Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The government has in the past stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process, and an agreement to ban landmines by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).[1]  The civil war in Sri Lanka ended on 20 May 2009.

In October 2009, Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General J. Jayasuriya gave a keynote address at a seminar co-organized by UNICEF and the ICBL (Sri Lanka Campaign). He said that since the end of the conflict, the government had reviewed Sri Lanka’s position on the Mine Ban Treaty. He stated, “In the current post-conflict phase in Sri Lanka, it is timely that we focus our attention on the international legal instruments that limit or ban certain weapons based on humanitarian grounds,” referring to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[2] Lieutenant General Jayasuriya said that at the end of the review, the government decided to submit an updated voluntary Article 7 transparency report.[3]

Sri Lanka sent an observer to the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartatena, Colombia in November–December 2009, where it assured States Parties that Sri Lanka “fully subscribes” to the humanitarian objectives of the treaty, and pledged to submit a second voluntary Article 7 transparency report.[4]  Sri Lanka did not participate in the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

Sri Lanka voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 64/56 on 2 December 2009, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has for every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka is party to the CCW and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted an annual Article 13 transparency report.  It has not joined Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Since the end of armed conflict in May 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has not received any reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by any entity.

Sri Lanka Army

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has a stockpile, but its current size and composition are not known.

In April 2009, Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) acknowledged that the army had used antipersonnel mines in the past, but stressed that such use was only in the past. He said the army had used non-detectable Belgian, Chinese, and Italian mines, as well as bounding and fragmentation mines of Pakistani, Portuguese, and United States manufacture.[5] Landmine Monitor had previously reported that Sri Lanka had acquired antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (and/or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the US, and others.[6]

In October 2009, Army Commander Lieutenant General Jayasuriya said that, “the use of mines by the Sri Lankan military is strictly limited and restricted to defensive purposes only…to demarcate and defend military installations....”  He said mines are “marked accordingly and relevant records systematically maintained….”[7]

Landmine Monitor previously reported that there were serious allegations of use antipersonnel mines by Sri Lankan security forces in 2007 and early 2008, and that Sri Lanka strongly denied all accusations.[8]

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

From the time of the cease-fire in February 2002 until mid-2006, Landmine Monitor received few allegations and no compelling reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LTTE, other than command-detonated Claymore-type devices that are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.  From mid-2006 until early 2009, the SLA repeatedly accused the LTTE of planting antipersonnel mines.[9]

 It appears that in 2008 and 2009, the LTTE laid large numbers of mines in defense of its military installations throughout the north. An SLA representative said that they came across many new mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and booby-traps between late November 2008 and March 2009.[10]

In October 2009, the SLA’s Commander stated, “With the end of conflict in Sri Lanka, large quantities of mines laid by the LTTE in the former LTTE dominated areas have been recovered and are continuing to be recovered by the Army during the past five months.” He claimed that, “it was evident that the LTTE had laid millions of mines in areas under their control.”  He said that the “greater proportion of the mines are antipersonnel type and they can be found virtually anywhere from unmarked minefields to agricultural lands, houses and home gardens….”[11]

In addition to the mines in the ground, the SLA has continued to find numerous caches of LTTE antipersonnel mines. In a survey of SLA reports and news articles between July 2009 and May 2010, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor recorded the recovery of more than 36,000 antipersonnel mines, as well as a large number of antivehicle mines, Claymore mines, and IEDs.[12] This does not constitute a comprehensive accounting.

Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Jayasuriya stated that the SLA had discovered factories of the LTTE in which mines had been manufactured and stored in large quantities.[13] During the late stage of the conflict, the SLA encountered at least two large LTTE factories producing exclusively antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines in Kilinochchi and Mullaittivu districts, as well as more than 10 makeshift antipersonnel mine production facilities.[14]

Prior to its demise, the LTTE was considered expert in making explosive weapons. It was known to produce several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), fragmentation antipersonnel mines from mortars, and variants of some of these antipersonnel mines, including some with antihandling features (including Rangan 99 antipersonnel mines with a motion sensor),[15] as well as Amman 2000, MK1, and MK2 antivehicle mines.[16]

Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Since the conclusion of the conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, the government has showed increased interest in the convention.

