Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. It has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1] Afghanistan submitted its eighth Article 7 transparency report covering calendar year 2009.[2]

Afghanistan participated in the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009, making statements on victim assistance and mine clearance, as well as during the high-level segment. Afghanistan also attended the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, making statements on victim assistance, mine clearance, and cooperation and assistance.

Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and thus is not a party to the CCW or its protocols on mines and explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. There have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in recent years.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007,[3] eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[4] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program.  It reported that as of April 2007, it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines,[5] and later reported that in calendar year 2007, it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines.[6] How many of those were found and destroyed after the October 2007 declaration of completion is not known.

In its latest Article 7 report, Afghanistan indicated that an additional 4,392 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2009. This included 2,006 Iranian-produced YM-1 mines.[7] The mines were destroyed at 103 events in 21 provinces, all by open detonation.[8] The type and number of mines destroyed in each location, and the dates of destruction, have been recorded in detail in the Article 7 report.[9] These mines were either recovered during operations, turned in during disarmament programs, or discovered and turned in by civilians.[10]

Afghanistan had reported the discovery and destruction of 62,498 antipersonnel mines during 2008.[11]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan reported that at the end of 2009, it retained a total of 2,618 antipersonnel mines for training purposes.[12]  This was the same number and types of antipersonnel mines as the previous year.  In June 2010, a representative of the Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) told Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor that all the mines Afghanistan has retained are fuzeless, and that Afghanistan retains no live mines for training. He said the number of mines has remained the same because the mines are not being destroyed, but are being used to train mine detection dogs.[13]

As in previous Article 7 reports, Afghanistan stated, “MACCA uses retained antipersonnel mines in its test centers in Kabul, Logar, Herat, Kunduz, Jalalabad and Kandahar to accredit the mine detection dogs of implementing partners…The implementing partners, under the oversight of MACCA, use antipersonnel mines for training of their mine detection dogs and deminers.” It also noted that MACCA “stores mines that may be needed for testing and accreditation in the future in a secured bunker.”[14]

Use

Although the conflict in Afghanistan intensified and spread greatly in 2009, with the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, neither Afghan nor Coalition forces are reported to have used antipersonnel mines.

Non-state armed groups

As the level of insurgent activity has increased sharply, there has also been a notable increase in the number of reports of use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan.

However, as in past years, the vast majority of reported attacks with explosive devices did not involve victim-activated antipersonnel mines, even though media reports frequently attributed attacks to “landmines.” Use of victim-activated IEDs is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, because they function like antipersonnel mines, but use of command-detonated IEDs is not.  On its website, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) claimed responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[15]

The UN noted that anti-government forces principally targeted Afghan and international forces with IEDs, but that “the placement of IEDs and the location of suicide attacks often resulted in large numbers of civilians being killed. Many IEDs (both remote controlled and trigger detonated) are placed along roads heavily used by civilian vehicles and pedestrians.” In 2009, the UN registered 1,054 civilians as victims of IEDs used by opposition forces.[16]

Although most attacks involve command-detonated IEDs, there are a growing number of reports and allegations of use of antipersonnel landmines and victim-activated IEDs by the Taliban. In September 2009, United States forces in northwest Kandahar province reportedly said that widespread use by the Taliban of victim-activated IEDs was leading to one of the highest US casualty rates of any area in Afghanistan or Iraq.[17]

A sampling of other examples follow: In April 2009, a US soldier was killed when he reportedly stepped on an IED activated by a pressure plate.[18] In July 2009, two Australian soldiers were killed and three Afghan civilians injured when a soldier reportedly stepped on an antipersonnel mine that then initiated a more powerful IED.[19] In October 2009, a Canadian soldier was killed after reportedly stepping on a homemade landmine 10km from Kandahar City.[20] In November 2009 in Helmand province, a US military engineer was killed after reportedly stepping on a pressure plate IED while on patrol.[21]

In January 2010, US Attorney General Eric Holder decided the military should prosecute an Afghan detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for allegedly hiding and storing mines to be used against US forces in Afghanistan.[22]

There were some media reports of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces recovering antipersonnel mines. In December 2009, Afghan forces recovered 90 antipersonnel mines in Nawzad district, Helmand province.[23] Also in December, Afghan forces recovered 40 antipersonnel mines, and other weapons, from a cache 80km north of Kabul.[24] In January 2010, Afghan forces recovered 54 antipersonnel mines among 30 tons (30,000kg) of other weapons in Badakhshan province.[25] In February 2010, US forces involved in fighting near Marjah, Helmand province, discovered an IED factory with about 200 pressure plates, antipersonnel mines, and antitank mines.[26] In March 2010, Afghan forces recovered 50 tons (50,000kg) of weapons, including an undetermined number of mines, in Shindand district,  Herat province.[27] In May 2010, ISAF forces recovered three antipersonnel mines in Helmand province.[28]

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo on 3 December 2008. In June 2010, at the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Santiago, Chile, Afghanistan announced that it had taken “firm steps” toward ratification, and hoped to finish the process prior to the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.[1]

In December 2008, a Deputy Minister expressed strong support for the convention and early ratification in a meeting with representatives of the CMC, and explained the ratification process.[2] 

Afghanistan has been active in international efforts to promote the convention. In addition to the global meeting in Santiago, it participated in the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions in June 2009 and the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2009.

