Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

 

Background

Following a three-year peace process, the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held. Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A, and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).

Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004.

On 18 February 2010, the Sudan Mine Action Act of 2010 was approved by the Council of Ministers and the President signed Decree No. (51) approving the law and requiring its implementation. The Act is comprised of 29 articles divided into four chapters. Chapter Four includes Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the prohibition of antipersonnel mine use and stockpiling, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, victim assistance, and transparency reporting.  It also includes penalties for violations of the act.[1]    

The CPA signed on 9 January 2005 incorporates previous agreements between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines.[2]

As of July 2010, Sudan had not yet submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report due 30 April 2010.  Sudan has submitted six Article 7 reports to date, most recently in April 2009.[3]

Sudan participated in the Third Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines held in Pretoria, South Africa from 9–11 September 2009, where it made a presentation on victim assistance.

Sudan attended the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009. The State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Secretary-General of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) made a statement during the high-level segment. Sudan also made interventions on victim assistance and mine clearance.

Sudan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2010, where it made statements on mine clearance and cooperation and assistance as concerns victim assistance.

Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified it.

Production, transfer, and use

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[4] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the government, the SPLM/A, or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004.[5]  In January 2010, after violence in some regions of the south, the UN Mine Action Service told media that there was no evidence of new mines being laid in Sudan.[6]

The UN has reported one suspected mined area in Darfur region, but it is not known when the mines may have been laid.[7] In July 2009, a representative of the NMAA stated that there are no landmines in Darfur except for World War II mines on the borders with Libya and Egypt.[8]  Many groups remain outside the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, which prohibits mine use.[9] 

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied in accounts by Sudan leading up to and following stockpile destruction events in 2007 and 2008.[10] At the Second Review Conference, Sudan stated that a total of 10,656 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (possibly a typographical error from 10,566) and 1,938 mines retained for training.[11]

In its April 2009 Article 7 report, Sudan stated, “In addition to the destruction of known stockpiles of APMs [antipersonnel mines], caches of APM were discovered in various locations of Southern Sudan which contained 523 APM. All these mines were destroyed in 2008. The destruction took place in various parts of Blue Nile State, Southern Sudan during October–December 2008.”[12]

Mines retained for training purposes

In recent years Sudan has reported differing numbers of mines retained for training purposes, based on varying estimates of overall stockpiles. In April 2008, shortly after the completion of stockpile destruction, Sudan reported retaining 5,000 mines of unspecified types “for the purposes of research and [the] demining training process.”[13] In June 2008, it reported retaining 4,979 mines, again without specifying types.[14] In August 2008, Sudan reported retaining 4,997 mines of 18 types, without specifying numbers retained for each type. The list provided was evidently provisional, as Sudan stated, “Details of each type of mine and the quantities are being sorted out and will be reported in the next report.”[15] The same number of mines retained (4,997) was repeated in a statement by Sudan at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008.[16]

However, in its April 2009 Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008, Sudan reported retaining only 1,938 mines, consisting of PMN (178), Type 14 (130), “Desert plastic” (85), Type 35 (1,194), Valmara (46), and PPM mines (307).[17] This number of 1,938 mines was confirmed by Sudan in May 2009 at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings and in December 2009 at the Second Review Conference.[18]

Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at Mine Ban Treaty Review Conferences held in 2004 and 2009.

In June 2008, the head of the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) stated that all mines retained by Sudan for training and research purposes are held under the authority of GONU and are not accessible to mine action authorities or operators in Southern Sudan. He said mines required for training purposes in Southern Sudan must be obtained from sources other than GONU stocks, at least until the 2011 referendum on the status of Southern Sudan, at which time common access to stocks may result from the establishment of a joint government.[19]

 

Policy

The Republic of Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 

In August 2010, during an event in Khartoum to celebrate the convention’s entry into force, Sudan’s State Minister to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, said that Sudan would join before the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.[1]

In April 2010, during a celebration of UN Mine Action Day, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Sudan, General Mohamed Abd-al-Qadir, stated that Sudan was ready to join the convention.[2]

In March 2010, a government official told the CMC that relevant governmental agencies were considering Sudan’s position on joining the convention and a decision was expected after the April 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections.[3]

In December 2009, Sudan’s high-level delegation to the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty told campaigners that Sudan would likely join the Convention on Cluster Munitions eventually, but had become reluctant to do so since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2009 for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.[4]

Sudan has shown an interest in the work of the convention in 2009 and 2010. It participated in the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Santiago, Chile in June 2010, as well as the Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Pretoria, South Africa in March 2010. It did not make a statement at either of these meetings. 

