South Sudan
Mine Ban Policy
Mine ban policy overview
Mine Ban Treaty status |
State Party |
National implementation measures |
No measures taken yet |
Transparency |
Provided updated Article 7 report in in April 2014 |
Policy
Less than six months after becoming an independent state on 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan joined the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 November 2011 through the rarely used process of “succession.” According to the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the Mine Ban Treaty took effect for South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the date of state independence and succession.[1]
In December 2012, South Sudan reported that it is aware of its obligations under Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty to “take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress” any prohibited activity.[2] In its 2013 and 2014 transparency reports, South Sudan reported that it is aware of its Article 9 obligation, but has not yet taken any legal measures.[3]
South Sudan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 2012 and provided annual updated reports in April 2013 and 2014.[4]
Since it became an independent state in 2011, South Sudan has participated in every Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013. It attended the treaty’s Third Review Conference in June 2014. South Sudan has participated in every intersessional Standing Committee meeting held in Geneva since 2012, including those held in April 2014.
Production and transfer
South Sudan has declared that “There are not and never have been anti-personnel mine production facilities in South Sudan.”[5] It has also reported that it “does not have capability or an amenity for the production of the anti-personnel mine and has no intension [sic] whatsoever to produce them in the future.”[6]
There is no information available on past transfers.
Stockpiling and destruction
In accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan must destroy any stockpiles of antipersonnel mines as soon as possible and no later than 9 July 2015.
Before independence, the southern-based rebel movement the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) stockpiled and used antipersonnel mines.[7]
In December 2012, South Sudan reported that it had destroyed 10,566 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and also reported the discovery of previously unknown stocks of antipersonnel mines in former camps of the Sudan Armed Forces, stating that it had discovered four PMN antipersonnel mines that would be destroyed. It listed 30 different types of antipersonnel mines that have been destroyed in the course of mine clearance operations.[8]
In April 2013, South Sudan declared that the government destroyed 6,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in March 2008 and no longer had a stockpile.[9] The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) issued a letter confirming that the previously reported statement made by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Eleventh Meeting of the State Parties in 2012, regarding discovery of new stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, was made in error.[10]
In April 2014, South Sudan again reported that 6,000 antipersonnel mines have been destroyed from stocks and said “South Sudan does not have any stockpiles of antipersonnel mine, all identified or discovered Antipersonnel Mine stockpiles have been destroyed by the competent authority in March 2008.”[11]
South Sudan is not retaining any antipersonnel mines for training.[12] This has been confirmed in its Article 7 reports.[13]
Use
There have been no reports of new antipersonnel landmines in the internal armed conflict that erupted in late 2013 and continued into 2014.
Previously, in 2011, there were several incidents in which landmines were apparently laid in South Sudan, but the Monitor could not determine who was responsible for the mine-laying and to what extent antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antivehicle mines, were being laid. The NMAA visited the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and Western Bahr El Ghazal in June–July 2013 as part of a fact-finding investigation into the landmine use allegations, where it engaged in discussions with civil authorities in each state, including the governor and the deputy governor as well as the sector and division commanders from the SPLA. Both the civil authorities as well as the SPLA denied allegations of being involved in new mine laying activities and explicitly stated that no antipersonnel mines are held in SPLA stocks. The SPLA however confirmed that new mines had indeed been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states (see below).[14]
In March 2014, the UN shared with the ICBL the seven-page report of the investigation by the three-person NMAA team led by Nyang Chol Dhuor.[15]
Non-state armed groups
Previously, in 2011, there were reports of antivehicle mine use in Jonglei state and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was quoted in media reports saying that forces loyal to George Athor, a former deputy chief of staff of the SPLA, had used mines in northern Jonglei state.[16] The SPLA also blamed Athor’s forces for “planting land mines.”[17]
The 2014 report by the NMAA found that Athor’s forces were responsible for using landmines in Pigi Country at Kurwai, Pangak, and Kolid, but found “it is clear that there were no newly planted mines neither by the SPLA or rebels in Likuangole” in Pibor Country.
Previously, in Unity state, there were reports of antivehicle mine use in 2011, claiming multiple casualties and the Small Arms Survey documented newly-laid Chinese manufactured T-72 antivehicle mines, reportedly laid by armed opposition group the South Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SSLA/M), around Mayom on 29 October 2011.[18]
In September 2011, the SSLA/M denied responsibility for landmine use and blamed the SPLA “for planting anti-personnel mines.” In January 2012, a former senior SSLA member interviewed by Amnesty International admitted that their forces had laid antivehicle landmines on Unity state roads expected to be used by SPLA forces, but denied the use of antipersonnel landmines.[19]
The NMAA report found the SSLM, “tried to plant landmines” on several roads in Unity state that it said need to be resurveyed.
[1] See, “South Sudan,” on the Mine Ban Convention website. The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004. Under the “succession” process, a newly independent state may declare that it will abide by a treaty that was applicable to it prior to its independence.
[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, December 2012. In Sudan, a Mine Action Law adopted by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010 prohibits antipersonnel mines and includes penalties for violations.
[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2014.
[4] The initial report covers the period from 11 July 2011 to 1 September 2012, while the report provided in April 2013 is for the period from September 2012–April 2013, and the report provided in April 2014 covers calendar year 2013.
[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2013. In November 2011, South Sudan informed States Parties that it does not possess facilities for the production of landmines. Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 28 November 2011. Notes by the ICBL.
[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2014.
[7] In 1996, the SPLM/A declared a moratorium on antipersonnel mine use and reasserted its pledge to not use mines in 1999. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 182. The SPLM/A subsequently signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in 2001. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 575. In January 2002, the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan signed the Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement in which both parties agreed to stop using mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 534. In 2005, the SPLM/A entered into a Sudanese government of national unity and was bound by the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 652–653.
[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms B and H, December 2012.
[9] Ibid., Forms B and D, April 2013. The report did not mention the four newly-discovered mines declared in 2012.
[10] Email from Lance Malin MBE, Programme Manager for South Sudan, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 October 2013.