Afghanistan participated in most of the preparatory meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but it did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, even as an observer.[3] Afghanistan’s signature of the convention came unexpectedly near the end of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 when the Afghan representative announced that within the past two hours he had received instructions and authorization to sign.[4] 

Afghanistan has not yet made known its views on several important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, including the prohibition on transit, the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, the prohibition on foreign stockpiling, and the prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and thus is not a party to the CCW or its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In August 2010, Afghanistan confirmed that it has not used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.[5] 

At the Santiago conference in June 2010, Afghanistan told other states that it has no cluster munition stockpiles.[6] Upon inquiries from Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that it has no cluster munitions in its depots, and said that “about 113,196 items containing 29,559 kilograms” of old Soviet stocks had been destroyed.[7]

In 2002, Australian photographer John Rodsted documented an estimated 60,000 tons (60 million kg) of abandoned Soviet-type submunitions, bulk storage containers (cassettes), and other paraphernalia abandoned at an area in Bagram airbase, outside Kabul.[8]

There is no clear accounting of former stockpiles in Afghanistan. Jane’s Information Group has listed Afghanistan as possessing KMGU dispensers and RBK-250/275 cluster bombs.[9] Standard international reference sources also list it as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[10] 

Some of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions. The current status of any possible stockpiles is not known. For several years, ISAF has had a policy against using cluster munitions.[11]

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989.[12] A non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[13] Between October 2001 and early 2002, United States aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 bomblets in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country.[14] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is not aware of additional cluster strikes since that time.

Cluster Munition Remnants

Afghanistan has a continuing threat from cluster munition remnants. However, most of the contamination is thought to have been removed during clearance operations in 2002–2003 guided by US cluster strike data. Clearance operators say they still encounter both NATO and Soviet unexploded submunitions but only in small numbers.[15]

Clearance of cluster munition remnants

The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) has recorded clearance by HALO Trust and Mine Clearance Planning Agency of 43 cluster munition sites since 2004 covering a total area of 3.2km². Of these, six sites covering a total of 670,276m² were reportedly cleared in 2009.[16]

HALO cleared a total of 2,607 unexploded submunitions in 2009, of which 331 were NATO items and 2,276 were Soviet submunitions.[17] G4S also reported clearing areas contaminated with US M-42 submunitions close to Camp Hero, near Kandahar, in 2009.[18]

Demining organizations continue to find unexploded submunitions used by Soviet forces, usually in small numbers. Hemayatbrothers Demining International, working on a US Army Corps of Engineers contract at Bagram airbase, reported finding substantial numbers of abandoned submunitions, many of them still in packing cases. The Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) also reported finding unexploded Russian submunitions on the border with Pakistan, which was bombed by Soviet and Afghan forces.[19]

Contamination and Impact

Afghanistan remains one of the states with the highest level of contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the 1979 Soviet invasion followed by internal armed conflict in 1992–2001, and the United States-led Coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of UXO.[1] As of mid-2010, the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA)[2] estimated the number of hazardous areas at 6,696 affecting 654km² and 2,127 communities.[3]

Mines

Afghanistan is affected by a wide array of mine types but mostly Soviet, Iranian, and Pakistani antipersonnel mines and much smaller numbers of antivehicle mines, including Italian minimum-metal mines. Operators believe most of the densest mine belts laid along lines of confrontation in the 1980s and 1990s have been cleared[4] but estimates of the extent of mine contamination have fluctuated in recent years as a result of new finds by returning refugees, further survey, and as MACCA conducted an audit of data.

The Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS), completed in 2005, found 2,368 communities and more than 4 million people affected by mines, and identified some 715km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[5] However, Uruzgan and Daikundi  provinces, which were identified by the survey as the only Afghan provinces where mine contamination was not found, are now included in demining operations.[6] By the end of 2007, the estimate of total contamination had risen to 852km². MACCA reported at the end of 2009 that since January 2008, 1,289 previously unknown minefields covering some 121km² had been identified.[7]

After further clearance and data consolidation, MACCA estimated the number of sites containing explosive hazards as of the end of July 2009 at 6,502 covering 668km² but it observed this figure could rise with the results of further survey.[8] By the end of 2009, the number of contaminated sites had fallen to 6,351, covering an estimated 630km² but still affecting 2,130 communities.[9]

MACCA contamination estimates

Rising insurgency in recent years has led to some additional contamination resulting from use by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) and other non-state armed groups of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[10] A US Department of State report in 2009, however, noted that “with the exception of reported sporadic use by the Taliban, parties to the con­flicts in Afghanistan are reportedly not using anti-personnel mines in the standard military sense.”[11]

