Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Lao officials have stated on many occasions that the government made a decision in 2004 to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, but that the country needs time to prepare to meet the treaty’s obligations.[1] At the June 2011 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Lao PDR told States Parties that “We are confident that, with all the efforts we are undertaking and the support from the international community, the Lao PDR would be able to become party to the Ottawa Convention in the coming years.”[2]

Since 2004, the Lao government has cited the treaty’s mine clearance obligation and deadline under Article 5 as an obstacle to accession. Lao PDR has also expressed concern regarding the possible diversion of resources from unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance activities to a focus on antipersonnel mines.[3]

In July 2011, Lao PDR provided a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for the first time. It has long said that its voluntary Article 7 report, when submitted, would allow the international community to “understand the facts and reality on the ground.”[4] Form A of the Article 7 report notes that sanctions in the penal code prohibit production, possession, use, or trade of war weapons, although not specifically mines, unless legally sanctioned. Form B states that the information will be provided when it is available. Form C notes that “no survey on anti-personnel mines has been carried out, therefore the information on the locations of mine fields are lacking.” Form D states that the Ministry of Defense retained a “small quantity of APMs [antipersonnel mines] for the training in mine detection…” On Form E, Lao PDR stated that it has no antipersonnel mine production facilities. Forms F, G, and H state that no information is available. Form I states that “there is no specific warning about APMs, but only UXOs that could be also valid for landmines. Since the contamination areas are so wide UXO marking signs were set up only at the project areas.” Form I includes a total of mine victims as a percentage of a casualty figure from 1964–2008, and notes that Lao PDR will continue to destroy mines when they are found during the course of UXO clearance.[5]

Lao PDR played a leading role in the development and adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2007 and 2008, and hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010. 

In April 2010, Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan visited Lao PDR on his first mission in his capacity as the Mine Ban Treaty’s Special Envoy on Universalization. Following his visit, he wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lao PDR noting that he was extremely pleased to learn that there is openness to acceding to the convention. Regarding Lao PDR’s concerns that accession could mean diversion of resources from cluster munition remnant clearance to mine clearance, he offered assurances that this would not be the case and that States Parties would have no expectation that Lao PDR would not address first those areas where explosive hazards pose the greatest threat.[6] 

In March 2010, a representative of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) told the Monitor that the only concern the country has regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is implementation of Article 5. He noted that Lao PDR is the country most affected by explosive remnants of war, and as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions is concerned that with its limited resources it may not be able to comply with both conventions’ obligations at the same time.[7]

Lao PDR sent observers to the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010. In a statement, Lao PDR noted the various aspects of its positive engagement with the treaty in recent years and said that the support of the international community should allow Lao PDR to accede to the treaty “in coming years.”[8]

On 8 December 2010, Lao PDR voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 65/48, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the fourth consecutive year it has voted in favor of the annual resolution, after abstaining in all previous years.

Lao PDR is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer

In 2008, Lao PDR acknowledged that it has used mines in the past “to protect its borders.” Lao PDR’s voluntary Article 7 report states that it has not used antipersonnel mines for more than two decades.[9] It also said that the government does not export antipersonnel mines, although it holds a small stockpile.[10] Lao PDR’s voluntary Article 7 report states that the country has no production facilities.[11]

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008. Lao PDR ratified the convention on 18 March 2009, the fifth country globally and the first in Asia to do so, making it among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the entry into force of the convention on 1 August 2010.

Lao PDR has stated that the relevant articles of its Penal Code will be amended in order to reflect its national implementation obligations as required by Article 9 of the convention.[1] Lao PDR also has a number of regulations on the clearance of cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).[2] The existing legislative measures are described in Lao PDR’s initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, submitted on 25 January 2011.[3] The report covers the 24-year period from 1 January 1996 to 30 November 2010.

As the most heavily affected country in the world, Lao PDR’s support was a crucial element in the success of the Oslo Process that produced the convention. It participated extensively in the Oslo Process and advocated strongly against proposals to weaken the treaty text.[4]

Lao PDR has continued to be centrally engaged in the work of the convention. In 2010, Lao PDR assumed a crucial leadership role as President of the First Meeting of States Parties.

On 9–12 November 2010, Lao PDR hosted the First Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane. A total of 122 governments (41 States Parties, 47 signatories, and 34 observer states) participated in the meeting, including a dozen high-level political representatives.[5] The CMC delegation was comprised of 492 campaigners from 80 countries, including 170 participants from Lao PDR. Hundreds of delegates also participated in field visits to Xieng Khouang Province to see firsthand areas affected by cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Some delegates also undertook a field visit to Savannakhet Province.[6] More than two dozen events were held parallel to the First Meeting of States Parties, including a wheelchair basketball match, book and film launches, and a Youth Leaders Forum.

