Korea, South

Last Updated: 03 November 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on Resolution 65/48 in December 2010, as in previous years

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

None

Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It continues to insist on the military necessity of antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging their negative humanitarian impact.

On 8 December 2010, South Korea abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 65/48 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has in previous years. South Korea has previously stated for several years that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula prohibits it from acceding to the treaty.[1] In June 2011 a Foreign Ministry official told the Monitor that South Korea’s policy in relation to the Mine Ban Treaty remains unchanged.[2]

South Korea has participated only minimally in the diplomatic work related to the Mine Ban Treaty and did not send an observer delegation to any meetings in 2010 or in the first half of 2011.

In September 2010, a draft law to allow commercial mine clearance companies to operate within the country was introduced into Parliament.[3]

South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. On 28 April 2011, South Korea submitted its annual CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report.[4]

Use, production, and transfer

While South Korea maintains existing minefields, it has regularly informed the Monitor that it has not engaged in any new use of antipersonnel mines in many years.[5]

In 2011, South Korea reported that it did not produce, export, purchase, or use antipersonnel mines during the year.[6] In 2007, a private South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown number of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[7]

South Korea said in October 2009 that it “is exercising tight control over anti-personnel landmines and enforcing a moratorium on their export for an indefinite extension of time.”[8] It has previous said that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of the moratorium on the export of AP [antipersonnel] mines since 1997.”[9] In June 2011, a Foreign Ministry official stated that the government has commissioned the development of remotely-controlled mines which will replace antipersonnel mines and that the newly developed mines will meet the requirements set out in the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.[10]

Stockpiling

In 2011, a government official told the Monitor that the size of South Korea’s stockpile and the types of mines stockpiled are classified.[11] South Korea said in 2006 and 2008 that its stockpile consisted of 407,800 antipersonnel mines.[12] Previously, the government stated that it held a stockpile of about 2 million antipersonnel mines.[13]

In the past year, South Korea reported that 18,464 antipersonnel mines (5,132 M14; 12,086 M16; and 1,246 M18) were destroyed in the Ammunition Units where they were stored. The precise date of the destruction(s) and reason for this action was not specified.[14]

The United States (US) military keeps a substantial number of remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 VOLCANO, and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.[15]

For many years, the US military also stockpiled about 1.1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea, with about half the total kept in South Korea and half in the continental US.[16] It now appears those mines are being removed from South Korea and destroyed. 

Most of the US-owned mines located in South Korea have been part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). On 30 December 2005, the US enacted a law authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program would be terminated, which occurred at the end of 2008.[17] In June 2009, the South Korean government told the Monitor, “AP [antipersonnel] mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”[18] However, in June 2011, a Foreign Ministry official stated that South Korea safeguards an antipersonnel mines stockpile that belongs to the US military on its territory as part of the WRSA-K program. These mines are planned to be gradually transferred out of South Korea.[19]

The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”[20] Moreover, US policy is to stop the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea in 2010. The US has previously destroyed all non-self-destructing mines not dedicated to potential use in Korea.

North Korean-made copies of Soviet PMD-6 mines were found in 2011 on the shores of South Korean islands and along watersheds downstream from the DMZ in South Korea. The mines have been moved by water due to heavy rainfall and landslides, causing casualties among civilians in South Korea.[21]

 



[1] See ICBL, “Country Profile: South Korea: Mine Ban Policy,” 18 October 2010, www.the-monitor.org.

[2] Email from Chi-won Jung, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[3] “Despite promises, land mine dangers still persist,” Korean JoongAng Daily, 30 September 2010, joongangdaily.joins.com. See also CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period 1 September 2010 to 31 December 2010), 28 April 2011.

[4] Article 13 Report, 28 April 2011. The report only contains mine clearance information.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kap-Soo Rim, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 1 June 2011.

[7] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 876. South Korea began producing remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006. South Korea has produced two types of Claymore mines, designated KM18A1 and K440. South Korean officials have stated that the country only produces the devices in command-detonated mode, which are lawful under the Mine Ban Treaty, and not with tripwires, which would be prohibited.

[8] South Korea, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.53,” 64th Session, UNGA First Committee, 29 October 2009.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 16 June 2008.

[10] Email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[11] Ibid.

[13] In May 2005, South Korea stated that “there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are buried,” and the government estimated one million buried mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. The Monitor reported that the stockpile includes 960,000 M14 mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II, and that South Korea also holds unknown numbers of self-destructing mines, including, apparently, more than 31,000 US ADAM artillery-delivered mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 544.

[14] Email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 25 May 2005.

[17] Public Law 109–159, “An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies, Korea,” 30 December 2005, p.119, Stat. 2955–2956.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 9 June 2009.

