Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2009, a Russian diplomat reiterated that Russia cannot accede at the moment due to the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile within four years.[1] However, Russia has also expressed support for the treaty’s humanitarian objectives.[2] In June 2009, a Russian official said that Russia is committed to the objective of a mine-free world, but stressed that any prohibition must take into account national security considerations. According to the official, Russia’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is dependent on “solving a number of technical, financial and other tasks” related to implementation.[3]

Russia attended as an observer the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia, in November–December 2009. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2010. Russian representatives did not make any formal statements at either event. Prior to the Second Review Conference, the last Mine Ban Treaty meeting Russia attended was in May 2003.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[4] It submitted a national annual report as required by Article 13 on 30 September 2009.  Russia joined CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 16 May 2008 and has submitted two annual transparency reports.

Russia reports that in order to comply with Amended Protocol II, a “National System of Technical Requirements for Landmines including antipersonnel and other than antipersonnel ones was elaborated and adopted; planned disposal of obsolete landmines is underway; new, more effective types of detection and demining tools are developed and commissioned. Marking of mine fields at the national boarder of the Russian Federation is fulfilled in full compliance with Paragraph 1 of the RF Federal Law #158FZ of December 7, 2004, ‘On Ratification of Amended Protocol II.…’”[5]

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines stopped in 1997.[6] Russia has been conducting research on modifications to existing landmines, new landmines, and alternatives to landmines since at least 1997.[7]

Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices since 1 December 1994. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russian officials have stated, most recently in June 2009, that it is still being observed.[8] Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994.  Antipersonnel mines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 28 mine-affected countries.[9]

In November 2004, Russia for the first time released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. The minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015.[10]  According to official statements, it appears that Russia has destroyed millions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2004.[11]

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).[12]

Use

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.[13] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop flows of weapons, drugs, and terrorists, and maintained that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[14]

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields.[15] Since 2006, Landmine Monitor has stated each year it will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing and active user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

In December 2009, at the Second Review Conference, the head of the Russian delegation told Landmine Monitor that during the previous few years Russia had not planted new antipersonnel mines on the territory of Russia including the Northern Caucasus republics.[16] During interviews with Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, military engineers and officers in the northern Caucasus also denied use in recent years.[17]

In light of these denials, and the fact that there have been no confirmed instances—or even serious allegations—of new use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces in 2009 or 2010 in Chechnya or elsewhere, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor will not identify Russia as a user of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. This is the first time since the inception of Landmine Monitor in 1999 that Russia has not been listed as a user.

Use by non-state actors

A Russian farmer was convicted in February 2010 after planting three antipersonnel mines around his field to stop the theft of potatoes from his farm in the eastern region of Primorye near the border with China.  In August 2009, an intruder set off one of the tripwire-type mines and was injured in the blast. The 73-year-old farmer, Alexander Skopintsev, was convicted for the unlawful construction and storage of weapons and received a two and a half year suspended sentence.[18]

The Russian domestic media regularly reports stories of bombings and attacks against state structures conducted by insurgent, separatist, or criminal groups in the Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and other locations. While many reports referred to “landmines,” it appears that in most cases armed groups used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), time-delay bombs, or antivehicle mines, according to available information in media reports.[19] Casualties from antipersonnel mines continue to occur, but the date of placement of mines, or who emplaced them, is rarely certain.

The so-called Armed Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, an armed group active in Chechnya and nearby areas, provides details, photographs and videos of their use of “landmines” against Russian forces, most of which appear to be command-detonated bombs.[20] According to information provided by the group: on 24 February 2010, after arriving at the site of an explosion in Grozny’s Avtorkhanvoskiy district that destroyed a military truck and police car, a deminer checking the area set off what was described as a landmine and was killed along with a mine detection dog;[21] on 26 February 2010, a Russian officer was injured by an antipersonnel mine or explosive booby-trap left by the insurgents;[22] and on 31 March 2010, near the village of Gansolchu in Chechnya, a local security officer was killed by a landmine planted by the insurgents.[23] 

There have also been reports of use of antivehicle mines. In January 2010, an unknown group placed four antivehicle mines on the rail line near the town of Mozdok in North Ossetia.[24] On 17 August 2009, a policeman was killed and two other policemen in were serious condition after a police car hit a landmine in Makhachkala.[25]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Russia attended the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Santiago, Chile in June 2010, but did not make any statements.