Lao PDR President Choummaly Sayasone spoke in the opening ceremony and appealed to delegates to seize the great opportunity before them to fully implement and realize the objectives and goals of the convention. The official meeting was chaired by Lao PDR’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thongloun Sisoulith. During the meeting, Lao PDR made statements on universalization, clearance, victim assistance, stockpile destruction, national implementation measures, and transparency measures.

At the First Meeting of States Parties governments adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to turn the legal obligations of the convention into concrete actions, as well as a Vientiane Declaration, which declares that the convention “sets a new standard by which states will be judged.” A reporting format for transparency measures reports was also adopted.

Throughout 2009 and 2010, Lao PDR led preparations for the First Meeting of States Parties.[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Saleumxay Kommasith played a key role coordinating the Lao Support Group: a small, informal group of governments, international organizations, and the CMC that supported preparations for the meeting.

In the first half of 2011, Lao PDR continued to engage in its capacity as President of the First Meeting of States Parties. In June 2011, Lao PDR chaired the convention’s first intersessional meetings in Geneva. During the meetings, Lao PDR made statements on universalization, clearance, victim assistance, transparency measures, cooperation and assistance, and national implementation measures.

Lao PDR has undertaken several efforts to promote the universalization of the convention, which it has described as “one of the key aspects of the convention that can assure its legitimacy.”[8] At the 16^th Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in Bali, Indonesia in May 2011, Lao PDR cooperated with Lebanon to secure language in the final declaration on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Lao PDR has also promoted the universalization of the convention within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other fora.[9]

In its capacity as President of the First Meeting of States Parties, Lao PDR issued a statement in April 2011 expressing “serious concern” at Thailand’s recent use of cluster munitions in Cambodia and reminding all parties to the convention of “our legal obligation to promote the norms of the Convention which sets a new standard for the conduct of armed conflict and should be accepted by all.”[10] In June 2011, Lao PDR expressed its “dismay” at the use of cluster munitions in 2011 by Libya and Thailand, which it said “undermines the ban” and noted the need to condemn new use “in line with our core commitments under the convention.”[11]

In 2010 and 2011, the Lao PDR government increased awareness of the convention across the country with a series of national and provincial level seminars on the convention and its obligations.[12] Civil society groups also undertook a range of activities to promote the convention and support the government’s hosting of the First Meeting of States Parties.[13]

Lao PDR is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Interpretive issues

Lao PDR has expressed its views on several important matters related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. In June 2011, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official informed the Monitor, “With regard to your question on relations with states not party to this convention, we are aware of the different interpretations of the Article 21. For us it is clear that we strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including those activities during the joint military operations, transiting, foreign stockpiling and investment in the production of cluster munitions.”[14]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Lao PDR is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Lao PDR actively engaged in CCW talks on cluster munitions in 2010 and the first half of 2011, often stating that it wanted strong text that would complement the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not a weak text that would compromise its provisions.[15]

In November 2010, Lao PDR said it had no objection to continued CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, but noted it would like the meetings “to be as fruitful as possible.”[16] In June 2011, Lao PDR warned that the CCW chair’s text could “undermine” the Convention on Cluster Munitions and described the text as “unacceptable for all of us, especially those that have extensive experience of being a victim” of cluster munitions.[17]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its Article 7 report, Lao PDR stated that it “has no stockpiles” of cluster munitions and indicated that it is not retaining any cluster munitions for training and research.[18] Lao PDR also reported that it had no production facilities to decommission.[19] Lao PDR has stated that it has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[20]

Historic photographic and testimonial evidence shows that the former Royal Lao Air Force used United States (US)-supplied cluster munitions during the Indochina War.

Cluster munition remnants

Between 1964 and 1973, the US dropped more than 2 million tons (2 billion kg) of bombs in Lao PDR, including more than 270 million submunitions.[21] There is no reliable estimate of the extent of residual contamination from unexploded submunitions. Analysis of US bombing records has identified close to 77,000 cluster munition strikes. Taking an average strike “footprint” of 125,000m² has yielded a rough estimate of cluster contamination of 8,750km², about one-tenth of officially cited estimates of overall ERW contamination.[22]

Clearance teams have found 19 types of submunitions during clearance.[23] Unexploded submunitions accounted for half (50.1%) of all items of explosive ordnance cleared in 2010.[24] UXO Lao, Lao PDR’s largest clearance operator, reported in 2011 that during 15 years of operations, submunitions accounted for just under half (49%) of the items cleared.[25]

The critical impact of submunitions (known locally as “bombies”) has given rise to calls for a clearance strategy that prioritizes cluster munition remnants,[26] which the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) identifies as the most common form of residual ERW contamination and which is responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[27] Bombies are also said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[28]

