Afghanistan

Last Updated: 02 November 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures 

Has not enacted new implementation measures

Transparency reporting

For calendar year 2009

Key developments

Taliban use of victim-activated IEDs has increased

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. It has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1]

Afghanistan has submitted eight Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports.[2] As of 30 September 2011, it had not submitted its annual report due 30 April 2011.

Afghanistan participated in the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2010 in Geneva as well as intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011. At both meetings, Afghanistan made statements on victim assistance and mine clearance.

Afghanistan is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and thus is not a party to the CCW or its protocols on mines and explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. There have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups in recent years.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007,[3] eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[4] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program.  It reported that as of April 2007, it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines,[5] and later reported that in calendar year 2007, it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines.[6] How many of those were found and destroyed after the October 2007 declaration of completion is not known.

In previous Article 7 reports, Afghanistan has indicated that thousands of mines continue to be recovered during operations or turned in during disarmament programs or discovered by civilians. A total of 4,392 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2009, including 2,006 Iranian-produced YM-1 mines.[7] Afghanistan had reported the discovery and destruction of 62,498 antipersonnel mines during 2008.[8]

Mines retained for training and development

In June 2011, the chief of operations of Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[9] All mines retained by Afghanistan are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[10] Afghanistan reported in its previous Article 7 report that it retained a total of 2,618 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, the same number and types as the previous year.[11] 

Use

Conflict in Afghanistan intensified and spread greatly in 2010 and the first half of 2011, with the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by Coalition or Afghan national forces, but an increase in the use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Taliban has been recorded.

Non-state armed groups

There has also been a notable increase in the number of reports of use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan by armed groups opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces.

In July 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report that found that the majority (approximately two-thirds) of IEDs encountered by ISAF in Afghanistan are pressure plate victim-activated devices.[12] UNAMA is of the view that victim-activated IEDs are de facto mines; that is, they function as antipersonnel mines. The majority of pressure plate IEDs are set to detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and contain approximately 20kg of explosive, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine. As a result of this design and configuration, “each pressure plate IED serves as a massive anti-personnel landmine with the capability of destroying a tank. Civilians who step or drive on these IEDS have no defense against them and little chance of survival.” [13] UNAMA has called on the Taliban to cease using pressure-plate IEDs and to publicly reaffirm its 1998 decree banning mines.[14]

On the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the allegation and said their explosive devices are command-detonated and do not use pressure plates.[15] The Taliban have continued to claim responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[16]

Use of victim-activated IEDs is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, because they function like antipersonnel mines, but use of command-detonated IEDs is not banned. Previously, the Monitor has reported that the vast majority of IED attacks did not involve victim-activated antipersonnel mines, even though media reports frequently attributed attacks to “landmines.”

According to the UNAMA report, the first six months of 2011 saw armed conflict intensify in the south and southeast and moved to districts in the west and north. IEDs were “the single largest killer of civilians in the first half of 2011, killing 444 civilians and comprising 30 percent of all civilian deaths in Afghanistan.”[17] In April 2010, the ICRC stated that its hospital in Kandahar had recorded an increase of victims from improvised mines in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan and condemned the use of improvised mines in the Marjah area of Helmand.[18]

There continued to be some media reports, but fewer than in previous years, of ISAF and Afghan forces recovering antipersonnel mines. In October 2010, Coalition and Afghan forces recovered antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines among other weapons.[19] In November 2010, Coalition and Afghan forces recovered 25 antipersonnel mines and other weapons.[20] In late 2010, Coalition forces launched a reward program for information on caches, which has led to the recovery of an unknown number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.[21] In March 2011, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Commission received 20 antipersonnel mines and other weapons collected by anti-terrorism police during operations.[22] In July 2011, a Coalition patrol recovered an arms cache that included 23 antipersonnel mines.[23]

 



[1] In May 2009, Afghanistan repeated from previous Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports that “its constitution adopted in January 2005 requires the country to respect all international treaties it has signed. The Ministry of Defense instructed all military forces to respect the comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines and the prohibition on use in any situation by militaries or individuals.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form A. 

[2] Previous Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports were submitted: in 2010 and 2009, and on 13 May 2008, 30 April 2007, 1 May 2006, 30 April 2005, 30 April 2004, and 1 September 2003.

[3] On 11 October 2007, Afghanistan formally notified the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that “Afghanistan has now fully completed the destruction of all its known stockpiles of Anti-Personnel Mines.” Letter from Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spania, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kerry Brinkert, Manager, ISU, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 11 October 2007.

[4] In April 2007, Afghanistan informed States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjsheer province, about 150km north of Kabul.  Provincial authorities did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. For details on the destruction program and reasons for not meeting the deadline, see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 89–90; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 79–80.

[5] Statement by Khaled Zekriya, Head of Mine Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 13 May 2008.

[7] The type and number of mines destroyed in each location, and the dates of destruction, have been recorded in detail in the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2009), Form G.

[9] Email from MACCA, 4 June 2011.

[10] Interview with MACCA, in Geneva, 24 June 2010.  The former UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan Program Director, also told the Monitor in June 2008 that all retained mines are fuzeless, and that the fuzes are destroyed prior to use in training activities.

[11] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2009), Form D.

[12] UNAMA meeting with ISAF Counter-IED office, Kabul, 10 July 2011. ISAF completed testing 400 of 1,000 IEDs removed from Afghanistan at the United Kingdom Defence Exploitation Facility to determine the weight that would set off the pressure plate IEDs used in Afghanistan. The majority were set at approximately 10kg, though some tested were set as high as 100kg.

[13] UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Mid Year Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, July 2011, p. 2.

[14] Ibid, p. 8. See statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998, in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 433–434.

[15] “UNAMA accuses Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of having  caused casualties to the common people by planting land mines. However, all the country men know that Mujahideen use landmines which are controlled remotely, i.e. they are not detonated by heavy pressure. So Mujahideen’s mines aim only at a specific targets.” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Repeatedly Baseless Accusations of UNAMA,” 19 July 2011, alemara1.com.

[16] See Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan website, shahamat.info.

[17] UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Mid Year Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, July 2011, p. 17.

[18] “Afghanistan: homemade bombs and improvised mines kill and maim civilians in south” ICRC, Operational Update No 10/04, 14 April 2010, www.icrc.org; and Lisa Schlein, “Red Cross Condemns Use of Improvised Mines in Southern Afghanistan,” Voice of America (Geneva), 6 March 2010, www.voanews.com.

[19] “Afghans Turn-in Numerous Weapons, Explosives,” American Forces Press Service (Washington), 12 October 2010, www.defense.gov.

[20] ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan statement, “Large Weapons Cache Found, Destroyed,” 14 November 2010.

[21] “Bomb squad or fraud squad? Phoney IEDs planted for cash in Afghanistan,” The Telegram, 12 August 2011, www.thetelegram.com.

[22] “Arms, Ammunition Hands Over To DIAG Commission,” Bakhtar News Agency, 9 March 2011, bakhtarnews.com.af.

[23] “Afghan-led Force Finds Enemy Mortars in Kandahar,” American Forces Press Service (Washington, DC), 18 July 2011, www.defense.gov.


Last Updated: 25 August 2011

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

Signatory

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011

Key developments

Completed domestic ratification process on 6 June 2011

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

As of early August 2011, Afghanistan had yet to deposit its instrument of ratification with the UN in New York—the final step required to complete its ratification of the convention.

On 30 April 2011, Afghanistan’s lower house of the parliament (Wolesi Jirga) approved Resolution 3 to ratify the convention. On 24 May 2011, the upper house of the Afghan parliament (Meshrano Jirga) approved the resolution. On 6 June 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed Decree 25 approving ratification. On 8 June 2011, Dr. Zalmai Rasoul, minister of foreign affairs, signed the instrument of ratification and it was sent to be deposited with the UN.[1]

Afghanistan has provided regular updates on the status of ratification. In November 2010, it stated that ratification had been delayed by parliamentary elections, but confirmed “strong steps” were being taken to ensure the swift completion of ratification.[2] In June 2011, Afghanistan informed other States Parties that the Afghan parliament has approved ratification of the convention.[3]

Afghanistan participated in most meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but, despite its active support for the ban objective, did not endorse the Wellington Declaration, which would have committed it to participate fully in the formal negotiations of the convention, and did not attend the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, even as an observer.[4] Afghanistan came to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer, but unexpectedly signed the convention near the end of the conference after the Afghan representative announced that he had received instructions and authorization to do so.[5]

Since 2008, Afghanistan has played a positive and active role in the work of the convention. Afghanistan attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010, where it gave an update on ratification and made a statement on clearance. Afghanistan also participated in intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in June 2011, where it also provided updates on ratification and clearance.[6]

CMC Afghanistan has campaigned in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including swift ratification.[7] On 8 May 2011, campaigners met with the First Deputy (speaker) of the upper house of the Afghan parliament, Mohammad Alam Izatyar, to advocate for parliamentary approval of the convention’s ratification.

