Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 September 1998. It entered into force on 1 March 1999. National implementation legislation was enacted on 20 April 2005.[1]

Yemen submitted its 16^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in April 2014, covering the period 31 March 2013 to 31 March 2014.

Yemen has participated in all of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Review Conference, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014, as well as every Meeting of States Parties, such as the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013. It has participated in many of the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, including in April 2014.

Yemen is not a party to the 2008 Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Yemen has stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

It destroyed the last of its known stockpile of 74,000 to 78,000 antipersonnel mines in April 2002.[2] An additional 30,000 mines found in November 2006 were destroyed in December 2007.[3]

In 2014, Yemen again reported that it has retained 3,760 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, the same number declared retained since 2008.[4] Yemen still has not reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004.[5]

Some of the types of mines used by government forces in 2011 were the same types that have been retained.

Use

In November 2013, the prime minister’s office issued a statement that admitted a “violation” of the Mine Ban Treaty occurred in 2011 during the popular uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Ali Abduallah Saleh.[6]

In early 2013, credible information emerged alleging government use of antipersonnel mines at a location north of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a in 2011. According to witness testimony and evidence gathered by human rights organizations and media, mines including PMN and PMD-6 antipersonnel mines were laid around the camps of the government’s Republican Guards at Bani Jarmooz in late 2011.[7]

In April 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the landmines laid at Bani Jarmooz had killed at least two civilians and wounded 20 others since late 2011, including at least one dead and six wounded in the year since April 2013.[8] The casualties all occurred in the vicinity of military camps that the 63rd and 81st Brigades of the Republican Guard established at Bani Jarmooz around 26 July 2011, and which remained in place as of September 2014. During an April 2013 visit, HRW did not observe any fencing or warning signs.

At the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013, 15 states as well as the President of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties and the ICBL called for a thorough investigation, expressed concern at the civilian casualties, and urged rapid mine clearance as well as calling for an investigation that would report back to States Parties.[9]

In a statement on the matter at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, Yemen said it had “lost control on the ground” during the 2011 political crises and committed to be “serious and transparent on that issue.” It said the Prime Minster had directed that an inter-agency investigation committee be established to look into the incident and determine who was responsible, and to apply criminal sanctions in accordance with the 2005 implementation law. Yemen reported that the “Minister for Defense had given the order to implement this investigation, to account for those who participated in that action, and to clear the mines.” It stated that the engineering corps and the general reserve forces had commenced clearance operations at Bani Jarmooz.[10]

In the final report of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, States Parties expressed concern at the “breach” of the Mine Ban Treaty at Bani Jarmooz and welcomed Yemen’s commitment to provide to them, through the president, a final report by 31 December 2014 on the investigation, including information on (a) the status and outcomes of Yemen’s investigation; (b) the identification of those responsible for deploying antipersonnel mines, and subsequent measures taken; (c) information on the source of the antipersonnel mines and how those mines were obtained, particularly given that Yemen had long ago reported the destruction of all stockpiles; (d) the destruction of any additional stocks discovered and the clearance of the mined areas in question; and (e) action to prevent and suppress any possible future prohibited activities undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

HRW has raised the need for clearance of Bani Jarmooz’s minefields with Yemeni government representatives on multiple occasions, including meetings with President Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi and other high-ranking officials and political party leaders in Sana’a in January 2014.[11]

Yemen provided an interim report on 29 March 2014 that indicated plans had been made for clearance, marking, risk education, and victim assistance.[12] In April 2014, a HRW investigation confirmed no evidence of any mine clearance, nor any marking or fencing of mine-affected areas, and few if any risk education and victim assistance activities.

At the April 2014 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the ICRC, and the ICBL expressing concern at the apparent violation of the treaty and welcomed Yemen interim report and continued investigation.