Survey

In 2011, the NRA resumed its District Focused Approach (DFA) survey of contamination and impact.[29] The NRA planned pilot surveys by three operators in three districts, including by Handicap International (HI) in Nong district, Savannakhet province (105 villages); Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Boualapha district, Khammouane province (81 villages); and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Ta-Oy district, Salavan province (56 villages). The NRA does not expect the survey to locate all contamination, but rather to identify areas of concern in each district, particularly areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants. The survey will eventually be extended to 85 UXO-contaminated districts in Lao PDR.[30]

The NRA conducted a series of workshops in April and May 2011, to introduce the DFA in districts selected for pilot surveys, and trained survey teams in July. Survey work was expected to start in the three pilot districts in August 2011 and take six to nine months to complete.[31]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas

Lao PDR does not yet disaggregate clearance of cluster munition strikes from other ERW clearance; therefore, clearance figures encompass clearance of all ERW, including, but not limited to, cluster munition remnants (see Table below). In 2010, clearance operators destroyed at least 35,448 unexploded submunitions.

Destruction of submunitions during battle area clearance in 2010[32]

NPA started clearance operations in the last quarter of 2009 with three teams in Saravane and Sekong provinces. Five more teams were added in 2010 as operations expanded into Attapeu province and NPA ended the year with 129 active deminers. NPA plans to add eight more teams in 2011. NPA trialed and won NRA endorsement for land release survey procedures for mapping the footprint of cluster munition strikes that are expected to produce a more precise estimate of contaminated areas and lead to more effective use of clearance assets. NPA has also conducted trials with signature detectors that help to screen out metal fragments and are expected to help accelerate clearance.[33]

Destruction of submunitions during roving operations in 2010[34]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

With clearance progressing at a rate of approximately 40km² a year and potentially many thousands of square kilometers of contamination to address, it is apparent Lao PDR will not meet its Article 4 clearance deadline. In June 2011, however, Lao PDR informed the convention’s first intersessional meeting that operators were researching new technologies and survey and clearance methodologies to try to accelerate clearance.[35] In 2011, the NRA started work on a 10-year plan for practical steps and targets for implementation of the convention to be undertaken in two phases: 2011−2015 and 2016−2020.[36]

In November 2010, NPA released a report on how Lao PDR could meet the convention’s obligations that noted the work “can be done efficiently and it will not take hundreds of years.” The report noted the need for “a renewed focus on gathering and assessing available data” and recommended the development and use of “structured and relevant survey methods” to ensure “clearance standards appropriate to the context.”[37]

According to the report, operators do not target cluster munition strikes, but regard all threats equally and current clearance strategies do not really assist in removing strike sites as clearance polygons relate more to perceived development priorities than to the strikes. The report suggests that “by dividing the problem into a cluster munition problem and a UXO problem the threat can be more appropriately identified and the response can, as a result, be more efficient and effective.”

The report calls for a general cluster munition assessment followed by a non-technical survey to understand the “footprint” of cluster strikes and technical survey aiming to reduce confirmed hazardous areas to defined tasks. It suggests that clearance focus on cluster munition remnants, that clearance assets be deployed only in relation to cluster strikes, and recommended that operators adopt the principle of clearing the whole strike and not only what has been requested for development or other purposes.[38]

Cluster munition casualties

The NRA did not report which explosive items caused casualties for 2010 and the number of unexploded submunition casualties during the year is not known. However cluster munition remnants continued to cause casualties. In one incident, a 10-year-old girl was killed and her 15-year-old sister was injured by an unexploded submunition in November 2010 during the First Meeting of States Parties.[39]

Unexploded submunitions were reported to have caused 7,571 casualties in the period 1964–2009 (3,170 killed; 4,368 injured; 33 outcome unknown).[40] In 2010 it was estimated that there were approximately 2,500 unexploded submunition survivors in Lao PDR.[41]

Contamination and Impact

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history during the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s, which left it with the world’s worst contamination from unexploded submunitions. The extraordinary intensity of that bombing has tended to obscure the extent of other forms of contamination left by the war on the ground and Lao PDR also has extensive air-dropped and ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

After more than 12 years of UXO/mine action, Lao PDR still lacks a credible estimate of the total area contaminated in the country, the amount of land that has been cleared, or even the extent of land designated a priority for clearance. Its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report cites an estimate of contamination that is “within 87,000km².”[1] The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) says that 10 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are “severely contaminated” by explosive remnants or war (ERW), affecting up to a quarter of all villages.[2] A 2002 evaluation by the Japan International Cooperation Agency estimated that 236.8km² of potential agricultural land was contaminated by UXO.[3]

UNDP has declared that “UXO/Mine Action is the absolute pre-condition for the socio-economic development of Lao PDR.”[4] UNDP reports that as a result of submunition contamination “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive.”[5]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped more than two million tons (two billion kg) of bombs between 1964 and 1973,[6] including more than 270 million submunitions. There is no reliable estimate of the extent of contamination from unexploded submunitions. However, analysis of US bombing records has identified close to 70,000 cluster munition strikes and local research putting the average strike “footprint” at a “generous” 125,000m² has yielded a rough estimate of cluster contamination of 8,750km², about one-tenth of officially cited estimates of overall ERW contamination.[7]