Afghanistan has not yet made known its views on several important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. The United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks have outlined the US interpretation of the convention, but the Afghanistan government has not yet made its views known (see Foreign stockpiling section). In a December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, the US outlined its concern over how Afghanistan would interpret the convention’s prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling, as well as Article 21 on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party to the convention. According to the cable, the US has interpreted the convention as allowing “U.S. forces to store, transfer, and use U.S. cluster munitions in the territory of a State Party.”[8]

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it; thus it is not a party to the CCW or its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Afghanistan has stated on several occasions that it has not used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.[9]

At the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010, Afghanistan stated that it has no stockpiled cluster munitions.[10] This confirmed a previous statement made in June 2010.[11] In August 2010, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense informed the Monitor that it has no cluster munitions in its depots, and said that “about 113,196 items containing 29,559 kilograms” of old Soviet stocks had been destroyed.[12]

There is no clear accounting of former stockpiles in Afghanistan. Jane’s Information Group has listed Afghanistan as possessing KMGU dispensers and RBK-250/275 cluster bombs.[13] Standard international reference sources also list it as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[14] In 2002, Australian photographer John Rodsted documented an estimated 60,000 tons (60 million kg) of abandoned Soviet-type submunitions, bulk storage containers (cassettes), and other paraphernalia abandoned at an area in Bagram airbase, outside Kabul.[15]

Foreign stockpiling

Some International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions, but the current status of any possible stockpiles is not known. According to the December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[16] In February 2011, an Afghan human rights group called on the US government and NATO to reveal if it stockpiles or has used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since the 2002 conflict.[17] An ISAF spokesperson told media, “ISAF conducts operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. All weapons, weapons systems, and munitions are reviewed for legality under international law.”[18] A spokesperson for the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) said, “We have no evidence of NATO/US using cluster munitions [in Afghanistan] since 2002.”[19] For several years, ISAF has had a policy against using cluster munitions.[20]

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989.[21] A non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[22] Between October 2001 and early 2002, United States aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 bomblets in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country.[23] The Monitor is not aware of additional cluster strikes since that time.

Cluster Munition Remnants

Afghanistan has a residual threat from cluster munition remnants. Contamination resulted primarily from cluster munitions used during the Soviet occupation as well as US cluster munition strikes in 2001 and 2002.[24] Clearance operations are believed to have removed most of the contamination from the 2001–2002 air strikes.[25] Demining operators, however, continue to encounter both US and Soviet cluster munition remnants.[26] Survey in 2010 did not identify any additional cluster munition contaminated areas.[27]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas

MACCA recorded clearance of 43 cluster munition sites between 2004 and 2009 covering a total area of 3.2km2, all by HALO Trust and the Afghan NGO Mine Clearance Planning Agency. Of these, six sites covering a total of 670,276m2 were reportedly cleared in 2009.[28] In 2010, MACCA reported clearance of a further 1km2 of cluster munition contaminated areas by HALO and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), resulting in the destruction of 594 submunitions from abandoned cluster munitions and 2,683 unexploded submunitions (see Table below).

Cluster munition clearance in 2010[29]

Operator

Area
cleared (m2)

No. of abandoned
cluster munitions destroyed

No. of unexploded
submunitions
destroyed

OMAR

6,421

533

2,683

HALO

1,002,640

61

0

Totals

1,009,061

594

2,683

HALO, in addition, said it cleared a further 1,328 unexploded submunitions in 2010, 696 in the course of battle area clearance and 632 during roving explosive ordnance disposal operations.[30]

Cluster munition casualties

Two casualties of unexploded submunitions were reported in Afghanistan in 2010. This represented a significant decrease over the past decade and compared to the 70 casualties recorded in 2001.[31] In Afghanistan there have been at least 771 casualties in total from cluster munitions. Some 745 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded between 1980 and the end of 2010. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[32]

 



[1] The ratification process is detailed in a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that announces completion of the domestic ratification process and confirms the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s intent to comply with the provisions of the convention. Statement by Dr. Zalmai Rasoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 8 June 2011.

[2] Statement of Afghanistan, First Meeting of States Parties, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[3] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011. Notes by CMC.

[4] For details on Afghanistan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 27–28.

[5] Two US Department of State cables subsequently made public by Wikileaks have shown how US officials had sought assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not join the convention; but during the Oslo Signing Conference, President Karzai decided that Afghanistan should sign the convention. “AFGHAN VIEWS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND OSLO PROCESS, US Department of State cable dated 12 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 20 May 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net.

[6] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.

[7] For example, Afghan campaigners, including survivors of cluster munition and mines, conducted media outreach, distributed information on cluster munitions, and organized a public drumming event in Kabul to celebrate the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force. CMC, “Entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Report: 1 August 2010,” November 2010, p. 11.

[8] According to the cable, “the United States reads the phrase ‘military cooperation and operations’ in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party.” “DEMARCHE TO AFGHANISTAN ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[9] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011, notes by the CMC; and response to Monitor questionnaire by MACCA, “Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitoring Report 2010,” received by email from Akhshid Javid, Third Secretary, Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in Geneva, 19 August 2010.

[10] Statement of Afghanistan, First Meeting of States Parties, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[11] Statement of Afghanistan, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 8 June 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence/Human Rights Watch.

[12] Information provided by the Chief of Ammunition Management, Ministry of Defense, to MACCA, received by the Monitor in an email from MACCA, 9 August 2010.

[13] Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

[14] Ibid.; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005–2006 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 233.

[15] See for example, Norwegian People’s Aid, “PTAB,” undated, npaid.websys.no.

[16] “DEMARCHE TO AFGHANISTAN ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[17] Afghanistan Rights Monitor, “Annual Report: Civilian Casualties of War, January–December 2010.” p. 17,

[18] “Afghanistan: US military denies keeping, using cluster munitions,” IRIN, 2 February 2011, www.irinnews.org.

[19] Ibid.

[20] In July 2010, Poland confirmed to the Monitor that the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan “has been equipped with 98mm mortars and the appropriate cluster munitions,” while noting, “To date, cluster munitions have never been used in combat in Afghanistan” by Polish forces. Poland also confirmed that the ISAF policy of no use of cluster munitions remains in effect, and stated that this policy has been incorporated into Polish rules of engagement. Letter DPB 2591/16/10/80613 from Marek Szcygiel, Deputy Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 16 July 2010.

[21] CMC fact sheet prepared by Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” October 2008.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Human Rights Watch, “Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and their Use by the United States in Afghanistan,” Vol. 14, No. 7 (G), December 2002, www.hrw.org.

[24] Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 27.

[25] For example, HALO has reported that it cleared 9,000 unexploded US submunitions in 2002–2003. Email from Ollie Pile, Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Officer, HALO, Kabul, 30 June 2009; and email from Tom Dibb, Operations Manager, HALO, 3 June 2010.

[26] Interviews with demining operators, Kabul, 12–18 June 2010. In 2009, HALO cleared 2,607 unexploded submunitions; and emails from Ollie Pile, HALO, Kabul, 30 June 2009, and from Tom Dibb, HALO, 3 June 2010.

[27] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[28] MACCA records cleared submunitions under unexploded ordnance, not as a separate item. Email from MACCA, 14 July 2010.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[30] Response to Monitor questionnaire by HALO, 30 May 2011.

[31] MACCA, “Fact Sheet on Cluster Munitions in Afghanistan,” June 2011.

[32] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p, 95. The ICRC recorded 707 casualties occurring during cluster munition use between 1980 and 31 December 2006 to which 36 casualties from 2007 to the end of 2009 recorded by MACCA were added. Due to under-reporting it is likely that the numbers of casualties during use as well as those caused by unexploded submunitions were significantly higher. Email from MACCA, 18 February 2010; and MACCA, Fact Sheet on Cluster Munitions in Afghanistan, June 2011.


Last Updated: 06 October 2011

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, and the United States (US)-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[1] The Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) estimated the number of remaining hazards as of 31 March 2011 at 6,545 covering 627km2 and affecting 2,056 communities.[2]

Mines

Afghanistan is affected by a wide array of mine types but mostly Soviet, Iranian, and Pakistani antipersonnel mines and much smaller numbers of antivehicle mines, including Italian minimum-metal mines. Mines account for more than three-quarters of known hazards,[3] but most battle areas requiring clearance are not recorded in the database and estimates of the extent of mine contamination have fluctuated in recent years as a result of new finds by returning refugees, further survey, and an audit of data by MACCA.[4]

A Landmine Impact Survey completed in 2005 identified some 715km2 of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 2,368 communities and more than four million people.[5] Estimates of contamination peaked at 852km2 at the end of 2007, but a year later dropped to 689km2. Afghanistan reports clearing more than 222km2 of mined areas in the last five years, but as a result of new finds the overall estimate of contamination has remained above 600km2 (see, below, the Five-year summary of clearance table in the Land Release section). Re-survey in the Afghan year 1389 (ending 31 March 2010) led to cancellation of suspected hazards covering a total of 13km2, but new finds resulted in a net addition to the database of 1,051 SHAs covering an estimated 37 km2, most of them in central and eastern areas.[6]

MACCA contamination estimates[7]

Date

Estimated area of mine/ERW contamination (km2)

No. of sites containing explosive hazards

No. of affected communities

31 December 2009

630

6,351

2,130

31 December 2010

640

6,628

2,082

The escalating conflict in Afghanistan has resulted in some additional contamination resulting from use by Taliban and armed groups of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, especially victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs; see below),[8] but organizations involved in Afghanistan’s clearance program do not see evidence of widespread new use of conventional mines.[9]

Cluster munition remnants

Afghanistan has a continuing threat from cluster munition remnants resulting from use of air-dropped and rocket-delivered submunitions by Soviet forces and the government of Najibullah in the 1979−1992. US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002,[10] but clearance operations since 2002 are thought to have removed most of the resulting contamination.

