Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.[1]

Iraq has not indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically is being pursued or if existing laws are considered adequate.[2]

In April 2011, Iraq submitted its fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering calendar year 2010.

Iraq hosted a conference on the national strategy for mine action in coordination with donor countries in Baghdad in October 2010. Iraq attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010. It also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in June 2011.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 conflict. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign in 2003.[3] Iraq reported that it has no intention to reconstruct its production capacity.[4]

For the second year in a row, the Monitor could not find any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government, Coalition, or insurgency forces. Civilians continued to be killed by mines laid in previous years.  No allegations of any mine transfers from Iraq have surfaced since the 1990s.

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012.[5] In June 2011, Iraq stated that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[6]

In previous Monitor reports, substantial but decreasing numbers of antipersonnel mines were recovered by foreign and Iraqi forces from caches. The Monitor has not found any information regarding seizures during the current reporting period. The Iraqi government has not previously reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports. The jurisdiction over and arrangements for antipersonnel mines collected by multinational forces is not clear.

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009. 

In June 2011, Iraqi government representatives informed the CMC that ratification was awaiting parliamentary approval amid a range of urgent issues.[1] In early November 2010, Iraq informed the CMC that ratification had been delayed following elections held in March 2010, but said ratification would be undertaken once a new government was formed.[2] The new government was established on 11 November 2010. Iraq has stated that it continues to implement the convention even though it has not yet ratified.[3]

Iraq participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but attended both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer.[4] In December 2008, Iraq pledged to sign the convention as soon as possible after completing national and constitutional processes.[5]  It subsequently signed the convention at the UN in New York in November 2009, becoming the 103rd country to join. 

Iraq has continued to engage in the work of the convention. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010, but didn’t make any statements. Iraq also participated in the convention’s first intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011. 

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability and other civil society groups have campaigned in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6]

Iraq is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Iraq is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has participated as an observer in CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in recent years, but has not made its views known on the draft chair’s text.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. According to one source, Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984 during their border war.[7]

Coalition forces used large numbers of cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States (US), France, and the United Kingdom (UK) dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions were used in the conflict.[8] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[9]

In May 2011, Iraq stated that “There are no facilities that produce cluster munitions in Iraq.”[10] Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs: the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[11] It was also involved in joint development of the M87 Orkan (known in Iraq as Ababil) with Yugoslavia.[12] 

Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[13] Jane’s Information Group has listed it as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[14] The current status of the stockpile is not known, although in May 2011, Iraq stated “The Iraqi Army does not possess any stockpiles of cluster munitions at the present time.”[15]

In June 2011, Iraq stated that its Civil Defense team had destroyed 20,819 “cluster items” from 2009–2010, and the Ministry of Defense had destroyed 6,265 “cluster items” in 2010.[16]

Cluster munition remnants

The precise extent of cluster munition remnants in Iraq is unknown, but believed to be significant. According to a 2009 report by UNDP and UNICEF, the main highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes during the 1991 Gulf War.[17] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[18] Cluster munitions remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken to open up access to oilfields and develop infrastructure, as well as for humanitarian clearance.[19]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has also found cluster munition remnants in the Iraqi Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Coalition forces launched cluster strikes around Dohuk in 1991 to support a Kurdish uprising against the government and left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[20] In 2010, a MAG survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[21]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas

Political uncertainties continue to hinder management of the mine action sector and formulation of a coherent national strategy.[22] As a result, comprehensive data on clearance operations does not exist. However, international and national companies, including G4S, Taaz Group, Arabian Gulf, and al-Safsafa, are undertaking commercial clearance tasks that encounter cluster munition remnants.