Clearance teams have found 19 types of submunition.[8] Unexploded submunitions accounted for half of all items cleared in 2010.[9] UXO Lao, Lao PDR’s largest clearance operator, reported in 2011 that during 15 years of operations, submunitions accounted for a little under half (49%) of the items cleared.[10]

The critical impact of submunitions (known locally as bombies) has given rise to calls for a clearance strategy that gives priority to tackling cluster munition remnants,[11] which the NRA identifies as the most common form of remaining ERW contamination and responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[12] Submunitions are said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[13]

Other explosive remnants of war

Clearance operators have encountered at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR, but the extent of residual contamination from other ERW is not known.[14] A partial survey by Handicap International (HI) published in 1997, although acknowledged as out of date, continues to be used as a primary source of reference.[15] It found that 15 of the country’s then-18 provinces—all those it surveyed—had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO. These reportedly range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 2,000lb general-purpose bombs and sometimes bigger items.[16] Other major causes of incidents are artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, and air-dropped bombs.[17]

Mines

All sides in the war laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,[18] and clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.[19] The remote location of most of these areas means that mines had little impact, accounting for only 0.3% of the total items cleared in 2010.[20]

Official figures presented in 2010 show mines are responsible for 17% of victims since 1998, almost as many as bombies (20%), but few mine victims have been reported in recent years.[21] The NRA has, however, recognized that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”[22]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, has an interministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 10 government ministries.[23] A decree issued in June 2011 appointed a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for rural development and poverty alleviation to be Vice-Chair of the Board together with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.[24]

The NRA’s role includes setting policy, coordinating, and regulating the sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management. It also has the mandate to serve as the technical focal point for matters relating to international weapons treaties.[25] The NRA has two sections: Operations, with units handling clearance, mine/ERW risk education (RE), victim assistance, and information management; and Policy, Administration and Standards. With US Department of State funding, ArmorGroup North America provided a technical advisor supporting quality management and operations.[26]

UXO Lao, a civilian government body, had primary responsibility for coordinating and regulating all UXO/mine action, including clearance, until 2004, and remains the largest clearance operator in Lao PDR, working in nine provinces.[27]

Lao PDR embarked in 2010 on “Safe Path Forward 2,” a plan for 2010−2020 which identified six goals:[28]

·         to reduce the number of casualties from 300 a year to less than 75 a year;

·         to ensure medical and rehabilitation needs of survivors are met in line with obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions;

·         to release priority land and clear UXO in accordance with national standards and treaty obligations;

·         to ensure effective leadership, coordination and implementation of the national program;

·         to establish sustainable national capacity integrated fully into the regular set-up of the government; and

·         to meet international treaty obligations.

The NRA also started work on an additional 10-year strategy that would “set out concrete and measurable steps, actions and targets to be completed during that time period in its practical implementation of the Convention.” A “concept paper” set out three strategic objectives for clearance, casualty reduction, and victim assistance identical to those in Safe Path Forward 2, but also calls for clearer identification of priority land, the setting of measurable targets, and accelerated clearance. It says the NRA will develop annual work plans setting out annual priorities and targets “in order to provide more detail and to account for up-to-date information and new developments that could impact prioritization.” It also says “the Government of Laos will assume funding responsibilities for certain elements of implementation as defined in the workplans.”[29]

Evaluations

A Post-Clearance Impact Assessment commissioned by the NRA and published in 2011 found that UXO clearance strategies have contributed to Lao PDR’s ninth Millennium Development Goal of enhancing clearance and reducing the impact of UXO, as well as increasing people’s sense of security. However, it states that the slow pace of clearance and the system of task selection make the clearance strategy “less relevant to district, community and household needs in terms of contributing to poverty reduction and reducing risk of exposure to UXO as people are compelled to use contaminated land.”[30]

The assessment observes that the present quota system, under which only a certain number of households per village benefit from clearance in a single year, aims to provide many villages with some level of service but results in expensive clearance assets paying repeated visits to the same village and “it is not possible to state that any villages or districts are ‘impact free’.”[31]

The assessment points to a contradiction in the clearance strategy trying to help the poor and effective post-clearance use of land. Poor people are not owners of good quality land, are less likely to seek clearance services and lack resources to maximize the benefits of clearance, the study says. As a result, the system of task selection “tends to favour the relatively well-off” and “marginalizes the poorest sections of the population even further.” Clearance of community assets is requested by local authorities but community participation in the process of selecting clearance tasks appears to be “very limited,” the study finds.[32]