Demining operators say they still encounter both NATO and former Soviet cluster munition remnants but only in small numbers.[11] Survey in 2010 did not identify any additional cluster munition hazards.[12]

MACCA reported in June 2011 that 24 cluster munition contaminated areas remained. It planned clearance of three of them in 2011 and eight more in 2012. It said the remaining sites were located in insecure areas such as Registan in Kandahar and Zurmat in Paktia, and would be cleared when security conditions allowed.[13]

Improvised explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war

Afghanistan contends with extensive ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as abandoned explosive ordnance. At the same time, increasing insurgency in the past three years has resulted in additional ERW contamination, including remotely detonated and victim-activated IEDs or booby-traps, although the precise extent is unknown.[14]

MACCA reported Afghanistan had only 267 battlefield hazards (4.5% of the total) covering 115.9km2 as of September 2010.[15] However, UXO from past conflicts now cause more casualties than mines[16] and MACCA has observed that “BAC [battle area clearance] work will essentially be the end state for the Afghan government and—like Europe after the world wars—Afghanistan can anticipate conducting BAC operations for a significant time period.”[17]

MACCA has also identified 34 “abandoned” IED fields laid by anti-government elements (AGEs) covering around 8km2, mostly in the southern province of Helmand.[18] However, IED use has increased sharply in the past three years inflicting heavy casualties among civilians as well as military forces, particularly in the southern half Afghanistan.[19] Operators report a wide range of devices from crude containers filled with ammonium nitrate to sophisticated devices avoiding metal components in order to escape detection.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported 904 civilian deaths attributed to IEDs in 2010,[20] and another 444 in the first half of 2011, making IEDs the single largest killer of civilians in that period and marking a 17% increase over the same period of 2010, driven largely by increased use of pressure plate IEDs. June 2011 had the highest number of IED attacks ever recorded in a single month.[21]

UNAMA reported that pressure plate IEDs make up nearly two-thirds the devices used by AGEs. It observed that “most of the pressure plate IEDs used in Afghanistan contain approximately 20kg of explosive, more than twice that of a standard anti-tank mine, yet have the trigger weight of an anti-personnel mine. As a result of this design and configuration, each pressure plate IED serves as a massive anti-personnel mine with the capability of destroying a tank. Civilians who step or drive on these IEDS have no defense against them and little chance of survival.”[22]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2011

National Mine Action Authority

ANDMA/DMC

Mine action center

MACCA

International demining operators

NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust

Commercial: DynCorps, EOD Technology (EODT), G4S, MineTech International, Reliance, RONCO Corporation

National demining operators

NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)

Commercial: Afghan Campaign for Landmines, Asda Brothers Demining Company, Country Mine Clearance Company, Hemayatbrothers Demining International, Kabul Mine Clearance Company, Kardan Demining Group, and National Demining Support Services

International risk education (RE) operators

Association for Aid and Relief Japan, Danish Demining Group (DDG), Handicap international (HI)

National RE operators

GO: Ministry of Education

NGO: Afghan Mini Mobile Children’s Circus, Afghan Red Crescent

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), set up by the UN in 1989, is coordinated by MACCA, a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). MACCA, with 380 national staff, coordinates planning and delivery of mine action, sets priorities, maintains a national database of hazards recording the results of humanitarian mine action, and advocates for donor support to the program.[23]

MACCA has seven sub-offices called Area Mine Action Centers (AMACS)[24] to coordinate and monitor mine and ERW clearance activities in the provinces, and to liaise with other UN and international agencies, government departments, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.[25]

Plans to nationalize MAPA have led to changes in its management structure and MACCA’s role. Until 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the government focal point on mine action.[26] An MFA-sponsored symposium in December 2007 decided an interministerial board (IMB) should provide guidance to MACCA and that existing institutions should continue to provide support to the government on mine action until 2013,[27] when responsibility for mine action is due to be handed over to national ownership.[28]

An interministerial meeting convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 January 2008 assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), which reports to the Office of the Second Vice President.[29] The DMC, which moved its offices into MACCA’s Kabul headquarters in May 2008, attends mine action meetings and manages a number of activities. These include processing requests for transporting explosives, and conducting an audit of land released or cancelled after clearance and survey. It has also started processing requests by demining organizations to import demining equipment and says it liaises with the Ministry of Education to strengthen RE.[30]

However, MACCA noted that “the IMB did not designate DMC as the eventual coordination structure therefore transitions of actions to DMC should themselves be understood as first steps.”[31] UNMAS developed a plan to transfer management of mine coordination to DMC which was due to be published before April 2011, but as of June 2011 ANDMA had still to decide on how and when it wanted transition to proceed. The IMB did not meet in 2010 and ANDMA’s director had decided agreement should be reached on terms of reference and a working mechanism for the IMB before it meets again.[32]

In the meantime, MACCA appointed a staff member in January 2011 to develop contacts with government ministries to increase awareness of potential mine/ERW hazards in the planning of development projects. By June 2011, 23 ministries or departments and the Asian Development Bank had assigned focal points to liaise with MACCA, which provided two briefings in March 2011 and on request provides government agencies with data on hazards in the area of proposed projects.[33]

Since 2009, MACCA has shifted its role from assigning clearance tasks to implementing partners (IPs) and instead focuses more on oversight, strategic planning, and coordinating operations while encouraging IPs to plan and manage tasks within the strategic framework.[34] MACCA now provides IPs with a list of planning criteria, priorities, and a dataset of hazards. Funds provided through the UN-administered Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) are allocated to specific projects. IPs submit workplans to MACCA setting out the tasks they propose to undertake. MACCA assesses and, where necessary, negotiates amendments to these plans with IPs to ensure they address MACCA priorities, achieve a geographic balance, and avoid duplication or overlap. MACCA tells donors and IPs that “an output reported only in terms of square metres cleared is not…acceptable.”[35]

Land Release

The MAPA, buoyed by increased funding and capacity, cleared 170.1km2 of mined and battle areas in 2010, 8.3% more than the previous year despite an increasingly insecure operating environment.

Five-year summary of clearance[36]

Year

Mined area cleared (km2)

Battle area cleared (km2)

2010

64.76

105.31

2009

52.59

104.33

2008

 47.42

128.38

2007

28.12

151.16

2006

29.74

108.20

Total

222.63

597.38

By May 2011, donor funding pledged for mine action in 1390 (April 2011−March 2012) amounted to $95.27 million, $37.47 million through the VTF and $57.8 million through bilateral agreements. However, commercial contracts reported to MACCA in 1389 added a further $85.42 million, much of it allocated to projects verifying land for commercial or military use rather than for clearing contamination recorded on MACCA’s database.[37]

Afghanistan already had the biggest (as well as oldest) mine action program, but extra funding for IPs and commercial companies saw the total number of people engaged in mine action rise from around 10,000 by the end of 1388 (March 2009) to around 14,000 in 1389. Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); with two international NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust.[38]

In addition, the number of commercial companies increased by three to 18 in 2010. These included eight Afghan companies (Asda Brothers Demining Company, Afghan Campaign for Landmines, Country Mine Clearance Company, Hemayatbrothers Demining International, Kardan Demining Group, Kabul Mine Clearance Company, National Demining Support Services, and OMAR International). Six international companies active in 2009 were DynCorp International, G4S (formerly ArmorGroup), EOD Technology (EODT), MineTech International, RONCO Corporation, and UXB International.

Four commercial companies gained accreditation in 2010, three of them national companies. These included Aims Demining Company, Gold Global Demining Company, and Titan Demining Group. The new international company was US-based Relyant. MineTech International and UXB ceased working in Afghanistan in 2010−2011 and no clearance was reported for DynCorp or The Development Initiative.[39]

Survey in 2010

Among the IPs that reported on survey in 2010, MCPA said it conducted polygon surveys of 21.6km2 of suspected mined area and 10.9km2 of suspected battle area as well as post-clearance assessment of 7.1km2.[40] HALO reported it surveyed a total of 51.1km2, of which 32.8km2 was newly surveyed and 18.3km2 was re-survey. It reported that in a survey of 2.5km2 of the Ghorband Valley in 2010 it identified 83 previously unrecorded minefields.[41]

Mine clearance in 2010

Despite the background of escalating conflict and insecurity, IPs increased the amount of mined land cleared by nearly a quarter (24%) in 2010, buoyed by increased donor funding that allowed the number of deminers in the MACCA-coordinated program to rise from about 10,000 in 1389 (Afghan year ended 31 March 2009) to over 14,000 in 1390.[42]

Half of all Afghanistan’s known hazards, which account for three-quarters of the known hazardous area, are in areas classified as extreme risk or high-risk environments, but mine action has continued in these areas partly through community-based demining programs (CBDs) that employ local inhabitants recruited with the approval and assistance of local community leaders. The number of CBD teams rose from 78 in 1389 to 131 in 1390 operated by ATC (9 teams), DAFA (23), MCPA (48), MDC (21), and OMAR (30).[43]