[19] Email from Chi-won Jung, MOFAT, 27 June 2011.

[20] Public Law 109–159, “An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies, Korea,” 30 December 2005, Section 1(c)(2).

[21] “1 killed, 1 injured in explosion near border town between S Korea, DPRK,” Xinhua, 1 August 2010, news.xinhuanet.com; and “3 mines found swept away from North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, 29 June 2011, joongangdaily.joins.com.


Last Updated: 23 September 2011

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea did not make any statements on the convention in 2010 or the first half of 2011. Previously, in October 2009, an official said, “The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the need to reduce humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions and supports international efforts to address the problems associated with the use of cluster munitions…. However, due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, my government is unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[1]

South Korea has described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[2] It has stated its preference for cluster munitions to be addressed within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in order to strike “an appropriate balance between humanitarian concerns and military considerations.”[3] Yet until the 2007 launch of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, South Korea opposed efforts to tackle cluster munitions in the CCW framework.

South Korea did not participate in the Oslo Process, but it attended the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and stated, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[4]

Since 2008, South Korea has not participated in any of the regional or international diplomatic meetings relating to the convention.

South Korea is party to the CCW and its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. South Korea has participated regularly in CCW meetings on cluster munitions. In November 2010, South Korea expressed its support for continued CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, noting “our efforts are by no means in vain.”[5]

A local peace group called “Weapon Zero Team” has undertaken several activities to call on the South Korean government to ban cluster munitions.[6]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has never used cluster munitions.[7] It is, however, a known producer, importer, exporter, and stockpiler of the weapon.

In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending, “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[8]

In November 2010, South Korea informed the CCW that, “we will do our part to reduce the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions by reflecting [international humanitarian law] standards in our defence forces.”[9]

The Ministry of National Defense has said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[10]

The United States (US) concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets.[11] 

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[12] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced 2 M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[13] In March 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[14]

Poongsan’s website has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DP-ICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DP-ICM K305.[15] In April 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DP-ICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DP-ICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[16]

Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan at Wah Cantonment. While the ammunition is primarily being produced for Pakistan’s army, the two firms will also co-market the projectiles to export customers.[17]

According to the report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” 17 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions. Both Hanwha and Poongsan are invested in by 16 Korean financial entities, 10 US financial entities, three in the United Kingdom (UK), and one each in both Canada and Switzerland.[18]

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers.  Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[19] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US. [20]In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[21] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[22]

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “There are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings…. Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[23]

 



[1] Republic of Korea, “Explanation of Vote on L. 16, 64th Session of the UN General Assembly First Committee,” New York, 11 October 2009.

[2] Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 14 January 2008.

[3] Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 28 March 2011. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[4] “Facing military confrontation, South Korea clings to cluster munitions,” Mainichi Daily News, 8 December 2008, mdn.mainichi.jp. For more details on South Korea’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 217–219.

[5] Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[6] War Resisters International, “South Korea: Weapon Zero Team,” 18 February 2010, www.wri-irg.org.

[7] Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 7 July 2008. Earlier, the ambassador said, “What should be noted here is that we have never used that weapon system in the real battlefield, and have never caused any harm to civilians.” Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 14 January 2008.

[8] Republic of Korea, “Explanation of Vote on L. 16, 64th Session of the UN General Assembly First Committee,” New York, 11 October 2009. See also, statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008; and Republic of Korea, “Explanation of Vote on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly, First Committee, New York, 30 October 2008. 

[9] Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[10] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, to IKV-Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[11] Notification to Congress pursuant to Section 36(c) and (d) of the Arms Export Control Act, Transmittal No. DTC 132–00, 4 April 2001, www.pmddtc.state.gov.

[12] Both companies were excluded from investment under the Norwegian Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines for producing cluster munitions, Poongsan in December 2006 and Hanwha in January 2008. For more details on production by these companies, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[13] Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation on exclusion of the companies Rheinmetall AG and Hanwha Corp.,” 15 May 2007, www.regjeringen.no. MLRS are ground rocket systems.

[14] See Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.  

[15] Letter from Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund—Global, to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation of 6 September 2006,” 6 September 2006, www.regjeringen.no.

[16] Poongsan, “Defence Products, Howitzer Ammunition,” www.poongsan.co.kr.

[17] “Pakistan Ordnance Factory, S. Korean Firms Sign Ammunition Pact,” Asia Pulse (Karachi), 24 November 2006.

[18] IKV-Pax Christi and Netwerk Vlaanderen, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” April 2010, pp.17−21.

