The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. In April 2011, Germany submitted its 13^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.

Germany produced, imported, and exported mines. Production was renounced in April 1996, and a 1994 export moratorium was made permanent in 1996. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically entered into force on 9 July 1998.

Germany destroyed its stockpile of 1.7 million antipersonnel mines in December 1997. Germany initially retained 3,000 mines for training and development purposes, which was reduced to 2,201 mines by the end of 2010.[1] On 3 March 2011, 22,716 antipersonnel mines entered Germany from Turkey in order to be destroyed.[2]

Germany served as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Technologies for Mine Action (1999–2000) and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on Mine Clearance (2000–2002) and General Status and Operation of the Convention (2006–2008).

Germany attended Tenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011.

Germany is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 8 July 2009. It was thus among the first 30 ratifications that triggered entry into force on 1 August 2010.

Germany submitted its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report on 27 January 2011 for the period from 1 August to 31 December 2010.

Germany reported that the War Weapons Control Act was amended in June 2009 to provide for national implementation of the convention’s prohibitions on the use, production, transfer, development, or stockpiling of cluster munitions. It includes penal sanctions for violations of up to five years imprisonment.[1] The Act also establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction over German citizens violating its law overseas.[2]

Under national implementation measures in its Article 7 report, Germany also cited the June 2009 law ratifying the convention.[3]

Germany participated throughout the Oslo Process that produced the convention and its position evolved significantly to support an immediate and comprehensive prohibition on cluster munitions.[4] Since the adoption of the convention in Dublin in May 2008, Germany has played a leading role in advancing the work of the convention. It hosted an international conference on the destruction of cluster munitions in Berlin in June 2009.

Germany attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 and made a statement expressing its commitment to the convention’s implementation and universalization.[5] Germany also participated in the first intersessional meeting in Geneva in June 2011, where it made a statement declaring that it had areas it suspected of containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. (See Cluster munition remnants section below.)

At both meetings, in its capacity as Friend of the President of the First Meeting of States Parties, Germany chaired sessions on stockpile destruction and retention of cluster munitions.

Germany has made several statements in support of universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In a statement welcoming the 1 August 2010 entry into force of the convention, Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle described the convention as a “an undeniable sign that progress in disarmament is possible” and called on all countries to endorse the ban on cluster munitions as soon as possible.[6]

At a UN Special Event on the convention in New York in October 2010, Germany encouraged states not party to the convention to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010 and stated its willingness to provide technical assistance in stockpile destruction.[7]

In a statement issued in November 2010 to mark the First Meeting of States Parties, Minister of Foreign Affairs Westerwelle appealed to all states that had not yet done so to accede to the convention and help create a “world free from cluster munitions.”[8] At the First Meeting of States Parties, Germany said that it had promoted the standards of the convention in a demarche to all cluster munition stockpilers that have not yet joined the convention.[9]

The Monitor is not aware of any public statements by Germany in the first half of 2011 condemning the use of cluster munitions by Libya or Thailand.

German NGOs have undertaken several activities in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[10]

Interpretive issues

Germany has not yet made known its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, including the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, and the prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions.

Germany’s implementation legislation bans transit of cluster munitions.[11]

During the negotiations, Germany advocated strongly for provisions on “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party).

Disinvestment

Germany’s implementation legislation does not explicitly prohibit investment in cluster munition production. In October 2010, Germany stated that it does not agree that the Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits investment in companies that produce cluster munitions and said that an investment ban would be imposed in exceptional cases only.[12]

In February 2011, the Alliance 90/Green group of parliamentarians tabled a motion in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) to amend the War Weapons Control Act of 2009, Germany’s implementation legislation for the convention, to prohibit both direct and indirect investment in companies producing, developing, and trading cluster munitions. The group proposed that tax incentives for investments in cluster munitions be removed through an amendment to the Act Governing the Certification of Contracts for Retirement Provision and requested that cluster munition producers to be excluded from receiving public contracts. The group also called on the government to agree to a more stringent interpretation of the convention’s Article 1(1)(c) prohibition of assistance with prohibited acts.[13]

