Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In June and September 2014, the US government announced new policy measures to ban production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and to halt use except on the Korean Peninsula. The new policy also commits the US to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea” and also to “not assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited” by the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 23 September 2014, the US announced the new policy committing to not use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and committing not to assist, encourage, or induce other nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of Korea.[1] President Barack Obama commented, “We’re going to continue to work to find ways that would allow us to ultimately comply fully and accede to the Ottawa Convention.”[2] The White House press secretary said the new landmine policy “means…we were signaling our clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention” describing the fact that “we are now articulating our desire to be able to accede” to the treaty as a “notable adjustment of U.S. policy.”[3]

On 27 June 2014, the US announced the policy foreswearing future production or acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and said the Defense Department will conduct a detailed study of alternatives to antipersonnel mines and the impact of making no further use of the weapon.[4]

The policy announcement follows years of efforts by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and NGOs organized under the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL). In a January 2014 letter to President Obama, the USCBL urged the President to conclude the landmine policy review—initiated in 2009—by the time of the Third Review Conference.[5] On 19 February 2014, the USCBL together with the Mine Ban Convention’s Implementation Support Unit hosted a symposium on the US and the Mine Ban Treaty in Washington, DC attended by representatives from more than 30 diplomatic missions.[6] On 12 September 2014, the USCBL sent another letter to President Obama urging him to take another step toward the Mine Ban Treaty by completing the policy review and pledge to not use antipersonnel mines.[7]

In commenting on the US commitment to no longer use antipersonnel mines outside of the Korean Peninsula, Senator Leahy said, “This is a crucial step that makes official what has been de facto U.S. practice.”[8] USCBL chair Human Rights Watch (HRW) welcomed the landmine policy measures as “an important acknowledgement that the Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for eradicating antipersonnel mines” but found “the US needs to get past the exception permitting landmine use on the Korean Peninsula and join the treaty.”[9] A New York Times editorial on the policy observed, “the Pentagon could easily draw up plans for South Korea that exclude American landmines.”[10]

The US was the first country to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines in September 1994 and it participated in the Ottawa Process that led to the creation of the treaty, but did not sign it in 1997. The Clinton administration set the goal of joining in 2006. However, in 2004 the Bush administration announced a new policy that rejected both the treaty and the goal of the US ever joining.[11] It is not yet known how the 2014 landmine policy announcements by the Obama administration will be codified, but previous landmine policies announced in 1996, 1998, and 2004 were all issued as presidential directives.

In making the 2014 announcement, President Obama credited the advocacy efforts of the ICBL and Jody Williams, who jointly received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for their role in bringing about the Mine Ban Treaty, stating: “This started in civil society. That’s what prompted action by President Clinton and by myself. And promoting civil society that can surface issues and push leadership is not just in keeping with our values, it’s not charity. It’s in our national interests.”[12]

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, the US has attended every Meeting of States Parties as an observer, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013 and intersessional meetings held in April 2014. The US attended the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014, where it made the policy announcement on the final day during the high-level segment.

On 5 December 2013, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68/30 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in previous years. It was one of only 19 countries to abstain.

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It submitted its annual national report for Amended Protocol II on 31 March 2014, as required under Article 13, and a national annual report for Protocol V on 31 March 2014, as required by Article 10.

Use

The Monitor has long reported that the last confirmed US use of antipersonnel mines was in 1991.[13] However, as part of the June 27 policy announcement, the US acknowledged using one antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[14] There were reports in 2009 and 2010 of US forces in Afghanistan using Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[15] However, these munitions are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty if used in command-detonated mode.[16]

According to a September 23 White House fact sheet, “the unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea preclude us from changing our anti-personnel landmine policy there at this time.”