Cluster munition remnants

Afghanistan has a continuing threat from cluster munition remnants. Soviet forces and the government of Afghanistan used air-dropped and rocket-delivered submunitions in the 1979–1992 conflict, and US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002.[12] However, clearance operations followed in 2002–2003 guided by US cluster strike data are thought to have removed most of the resulting contamination. Demining operators say they still encounter both NATO and Soviet unexploded submunitions but only in small numbers.[13] MACCA reports that since 2002 operators have cleared or cancelled 157 submunition sites covering a total of 15.2km². A further 23 sites covering 6.98km² are still open.[14] The ALIS found that 89% of affected communities reported only antipersonnel and/or antivehicle mines.[15]

Other explosive remnants of war

Afghanistan contends with extensive ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as abandoned explosive ordnance. Increased insurgency in the past three years has resulted in additional ERW contamination, including remotely detonated and victim-activated IEDs or booby-traps, although the precise extent is unknown.[16] The US military reported the number of IED incidents rose sharply to 6,440 in 2009 from 4,169 in 2008, 2,718 in 2007, and 326 in 2004. It said the rise was accompanied by a dramatic increase in 2009 in the size of IEDs’ typical explosive charge.[17] Military logs published by Wikileaks in July 2010 recorded 7,155 IED finds in 2009, up from 308 in 2004.[18]

Security forces, the government, and the UN have continued to uncover large caches of weapons and munitions, including landmines; more than 2,900 tons (2.9 million kg) of munitions were discovered in northern Afghanistan by the joint Afghan-UNDP Afghanistan New Beginnings Project.[19]

MACCA observed in 2009 that “BAC [battle area clearance] work will essentially be the end state for the Afghan government and—like Europe after the world wars—Afghanistan can anticipate conducting BAC operations for a significant time period.” [20]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), set up by the UN in 1989, is coordinated by MACCA, a project of the UN Mine Action Service implemented by UNOPS. Before 2009, MACCA was responsible for managing, planning, and coordinating all aspects of mine action undertaken by MAPA, including database management, oversight of all funds supporting MAPA, and resource mobilization.[21]

Plans to nationalize MAPA have led to changes in its management structure and MACCA’s role. Until 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the government focal point on mine action.[22] A Ministry of Foreign Affairs-sponsored symposium in December 2007 decided an interministerial board should provide guidance to MACCA and that existing institutions should continue to provide support to the government on mine action until 2013,[23] when responsibility for mine action is to be handed over to national ownership.[24] The Interministerial Board (IMB) has reportedly met three times since its creation but did not meet in the first half of 2010.[25]

An interministerial meeting convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 January 2008 assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, which reports to the Office of the President. The DMC was also assigned to act as the IMB’s secretariat.[26] In May 2008, the DMC, with 15 staff, set up its offices in MACCA’s Kabul headquarters but has continued to be funded through the national budget.[27]

In 2010, MACCA appointed a staff member to work on plans for transition and the DMC and UNMAS were also drawing up a roadmap for transition expected to be completed by the end of the year.[28] MACCA also pointed out that “the IMB did not designate DMC as the eventual coordination structure therefore transitions of actions to DMC should themselves be understood as first steps.”[29]

A European Union (EU) evaluation of mine action in 2009 expressed concern over the lack of clarity in plans for transition, MACCA’s role, and its relationship with the DMC. It said the “key stumbling block” to transition was that the government “has little or no interest in owning either the problem of, or solution to, ERW contamination in Afghanistan.” It added MACCA’s Afghan implementing partners also expressed no interest in changing the status quo. It concluded: “Until these issues are resolved talk of transition is largely meaningless.”[30]

In response, MACCA stated that: “MACCA provided feedback to the EU on this evaluation which they had funded, specifically that it had a number of substantive errors leading to poor analysis. Although finding aspects of the report constructive and useful, the MACCA found other parts grossly in error and intellectually loose. It is notable that the evaluation made recommendations that were not subsequently acted on by the EU.”[31]

Under plans for the Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–31 March 2010), the DMC was to assume responsibility for accrediting mine action organizations, coordinating external quality assurance, acting as lead coordinator for risk education (RE) with the Ministry of Education, and preparation of Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports, working with existing MACCA staff.[32] By mid-2010, the DMC reported that the process was incomplete. It was participating in the MACCA management committees while also focusing on capacity-building. Three staff underwent training in India and the DMC was preparing to send four for training in Azerbaijan. The DMC’s plans to appoint more than 20 new staff were awaiting government approval.[33]

MACCA’s seven Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs)[34] liaise with other UN and international agencies, government departments, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Teams. To try to promote coordination with government ministries and increase integration of mine action into development plans, MACCA also appointed a staff member in 2010 to try to improve knowledge of the mine/UXO problem in government departments and support planning of clearance.[35] MACCA has already passed the lead role in mine/ERW risk education to the Ministry of Education.[36]