In October 2009, Sri Lanka Army Commander Lieutenant General J. Jayasuriya gave a keynote address at a seminar co-organized by UNICEF and the ICBL (Sri Lanka Campaign). He stated, “In the current post-conflict phase in Sri Lanka, it is timely that we focus our attention on the international legal instruments that limit or ban certain weapons based on humanitarian grounds,” referring to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[1]

He stated, “Where the cluster munitions are concerned, I wish to categorically state that such inhumane weapons have never, and will never be used by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces.”[2]

In November 2009, Sri Lanka sent representatives from the military to the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Bali, Indonesia. They did not make any statements at the meeting. Sri Lanka did not participate in the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

Sri Lanka only attended one of the diplomatic Oslo Process conferences to develop the convention, in Vienna in December 2007. It did not intervene.

Sri Lanka is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sri Lanka is party to the CCW, but has not ratified Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Sri Lanka has not been an active participant in CCW discussions on cluster munitions in recent years.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

There were media reports of Sri Lanka using cluster munitions against the LTTE in 2008 and 2009, but Sri Lanka strongly denied the claims, and there has been no compelling evidence of such use.[3] Sri Lanka has said that it does not possess cluster munitions.

The Sri Lankan government’s Media Center for National Security posted the following statement on its website in February 2009: “The Government wishes to clarify that the Sri Lanka army do not use these cluster bombs nor do they have facilities to use them.”[4] The Ministry of Defence website posted a statement saying Sri Lanka never fired cluster munitions and never brought them into the country.[5]  Military spokesperson Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara was quoted stating, “We don’t have the facility to fire cluster munitions. We don’t have these weapons.”[6]

Sri Lanka possesses both aircraft and rocket launchers capable of deploying cluster munitions. In February 2009, the CMC wrote a letter to Sri Lankan President Rajapaska asking the government to officially state whether Sri Lanka possesses cluster munitions and to provide “clarification on whether Sri Lanka has imported either cluster bombs for use in Kfir attack aircraft or 122mm cluster rockets for RM-70 rocket launchers.”^[7] Sri Lanka did not respond.

Contamination and Impact

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), mostly in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Contamination posed a major obstacle to resettlement of nearly 300,000 people who were left displaced at the end of the conflict and to economic and social rehabilitation of the north.[1]

As of July 2010, Sri Lanka had identified 1,469 hazardous areas affected by mines and ERW covering a total of 537.7km², but 23 northern areas that had not been opened up to demining operators by the military remained to be assessed, including 17 in Mullaitivu district, four in Mannar district, and two in Vavuniya district.[2] The Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting for many years, had 3.2km² of confirmed minefields and 17.3km² of confirmed hazardous areas contaminated by ERW.[3]

Mines

Both sides made extensive use of landmines, including belts of Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and long defensive lines using a mixture of mines and booby-traps laid by the LTTE defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi. The LTTE also left extensive nuisance mining in many northern districts, particularly in areas of intense fighting and often emplaced as its fighters retreated in the face of army offensives.[4]

Operators encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including antipersonnel mines with antitilting and anticlearance mechanisms, and often containing a larger explosive charge (up to 140g) than Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines (30g). They also encountered tripwire-activated claymore mines, and to a lesser extent antivehicle mines.[5] According to HALO Trust, evidence from survey and subsequent clearance operations confirmed what had been suspected, that the LTTE significantly increased production of mines since conflict escalated in 2006. The majority of new mines were based on the basic Jony 99 or Rangan 99 type.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

A UN spokesperson alleged the government had used cluster munitions in a bombardment in February 2009,[7] but after further investigation retracted the statement.[8] At a workshop on international law organized by UNICEF on 27 October 2009, the SLA’s commander categorically denied having used cluster munitions during the conflict.[9] In clearance operations since the end of the conflict operators say they have not encountered cluster munition remnants.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Renewed conflict in 2006 is believed to have resulted in extensive new UXO contamination, particularly in the northern Vanni region, as a result of government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks, which reached a peak in 2009 as government forces sought to capture the last LTTE positions.^[11] Both the SLA and operators reported finding caches of mines and AXO. Operators also reported encountering mortars, grenades, air-delivered rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices or booby-traps, including mortar shells rigged with trip-wires and sometimes linked to mines.^[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Management of mine action entered a transition phase in 2009 spurred by the end of the conflict with the LTTE in May which created new political and humanitarian imperatives. The Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF) led by Basil Rajapakse, a member of parliament and senior advisor to the president, emerged as the highest authority setting the strategy for mine action. After the end of fighting in May 2009, the PTF decided mine action priorities and allocated operators areas for survey and clearance. In 2010, the PTF retained ultimate authority for mine action but focused mainly on overall strategy.