Two concerns regarding Korea have emerged as sticking points during the US policy review. One relates to the arrangement for a joint combined command structure that would put a US general in charge of South Korean military forces in the event of active hostilities, and the potential problems that might cause if the US were party to the Mine Ban Treaty but South Korea were not. However, in October 2014, US and South Korean officials agreed to delay return of wartime control of South Korean forces to its government until those forces are better prepared to deter North Korea.[17] A second concern is the possible need for the US to use antipersonnel mines in the event of an invasion by North Korea.

The landmines already emplaced in and near the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea are the responsibility of South Korean forces and not the US.

Numerous retired military officers have questioned the utility of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea and elsewhere, citing the overwhelming technological superiority of other weapons in the US-South Korean arsenal in comparison with North Korea’s as sufficient to compensate for not using mines. In addition, a former commander of US forces in South Korea, the late Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, said in 1997 that antipersonnel landmines’ “minimal” utility to US forces is “offset by the difficulty…[they] pose to our brand of mobile warfare…Not only civilians, but US armed forces, will benefit from a ban on landmines. U.S. forces in Korea are no exception.”[18]

Under the new policy, the Defense Department has been tasked with conducting “a high fidelity modeling and simulation effort to ascertain how to mitigate the risks associated with the loss of anti-personnel landmines.” In a 27 June statement, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that landmines remain “a valuable tool in the arsenal of the United States,” but expressed support for the new US policy, which it said “protects current capabilities while we work toward a reliable and effective substitute.”[19] Previously, according to budget documents released in February 2005, the Pentagon requested $688 million for research on and $1.08 billion for the production of new landmine systems between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.[20]

Until the 2014 policy banning any US antipersonnel mine use outside of Korea, the previous policy of President George W. Bush remained in effect, prohibiting from 2011 any US use of “dumb” or “persistent” antipersonnel landmines lacking a self-destruct and self-deactivate feature.[21]

The US is retaining a small quantity of “persistent mines” for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[22]

Transfer

US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992, through a series of multi-year extensions of the moratorium.[23]

The US exported antipersonnel landmines in the past, including more than 5.6 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992. Deminers in at least 28 mine-affected countries have reported the presence of US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.

Production

The last US antipersonnel mines were produced in 1997.[24] On 27 June 2014, the US announced the policy foreswearing future production or acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and said the Defense Department will conduct a detailed study of alternatives to antipersonnel mines and the impact of making no further use of the weapon.[25]

No victim-activated munitions are being funded in the procurement or the research and development budgets of the US Armed Services or Defense Department, but two related programs are being funded: the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and the IMS Scorpion. These once had the potential for victim-activated features (thereby making them antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty), but are now both strictly “man-in-the-loop” or command-detonated and therefore permissible under the treaty.[26]

Stockpiling and destruction

As part of the 2014 policy announcements, the Department of Defense disclosed that the US has an “active stockpile of just more than 3 million anti-personnel mines in the inventory.”[27] This represents a significant reduction from the previous total reported in 2002 of approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[28]

The US stockpile consists mostly of remotely-delivered mines that are scattered over wide areas by aircraft, artillery, or rockets, and equipped with self-destruct features designed to blow the mine up after a pre-set period of time, as well as self-deactivating features. The active stockpile consists of the following types and quantities:

US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 2010[29]

Note: * The accounting for GATOR includes CBU-89 [22], CBU-104 [22], and CBU-78 [15] air-dropped bombs.

The shelf-life of existing antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the US decreases over time, including deterioration of batteries embedded inside mines as they age. The new policy precludes the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries inside the existing stockpile.[30]

In response to a journalist’s question about the shelf-life of existing antipersonnel mines, the Defense Department spokesperson stated that, “We anticipate that they will start to decline in their ability to be used about -- starting in about 10 years. And in 10 years after that, they’ll be completely unusable.”[31] Previously, in 2010, the Department of Defense indicated that the batteries in self-destructing and self-deactivating mines have a shelf-life of 36 years and estimated that the shelf-life of batteries in the existing stockpile of antipersonnel mines would expire between 2014 and 2033.[32]

The 2014 policy commits the US to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.”