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that Russia “cannot agree to the classifications and restrictions of cluster munitions outlined in [the Convention on Cluster Munitions] because they were established with disregard for the input from the Russian Federation. Therefore, we are not considering the ratification.”[1] Russia has also said that “the definitions of cluster munitions and their prohibition” were decided “with no account for Russia’s opinion and groundless and we cannot accept them.”[2]

Russia did not participate in the diplomatic Oslo Process in 2007 and 2008 that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, it did attend as an observer the European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions in Brussels in October 2007.

In a statement released at the opening of the convention for signature in Oslo in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that cluster munitions are “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia…. We cannot stop using [cluster munitions]. We base our attitude to cluster munitions on a balance of humanitarian and defense interests. We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.”[3] Similar language was included in a September 2009 letter to the CMC.[4]  

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also noted that “Russia admits that the use of cluster munitions in the course of armed conflicts in recent years has had serious negative consequences. Seeking to make our contribution to their solution, we participate in negotiations in Geneva on this subject under the Inhumane Weapons Convention [Convention on Conventional Weapons].” [5] 

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and ratified Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 21 July 2008. Russia has said in recent years that it considers the CCW the most appropriate forum for dealing with cluster munitions, claiming that it involves the major users and producers of cluster munitions.

However, Russia has been among the states most opposed to pursuing any work internationally on cluster munitions, even in the CCW.^[6] In 2005, as other states began to look seriously at how to deal with the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions, Russia argued that the problems associated with cluster munition use are “mythical.”^[7] In November 2006, Russia rejected a proposal for a mandate to negotiate in the CCW a legally-binding instrument “that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions.”^[8]In November 2007, Russia continued to oppose a mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument and would only commit to negotiate a “proposal” as opposed to a legally-binding “Protocol.”^[9] In November 2008, after Russia and Georgia both used cluster munitions in their August conflict, Russia maintained that it was “premature to talk about a protocol” on cluster munitions.

In November 2009, Russia stated that it supported the continuation of work on cluster munitions in the CCW in 2010, but was not prepared to support concrete language mandating the CCW to negotiate a legally-binding protocol. It said that it would not object to a legally-binding instrument “so far as its main parameters would suit us and the main producers and stockpilers of cluster munitions.” It said it was willing to work on a “document” on cluster munitions, and expressed the view that there was already agreement on “significant and serious measures.”^[10]

During CCW deliberations in 2009 and 2010 through July, Russia favored retaining an optional approach to regulations on cluster munitions “where states can select what they consider appropriate” to their requirements. It has supported the inclusion of a transition period of sufficient length “to meet the economic and organizational requirements of all states.”[11] Russia has said that since it has a “large stockpile” of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” the disposal of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions types would be time consuming and result in “a significant financial expenditure,” comparable to the US$2.2 billion estimated by the US to destroy the US stockpile.[12] Russia has opposed definitions of “cluster munition” and “cluster munition victim” that mirror the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[14] Russia used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[15]

Russia most recently used cluster munitions in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46 more. Clearance personnel have found Russian air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK aerial bombs and Uragan ground rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[16]

Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia since the first reports about cluster use were published.[17]

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, a number of states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[18]

According to international technical reference materials, the following Russian companies are associated with the production of cluster munitions: Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs), Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles), and Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[19]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of the following 34 states:[20] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria,[21] Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic,[22] Egypt, Hungary,[23] Georgia,[24] Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, India,[25] Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[26] Libya, Moldova,[27] Mongolia, Peru,[28] Poland,[29] Romania, Slovakia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.  

Stockpiling

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[30] It is thought that Russia possesses a significant stockpile of cluster munitions which could number into the hundreds of millions of submunitions.