In 2009, the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development continued as the lead ministry for mine action, supported by UNDP. It acted as chair of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which comprises all stakeholders, including government departments, operators, and donors. The NSCMA met once in 2009 in May and again in February 2010 but appeared set to increase the frequency of its meetings and to limit the scope of participation to government and UN agencies.[13]

UNDP provided support through a project office in Colombo and through District Mine Action Offices in Vavuniya and Jaffna and sub-offices in Batticaloa and Mannar.[14] UNDP had worked without international technical advisors (TAs) in Sri Lanka since November 2006, but a Vavuniya-based TA started work in November 2009 and a second TA started in Jaffna in February 2010.[15] UNDP’s agreement with the Ministry of Nation Building, under which it supported preparatory arrangements towards the set up of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) (including the placement of government staff in key mine action positions at the national and district levels and their related operations costs), expired at the end of 2009 and was extended in January 2010 which included a grant of some US$40,000 to support national staff and mine action operations in 2009–2010.[16]

The government proposed the setting up of a transitional NMAC in 2009 to act as its coordinating body for mine action with responsibility for accreditation, national mine action standards, data management, and operational coordination. The NMAC was initially located within the Ministry of Nation Building until the ministry was dissolved and in mid-2010 it was placed under the newly created Ministry of Economic Development.[17] The NMAC had eight staff as of July 2010 but expected the number to rise to 13 by the end of the year.[18] The cabinet approved creation of the NMAC in July 2010.[19]

UNDP’s grant included support for hiring six national staff for the NMAC. UNDP planned to recruit an international TA in 2010 to be based in Colombo to advise the NMAC on management coordination, strategic planning, resource mobilization, and all aspects of demining operations.[20] UNDP said it will “continue to work with the government during the initial stages of the establishment of NMAC and will eventually follow a phase-out strategy over the next two years.”[21]

In addition, according to UNDP steps were underway as of July 2010 to bring the SLA Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), under the purview of the Ministry of Economic Development, with the intention of bringing the unit under civilian management but with continuing technical support from the SLA.[22]

Until May 2009, UNDP maintained the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at its office in Colombo. In May 2009, the database was transferred to the field.[23] In 2010, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and UNDP started verifying the database as a prelude to introducing IMSMA New Generation, expected to start in September 2010. Verification found the data from Jaffna and Kilinochchi in good condition but found problems, including significant duplication, in data from Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and the national database.[24]

Recent program evaluations

A review of mine action programs receiving Norwegian support, conducted by an independent contractor in February–March 2009 (before the conflict with the LTTE had ended), found the national mine action program “in some disarray.” The report observed that “the mine action program in Sri Lanka is not presently planned according to good practice standards and processes. The Ministry of Nation Building and the UNDP as its counterpart had little capacity and competence and the mine action database (IMSMA) had not been updated and consequently not used for strategic planning.”[25] UNDP disputed the findings, observing that the IMSMA database had been updated and synchronized and was used for planning and other purposes, including tasking and monitoring.[26] The review concluded that “the planning, prioritisation and tasking of national authorities leave much to be desired and this has a real and negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the mine action work.”[27]

Land Release

Sri Lanka reported the release of a total of 897.41km² during 2009, but 81% of this was a result of cancellation by non-technical survey or general assessment.[28] Despite constraints on all forms of mine action as a result of the intensified conflict from 2008 until May 2009, minefield clearance accelerated sharply in the second half of 2009 and by the end of the year had dramatically exceeded clearance in any previous year, although the amount of battle area cleared was lower than in the previous two years. Based on discussions with demining operators, it appears likely that significant quantities of battle area clearance (BAC) have been wrongly reported as mine clearance.