Major German investment groups, including Allianz Global Investors Europe, DWS, and Union Investment, have supported the Green Party’s views and agreed not to further invest in companies producing internationally prohibited weapons.[14] Research issued in April 2011 however indicates that Allianz Group still has some $581 million invested in cluster munition producers.[15]

Data compiled by German NGOs indicate that several German banks have invested approximately €1.3 billion (US$2 billion) in loans and bonds in cluster munition producers and at least 21 insurance companies providing public pension funds (so called “Riester-Fonds”) have invested another €500 million ($663 million).[16] In May 2011, Deutsche Bank Group was identified as a significant funder of Spanish company Instalaza SA, which produced the MAT-120 cluster munitions sold to Libya in 2006–2008, and the bank maintains relationships valued at $750 million with at least four other cluster munition producers.[17] At the annual general meeting of the Deustche Bank in May 2011, German NGO Facing Finance appealed directly to Deustche Bank Chairman Josef Ackermann and shareholders to cease investment in cluster munition producers. According to Facing Finance, after intensive discussion Deustche Bank has apparently decided not to invest in certain cluster munition producers in future, but this list of excluded producers will not be made public.[18]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Germany is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. In 2010 through the first half of 2011, Germany continued to actively engage in CCW deliberations on cluster munitions.

In November 2010, Germany did not oppose continued CCW work on cluster munitions in 2011, but sought unsuccessfully for the mandate to be “focused negotiations” on “an immediate prohibition on transfers for all cluster munitions.” Germany warned, “if it turns out we do not manage to arrive at agreement on transfers, we believe the CCW should seriously consider making a pause” in its work on cluster munitions.[19]

In February 2011, Germany introduced a proposal for an immediate CCW prohibition on transfers of cluster munitions, with the support of five other states, which it said would be “consistent” with the Convention on Cluster Munitions’ provisions and would not “undermine” international humanitarian law.[20]

In September 2010, Germany described the chair’s draft text as a “complicated structure of exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions” and expressed strong concern that it would set a lower standard than the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[21] It also questioned the effectiveness of a proposed ban on cluster munitions produced before 1980 and said it “fundamentally regretted that the draft continued to legitimize the use of cluster munitions in general.”[22] In March 2011, Germany said it was imperative that a CCW protocol on cluster munitions not undermine the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[23]

Use, production, and transfer

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany has never used cluster munitions and stopped production and transfer in 2005.[24] Germany unilaterally renounced the use of all types of cluster munitions on 29 May 2008, one day before it adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin.[25]

In the past, German industry was very active in the production and export of cluster munitions. Germany also imported cluster munitions from the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). In its Article 7 report, Germany stated that “all former production capabilities were dismantled prior to 2008.”[26] The last known export was in 2004 when Germany sent a quantity of M26 rockets with submunitions to Slovakia and another shipment was made in 2005.[27]

The company Diehl GmbH and numerous subcontractors were involved in the production of M26 rockets for the 227mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) as part of the MLRS European Producers Group.[28] Lenkflugkörpersysteme GmbH produced the MW-1 dispenser (that deploys submunitions) for aircraft.[29]

The company Rheinmetall produced several types of 155mm artillery projectiles containing dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[30] These were produced for the German Armed Forces, as well as export customers including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy (co-production), and Norway.[31]

A consortium of Diehl, Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme mbH (GIWS), and Rheinmetall produce the SMArt-155 artillery projectile, a weapon that employs two submunitions but is not considered a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions because it meets the five technical criteria set out by negotiators as necessary to avoid the negative effects of cluster munitions.[32] This has been produced for the German Armed Forces and export customers Greece and Switzerland.[33] The consortium granted Alliant TechSystems in the US licensed co-production rights for the SMArt-155, and Alliant has marketed the munitions in the United Arab Emirates. According to the NGO Actiongroup Landmine.de, over 25,000 SMArt-155 projectiles have been produced.[34] Facing Finance has estimated that between 2000 and 2003, Germany acquired 9,000 SMArt-155 howitzer projectiles, and in 2011, it was estimated that up to €510 million ($676 million) had been spent for the acquisition and development of the SMArt-155 howitzer projectiles.[35] According to the Ministry of Defense, as of March 2011, the SMArt-155 has not been used by the German Army in any operations as part of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.[36]

Stockpiling and destruction

Germany in total possessed 519,818 cluster munitions containing 63,297,553 submunitions, including weapons destroyed prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[37] According to its Article 7 report, as of 31 December 2010, Germany’s stockpile consisted of 238,046 cluster munitions containing 39,348,605 submunitions. All of Germany’s stockpiled cluster munitions are reported to have been “removed from service and earmarked to destruction contracts and/or retention.”