The CBD share of the mine action program budget more than doubled in 1390 (2009−2010) to 19%. The area cleared by CBD, also more than doubled rising from 5.8km2 in 1389 to 12.65km2 in 1390, representing 19.5% of total mine area clearance.[44] Some IPs acknowledge, however, that managing operations and quality control (QC) of teams in areas where insecurity limits access is problematic and although local recruitment has lowered the threat to local demining operations CBD teams still sustained casualties in attacks by anti-government elements (see Safety of demining personnel section, below).[45]

However, national and international IPs also expanded core capacity, which still accounted for about 80% of mined area clearance. In addition to demining undertaken by IPs according to work plans coordinated by MACCA, three IPs won UNOPS contracts through a Request for Proposals process. OMAR started work in August 2010 on a $1.85 million contract to clear Ghazni City, targeting 28 hazards covering an estimated 3.4km2. In January 2011, ATC started a $3 million contract for the first phase of Kabul City clearance plan under which it will clear 44 hazards covering 2.34km2, due for completion in January 2012. UNOPS supported by MACCA plans a second-phase project to complete removal of all known hazards in Kabul City, but implementation is dependent on receiving funding. DDG won a $5.35 million contract to clear 63 hazards covering a total of 8.04km2 in north and northeast Afghanistan. Work started in September 2010 and was due for completion by the end of August 2012.[46]

HALO, much the biggest operator with 3,724 personnel and 45 mechanical assets at the end of 2010, reduced its BAC capacity and operations (see Battle area clearance in 2010 section, below), but as a result of adding additional demining teams saw mined area clearance rise more than 29%. The number of antipersonnel mines it destroyed in 2010 was less than half the previous year, reflecting completion of clearing high-density Soviet mine belts around Kabul and Bagram, but HALO reports the addition of a new RAPTOR equipped with rotary mine combs in 2011 has significantly boosted clearance of antivehicle mined areas in western Afghanistan. HALO had planned to embark by the end of 2011 on clearance in or around Lashkar Gar, the main city of Helmand province, one of the most fiercely conflicted.[47] By August 2011, however, HALO was reviewing that initiative in the light of subsequent contacts and developments in the area, where responsibility for security had been handed over by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Army.[48]

 Mine clearance in 2010[49]

Operator

Mined area cleared (km2)

No. of antipersonnel mines destroyed

No. of antivehicle mines destroyed

No. of ERW destroyed

ACL

0.37

0

1

3

ADC

0.03

0

0

0

ATC

7.62

2,119

51

10,725

DAFA

5.49

739

32

4,138

DDG

2.05

3,028

0

6,485

EODT

1.70

22

14

905

HDI

0.51

3,117

0

9,755

HALO

16.57

8,325

144

5,259

MCPA

6.01

3,562

98

1,637

MDC

13.32

2,882

348

59,534

OMAR

10.97

2,324

111

58,192

Relyant

0.03

3

0

0

RONCO

0.09

821

47

0

Total

64.76

26,942

846

156,633

However, three IPs were in negotiation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in mid-2011 on plans for clearance of another highly conflicted province, Kandahar. Under discussion was a $28 million project to be funded by the UAE to clear all high-and medium-risk mined areas in the province involving 216 minefields estimated to cover more than 25km2 and affecting 106 communities. The project, expected to last two to three years, would clear all known hazards in nine districts and remove a significant amount of the contamination in 12 more.[50]

Discussions have centered on implementing the project in two parts, with clearance of 113 tasks, mostly antipersonnel and mixed antipersonnel/antivehicle mines in southern Kandahar province by a joint venture between G4S and OMAR and clearance of 235 tasks, mostly mined areas containing only antivehicle mines, in west Kandahar by EODT. G4S expected to provide management coordination and quality assurance (QA) for clearance undertaken by OMAR, which envisaged employing 420 to 450 people recruited from the local community for the project. EODT expected to employ some 250 deminers, also locally recruited.[51]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013 (which falls within Afghan year 1391).

Although Afghanistan has the biggest mine action program in the world and clears the most mined and battle area, progress towards achieving its treaty obligations has been frustrated by new discoveries of contamination. In its statement to the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Afghanistan described new finds of contamination as “the major challenge” for the mine action program.[52] Re-survey removed 13km2 of hazard from the database in 2010, but new finds of another 1,051 hazards in 2010 added 50km2 of contamination, for a net increase of 37km2. Nearly 40% of the new discoveries were located in the central region around Kabul.[53]

As a result, despite increasing efficiency and productivity among IPs and the release of more than 222km2 of mined area in the last five years, Afghanistan was well behind its clearance targets. The 2006 Afghan Compact had set the goal of reducing the area contaminated by mines and UXO by 70% by March 2011, but at the end of that month it had achieved less than three-quarters of its target and just over half its Mine Ban Treaty goal, leaving an estimated 627km2 of contamination still to clear. MACCA estimates the Afghan program has a capacity to clear about 90km2 a year,[54] making it apparent Afghanistan will not meet its Article 5 deadline. MACCA expected to start work in 2011 preparing an Article 5 deadline extension request.[55]

 Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2010

MACCA recorded clearance of 43 cluster munition sites between 2004 and 2009 covering a total area of 3.2km2, all by HALO and MCPA. Of these, six sites covering a total of 670,276m2 were reportedly cleared in 2009.[56] In 2010, MACCA reported clearance of a further 1km² of cluster contamination by HALO and OMAR. HALO, in addition, said it cleared another 1,328 submunitions, 696 in the course of battle area clearance (BAC) and 632 during roving explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[57]

Cluster munition clearance in 2010[58]

Operator

Area cleared (m2)

No. of failed/abandoned cluster munitions destroyed including submunitions

No. of unexploded submunitions destroyed

OMAR

6,421

533

2,683

HALO

1,019,210

61

0

Total

1,025,631

594

2,683

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Afghanistan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but as of 1 August 2011 had not ratified it.

Battle area clearance in 2010

Unlike mined area clearance, which has increased every year for the past five years, BAC has either flatlined or declined. With the number of companies engaged in BAC rising from 20 to 24, the total area cleared in 2010 rose marginally (0.4%) over the previous year but the number of UXO cleared fell by almost half to 549,867.[59] HALO, which accounted for 70% of the total battle area cleared in 2009, reduced the number of teams on BAC by five in 2010 and cleared 42% less area and less than half the number of items tackled in 2009.[60] HALO commented that most surface UXO had been dealt with by previous BAC and that it had converted some BAC teams to roving EOD teams, which it found more effective for tackling the residual threat. HALO noted it also operates weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams, which also tackle surface and sub-surface UXO.[61]

Commercial operators accounted for almost half the battle area cleared in 2010, with many of the bigger international companies, such as G4S, RONCO Corporation, and EODT, as well as national firms such as Hemayatbrothers Demining International, undertaking work for the US Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) in support of the ISAF and the US Agency for International Development. G4S tasks range from an ACE contract for clearing for expansion of the US airbase at Bagram, for which it brought in 15 teams of deminers from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, to other infrastructure projects to several days’ work clearing wells in the northern province of Mazar-e-Sharif.[62] EODT, with 18 teams, undertook a range of tasks from clearance for military bases with manual and mechanical demining and mine detection dog assets to road clearance for access to oil deposits.[63]

However, much of the work undertaken by commercial companies has involved verifying land for military facilities or for commercial and infrastructure development projects that had little or no impact on reducing Afghanistan’s known ERW hazards. In 1389 (2010/11), commercial operators cleared a total of 49.4km2 of battle area, but MACCA reports they removed 27 known hazards that reduced the amount of known contamination by a total of 0.97km².[64]

Battle area clearance in 2010[65]

Operator

BAC (km2)

No. of UXO destroyed

No. of APM destroyed

during BAC

No. of AVM destroyed

ACL

3.20

220

0

0

ADC

2.37

4,005

0

0

AG

0.57

2,153

3

0

AMDC

0.01

0

0

0

ATC

3.62

15,339

0

1

CMCC

0.27

140

0

0

DAFA

1.75

102,529

0

0

DDG

4.36

26,280

4

2

EODT

12.66

13,614

10

0

G4S

1.49

17

0

0

HDI

0.08

184

0

0

HALO

42.27

251,287

6,230

134

KMCC

1.61

1,595

0

0

MCPA

2.04

4,057

0

0

MDC

0.53

4,542

0

0

MTI

0.19

0

0

0

OMAR

1.34

29,481

1

0

OMARI

0.10

7,377

0

0

RELY

8.55

326

0

0

RONCO

11.63

36,270

31

3

TDC

4.11

49,125

0

0

TDG

0.06

836

0

0

UADC

2.45

490

0

0

UXB

0.05

0

0

0

Totals

105.31

549,867

6,279

140

Quality management

IPs all operate internal QA/QC. MACCA provided external quality management in 2010 through a three-person unit in Kabul and 50 staff in seven AMACs who conduct demining site visits.[66] The number of MACCA QA site visits increased 8% to 4,489 in 1389, but the number of instances of non-compliance dropped marginally from 97 to 95.[67]

MACCA started regular meetings of a “Quality Circle” in 2009 involving members of the mine action community who discuss issues of interest to the sector, including clearance methodologies and experience with and optimizing the performance of different types of equipment and deminer safety.[68]