[11] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2014.
[12] Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 28 November 2011. Notes by the ICBL.
[13] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, December 2012; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2014.
[14] UNMAS has been unable to independently verify the allegations due to access restrictions to the alleged sites. Email from Lance Malin MBE, UNMAS, 14 October 2013.
[15] Email to Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, from Gustavo Laurie, Acting Senior Liaison Officer, UNMAS Geneva, 13 March 2014, containing the NMAA report dated 12 March 2014 and entitled “NMAA investigation report on alleged re-mining in the Republic of South Sudan.”
[16] George Athor’s forces launched an armed rebellion against the government of southern Sudan in the aftermath of the April 2010 elections. George Athor subsequently formed a breakaway movement, the South Sudan Democratic Movement/South Sudan Army (SSDM/A). UNMIS, “Near-verbatim Transcript of the Press Conference by Mr. David Gressley, UNMIS Regional Coordinator for Southern Sudan,” Miraya FM Studios, Juba, 29 March 2011.
[17] “South Sudan ceasefire broken: Athor attacks Jonglei,” BBC News, 10 February 2011; and Ngor Arol Garang, “Sudan: South Sudan Army Retake Fangak from Athor Forces –SPLA,” Sudan Tribune, 10 February 2011.
[18] Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Unity and Jonglei states,” 5 March 2012.
[19] According to the former SSLA member, “We had some landmines but we kept many of them back. We sent intelligence guys to lay down anti-tank mines, and then attract SPLA forces to them.” Amnesty International, “South Sudan: Overshadowed Conflict,” 28 June 2012, p. 23.
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Policy
The Republic of South Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
In May 2013, a government representative informed a regional seminar that South Sudan is committed to acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Cluster Munitions.le cbut has been unable to do so until now due to competing priorities.[1] In September 2011, South Sudan said ntion on Cluster Munitions Cluster Munitions.o warned that there are “many pressing issues to address not least to capacity build all departments of government and the judiciary.a[2]
South Sudan has engaged in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since it became an independent state on 9 July 2011. It participated as an observer in 2011 and 2012 Meetings of States Parties, but was absent from the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. South Sudan attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva for the first time in 2013, but did not participate in intersessional meetings in April 2014. South Sudan participated in a regional seminar on the convention in Lomé, Togo in May 2013.
South Sudan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 November 2011.[3] It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, transfer, and stockpiling
The Monitor has no indication of any past production, export, or stockpiling of cluster munitions by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In September 2011, South Sudan stated that it “is not a user or producer of cluster munitions” and a government official informed the CMC that South Sudan does not stockpile cluster munitions.[4]
Use
In February 2014, evidence emerged showing that cluster munitions had been used in previous weeks during the conflict between the opposition forces loyal to South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, with air-support for the SPLA provided by Uganda, a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In the week of 7 February 2014, UN mine action experts found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and an unknown quantity of intact AO-1SCh submunitions by a stretch of road 16 kilometers south of Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, in an area not known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants prior to mid-December 2013.[5]
Both South Sudanese and Ugandan forces are believed to possess the air power to deliver these types of cluster munitions, which are dropped by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters, but the opposition forces are not believed to possess these means of delivery.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon drew attention to the UN’s discovery of the cluster munition remnants near Bor and condemned the use of cluster bombs in the South Sudan conflict, but did not indicate who the UN believed was responsible or if an investigation would be undertaken.[6] The CMC condemned the instance of use of cluster munitions in South Sudan and called for an immediate investigation into this new use of cluster munitions.[7]
South Sudan has denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and also denied Ugandan use of the weapons.[8] In March 2014, a South Sudan government army spokesman said “South Sudan has no capacity to use or stockpile cluster bombs; neither do the Ugandan forces who have been assisting with security in South Sudan…The war is not intensive enough to require the use of cluster bombs.”
The commander of the Ugandan forces in South Sudan, Brig. Muhanga Kayanja, acknowledged in February 2014 that his forces used helicopters to provide close aerial support to ground troops, but denied the use of cluster bombs, or any bombs, during the conflict.[9] A UPDF spokesman told media on 19 February that the Ugandan army would not take part in any investigation into the incident as responsibility rests with the South Sudanese government and international experts.[10]
By 31 July 2014, 20 countries had expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan, including Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wylbur C. Simuusa—in Zambia’s capacity as the President of the Convention on Cluster Munitions—and Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende.[11] During the April 2014 intersessional meetings of the convention, Cambodia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand made interventions expressing concern at the reported cluster bomb use in South Sudan, while 15 other states unanimously endorsed a UN Security Council resolution on 27 May 2014 that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei State and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[12]
In previous years, numerous independent sources have documented the presence of cluster munition remnants, including unexploded submunitions, indicating that the armed forces of Sudan sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan between 1995 and 2000.[13]
Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 reported two allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in the first half of 2012 in Troji and Ongolo in Southern Kordofan, a state bordering South Sudan that has seen fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army North (SPLM-N) and the Sudan Armed Forces since June 2011.
[1] Statement of South Sudan to the Loma Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomg, Togo, 23 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence.
[2] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.
[3] In September 2011, a South Sudan representative informed the CMC that the government would address its accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions after joining the Mine Ban Treaty. CMC meeting with South Sudan delegation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011. Notes by the CMC.
[4] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.
[5] UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, pp. 26–27.
[6] Statement of UN Secretary-General on South Sudan, New York, 12 February 2014. In May 2014, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) director informed the CMC that while cluster munitions had been used in South Sudan, it was not possible to determine who was responsible for the use. Email from UNMAS, 13 May 2014.
[7] CMC, “Cluster munition use in South Sudan,” undated, but 2014.
[8] See Jacey Fortin, “The Bad Bomb: Cluster Munitions, Cold Cases And A Case of Blame Game in South Sudan,” International Business Times, 12 March 2014.
[9] Human Rights Watch press release, “South Sudan: Investigate New Cluster Bomb Use,” 15 February 2014.