DPICM=Dual purpose improved conventional munition

A number of international reference sources note that at least two Russian/Soviet ballistic missile systems are equipped with submunition payloads—the R-65/70 Luna M (FROG-7) and Iskander (SS-26)—but confirmed details are not publicly available.[31]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines, much of it resulting from World War II, as well as from conflict in the north Caucasus since the early 1990s.

Mines have been used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the number vary greatly, because there has been no effort to comprehensively survey or catalogue the impact or scope of the problem.^[1] In 2009, Chechen officials were quoted as having estimated that 24.5km² of land was affected, of which 16.5km² was farmland.^[2] Casualties continued to occur in Chechnya in 2009, albeit at a reduced rate.^[3] In addition to Chechnya, mine incidents have been reported in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia.^[4]

Cluster munition remnants

Cluster munitions were used extensively by Russian Federation forces in Chechnya, during the 1994–1996 conflict and again during the recurrence of hostilities in 1999.^[5] The extent of residual contamination is not known.

Other explosive remnants of war

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) include ordnance from World War II as well as from the conflicts in the Caucasus. ERW are said to be a significant problem in Dagestan, especially in Botlikh, Buynaksk, and Novolaksky districts.^[6] The extent of residual contamination is not known.

There also appears to be a problem with poor management of ammunition stockpiles. On 14 September 2009 a military ammunition storage area (ASA) in Karabash, in southwestern Russia, blew up, killing a deputy commander and injuring two military personnel.^[7] The extent of any residual contamination is not known. On 13 November 2009 near Ulyanovsk, a Russian navy ASA exploded as a result of fire. This incident resulted in the death of two service personnel and 60 people were injured.^[8] The incident destroyed three munition depots and five ammunition wagons.^[9] In addition, on 23 November 2009, another explosion occurred at the same ASA as a result of UXO exploding when personnel tried to load items left after the fire on 13 November 2009 onto a truck. As a result of this second incident a further eight service personnel from a demining unit were killed and two others injured. ^[10]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by the federal Ministry of Defense Engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES),^[11] through its specialized demining units, EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks.^[12]

A special committee to deal with mine and ERW problems has been set up within Chechnya, comprising different ministries.^[13] It is not known what concrete actions this committee has carried out.

Land Release

Russia has continued to clear ordnance left over from World War II from its territory but has shown little commitment to clearing mines and ERW from Chechnya. It has not reported in detail on clearance progress.

On 22 July 2009, the Minister of Emergency Situations, Sergey Shoygu, was reported to have officially stated that “within 10 days” the ministry would set up “special groups” to demine agricultural land in Chechnya and following this statement, the president of Chechnya stated that all mines and ERW would be cleared from the territory of the republic in “a short time.”^[14] Some clearance has since taken place (see Mine and battle area clearance section below). On 23 November 2009, however, more than 10,000 people are reported to have taken to the streets of Grozny, calling for demining of all contaminated areas in Chechnya. The head of the Chechen parliament delivered a speech in which he stated it was impossible to achieve this goal without the support of federal ministries of defense and emergency situations.^[15]

In May 2010, it was reported that the Chechen Parliament had resolved to formally request Moscow to assist with clearing minefields in the republic.^[16]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009

Russia has reported only partially on clearance within its territory, and does not disaggregate between mine and battle area clearance.

During 2009, two clearance operations were conducted in Chechnya by specialist personnel from the Ministry of Emergency Situations. In the first, 650,000m² of land was reportedly cleared in the area around Grozny, with the destruction of 183 ERW.^[17] In the second, an additional 1.1km² was said to have been cleared, with the destruction of a further 349 ERW.^[18]

Russia has also reported that during 2009, Ministry of Defense Engineers destroyed a total of 255,329 ERW. The area cleared and their locations were not specified.^[19]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

UNICEF has been supporting mine/ERW risk education (RE) in Chechnya, but received only limited funding for its activities in 2009, from the United Kingdom. At the end of March 2010, lack of funds forced it to suspend its RE program.^[20]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