[19] Data from US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” “Foreign Military Sales,” “Direct Commercial Sales,” and “Excess Defense Articles” databases, www.dsca.osd.mil. M26 rockets each contain 644 submunitions, and there are six rockets to a pod. M26A1 rockets have 518 submunitions each. ATACMS 1 missiles have 950 submunitions each.

[20] M483A1 shells have 88 submunitions, M864 have 72 submunitions.

[21] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Republic of Korea—F-15E/K Aircraft Munitions and Avionics,” Press release, 15 February 2001, www.dsca.mil. It also provided 45 AGM-54 JSOW bombs, but it is not known if these were the version with submunitions.

[22] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 841. CBU-87 bombs have 202 submunitions, and Rockeye cluster bombs have 247 submunitions.

[23] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, to IKV-Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.


Last Updated: 18 July 2011

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by the Korean War and from emplacing barrier minefields as a security measure along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Mines

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, 1978, and 1988. In May 2006 South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover about 3km2 of the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do provinces, below the CCZ.[1]

A report by the National Defense Committee in 2010 said South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km2 and some 209 unconfirmed or suspected mined areas covering 97.82km2. This latter figure was repeated in a draft bill on demining, which was submitted to parliament in January 2010 (see below).[2]

In July 2010, wooden box mines were found on South Korea’s Kanghwa Island, in the estuary of the Han River and the Samichon River area in Yonchon-gun, Gyeonggi-do province. There mines had apparently been washed down from North Korea by heavy rains.[3]

Explosive remnants of war

Many parts of South Korea are also contaminated by ERW, particularly unexploded ordnance from the Korean War, although the precise extent is not known.

Mine Action Program

There is no national mine action authority or mine action center. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCZ, but has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas.[4] In January 2010, the government submitted a draft bill on mine clearance to the national assembly that would allow private companies to engage in demining. The draft law stipulated that clearance tasks must be requested by the national government, local government, a public institution, or a landowner, while clearance must be authorized by the Secretary of Defense and conducted under the supervision of the army commander in charge of the area.[5] The bill was still pending before the Defense Committee of the National Assembly in March 2011.[6]

In 2009, Korea stated that clearance originally planned to finish in 2009 would continue until 2015.[7] The same year, government plans to create an “eco-peace belt” in the southern part of the DMZ and a 500km-long bike trail just below the DMZ were reported in the media. If approved, work was expected to begin in 2011 and to involve some mine clearance.[8]

Land Release

South Korea reported in October 2010 that it cleared 107,000m2 in the 12 months prior to the end of August 2010,[9] marginally more than in 2009 but less than the 140,000m2 the military had planned to clear in 2010.[10] In a follow-up CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in late April 2011, however, South Korea reported that a further 57,190m2 was cleared in the last three months of 2010, resulting in destruction of 216 mines. The report stated clearance was under way at eight sites between Seoul and the CCZ.[11]

In addition to area clearance, the Army mobilized hundreds of soldiers on three separate occasions after 1 August 2010 to search for wooden box mines that had apparently become displaced by heavy rains in North Korea and floated to South Korea (see above).[12] The Army’s search operation recovered 158 wooden boxes but 105 were empty and only 53 contained explosives, all of which were destroyed.[13]

Mine clearance in South Korea, 2006–2010[14]

 

2010*

2009

2008

2007

2006

Area cleared (m2)

107,000

100,000

104,000

169,000

229,000

Mines destroyed

1,379

Approx. 1,300

1,470

2,300

7,800

* 1 September 2009 through 31 August 2010.

Other Risk Reduction Measures

The government reported in 2009 that “the military holds meetings with local people to provide specific information on landmines.”[15] It said it provides two types of mine/ERW risk education (RE): one for the armed forces and the other for civilians, mainly as community liaison prior to clearance.[16] South Korean NGOs dispute the government’s description of RE activities, which are believed to be limited to the placement of mine warning signs in the CCZ and displaying models of mines at the entrance gates to the CCZ.[17]

The Army distributed a flyer called “Public Information about Lost North Korean Mines” in the CCZ in August 2010 in response to the danger posed by mines displaced from North Korea by floods. It advised people not to pick up suspicious devices but to report them to a military center by telephone. Local government authorities also mobilized employees to patrol the banks of the Imjin River, and broadcast warnings to the public through loudspeakers.[18]

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. The Republic of Korea response refers to the CCZ as the Military Control Zone.

[2] See “Bill for Landmine Removal Work,” Government motion submitted to the National Assembly, 25 January 2010, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, likms.assembly.go.kr; and Kim Chang-Hoon, “Find One Million: War With Landmines,” The Korea Times, 3 June 2010.