In 2009, MACCA sought to shift away from its former role assigning clearance tasks to implementing partners and to concentrate more on oversight, strategic planning, and coordinating operations while encouraging implementing partners to plan and manage clearance tasks within the strategic framework.[37] MACCA issued a list of planning criteria, priorities, and a dataset of hazards to provide the basis for implementing partners to draw up “aspirational plans.” MACCA assessed and where necessary negotiated amendments to these plans with implementing partners to ensure they addressed MACCA priorities, achieved a geographic balance, and avoided duplication or overlap.[38]

Priorities for action under the Afghan year 1389 (1 April 2010–31 March 2011) workplan included:[39]

·         “killing zones” (communities that have recorded casualties every year since 2003);

·         high-impact districts and communities (victims, blockages);

·         hazards causing victims recorded in the ALIS (but less than in previous categories);

·         small hazards (less than 5,000m²);

·         all hazards within 500m of the center of a community;

·         hazards classified according to terrain that did not fit the categories above;

·         donor priorities, including areas with cultural or other benefits; and

·         demining organization priorities (funded bilaterally).[40]

MACCA’s operational framework for Afghan year 1389 noted the need for “a balancing act” between the wish to complete clearance of some areas and uphold priorities. It noted that 17 districts each had more than 70 hazards and 85 districts had five mined areas or less and observed that “considerable progress can be made towards reaching an end state by seeking to coordinate the focusing of some clearance into districts with fewer hazards.”^[41]

MACCA also identified six large projects for consideration by donors, including a US$5 million project to clear all known hazards within Kabul municipality covering an area of 7km², a $7 million, three-year project for clearance of Ghazni city, a $38 million, four-year project to clear all high- and medium-priority as well as a range of other hazards in Kandahar province, and a $40 million, two-year project to clear all of four eastern provinces, for which estimated contamination covered 17km².[42]

Mine action, however, has faced increasing constraints from the spread and intensification of insurgency. MACCA observed that funding is more of a challenge than insurgency[43] but the operational framework for Afghan year 1389 points out 42% of all known hazards covering 68% of the known hazardous area lies in areas classified by the UN as extreme risk and high-risk environments. “This is a significant figure that will have a major impact on programme delivery,” it said.[44]

In June 2010, MACCA and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), embarked on a “Landmines and livelihoods” survey, conducting a post-clearance analysis in 25 communities to test the planning criteria applied in recent years. It also planned to conduct a follow-up survey in one area assessing community priorities for clearance against known hazards with a view to producing a prioritization model. The results were expected to be published towards the end of 2010.[45]

Until March 2009, MACCA used a decentralized data entry system in which staff at the AMACs entered clearance data and completion reports provided by operators into the database, and MACCA was responsible for quality control, updating of information, and sending updates to the AMACs. From April 2009, the AMACs continued collecting and verifying clearance data but data entry was undertaken by MACCA staff in Kabul.[46] RE activity reports are also provided to MACCA and entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[47]

MACCA embarked on a trial of IMSMA New Generation (NG) in June 2009 with a view to upgrading its database but encountered problems with the new system and decided in 2010 to revert to its existing IMSMA 3 version. MACCA said it would continue to work with GICHD to “ensure continuous improvement” of IMSMA NG and it anticipated trying again to transition to NG in 2011.[48]

Recent program evaluations

A 2009 EU evaluation judged MAPA to be “highly successful” and recommended the EU “substantially increase funding” for mine action, “perhaps by 100%.”[49] The evaluation said MACCA was “adding more value to the MAPA by better analysis of the mines problem as recorded in the national database, and is co-ordinating a more intelligently crafted solution that is driven far more by qualitative factors than ever before.”[50]

The evaluation found mine action “much improved” by operational reforms since 2006 but observed that many national operators lacked the ability and confidence to fulfill the role of full service providers under the new concept of operations[51] and suggested that this could affect safety. The evaluation also found it “unacceptable” that at least 48 demining accidents occurred among Afghan implementing partners in 2008.[52] It also drew attention to problems of missed mines and incidents on previously cleared land.[53] The evaluation recommended quality assurance should be outsourced to a technically competent agency not operating in Afghanistan.[54]

An assessment of humanitarian demining conducted in 2009 by the US Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) said the six demining organizations the US supported in 2009 “merit further support” and noted demining NGOs had achieved “impressive increases in productivity. The 82,000 antipersonnel and 900 antitank mines cleared in 2008 represent over 20 percent of all mines cleared since 1989.”^[55]

The report described as “promising” efforts to promote community-based demining initiatives (see Mine clearance in 2009 section below) but also drew attention to a number of potential problems. It noted that much of the success of the program to date may have been due to community expectations that clearance of mines would lead to development funding to help the community make better use of the land. However, this had not occurred so far and called for “far greater coordination than currently exists.”[56]