In the humanitarian sector, MAG deployed a mine action team to cluster munition clearance in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2010, which resulted in the clearance of 2.1km² of land and the destruction of 1,255 unexploded submunitions.[23] In southern Iraq, Danish Demining Group (DDG), whose operations are based in Basra, cleared 8.3km² of battle area in 2010 destroying 1,008 unexploded submunitions in the process.[24]

Iraq stated in a letter to the Monitor in May 2011 that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has formed a committee to conduct operations throughout the country to detect and discard unexploded cluster bombs that remain from past armed conflicts.[25]

Casualties

In 2010, a deminer was killed during a clearance accident caused by a cluster submunition in Duhok, northern Iraq.[26]

By the end of 2010, there had been at least 388 cluster munition casualties during strikes (128 killed; 260 injured). Another 1,672 casualties of cluster munition remnants were reported (747 killed; 921 injured; four unknown) and unexploded submunitions caused another 935 casualties with no further details on use (411 killed; 507 injured; 17 unknown).[27] However, due to the level of contamination, it is estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes, and that children made up one quarter of these casualties.[28]

Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led Coalition, and the conflict that has continued, albeit less intensely, ever since. Attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have occurred regularly against civilians, the military, and the police in 2010 and 2011, with much of the ordnance used having been plundered from the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP in 2009 observed the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”[1]

Mines

Iraq has a level of mine contamination that is among the world’s highest, although the precise extent is not yet known. The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering an estimated 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. A second phase survey of these five governorates completed fieldwork in 2010,[2] but no estimate of the area of contamination had been released as of August 2011.

In the meantime, a non-technical survey of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 70.03km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450.1km²) identified by the ILIS. [3]

However, there is known to be substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts and was therefore not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[4] Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².[5] Iraq’s initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report claimed that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another one million mines ahead of both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[6] In addition, security forces continue to find substantial caches of abandoned mines.[7]

Cluster munition remnants

The precise extent of cluster munition remnants in Iraq is unknown, but significant. A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[8] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[9] Cluster munitions remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken to open up access to oilfields and develop infrastructure as well as for humanitarian clearance.[10]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has also found cluster munition remnants in the Iraqi Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Coalition forces launched cluster strikes around Dohuk in 1991 to support a Kurdish uprising against the government and left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[11] In 2010, a MAG survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq has extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining from past conflicts and continues to accumulate contamination from continuing conflicts in the north, where Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery have bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in 2010 and 2011.[13] Moreover, Iraqi civilians continued to run the gauntlet of around 100 IED detonations each month in 2010[14] and security forces continue to find substantial caches of weapons and ordnance accumulated by NSAGs.[15]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, including “bunker-buster” bombs and tank-fired shells used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[16] Britain acknowledged in 2010 that it used 1.9 metric tonnes of DU ammunition during the 2003 war.[17] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, DU munitions have been claimed to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components. In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government, mine action is managed in Erbil and Dohuk governorates by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) and in Sulaymaniyah governorate by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA). In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) to replace the National Mine Action Authority that had been attached to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation but had become inactive and was closed down by the government in mid-2007.[19]

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south.[20] However, the DMA’s role has been weakened by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate, political uncertainties about the direction of mine action, and fragile cooperation between key government ministries.[21]

In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense imposed a ban on civilian mine/UXO clearance pending a review of security issues relating to the mine action sector, including vetting operators. In August 2009, the ban was lifted and ministries of defense and environment signed a memorandum of understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[22]

The “Mine Action Strategy 2010 to 2012,” published by the Ministry of Environment in February 2010, set out a vision of “an Iraqi society free from the fear and impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war” and identified broad strategic goals for mine action, RE, victim assistance, and data management. It also outlined the role of key government ministries in mine action. It said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD [Ministry of Defense] will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[23] In practice, mine action in 2010 continued on a largely ad hoc basis without central coordination or direction.[24]

 A joint UNICEF/UNDP report in 2009 observed “a final decision on where the responsibilities for mine action within government will be vested should now be taken in order that Mine Action in Iraq can be properly structured and that all international civilian and commercial demining operations will be well regulated and supported by Iraqi authorities.”[25] A succession of interministerial meetings convened in 2009 and 2010 to consider coordination and management of mine action but, as of August 2011, that process had yet to reach a conclusion.[26]