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Germany (as of 31 December 2010)[38]

In June 2011, Germany presented revised stockpile figures, stating that it has a total of 520,000 cluster munitions containing 60,500,000 submunitions.[39] Previously in April 2010, Germany stated it initially possessed about 550,000 cluster munitions of 14 types, containing more than 50 million submunitions.[40] In June 2009, Germany for the first time revealed stockpile totals, it cited 440,000 cluster munitions with 50 million submunitions.[41] These numbers represent a significantly larger stockpile than was first estimated by German NGOs.[42]

Germany has stated on a number of occasions its intention to complete stockpile destruction by the end of 2015, three years ahead of the August 2018 deadline mandated by the convention.[43]

In its Article 7 report submitted in January 2011, Germany stated that 56% of its cluster munition stockpile has been destroyed since 2001.[44] In June 2011, Germany announced that 57.4% of its stockpile has been destroyed.[45]

Germany started destroying its BL-755 cluster bombs in the period from 2001 to 2008, following reliability concerns. In June 2009, Germany stated that it had destroyed “approximately 65,000 grenades [meaning DPICM submunitions], launch tube clusters and weapons containing 4.5 million submunitions.”[46] Destruction of DM612 155mm artillery projectiles began in 2007, and followed with other types in 2009, aiming to finish in 2012. Destruction of MW-1 began in 2009 and is due for completion in 2011. The destruction of M26 rockets began in 2009 and should be finished in 2015.[47]

In June 2009, the parliamentary committees for defense and budgets approved a “detailed working plan, schedule, and budgetary plan” for destruction of stocks.[48] In June 2011, Germany estimated the general cost of destruction to be €37 million ($49 million).[49]

According to the Article 7 report, the cluster munition stockpile is being destroyed at three locations in Germany: Nammo Buck in Pinnow, Spreewerk Lübben in Lübben, and Muniberka in Dietersdorf. The report describes the safety and environmental standards to be observed.[50]

At both the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010 and the intersessional meetings in June 2011, Germany gave detailed presentations on its progress on stockpile destruction.

Retention

In its Article 7 report, Germany listed the types of cluster munitions that it intends to retain, but did not indicate the quantity that it will retain.[51] In the report, Germany stated that it had consumed 10 cluster munitions and 958 submunitions in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training in the reporting period (1 August–31 December 2010).[52]

In June 2011, Germany said that quantity and types of cluster munitions to be retained as well as future training and research requirements had not yet been determined.[53]

Previously, in April 2010 Germany stated that “only the smallest fraction of the former holdings of munitions will be retained for training and test purposes.”[54]

Cluster munition remnants

At the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings in June 2011, Germany declared for the first time that it suspected it had areas containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg.[55] It repeated this information at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings a week later and noted that the remnants were “principally found within the confines of a target range,” located at the south of the training area. The suspected hazardous area is some 4km² in size.[56]

In its initial Article 7 report submitted in January 2011, Germany had declared no confirmed or suspected cluster munition contaminated areas.[57]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

In June 2011, Germany said that it plans to conduct a survey prior to initiating clearance and emphasized that the training range is marked and a security company monitors and controls the area to prevent unauthorized entry.[58]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Germany reported for the first time in 2011 that it might be contaminated with antipersonnel mines.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Germany was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 March 1999.

Germany’s initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, submitted on 31 August 1999, declared no confirmed or suspected mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Its Article 7 report for calendar year 2010 made a similar declaration. In June 2011, however, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Germany announced that it suspected that a former Soviet military training facility in the erstwhile East Germany contains antipersonnel mines.[1] Germany has thus provided clear information to the other States Parties on its newly discovered mined area.