The acceleration in demining in the second half of 2009 was made possible by the defeat of the LTTE in May and driven by government urgency to resettle some 280,000 people displaced by the fighting in the north. The PTF observed in July 2009 that demining was “the foremost operation in order to enable resettlement and other development initiatives.”[29] By the end of 2008, demining operators had largely completed clearance of tasks assigned in eastern Sri Lanka and Jaffna and some operators cut back staff.[30] In mid-2009, the PTF opened up areas of northern Sri Lanka for demining and operators rapidly expanded capacity to meet the government’s demand for survey and clearance.

According to HALO, the annual statistics for 2009 only reflect the equivalent of about six months’ work. Some donors did not commit funding for demining until better access was granted and resettlement from the camps commenced. The consequence for demining agencies was that they were unable to scale up sufficiently until well into the second half of the year. For three months (July to August) most demining agencies were tasked to clear in the (relatively small) Mannar “rice-bowl” area. Access to the Vanni region (proper) was only afforded to HALO (and later DDG) from September 2009. This is reflected in the dramatically increased clearance results from early 2010 (by which time work had commenced on some of the larger minefields identified as causing greatest impact on resettlement).[31] 

Five-year summary of land release by clearance

Survey in 2009

Government efforts to resettle northern internally displaced persons (IDPs) as fast as possible put operators under pressure to accelerate survey and release of land. DDG reported assessing the whole of the 670km² Poonakary division but found most of it free of contamination. In the remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), however, DDG reported contamination was so dense it would likely take years to clear.[32]

The depopulated state of northern areas affected by conflict posed a number of difficulties for the conduct of non-technical survey or general assessment. Operators relied heavily on knowledge of the progress of conflict in particular areas among SLA personnel and on physical evidence of conflict.[33] Where non-technical survey did not produce enough evidence to release land, UNDP said clearance teams were sent to do technical survey or full clearance. As much of the area assessed or non-technically surveyed in 2009 was largely depopulated, UNDP and operators considered it would be necessary to send non-technical survey teams to some areas three to six months after they had been resettled to update survey findings with the benefit of local knowledge.[34]

The United States Department of State, responding to a request by HALO, supplied high resolution satellite imagery of hundreds of square kilometers of northern Sri Lanka which enabled operators to obtain precise mapping of major LTTE defensive positions and to assist the classification of land and prioritization of clearance. HALO believed the satellite imagery represented “a major leap for survey and coordination of demining in general.”[35]

Mine clearance in 2009

The NSCMA reported a dramatic increase in total mined area clearance in 2009 to 62.23km², up from 4.33km² in 2008. This included more than 44km² attributed to the SLA’s HDU, which was reported to have manually cleared 2km² in 2008.[36] Clearance by seven NGOs also rose sharply to 17.79km² in 2009 compared with 2.33km² the previous year.[37] However, the government did not require operators to distinguish between manual and BAC in reporting on operations in the second half of 2009. As a result the manual clearance total is thought to include significant amounts of BAC, and the BAC results may not show the full extent of that activity.[38]

The HDU provides the biggest demining capacity, operating with a maximum of 1,290 deminers and 60 flail operators, but, as of March 2010 750 deminers were assigned to humanitarian demining under the Ministry of Nation Building, mostly in Mannar district. The remainder were operating under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and the SLA.[39] HDU mechanical capacity was increased to a total of 29 Bozena flails in 2009,[40] including 10 that were provided by international funding, and the remainder of which were bought by the Sri Lankan government at a cost of $13 million.[41] The SLA said it used flails to help define the perimeters of mined areas before deploying manual demining teams for clearance. In 2010, the HDU also took delivery of 50 large-loop detectors provided by China, bringing its total number of these detectors to 75.[42]

Tasks undertaken by the HDU in 2009 included extensive clearance of roads, including 62km of the A9 road linking the south with Jaffna, closed for many years because of conflict with the LTTE; religious sites; a radio transmission complex; areas needed for infrastructure, such as power lines and railways; and land needed for agriculture.[43]

By the start of 2009, civilian demining organizations had sharply reduced their human resources after completing tasks in Jaffna or eastern Sri Lanka and while authorities had stopped assigning new areas for clearance as conflict escalated in the north.