Land Release

In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government, mine action in 2010 released a little less land overall than in 2009 as a result of reduced battle area clearance (BAC), but reported a fourfold increase in the numbers destroyed of mines and UXO.[27]

In central and southern Iraq, however, the DMA, Ministry of Defense, and other operators did not provide sufficient data to make a meaningful determination of the total amount of land released through clearance or survey in 2010. Operations recovered some momentum after stalling in 2009 as a result of a suspension imposed by the Ministry of Defense on security grounds that remained in place until August 2009. However, clearance appears to have continued without central coordination or control and the UN expressed concern over the quality of some of the clearance.[28]

Commercial operations appear to have accelerated, particularly as a result of moves to open up access to oilfields and restore infrastructure. Humanitarian mine clearance, however, appears to be confined to Kurdish governorates of the north. In the south, humanitarian mine action capacity contracted with the shut-down of Rafidain Demining Organization (RDO) in July 2010,[29] and the main remaining actors, DDG and IMCO, only conducted BAC.[30] Civil defense units are reportedly active,[31] but the extent of their capacity and operations is unknown.

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2010

In July 2010, IKMAA completed a 14-month “Preliminary Technical Survey,” which it described as “an advance form of non-technical survey,” and at the end of December 2010 it approved the survey report. This put the total of CHAs in its two governorates of Erbil and Dohuk at 70.03km². IKMAA commented this in effect cancelled 380.1km², or 84% of the SHAs identified in those governorates by the ILIS.[32]

Also in the north, MAG surveyed Dibis, an area near Kirkuk city previously inaccessible because of insecurity, and reported identifying 20 cluster munition strikes and a minefield but gave no further details.[33]

Military engineers started a general survey in 2011 intended to identify major minefields. By August 2011, its surveyors had completed Diyala and Maysan governorates and started on Wasit and Basra governorates, all four governorates lying along the border with Iran.[34]

The lack of up-to-date information on mine/ERW contamination prompted the UN and operators to plan a non-technical survey of southern Thi Qar governorate, drawing on the resources of DDG, IMCO, G4S, Arabian Gulf, and Al-Safsafa as well as Civil Defense and with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The Thi Qar survey is intended to serve as a pilot for survey of other governorates.[35]

Mine and battle clearance in 2010

Mined area clearance in the three northern Kurdish governorates rose slightly in 2010, but the items destroyed was four times larger than the previous year. IKMAA, with 120 deminers in 15 manual clearance teams supported by mechanical assets and four mine detection dog (MDD) teams, reported a sharp rise in productivity, helped by better use of different detectors technologies and a toolbox approach to deploying assets.[36] The GDMA, which has 10 teams for technical survey and contracts clearance to local operators, reported the same level of mined area clearance in 2010 undertaken mainly for oil companies.[37]

MAG, after reduced funding and manpower cuts in 2009, had funding to increase its mine action teams from 11 to 17, with 170 deminers, and to add an additional mechanical team and another MDD team. In addition to mine and BAC, EOD teams cleared more than 70,000 items of UXO in roving tasks.[38]

In central and southern Iraq, the increased momentum to restore oil production saw a surge in work for commercial companies in 2010−2011. But despite Iraq’s status as one of the most mine- and ERW-affected countries in the world, growth of both commercial and humanitarian demining activity continued to be constrained by convoluted bureaucratic procedures and severe delays in processing applications for accreditation and visas. As a result, G4S was the only international commercial company accredited for mine action in most of 2010, until Sharjah-based Ta’az Group gained its accreditation in August 2010. MineTech worked in Iraq in support of Arabian Gulf.[39]

National companies Arabian Gulf and Al-Safsafah did not report on their activities. G4S, with 342 personnel as of August 2011, had one oil industry contract in the first nine months of 2010 resulting in BAC of 16.46km² and destruction of 445 ERW. In the year since September 2010, G4S had one quality assurance contract and three clearance contracts from international oil companies for BAC, mainly of oilfield access routes, camp sites, production and treatment facilities and pipelines, resulting in clearance of a total of 58.95km² and destruction of 1,489 ERW.[40]