[10] “Ugandan army won’t take part in cluster bomb investigation,” Sudan Tribune, 19 February 2014.
[11] Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, “Norway condemns use of cluster bombs in South Sudan,” 22 February 2014; and statement by Wylbur C. Simuusa, President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 14 February 2014.
[12] The 15 states were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, and US) and 10 non-permanent members: Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, and Rwanda. See UN Security Council press statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014. See also CMC, “Cluster munition use in South Sudan,” undated, but 2014.
[13] Virgil Wiebe and Titus Peachey, hey, eachey, f the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UKid=751685id=751685" to 014_E. Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5. Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 55.
Mine Action
Overall Mine Action Performance: VERY POOR[1]
Performance Indicator |
Score |
Problem understood |
4 |
Target date for completion of clearance |
4 |
Targeted clearance |
3 |
Efficient clearance |
4 |
National funding of program |
3 |
Timely clearance |
5 |
Land release system |
4 |
National mine action standards |
5 |
Reporting on progress |
3 |
Improving performance |
4 |
MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE |
3.9 |
Contamination and Impact
Mines
During conflict in 1955–1972 and 1983–2005, mines and other munitions were regularly used in the Republic of South Sudan resulting in a mine and especially explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem. New suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) are said to be identified by survey teams on a weekly basis,[2] while the threat is being compounded by new contamination from renewed heavy fighting since December 2013.[3] The full extent of South Sudan’s contamination remains unknown but was expected to see “a substantial change in contamination levels and a significant increase in the threat posed by ERW and possibly landmines.”[4]
As of August 2014, South Sudan had 395 confirmed mined areas across all 10 states and a further 86 SHAs may contain antipersonnel mines.[5] In addition, due to the current instability in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states, access to a number of areas has been extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to identify or address contamination.
The number of antipersonnel mine victims saw a four-fold increase from 12 in 2012 to 46 in 2013.[6]
Cluster munition remnants
Since 2006, 770 sites containing cluster munition remnants have been identified across all 10 states in South Sudan, including new contamination as a result of the ongoing clashes in the country since December 2013.[7] On 7 February 2014, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) unexploded ordnance (UXO) survey teams discovered new remnants of RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and unexploded AO-1SCh submunitions on the Juba-Bor road, south of Bor in Jonglei state.[8]
As of August 2014, UNMAS reported that 95 known dangerous areas containing cluster munition remnants remained in all 10 states. Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria states are the most heavily contaminated.[9]
Cluster munition-contaminated areas as of August 2014[10]
State |
No. of contaminated areas |
Central Equatoria |
35 |
East Equatoria |
34 |
Jonglei |
5 |
Lakes |
2 |
North Bahr El Ghazal |
3 |
Unity |
2 |
Upper Nile |
2 |
Warrap |
0 |
West Bahr El Ghazal |
3 |
West Equatoria |
9 |
Total |
95 |
Mine Action Program
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—now named the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)—was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[11]
Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Thus, UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, and Yei. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), and tasking operators.[12] The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.[13]
While it is planned that eventually the NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance.”[14] UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (SCR1996) authorized the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.[15]
In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2014. The new Resolution marked a significant change from SCR1996 focusing on four areas: protection of civilians; creating the conditions for humanitarian access; reporting and investigation human rights violations; and support to the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly the majority of capacity development for Government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.
International demining operators comprised four NGOs in 2013: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S OM), MECHEM, MineTech International (MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). The Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS) was the sole functioning national demining operator.
In 2013, South Sudan had a total mine action capacity of 26 multitasking teams (MTT)—trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), manual mine clearance, technical survey (TS) and battle area clearance (BAC);[16] four road clearance/survey teams; 12 EOD teams; seven mine detection dog (MDD) teams; nine mechanical teams; and 18 risk education teams.[17] Capacity requirements for 2014 were not known due to the ongoing conflict, but it is “likely that there will be more security implications than during 2013 which may restrict access to some locations.”[18]
Land Release
During 2013, UNMAS reported the release of 213 mined and battle areas across all 10 states in South Sudan totaling 27.1km2 with the clearance of 845 antipersonnel mines, 215 antivehicle mines, and 22,018 items of UXO.[19] UNMAS reported that since 2004 a total of 8,165 hazards have been addressed, more than 1,124 km2 of land has been released, and 23,000km of road has been verified, destroying more than 32,000 landmines and 840,000 items of UXO.[20]
Land release in 2009–2013[21]
Year |
Mined area cleared (km2) |
BAC (km2) |
Area canceled (km2) |
Antipersonnel mines cleared |
Antivehicle mines cleared |
2013 |
4.33 |
5.78 |
16.99 |
845 |
215 |
2012 |
4.20 |
2.86 |
21.78 |
1,278 |
156 |
2011 |
2.62 |
5.17 |
0.64 |
3,509 |
699 |
2010 |
3.85 |
3.42 |
35.46 |
6,916 |
666 |
2009 |
3.64 |
4.31 |
987.75 |
3,158 |
349 |
Total |
18.64 |
21.54 |
1,062.62 |
15,706 |
2,085 |
Mine clearance in 2013
In 2013, a total of 135 confirmed mined areas and 24 suspected mined areas were released through technical survey and clearance over 4.33km2, destroying in the process 691 antipersonnel mines, 150 antivehicle mines, and 2,142 items of UXO.[22] Non-technical survey (NTS) activities canceled a further 16.99km2.