At the Treaty’s Third Review Conference in June 2014, Yemen stated that the Military Prosecutor’s Office has begun an investigation to identify those responsible for the mine use at Bani Jarmooz.[13]

As of October 2014 the area of Bani Jarmooz was no longer under government control and had been seized by Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthi rebellion).[14]

Previously, as Landmine Monitor has documented, antipersonnel mines were laid at a government building in Sana’a at some point between early 2011 and March 2012, when a child was injured by an antipersonnel mine at the site.[15] In May 2013, Yemen said it had investigated the incident, but did not find any landmines.[16]

Use by non-state armed groups

In 2013, there were credible reports of use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups in the mountainous northern governorates of Sada’a and Haijjah where the government of Yemen and local government-backed Sunni tribes have been in conflict with Ansar Allah rebel forces (led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi) after new fighting erupted in 2012. There have been occasional reports and allegations of antipersonnel mine use by both sides since 2004.[17]

Yemen’s 2014 Article 7 report stated that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) faced a “new challenge” in Sada’a governorate from “new kinds of mines made manually by insurgences [sic] and planted in Sada’a, some of them demined by the insurgences [sic] and they missed others…lot of mine accidents happened and many of people [sic] killed and injured.”[18] In September 2013, a representative of the district of Al-Asha bordering Saad’a governorate told media that Houthi rebels were planting landmines “in the mountainous areas under their control.”[19]

After a 2010 ceasefire opened access to the region, it subsequently became apparent that the Houthi rebel forces had used mostly, if not exclusively, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[20]

In its 2012 Article 7 report, Yemen listed Abyan governorate in the south of the country as newly mine-affected “because of the war that started between the Yemeni army and Al Qaeda groups.”[21]

In June 2012, engineering teams removed landmines from around the cities of Zinjibar and Jaar in Abyan governorate after government forces regained their control from Ansar al-Sharia, an armed organization linked to al Qaeda.[22] Photographs of weapons recovered by deminers from Ansar al-Sharia positions after their withdrawal, which HRW examined in October 2012, show antipersonnel mines as well as IEDs.[23] Ansar al-Sharia continues to exist as a military threat but is not reported to have used more antipersonnel mines in 2013 or the first half of 2014.

 

Policy

The Republic of Yemen has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Yemen has not made a public statement explaining its position on joining the convention.

Yemen participated in two meetings of the Oslo Process that produced the convention (Lima in May 2007 and Belgrade in October 2007) and expressed its support for work to prohibit cluster munitions.[1]  It did not attend the negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008 or the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008.[2]

Yemen attended in its first meeting of the convention in September 2011, when it participated as an observer in the Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon. It did not attend the 2012 meeting, but participated as an observer in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Yemen attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013, but not those held in April 2014.

Yemen has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munition, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[3]

Yemen is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Yemen is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

New evidence, detailed below, indicates that Yemen may have stockpiled cluster munitions in the past. Jane’s Information Group reported in 2004 that KMG-U dispensers that deploy submunitions are in service with the country’s air force.[4] Moldova exported 13 220mm Uragan multiple launch rocket systems to Yemen in 1994, and Yemen possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[5]

Use

Recently disclosed information shows that cluster munitions were used in Sada’a governorate in northern Yemen during fighting between the government of Yemen’s armed forces and Houthi rebels that intensified and spilled over the border with Saudi Arabia in November 2009, resulting in airstrikes and a ground intervention by armed forces from Saudi Arabia into Sada’a.

In July 2013, the Monitor reviewed photographs taken by clearance operators showing the remnants of unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-61 submunitions, made in the United States (US), as well as dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions of an unknown origin.[6] The BLU submunitions are dropped by aircraft, while the DPICM is launched from the ground or air by artillery or rocket. Arms experts view both means of delivery as beyond the military capabilities of the Houthi rebels.[7]

In May 2014, VICE News aired video footage shot near the city of Sada’a, the capital of Sada’a governorate, showing remnants of a US-made CBU-52 cluster bomb.[8] The Houthi administration in Sada’a provided VICE News with photographs showing remnants of Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs and associated antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions.[9]

The US-made CBU-52 and the Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh possess suspension lugs spaced at different lengths, which means the US cluster munitions were likely dropped by US-manufactured or compatible aircraft and the Soviet cluster munitions were likely delivered by Soviet-made or compatible aircraft. Saudi Arabia possesses attack aircraft of US and Western/NATO origin capable of dropping US-made cluster bombs, while Yemen’s Soviet supplied aircraft are capable of delivering Soviet-made RBK cluster bombs.