The OIG also cautioned against pushing community-based demining too aggressively in insecure areas, warning that this might “eventually place the NGO management/training staff and even the community deminers at risk, and not only from insurgents or criminals. Allied pilots, for example, will want to take care not to mistake deminers for insurgents. There is also the risk of shifting mine action resources to areas where there is actually less immediate economic return.”[57]

Land Release

MAPA released or cancelled a total of 219.5km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 2009, a marginal increase on the 216.95km² released or cancelled in 2008 despite the increasingly difficult operating environment created by an expanding insurgency. The area reduced or cancelled accounted for more of the total (28.5%) in 2009 than the previous year (17.8%). The total included 52.6km² of mined area released through clearance and 39.3km² reduced or cancelled, together with 104.3km² of battle areas that were cleared, and 23.3km² that was cancelled.[58] In the process, MACCA reported demining organizations destroyed a total of 52,105 antipersonnel mines, 789 antivehicle mines, and 1.02 million items of ERW.[59]

Afghanistan has the oldest and biggest mine action program with some 8,000 deminers working for seven implementing partners coordinated by MACCA. Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC); Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA); Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA); Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC); and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); with two international NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO.

In addition, 16 commercial companies operated in 2009. These included nine Afghan companies: Afghan Campaign for Landmines, Asda Brothers Demining Company, Country Mine Clearance Company, Hemayatbrothers Demining International (HDI), Kabul Mine Clearance Company, Kardan Demining Group, National Demining Support Services, OMAR International, and Trust Demining Company. Seven international companies active in 2009 were: G4S Ordnance Management (formerly ArmorGroup), DynCorp International, EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Technology, MineTech International, RONCO Consulting Corporation, The Development Initiative (TDI), and UXB International. MACCA accredited eight more commercial companies (including seven Afghan companies) in 2009 and two more (one Afghan) in the first half of 2010.[60]

Five-year summary of land cancellation and release[61]

Survey in 2009

Before 2007, only one Afghan organization, MCPA, conducted survey. Under the new concept of operations put into practice in 2007 to increase operational flexibility, all Afghan implementing partners undertake survey.[62]

HALO and MCPA completed a polygon survey of SHAs in 2009 which resulted in cancellation of some 60km² of SHA but also identified 52km² of previously unidentified contamination, for a net reduction of 8km² in the estimate of overall contamination.[63] HALO surveyed 33.6km² of suspected mined areas in 2009 of which 14.9km² was previously unidentified.[64]

Mine clearance in 2009

Demining organizations marginally increased the amount of land manually cleared in 2009 compared to the previous year helped by a revival of funding which allowed many of MACCA’s implementing partners to rehire staff laid off in 2008 and even expand capacity. Operations faced increasing constraints imposed by deteriorating security conditions.

Deteriorating security in much of Afghanistan gave added impetus to MACCA’s program of community-based demining (CBD) initiated in 2008. The Afghan year 1389 operating framework noted that “mine action is considered by most Afghans of all persuasions to be a task that transcends political or ethnic differences.”[65] In areas where insecurity prevents normal operations, Afghan implementing partners, after consulting and gaining explicit approval of local elders, recruit and train local people to clear hazards in their area, providing employment and skills training for the duration of the task. Implementing partners provide equipment and team leaders direct clearance at least until local recruits have sufficient experience to assume the role.[66]

The number of CBD projects rose from three in 2008 to 10 in 2009, when they resulted in clearance of 5.8km² with the destruction of 1,179 antipersonnel mines, 39 antivehicle mines, and 21,423 ERW. A further nine CBD projects had started by early June 2010.[67] A total of $8.8 million was allocated to CBD in 2009, representing 11.4% of total funding. A further $10 million had been allocated for CBD in 2010 as of June, also representing 11% of funding.[68]

Mine clearance in 2009[69]

*HALO reported clearing 12.83km² in 2009 and destroying 33,700 antipersonnel mines and 188 antivehicle mines.[70]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013 (which falls within Afghan year 1391). This obligation is a key influence in Afghanistan’s strategic planning. The Afghan Compact of 2006 set the target of clearing 70% of hazards and contaminated areas by 1 March 2011, and The Way Ahead draft strategy for mine action released in 2006 set the target of completing clearance of all known mined areas by 2013.[71]

At the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan said its mine action strategy was based on “the government’s vision of a country free of landmines.”[72] At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, however, it claimed that “the programme is chronically under-funded to meet the goals of the Ottawa Treaty.”[73] MACCA’s Afghan year 1389 workplan observed that “the programme has the general capacity to remove 90km² of hazard from the database per annum therefore, quite clearly, unless the programme triples in size before April 2010 the Compact target will not be achieved.”[74]

Progress towards completion is hampered by continuing new discoveries of mined areas as a result of new information produced by the return of refugees and by further survey. By the end of 2009, Afghanistan had cleared 41% of its known hazards and 39% of the estimated contaminated area, although by the end of March 2010 the progress towards those targets was 43% and 47% respectively.

