Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 14 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999.

Venezuela has not adopted national implementation legislation stipulating penal sanctions for treaty violations, maintaining that domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is not necessary because international treaties ratified by the government automatically become national law.[1]

In April 2010, Venezuela submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report for the period from April 2009 to April 2010.  Venezuela has provided seven previous reports.[2]  Under national implementation measures, Venezuela lists Resolution 012281 issued by the Ministry of People’s Power for Defense (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa) on 21 September 2009 to create a demining committee in the National Armed Forces.[3]

Venezuela did not attend the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009.  It participated in the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, speaking on mine clearance.

Venezuela is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Venezuela has never submitted an annual report as required by the protocol’s Article 13. Venezuela is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use

Venezuela has reported that it laid 1,074 antipersonnel mines around six naval bases between April 1995 and March 1997, one of which was subsequently accidentally detonated.[4]  In 2007, Venezuela made statements indicating that it was still making active use of these emplaced antipersonnel mines, which is inconsistent with the Article 1 ban on use.[5]  During 2007 and 2008, the ICBL repeatedly stated its concern that Venezuela was purposefully keeping its antipersonnel mines in place in order to derive military benefit from them, and was not, as required by the treaty, clearing them as soon as possible.[6]

Since 2008, Venezuela stressed other factors—such as dense vegetation, rough weather, and safety concerns—to explain why it has not yet cleared its antipersonnel mines (see Mine Action section of this Country Profile).[7]  In June 2008, Venezuela stated that it was not using mines for defensive purposes, even though there are still “anti-state actors” across its border with Colombia.[8] In June 2010, Venezuela said the mines “pose no danger.”[9]

The Colombian rebel group the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), a known producer and user of antipersonnel mines, appears to be maintaining a presence in Venezuela. In October 2009, the governor of the Venezuelan state of Tachira said that four ELN camps exist inside Tachira.[10] Landmine incidents attributed to the ELN have taken place very close to the border on the Colombian side.[11]

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Venezuela has stated that it has not produced antipersonnel mines.[12] It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Venezuela previously obtained antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia.[13]

Venezuela completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003.[14] It has never specified the types of antipersonnel mines that were destroyed.[15]

In its April 2010 Article 7 report, Venezuela stated that it is retaining 4,960 PMA-3 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, held by the Ministry of Defense.[16] The number is unchanged from the previous five reports.[17] At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Venezuela emphasized that States Parties retaining mines under Article 3 have no obligation to use these immediately, and noted that not all states can or need to use them with the same frequency.[18]

Venezuela has not used the expanded Form D adopted by States Parties in 2005 for reporting on retained mines. Venezuela has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties at the review conferences held in 2004 and 2009.

Policy

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has not yet acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, despite participating in the Oslo Process that created the convention and adopting the convention text on 30 May 2008. Venezuela has made no public statements on its cluster munition policy since May 2008.

At a meeting in Lugano, Switzerland in 1976, Venezuela was one of a dozen states to propose a ban on cluster munitions in a working paper that argued that antipersonnel cluster munitions “tend to have both indiscriminate effects and to cause unnecessary suffering.”[1]

Venezuela first engaged in the Oslo Process in May 2007 at the second international preparatory conference, held in Lima, Peru. At the meeting, Venezuela said that it was “fully committed” to the Oslo Declaration issued in February 2007, which it described as, “the framework of our work towards the banning of cluster munitions.”[2] The Oslo Declaration committed states to conclude in 2008 a new international treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Venezuela also said, “We…disagree with the argument posed by some countries about the military utility of cluster munitions. It is our humble opinion that these arguments lack any kind of substantive basis.”[3]

Venezuela did not attend the subsequent international conferences to develop the convention text held in Vienna in December 2007 and Wellington in February 2008, but it participated in the regional meetings to promote the Oslo Process held in Costa Rica in September 2007 and in Mexico City in April 2008. On 24 April 2008, Venezuela endorsed the Wellington Declaration, thereby indicating its intention to participate in the formal negotiations in Dublin of a treaty prohibiting cluster munitions.

Venezuela played an active role in the Dublin negotiations in May 2008. At the outset, Venezuela stated that it did not support the view that the effects of inhumane weapons could be mitigated by technological improvements, stating that “results in laboratory tests may not coincide with matters on the ground.” Venezuela also stressed the need for the proposed treaty to provide full assistance to cluster munition victims.[4] 

Venezuela sought a clear provision on the responsibility of user states for attacks that occurred before the entry into force of the convention as “it would be contradictory to seek a prohibition and include victim assistance and not make provision for what had happened in the past.”[5] Venezuela opposed a transition period in which prohibited cluster munitions could still be used for a number of years.[6]