This discovery raises some important issues relating to Article 5 given that Germany’s Article 5 deadline has already expired without an extension being requested. As is well known, under Article 5, paragraph 1, each State Party “undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years” after becoming a State Party. Under paragraph 3 of the same article: “If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.”

The use of the word “will” clearly limits the treaty’s permissive regime for the request of an extension to cases where a State Party identifies contamination prior to the expiry of its Article 5 deadline. Thus, the treaty does not address directly the scenario of newly discovered mined areas in a State Party whose Article 5 deadline has expired, although on a prima facie reading of the text it appears that such an affected State is in violation of the convention’s primary obligations in Article 5 to conduct survey and clearance.

Under the Cartagena Action Plan, adopted by the States Parties at the Second Review Conference: “All States Parties will … [w]hen previously unknown mined areas are discovered after reporting compliance with Article 5 (1), report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy the anti-personnel mines in these areas as a matter of urgent priority.”[2]

This might seem to imply an interpretation of the treaty by States Parties whereby there is no obligation to request an extension for a State Party that has not only declared full compliance with Article 5 but whose Article 5 deadline has expired. Alternatively, such an interpretation could be limited to those States Parties that have declared full compliance with Article 5 but whose Article 5 deadline has yet to expire. There are solid legal reasons for preferring a more limitative approach in a situation where either the extent of the contamination is unknown or it is known to be extensive.

If Germany requests an extension from the next Meeting of States Parties this would ensure that it is in conformity with the letter and spirit of Article 5. It would also establish a clear legal deadline for its full compliance with those provisions under the oversight of the treaty’s institutions and mechanisms.

Since the extent of contamination in Germany is unclear, a short extension to permit the necessary survey to be conducted would be appropriate, akin to the approach that has become standard for other States Parties requesting an extension in advance of the expiry of their Article 5 deadline, but which do not yet know the full extent of antipersonnel mine contamination.

Cluster munition remnants

Germany is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants. In its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, Germany had declared no confirmed or suspected cluster munition contaminated areas.[3] In June 2011, however, at the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings, Germany declared for the first time that it suspected it had areas containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg.[4] It repeated the information at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting a week later, noting that the remnants were “principally found within the confines of a target range,” located at the south of the training area. The suspected hazardous area was some 4km² in size.[5]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

Germany plans to conduct a survey prior to initiating clearance. All of the training range is marked and a security company monitors and controls the area to prevent unauthorized entry.[6]

In 2010 Germany contributed €17,610,877 (US$23,353,785) in mine action funding.[1] The largest contribution went to Afghanistan (€5,165,558/$6,850,046), with four additional countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Cambodia, and Lao PDR) each receiving over €1 million.

Germany provided support to 23 states. Support was provided through two trust funds—the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), and the Cluster Munitions Trust Fund for Lao PDR[2]—as well as five National Mine Action Centers (Cambodia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Peru), and 18 organizations.

Contributions by recipient: 2010

 Germany allocated the vast majority (94%) of its mine action support in 2010 for clearance activities.

Contributions by thematic sector: 2010

Of the total funds provided, the majority (66%) were allocated for activities related to mines and ERW not including cluster munitions, 11% went towards activities related to cluster munitions, and 23% went towards activities where no differentiation was made between landmine and cluster munition related activities.

Mine and cluster munition related contributions: 2010

The German Federal Foreign Office allocated all funding, with the exception of €190,000 ($251,959) of victim assistance funding for orthopedic technician training, which was contributed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Germany’s contribution in 2010 increased by 1% from 2009. From 2006–2010 Germany’s contribution to mine action totaled €81.00 million ($110.79 million). Germany’s contributions in 2006 and 2007 averaged €14,119,639 ($18,507,715) per year. In 2008 its annual contribution increased sharply, and from 2008–2010 Germany’s contributions have averaged €17,587,594 ($24,591,183) per year.

Summary of contributions: 2006–2010[3]

N/A = not applicable