Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 28 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation—the Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-personnel Mines—took effect on 28 May 1999.[1]  Cambodia submitted its 11^th Article 7 transparency report in May 2010, covering calendar year 2009.[2] 

Cambodia participated in Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009, where it was granted an extension of its mine clearance deadline. Cambodia delivered statements during the high-level segment and the victim assistance session.  States Parties accepted the offer made by Cambodia to host the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties in 2011.

Cambodia also participated at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2010, where it made statements on mine clearance, victim assistance, and cooperation and assistance.

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted an annual report under Article 13 of the protocol in December 2009. Cambodia is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The government has reported that it does not have any antipersonnel mine production facilities, and that it has not exported antipersonnel mines.[3]

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999, the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.[4]  In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police, which were subsequently destroyed.[5] Cambodia reports that while there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001, “police and military units are still finding and collecting weapons, ammunitions and mines from various sources, locations and caches.”[6] Informal (“village”) demining and the scrap metal trade also account for some of the newly discovered stocks of mines.

Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction.[7] A Cambodian official has previously stated that newly discovered stocks are destroyed immediately.[8]

It is unknown how many stockpiled mines Cambodia may have discovered and destroyed in 2009. The latest Article 7 report states that such information is “not available.”[9]

Cambodia has declared that a total of 133,478 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008 (9,698 by CMAC, 2,713 by HALO Trust, and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group, MAG). Cambodia stated these mines were “reported by local communities.”[10]

Mines retained for research and training

As in previous years, in its Article 7 report covering 2009, Cambodia declared that it does not retain any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes.[11] However, Cambodia has reported transfer of such mines to the CMAC training center and other operators each year.[12] It reported that in 2009 Cambodia transferred for training purposes 701 antipersonnel mines “from various sources and Demining Units/CMAC that were found in the Mined Areas.”[13]  

Cambodia has never reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines kept for training—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004. Cambodia has not utilized expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2005.

Use

In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel landmines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of landmines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces.  Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts.[14]

In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries.[15] In September 2009, Royal Thai Army Commander in Chief, General Anupong Paochinda, stated that Cambodian troops were laying fresh landmines along the disputed areas and close to routes where Thai soldiers make regular patrols.[16] The statement elicited a strong rebuttal from the Cambodian ambassador in Bangkok.[17]

Cambodia and Thailand have never reached a resolution of this matter, and other States Parties have apparently not pursued a resolution of this serious compliance concern.

In February 2010, a Thai civilian who had been arrested a year earlier reportedly pled guilty to laying landmines on Cambodian soil and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.[18]

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, despite the fact that it was an early, prominent, and influential supporter of the Oslo Process that produced the convention.

 At the time when the convention opened for signature in Oslo in December 2008, Cambodia told the states gathered there that due to “recent security developments” in the region, it now needed more time to study the “impacts of the convention on its security capability and national defense.”[1]

Shortly thereafter, a Cambodian government spokesperson said, “We are not under any pressure…as a non-producing country. Due to the fact that Thailand does not sign yet the treaty…we can delay a bit our adhesion to the treaty.”[2] 

At the same time, a Ministry of Defense official said that the government needed to further study the treaty to see how it would affect the nation’s defense capabilities. He said that Cambodia had to determine if some of its weapons would be prohibited by the convention.[3]

In July 2009, a Council of Ministers official said that due to current border tensions with Thailand, Cambodia had to delay signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions. He said, “This does not mean that Cambodia has turned away from its promise. We will still sign on to this treaty…even though our two big neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, have refused to sign.”[4]

He further said that the Ministry of Defense had requested more time to determine how many cluster munitions the armed forces possess and how long it will take to replenish the defense capabilities after stockpiles are destroyed. Officials said it was unclear how long the armed forces would need to complete their study of cluster munition stockpiles.[5]

In a December 2009 meeting with CMC and ICBL members, Cambodian officials said that Cambodia intends to join the convention, but must complete a review of its stockpile first to determine when this might be possible. There is no timetable for the review, but it could take a year or more.[6]

In June 2010, Minister of Defense Tea Banh said, “We will sign in the future. Now we need to protect our country and our sovereignty from other countries like Thailand, which has border problems with us.”