Release of mined area by operator in 2013[23]
Operator |
Mined area cleared/released by TS (m2) |
BAC (m2) |
Canceled (m2) |
Antipersonnel mines destroyed |
Antivehicle mines destroyed |
MAG |
47,485 |
100,293 |
12,381 |
116 |
7 |
MECH |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
DCA |
0 |
1,545 |
1,300,000 |
32 |
15 |
G4S |
1,264,319 |
2,639,340 |
8,283,519 |
212 |
0 |
DDG |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
SIMAS |
186,720 |
26,110 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
MTI |
1,756,738 |
1,486,358 |
0 |
194 |
77 |
TDI |
6,579 |
1,485,037 |
7,397,933 |
58 |
70 |
NPA |
1,069,528 |
39,464 |
0 |
230 |
32 |
Totals |
4,331,369 |
5,778,149 |
16,993,833 |
845 |
215 |
Most mined areas cleared or otherwise released in 2013 were in the states of Central, Western, and Eastern Equatoria, respectively. While these states were the most heavily contaminated, the states of Jonglei and Upper Nile have been identified as home to a significant proportion of internally displaced people and refuges and as such were high-priority areas. The relative low level of clearance activities in these states in 2013 by comparison to the Equatoria states can be explained by lack of access in Jonglei and Upper Nile due to the long rainy season and flooding that meant the majority of operations there had to be completed in January–May 2013.[24]
Mined areas released in 2013 by state[25]
State |
CHAs |
SHAs |
Total |
Central Equatoria |
65 |
6 |
71 |
Eastern Equatoria |
25 |
4 |
29 |
Jonglei |
2 |
- |
2 |
Lakes |
1 |
- |
1 |
North Bahr El Ghazal |
3 |
1 |
4 |
Unity |
1 |
|
1 |
Upper Nile |
17 |
3 |
20 |
Warrap |
- |
- |
- |
West Bahr El Ghazal |
2 |
- |
2 |
Western Equatoria |
19 |
10 |
29 |
Total |
135 |
24 |
159 |
Article 5 Compliance
In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021.
South Sudan expects to have surveyed and recorded all SHAs by the end of 2016 to facilitate the next strategic mine action planning phase, and to release approximately 5km2 of confirmed hazardous area per year through technical survey and/or clearance, corresponding to 25km2 in 2012–2016.[26] In 2012 and 2013, South Sudan were not far behind their clearance targets; however with new contamination and decreased access to contaminated areas caused by the fighting at the end of December 2013 in addition to the continued identification of suspected and confirmed mined areas, it was highly uncertain whether South Sudan can sustain this pace of land release in 2014 and beyond. NPA has reported that its deployment to several states had been suspended or delayed in Upper Nile and the equatorial states in early 2014 due to the heavy fighting.[27]
Given the current security situation, it is too early to know if South Sudan can meet its 2021 Article 5 deadline.
Cluster munitions clearance
In 2013, South Sudan reported the release of 96 cluster munition-contaminated areas totaling 634,491m2, of which 509,558m2 was cleared through TS and clearance, while 124,966m2 was canceled through NTS. During cluster munitions survey and clearance operations, 19 antipersonnel mines, nine antivehicle mines, and 1,232 UXO were destroyed.[28]
Cluster munition contaminated areas closed in 2013[29]
State |
Closed |
Central Equatoria |
14 |
Eastern Equatoria |
63 |
Jonglei |
10 |
Lakes |
0 |
Unity |
0 |
Upper Nile |
2 |
Warrap |
2 |
West Bahr El Ghazal |
0 |
Western Equatoria |
5 |
Total |
96 |
NPA is currently planning a dedicated cluster munitions survey project and has reported that it expects to find that a high number of cluster submunitions currently logged as EOD spot tasks will in fact constitute the footprint of a cluster strike and so require cluster clearance rather than individual clearance or destruction. NPA intends to use the IMSMA database as the starting point for a more comprehensive survey effort once funding for the project is secured.[30]
Battle area clearance in 2013
In 2013, eight operators conducted BAC in 54 hazard areas, during which 5,778,149m2 of area was released and 135 antipersonnel mines, 56 antivehicle mines, and 13,430 UXO were destroyed. In addition, 5,201 UXO were destroyed in EOD spot/roving tasks in 2013. The increase in BAC from 2012 is due to an increased focus on EOD and BAC tasks, in addition to the deployment of eight extra MTTs that were more mobile and reached a higher number of areas.[31]
Safety of demining personnel
There were no incidents during demining reported in 2013.[32]
Support for Mine Action
South Sudan received more than US$17.8 million in international funding in 2013 for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance from 12 donors—two more donors than in 2012 but a decrease of $1.1 million in total funding. The decrease in international support was due to reduced funding from the European Union, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States compared to 2012, along with a decrease in the value of the Yen. While 2013 marked an increase in support from Denmark and Sweden and included three donor States (Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) that had not contributed the previous year, these increases were not sufficient to match the level of funding in 2012.
No national funding was reported to by the Government of South Sudan to its mine action program,[33] but it has been previously stated that the government provides a budget to the NMAA to cover salaries and limited operational costs.[34]
Italy, Japan, and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) provided funding through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.[35] In addition, South Sudan received more than $40 million in UN assessed peacekeeping funds for mine action,[36] an increase of almost $3 million from 2012.
The combined total of all contributions towards South Sudan’s mine action program in 2013 was just over $58 million. This is in excess of the 2013 annual budget projection of some $45 million envisaged as needed under the National Mine Action Strategy 2012–2016.[37]
Recommendations
· South Sudan should develop a resource mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
· South Sudan should increase its financial contribution to the NMAA.
· South Sudan should reassess its capacity needs in light of ongoing fighting in the country and the access and new contamination issues this poses.
· Greater consideration should be given to the need for support to national operators in order to increase the pace of clearance as well as ensure sustainability.
[1] See “Mine Action Program Performance” for more information on performance indicators.
[2] Lance Malin, “The Logical Framework Approach: is this the most appropriate instrument for managing the elimination of the threat posed by landmines and ERW in South Sudan?,” 23 November 2013, p. 14.
[3] United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2014.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Annex 7 (for 2013), April 2014; and email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, Operations Section, UNMAS South Sudan, 29 September 2014.
[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J (for 2013), April 2014.
[7] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS South Sudan, 12 May 2014.
[8] UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.
[9] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 12 May 2014.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan De-Mining Authority,” undated.
[12] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iv.
[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 24 May 2013.
[14] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iii.
[15] UNMISS, “United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC],” undated.
[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rory Logan, South Sudan Programme Manager, NPA, 29 April 2014.