Sudan participated in the Oslo Process that produced the convention from December 2007 onwards. It joined the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008. Sudan also endorsed the Livingstone Declaration calling for a comprehensive treaty with a prohibition that should be “total and immediate.”[5]  

Sudan attended the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer, where it stated its commitment to the principles of the convention and its intent to sign as soon as possible, once logistical and national measures had been completed.[6]

Sudan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but has never ratified the convention or its protocols.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Sudan has used cluster munitions in the past. It imported cluster munitions from a number of countries, but the current status of its stockpile is uncertain.

On 1 April 2010, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Sudan stated that Sudan does not possess cluster munitions.[7]

Sudanese government forces sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions, including Chilean made PM-1 submunitions, in Southern Sudan between 1995 and 2000.[8] Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese-language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 and Mk118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5.[9]

Jane’s Information Group reports that KMG-U dispensers which deploy submunitions are in service with the country’s air force.[10]

Sudan is not believed to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the Government of Sudan and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the south, mainly the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The struggle ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 although continued violence has raised fears of a return to conflict. The 9 January 2011 referendum on the future political structure of Sudan is a critical milestone of the CPA.[1]

Of Sudan’s 25 states, 19 have previously been suspected to be mine-affected.[2] The combination of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), completed in May 2009, and the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) records of dangerous areas, confirmed mined areas and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) across 18 states in 2002 through June 2010 and provides the basis for the extent of the mine/ERW problem in Sudan. As of June 2010, 314 SHAs and 173 confirmed mined areas, covering a total of 75.26km²,remained to be released. Another 695 dangerous areas awaited clearance.[3] UNMAO does not measure the size of dangerous areas until clearance is completed.

The LIS was conducted in 16 states in an estimated 5,445 villages, of which 296 were identified as impacted by landmines. The survey identified 605 SHAs covering 106km². As of June 2010, through clearance and cancellation, the number of SHAs from the LIS had been reduced to 314 estimated to cover 46km².[4] Reports and surveys from operators have identified a further 500 SHAs. As of June 2010 1,182 hazardous areas remained, a decrease of 862 from June 2009. Of these, 173 were confirmed mined areas, 314 were SHAs, and 695 were dangerous areas (see table below).[5] Of the remaining dangerous areas, there are 416 suspected mined areas, 178 UXO spot-clearance tasks, 34 ammunition storage areas, 53 former confrontation areas, eight “current ambush areas,” and six where the type of contamination is unknown.[6]

The confirmed mined areas were estimated to cover some 29.5km² of land, and as of June 2010, the SHAs remaining from the LIS covered an estimated 45.8km², for a total estimated area of contamination of 75.26km².[7] This represents a decrease of 44km² since June 2009.

Prior to the LIS, the Sudanese government considered the five states of Gezira, Khartoum, Northern, Northern Kordofan, and White Nile as not being affected, and they were not surveyed as a result, although the borders with Libya and Egypt in Northern and Nile states may be contaminated with mines laid during World War II.[8]

The Government of Sudan has stated there are no landmines in Darfur region. UNMAO has identified areas of significant ERW contamination, including Tawila in North Darfur, Muhajeria in South Darfur, and Kulbus in West Darfur.[9] As of June 2010, in Darfur region 34 sites with a residual UXO threat remained to be released. The UN-African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has three clearance teams in Darfur, consisting of national and international experts conducting route assessments, general explosive hazard assessments, ERW demolitions, ERW risk education (RE) for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and civilians, and training of teachers.[10] The extent of activities is dependent on the availability of force protection, permission from the Government of Sudan, and accessibility to contaminated regions.[11]