Under the new policy, all US stockpiles of weapons containing antipersonnel mines as well as munitions containing a mix of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines that are not required for Korea will need be removed from stocks located in the US, on supply ships, and in storage facilities overseas, then transported to a destruction facility.

Human Rights Watch has noted that transparency is needed in carrying out the new landmine policy, including on the types and quantities of antipersonnel landmines to be removed from active inventory and destroyed, as well as on the stockpile destruction plan, with its timeline and cost.[33]

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The US has acknowledged the “important contributions” made by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but it has not indicated if its 2008 policy on cluster munitions will be reviewed following the failure of the effort that the US led in 2011 to create an alternate international law to regulate cluster munitions through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), to which it is party.[1]

The US opposed the negotiation of a legally binding instrument in the CCW until June 2007 when the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions was underway.[2] It subsequently became one of the most ardent supporters of a CCW protocol, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[3] The US said it was “deeply disappointed” at the 2011 failure by the CCW to conclude the draft protocol, which leaves the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument that specifically addresses cluster munitions.[4]

An April 2014 report by the Congressional Research Service on cluster munitions and “potential issues for Congress” stated, “There are doubts that CCW efforts to develop a cluster munitions protocol will be viable, as some nations that are part of the CCW who have also signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions stand in opposition of a CCW protocol on cluster munitions.”[5]

The Obama administration has continued to implement a cluster munition policy created under President George W. Bush in July 2008. Under the 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO).[6] Until 2018, any use of cluster munitions that exceed the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[7] The 10-year transition period was seen as “necessary to develop the new technology, get it into production, and to substitute, improve, or replace existing stocks.”[8] Under the policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” must be removed from active inventories as soon as possible (but not later than 19 June 2009) and demilitarized as soon as practicable.[9]

In November 2011, the US stated that it would continue to implement the 2008 DoD policy on cluster munitions.[10] As of 31 July 2014, it was not known if the process for the “removal from active inventory of all cluster munition stocks that exceed operational planning requirements” had been completed and no information was available detailing the types and quantities of excess cluster munitions and submunitions that have been demilitarized because the DoD has not reported on its implementation of the 2008 policy.

The US did not directly participate, not even as an observer, in the diplomatic Oslo Process in 2007 and 2008 that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the Oslo Process to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[12]

The Congressional Research Service’s 2014 report notes that “U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions] would prevent military forces from non-states parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations” but found the convention “does permit states parties to engage in military cooperation and operations with non-states parties” under Article 21.[13]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013.

Recent Congressional initiatives relating to US cluster munitions policy include:

·         A 17 July 2013 letter to President Obama from US Senators Dianne Feinstein (Democrat [D]-California) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), as well as Representative James McGovern (D-Massachusetts [MA]) urging that the US government’s “outdated” cluster munitions policy be “immediately” and “expeditiously” reviewed to put the US “on a path to join the international Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[14] As of July 2014, the White House had not replied to the letter.

·         On 28 February 2013, Senators Feinstein and Leahy reintroduced the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, Bill S. 419, to limit the use of cluster munitions to munitions that have a 99% or higher reliability rate, prohibit use of cluster munitions in areas where civilians are known to be present, and require a clearance plan if the US uses cluster munitions.[15] The legislation was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

·         On 19 June 2013, Representative Darrell Issa (Republican [R]-California) introduced the Designating Requirements On Notification of Executive-ordered Strikes Act of 2013 or DRONES Act, which includes provisions requiring that US cluster munitions have a less than 1% dud rate and be used only against military targets and not in areas inhabited by civilians.[16]

The US has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[17] On 18 December 2013, Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, stating that “Americans should be appalled and saddened” by the reports of cluster munition use in Aleppo.[18]

In its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the US endorsed a resolution on 27 May 2014 that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[19]

In August 2013, after reports that the US was considering a military operation against Syria involving sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, the CMC issued a statement warning the US against any cluster munition use in any military operation against Syria and urging that parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions help ensure that the weapons are not used.[20] The statement noted that the last US use of a cluster munition in 2009 in Yemen involved the use of a TLAM-D cruise missile containing BLU-97 bomblets. (See Use section below.)