Since 2009, MACCA has operated a “balanced scorecard” measuring the performance of IPs on a quarterly basis against a set of four indicators for assessing demining operations (operations, quality management, demining accidents, and reporting) and three indicators for RE (the same but not including accidents). Data on performance drawn from the IMSMA database is shared with IPs who then confirm the score.[69]

Safety of demining personnel

The number of demining casualties continued to fall in 2010, from 48 in 2008 and 32 in 2009 to 25 in 2010, including seven fatalities.[70] Maintaining standards in CBDs has proved a challenge. In the Afghan year 1389 (2010/11), four CBD personnel were killed and five injured in demining accidents in Helmand, Khost, and Paktia provinces.[71]

IPs faced an increasing challenge from deteriorating security and rising criminality around the country, including a growing threat to road movement from IEDs placed by antigovernment elements in some, particularly southern, provinces. MACCA observed that despite a 40% jump in the number of people working in mine action to 14,000, which made it one of the biggest UN-funded programs in the country, it suffered only 59 (0.3%) of 59,000 reported security incidents.[72]

MACCA reported 11 cases of abductions, but in all cases the personnel seized were released.[73] In one of these incidents 16 community-based deminers working for OMAR were abducted in eastern Nangahar province in December 2010. Nine deminers were freed within hours and the remaining seven two days later. Two vehicles and all the team’s equipment were burnt.[74]

Of the 59 incidents, however, 21 involved death or injury, including 10 people killed and 20 injured by IEDs, and three people killed and eight injured in attacks.[75] HALO reported two attacks in 2010 resulting in one fatality and the forced retirement of another worker. Its country program manager was abducted in Kabul in February 2011 and held for 27 days.[76] DAFA and its community-based deminers suffered the worst setback, reporting eight people killed and eight injured in an IED attack in 2010.[77] In July 2011, DAFA suffered another attack in western Farah province when 20 deminers were abducted and four of them killed.[78]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) is coordinated by MACCA according to plans drawn up by the Ministry of Education, MACCA, and the DMC. RE has been incorporated into the school curriculum and MACCA reported 19,000 teachers are now trained to deliver RE in schools. In addition, RE was implemented in 2010 by 75 teams drawn from the Afghan Red Crescent Society (44 teams), Handicap International (HI, 10 teams), DDG (seven teams), and the Association for Aid and Relief Japan as well as by the Afghan Mobile Mini Children’s Circus.[79]

HI also has 23 community-based mine/ERW risk educators and 1,142 community volunteers in 20 districts of Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where access is constrained by the high level of insecurity. HI passes on information it receives on the location of UXO to MACCA’s regional AMACs, but does not address the location of IEDs.[80]

In 2010, HI completed analysis of a Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices survey conducted in about 70 villages in 10 mine-affected provinces. Overall, more than half of the interviewees considered mines/ERW a problem affecting their daily lives, but in three provinces, Kandahar, Paktia, and Kapisa, the figure rose to 98% of interviewees. More than 80% of those interviewed also said they would welcome a community-based program in their area to conduct RE and mine clearance.[81]

 



[1] “Explosive remnants of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines,” Landmine Action, London, March 2005, p. 14.

[2] MACCA, “Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan Fast Facts 1389, Data as of 1 April 2011,” www.macca.org.af.

[3] Hazards containing antivehicle mines only accounted for 20% of the number of mine hazards, but for more than one-third of the total estimated mined area, hazards containing antipersonnel mines only accounted for over half (56%) of mine hazards but 29% of the mined area. MAPA, “1390 Integrated Operational Framework,” MACCA, December 2010, p. 30.

[4] Email from MACCA, 16 August 2011. Renamed with effect from l January 2009, MACCA was formerly known as the Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) and before 2007 as the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA).

[5] Patrick Fruchet and Mike Kendellen, “Landmine Impact Survey Afghanistan: results and implications for planning,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.

[6] In 1388, 2,188 hazards covering an estimated 218km2 were added to the MACCA database following synchronization of MACCA data with HALO’s, previously separate database. Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[7] MACCA, “Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan Fast Facts,” December 2009, June 2010, December 2010, and April 2011, www.macca.org.af.

[8] HALO, for example, reported that victim-activated explosive antivehicle devices had been emplaced on tracks in Baglan province. Telephone interview with Tom Dibb, Desk Officer, HALO, 23 July 2010; ICRC, “Afghanistan: mines prevent resumption of normal life in Marjah,” Press release, 5 March 2010; and US Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, “Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan,” Report Number ISP-I-10-11, November 2009, p. 5.

[9] Interviews with MACCA and IPs, Kabul, 28 May–6 June 2011.

[10] Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, “Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice,” Mines Action Canada, May 2009, p. 27.

[11] Interviews with demining operators, Kabul, 12–18 June 2010. HALO, the biggest demining operator in Afghanistan, reports that it continues to find abandoned Soviet cluster munitions, but finds only occasional unexploded Soviet submunitions in the course of demining or BAC operations. HALO reports it cleared 9,000 unexploded US submunitions in 2002–2003 and a further 1,780 unexploded submunitions between 2004 and 2008. In 2009, it cleared 2,607 unexploded submunitions. Emails from Ollie Pile, Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Officer, HALO, Kabul, 30 June 2009; and from Tom Dibb, HALO, 3 June 2010.

[12] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[13] MACCA, “Fact sheet on cluster munitions in Afghanistan,” June 2011, www.macca.org.af.

[14] Interviews with MACCA Chief of Staff, in Geneva, 19 March 2010; and with demining operators, Kabul, 12 18 June 2010.

[15] MACCA, “1390 Integrated Operational Framework,” December 2010, p.30.

[16] Interview with Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, Kabul, 15 June 2010.

[17] MAPA, “1389 Integrated Operational Framework,” MACCA, December 2009, p. 33.

[18] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[19] Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), “map of Afghan Security Incidents 2008−2011,” received by email from Craig von Hagen, iMMAP, 14 July 2011.

[20] UNAMA, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Afghanistan, Annual Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, March 2011, pp. i−ii.

[21] Statement by Georgette Gagnon, Director of Human Rights, UNAMA, 14 July 2011, unama.unmissions.org.

[22] UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2011,” Kabul, July 2011, p. 2, unama.unmissions.org.

[23] MAPA, “1390 Integrated Operational Framework,” MACCA, December 2010, p. 12. Thus, commercial clearance, which MACCA does not contract directly, and demining by the ISAF are outside of its purview.

[24] AMACs are located in in Gardez (Southeast), Herat (West), Jalalabad (East), Kabul (Central), Kandahar (South), Kunduz (Northeast), and Mazar-e-Sharif (North).

[25] MACCA, “About MAPA and MACCA,” MACCA website, www.macca.org.af.

[26] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 May 2006.

[27] Email from MACCA, 30 April 2008.

[28] MAPA, “1388 Integrated Operational Plan,” (Version 1.0), Kabul, 20 October 2008, p. 61. Hereinafter, this document is referred to as the “1388 Integrated Operational Plan.”

[29] Email from MACCA, 16 August 2011; interviews with MACA, Kabul, 25 May 2008; and with Abdul Haq Rahim, Director, DMC, Kabul, 26 May 2008.

[30] Interview with Abdul Haq Rahim, DMC, Kabul, 1 June 2011; and email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[31] MAPA, “1389 Integrated Operational Plan,” MACCA, December 2009, p. 49.

[32] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011; interview with MACCA Director, Kabul, 28 May 2011.

[33] Interview with Operations Project Manager, MACCA, 2 June 2011.

[34] MAPA, “Integrated Operational Framework” for 1389 and 1390, MACCA, December 2009, p. 44 and December 2010, p. “1390 Integrated Operational Framework”; and interviews with MACCA Chief of Staff, 19 March and 21 June 2010.

[35] Interview with Chief of Operations, MACCA, 15 June 2010; and MAPA, “1389 Integrated Operational Framework,” MACCA, December 2009, p. 7; “1390 Integrated Operating Framework,” December 2010, p. 13.

[36] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[37] Ibid.; and interview with Programme Director, MACCA, Kabul, 28 May 2011.

[38] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Haji Attiqullah, Director, MCPA, 30 April 2011.

[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by, and interview with, Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011.

[42] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[43] CBD teams were active in 13 provinces: Bamyan (ATC), Farah (DAFA), Gore (OMAR), Helmand (DAFA and MDC), Kabul (MCPA), Kandahar (DAFA, MCPA, and MDC), Khost (MCPA), Kunar (OMAR), Logar (MCPA), Nangahar (ATC and OMAR), Nimroz (DAFA), Paktia (MDC), and Uruzgan (MDC). Emails from MACCA, 10 May and 15 June 2011.

[44] Emails from MACCA, 10 May and 15 June 2011.

[45] Interviews with IPs, Kabul, 28 May to 5 June, 2011.

[46] Interview with Kefayatullah Eblagh, Director, ATC, Kabul, 31 May 2011; and emails from Chief of Staff, MACCA, 3−4 August 2011.

[47] Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011.

[48] Telephone interview with Tim Porter, Desk Officer, HALO, 1 August 2011.