Hazardous areas as of June 2010[12]

Cluster munition remnants

Sudan has identified 324 sites affected by cluster munition remnants in 13 states, including two sites in Darfur. Eastern Equatoria state contains more than one-third of the affected areas. As of 16 August 2010, all but 34 had been cleared. Central Equatoria, which is the most mine affected state contains 13 of the remaining 34 sites.[13]

Number of cluster munition contaminated areas in Sudan as of August 2010

Other explosive remnants of war

As of June 2010, UNMAO reported that 888,208 ERW had been found compared to 22,516 antipersonnel mines and 4,574 antivehicle mines since 2002.[14] Although a considerable amount of ERW have been found in Sudan, illustrating the intensity of the long conflict that ended in January 2005, only landmines have caused road closures.[15]  

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

UNMAO is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the CPA to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance of all mine action activities in Sudan until 2011.[16] The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the institution responsible for coordination and management of mine action in Sudan. The NMAA[17] includes a National Mine Action Committee, a General Secretariat, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) in Khartoum, and the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) in Juba.[18]

UNMAO operations consist of its headquarters in Khartoum, regional offices in Kadugli in Southern Kordofan state; Juba in Central Equatoria state; Al Fasher in Northern Darfur state; and ten suboffices.[19] As part of the planning for transition to national ownership, the UNMAO office in Khartoum was in the process of relocating to the NMAA office as of 15 August 2010.[20]

The Mine Action Multi-Year Plan for 2009–2011 serves as the planning and resource mobilization document for all partners, identifying strategic priorities and benchmarks for mine action within the UN Development Assistance Framework. It also guides annual planning for the contributions to the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects and the UN and Partners Work Plan. Further, it aligns plans with the goals of the Sudan Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework as well as Sudan’s commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty.[21]

Within the structure of UNMAO, UNDP has the key responsibility for national mine action program development and capacity-building, through its “Support to Mine Action and Capacity Building in Sudan” project which began in early 2004.[22]

Cranfield University conducted a comprehensive Training Needs Assessment of NMAC and the SSDA in July 2009, and prepared a training plan. It is based on the gaps identified and includes: a mine action quality management course, a resource mobilization and resource management course, an information management course, and a process improvement course. The courses will be conducted in 2010.[23]

UNMAO and the NMAA developed a transition plan that began in 2009. Five workshops were conducted on the transition. The focus of the transition plan is to transfer the 10 core responsibilities of the mine action program to the Government of Sudan. The 10 core management responsibilities are:

1.      coordinate all aspects of mine action;

2.      prioritize, task, and authorize all mine action activities;

3.      accredit mine action organizations in accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG);

4.      ensure quality management of all mine action activities;

5.      revise the national standards according to in-country needs and conditions;

6.      maintain the integrity of the national mine action database;

7.      mobilize necessary funds from national and international sources;

8.      coordinate and manage the implementation of RE;

9.      coordinate and manage assistance to survivors; and

10.  ensure that Sudan meets its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.[24]

The transition is divided into three stages: capacity development, joint activities, and finally full national ownership.[25] The handover for June 2011 is in the final stage and was said to be on schedule as of June 2010.[26] After the transition it is expected that the UN will respond to a Government of Sudan request to retain a small but yet to be determined number of technical advisors.[27] UNMAO projects the majority of funding after the transition will be directed toward commercial contracts for direct support to the two UN peacekeeping missions.[28]

In November 2009, the translation of the NTSG into Sudanese Arabic was completed. The translation of the guidelines was a key milestone in facilitating national ownership, scheduled to take place in June 2011.[29] Another critical part of the transition plan is to develop the national NGOs into a technically competent and well managed national demining resource.[30]

As part of the transition plan, UNMAO will equip the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs) to deal with the residual threat from landmines and ERW after June 2011.[31] The JIDUs teams consist of personnel from the engineer corps of the Sudanese army.[32]