Ta’az Demining, with 18 10-person BAC teams and three 10-person demining teams based in Basra, conducted a quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) contract for ENI in Az Zubayr oilfield in September 2010 and started another contract for Gazprom for QA/QC of a 18km² site. In 2011, it undertook a series of oil industry jobs including a QA/QC contract on 0.75km² of North Rumailah oilfield for Saipem which resulted in clearance of 181 unexploded BLU M-42 and M-61 submunitions, as well as mortar and artillery AXO. As of August 2011, it was conducting BAC for Shell on 3.6km² of Majnoon oilfield.[41]

Mine clearance in central and southern Iraq is undertaken largely by the army, which has 14 engineering regiments and two explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies in each regiment, totaling some 2,000 EOD/mine clearance personnel. The Ministry of Defense reported conducting 21.96km² of manual mine clearance and 87.3km² of BAC in 2010.[42] Tasks undertaken in 2010−2011 included clearance for the oil industry, utilities, and infrastructure and resulted in the opening of four border crossing-points into Iran.[43]

Humanitarian clearance operations in central and south Iraq were limited to DDG, IMCO, and the ICRC, while NPA worked with RMAC South to build capacity for coordination, tasking, and data management. DDG, with 72 EOD/BAC personnel and 28 support staff, shifted the focus of its operations towards tackling tasks identified by communities and on the basis of social impact rather than size of contaminated area. To support this focus, DDG trained seven mixed gender community liaison teams in 2010, which it described as “the cornerstone” of its planning and prioritization processes.[44] IMCO had 96 operators supported by a mechanical team (one flail) and 11 MDDs, undertaking a range of survey, clearance, and QA tasks. In 2011, it envisaged expanding capacity and the scope of its operations.[45] The ICRC operated with one two-strong EOD team based in Amara doing roving community clearance as well as some community liaison and RE.[46]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2010[47]

N/A = Not applicable; N/R = Not reported

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

Three years after it adhered to the treaty, Iraq has still to demonstrate how it expects to progress towards fulfilling its international legal obligations. Mine action continued to be held back by lack of precise data on the mine threat and political uncertainties have impeded the development of an effective institutional framework for mine action or a strategic plan for fulfilling its treaty obligations.[48]

Only in three northern Iraqi governorates, where mine action is under the management of IKMAA and GDMA, has there been concerted action to deal with the mine threat. In central and southern Iraq, most of the reported commercial and humanitarian clearance consists of BAC of unexploded submunitions and other UXO. The army has embarked on survey of the mine threat and as of mid-2011 was the only operator in central and southern Iraq to be tackling it. Until Iraq gives clear political and institutional direction to mine action, the outlook for progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations is at best uncertain.

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2010

Clearance of cluster munition remnants, a major threat to communities and obstacle to economic development, was recorded in the course of a variety of activities including commercial and humanitarian BAC and roving EOD operations.

MAG reported clearing 2.1km² of cluster munitions hazards in 2010 resulting in the destruction of 1,255 submunitions. This included clearance of two areas totaling 0.2km² at Kherava, northeast of Mosul.[49] DDG reported 1,009 unexploded submunitions destroyed as a result of its BAC operations in 2010 out of a total of 3,028 destroyed.[50]

Quality management

GDMA, with 22 personnel working on QA and 10 on QC, reported making 2,118 visits to monitor clearance operations at 152 mined areas and checking 0.5km² of cleared land. It passed 145 of these tasks, but called for re-clearing of 276,062m².[51] IKMAA has a QA/QC department whose monitors made 1,202 inspections, visiting 23 clearance sites and sampling 11,853m² of cleared land.[52]

Safety of demining personnel

A MAG deminer was killed by the detonation of a submunition in June 2010.[53] GDMA reported four accidents in 2010 but gave no details.[54]

Iranian artillery shelling of border areas caused interruptions to the operations of two IKMAA manual teams in Choman district, requiring them to leave the minefields for safety reasons and then resume work when the situation allowed.[55]