A community-based approach in which operators, when they deploy to a locality, clear all contamination or at least all cluster munition contamination (which causes most non-tampering casualties) “is likely to make a greater contribution to poverty reduction.” The report observes that most clearance tasks are Priority 1 or Priority 2 under the Safe Path Forward 2.[33] It suggests instead that a combination of Priority 1 tasks with some Priority 3 infrastructure tasks, such as village roads, would facilitate development.[34]

A report released by NPA in November 2010 assessing how Lao PDR could meet its Convention on Cluster Munitions obligations observed that “a) the work can be done efficiently and it will not take hundreds of years; and b) there is a need for a renewed focus on gathering and assessing available data, structured and relevant survey methods must be developed and used and clearance standards appropriate to the context must be elaborated.”[35]

The report notes that operators do not target cluster munition strikes but regard all threats equally, and that current clearance strategies do not really assist in removing bomb strikes as clearance polygons relate more to development priorities than to the strikes. It suggests that “by dividing the problem into a cluster munition problem and a UXO problem the threat can be more appropriately identified and the response can, as a result, be more efficient and effective.” The report calls for a general cluster munition assessment to be conducted, followed by non-technical survey to understand the “footprint” of cluster strikes and technical survey aiming to reduce confirmed hazardous areas to defined tasks. It suggests clearance should focus on cluster munition remnants, clearance assets should be deployed only in relation to cluster strikes, and operators should adopt the principle of clearing the whole strike, not only what has been requested for development or other purposes.[36]

Land Release

The pace of land released by clearance and technical survey in Lao PDR dropped in 2010 for the second consecutive year to 40.62km², only marginally less than the 41.14km² released in 2009 but still far behind 2008 (58km²) and trailing even 2006 and 2007. Moreover the number of bombies and items of ERW destroyed in 2010 was well below the number destroyed in 2001.[37] Although commercial companies’ clearance increased by more than half to 4.98km² it remained less than a quarter of the level achieved in 2008 as a result of still depressed demand from mining companies hit by the financial crisis. However, clearance by humanitarian operators also dropped by more than 10% to 30km² in 2010 from 33.82 km² the previous year.[38]

The slow rate of progress has prompted calls for accelerated clearance. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Duangchay Phichit, who chairs the NRA Board, commented in early 2011 that “UXO clearance in Laos still does not respond to the needs of our country. We plan to alleviate poverty by 2020 but if UXO clearance does not speed up, it will hinder our efforts to reach our development goals.”[39]

Discussions between the NRA and the Army General Staff in 2011 paved the way for active military involvement in mine action as a partner in clearance for a proposed US$7 billion, five-year project to build a railway between the capital Vientiane and the Chinese border. Initial planning provides for the clearance work to be divided into three parts with the Army responsible for two of them and the NRA responsible for management of the third.[40] The Army received a three-week course by five Indian Army combat engineers starting in February 2011 in Vientiane.[41]

Five-year summary of clearance[42]

Survey in 2010

Land released by survey increased 42% in 2010, but the total remained modest at 5.64km² (compared with 3.95km² in 2009) and one operator, UXO Lao, accounted for 93% of what was released.

NRA resumed preparing for a District Focused Approach (DFA) survey, which started in 2010 but was delayed by Lao PDR’s preparations for hosting the first Convention on Cluster Munitions Meeting of States Parties in November 2010. The NRA planned pilot surveys by three operators in three districts, including HI in Nong district, Savannakhet province (105 villages); MAG in Boualapha district, Khammouane province (81 villages); and NPA in Ta-Oy district, Salavan province (56 villages). The NRA did not expect the survey to locate all contamination but to identify all areas of concern to each district, particularly areas of cluster munition contamination. It is planned that the survey will eventually be extended to cover 85 UXO-contaminated districts in Lao PDR.[43]

The NRA conducted a series of workshops in April and May introducing the DFA to districts selected for pilot surveys and training for survey teams in July. It expected survey work in the three pilot districts to start in August 2011 and to take six to nine months to complete; in the meantime, the NRA would expand the workshops to additional provinces.[44]

Battle area and roving clearance in 2010

UXO Lao, much the biggest operator with more than 1,000 staff, conducted more roving tasks in 2010 than in the previous year, but NRA data shows it cleared 15% less area.[45] UXO Lao said the pace of clearance had slowed in 2010 as a result of clearing more remote tasks and because an upgrade in its detector software to support deeper searches had resulted in detecting more small metal fragments.[46]

MAG, the biggest of the international NGOs operated in Khammouane and Xieng Khouang provinces with 261 staff in 2010, including 221 active deminers, saw a 16% dip in area clearance to 6.17km²—also citing the problem of encountering more metal fragments together with more difficult terrain on which teams worked.[47] HI, the smallest of the clearance NGOs with 29 active deminers working in two teams in Savannakhet province, cleared 3.6km² and conducted roving tasks five to seven days a month. It planned to expand in 2011 by adding one team for area clearance and another team to work permanently on roving explosive ordnance disposal.[48]