Progress towards mine action benchmarks[75]

In the past nine years, demining organizations have cleared 317.34km² of mined areas[76] but in June 2010 MACCA estimated 654km² still remained to be released.[77]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Afghanistan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions but as of 1 September 2010 had not ratified it.

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2009

MACCA has recorded clearance of 43 cluster munition sites since 2004 covering a total area of 3.2km², all by HALO and MCPA. Of these, six sites covering a total of 670,276m² were reportedly cleared in 2009.[78]

HALO cleared a total of 2,607 unexploded submunitions in 2009, of which 331 were NATO items and 2,276 Soviet submunitions.[79] G4S also reported clearing areas contaminated with remnants of US M-42 submunitions close to Camp Hero, near Kandahar, in 2009.[80] However, most of the submunitions dropped by US aircraft in 2001–2002 were destroyed in clearance operations conducted in 2002–2003 that were guided by US strike data and demining organizations say they do not encounter many.[81]

Demining organizations continue to find unexploded submunitions used by Soviet forces, also usually in small numbers. HDI, working on a US Army Corps of Engineers contract at Bagram airbase reported finding substantial numbers of abandoned submunitions, many of them still in packing cases. OMAR also reported finding unexploded Russian submunitions on the border with Pakistan which was bombed by Soviet and Afghan forces.[82]

Battle area clearance in 2009[83]

A total of 20 operators, including MACCA’s implementing partners and commercial companies, reported clearing 104.83km² of battle area in 2009 and more than 1 million items of UXO.

Much of the BAC undertaken by commercial companies involved contracts to clear sites for construction or expansion of military bases and police posts as well as checking areas designated for construction of buildings or infrastructure. RONCO, G4S, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology (EODT), and UXB International undertook contracts for the US Army Corps of Engineers.[84]

DynCorp International, working under contract to the US State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, operated seven 12-person teams doing village-by-village clearance of UXO, tasked by MACCA’s AMACs and responding to local calls.[85]

Battle area clearance and explosive ordnance disposal in 2009[86]

Quality management

MACCA provides quality management through a three person unit in Kabul and 50 staff in seven AMACs who conduct demining site visits.[87] In 2009, MACCA put out an expression of interest for an international agency to undertake quality assurance, a measure recommended in the 2009 EU evaluation.[88] After an internal review, MACCA instead initiated transition to a new system of quality assurance (QA) to be implemented over the ensuing two years focusing less on routine site visits and more on an audit of implementing partners’ systems and procedures. MACCA also brought in an Afghan organization, the Afghan Institute of Management, Training and Enhancement of Indigenous Capacities, formerly Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency to work with the DMC on a QA needs assessment.[89]

MACCA introduced in 2009 a “balanced scorecard” to monitor the activities of implementing partners and provide a benchmark for raising standards. The scorecard, welcomed by Afghan implementing partners,[90] measures their performance on a quarterly basis against a set of five indicators for assessing demining operations (operations, quality management, demining accidents, cost, and reporting) and four indicators for RE (the same but not including accidents). MACCA and demining operators gave the scorecard a trial run in July through September 2009 and put it into practice with amendments in the final quarter of the year. Data on performance drawn from the IMSMA database is shared with implementing partners who then confirm the score.[91]

The operations indicator (40% of the total score) included sub-indicators for the number of hazards started and completed and asset productivity. Quality management (15%) measured major breaches of mine action standards, and reporting (15%) measured the accuracy and timeliness of progress reports, mine and battle area clearance completion reports, quarterly operational plans, and response to demining investigations. The cost indicator (10%) is under review.[92]

MACCA reported that out of 380 quality checks it conducted in March 2010, 19 found minor non-conformities or breaches of standards and six serious non-conformities.[93]

Safety of demining personnel

One deminer from ATC was killed in Bamyan city and 31 deminers were injured in demining accidents in 2009, a drop of more than one-third from the 48 accidents MACCA reported in 2008. In the first half of 2010, one deminer was killed and seven were injured.^[94]

MACCA states that since demining started in Afghanistan in 1989, IMSMA records show 120 deminers have died as a result of accidents and 792 were injured. MACCA said that it takes accidents very seriously but commented that “when this is viewed against the number of deminers at work in any given year, the percentage of the workforce affected by accidents is very small.”[95] A US Department of State OIG evaluation cited an unconfirmed report from July 2008 that 371 civilian deminers had been killed since the start of demining and noted “some media reports place the figure far higher.”[96]

Demining operators are arguably more at risk from deteriorating and unpredictable security than from the more manageable hazard posed by the mines and ERW they clear. MACCA’s integrated operating framework for Afghan year 1389 noted that “in the past year, deminers have been attacked, forcing plans to change and projects to be adapted.”^[97]

DDG experienced two attacks in 2009, the first on 15 July and the second five days later on 20 July in Balkh province, which resulted in the death of a group supervisor.^[98] Seven people working for MineTech International were killed in armed violence in 2009, including three armed security guards killed in an ambush in April, and four other MineTech staff killed in an ambush the next month as they transported equipment. In addition, a total of 30 deminers were abducted in six separate incidents in 2009, although all were subsequently released. A total of 18 other attacks on deminers resulted in loss of, or damage to, equipment and/or vehicles.^[99]