UNICEF observed that the major predicament for its RE program was “the volatile and unstable security situation throughout Iraq and especially in the most affected regions by Mines, UXOs and ERWs severely hampering and affecting the efforts of Mine Action actors in Iraq.”[56]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

UNICEF coordinates national and international NGOs in providing RE in support of IKMAA and GDMA in the north and the DMA in central and south Iraq. Its main partners in 2010 included HI, IHSCO, Iraq Red Crescent Society, the ICRC, and demining operators, including MAG, IMCO, and NPA.[57]

Iraq’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2010–2012 calls for “a comprehensive national mine risk education program to raise awareness in order to reduce risks and adopt safe behavior among the population.”[58] UNICEF and other RE organizations accordingly developed an RE strategy in 2011 that sets uniform standards and guidelines for the whole country. On the basis of the strategy, UNICEF and its partners worked in 2011 on including RE in the national school curriculum.[59] UNICEF also supported a community-based RE program targeting 30 villages in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah and working with community focal points to develop risk reduction strategies, including community mapping and RE delivery. [60]

IKMAA had two three-person RE teams in 2010, one in Erbil and the other in Dohuk, holding direct RE sessions for populations at risk, notably shepherds, nomads, and children, and organizing the broadcast of RE messages on local radio and television. The teams also delivered RE through community liaison supporting mine clearance operations.[61] IKMAA’s Public Information section published information on all mine/ERW related accidents in local media printed and distributed posters. RE teams support for mine action teams resulted in clearance of more than 1,200 items of UXO.[62]

Casualties Overview

In 2010, the Monitor identified 82 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties.[1]  There was no active or reliable data collection in southern and central Iraq.[2] It is certain that there are many more casualties in these regions that were not identified.[3]

Children made up nearly a third (32%) of civilian casualties for which the age was known (18 of 56), 14 of whom were boys. Most child casualties, 13 of 18, were caused by ERW. As in previous years, men made up the single largest casualty group, representing 52% of all casualties; six casualties were women. Five clearance accidents caused five casualties, all in the Iraqi Kurdistan region of northern Iraq; four deminers were injured; the fifth was killed by a cluster submunition. Civilians made up the vast majority of reported casualties, 70, with just seven casualties among security forces.

At least 10 casualties were caused by victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including one child. This was similar to the 12 IED casualties identified in 2009.[4]

The 82 casualties identified in 2010 represented a slight increase in the number of registered annual casualties as compared with the 78 casualties in 2009.[5] In the governorates of Erbil and Duhok, there was a reduction reported in the number of casualties, from 21 to 17.[6] In southern and central Iraq, where the media served as the only source of casualty data in both 2009 and 2010, the number of casualties reported was not thought to reflect an accurate picture of the total number of casualties that occurred in either year.[7]

The total number of casualties in Iraq is unknown, though there are known to be many thousands.[8]  In the governorate of Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) recorded 9,093 casualties (4,019 killed; 5,074 injured) through the end of 2010.[9] The 2004–2006 Landmine Impact Survey Phase I, which included 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates, estimated 18 new victims per 100,000 people in affected communities.[10] It was estimated that 25% of mine/ERW casualties are children under the age of 14.[11]

By the end of 2010, there were at least 388 cluster munition casualties during strikes (128 killed; 260 injured). Another 1,672 casualties of cluster munition remnants were reported (747 killed; 921 injured; four unknown) and unexploded submunitions caused another 935 casualties with no further details on use (411 killed; 507 injured; 17 unknown).[12] However, due to the level of contamination, it is estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes, and that children made up one quarter of these casualties.[13]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is estimated to be 48,000–68,000.[14] There have been approximately 14,000 survivors identified in the three governorates of Iraqi Kurdistan.[15]