[49] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011. MACCA data does not include results of G4S, which reported manual clearance of 0.5km2 in 2010, resulting in destruction of 620 antipersonnel mines, 11 antivehicle mines, and 5,005 items of UXO. Interview with Tony Thompson, Country Manager; Steve Priestley, Deputy Country Manager; and Gus Melin, Country Operations Manager, G4S, Kabul, 29 May 2011.

[50] Email from Chief of Staff, MACCA, 3 August 2011.

[51] Interviews with Tony Thompson, Steve Priestley, and Gus Melin, G4S, Kabul, 29 May 2011; Zekria Payab, Deputy Director, OMAR, Kabul, 30 May 2011; and with Gareth Hawkins, Country Mine Action Projects Manager, EODT, Kabul, 2 June 2011.

[52] Statement of Afghanistan, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010.

[53] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[54] MACCA, “1390 Integrated Operating Framework for Mine Action,” undated but 2010, p. 24, www.macca.org.af.

[55] Interview with Programme Director, MACCA, Kabul, 5 June 2011.

[56] MACCA records cleared submunitions under UXO, not as a separate item. Emails from MACCA, 14 July 2010; and from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 11 August 2011.

[57] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Farid Homayoun, HALO, 30 May 2011.

[58] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Farid Homayoun, HALO, 30 May 2011.

[61] HALO operated 15 WAD teams in 2010. Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011, and email, 5 August 2011.

[62] Interview with Tony Thompson, Steve Priestly, and Gus Melin, G4S, Kabul, 29 May 2011.

[63] Interview with Gareth Hawkins, EODT, Kabul, 2 June 2011.

[64] MACCA, Annual Report 1389, undated but 2011, p. 56.

[65] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011. G4S reported BAC of 12.5km2 in 2010, resulting in destruction of 14,837 items of UXO. Interview with Tony Thompson, Steve Priestley, and Gus Melin, G4S, Kabul, 29 June 2011.

[66] Email from MACCA, 10 June 2010.

[67] MACCA, “1389 Annual Report,” p. 34.

[68] MACCA, “1389 Annual Report,” p. 33.

[69] MACCA, “MACCA balanced scorecard,” Kabul, 6 May 2010; email from MACCA, 16 August 2011.

[70] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[71] MACCA, “1389 Annual Report,” p. 34.

[72] Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Interview with Zekria Payyab, OMAR, Kabul, 30 May 2011.

[75] Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

[76] Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011, and email, 11 August 2011.

[77] Interview with Mohammad Daud Farahi, Executive Manager, DAFA, Kabul, 31 May 2011.

[78] UNAMA, “UNAMA and MACCA condemn the killing of Afghan deminers,” Press release, Kabul, 11 July 2011.

[79] Emails from MACCA, 1 July 2010 and 10 May 2011.

[80] Interview with Awlia Mayar, Mine Action Technical Adviser, HI, Kabul, 2 June 2011, and email, 23 February 2011.

[81] MACCA, “Mine Action Activities KAPB + Survey 2009−2010,” undated but 2010, www.macca.org.af.


Last Updated: 21 October 2011

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2010

20,756 mine/ERW casualties

Casualties in 2010

1,211 (2009: 859 )

2010 casualties by outcome

565 killed; 646 injured (2009: 212 killed; 647 injured)

2010 casualties by device type

128 antipersonnel mines; 134 antivehicle mines; 383 victim-activated IEDs; 159 unspecified mine types; 402 ERW; 2 unexploded submunitions; 3 unknown explosive items

For 2010, the Monitor identified at least 1,211 casualties due to mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Afghanistan. This was a significant increase (29%) from the 859 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor identified for 2009.[1] Mines of all types, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), caused the most casualties (804). The vast majority of casualties in 2010, 1,095 or some 90% of the total, were civilian. Children (469) made up at least 53% of the civilian casualties where the age was known.[2] At least 74 casualties were girls and 69 were women. There were 84 military casualties.[3] Clearance accidents caused 25 deminer casualties; another six deminers were killed or injured in non-clearance-related IED incidents.

The increase in 2010 was in part due to a continuing rise in the number of victim-activated IED casualties; the 383 casualties represented 31% more than in 2009. There was also an increase in ERW casualties, up 38% from 292 in 2009. In 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan was quoted as saying that “two-thirds of all IEDs used in Afghanistan, and the vast majority that kill civilians, are designed to be triggered by a weight of between 10-100 kilograms,”[4] which places them clearly within the definition of anti-personnel mines.[5] In 2010, 83% (316) of victim-activated IED casualties recorded by the Monitor were civilians.

The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) recorded 661 mine/ERW casualties (237 killed; 424 injured) for 2010.[6] Children (378) accounted for 57% of MACCA recorded civilian casualties in 2010, similar to the 55% recorded in the previous year.[7] A significant rise in ERW casualties contributed to the increase from 539 mine/ERW casualties recorded by MACCA for 2009. These casualties were included in the Monitor total for 2010.

The ICRC identified 212 mine survivors among its beneficiaries who were injured in 2010. The information was not collected by MACCA and may include casualties not counted in the MACCA and Monitor totals.[8]

Some 745 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded between 1980 and the end of 2010. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[9] MACCA recorded 20,756 casualties between 1979 and the end of 2010. No further details, such as the number of people injured and killed, were available.[10]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown but, in 2006, was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[11]

Assessing victim assistance needs

There was no general assessment of the needs of mine/ERW survivors in 2010.  Several service providers collected information for their own programs.  Handicap International (HI) collected data on mine/ERW casualties, which was shared with regional Area Mine Action Centers (AMAC) and the MACCA. In 2009–2010, HI was contracted by the MACCA to implement data collection and analysis of a Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs survey in mines/ERW affected communities of 10 provinces, which also included data on the services received by mine/ERW survivors. The findings were based on a relatively low number of respondents, and a wider specific survey on victim assistance was still needed.[12] In Kandahar, the needs of survivor beneficiaries of HI services were assessed and MRE community outreach teams collecting casualty data also made referrals for rehabilitation. All data was submitted to the AMAC/MACCA for national mine action planning purposes. The Afghanistan Red Crescent Society in southern Afghanistan and the provincial and regional hospitals also submit data to the AMAC.[13]

ICRC centers continued to register and assess all survivors assisted. The ICRC reported that, in 2010 and 2009, casualty data collectors were no longer gathering information from ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers on new casualties for use in the national database, as had been done regularly in past years.[14]

Although the MACCA did not support government or NGOs mine/ERW survivor needs assessments specifically, it supported the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in data collection regarding rehabilitation services.[15] There was no injury surveillance system and plans by the MoPH to introduce one were dependent on increased funding.[16]

Victim assistance coordination[17]

Government coordinating body/focal point

MoLSAMD was the focal point and primary coordinating agency in the disability field, including victim assistance, with MACCA technical support and funding

Coordinating mechanism

MoLSAMD hosted the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group; the MoPH, through the Disability and Rehabilitation Department, coordinated disability issues; MACCA provided financial support and its representatives worked in the key ministries

Plan

Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan 2008–2011 (ANDAP)

There was no specific victim assistance coordination; it was integrated within broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) continued to host the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Groups which met to strengthen coordination of disability activities, particularly in social and economic inclusion. In Kabul, eight Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group Meetings were held in 2010 and another four regional meetings were conducted in Jalalabad, Hirat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Maimana. Participants included the Deputy Minister of MoLSAMD, regional governors, NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations and other relevant stakeholders.[18] Meetings were used to coordinate activities, share relevant information, exchange ideas, and advocate for adequate legislation for persons with disabilities at national and regional levels.[19]

The Inter-ministerial Task Force on Disability was established to improve coordination between the different ministries.[20] The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department chaired the Disability Task Force and meetings were hosted by MoLSAMD. After a period of relative inactivity in 2009, two meetings of the Inter-ministerial Task Force were held in 2010 to work on specific issues including community-based rehabilitation (CBR) development and to raise awareness of disability issues and advocate for inclusion and mainstreaming of disability.[21]

The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department coordinated the CBR network and was responsible for reporting on rehabilitation services; it was developing a new four-year strategy starting in 2011 (Afghan year 1390). [22] The Ministry of Education continued a four-year pilot project for inclusive education of children with disabilities, but lacked funding to extend its inclusion program as planned. [23]

The MACCA provided financial and technical support for the victim assistance-related activities of the key ministries above. In early 2011, the MACCA and UNMAS established a new sub-project to increase support to the government of Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Disability Support Program (ADSP). The ADSP’s role is to enable the government to coordinate and expand disability-related activities in Afghanistan and improve services as well as strengthen support to civil society actors.[24]

MoLSAMD planned to review the ANDAP and develop a new plan by the end of 2011. Most key ministries had also made progress in including disability in their strategic planning documents.[25] There was no monitoring of the implementation of the ANDAP in 2010. A monitoring system for the ANDAP was drafted in 2009, however it was considered too complex to implement because the capacity of the relevant ministries to provide regular monitoring had changed. A new monitoring mechanism was being developed for 2011.[26] In 2010, meetings took place in the key ministries with the participation of several organizations working in the field of disability to discuss the ANDAP, but no reporting was produced to document the progress or results.[27]

Several of the service providers attending the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group meetings were also involved in other related coordination activities including the Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Disability Taskforce, Health Cluster and Education Cluster meetings, the CBR Network, Afghan National Society for Orthotics and Prosthetics, and MACCA coordination meetings.[28]