NPA, which started clearance operations with three teams in Saravane and Sekong provinces in the last quarter of 2009, added five more teams in 2010—expanding operations into Attapeu province and finishing the year with 129 active deminers. NPA planned to add eight more teams in 2011. NPA trialed, and won NRA endorsement for, land release survey procedures for mapping the footprint of cluster munition strikes, a methodology that is expected to produce a more precise estimate of contaminated areas and lead to more effective use of clearance assets. NPA has also conducted trials with signature detectors that help to screen out metal fragments and are expected to help accelerate clearance.[49]

SODI completed its first full year of operations in Bolikhamxay province where it is undertaking integrated clearance and poverty alleviation in Khamkeut district bordering Vietnam, aiming to eliminate the impact of ERW in five to seven years. In addition to area clearance, SODI operates a mobile team undertaking small area and roving tasks. Under a Village Assisted Clearance (VAC) program, SODI employs local residents close to large area tasks to clear brush and also trains a fixed number of villagers to operate detectors, each working with two assistants who dig out the location of signals. SODI reports the VAC program increases efficiency and cost effectiveness and provides a basis for clearance of residual ERW contamination after the program ends sometime in 2014–2016.[50]

Battle area clearance in 2010[51]

In addition to area clearance, operators cleared more than 33,000 ERW in the course of roving operations in 2010, including 14,417 unexploded submunitions. MAG increased the number of roving tasks by half compared with 2009 to 742, during which it destroyed 7,883 items of UXO.[52] However, UXO Lao’s plans to set up 27 roving teams to cover every poor or very poor district in 12 provinces in line with the recommendations of a 2008 UNDP-commissioned evaluation remained on hold in 2010 because of lack of donor support.[53]

Roving clearance operations 2010[54]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

With clearance progressing at a rate of approximately 40km² a year and many thousands of square kilometers of contamination, it is apparent Lao PDR will not meet its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline. In accordance with its treaty obligations, however, Lao PDR told the first Intersessional Meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that operators were researching new technologies and survey and clearance methodologies to try to accelerate clearance.[55] The NRA started work in 2011 on a 10-year plan for practical steps and targets for implementing its Convention on Cluster Munitions obligations to be implemented in two phases from 2011−2015 and 2016−2020.[56]

Quality management

The NRA has a technical advisor, provided by ArmorGroup North America and funded by the US government, responsible for developing quality assurance.[57] UXO Lao set up three mobile quality management teams—each covering three provinces—for the north, center, and south of the country;[58] they became operational in early 2010, receiving support from two technical advisors provided by Switzerland and a third provided by ArmorGroup North America.[59]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

The NRA’s Technical Working Group on Mine Risk Education coordinates planning and implementation of risk education which in 2010 was delivered in nine of the worst-affected provinces in Lao PDR by six organizations: World Education (WE), CARE, and four clearance operators, UXO Lao, MAG, HI, and SODI.[60] Four other organizations started delivering RE in 2010, including Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Spirit of Soccer, Empower for All, and Norwegian Church Aid.[61]

RE activities targeted four high-risk groups: farmers, scrap metal collectors, scrap metal dealers, and children in high-risk areas.[62] The NRA organized an “Annual Review” of RE in November 2010[63] and at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional meeting in June 2011 it reported that RE strategies “are evolving, from the provision of traditional awareness‐raising sessions on the consequences of unexploded ordnance to more complex and targeted processes focused on behavior change. Such processes involve data analysis to identify high‐risk groups, development of new MRE materials (in local languages where appropriate), community liaison, development of government policies on scrap metal, as well as teacher training programmes and the growing involvement of Buddhist monks.”[64] From June 2011, NRA initiated a survey of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices to assess the effectiveness of RE materials and strategies.[65]

WE submitted a strategic plan for sustainable RE in primary schools to the Ministry of Education, integrating UXO lessons into the national curriculum.[66] UXO Lao and clearance NGOs delivered RE in the course of their community awareness programs. MAG worked with CRS developing an integrated program focusing on livelihoods, education, and scrap metal collection and helped the NRA to produce RE materials in both Lao and Vietnamese aimed at scrap dealers and collectors.[67] SODI started RE activities in Bolikhamxay province in 2010 and planned to set up a specialized RE team in 2011.[68]

HI conducted roving RE through briefings and house-to-house visits in target villages in Vilabuly and Sepon districts.[69] It also conducted a household garden project targeting scrap metal dealers and providing 30 families with instruction and resources intended to help them develop a sustainable alternative source of livelihood.[70]

Casualties Overview

The National Regulatory Authority for the unexploded ordnance (UXO)/Mine Action Sector in the Lao PDR (NRA) reported 117 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties for 2010. The majority of casualties (67) were children: 52 boys and 15 girls. Adult casualties included 42 men and eight women.[1] The NRA revised casualty data for 2009 down to 117, the same number as reported for 2010, and revised casualties for 2008 to 304.[2]

