draft report, June 2006, p. 3.

[11] Statement of Ukraine, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 3 April 2014 (audio only).

[12] Cabinet of Ministers Order No. 73471/1/1-09, 25 December 2009.

[13] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form A, 27 March 2013.

[15] Statement of Ukraine, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 3 April 2014 (audio only).

[16] Email from Lt.-Col. Vitaliy Baranov, Ministry of Defense, 20 January 2010.

[17] Statement of Ukraine, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 3 April 2014 (audio only).

[18] Ibid.

[19] See for example, Ukraine’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form C.

[20] Final Report, Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, APLC/MSP.12/2012/10, 21 January 2013, para 28(a)–(c), p. 10.


Last Updated: 09 December 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2012

At least 1,987 (1,778 killed; 209 injured)

Casualties in 2013

Unknown (2012: 22)

As of 1 December 2014 Ukraine had not submitted a Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 report for calendar year 2013; therefore the number of annual casualties in 2013 due to explosive remnants of war (ERW) leftover from World War II was unknown.

In mid-2014, several unconfirmed reports of casualties from landmines were reported in Luhansk province, although the incidents remained unverified as of 1 December 2014. In June 2014, it was reported that six border guards were injured by a landmine.[1] On 3 July 2014, one person was reported killed and another injured by a mine at Luhansk airport.[2] On 7 July 2014, it was reported that a tractor drove over a mine, killing the driver.[3]

The Monitor has recorded at least 1,987 mine/ERW casualties (1,778 killed; 209 injured) in the Ukraine to the end of 2012.[4] The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[5] The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed; 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[6]

Cluster munition casualties

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that during the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2014 “cluster munitions killed at least 6 people and injured dozens.”[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Ukraine is not known.

Media reports indicated that tampering with ERW was a significant cause of casualties.[8] Many mine survivors are thought to be veterans of the Soviet Army, injured during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

There is no specific victim assistance strategy, and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities or other disabled veterans. The State Committee on Veterans of Ukraine coordinates policy on war veterans.[9]

Disability issues are the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; the Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sports; the Ministry of Health; and the Ministry of Education and Science.[10]

Ukraine ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 4 February 2010.

 



[2]At Lugansk airport two persons are victims of a landmine,” UNIAN (in Russian), 3 July2014.

[4] The cumulative casualties are calculated using UN data for 1945–1995 (1,500 civilians; 130 deminers killed), Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) data for 1996–2008 (100 killed; 129 injured), and CCW Protocol V Article 10 report data for 2009–2011 (42 killed; 64 injured). See also previous Ukraine country profiles for 2010 and 2011 available on the Monitor website.

[5] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999).

[6] Monitor analysis of MES, “Daily Reports,” for calendar year 2008.

[7] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[8] The total includes 2009–2010 casualty data and Monitor analysis of MES, “Daily Reports,” from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008.

[9] Ukraine Government Portal, “State Committee on Veterans of Ukraine,” undated

[10] United States (US) Department of State, “2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2010.


Last Updated: 19 September 2012

Support for Mine Action

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, Norway contributed NOK5,841,787 (US$1,042,767) to Ukraine to destroy its stockpile of landmines.[1] In May 2012, Ukraine estimated it had more than five million landmines to destroy.[2]

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 March 2012; and Norway Average exchange rate for 2011: NOK5.6022 = US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.