Afghanistan provided information on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties November–December 2010, at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2011.[29]

Survivor Inclusion

Mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were included in the planning and provision of victim assistance in 2010. Persons with disabilities were included in the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group meetings and disabled persons’ organizations, including mine/ERW survivors groups, led or participated in representative umbrella bodies that negotiated with the government. Persons with disabilities and survivors’ representative organizations were consulted on the strategic plans of ministries and were part of their ongoing development processes. MoLSAMD was an active member of many disability stakeholders’ coordination groups and this gave survivors and disabled persons’ organizations access to government decision-makers.[30]

Mine/ERW survivors were included in the implementation of peer support, rehabilitation, and other services.[31] Persons with disabilities employed by MACCA supported the activities of the key ministries and were included in NGO activities that MACCA supported. Persons with disabilities, including MACCA staff, participated in the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and had input to the preparation of government statements and reports.[32] However, mine/ERW survivors were not directly included as part of the official government delegation to the Tenth Meeting of States Parties or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2011.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2010[33]

Name of organization

Type of organization

 

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2010 (Afghan year 1389)

MoLSAMD

Government

Technical support and training

Ongoing

MoPH

Government

Emergency and continuing medical care, medication, surgery, awareness-raising, counseling

Ongoing

Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation

National NGO

Physiotherapy, education and vocational training; sport and recreation

Increased vocational training activities

Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO)

National NGO

Social and economic inclusion, including peer support, physical accessibility, public awareness, literacy and vocational training, and advocacy

Expanded peer support into two new provinces (Herat and Balkh) of Afghanistan and established mainstreaming centers in each province providing education opportunities and vocational training for persons with disabilities including women and children

Accessibility Organization for Afghan Disabled (AOAD)

National NGO

CBR, education, and economic inclusion, physical accessibility, access to schools for mine survivors and others persons with disabilities

Extended activities to two new provinces (Paktia and Maidan Wardak) including accessibility, accessibility in schools and vocational training

Community Center for Disabled People (CCD)

National NGO

Social and economic inclusion and advocacy in Kabul

Expanded activities in three districts of Kabul

Development and Ability Organization (DAO)

National NGO

Social inclusion, advocacy, and income-generating projects

Expanded its activities to 18 provinces of Afghanistan from 12 in 2009; included new disability support activities and awareness-raising through the media

Kabul Orthopedic Organization (KOO)

National NGO

Physical rehabilitation and vocational training, including for Ministry of Defense/military casualties

Continued production of prosthetics and increased number of economic inclusion beneficiaries

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)

National organization

Awareness-raising and rights advocacy program for persons’ with disabilities organization; monitoring

Increased activities with large scale awareness-raising and workshops as well as through the media

Clear Path International (CPI)

International NGO

Provided sub-grants and technical assistance to six national NGOs implementing physical rehabilitation, psychological and peer support, school accessibility, and economic inclusion activities

Increased employment of deminers with disabilities and provided grants; technical assistance and grants to nine national NGOs; benefitted more than 42,000 people

HI

International NGO

Physical rehabilitation programs operated in Herat and Kandahar, with Kandahar concentrating on prosthetics and orthopedics; also supported the physiotherapy training curriculum

Increased coverage with one new district in Helmand, Nawzad; increased training of staff and knowledge management in rehabilitation

 

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

International NGO

CBR, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic inclusion through revolving loans, inclusive education, advocacy, and capacity-building

Improved quality of CBR services

ICRC

International organization

Emergency medical care; physical rehabilitation including physiotherapy, prosthetics, and other mobility devices; economic inclusion and social reintegration including education, vocational training, micro-finance, and employment for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors

Maintained the level of prosthetic services for mine/ERW survivors; supported one new rehabilitation center with a large catchment area

Challenges in resources and security continued and there were few overall improvements in victim assistant services in Afghanistan in 2010.[34] Little improvement in the overall accessibility of services was reported. This was mostly due to the deterioration of the security situation, which was detrimental to progress in victim assistance in general. Large geographic areas remained off limits for national and international NGOs and other organizations.[35] Progress was reported in providing physical accessibility to schools through the construction of ramps.

Activities to assist survivors were mostly provided by NGOs and international organizations under the coordination of relevant ministries. MoLSAMD noted that the funding for NGOs was low in 2010 and falling in 2011 and that without those its program would be greatly impacted. The development of a donor relations mechanism specifically to address disability programming needs was under consideration.[36]

Given the extensive need, government ministries and several international NGOs were engaged in creating health facilities throughout the country including in remote areas.[37] ICRC provided a skills training seminar on war surgery for surgeons and an emergency room trauma course for medical doctors. Lashkar Gah hospital closed due to insecurity in 2010, and ICRC-funded taxis transferred many wounded to Mirwais Hospital in Kandahar. ICRC also supported Shiberghan Hospital and blood banks at both hospitals received year-round support. Four other hospitals received ad hoc supplies to ensure readiness for mass-casualty influxes.[38]

No significant difference in the quantity of prostheses production was reported for 2010. However, the long-term availability of services increased in August 2010 when a new ICRC-run orthopedic center opened and began prosthetic production in Lashkar Gah, in the highly conflict-affected Helmand province. The first rehabilitation facility in the province, the center is designed to manufacture some 50 prosthetic devices per month. All employees were persons with disabilities. Those in need of specialized treatment were referred to the HI center in Kandahar or ICRC in Kabul.[39] The new Khost Orthopedic Workshop and physiotherapy department began providing rehabilitation services in 2011. In 2010, the first group of new certified physiotherapists with a three-year qualification graduated from the Physiotherapy Training Institute of Kabul; previously, training was for two years.[40]

The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department trained 600 health staff in 12 Provinces about disability awareness and physical rehabilitation training in 2010, resulting in improved cooperation between health clinics and rehabilitation centers.[41] HI established three resource centers to improve the knowledge management of rehabilitation services. [42]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, though some national and international NGOs provided these services.[43] The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department included psychological support information and training to health practitioners and implementing agencies as part of the integration of disability services within the MoPH Basic Package of Health Services and the Essential Package of Hospital Services. The Mental Health Department of the MoPH approved a four-year strategy for mental health that includes psychological support.[44]

In 2010, the South Asia CBR congress was held in Kabul supported by the MACCA. Following the congress, CBR was adopted as a strategy by the MoPH.[45] New CBR guidelines developed in 2010 were introduced to the relevant stakeholder and ministries during a CBR Network Meeting in January 2011.[46] The focus was on psychological support and relevant victim assistance and disability actors from both Afghanistan and Tajikistan shared experiences and information on projects and government programs.[47]

ALSO expanded its peer support into Balkh and Herat provinces.[48] However by early 2011, the main peer support program run by ALSO in Kabul had to close due to a lack of funding, leaving a severe lack of peer support services for mine/ERW survivors.

An HI social inclusion project in Herat concluded in May 2010 and the activities were included in its physical rehabilitation project. Social inclusion activities in Kabul, conducted through a local partner, were ongoing.[49] As part of a new program objective, in early 2011, the ICRC Orthopedic Program imported sports wheelchairs for sports programs for persons with disabilities including volleyball and soccer and wheelchair basketball in Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, with both male and female teams.[50]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, including healthcare and financial protection. The constitution also requires the state to adopt measures to reintegrate and to ensure the active participation in society of persons with disabilities.[51]

Differences in treatment in Afghanistan were often not based solely on needs, but were influenced by the economic and social situation of survivors as well as their gender and cause of disability. Women and elderly persons with disabilities received fewer services for these reasons.[52] The MACCA did not note discrimination within ministry work or policies.[53]

The National Law for the Rights and Privileges of Persons with Disabilities, developed in 2006, was authorized on 28 August 2010. Some civil society groups expressed concern that the law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).[54] In order to implement the National Law for Persons with Disabilities in the society, the government, especially the Deputy Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, trained regional directorates in Kabul on its contents.[55]  

There was no legislation to ensure physical accessibility and this remained a significant challenge as persons with disabilities in Afghanistan lacked access to many existing services. In Kabul, for example, some 95% of public buildings were not accessible for persons with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors.[56] In August 2010, ALSO, together with NGO partners, organized a conference to promote physical accessibility and peer support attended by relevant ministries—the MoLSAMD, the Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation, and the Ministry of Urban Development—and other members of civil society. As a result of the workshop, MoLSAMD organized a training workshop in accessibility for most provincial mayors of Afghanistan in September 2010.[57]

ALSO made some 50 buildings accessible in 2010 and was increasing that number significantly in 2011. To address the accessibility challenges in the long term, CPI, AABRAR, ALSO, and AOAD established a Physical Accessibility Projects Consortium for Afghanistan.[58]

In 2010, DAO worked toward the establishment of an Afghanistan National Disability Federation through capacity building, rights and disability awareness training and regional coordination workshops for disabled persons’ organizations and government officials.[59] AIHRC established seven regional committees that advocated for the rights of persons with disabilities.[60]

As of 1 August 2011, Afghanistan was preparing to finalize its ratification of the CRPD. The CRPD had been adopted in June and was pending the corresponding paperwork being drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sent to the UN.[61]

 



[1] MACCA recorded 661 casualties. An additional 14 casualties were recorded by HI, but had not been included in MACCA’s data because they were thought to be caused by victim-activated IEDs (of 81 casualties in 2010 recorded by HI all others were recorded in the MACA database) and the remainder was identified through Monitor media monitoring for calendar year 2010. Casualty data provided by email from MACCA, 5 April 2011 and by email from Awlia Mayar, Mine Action Technical Advisor, HI, 8 August 2011.