Assessing victim assistance needs

There were no national or regional efforts to assess the needs of survivors in Iraq in 2010. In southern and central Iraq the lack of available data made it difficult to identify survivors and to prioritize and address their medical and rehabilitative needs.[16] The Directorate for Mine Action’s (DMA’s) 2009 pilot victim survey was not expanded to all parts of the country in 2010 as planned, due to a lack of funding.[17] In early 2011, the DMA began working with the Ministry of Health to develop a national disability registry that would collect information on types and causes of disabilities and the needs of all persons with disabilities. By June 2011, representatives of health centers and physical rehabilitation centers in pilot districts of Baghdad, Erbil, Salahedin and Thiqar had received training on data collection.[18] Information collected was to be shared with relevant actors in victim assistance and the wider disability field.[19]

As in previous years, victim assistance service providers reported the ongoing collection of information on the needs of their beneficiaries.[20] The Iraq Red Crescent Society (IRCS) collected survivor data during impact surveys, risk education trainings, and from survivors visiting the IRCS rehabilitation center in Mosul and provided data to the DMA.[21] GDMA provided casualty data on a regular basis to relevant government ministries in Iraqi Kurdistan.[22]

Victim assistance coordination[23]

In March 2010, the first national victim assistance conference was held to discuss the development of a victim assistance strategy and included government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, and disabled persons’ organizations. A follow up meeting was planned for August 2011.[24]

In Iraqi Kurdistan, GDMA held regular meetings to share information about victim assistance activities and planning. UNDP held bi-monthly victim assistance coordination meetings with implementing partners. Meetings were seen to improve coordination among service providers.[25]

In 2010, the DMA was the focal point for victim assistance coordination for all of Iraq, except Iraqi Kurdistan, but was not active because of a lack of capacity. The establishment of a community liaison department within the DMA in early 2011 was seen as a critical first step to develop the capacity to coordinate and plan victim assistance.[26]

In southern and central Iraq, the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation (HCPR), within the Ministry of Health, coordinated physical rehabilitation. The HCPR included representatives of other relevant ministries, the ICRC, and all physical rehabilitation centers.[27] Coordination activities in 2010 included budgeting and funding for centers, supply and control of materials, training, and sharing of best practice among centers.[28] In 2010, links were established between the HCPR and the DMA to coordinate roles and responsibilities around disability assistance, including victim assistance.[29] There was no equivalent body responsible for the coordination of physical rehabilitation in Iraqi Kurdistan.[30]  Efforts were underway in 2010 to establish a national disability council; as of June 2011, it had not yet been formed.[31]

Initial efforts were made to develop a national victim assistance plan at the national Victim Assistance Conference in March 2010, but as of June 2011, no further progress had been made.[32] The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 included as its third objective to “establish an integrated and capable program for mine/UXO [unexploded ordnance] victim rehabilitation and reintegration in the society.”[33] Planned activities included targets for providing physical rehabilitation and economic reintegration services to survivors, but no efforts were reported to monitor progress towards set targets.[34] The Ministry of Health’s plan included objectives designed to improve medical and physical rehabilitation services for all persons with disabilities throughout Iraq.[35]

Iraq provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2010 and at the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011.[36] Iraq also provided limited casualty data through form J of its Article 7 report.[37]

Survivor Inclusion

The involvement of survivors and other persons with disabilities in victim assistance coordination was very limited.[38] GDMA and IKMAA worked with disabled persons organizations and survivors in the implementation of victim assistance activities, including physical rehabilitation and peer support.[39] More than one-third of technicians in physical rehabilitation centers were persons with disabilities.[40]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2010[41]

In 2010, the improving security situation allowed mine/ERW survivors to access victim assistance services more safely. This encouraged survivors in southern and central Iraq to travel to Iraqi Kurdistan where there was support available for transportation and housing costs while receiving services.[42] The improved security situation also expanded the geographic coverage for the ICRC in southern and central Iraq.[43] However, the increased mobility of survivors led to a greater demand for health and rehabilitation services. The demand was beyond the capacity available from existing service providers due to insufficient supplies and technical staff.[44] In Iraqi Kurdistan, decreasing international support put pressure on government service providers to fill the gap.[45]