Casualties, abduction, and seizure of vehicles and equipment also occurred in the first half of 2010. Five DAFA deminers were killed and 15 injured when insurgents identified as Taliban detonated two remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near the parking area of a demining site in Kandahar province, setting off the second IED as those injured by the first were brought to agency vehicles for evacuation. DAFA said Taliban sources contacted by the local community described the attack as a misunderstanding and it resumed operations after a one-month suspension.^[100]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

RE is coordinated by MACCA and implemented by 75 teams drawn from the Afghan Red Crescent Society (44 teams), Handicap International (10 teams), DDG (seven teams), and the Association for Aid and Relief Japan as well as by the Mobile Mini Children’s Circus.[101] These agencies reportedly delivered RE to a total of 994,870 people in 2009.[102]

MACCA analysis in 2009 showed that 108 communities categorized as “highly impacted” or “highly impacted with victims” had received no RE and that a high proportion of these were in the central area of Afghanistan.[103] Armed conflict has also hampered RE delivery, particularly in the south and remote areas.[104]

However, MACCA hoped to expand coverage through a series of agreements with government ministries. It had already worked with the Ministry of Education to train child protection officers to deliver RE in schools and in 2009 started an initiative to set up school mine action committees with the participation of parents and community elders. In addition, it reached agreement in 2009 to provide training for up to 70 staff in NGOs working with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National Solidarity Program who would then serve as focal points for further RE training through the ministry’s network of community development councils. MACCA also reached agreement with the Ministry of Religious Affairs to incorporate RE messages into speeches broadcast nationally on Fridays as well as into its publications.[105]

The EU’s 2009 evaluation concluded that, “Mine risk education (MRE) is conceptually weak” and stated that, “MACCA’s MRE department needs to improve its understanding of the problem, and its solution, by investing time in analyzing victim data within the IMSMA database, and trends that this contains.”[106] In response, MACCA stated that it “did not agree with this statement of the evaluation and provided this feedback to the EC.”[107]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

For 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified at least 859 new casualties due to mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan; this was a significant decrease (13%) from the 992 casualties identified for 2008.

The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) recorded 539 mine/ERW casualties (118 killed and 421 injured) for 2009 including 491 civilians,[1] 34 deminers, three off-duty military personnel, and 11 of unknown civilian/military status. Children (269) accounted for 55% of recorded civilian casualties (228 boys and 41 girls). Of the 270 adult casualties, 234 were men and 36 were women. One deminer was killed (a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 33 were injured (all Afghan nationals) in 32 accidents.[2]

This represented a significant decrease from the 831 casualties MACCA recorded for 2008.[3] The reason for the steep decline in reported civilian casualties was not known. No changes in data collection in 2009 were known to account for the decrease.[4] As in previous years, MACCA data did not include IED casualties.[5]

Handicap International (HI) recorded 27 additional civilian casualties for 2009 (23 killed and four injured), including 19 children (16 boys and three girls).[6]

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor analysis of United States military data made available through the Guardian newspaper identified 293 casualties of victim-activated IEDs (71 killed and 222 injured): 168 foreign military casualties (24 killed and 144 injured), 66 Afghan military casualties (18 killed and 48 injured), and 59 civilian casualties (29 killed and 30 injured) in 166 incidents.[7] For 2008, Landmine Monitor recorded 161 casualties (79 killed and 82 injured) identified through media analysis in addition to those reported by MACCA for 2008 including foreign soldiers and military deminers.[8]

Some 743 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded between 1980 and the end of 2009. In addition, at least 26 casualties during the use of cluster munitions have been recorded.[9]

MACCA recorded 20,095 casualties between 1979 and the end of 2009.[10]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown but in 2006, was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[11]

There was no comprehensive assessment of the needs of mine/ERW survivors in 2009. Needs assessments or surveys were carried out by individual national and international NGOs in the field and the results were shared with MACCA and relevant ministries. However, there was no centralized distribution of existing data on survivors’ needs.[12] The ICRC reported that in 2009, national casualty data collectors ceased gathering information on new casualties from ICRC-supported centers, as had been done regularly in past years. No external acquisition or crosschecking of their data was carried out.[13] ICRC centers continued to assess and register all survivors assisted.[14]

The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) used MACCA data for planning activities. Reportedly, there was a need for a national disability and injury surveillance mechanism. The Ministry of Public Health’s (MoPH) Disability and Rehabilitation Department (DRD) was responsible for injury surveillance and needs assessment, but had no budget to implement a system.[15]

Victim assistance coordination[16]

Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group meetings were held monthly in Kabul in 2009 and new groups were established in the northern and eastern regions of Afghanistan.[17] A wide range of relevant governmental and non-governmental actors attended the meetings, primarily to discuss their own activities and plans.[18] During 2009, representatives from disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) and survivor organizations noted that coordination with the ministries remained challenging.[19]

The Inter-ministerial Task Force on Disability was expected to “improve coordination between the different ministries.”[20] The MoPH DRD, with the support of task force members, drafted a rehabilitation policy which was under revision at the end of 2009.[21] No formal meetings of the task force were reported to the end of 2009 after the first meeting in October 2008.