With the defeat of the LTTE, the government called for rapid clearance of areas previously closed to operators to facilitate IDP resettlement. FSD, which had engaged less than 100 nationals in 2008, increased its operation to 288 staff with nine teams by the end of 2009 supported by four flails and a heavy roller.[44] HALO similarly increased human resources from 30 at the start of 2009 to 426 by the end of the year and 600 by April 2010.[45] MAG expanded from one mine action team to 10 and from two mechanical teams to seven, with plans to also increase its mechanical assets.[46]

Mine clearance in 2009[47]

* In July 2010, DDG reported clearance of 3,985,728m² of mined area in 2009, with the destruction of 3,374 antipersonnel mines.[48]

** In July 2010, HALO reported clearance of 0.26km² in 2009, with the destruction of 3,929 antipersonnel mines.[49]

*** In May 2010, MAG reported clearance of a total of 5,626,200m² in mine and BAC in 2009.[50]

**** In June 2010, Sarvatra reported clearance of 0.75km² of mined area in 2009, destroying 5,531 antipersonnel mines and 635 items of UXO in the course of mine clearance.[51]

Battle area clearance in 2009

The total BAC of almost 107.6km² reportedfor 2009 was more than one-third down from 2008, largely as a result of a drop in the amount of BAC conducted by the SLA from 121km² in 2008 to 55.36km² in 2009. However, it is thought some BAC in 2009 may have been reported as minefield clearance (see Mine clearance in 2009 section above).

BAC by NGOs was up 20% from the previous year. However, HALO noted that it engaged in BAC as a necessary first step because of the lack of information available to survey teams prior to return of the population to areas of conflict. As the pace of resettlement accelerated in 2009–2010 HALO said it was increasingly difficult to justify BAC and reverted increasingly to a combination of mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs conducted in cooperation with the SLA.[52]

Battle area clearance in 2009[53]

* In July 2010, DDG reported clearance of 0.47km² of battle area in 2009, with the destruction of 3,382 items of UXO.^[54]

** In July 2010, HALO reported clearance of 13.54km², with the destruction of 1,417 ERW.[55]

Community liaison

Demining organizations were not permitted by the government to conduct risk education (RE) anywhere in the country, but could undertake community liaison within their operating areas and in support of demining.[56] Operators including FSD, MAG, HALO, and Sarvatra, undertook community liaison as part of the hazard assessments they conducted in their operating areas to tap any available community knowledge for the assessment of contamination, to promote awareness of the mine/ERW threat, and to strengthen the channel for reporting of any hazards.[57]

Quality management

Quality assurance (QA) of demining operations in 2009 was conducted by eight staff operating from UNDP sub-offices in Vavuniya (five staff) and Jaffna (three staff). By July 2010, UNDP had 28 staff for QA and was preparing to open sub-offices in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.[58]

Safety of demining personnel

An expatriate FSD advisor was killed in May 2010 when ordnance he was handling detonated. FSD said two national staff were injured “in a related incident.”[59]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Conflict between the government and LTTE brought formal mine/ERW RE programs to a standstill in the northern Vanni region (Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi) until November 2009, but it continued in Mannar, Mullaitivu, and the eastern provinces through a variety of channels. These included training of education staff including school-principals, in-service advisers, and teachers, and RE programs conducted by national NGOs Community Trust Fund (CTF), Sarvodaya, EHED-Caritas, and Social Organizations Networking for Development (SOND). RE reportedly reached 252,953 people over the year, mainly in Menik Farm, Vavuniya, Mannar, and Jaffna. Plans to include RE in the national school curriculum were accepted by the Secretary of Education but were not implemented in 2009.[60] Lessons and additional teaching materials were developed in a workshop held in May 2010.[61]

In October 2009, the PTF requested that UNICEF conduct an emergency RE program that was initially planned for two months from the last week of October until the end of January 2010, targeting Tamil communities displaced by fighting. In that period, RE reached more than 114,000 people and Internews project public service announcements were broadcast on three major Tamil radio stations almost every hour after the news.[62]

Most elements of the program continued until July 2010. It involved direct community-based RE, RE in schools, and dissemination of information through the mass media. In addition to CTF, Sarvodaya, EHED-Caritas, and SOND, Internews, a US-based NGO supporting media in emergency situations, became involved, broadcasting reports and public service announcements on ERW hazards.[63] International demining NGOs also provided emergency RE in newly resettled areas.