The NRA did not report which devices caused casualties in 2008–2010, although that data had previously been available for 2009. After more than five years invested in the NRA data collection system there was little or no improvement in the quality of the data available. For one year, 2008, the NRA reported the same number of annual casualties (300) that it had previously been estimating. In 2009 and 2010, the number of casualties was similar to those being reported before 2008.[3]

As of the end of 2010, the NRA had identified at least 50,370 mine/ERW (including unexploded submunitions) casualties, including 29,469 people killed and 20,901 injured since 1964. The majority of casualties recorded (30,128) occurred during the conflict years from 1964 to 1973.[4] By region, the highest numbers of casualties were recorded in Savannakhet province (12,500) and Xieng Khouang province (6,000).[5]

Unexploded submunitions were reported to have caused 7,571 casualties in the period 1964–2009 (3,170 were killed; 4,368 injured; 33 outcome unknown).[6]

Victim Assistance

Lao PDR has estimated that there are some 12,500–15,000 mine/ERW survivors still alive, including approximately 2,500 unexploded submunition survivors.[7]

Assessing victim assistance needs

Lao PDR reported that the National UXO Victim and Accident Survey formed the basis of a national database that was being used in priority-setting for activities including victim assistance.[8] Victim assistance providers, including the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) and the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), used NRA casualty data to identify and contact survivors in need of their services.[9] World Education (WE) reported that it had used NRA data to compare to their own survivor data.[10] In 2011, the NRA was planning the implementation of a survivor tracking system that “should eventually provide an accurate picture of survivors needs.”[11]

Victim assistance coordination in 2010[12]

The NRA’s Victim Assistance Unit is responsible for victim assistance policy development, sector coordination, and liaison between stakeholders, with the goal of ensuring that the needs of all mine/ERW survivors are met.[13] Lao PDR identified the NRA as the national focal point/coordination mechanism for implementation of victim assistance under Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[14]

The NRA’s Victim Assistance Unit continued developing its Victim Assistance Strategic Plan, which was to be finalized after the completion of six position papers (on data collection, medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, vocational training, and advocacy).[15]

The TWGVA held bi-monthly meetings in 2010, during which the NRA’s Victim Assistance Unit and other organizations working on victim assistance updated their activities and exchanged views. They also discussed cooperation at the central, provincial, and district levels. The main points of discussion in 2010 were data collection and the survivor tracking system, annual work plan, and organizing victim assistance workshops for provincial and district officials in every province. The TWGVA also discussed progress in designing the National Strategic Victim Assistance Plan and victim assistance position papers. Provincial and district level Labor and Social Welfare offices were requested to report all ERW incidents and casualties to the TWGVA.[16]

Lao PDR’s Safe Path Forward II strategic plan included a section containing a number of victim assistance objectives.[17] The strategy was yet to be endorsed by the government at the end of 2010. Lao PDR reported that the strategy’s victim assistance activities would be carried out following its endorsement.[18] The strategy and its victim assistance component were included in Lao PDR’s Millennium Development Goals Compact of October 2010.[19]

Several ministries have responsibility for services for persons with disabilities more generally, including the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) and its “Department of Pension, Invalid and Disability,” the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Education.[20]

Lao PDR reported on past victim assistance efforts for the period 1996 to the end of November 2010 in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report and also made statements on victim assistance at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in October 2010 and at the Convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2011.[21]

Survivor Inclusion

Survivors and their representative organizations were included in TWGVA meetings and planning processes. The Lao Disabled Peoples Association (LDPA) was a regular member of the TWGVA, as were survivors working with WE and with Handicap International (HI).[22] Survivors working for WE participated in the implementation of its survivor assistance program.[23]

Lao PDR did not have a survivor on its delegation at the First Meeting of States Parties or the intersessional meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2010[24]

There was some improvement in the availability of service with the expansion of the COPE prosthetics outreach program in 2010. However, the number of services provided in the year did not increase. A particularly high level of destitution in regions most contaminated by mines/ERW was reported by ICRC.[25] No specific measures to address the needs of survivors in remote areas were reported by Lao PDR. Overall, Lao PDR did not report on activities to increase the availability and accessibility of services or to guarantee the implementation of quality services, as called for in the Vientiane Action Plan of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[26] Mobilization of both national and international resources for victim assistance remained very challenging. In general the government had not found funding for services for persons with disabilities.[27]

In 2011 AAR launched an emergency medical care project in Xieng Khouang, one of the worst ERW affected provinces in Lao PDR.[28]

COPE, based at the National Rehabilitation Center (NRC) in Vientiane, continues to operate as a partnership with the Ministry of Health in cooperation with international NGOs. COPE provided the only prosthetics services and capacity-building in Lao PDR through the NRC and four provincial rehabilitation centers.