[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mike Rashid, NMAA, 9 May 2014.
[20] UNMAS South Sudan, “International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action,” Press Release, 4 April 2014; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 September 2014.
[21] Information on 2013 in email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 September 2014.
[22] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G (for 2013), April 2014; and emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014 and 29 September 2014.
[23] Ibid.; and 29 September 2014.
[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rory Logan, NPA, 29 April 2014.
[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Annex 7 (for 2013), April 2014.
[26] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, pp. 16–18.
[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rory Logan, NPA, 29 April 2014.
[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014; and emails, 8 May 2014 and 29 September 2014.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Rory Logan, NPA, 29 April 2014.
[31] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014, and 29 September 2014.
[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. 30.
[35] Email from Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UNMAS, 7 April 2014.
[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014.
[37] Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. 27.
Casualties and Victim Assistance
Summary findings
· There was a decline in availability of services across all pillars of victim assistance in 2013.
· Since victim assistance projects funded through the UN closed in June 2012, economic inclusion opportunities for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and other persons with disabilities have decreased significantly.
· Mainstream economic inclusion programs should be adapted to include survivors and persons with disabilities, and programs should be expanded in line with significant unmet needs.
Victim assistance commitments
The Republic of South Sudan is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. South Sudan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.
Casualties Overview
All known casualties by end 2013 |
At least 4,786 mine/ERW casualties (1,330 killed; 3,456 injured) since 1964 |
Casualties in 2013 |
46 (2012: 22) |
2013 casualties by outcome |
18 killed; 28 injured (2012: 9 killed; 13 injured) |
2013 casualties by device type |
2 undefined mine; 6 cluster submunitions; 15 ERW; 23 unknown |
In 2013, the Monitor identified 46 mine/ERW casualties in South Sudan.[1] All casualties were civilians. Children constituted 75% of all casualties for whom the age was known (33 of 44) and boys made up the single largest casualty group (25 of 44, or 57%).[2] At least three casualties were women.[3] There were no casualties among deminers in 2013.
The 46 casualties identified in 2013 were more than double the 22 casualties reported in 2012, but a significant decrease compared with 206 mine/ERW casualties in 2011.[4] South Sudan attributed the decreased number of casualties as compared with 2011 to the greater role played by mine risk education and increased marking of surveyed suspected hazard areas.[5] The high number of casualties in 2011 was specifically attributed to the movement of people (affected by conflicts in South Kordofan state and Abyei in Sudan) into South Sudan and also by the laying of new mines near South Sudan’s northern border.[6] In addition, it was believed that not all incidents in 2012 and 2013 were reported or identified due to poor communications infrastructure, ongoing armed conflict and related movements of populations within the country.[7]
A total of 4,786 mine/ERW casualties (1,330 people killed; 3,456 injured) were reported in South Sudan from 1964 through the end of December 2013.[8]
Cluster munition casualties
As of December 2013, 87 casualties from munitions were reported in South Sudan. Of the total, 71 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions. A single unexploded submunition incident that occurred in Juba in 2013 caused six casualties, among them four children who were killed.[9] The remaining 65 unexploded submunition casualties all occurred in 2009 or before.[10] Another 16 casualties which occurred during cluster munition strikes in South Sudan have been reported.[11]
Victim Assistance
As of the end of 2013, 3,456 mine/ERW survivors were identified in South Sudan.[12] In 2011, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) estimated that there were a total of some 50,000 mine/ERW victims, including survivors, their families, and the immediate family members of people killed.[13]
Victim assistance since 1999[14]
As a result of decades of conflict, since 1999 mine/ERW survivors in South Sudan have lacked basic services of all kinds. The limited services available have been almost entirely provided by international organizations. Throughout the period, emergency medical care has been inadequate to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors and others wounded as a result of the armed conflict, a situation worsened by the high number of casualties caused by the outbreak of violence at the end of 2013. Ongoing medical care reaches just a fraction of the population.
Despite the very challenging security situation, there have been some improvements in the availability of physical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors. In 1999, South Sudan had just one physical rehabilitation center, in the capital Juba. In 2003, an additional rehabilitation center at the Rumbek Regional Hospital was opened with support from an international organization. By the end of 2010, the regional government assumed full management of the center. In 2008, the ICRC introduced a physical rehabilitation training program at the Juba rehabilitation center and by 2009 it had been upgraded to a Rehabilitation Referral Center.
From 1999, there were little to no economic inclusion initiatives for mine/ERW survivors, a situation that improved somewhat with increased international funding for victim assistance from 2007 to mid-2012. These programs were implemented by national organizations, including disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and coordinated by the national mine action center with support from the UN within the framework of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011. However, these programs were insufficient to meet demand and they ended in mid-2012 when international funding ceased. Psychological support for mine/ERW survivors is entirely absent in South Sudan.
In June 2012, the government of South Sudan approved the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016, which included victim assistance. The Victim Assistance Coordination Group changed its name to the Victim Assistance and Disability Working Group and steps were taken to integrate victim assistance and disability into the work of all relevant government ministries.
Victim assistance in 2013
In 2013, there was limited to no progress identified toward the victim assistance objectives of South Sudan’s Mine Action Strategic Plan. The South Sudan Landmine Victims Association (SSLMVA) reported a decline in availability of services across all pillars of victim assistance in 2013.[15] As in previous years, a lack of transportation, the cost of transportation where it existed, insecurity including attacks on healthcare centers, and poor road infrastructure proved to be the greatest obstacles to accessing all services for survivors.[16] Funding for nearly all victim assistance projects supported through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) had ceased in 2012.[17]
Assessing victim assistance needs
No assessments of the needs of survivors were carried out by the government of South Sudan in 2013. Both Handicap International (HI) and the SSLMVA carried out surveys that included landmine survivors in 2013.