In 2010, the program expanded further with the participation of a national NGO, the Rural Development Fund. In the first five months of the year, the program delivered RE to 185,604 people, mostly in Jaffna, Vavuniya, and Mannar, but also in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. The government reached an agreement with Internews in June 2010 authorizing it to conduct road shows going from village to village and visiting schools. UNICEF also trained six RE teams with a total of 64 people from the HDU, mostly Sinhala-speaking. By June 2010, the teams still did not have their own vehicles and UNICEF requested them to set up mine sign gardens—exhibitions of mine/ERW safety messages located along major roads and intended to inform tens of thousands of Sinhala tourists that have been traveling north to Jaffna since the end of fighting opened road access.[64]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified a total of 38 casualties in Sri Lanka in 2009. UN agencies reported 28 civilian mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties. Four people were killed and 24 injured in 18 incidents. Of the total civilian casualties, 18 were adults (15 men and three women) and 10 casualties were children (nine boys and one girl).[1] Another 10 mine/ERW casualties were identified in media reports (two killed and eight injured). All were military; one was an engineer attempting to defuse a stock of antipersonnel mines.[2] 

Landmine Monitor identified at least 79 new mine/ERW casualties in Sri Lanka for 2008. UNDP recorded six civilian casualties, including one deminer: one person killed and five injured in four incidents. The rest of the casualties were identified through media reports.[3] From 2006 to 2009 accurate casualty information was difficult to access, probably resulting in under-reporting.[4] The decrease in mine/ERW casualties recorded from 2008 is not likely indicative of a trend, particularly in the case of military casualties during the conflict.

It was reported that since the 1980s, there were a total of 21,993 landmine casualties, including 1,419 civilian returnees. According to the same report, 3,770 amputees had been recorded among the armed forces, police, and civil defence forces; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had had 16,804 mine casualties.[5] A limited survey carried out in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2009 indicated that a large number of IDPs had mine-related disabilities; 750 people with amputations were identified, many had been injured while fleeing conflict in the last months of the conflict.[6]

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 1,310 casualties in Sri Lanka from 1999 to the end of 2009 (123 killed, 453 injured, and 734 unknown).[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Sri Lanka was estimated to be in the thousands. [8]

Generally data on war injuries and disabilities was not available and the topic was highly sensitive in the post-conflict context in Sri Lanka.[9] It was planned to establish a fully functional data collection mechanism on persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, and available services, by the end of 2010. In 2009, the system remained in discussion and no concrete progress in establishing a system was made.[10]

However, some pilot assessment activities were undertaken in 2009. Limited screening of people with physical injuries in four zones of the Menik Farm IDP camps was undertaken by Handicap International in September 2009.[11] UNICEF partnered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Ministry of Health and Nutrition (MoHN) to implement a Retrospective Community and Household Survey in Jaffna (the most mine-affected district) in July through September 2009. The survey included questions for measuring the impact of mines/ERW. Almost 30% of communities surveyed were found to have residents with mine/ERW-related injuries.[12] The survey was undertaken to create a 10-year baseline to support the MoHN in expanding its injury surveillance system.[13]

Victim assistance coordination[14]

UNICEF organized quarterly Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings at which victim assistance was discussed with relevant stakeholders, including UNDP and the Ministry of Social Services and Social Welfare (MoSS). The meetings analyzed needs, planed activities, and sought agreement on common approaches.[15] A national strategy on victim assistance had not been developed by the end of the year as efforts were focused on building relationships to encourage key government partners to carry out their responsibilities.[16]

The MoHN Directorate of Rehabilitation for Youth, Elderly, Disabled and Displaced and the MoSS shared responsibility for disability issues more generally.[17] Coordination among key physical rehabilitation stakeholders took effect during 2009 with the MoHN increasingly taking on a lead role.[18]

UNICEF worked with victim assistance officers from the staff of NGO partners who supported victim assistance coordination and facilitated access to services for persons with disabilities. Coordination networks for people with disabilities also existed in some mine-affected districts, including Batticaloa, Mannar, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya.[19] Attempts to revive disability coordination in Jaffna began in 2010.[20]

Disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) are included in the various coordination mechanisms. Survivor representatives and persons with disabilities also participated in TWG meetings and played key roles in the drafting of the victim assistance strategy for 2010. [21]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[22]

The situation for persons with disabilities (including mine/ERW survivors) reportedly improved during 2009, following the end of the conflict.[23] However there were few reports of improvements in the quality of services in 2009.