The number of people who received prostheses through COPE in 2010 was unchanged from the previous year. Approximately one third of those people served were mine/ERW survivors. A COPE outreach project initiated in 2009, COPE Connect, had expanded to eight provinces around the country by the end of 2010, with some focus on the most UXO-contaminated areas. In 2010, COPE introduced capacity-building of occupational therapists into its program in order to expand the application of occupational therapy into the five existing rehabilitation centers.[29]

The number of people receiving subsidized access to services through COPE from the ICRC SFD decreased by 20% compared to 2009. The majority of people supported by the SFD were from the most ERW-contaminated areas and many were members of ethnic minorities.[30] No change in the level of support provided by the Ministry of Health was reported.

According the National Mine Action Standards, personnel responsible for the manufacture and fitting of prosthetic devices must have qualifications to the corresponding International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics category.[31] The ICRC SFD reported that, in 2010, all assisted rehabilitation centers had staff sufficiently trained to produce the most needed prosthetic devices.[32]

AAR introduced a physiotherapist for training in the assessment of children and also improved services through follow-up as part of its wheelchair repair outreach system. By the end of May 2011, AAR had handed over its wheelchair manufacturing role to the NRC. WE retained Motivation to make recommendations for the future of production and Deseret International Charities continued to pay for materials.[33]

No significant increase in economic inclusion of mine/ERW survivors was reported; however, in 2010 some new sustainable employment and self-employment opportunities emerged. CPI began a partnership with the Lao Women’s Union to provide low-interest loans to female heads of households for home-based businesses in the ERW affected Xieng Khuang province.[34] In 2010, WE Australia partnered with WE Laos to develop a micro-finance institution based on a network of village banks focusing on poor, rural communities in Salavan province. In addition, WE continued to provide training and a small grants program specifically for ERW survivors and their families. [35] The NGO Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS), in cooperation with LDPA, was building a vocational training center and creating a three-year-training program for survivors and people disabled by war in Savannakhet Province [36]

No change in psychosocial support activities was reported for 2010. This area remained among the greatest victim assistance challenges. However, survivors working on the WE UXO Survivor Assistance program provided peer support together with other project activities.[37]

Regulations protect persons with disabilities against discrimination; however, they lack the force of law. The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings or government services for persons with disabilities. The MLSW established regulations regarding building access, but lack of resources for infrastructure slowed the retrofitting of most buildings.[38]

In 2010, HI started an advocacy project for cluster munition survivors and family members including a component on local advocacy for survivors’ rights. The HI Lao Ban Advocates project with LDPA held a training session on disability rights advocacy for survivors in early 2011.[39]

The Draft Decree on the Rights of Persons with disabilities, which had been prepared at the beginning of 2008, was still pending government approval in mid-201l. The draft was being revised by the Ministry of Justice regarding legal terminology.[40] Lao PDR reported that, despite the Decree, not having passed a review of legislation made while drafting the victim assistance position papers had found existing legislation adequate for implementing the victim assistance provisions of the Convention on Cluster munitions. However the statement did not say which laws were found to be relevant and adequate.[41]

Lao PDR reported that policy on victim assistance was upgraded in the 2010–2020 Safe Path Forward II strategy to complement a 2001 law, which affords all citizens and persons with disabilities, in particular, the right to receive medical care without discrimination.[42] As of July 2011, the NRA had not reported that the Safe Path Forward II had been officially endorsed.[43]

According to the National Mine Action Standards, victim assistance projects must ensure that there is no discrimination against groups or individuals due to age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, or social status.[44] Lao PDR and the NRA, as well as survivors and victim assistance service providers, reported that differences in treatment in Lao PDR were based on survivors’ needs and that there was no discrimination in the provision of victim assistance services in 2010.[45]

In June 2011, Lao PDR presented a 10-year draft concept paper for addressing its obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including victim assistance. The concept paper projected a victim assistance budget of some US$23.2 million for the period 2011–2015, in line with the draft victim assistance strategy. The concept paper did not report projected national contributions, financial or in-kind, for the period.[46]

Lao PDR ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 25 September 2009.

In 2010, 13 donors contributed US$20,800,862 to support mine action in Lao PDR.[1]

In March 2010, the government of Lao PDR, with UNDP support, established a trust fund to support the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lao PDR.[2] Six states (Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and New Zealand) reported contributions to the Cluster Munitions Trust Fund for Lao PDR in 2010, totaling $5,408,494.

From 2006 to 2009 international contributions to Lao PDR averaged approximately $12 million per year. Funding of over $20,000,000 in 2010 represents an increase of 89% from the previous year.

The Lao PDR government has never reported financial contributions towards its mine action program.

International contributions: 2010[3]

Summary of contributions: 2006–2010[4]