In March 2009, a third national workshop was held to discuss the Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan 2008–2011 (ANDAP) and its implementation.[22] A proposed monitoring mechanism for ANDAP had not been approved by the end of 2009.[23] All implementing organizations were asked to apply ANDAP in their plans and services.[24] Some reported adhering to it, but no specific outcomes were reported for 2009.

Afghanistan provided information on progress and challenges for victim assistance in 2009 at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009, at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2010, and a brief update in Form J of its Article 7 report.[25]

Relevant coordination meetings included representatives from survivors’ organizations and survivors were included in provision of victim assistance services through NGOs during 2009. Afghanistan’s delegation to the Second Review Conference included a survivor. Other survivors from Afghanistan also participated, representing their own organizations.[26] However, it was also reported that overall inclusion of survivors was inadequate, due in part to prejudices against persons with disabilities.[27]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[28]

There were many stakeholders in the victim assistance and disability sector.[29] MACCA was not aware of any that ceased their activities in 2009, as in 2008, or of any new organizations.[30] The deteriorating security situation severely affected the delivery of humanitarian services in a growing number of geographic areas and disproportionately impacted vulnerable individuals, including mine/ERW survivors.[31]

ICRC-supported hospitals assisted more than double the number of people injured by mines/ERW in 2009 as compared to 2008 (an increase of 133%).[32] However, Afghan Red Crescent Society first-aid volunteers and other community first-aid workers lacked the training to provide complex medical treatment. In response to the lack of local emergency capacity and the poor security situation, the ICRC evacuated war-injured persons to appropriate facilities through a system of private taxis.[33] No new emergency medical care training was reported to MACCA for 2009. Additional mobile medical teams were established to assist the nomadic Kochi people: 30 teams in 2009, from eight in 2008. Health staff in 15 of the mobile teams received training from the MoPH DRD in physical rehabilitation and disability awareness in order to better identify and assist beneficiaries with disabilities.[34]

No significant changes in physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics, were reported for 2009. The establishment of new peripheral prosthetic centers would have been needed to make significant improvements for survivors.[35] As of 2009, the MoPH’s Basic Package of Health Services included providing physiotherapists in 56 hospitals, including a male and female physiotherapist in each. However, the number of physiotherapists graduating annually was insufficient to fulfill this requirement.[36] By the end of 2009, there were still no physical rehabilitation services available in the southeastern region of Afghanistan. However, funding for equipment and running costs of the newly built Khost Orthopedic Workshop was approved by the Ministry of Finance in the fiscal year 2009 (Afghan year 1388) though the center was not yet operational.[37]

As in past years, no significant changes were reported in economic or social inclusion activities.[38] The lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs.[39] In 2009, training on the psychosocial aspects of disability was included in other awareness-raising training for MoPH staff.[40]

Differences in treatment in Afghanistan were often not based solely on needs, but were influenced by the economic and social situation of survivors as well as their gender and cause of disability. Women and elderly persons with disabilities received fewer services for these reasons.[41]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, including healthcare and financial protection. The constitution also requires the state to adopt measures to reintegrate and to ensure the active participation in society of persons with disabilities.[42] There were no laws or concrete plans to ensure accessibility and this remained a significant challenge as persons with disabilities in Afghanistan lacked access to many existing services. In Kabul for example, some 95% of public buildings were not accessible for persons with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors.[43] The National Law for the Rights and Privileges of Persons with Disabilities, developed in 2006 and passed in 2008, was finally adopted in December 2009, but it was not yet enforceable pending its being published in the official gazette of the Ministry of Justice.[44]

As of 1 September 2010, Afghanistan had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The government of Afghanistan only began contributing to its mine action program in 2009. The Department of Mine Clearance reported that in 2009 the value of the 50 contracts awarded to national commercial demining organizations was US$2,803,607.[1]

In June 2009 the government of Afghanistan agreed to contribute $2,600,000 for mine clearance in support of the development of the Aynak copper mine in Logar province. Of this, $1,277,000 was used in Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–31 March 2010); the remainder will be spent in Afghan year 1389 (1 April 2010–31 March 2011).[2]

In 2009, 18 governments, the European Commission (EC), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) contributed $106,555,763, approximately the same amount as in 2008. Thirteen of the 20 donors made their contributions, totaling approximately $60 million, through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.[3]

For Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–31 March 2010) the Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) reported receiving $77,437,589 from 18 governments, the EC, and the UN.[4]

International contributions: 2009[5]

N/R = not reported

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[6]