[2] The age of 215 casualties was not known.

[3] Military casualties included personnel from the following countries: Afghanistan 10, Canada 10, Romania 1, Georgia 4, the UK 16, and the US 43.

[4] “Report: War-related civilian deaths up in Afghanistan,” CNN, 14 July 2011, afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com.

[5] An antipersonnel IED that is victim-activated—one that explodes on contact by a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

[6] Including 334 civilians, 25 deminers, one off-duty military personnel, and one casualty of unknown civilian/military status.

[7] Email from MACCA, 3 April 2010.

[8] Casualty data for 2010 provided by email from Alberto Cairo, Head of Orthopedic Program, ICRC, 24 August 2011. These casualties were not included in the 2010 total pending cross-checking.

[9] HI, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p, 95. The ICRC recorded 707 casualties occurring during cluster munition use between 1980 and 31 December 2006 to which 38 casualties from 2007 to the end of 2010 recorded by MACCA were added. Due to under-reporting it is likely that the numbers of casualties during use as well as those caused by unexploded submunitions were significantly higher. Email from MACCA, 18 February 2010.

[10] Emails from MACCA, 24 June 2009; 10 August 2010; and 3 April 2011.

[11] HI, “Understanding the Challenge Ahead, National Disability Survey in Afghanistan,” Kabul, 2006.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), 8 March 2011.

[16] Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[17] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2009), Form J; response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[19] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011; Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011; and Said Muhammad, Assistant Director, DAO, 21 February 2011.

[20] Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[22] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011; and MACCA “MAPA Annual Report 1389,” www.macca.org.af.

[25] Interview with Suraya Paikan, Deputy Minister, MoLSAMD, Kabul, 1 June 2011.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 march 2011.

[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[28] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011; Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011; Said Muhammad, DAO, 21 February 2011; Fahima Kohistani, Professional Deputy, KOO, 6 January 2011; Haji Ahmad Sha, Program Manager, CCD, 4 April 2011; and Ali Mohabati, Coordinator for Rights of Persons with Disabilities, AIHRC, 31 January 2011.

[29] Statement of Afghanistan, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 1 December 2010; Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration, Geneva, 22 June 2011; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2010), Form J.

[30] Responses to Monitor questionnaires by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011, and Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011; Abdul Khaliq Zazai, Executive Director, AOAD, 27 April 2011; and Haji Ahmad Sha, CCD, 4 April 2011.

[31] Responses to Monitor questionnaires by Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011; Sulaiman Aminy, Executive Director, ALSO, 27 March 2011, HI; and Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011

[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[33] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Khaliq Zazai, AOAD, 27 April 2011; Said Muhammad, DAO, 21 February 2011; Ali Mohabati, AIHRC, 31 January 2011; Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011; Haji Ahmad Sha, CCD, 4 April 2011; and Fahima Kohistani, KOO, 6 January 2011; Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011; ICRC, “Annual Report 2010,” Geneva, May 2011, p. 238; and email from  Karen Matthee, Director of Communications, CPI, 31 December 2010.

[34] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Mohabati, AIHRC, 31 January 2011.

[35] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[36] Interview with Suraya Paikan, MoLSAMD, in Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sulaiman Aminy, ALSO, 27 March 2011.

[38] ICRC, “Annual Report 1010,” Geneva, May 2011, p. 241.

[39] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011.

[43] ALSO, “Conference on Peer Support and Physical Accessibility in Kabul 1st August 2010–3 Aug 2010,” www.afghanlandminesurvivors.org.

[44] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[45] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sulaiman Aminy, ALSO, 27 March 2011.

[49] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Awlia Mayar, HI, 23 February 2011.

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 February 2011.

[51] US Department of State, “2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,” Washington, DC, 8 April 2011.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 28 March 2010.

[53] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[54] ALSO, “The New Disability Law of Afghanistan,” 30 July 2011, www.afghanlandminesurvivors.org; and Statement of ICBL and Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 22 June 2011.

[55] Response to Monitor questionnaire by ADSP, UNOPS, 8 March 2011.

[56] ALSO, “Conference on Peer Support and Physical Accessibility in Kabul 1st August–2010, 3 Aug 2010,” www.afghanlandminesurvivors.org.

[57] “Connecting the Dots Detailed Guidance Connections, Shared Elements and Cross-Cutting Action: Victim Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions & in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (ICBL-CMC Geneva, April 2011), p. 16.

[58] Email from Matthew Rodieck, Program Manager, CPI, 16 May 2011; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sulaiman Aminy, ALSO, 27 March 2011.

[59] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Said Muhammad, DAO, 21 February 2011.

[60] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Mohabati, AIHRC, 31 January 2011.

[61] Email from ADSP, UNOPS, 15 August 2011.


Last Updated: 31 August 2011

Support for Mine Action

National

The government of Afghanistan began contributing to its mine action program in 2009. In June 2009 the government of Afghanistan agreed to contribute US$2,600,000 for mine clearance in support of the development of the Aynak copper mine in Logar province. Of this, $1,277,000 was used in Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–31 March 2010); the remainder was spent in Afghan year 1389 (1 April 2010–31 March 2011). In addition, Afghanistan committed $4,100,000 from December 2010 to July 2012 to be paid in quarterly installments. Of the $4.1 million, $94,435 is for clearance at the Eshposhta coal mine.[1]

Afghanistan also reported that $85.45 million was spent from April 2010 to 31 March 2011 to check for landmines covering 51.7km2 of land prior to beginning development projects. The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) records outputs on checking for mines in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) but separates the results from progress made against known hazards.[2] Funding for checking for mines comes primarily from the United States (US) through the Army Corps of Engineers, as mandated by the US Congress.[3]

International

In 2010, international contributions towards mine action in Afghanistan totaled $102,552,749,[4] which represents a decrease of 4% compared to 2009. The US provided the largest contribution ($33,820,000), while Canada and Japan each provided over $18 million.

Of the total contribution, 96% went towards clearance activities, while the remainder was for victim assistance activities.

Donors reported that 31% of the total contribution was allocated specifically for activities related to mines and ERW not including cluster munitions, while 70% went towards activities where no differentiation was made between landmine and cluster munition related activities.

International contributions: 2010[5]

Donor

Sector

Amount
(national currency)

Amount

($)

US

Clearance; victim assistance

$33,820,000

33,820,000

Canada

Clearance

C$19,272,706

18,714,999

Japan

Clearance

¥1,625,278,636

18,515,364

Netherlands

Clearance

€5,266,364

6,983,725

Germany

Clearance

€5,165,558

6,850,046

United Kingdom (UK)

Clearance

£1,984,278

3,066,106

Norway

Victim assistance

NOK18,390,000

3,042,133

Sweden

Clearance

SEK20,000,000

2,775,735

Denmark

Clearance

DKK15,000,000

2,665,908

Finland

Clearance

€1,590,000

2,108,499

Belgium

Clearance

€1,000,000

1,326,100

Ireland

Clearance

 €800,000

1,060,880

Italy

Clearance

€400,000

530,440

Austria

Clearance

€365,000

484,027

Luxembourg

Clearance

225,473

299,000

Czech Republic

Clearance

CZK4,000,000

209,787

South Korea

Clearance

$100,000

100,000

Total

 

 

102,552,749

N/R = Not reported

Summary of contributions: 2006–2010[6]

Year

Amount

($)

2010

102,552,749

2009

106,555,763

2008

105,070,944

2007

86,274,716

2006

87,534,418

Total

487,988,590

 



[1] Email from MACCA, 14 July 2011.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Afghanistan Engineer District-North, “Quantity Contract for Demining UXO/Clearance in Afghanistan,” 2 September 2009, www.aed.usace.army.mil.

[4] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Wolfgang Bányai, Unit for Arms Control and Disarmament in the Framework of the UN, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria,  29 March 2011; Miroslav Klima, Deputy Director, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2 July 2011;  Hanne B. Elmelund Gam, Department for Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 29 March 2011; Lt.-Col. Klaus Koppetsch, Desk Officer Mine Action, German Federal Foreign Office, 18 April 2011; Alma Ni Choigligh, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, 31 March 2011; Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy, 6 April 2011;  Chisa Takiguchi, Official, Conventional Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 27 April 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 8 April 2011; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2011; and Hannah Binci, Security and Justice Team, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development, UK, 10 August 2011. Austria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 January 2011; Belgium Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2011; Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 January 2011; Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2011; letter from Markku Virri, Arms Control Unit, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland, 10 March 2011; email from Julia Goehsing, Program Officer, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 19 April 2011; email from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 16 August 2011; and US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2011,” Washington, DC, July 2011.

[5] Average exchange rate for 2010: US$1=C$1.0298; US$1=¥87.78; €1=US$1.3261; £1=US$1.5452; US$1=NOK6.0451; US$1=SEK7.2053; US$1=DKK5.6266; and US$1=CZK19.0670. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2011.

[6]  See previous editions of Landmine Monitor; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Afghanistan: Support for Mine Action,” www.the-monitor.org, 5 October 2010.