US use

On 17 December 2009, the US used at least five ship- or submarine-launched TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “terrorist group” training camp in al-Ma‘jalah in the al-Mahfad district of Abyan governorate in southern Yemen. The attack killed 55 people, including 41 civilians living in a Bedouin camp.[10] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the allegations.[11] The US has never exported the TLAM-D cruise missile.[12]

A 2010 report of the Yemeni parliament’s investigation into the attack called on the Yemeni government to investigate and “hold accountable those found guilty” of “mistakes that were made causing the deaths of…innocent victims” and called on the Yemeni authorities to compensate victims and remove cluster munition remnants from the site.[13]

The government of Yemen accepted the report’s findings in 2010, but does not appear to have implemented the recommendation to clear the contaminated area and provide compensation for the casualties caused and damaged property. An October 2013 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) found the cluster munition remnants from the 2009 attack at al-Ma‘jalah were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 more in the period since the strike. The most recent casualty was on 24 January 2012, when a young boy brought home a bomblet that exploded, killing his father and wounding him and his two brothers.[14]

 

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: AVERAGE[1]

Mines

The Republic of Yemen is contaminated with mines from a series of conflicts dating back five decades (in 1962–1969, 1970–1983, and in 1994) but instability and conflict in the last three years have added significant new contamination. Mines were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and again in the 1994 internal conflict.[2] The precise extent of contamination remaining is, though, unclear.

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in 2000 identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) containing mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) covering an estimated 922km² and affecting 592 mine villages across 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates. Yemen’s first Article 5 deadline extension request stated in 2008 that 710km² had been released and 457 areas covering 213km² remained to be “addressed.”[3]

However, additional mine contamination resulted from the 2010 insurgency in northern Sada’a governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi[4] and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.[5] The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) reported that insurgents in Sada’a had laid homemade mines, later clearing some but missing others.[6] In 2011, under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Republican Guard reportedly laid thousands of mines in the Bani Jarmoz area near Sana’a. The number of mines and the extent of the area affected remain to be determined. Information provided to YEMAC by local inhabitants in February 2014 suggested 25 villages were affected.[7]

Official data on the extent of mine contamination is inconsistent. Yemen’s March 2013 Article 7 transparency report claimed that 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates are affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and that 417km² of possible contamination remained, a quarter more than the previous year and almost double the extent of the threat reported in 2008. This included a total of 61km² where work had been suspended and 169km² where work was said to be still “ongoing.” The report said a further 200km² had been “left” for later survey or clearance.[8]

 In December 2013, Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request identified 107 confirmed mined areas covering some 8km² and 438 SHAs covering a further 338km².[9] It added it had still to survey the governorates of Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a.[10] Then in March 2014 YEMAC reported 106 CMAs covering 7.2km² and SHAs affected by antipersonnel mines covering 132km² from a total SHA of 294km². The total included 22km² of area contaminated by antivehicle mines.[11]

Cluster munition remnants

YEMAC reported it had identified 43 areas amounting to 22km² contaminated by cluster munition remnants in Sada’a governorate in 2012 and 2013 and said it had cleared 3.7km² of it. But it also believes there are cluster munitions affected areas in northwestern Hajjah governorate which it has so far been unable to survey due to insecurity.[12]

Amnesty International reported the presence of unexploded BLU-97 submunitions in June 2010 which it alleged originated from a United States (US) cruise missile attack on 17 December 2009 on the community of al-Ma’jalah in the Abyan area in south Yemen.[13]

Mine Action Program

Yemen established a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) in June 1998 by prime ministerial decree to formulate policy, allocate resources, and develop a national mine action strategy.[14] NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries.

YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.[15] It is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a National Training Center in Aden also set up in 1999 and another REMAB in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate) was added in March 2004. REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) started a program to support YEMAC in May 1999, switching from UN execution to national implementation in October 2003. In March 2013, UNDP embarked on a new US$10 million, four-year program of support, returning to “direct implementation” and providing an international technical advisor to work with NMAC and YEMAC to develop a national strategy, set priorities, and define national standards. The project document states: “the existing YEMAC technical, operational and financial resources require significant realignment to effectively respond to the challenges of mine action during the next six years: 2014–2019.”[16]

Strategic planning

In March 2008, YEMAC developed a strategic plan for April 2009 through September 2014, within the period it sought in its first Article 5 deadline extension request.[17] In December 2013, Yemen applied for a second five-year extension until 2019, identifying remaining mined area for clearance at 8.14km². The request foresees clearance of more than 1.6km² of mined area a year between June 2014 and May 2019 and allows another year for clearing any additional hazards identified during the extension period. The request identifies total expenditure of more than US$65 million over the five years, equivalent to more than $13 million a year, compared with average annual expenditure of less than $2 million over the past five years.

YEMAC’s 2014 work plan calls for clearance of a total of 2.36km² of ERW-affected areas, including 1,77km² of mine-affected land. It makes no reference to non-technical survey but sets a target of conducting technical survey on areas totaling 38.27km².[18]

Land Release

YEMAC reported releasing a total of 7.2km² in 2013, more than double the area released in 2012. Release through mine clearance was of 1.16km², a 44% drop on the previous year, and some 6km² of battle area clearance,[19] destroying in the process some 440 submunitions. Operations in 2013 were severely constrained by shortage of funds and by insecurity, factors that have carried over into 2014.[20]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2013[21]

Mine clearance in 2013 was conducted mainly in Amran, Hadramout, and Ibb governorates. YEMAC has around 1,000 staff, including 558 field operations personnel operating in six manual demining teams and three mine detection dog teams, as well as 12 technical survey teams and eight explosive ordnance disposal teams. Plans for expansion were constrained by lack of funds.

YEMAC reported conducting non-technical survey in two districts of Abyan in 2013 (Zinjibar and Khanfar) identifying 61 SHAs affected by mines and ERW covering a total of 126km² and affecting 37 villages. It said it did not cancel any land as a result of non-technical survey in 2013.[22] UNDP said technical survey was conducted over an area of 65.4km² in 2013, resulting in 58km² being “reduced” and 7.4km² marked as minefield.[23]

In March 2014, YEMAC said it suspended all clearance operations because of delays in receiving funding pledged by donors.[24] However, it was able to deploy a technical survey team and a clearance team to the area of Bani Jarmoz north of the capital Sana’a to begin demining of areas around 25 villages in two districts affected by mines emplaced by the Republican Guard in 2011.[25]

Clearance has slowed considerably during the last five years.

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009–2013 (km²)

N/R = not reported

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2008), Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2015.

In December 2013, Yemen submitted a request for a second five-year extension until 1 March 2020. The request foresees clearance of 8km² of confirmed mined areas at a rate of 1.6km² a year for five years through 2019, leaving the final year for tackling additional mined areas identified during the extension period.[26] It also reported 438 SHAs covering 338km² and says YEMAC has yet to survey significant areas of suspected contamination in Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a provinces.[27]