NGOs have continued to press for US action on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[21]

The US has not joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but on 27 June 2014, the Obama administration made an “interim” announcement with respect to its ongoing review of US landmine policy that committed to immediately ban US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and initiated other measures that could see the US accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the future.[22] Since 2009, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings after not participating in the treaty’s first decade of meetings.

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); and Iraq (2003).[23]

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have confirmed the US use of at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” at al-Ma‘jalah in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen on 17 December 2009.[24] The attack killed 55 people including 14 women and 21 children.[25] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the allegations.[26]

A 2010 report on the Yemeni parliament’s investigation into the attack called on the Yemeni government to investigate and “hold accountable those found guilty” of “mistakes that were made causing the deaths of...innocent victims” and called on the Yemeni authorities to compensate victims and remove cluster munition remnants from the site.[27] An October 2013 report by HRW found the cluster munition remnants from the 2009 attack on al-Ma‘jalah were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 others in the period since the attack, most recently in January 2012.[28]

The July 2013 letter by Senators Feinstein and Leahy refers to the Yemen strike and reported civilian casualties. It notes that “current DOD policy requires Combatant Commanders to approve the use of cluster munitions that exceed a one percent unexploded ordnance rate” and requests that the DOD provide “detailed information on the use of cluster munitions since the implementation of current DOD policy” issued in June 2008.[29]

The 2014 Congressional Research Service report asserts that the US military has not used cluster munitions since 2003 and states, “For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results. Also worth considering are effects-based weapons systems and operations, which seek to achieve the same or similar effect against a potential target without applying a ‘kinetic solution’ such as a cluster munition. Such insights could prove valuable in analyzing U.S. policy options on the future of cluster munitions.”[30]

Production

In 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a policy memorandum requiring that all submunitions reaching the “full rate” production decision by fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a failure rate of less than 1%.[31] The US has not budgeted any money for producing new cluster munitions since 2007.[32] Research and development activities continue at the applied research level for the purposes of improving the reliability of existing submunitions as well as the development of new types of submunitions. These activities are in programs being conducted by the Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[33]

The US has in the past licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Transfer

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK).[34] In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with information showing an export to the US in 1991 of one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb.[35]

The US first instituted a moratorium on the export or transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO standard in a 2007 appropriations (budget) bill at the initiative of Senator Leahy. The moratorium was extended the following year as the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, but again the restrictions only applied to that fiscal year.[36]

The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act contained similar restrictions as the previous appropriations bills; it prohibited the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[37]

The same export moratorium language was included in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law by President Obama on 16 December 2009.[38] Similar export moratorium language was included in the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) signed into law on 23 December 2011,[39] the 2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution signed into law on 28 September 2012,[40] and the 2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act.[41]

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the US agency that administers weapons transfers, “At present the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). The CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban.”[42]

Recent US exports of cluster munitions include sales to the UAE (announced in 2006 of 780 M30 GMLRS rockets),[43] India (announced in 2008 of 510 CBU-105 SFW),[44] Saudi Arabia (announced in 2011 of 404 CBU-105D/B SFW),[45] Taiwan (announced in 2011 of 64 CBU-105 SFW),[46] and the Republic of Korea (announced 2012 of 367 CBU-105D/B SFW).[47]

In April 2013, Representative Gerald Connolly (D-MA) introduced H.R. 1793 or the “Global Partnerships Act of 2013” which contains language identical to the export moratorium on cluster munitions.[48]

Stockpiling

In 2009, a US Department of State official said, “The current stockpile is huge; the DoD currently holds more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions. Using our current demilitarization capabilities, it will cost $2.2 billion to destroy this stockpile.”[49] In 2011, the US stated that the US stockpile includes “more than 6 million cluster munitions,” which indicates that the stockpile may be larger than previously reported.[50]

An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the DoD provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.[51]

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[52]

In a February 2011 presentation to CCW delegates, the US stated that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal for a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the DoD in a report to Congress in late 2004.