In 2009, the total number of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Russia was not known. Casualties from explosives, particularly those involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), occurred regularly in Russia due to insurgent use in the South Caucasus and in criminal activities throughout the country. Most of the incidents reported were clearly caused by command-detonated devices.[1] However in other cases the types of devices involved could not be identified.[2]

In Chechnya, where there was more reliable casualty data available, 17 casualties were reported in 2009. Nine of the total casualties were reported by UNICEF (two killed and seven injured) and the other eight casualties were identified from media reports. Most casualties were civilian (13 or 76%), two were security personnel, one explosive ordnance disposal personnel was killed in a demining accident, and the civilian/military status of one casualty was unknown. At least three casualties were children; the age of one was unknown.[3] A similar number of casualties were reported in Chechnya for 2008 (18), 12 of which were reported by UNICEF (five killed and seven injured). The 2008 and 2009 casualty rates are the lowest for Chechnya since the beginning of Landmine Monitor reporting in 1999.[4] No casualties from cluster munition remnants were identified for 2009.

UNICEF reported a total of 3,115 casualties in Chechnya (727 killed and 2,388 injured) from 1994 to 2009.[5]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 612 casualties during use in Chechnya (294 people were killed and 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. Another 26 casualties caused by unexploded submunitions were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[6]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known, but are in the thousands. Most mine survivors in the Russian Federation are war veterans from the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the South Caucasus, and civilian casualties in Chechnya. At least 2,388 people have been injured by mines/ERW in Chechnya since 1994.[7] No needs assessments for mine/ERW survivors were reported in 2009.

Victim assistance coordination

There is no specific victim assistance coordination in Russia. The Ministry of Health and Social Development is responsible for programs and benefits for persons with disabilities.[8] The federal program “Social Support for Persons with Disabilities 2006­–2010,” includes a sub-strategy on “Social support and rehabilitation of those disabled as a result of conflict and war trauma.”[9]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Mine/ERW survivors in Russia are assisted with the same services as other persons with disabilities or as disabled veterans from post-World War II conflicts.

Numerous war veterans’ groups and associations of disabled war veterans in many regions of Russia advocated for improved benefits and implementation of legislation and also provided services including physical rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration activities.[10] Five major rehabilitation centers provided free treatment, including prosthetics, rehabilitation, and psychosocial support to war veterans, including amputee mine/ERW survivors.[11] No significant changes were reported in 2009.

Russia has legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. However, these laws were not adequately enforced. Persons with disabilities continued to face discrimination and denial of equal access to education, employment, and social institutions. Federal law required that buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities; in practice most buildings were not accessible.[12]

Russia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 24 September 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 19 July 2010.

Victim assistance services in Chechnya

Programs and activities which specifically included direct assistance to mine/ERW survivors in Chechnya continued to decrease rapidly in 2009.

The overall security and health sector situation gradually improved.[13] Several government-run medical facilities were renovated or opened in 2009. These included services offering trauma care and psychological support.[14] Hospitals reporting to the ICRC provided services to more mine/ERW survivors than in 2008.[15]

In 2009 Handicap International (HI) provided equipment and orthopedic fittings for amputees and supported medical facilities which provided services for people with disabilities. From mid-2009, HI reoriented its services in Chechnya towards supporting associations of parents of children with disabilities. HI’s regional program office moved from Moscow to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.[16] The ICRC reported that the Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Centre, which was fully financed by Chechen local authorities, produced more prosthetic and orthotic devices in 2009 than in 2008 when ICRC support ended.[17]

In 2009, UNICEF ended its support to psychological assistance programs and did not support victim assistance activities, including those of the local NGO, Let’s Save the Generation, due to a lack of funding.[18] In August 2009, Let’s Save the Generation’s director, Zarema Sadulayeva, was murdered. Further assistance activities in physical and psychological rehabilitation to children with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors were not reported.[19] Local NGO, Voice of the Mountains (Laman Az) provided some social reintegration activities through sports.[20]

In July 2009 the government of Chechnya established a Council of Persons with Disabilities under the auspices of the President of the Republic.[21]