The request, however, raised concerns. Contamination data was not consistent with information provided in Yemen’s 2013 Article 7 report. The request foresees expenditure of US$65 million, averaging over $13 million a year, more than triple recent levels of support available to mine action in Yemen. Further, Yemen states in the request that many of its objectives are “based on speculation of what will be identified” during non-technical and technical survey and offered to provide yearly updates on the progress of survey.[28] Yemen officials acknowledged the financial constraints on operations and described the request as an interim document to give it time to more clearly define the remaining contamination.[29]

Among comments on the request at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in April 2014, Norway expressed its wish for a revised extension request containing more precise information.[30] The ICBL, noting inconsistencies between data presented in Yemen’s 2013 Article 7 report and the extensio n request, called on Yemen to conduct a comprehensive review of data and submit a revised request in 2014 or by early 2015.[31]

Support for Mine Action

Yemen reported receiving US$4.96 million in 2013, mostly from UNDP, of which $492,000 was carried forward into 2014. YEMAC planning was based on a budget of $7.2 million in 2014 but said it would adjust the plan according to funds received.[32]

Funding 2013[33]

Recommendations

·         Yemen, with technical support, should audit and rationalize its data on ERW contamination and provide a summary document setting out as of the end of 2013 the extent of confirmed and suspected mined areas by governorate.

·         Using cleaned-up data and realistic projections, a revised extension request should be submitted as soon as possible.

·         Yemen should adopt terminology consistent with international mine action standards.

 

Action points based on findings

·         Secure funding for the implementation of the national victim assistance plan.

·         Include survivors in the planning and coordination of all aspects of victim assistance.

·         Ensure that government assistance for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors is comprehensive and includes economic inclusion and psychological support, as well as medical assistance and physical rehabilitation.

·         Improve linkages between Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and the Ministry of Social Affair’s Disability Fund (MOSUL) to ensure more effective coordination and improved access to needed services and programs for all mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Yemen is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Yemen has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

In 2013, the Monitor identified 55 casualties from mines and ERW from YEMAC casualty data and other sources.[1] There were no casualties among soldiers identified in 2013; the vast majority of casualties (49 of 55) were civilians and the rest were casualties among deminers. The six deminer casualties represent a significant decrease compared with the 19 deminer casualties in 2012.[2]

The percentage of child mine/ERW casualties continued to be high, as in past years. Of the total casualties for 2013, there were 40 children, representing 73% of the total civilian casualties; 32 of these were boys; there were eight casualties among girls.[3] Nearly two-thirds of child casualties were caused by ERW as opposed to approximately half of casualties overall. Three of nine adult casualties who were not deminers were women; this represented a much higher proportion of casualties than in 2012 when women made up just 1% of all casualties.

The 55 casualties recorded in 2013 was a significant decrease compared with the 263 casualties recorded for 2012; however, it was higher than the 19 recorded in 2011 and similar to the 52 casualties identified in 2010.[4] The casualty total for 2012 was the highest annual number recorded by the Monitor for Yemen since research began in 1999 and was due to the increased population movement immediately after fighting subsided in early 2012.[5] It was also, at least in part, attributed to suspected new use of mines in the governorates of Sana’a, Sada’a, Hajjah, and Abyan in 2011–2012.[6]

Through the end of 2013, there were at least 5,840 mine/ERW casualties identified in Yemen.[7] A Landmine Impact Survey had identified 4,904 casualties through July 2000, of which 2,560 people were killed and 2,344 were injured.[8] In 2010, it was reported in the media that there were 35,000 mine/ERW casualties in Yemen since 1995.[9]

Cluster munition casualties

A cluster munition strike in Yemen in December 2009 was reported to have killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[10] No confirmed cluster munition remnants casualties have been reported.[11]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 2,828 survivors registered in Yemen as of end of 2013.[12]

Victim assistance since 1999

Yemen’s mine action center established a victim assistance department in 2001 with the aim of helping mine/ERW survivors access medical care, physical rehabilitation, and economic reintegration assistance. It coordinated, if sporadically, with survivors to identify and access survivors living in rural areas. This department’s program, supported with international assistance, has covered the cost of treatment, transport, and accommodation of survivors who receive health and rehabilitation services. International organizations and NGOs have supported Yemen’s physical rehabilitation centers since 2001, with ICRC support continuing to the present.