In 2013, HI surveyed persons with disabilities and landmine survivors living in Yei County. The survey also included members of the community who did not have disabilities as a control sample. The survey assessed the socio-economic context of its 644 respondents, their needs and challenges, the scope and gaps of available resources or services for respondents, and compared their status and vulnerability to that of the rest of the population. The purpose of the survey was to inform HI’s victim assistance program in this county of South Sudan.[18] HI shared information about survivors and their needs for assistance with the UN Mine Action Cluster’s sub-cluster on victim assistance in 2013.[19]
In 2013 and into 2014, SSLMVA carried out an ongoing survey of the needs of its members, including family members of mine victims and affected communities, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of service provision. The organization identified the need for increased funding to expand the survey throughout the country.[20]
Previously, needs assessments had been carried out in other areas of the country by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and the MGCSW, with support from the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and by the South Sudan Disabled Persons Association (SSDPA). Information from survey in Wau, Torit, and Bor was used to develop a national disability policy.[21] Data collected in Juba and in Upper Nile state in October and November 2010 were included in the national casualty database, maintained by the UNMACC.[22] The SSDPA needs assessment in Juba collected data on 238 survivors. The SSDPA collected data on 1,188 survivors in Upper Nile state.[23]
Victim assistance coordination[24]
Government coordinating body/focal point |
MGCSW with support from NMAA |
Coordinating mechanism |
Victim Assistance and Disability Working Group (VADWG) chaired by MGCSW and co-chaired by NMAA |
Plan |
South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 |
In 2013, the Victim Assistance and Disability Working Group continued to hold monthly meetings, chaired by the MGCSW and co-chaired by the NMAA’s director of victim assistance.[25] Participants included government ministries, DPOs, SSLMVA, NGO service providers, UNMAS, the ICRC and other stakeholders.[26]
Meetings were used to develop the victim assistance component of the UN mine action cluster strategy for 2014–2016;[27] in this strategy, the priority activities for victim assistance were to be a focus on community awareness and provision or development of:
· Basic rehabilitation services;
· Psychosocial support;
· Income-generating activities;
· Referral systems.
The strategy proposes that the subcluster “prioritize states where survivor assistance needs are of highest concern, including Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity.”[28]
Participants also used meetings to share information about activities implemented, avoid overlap in efforts, and refer survivors in need of assistance.[29] According to the SSLMVA, the meetings were also an opportunity to share information about resources needed for various organizations’ activities.[30] The VADWG also appointed focal points within government ministries and commissions to mainstream victim assistance and disability issues throughout government structures. In 2013, at least 10 focal points had been appointed.[31]
In 2013, no progress was made toward the first two victim assistance objectives of the Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016. Implementing partners shared progress toward the third objective during monthly VADWG meetings.[32] The three victim assistance objectives were:
· Establish an information system for persons with disabilities to provide reliable, systematic, and comprehensive information on persons with disabilities, including landmine and ERW victims;
· Accede to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) by the end of 2013[33] and adopt the necessary national laws to protect the rights of landmine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities;
· Ensure equal access to rehabilitation, psychosocial (including peer support) and socio-economic inclusion services for all landmine and ERW victims, as well as women, girls, boys, and men with disabilities.[34]
The limited progress toward the implementation of the strategic plan was attributed to the decrease in donor funds for victim assistance activities.[35] One source also saw it as being due to the “constant lack of transparency amongst the national NGOs that implemented VA [victim assistance] projects in past.”[36]
The MGCSW, with support from HI, held quarterly disability coordination meetings in Yei County, inviting representatives of UNMACC, the Union of Persons with Disabilities (UPD), the Landmine Survivor Association (LSA), War Wounded Hero (WWH, an organization of disabled veterans), and other relevant disability-related stakeholders. Generally, these meetings were poorly attended.[37]
Coordination between the MGCSW and the NMAC was seen to be limited due to a lack of resources that limited the activity of both entities.[38]
South Sudan reported on mine/ERW casualties and progress and challenges for victim assistance through the submission of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2013.[39] It did not make a statement at the Thirteen Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2013 in Geneva or at the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014.
Inclusion and participation in victim assistance
Representatives of the SSLMVA and other organizations of persons with disabilities were included in the monthly meetings of the VADWG. Survivors and their representative organizations participated in the development of the draft national disability policy and in the review of the South Sudanese constitution.[40] HI facilitated workshops in Yei County to collect feedback from UPD, LSA, and WWH to contribute towards the development of the national disability policy. All three groups were very actively represented in these workshops.[41]
Due to a lack of funds, the SSLMVA was largely inactive in regards to the provision of direct assistance to mine/ERW survivors in 2013;[42] however, the association collected information about the needs of survivors.[43]
The SSLMVA did coordinate with other DPOs through the VADWG[44] though this coordination was limited in 2013.[45]
Service accessibility and effectiveness
Victim assistance activities[46]
Name of organization |
Type of organization |
Type of activity |
Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2013 |
MGCSW |
Government |
Capacity building for survivor associations and DPOs |
Ongoing |
NMAA |
Government |
Support for the national Landmine Victim Association (SSLMVA) |
Ongoing |
Ministry of Social Development of Central Equatoria and Lakes States |
Government |
Physical rehabilitation through the Rumbek Center and the Nile Assistance for the Disabled Center in Juba |
Ongoing |
Central Equatorial State Government |
Government |
Physical rehabilitation and psychosocial counseling through the Juba Rehabilitation Center (national referral center) |
Ongoing |
SSLMVA |
National Survivor Network |
Participation in relevant policy-making; assessment of survivors’ needs |
Decreased geographic coverage due to lack of funds |
Equatoria State Association of Disabled (ESAD) |
National NGO |
Skills trainings and income-generating activities in Juba, Central Equatoria state; peer support for members |
Ongoing |
HI |
International NGO |
Basic rehabilitation services; training for health professionals in rehabilitation; needs assessment; referrals for victim assistance services; micro-grants to DPOs; awareness raising and advocacy on disability rights |
Ongoing; launched activities in Yei County |
Organization of Volunteers for International Cooperation (OVCI) |
International NGO |
Community based rehabilitation in Kator and Munuki districts, Juba, occupational therapy |