The October 2004 DoD report to Congress provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types that contain about 728 million submunitions.[53] However, this figure does not appear to be a full accounting of cluster munitions available to US forces. The number apparently does not include cluster munitions that are located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[54]

The DoD had not publicly reported on the removal of excess cluster munitions from stocks by June 2009, as called for in the 2008 policy. The July 2013 letter to President Obama from Senators Feinstein and Leahy notes that the 2008 policy “requires the Services and Combatant Commands to initiate the removal from active inventory all cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements” and requests that the DoD provide “an unclassified report detailing the number of cluster munitions that have been removed from the active stockpile, as well as how many remain.”[55]

Between 2000 and 2012, the US destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year at an average annual cost of $7.2 million. For fiscal year 2012, the funding for the destruction of non-missile cluster munitions and submunitions consumes 24% of the annual budget allocation for the destruction of conventional ammunitions.[56]

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The Army has requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[57]

According to one report, “the Pentagon estimates that ‘upward of 80 percent of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile.’”[58]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have taken action to remove its stockpiles from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[59] The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[60]

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

·         In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions” according to a December 2008 cable.[61]

·         Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany according to a December 2008 cable.[62]

·         In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime. A cable on the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG) states that “U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[63]

·         Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[64]

·         Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them” according to a December 2008 cable.[65]

·         The US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait according to a May 2007 cable.[66]

Casualties^[1]

Thirty-seven US soldiers were killed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and 132 in Afghanistan in 2009, compared to 131 soldiers killed in Iraq, and 72 in Afghanistan in 2008.^[2] It was not known how many incidents were caused by victim-activated IEDs.^[3] In addition, five US soldiers were killed or injured by mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW). One US soldier was killed by a mine in Afghanistan;^[4] one US soldier was killed and two were injured by an item of ERW at Camp Hansen in Okinawa, Japan;^[5] and one US soldier was killed by a mine in Baghdad, Iraq.^[6]

Between 1999 and 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor recorded 212 US mine/ERW/IED casualties (83 killed, 129 injured).^[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW/IED survivors in the US is likely to number in the thousands. From 2001 to 1 March 2010, 967 soldiers lost at least one limb in Iraq and Afghanistan.^[8]

Survivor needs

In 2009, the Joint Department of Defense/Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Disability Evaluation System (DES) piloted a single disability examination at 21 sites to assess whether 337 injured active duty soldiers should be discharged from the military based on injuries, wounds, or illnesses incurred during their service. Based on the information collected, it assisted the pilot participants in transitioning to civilian life with access to the benefits and services available to them through the DVA.^[9]

Victim assistance coordination

The DVA is the lead government agency that assists all veterans, including those disabled from mines/ERW/IEDs, with offices in each of the 50 states, the Philippines, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.^[10] The DVA Office of Survivors Assistance is the primary advisor to the government on policies and programs affecting survivors and dependents of deceased veterans and service members.^[11]

Survivor inclusion

In February 2009, Tammy Duckworth, a disabled US veteran, was appointed as an assistant secretary of the DVA, helping to “overhaul the agency” with a goal of reducing bureaucratic obstacles to disability benefits.^[12]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009

In 2009, the DVA increased the number of local accredited orthopedic and prosthetic providers to ensure decentralized access to physical rehabilitation care. As of March 2010, it had contracted more than 600 local orthopedic and prosthetic providers.^[13] The DVA also added additional mental health clinicians and increased its psychological support capacity to treat veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), though stigma around mental health prevented many veterans from accessing available services.^[14]

In January 2009, the Department of Labor initiated the “America’s Heroes at Work” employment pilot project to coordinate employment opportunities for veterans with Traumatic Brain Injury and/or PTSD and document best practices to help employers hire, accommodate, and retain veterans in the workplace.^[15]

In 2009, the Wounded Warrior Project identified a number of shortcomings in the DVA’s Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment program. These included insufficient, temporary support payments for disabled veterans; too few counselors attending to program participants; insufficient reimbursement of program participation expenses; and a lack of long-term measurement mechanisms to quantify program success.^[16]

On 30 July 2009, the US signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but had not ratified it as of June 2010.