Each year, the victim assistance department’s program has a targeted number of survivors to reach, though it has nearly always fallen short of its target. Survivors not assisted through this program have faced significant challenges to access assistance due to the centralization of services in urban centers, far from where most survivors are. Women have faced particular challenges since cultural norms generally require that they travel with a male family member.

The economic reintegration component of the national victim assistance program was begun in 2004 with the establishment of the Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS) as the mine action center’s implementing partner for these activities. However, in most years, there has not been sufficient funding to implement this component as planned. Psychosocial support has never been included in the victim assistance department’s program and has not been widely available in Yemen. However some local NGOs, including YALS, have offered this support when possible given limited budgets.

Increasing levels of violence and insecurity led to the suspension of the victim assistance program in 2011 and prevented many survivors from traveling to needed services. For example, the Aden Rehabilitation Center, one of only four in the country, suspended its outreach program and its plans to build a new rehabilitation center, with support from ICRC, remained on hold through 2013.

Victim assistance in 2013

YEMAC reached a significantly larger number of survivors in 2013 than they had in 2011 or 2012, facilitating their access to medical care and physical rehabilitation. However, as the security situation worsened once again near the end of 2013, most survivors continued to face significant challenges in accessing all needed services. YALS lacked sufficient funding to address the demand for its economic inclusion and psychosocial support programs. No progress was identified in the implementation of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2014 and survivors did not participate in the coordination and planning of victim assistance.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, YEMAC surveyed 750 survivors of armed conflict, including mine/ERW survivors, in nine districts of the governorate of Abyan. The survey assessed the needs of survivors; results were shared with the Mine Action Working Group in Aden.[13] YEMAC also carried out a medical survey of 911 mine/ERW survivors in 51 villages in Abyan and Hajjah[14] to determine medical and physical rehabilitation needs of survivors.[15] The number of survivors reached for a medical assessment was a significant increase compared with other recent years; 295 survivors were surveyed in 2012 and just 89 in 2011.[16] YEMAC attributed this increase to the fact that, in 2013, they surveyed parts of the country that had been the site of intense armed conflict in 2011 and 2012 and thus areas with high numbers of recent mine/ERW survivors and other survivors of the armed conflict who could not be reached during the armed conflict.[17]

Victim assistance coordination[18]

While the Victim Assistance Advisory Committee remained inactive, the planning and coordination of victim assistance was discussed at meetings of the Mine Action Working Group in 2013. The purpose of the meetings was to improve collaboration among victim assistance service providers and other stakeholders and to avoid duplication of efforts. YEMAC delegated coordination with the MOSUL to YALS.[19]

In 2013, no significant progress was made in implementing the National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2014.[20] YEMAC indicated that it did not monitor the implementation of the plan in 2013.[21] The Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation integrated the Victim Assistance Strategic Plan into 2014 national plans submitted to donor states.[22]

Yemen provided an update on the details of its victim assistance program in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2013 but did not provide any update at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013.[23]

Survivor inclusion

In 2013, neither mine/ERW survivors nor their representative organizations were included in the planning and coordination of victim assistance.[24] YALS held ad hoc meetings with the Disability Fund to facilitate access to services for its members and also to meet as possible with other government ministries to advocate on behalf of its members.[25]

Through YALS, survivors were involved in implementing income-generating projects, collecting data on the needs of other survivors and in distributing mobility devices and other assistance.[26]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[27]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Government support via YEMAC for medical care and rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors, stalled in 2011 and resumed in 2012, increased in 2013. YEMAC assessed the medical and rehabilitation needs of more than 900 survivors. It referred and provided transport to 322 of the survivors surveyed to hospitals in Aden and Sana’a for medical care.[28] A survey of mine/ERW survivors in three districts of Sana’a where landmines were used in 2011 and 2012 found health services in these areas to be “very poor” with limited to no capacity to provide specialized emergency care following a mine incident. Many survivors did not receive basic care needed after their incidents because, as one survivor reported, “we were forced to hide our disabilities and our crutches fearing questioning and investigations.”[29]