Ongoing; began training on disability awareness in schools |
ICRC |
International organization |
Emergency first-aid to conflict casualties and capacity-building for health centers’ emergency response; support for national Rehabilitation Reference Center (Juba) and Rumbek Rehabilitation Center; Physical Rehabilitation Unit in Wau |
Ongoing; increased prosthetic production by 50%, number of mine survivor beneficiaries constant with 2012 |
Emergency and continuing medical care
In 2013, attacks on health facilities and threats against medical personnel narrowed the population’s already limited access to healthcare. When security conditions allowed, the ICRC assisted eight hospitals in government- and opposition-controlled territory to respond to the influx of armed conflict casualties, including landmine/ERW survivors.[47] Among survivors and other persons with disabilities surveyed by HI who were in need of disability-related surgery, the main reasons given for the lack of access to these services were cost and the lack of access where they lived.[48]
Physical Rehabilitation including prosthetics
In 2013, the SSLMVA reported a decrease in the availability of physical rehabilitation for survivors.[49] The overall rehabilitation capacity in the country was insufficient to meet the demand for these services, with many survivors either unaware of rehabilitation services or unable to access the two available centers because of their distance from their homes.[50] HI began to develop the rehabilitation capacity at the Yei County hospital, training medical professionals and carrying out home visits to survivors and other persons with disabilities in Yei to assess their rehabilitation needs. HI also began to provide financial assistance and refer beneficiaries to rehabilitation services at the national Rehabilitation Reference Center in Juba.[51]
The ICRC sustained its support for the Reference Center in Juba, for South Sudan’s other rehabilitation center in Rumbek, and also for the rehabilitation unit in Wau in northwestern South Sudan that is staffed by ICRC rehabilitation specialists and which operated one week of every month. The number of mine survivors receiving prosthetic services through ICRC-supported centers was exactly the same in 2013 as compared with 2012. Overall, production of prosthetics increased by 50%.[52]
The Italian NGO OVCI continued to work to increase services to children with disabilities, including landmine survivors, through the USURATUNA Center in Juba. It also continued to develop community-based rehabilitation in districts near Juba.[53] However, these gains were somewhat offset by the loss of trained rehabilitation professionals who left their jobs, leaving the centers understaffed and causing declines in the production of prosthetics and mobility devices.[54]
Economic Inclusion
In June 2012, several projects that focused on vocational training and income-generating activities implemented by local NGOs (including survivor associations and DPOs) targeting survivors[55] were closed when the funding available through UNMAS ended, significantly reducing economic inclusion opportunities for mine/ERW survivors.[56] As of the first quarter of 2014, such opportunities remained very limited compared with the demand for these programs and the number of survivors and other persons with disabilities in need of work and employment.[57] In 2013, HI began to provide training in small business skills to mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in Yei County.[58]
The South Sudan National Commission for War Disabled, Widows and Orphans provided training and income-generating support to a limited number of people who were disabled due to armed conflict.[59]
Psychological support and social inclusion
No change was identified in the availability or quality of psychological support in 2013; available facilities and trained professionals were very limited.[60] Some survivor associations and DPOs offered peer support to their members.[61]
There was an increase in sports opportunities for persons with disabilities with the donation of wheelchairs for wheelchair basketball by the ICRC.[62] Disabled sports activities were only available in Juba.[63]
Laws and Policies
The MGCSW began developing a national disability policy in 2011[64] that was scheduled to be reviewed by the cabinet in late December 2013; however, the outbreak of armed conflict on 15 December caused an indefinite delay.[65] South Sudan reported that the development of the policy was pending the ratification of the CRPD, planned for 2014.[66]
HI constructed ramps to make public buildings and relevant services accessible as part of their victim assistance project in Yei County.[67] There were no other reported improvements in 2013 to make the physical environment more accessible for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities.[68]
Military veterans wounded in armed conflict had access to benefits that were not available to civilian victims of armed conflict, including mine/ERW victims.[69]
As of 1 August 2014, South Sudan had not signed the CRPD.
[1] All casualty details, unless otherwise specified, provided by email from Mohammad Kabir, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 6 March 2014.
[2] The age of two casualties was unknown; there were eight casualties among girls.
[3] The two casualties of unknown age were female.
[4] Casualties for previous years provided by emails from Mohammad Kabir, IMSMA Officer, UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC), 22 June 2012; and from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAS South Sudan, 14 May 2013.
[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (2013 calendar year), Form J.
[6] UN Secretary General, “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,” 2 November 2011, S/2011/678, p. 10; and UNMAS, “South Sudan: Fact Sheet,” May 2012.
[7] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAS South Sudan, 14 May 2013.
[8] Ibid., 6 March 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (2013 calendar year), Form J.
[9] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAS South Sudan, 6 March 2014.
[10] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMACC, 22 June 2012.
[11] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 56; and Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, “Chapter IV: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan,” Clusters of Death (The Mennonite Central Committee: July 2000), pp. 79–85. The casualties during cluster munition strikes were reported in locations including Akak, Bahr el Ghazal, Nimule, Magwi County, and Yei County in South Sudan in the period 1995–2000.
[12] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (2013 calendar year), Form J.
[13] MGCSW, “Victim Assistance Report Southern Sudan for the year 2010 and 2011. Southern Sudan Presentation, On States Party Meeting As From 20 To 24th June, 2011,” provided by Nathan Wojia Pitia Mono, Director General, MGCSW, in Geneva, 24 June 2011.
[14] See previous Sudan and South Sudan country profiles at the Monitor on the Monitor website.
[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, Representative, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014.
[16] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[17] Email from Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS, 2 October 2013.
[18] HI, “Baseline Assessment of Persons with Disabilities and Landmine/ERW Survivors in Yei River County, South Sudan,” May 2014.
[19] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, Director of Programs, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014.
[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[22] UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan 2010–2014,” February 2011, p. 48.
[23] Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2010; and email from Tim Horner, UNMAO, 25 July 2011.