Venezuela expressed concern that Article 2(c) on definitions, which permits weapons with a small number of submunitions that meet five technical criteria, would favor the use of certain technologies and stated that there was “no evidence to prove that a munition meeting all of these criteria might not still be indiscriminate.”[7]

Venezuela joined in the consensus adoption of the convention text on 30 May 2008. In a statement to the plenary, Venezuela welcomed the adoption and acknowledged the roles of the CMC and the ICRC. Venezuela said that the text contained key provisions of international humanitarian law which would address the suffering of innocent civilian populations, but said it was “not happy” with the provision on Article 21 on “interoperability” (relations with states not party) and said the concept of interoperability “undermines the spirit and purpose” of the convention. While Venezuela said that it wanted its views on Article 21 “to be recorded,” it also emphasized that that it supported “the main thrust of this convention.”[8]  

It is unclear how the convention was received by the government after the Dublin negotiations. Venezuela did not attend the regional meeting on cluster munitions held in Quito, Ecuador in November 2008. At a meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in November 2008, Venezuela was one of 26 states that issued a joint statement expressing their opposition to the weak draft text on a possible CCW protocol on cluster munitions, indicating it was an unacceptable step back from the standards set by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[9]

Despite engaging in the Oslo Process, Venezuela did not attend the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008. 

Venezuela did not engage in the work of the convention in 2009 and the first half of 2010. It did not attend the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Muntions in June 2009, the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions held in Santiago, Chile in September 2009, or the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions also held in Santiago, in June 2010.

Venezuela is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Venezuela is a State Party to the CCW but has not ratified Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It has not actively engaged in the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in recent years.

Venezuela is not believed to have used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions. 

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Venezuela’s mine contamination is the result of mine emplacement by its armed forces at six naval bases near Río Arauca in the Amazon region along its border with Colombia in 1995–1997. After a 25 February 1995 attack on the naval post in Cararabo, Apure state, by suspected non-state armed groups operating across the border with Colombia, Venezuela laid 1,074 mines in 13 minefields around six naval posts in Cararabo, Guafitas, Isla Vapor, Puerto Páez, Río Arauca, and San Fernando de Atabapo.[1] The total mined area is reported to be 180,000m².

The maps and photographs in Venezuela’s Article 5 deadline extension request clearly show the locations and terrain of the mined areas.[2] The minefields are located on a flood plain in dense vegetation and in an isolated part of Venezuela,[3] on secure naval bases to which civilians are prohibited from entering and are said to be marked with warning signs.[4]

Mine Action Program

The mine action program is under the control of the Ministry of Defense with no civilian input or guidance from the legislature.[5] Rear Admiral Alcibíades Jesús Paz, from the Department of Defense, is responsible for coordination, a post to which he was first appointed in 2004.[6] There are no external technical advisors.

Land Release

Venezuela has released no mined land since joining the Mine Ban Treaty.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension to its deadline granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parites in 2008), Venezuela is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2014. In granting the extension, States Parties noted that “with speedy establishment of a demining program and acquisition of mechanical demining assets, Venezuela may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete implementation before October 2014 and that this could benefit the Convention.”[7]

Venezuela has not sought to implement its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations in good faith. As of June 2010, more than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty, Venezuela had not cleared a single mined area.[8] Previously, Venezuela cited wet weather as the main reason for not being able to conduct mine clearance. As the mined areas are located on a flood plain, Venezuela has claimed that the rains would quickly end any ongoing clearance activities.[9]

In June 2010, however, Venezuela cited a severe drought as one of the reasons demining could not begin, as well as a fall in the Gross National Product and new priorities for the government as the primary reasons for not initiating the operational plan described in its Article 5 extension request that was approved by States Parties in November 2008.[10] In response, the ICBL stated that “the time for excuses is over, the time for clearance is now.”[11]

In 2007, Venezuela made statements indicating that it was still making active use of these emplaced antipersonnel mines, which is inconsistent with the Article 1 ban on use.[12] During 2007 and 2008, the ICBL repeatedly stated its concern that Venezuela was purposefully keeping its antipersonnel mines in place in order to derive military benefit from them, and was not, as required by the treaty, clearing them as soon as possible.[13] In June 2008, Venezuela stated that it was not using mines for defensive purposes, even though there are still “anti-state actors” across its border with Colombia.[14]

In May 2009, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, the ICBL stated again its view that the failure to initiate clearance does not serve the interests of the Mine Ban Treaty as a whole, and that whatever the merits of granting Venezuela a five-year extension, Venezuela should begin clearance as soon as possible.[15] Venezuela said it wishes to comply with all of the details in the extension request and is on schedule to do so.[16] According to its extension request, Venezuela should have formally started demining operations in 2009, with clearance of all three minefields at the Puerto Páez Naval Post carried out in February–May 2010.[17] This did not occur and no date has been offered for when operations will begin.