[3] “Finding 30 Additional Wooden Box Mines of North Korea–Total 66 Mines,” Yonhapnews, 2 Aug. 2010; “Finding 25 Additional Wooden Box Mines of North Korea–Total 119 Mines,” Yonhapnews, 10 August 2010; and “158 North Korean Wooden Box Mines Recovered Up to Present,” Yonhapnews, 18 August 2010, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

[4] Response to Monitor questionnaire from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN, New York, 25 May 2005; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 14 October 2009.

[5] “Bill for Landmine Removal Work,” Government motion submitted to the National Assembly, 25 January 2010, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, likms.assembly.go.kr.

[6] Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Executive Director, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 14 March 2011.

[7] Article 13 Report, Form B, 14 October 2009; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN, 9 June 2009.

[8] Min-yong Lee, “Gov’t Planning to Create Eco-Peace Area in the DMZ,” JoongAng Daily, 3 December 2009.

[9] Article 13 Report, Form B, 30 October 2010.

[10] “ROK Land Mine Removal,” Yonhap, cited by NAPSNet Daily Report, 21 December 2009, www.cacda.org.cn.

[11] Article 13 Report, Form B, 28 April 2011.

[12] News reports indicate that the Army mobilized 993 soldiers at 60 locations on 2 August, 680 soldiers at 90 locations on 10 August, and 329 soldiers at 36 locations on 18 August 2010. “Finding 30 Additional Wooden Box Mines of North Korea–Total 66 Mines,” Yonhapnews, 2 August 2010; “Finding 25 Additional Wooden Box Mines of North Korea–Total 119 Mines,” Yonhapnews, 10 August 2010; and “158 North Korean Wooden Box Mines Recovered Up to Present,” Yonhapnews, 18 August 2010, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

[13] “158 North Korean Wooden Box Mines Recovered Up to Present,” Yonhap News Agency, 18 August 2010.

[14] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN, New York, 16 April 2007, 16 June 2008, and 9 June 2009. Figures for 2009 from “ROK Land Mine Removal,” Yonhap News Agency, cited by NAPSNet Daily Report, 21 December 2009, www.cacda.org.cn.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009.

[18] “Military Searching Wooden Box Mines at Imjin River for Two Days…Without Result,” NK Chosun, 2 August 2010, www.nkchosun.com.


Last Updated: 14 September 2011

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

In 2010, the Monitor identified three new mine casualties in South Korea. In July 2010, one man was killed and another was injured by a wooden antipersonnel mine that drifted along a river from North Korea.[1] In another incident in July 2010, a man was injured by an antipersonnel mine.[2] Both incidents happened in Gyeonggi-do province. In 2009, four casualties were identified: a civilian killed by an antipersonnel mine just below the Demilitarized Zone,[3] a man and a woman injured by an antivehicle mine, and another man injured by an antipersonnel mine.[4]

The number of mine/explosive remnants of war casualties is unknown, but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there were at least 500 civilian survivors.[5] In 2007, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties and the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.[6] The Monitor identified 66 mine casualties between 1999 and 2010 (eight killed; 58 injured). At least 20 of these casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001.[7] Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.[8]

 



[1] “Drifting N. Korean mine kills S. Korean,” Bangkok Post, 1 August 2010, www.bangkokpost.com.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 27 June 2011.

[3] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), www.the-monitor.org.

[4] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 27 June 2011.

[5] Emails from Kim Ki-Ho, CEO, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 and 23 March 2009.

[6] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Towards a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2008), www.the-monitor.org.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.


Last Updated: 29 July 2011

Support for Mine Action

In 2010 the Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—contributed US$260,000 in mine action funding.[1] The largest contribution went to Afghanistan ($100,000).

South Korea provided support to five states and areas and one region through two trust funds, the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (UNVTF) and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).[2]

Contributions by recipient: 2010

Recipient

Sector

Amount
($)

Afghanistan

Unspecified

100,000

Lebanon

Clearance

50,000

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Clearance

30,000

Azerbaijan

Victim assistance

30,000

Occupied Palestinian Territories: Gaza Strip

Victim assistance

30,000

Region: Central Asia

Clearance

20,000

Total

260,000

South Korea’s contribution in 2010 increased by 4% from 2009, when it contributed $250,000 in mine action support ($190,000 via the UNVTF for Afghanistan and Lebanon, and $60,000 via the ITF).



[1] Email from Julia Goehsing, Program Officer, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 19 April 2011; ITF, "Donors: Donations Overview: All, 2010," www.itf-fund.si; and ITF, "Annual Report 2010," March 2011, www.itf-fund.si.

[2] South Korea’s contributions to Afghanistan and Lebanon, totaling $150,000, were made via the UNVTF, while all other contributions in 2010, totalling $110,000, were made via the ITF.