The United States of America (US) is the largest donor for mine action, having contributed over US$2 billion since 1993. In 2012 as part of the its Conventional Weapons Destruction program within the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA), the US contributed $134.4 million to mine action in 30 countries and three territories through more than 40 organizations, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNDP, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security (ITF).[1]

Afghanistan and Iraq received the largest contributions, and together they constituted almost half (48%) of US funding in 2012, approximately the same percentage as in 2011. Six recipients (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, and Lao PDR) each received at least $5 million each.

In 2012, the US reported on their priorities for the period in different regions: in addition to increased US support in the Pacific to clear World War II-era unexploded ordnance in Palau, the Solomon Islands, and other Pacific nations and to build local capacity in the region,[2] it also increased its assistance to Lao PDR from $5 million to $9.3 million, an increase of 46%.

In southeastern Europe, largely consisting of countries that were part of the former Yugoslavia, the US shifted its major focus from reducing the threat from landmines to reducing excess stockpiles of obsolete small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. Nevertheless, the US contributed $4.7 million to countries in southeastern Europe for mine action, including $2.3 million to Bosnia Herzegovina. All US funding for southeastern Europe is provided through the ITF.

Since 2011, the US has provided approximately $40 million in assistance to locate and secure man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other weapons.[3] The WRA in the US Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs reported a contribution of $21.8 million to Libya from other State Department sources in 2012.[4] The US did not disaggregate this funding to Libya regarding MANPADS and landmines. In an interview with Michael P. Moore from Landmines in Africa, Major General Walter D. Givhan, the US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs and Operations, said, “In Libya, the US government prioritized securing MANPADS over landmines and while some of the funds made available for MANPADS destruction also covered landmine destruction and removal, the intent was to eliminate the MANPADS.”[5]

The US also provides ongoing support to the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR), located at James Madison University in the state of Virginia, which supports research, training—including the annual Senior Mine Action Managers’ Course—and the Journal of Mine Action publication.[6]

Since 2008, the US has contributed almost $600 million to mine action, largely through the WRA and the Leahy War Victims Fund of USAID.

Contributions by recipient: 2012[7]

In 2012, 88% of US support went towards capacity building, survey, and clearance programs. The US contributed $15.5 million towards victim assistance in 13 countries, an increase of $3 million from 2011.[8] Recipients included the ICRC, the International Center, Information Management and Mine Action Programs, It is known as iMMAPClear Path International, the Polus Center, Project Renew, and PeaceTrees Vietnam. Contributions attributed to global funding went to the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics and the World Health Organization.[9]

Two US government offices provide funding for victim assistance. In 2012, WRA provided $5.8 million to victim assistance projects in five countries; USAID provided $9.7 million to victim assistance projects in seven countries through the Leahy War Victims Fund, which is one of the five Special Programs to Address the Needs of Survivors (SPANS) within the Bureau for Democracy (a part of USAID).[10] In 2013, the Leahy War Victims Fund commenced a new three-year, $2.3 million project for people with disabilities.[11] Other victim assistance support went through the ITF in Slovenia and grants from the WRA directly to NGOs.

In addition, the US provided $10.2 million through USAID to programs that target persons with disabilities in more than 30 countries and territories where there are landmine survivors, including Georgia, Montenegro, Iraq, Jordan, and Nicaragua as well as Kosovo.[12]

The US-based NGO Spirit of Soccer received funding to deliver risk education in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Iraq in 2012.[13]

Contributions by thematic sector: 2012

Contributions for victim assistance, by recipient country: 2012

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[14]