Land Release

In 2009, organizations in Sudan cleared 5.65km² of mined areas and 5.34km² of battle areas.[33] Despite a decrease in funding in 2009 Sudan cleared almost as much contaminated area as in 2008. According to Tim Horner, Deputy Director of UNMAO in Southern Sudan, the UN has “learned to do more with less” including aggressively applying land release practices through survey before beginning clearance operations.[34] The NTSG on land release was launched in September 2009, with implementation commencing in October. In 2009, Sudan assessed a total of 988km² of land and found it to be without risk.[35]

Seven-year summary of land release

Mine clearance in 2009

As of June 2010, Sudan had 17 national and international demining operators (the JIDUs, four international NGOs, five UN peacekeeping companies, one local NGO, and six commercial demining companies).[36] UNMAO tasks all demining operators, including the five demining contingents with the UNMIS peacekeeping operation, and conducts quality assurance on all tasks.[37] UNAMID has three battle area clearance (BAC) teams in Darfur.[38]

ArmorGroup, MineTech International, and RONCO Consulting Corporation cleared 72% of the area cleared in 2009, finding 54% of all antipersonnel mines and 42% of antivehicle mines. The five UN peacekeeping contingents cleared 0.43km² (4% of all clearance) in 2009 compared to 3.99km² (41% of all clearance) in 2008.[39] During clearance in 2009, 4,561 antipersonnel mines and 898 antivehicle mines were destroyed.[40] More than three times more antivehicle mines were found in 2009 than in 2008. Approximately 80% of all clearance since 2002 has been conducted in the four most contaminated states: Central Equatoria, Kassala, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile.[41]

Sudan’s mine action program faces formidable challenges in 2010–2011, beginning with the fallout from the outcome of the January 2011 referendum on the future status of Southern Sudan. Although not unique to Sudan, other challenges include the size of the country, distances to travel, security, weather, capacity and funding.[42]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009[43]

* UNMAO does not disaggregate between mine clearance and BAC in detailed reporting.

** No distinction is made between abandoned explosive ordnance and UXO in reporting on demining by UNMAO.

Roads

The verification and clearance of roads has been a major focus of the mine action program in Sudan. In 2009, a linear total of 7,152km of roads were opened.[44] As of June 2010, UNMAO had assessed 36,915km of roads and verified a further 5.25km, and the JIDUs opened another 1,698km of road, including 501km in 2009.[45] According to UNMAO, 95% of the major roads have been opened.[46]

The impact of road verification and assessment has been substantial. IDPs and refugees have returned home, travel is safer, faster, and less costly, and the cost of delivering humanitarian aid, still the primary international aid effort in Sudan, has significantly decreased for UNMIS and the World Food Programme, compared to transporting aid by air. For UNMIS alone, the savings are said to have equaled US$150 million, approximately the equivalent of the cost of the mine action component of UNMIS over the same period. In 2009, routes opened to Boma, one of the major corridors for refugees from Ethiopia and the Juba-Kajo Keji road opened to facilitate the resettlement of IDPs and refugees in Central Equatoria state.[47]

UNMAO has also responded to requests to allow for the widening and reconstruction of roads for increasing trade and commerce. In northern Sudan, route clearance facilitated the movement of refugees and IDPs, and permitted increased aid delivery. Clearance of the Kauda-Talodi road and the Kalkada to Tumbera route in Southern Kordofan, allowed communities in the surrounding areas to have better access to services provided by the government and international organizations.[48]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2009

UNMAO does not distinguish yet between different types of UXO in their reporting.[49] In May 2009, RONCO Consulting Corporation began clearance operations in four dangerous areas contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and hundreds of unexploded submunitions in Ullu, Blue Nile state, a town completely surrounded by minefields with only one road. It was expected that clearance would be completed before the end of 2010.[50]

Battle area clearance in 2009

For 2009, UNMAO reported BAC of 5.74km² of land.[51]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014.