International organizations such as the ICRC and MSF made efforts to sustain increased emergency relief, but planned activities continued to be hampered by unpredictable insecurity that prevented access to certain parts of the country.[30] Starting in May, the ICRC restricted staff movements and in December, temporarily suspended the operations of its sub-delegation in Amran.[31] Due to insecurity, MSF were forced to suspend their activities twice in Amran and once in Aden, further reducing access to medical care in these areas. Near the end of the year, MSF also saw a sharp rise in demand for surgeries in response to conflict-related injuries in Amran.[32]

Physical rehabilitation

Poor security conditions, the lack of service providers, and poverty, all of which made transportation and accommodation inaccessible, were the main obstacles in accessing physical rehabilitation in 2013, especially for mine/ERW survivors living in rural areas. A lack of female rehabilitation professionals prevented women from accessing needed services.[33] YEMAC facilitated access to physical rehabilitation for 258 survivors from Abyan and Amran, conflict-affected areas, and referred many persons with disabilities to MOSUL for assistance.[34] While the number of people accessing rehabilitation through ICRC-supported centers increased by 80% compared to 2012, the number of survivors receiving prosthetics in 2013 decreased to almost half the number who received this attention in the previous year.[35]

The rehabilitation center in Aden, which had already suspended its outreach service in 2011, was handed over to the Ministry of Health in 2013; no information was available as to how this handover impacted access to rehabilitation for those mine/ERW survivors living in Aden.[36] The ICRC continued to provide support to four rehabilitation centers throughout the country and made improvements to centers in Aden, Taiz, and Sana’a. At the center in Sana’a, the ICRC supported the construction of a designated physiotherapy building for women and children to overcome obstacles women and children had faced in accessing services. The ICRC continued to sponsor formal prosthetics and orthotics training for four women to address lack of female professionals.[37]

Survey interviews in Sana’a showed that most landmine survivors recently injured (in 2011 and 2012) had not received assistance in getting prosthetic limbs and other rehabilitation services. Some survivors felt that the care that was available was inadequate and traveled to Egypt to get better quality assistance. Another survivor reported a long waiting period between having measurements taken and receiving his new limb.[38]

Economic Inclusion

YALS undertook economic inclusion activities in six governorates of Yemen in 2013, providing vocational training, supporting access to education, and initiating livelihood projects for mine/ERW survivors. YALS also supported survivors to access benefits and support from MOSUL. By the end of 2013, YALS had included just 20% of all registered survivors in economic inclusion activities due to a lack of funding.[39] The ICRC provided income-generating support to 190 households with persons with disabilities in Abyan and Taiz.[40]

Psychological Support

YALS and a few national NGOs such as the AHRF continued to provide psychosocial support to mine survivors in some areas of Yemen.[41] None of the survivors interviewed from Sana’a had received any psychological support.[42]

Laws and Policies

Legislation protects the rights of persons with disabilities, but they were poorly enforced and discrimination remained. No national law mandated accessibility of buildings for persons with disabilities.[43] No improvements in physical accessibility were identified in 2013.[44]

Yemen ratified the CRPD on 26 March 2009. The Social Fund for Development and the Special Needs Association held workshops to raise awareness about the CRPD and the rights of persons with disabilities, targeting government ministries and NGOs.[45]

In 2012, the United States (US) and Germany contributed US$3,668,984 to UNDP for mine action in the Republic of Yemen.[1]

Since 2008, the government of Yemen has reported contributing at least $1.5 million per year toward its own mine action program.[2]

International government contributions: 2012[3]

Summary of support: 2008–2012[4]