UNICEF found that there was a large funding gap for victim assistance due to the relatively slow donor response in 2009. This was in part a result of competing humanitarian needs and concerns about access and security, and also since victim assistance received less attention from donors overall than other areas of mine action.[24]

In 2009, medical structures in government-controlled areas struggled to cope with the large influx of patients from the conflict zone. The ICRC supported some hospitals and medical facilities, but planned war-surgery seminars and emergency-room trauma courses were cancelled as medical staff were overstretched by the high numbers of casualties. Facilities in LTTE-controlled areas suffered from decreasing staff levels and a lack of supplies.[25] HI established a temporary emergency unit to treat injured persons who fled the fighting.[26]

Relief efforts were further hampered by the government reportedly refusing to extend dozens of international aid workers’ visas in June 2009.[27] The ICRC continued supporting the Jaffna Jaipur Center for Disability Rehabilitation, but some planned training activities were not implemented because an ICRC specialist could not obtain a visa.[28] Instead, prosthetic technicians attended courses abroad, but the training of physiotherapists was postponed to 2010.[29] To cope with the increased workload, the Jaffna Jaipur Center for Disability Rehabilitation increased services to six days a week in September 2009. [30]

On the Jaffna peninsula, persons with disabilities continued to face many obstacles in obtaining rehabilitation services. Irregular public transport, poor roads, and the high cost of transportation continued to make travel to access services costly and time consuming.[31] However near the end of 2009, overall accessibility in Jaffna was rapidly changing with the opening of the main A9 road, which had been closed since 1990.[32] 

There were ongoing concerns that the technology used to make prostheses at the Mannar physical rehabilitation center was not of internationally accepted standards and the training level of technicians was insufficient.[33] The center’s Caritas management agreed to change to internationally accepted standards and received funding support from Catholic Relief Services and UNICEF in late 2009 and for 2010.[34]

Psychological assistance and social support were very limited in Sri Lanka.^[35] No improvements were reported. There was a need to strengthen and improve the quality of existing community-based programs for psychological support such as problem sharing and peer support.^[36] The government reportedly incorporated vocational training in rehabilitation activities for some disabled former LTTE fighters in detention camps, prior to their release.^[37]

The MoSS provided a community-based rehabilitation program for people with disabilities, however the mine-affected North and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka were yet to be included in the program in 2009.[38]

The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities in Sri Lanka, however discrimination continued to occur in employment, education, and the provision of state services. There were regulations on physical accessibility to buildings for persons with disabilities, but these were rarely implemented. In October 2009, the Supreme Court directed that measures be taken to provide access to public buildings for persons with disabilities.[39]

Sri Lanka signed the UN Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities in March 2007.

In 2009 seven donor states, UNDP, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) contributed US$24,806,090 for mine clearance and risk education. This represents more than a 200% increase from 2008 and is the highest amount since 2005. The increase in funding is a direct result of the end of conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 2009. No contributions for victim assistance were reported for 2009.

India has contributed to mine action in Sri Lanka since 2003. In August 2009 India announced it would send 80 deminers to Sri Lanka through the Sarvatra and Horizon, two Indian NGOs working in Sri Lanka.[1]

The Sri Lanka Army has never reported the costs associated with maintaining its 1,000 deminers. It was reported in July 2010 that the government spent LKR2.18 billion ($19,009,600)[2] on mine clearance in 2009 including the purchase of 29 Bozena flail machines by the Economic Development Ministry for $13 million.[3] UNHCR provided $5 million in 2009 for the purchase of 10 flail machines.[4]

International contributions: 2009[5]

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[6]