At the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena in December 2009, Sudan said the NMAA, UNMAO, and UNDP have developed a 2009–2011 operational plan that would target for clearance 80% of the high- and medium-impacted areas at a cost of $120 million.[52] Based on maintaining the demining capacity, as of June 2010 UNMAO projected Southern Sudan would clear all known mined areas by mid-2015, although the projected date could be extended depending upon the number of returnees, road access, security, and development inputs.[53]

Quality management

UNMAO is responsible for quality management of mine and BAC operations across Sudan.

Safety of demining personnel

The safety of personnel is an ongoing concern in Sudan. In 2009, field deployments, especially in Western Darfur, were hindered by “car-jackings” and armed attacks against UNAMID convoys. In Southern Sudan, violence in Malakal resulted in the disruption of clearance activities in Upper Nile, and due to tribal fighting, roads and mined areas in Jonglei state could not be addressed. As a result assets originally designated for Upper Nile and Jonglei states were relocated to the Equatoria states. Ambushes from the NSAG, the Lord’s Resistance Army, have also impacted clearance operations in Central and Western Equatoria states.[54]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for Sudan for 2006–2011 commits Sudan to provide mine/ERW RE to communities at risk and to strengthen the national operations capacities in delivering RE. Within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF is responsible for the management and coordination of RE, together with NMAC and the SSDA, and implemented by the government and national and international NGO partners.[55]

In 2009, 394,836 children and adults in 20 states were said to have received RE, of which 77% were in seven states.[56] IDPs and returnees remained the key focus of mine and ERW RE. It is planned the Government of Sudan will be responsible for RE after the transition in June 2011.[57]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 78 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Sudan. The vast majority of casualties (61 or 78%) were male. At least 43 were children (68% of the 63 casualties for which the age was known) and most of these (34) were boys.[1] Most casualties (59 or 75%) were civilians and just four casualties were known to be military officials.[2] Full information on the type of explosive device which caused casualties in 2009 was not available; only casualties caused by cluster submunitions were identified. However, according to an analysis done by the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), 45% of all casualties occurring in Sudan between 2003 and November 2009 were caused by antipersonnel mines, 27% by antivehicle mines, and 28% by ERW.[3]

The 78 casualties reported in 2009 constituted an increase from the 65 reported in 2008 but still represented a decrease when compared with other recent years.[4] This increase was attributed to improvements in data collection and verification in 2009 in the Darfur region, where 40 of the 78 casualties occurred.[5]

There were a total of 4,283 casualties (1,422 killed and 2,861 injured) recorded by UNMAO for the period from 1964 to the end of 2009. Of these casualties, 80% were male and 23% were children.[6] This included 104 casualties (37 killed and 67 injured) identified by the Sudan Landmine Impact Study (LIS) as having occurred within the two years preceding the survey.[7] At least 41 casualties of cluster munition remnants had been identified through July 2009. In addition, 16 casualties which occurred during the use of cluster munitions were reported.[8]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 2,861 mine/ERW survivors in Sudan at the end of 2009.[9]

In 2009, Sudan recognized the lack of sufficient data on landmine survivors in some mine/ERW affected areas as “one of the most pressing challenges” facing victim assistance provision.[10] No national survivor needs assessment was carried out in 2009, but casualty data collection was carried out in the states of Blue Nile, Central Equatoria, Kassala, Khartoum, Southern Kordofan, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile.[11] The LIS, completed in 2009, collected recent casualty data in the 16 most mine/ERW-affected states and surveyed survivors as to whether or not they had received emergency medical care, physical rehabilitation, and/or vocational training.[12]  Casualty and victim assistance beneficiary data was managed by UNMAO and shared amongst all mine action partners, including government ministries and NGOs.[13]

Victim assistance coordination[14]

 

In 2009, Sudan’s two regional Victim Assistance Working Groups continued to convene increasing numbers of government, NGO, and UN victim assistance stakeholders in monthly coordination meetings.[15] Just one national victim assistance coordination meeting was held to revise, update, and extend the National Victim Assistance Work Plan and to discuss collaboration between the two regional working groups.[16] Coordination was believed to have improved information sharing, helped identify victim assistance needs and priorities, and be effective at the regional but not at the national level.[17]