[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (2013 calendar year), Form J.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[28] “Cluster Strategy and Monitoring Plan Template 2014-2016 South Sudan CAP,” provided by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan via email, 11 March 2014.
[29] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, Mine Risk Education/Victim Assistance Assistant, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[30] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014.
[31] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[33] Originally a goal that was aimed to be achieved by the end of 2012. South Sudan adjusted the timeframe of this objective to the end of 2013. Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, 4 December 2013.
[34] “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” June 2012, p. vii.
[35] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[37] Email from Sophie Allin, Project Manager for Victim Assistance, HI South Sudan, 23 September 2014.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, 4 December 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 9 July 2011–1 September 2012, Form J.
[40] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[41] Email from Sophie Allin, HI South Sudan, 23 September 2014.
[43] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[46] OCVI, “Sud Sudan - impegno Riabilitazione su Base Comunitaria (RBC)” (“South Sudan - Commitment to Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR)”), undated but after January 2014; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014; by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014; by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014; and by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013; ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, June 2014, p. 202.
[47] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, June 2014, p. 202.
[48] HI, “Baseline Assessment of Persons with Disabilities and Landmine/ERW Survivors in Yei River County, South Sudan,” May 2014, p. 45.
[49] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014.
[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[51] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[52] Fifty-five survivors received prosthetics in 2012 and in 2013. ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014.
[53] OCVI, “Sud Sudan - impegno Riabilitazione su Base Comunitaria (RBC)” (“South Sudan- Commitment to Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR)”), undated but after January 2014.
[54] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[55] UNMAS estimated that some 50% of the beneficiaries of victim assistance programs were persons with disabilities due to causes other than landmines and ERW. UNMAS, “VA projects comprehensive report 2007–2012,” received by email from Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS, 2 May 2013.
[56] Email from Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS, 2 October 2013.
[57] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014; and HI, “Baseline Assessment of Persons with Disabilities and Landmine/ERW Survivors in Yei River County, South Sudan,” May 2014.
[58] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[59] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013; and Government of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Commission for War Disabled, Widows and Orphans,” undated, accessed 27 September 2013.
[60] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[61] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[62] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014.
[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[64] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013.
[65] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[66] As of August 2014, South Sudan had not yet ratified the CRPD. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form J.
[67] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
[68] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Apollo Soro, SSLMVA, 25 April 2014; and by Arek John Akot Kon, UNMAS South Sudan, 24 March 2014.
[69] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Morera, HI South Sudan, 11 March 2014.
Support for Mine Action
After decades of civil war that ended with a six-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Republic of South Sudan became a state on 9 July 2011.
In 2012, 10 donors contributed US$18.9 million for clearance and victim assistance.[1]
As part of Canada’s C$1,268,693 (US$1,269,328) it provided C$40,000 (US$40,020) to the Hunger Foundation while Finland provided €100,000 ($128,590) to the ICRC for victim assistance.[2]
The UN General Assembly appropriates annual mine action budgets for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISS) operating in South Sudan. In 2012, the assessed budget for UNMISS in South Sudan was $37.3 million.[3]
Combined with $18.9 million from international assistance, and $37.3 million from the peacekeeping assessed budget, the total budget in 2012 was $56.2 million, one of the largest in the world.
International contributions: 2012[4]
Donor |
Sector |
Amount (national currency) |
Amount ($) |
Japan |
Clearance |
¥399,100,000 |
5,000,000 |
United States |
Clearance |
$2,800,000 |
2,800,000 |
European Union |
Clearance |
€2,097,000 |
2,696,532 |
Norway |
Clearance |
NOK15,000,000 |
2,578,161 |
Netherlands |
Clearance |
€1,223,760 |
1,573,633 |
Canada |
Clearance, victim assistance |
C$1,268,693 |
1,269,328 |
Denmark |
Clearance |
DKK6,605,000 |
1,140,327 |
Sweden |
Clearance |
SEK7,440,000 |
1,098,625 |
Germany |
Clearance |
€500,000 |
642,950 |
Finland |
Victim assistance |
€100,000 |
128,590 |
Total |
|
|
18,928,146 |
Summary of contributions: 2011–2012[5]
Year |
International contributions ($) |
UNMISS assessed budget ($) |
Total contributions ($) |
2012 |
18,928,146 |
37,300,000 |
56,228,146 |
2011 |
22,946,144 |
16,900,000 |
39,846,144 |
Total |
41,874,290 |
54,200,000 |
96,074,290 |
[1] Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; email from Carolin J. Thielking, European Union Mine Action Focal Point, Division for WMD, Conventional Weapons and Space, European External Action Service, European Commission (EC), 15 May 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Adam Ravnkilde, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 2013; Germany, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Amended Protocol II, Form B, 22 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Helena Vuokko, Desk Officer, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2 April 2013; Japan, CCW, Amended Protocol II, 28 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Fabienne Moust, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 19 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; Sweden, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 March 2013; and United States (US) Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington, DC, August 2013, p. 14.
[2] Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire from Helena Vuokko, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2 April 2013. Average exchange rate for 2012: €1=US$1.2859; C$0.9995=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.
[3] UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” p. 22.
[4] Average exchange rate for 2012: DKK5.7922=US$1; €1=US$1.2859; ¥79.82=US$1; NOK5.8181=US$1; SEK6.7721=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.
[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Christine Pahlman, Mine Action Coordinator, AusAID, 24 April 2012; Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire from Katrine Joensen, Head of Section, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 1 May 2012; email from Carolin J. Thielking, EC, 15 April 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Klaus Koppetsch, Desk Officer Mine Action, German Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire from Douwe Buzeman, Policy Officer Security and Development, Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 16 April 2012; email from Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UNMAS, 30 May 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 March 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Section for Multilateral Peace Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 19 June 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire from Maria Linderyd Linder, Deputy Director, Head of Section, Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 24 April 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire by Hannah Binci, Security and Justice Team, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development (DfID), 9 May 2012; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2012,” Washington, DC, July 2012; “UNMAS Annual Report 2011,” p. 35; and “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” p. 22.