In 2010, the Ministry of Health was better able to provide the supplies necessary for emergency medical attention. That progress, coupled with a reduction in the need for emergency care as a result of the reduction in armed violence, decreased the need for hospitals to rely on ICRC emergency medical supplies.[46] However, some 260 out of 298 communities in southern Iraq still lacked sufficient medical facilities.[47] The government was not able to provide all needed medical supplies, while NGO support in providing supplies was considered “unorganized and uncontrolled.”[48]

There were increasing numbers of survivors from southern and central Iraq seeking physical rehabilitation services in Iraqi Kurdistan.[49] KORD, which operated five rehabilitation centers in the region, coordinated with three national disabled persons organizations from outside Iraqi Kurdistan that provided referrals.[50] The improved security situation and communications increased survivor mobility, allowing survivors to benefit from free transportation and accommodation available at centers in Iraqi Kurdistan, but not available at centers in the south.[51] The increase in people from the south seeking physical rehabilitation services was believed to have lengthened the wait list in Sulaymaniyah governorate,[52] whereas centers elsewhere in Iraqi Kurdistan were coping adequately with the increased demand despite perceived decreases in funding available.[53] The construction of a new rehabilitation center in Nasiriyah, in southeastern Iraq, was completed by the end of 2009, but it still had not opened by mid-2011.[54]

Throughout Iraq, a lack of raw materials and components,[55] as well as insufficient trained technicians limited the availability of physical rehabilitation services. In 2010, the Ministry of Health estimated that existing rehabilitation services met just 40% of needs.[56]  The 12 prosthetic-orthotic workshops produced approximately 5,000 mobility devices during the year, just 25% of the estimated needed by people with disabilities. There were 130 rehabilitation physicians as compared with the need for 600 and 180 prosthetic technicians while there was an estimated demand for 400.[57] To address the need for trained technicians, the ICRC continued to provide scholarships for study outside of Iraq, including support to four candidates for training to ISPO Category I level to serve as teachers and strengthen the teaching capacity at the Baghdad Prosthetics and Orthotics School.[58]

Aside from the launch of the peer support program by KORD, no improvements were seen in access or availability of psychological support or social inclusion initiatives for survivors.[59]

Economic inclusion activities continued to be carried out on a limited basis in Iraqi Kurdistan by NGOs[60] and the ICRC increased its coverage by making its micro-economic initiative program available in two rehabilitation centers, up from one in 2009.[61]As in previous years, all information provided by Iraq on progress and challenges in victim assistance was focused on medical attention and physical rehabilitation.[62]

The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities.[63] However in 2010 the legal framework and the enforcement of existing laws were weak and had not improved. Legal reforms to improve the protection of rights for persons with disabilities that had been underway since 2008 were still not seen to be a government priority and did not advance in 2010.[64] Iraqi Kurdistan lacked legislation to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and public spaces were not accessible for persons with disabilities. [65]

As of 1 August 2011, Iraq had not signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 assumes international donors will fund clearance operations and that national authorities—the ministries of defense, interior, and the environment—will contribute approximately US$21.71 million over three years for victim assistance (VA), risk education (RE), strategic planning, and information management personnel.[1]

As in 2009, neither the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), the Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, or the General Directorate of Mine Action reported making financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program in 2010.

International support has averaged over $36 million per year since 2006. In 2010, 10 donors contributed $37,152,204 for clearance, VA, and RE activities.[2]

Of the total international contribution in 2010, 91% went towards clearance activities. The United States (US), Finland, Netherlands, and Norway contributed $2,592,905 towards VA activities, [3] which represents 7% of the total international contribution in 2010. The remaining 2% of funds went towards RE activities.

In 2011, the UN Mine Action Portfolio Iraq Country Team based its plans on continued international support at least until 2015.[4]

In a June 2010 assessment of US support to mine action in Iraq, the Office of the Inspector General for the US Department of State concluded that until the government of Iraq makes a sustainable commitment to clearing mines and explosive remnants of war, especially in the southern regions, progress towards clearing mines would be slow.[5]

International contributions: 2010[6]

Summary of contributions: 2006–2010[7]