In northern Sudan, by 2009, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) had assumed full responsibility for victim assistance coordination with little technical support needed from UNMAO, and had improved its role in monitoring victim assistance project implementation. In Southern Sudan, the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare, and Religious Affairs (MoGSWRA) appointed a senior staff person as victim assistance focal point in February 2009 who was increasingly engaged in victim assistance coordination throughout the year.[18]

Sudan provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009 and at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2010.[19]

Survivors’ associations and disabled people’s organizations were represented at the meetings of the victim assistance working groups,[20] though some felt they were not included in decision-making processes.[21] Survivors contributed to the implementation of the national victim assistance plan through NGO activities.[22]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[23]

In 2009, there was an increase in victim assistance services available in Southern Sudan, particularly in the area of physical rehabilitation, though this was somewhat offset by the worsening security situation in the region that prevented accessibility to these services.[24] In northern Sudan, a significant decrease in the Ministry of Finance’s budget allocation for the NAPO reduced the availability of physical rehabilitation and psychological support services and increased waiting periods to up to four to six months for rehabilitative care.[25] The difficult security situation in Southern Sudan prevented expansion of a medical care program to new geographic areas.[26]

There was an increased focus on psychological support to mine/ERW survivors and all UNMAO-supported victim assistance projects included a psychological support component. However, the services available were very limited and varied in quality and quantity. Psychological support was still the greatest gap within the overall victim assistance program.[27]

The quality of economic inclusion programs improved in 2009 with an increased focus on providing survivors with adequate training.[28] However, the existing number of actors providing economic inclusion services was insufficient to address the overall demand.[29] None of the 67 survivors identified as part of the LIS had received assistance with economic inclusion.[30]

In Sudan, the rights of persons with disabilities were guaranteed by law, but this was not implemented sufficiently to prevent discrimination.[31] There were no laws or policies that ensured access by persons with disabilities to buildings and public spaces.[32]

Sudan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 24 April 2009. In 2009, the Ministry of Social Welfare led efforts to develop a national implementation plan for the convention, efforts which included disability organizations and other relevant government ministries.[33]

National and international contributions to mine action in Sudan in 2009 totaled US$84,071,904, making Sudan the second largest mine action program in the world (after Afghanistan).  

In 2009, 14 donors contributed $25,250,222 for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance, a decrease of more than $12 million from 2008.[1]Contributions from Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission (EC) totaling approximately $10.5 million were made through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance administered by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and then disbursed in Sudan through the Common Humanitarian Fund, the main channel in Sudan for disbursing all humanitarian aid funding.

While Japan was the only donor who reported funding for victim assistance to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (¥9,128,000/$97,396),[2] UNMAS reported expenditures of $1,261,179 for victim assistance in Sudan in 2009.[3]

The UN General Assembly appropriates annual mine action budgets for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) operating in Southern Sudan and the UN-African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID funding of three clearance teams through a commercial company was the sole source of funding for mine action in Darfur. In 2009 UNAMID received $10,806,650. The assessed budget for UNMIS in Southern Sudan of $43,015,032 supported rapid response emergency surveys, explosive ordnance disposal, battle area clearance, landmine and explosive remnants of war clearance, risk education, and transport route verification and clearance.[4] The assessed budgets for the two peacekeeping operations comprised approximately 64% of the Sudan Mine Action Programme in 2009. In 2008 it comprised 54% of the total budget and 58% in 2007.

The Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS) and its partner the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) convened a workshop on 30 June 2010 in Juba for government officials in Southern Sudan, the Southern Sudan Demining Authority, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), and UNICEF in response to the low level of support for mine action in Sudan and the decline in international funding. It recommended the government develop a long-term strategy for mobilizing resources and initiatives be explored with the UN and NGOs on how to build such capacity in Southern Sudan.[5] 

International government contributions: 2009[6]

Summary of UN General Assembly Assessed Mine Action Budget for Peacekeeping Operations in Sudan: 2007–2009[7]

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[8]

N/R = Not reported