On 1 August 2010, as the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force internationally, Cambodian officials continued to say that the government cannot join before first determining how it might affect the military. Concerns were also raised about the ability to meet the clearance obligations.  An official said, “If we sign, it means we bind our hands. We’re studying how much it will cost to remove old cluster munitions and to protect our nation against border violations.”[7]

Another official said, “As a heavily cluster-bombed country, we are willing to become a party to the convention. But we have to consider thoroughly any impact to our national security.”[8]

 Cambodia has shown some continued interest in the convention. It attended the Special Event on the Convention on Cluster Munitions held at the UN in New York in March 2009 to promote the convention, and the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in Bali, Indonesia in November 2009. In Bali, it recounted its long-term support for the convention.[9] Cambodia did not attend the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Santiago, Chile in June 2010. 

Oslo Process

In March 2007, the Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia, Sok An, announced Cambodia’s decision to join the Oslo Process, saying, “Cambodia supports this Oslo appeal to ban cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and will become an active participant in the process.”[10] Cambodia endorsed the Oslo Declaration, thereby committing to conclude in 2008 a new convention prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 

Cambodia hosted the first regional forum on cluster munitions in Southeast Asia in Phnom Penh in March 2007. It participated actively in all three of the international conferences to develop the convention text in Lima, Vienna, and Wellington, as well as the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008. Throughout the Oslo Process, Cambodia advocated strongly for the most comprehensive and immediate ban possible, without any exceptions, and for strong provisions on victim assistance and on international cooperation and assistance. Cambodia was one of the 107 nations that adopted the text of the Convention of Cluster Munitions at the conclusion of the negotiations in May 2008.[11]

Despite Cambodia’s extensive and positive leadership role in the Oslo Process, it did not sign the convention in Oslo on 3 December.  It attended the signing conference as an observer and made a statement reiterating its commitment to the convention, describing it as a “historic development.” However, as noted above, it said that it needed more time to study the security implications of signing, in light of recent developments.[12]

Cambodia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Cambodia has not actively engaged in the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in recent years.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Cambodia is not believed to have used, produced, or exported cluster munitions. The size and precise content of Cambodia’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known.

In December 2008, a Ministry of Defense official said that Cambodia has “some missile launchers that use cluster munitions that weigh more than 20 kg,” and that Cambodia needs to determine whether it would still be able to use those cluster munitions in times of war. He also said Cambodia has stockpiles of cluster munitions weighing 250kg left over from the 1980s which Cambodia intends to destroy.[13] Weapons with submunitions that weigh more than 20kg each are not defined as cluster munitions in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are not prohibited.[14]

In July 2009, it was reported that the armed forces was still engaged in a study of its cluster munition stockpile.[15] In December 2009, Cambodian officials said the review, which could take a year or more, is looking at how many cluster munitions are in stock, which are prohibited by the convention, and how many years it would take to replace them. The review is being assisted by the German Society for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit,GTZ) and Dyncorp.[16]

The United States dropped large numbers of cluster bombs on Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s.

Contamination and Impact

Cambodia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. The precise extent of contamination is not known. Cambodia’s Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2009 estimated the total area containing antipersonnel mines and still requiring clearance at 648.8km².[1]

Mines

The antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 districts of northwestern Cambodia along the border with Thailand, which accounted for more than 90% of casualties in the past three years. Contamination includes the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s to block insurgent infiltration, which constitutes Cambodia’s densest contamination with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.[2] Operators also encounter significant antivehicle mine contamination, which has accounted for about one-third of mine casualties in recent years.[3] The first phase of a Baseline Survey covering the 21 districts was due for completion by the end of 2010 and is expected to provide a more precise definition of the residual mine problem.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States dropped at least 26 million cluster submunitions on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern and northeastern areas bordering Lao PDR and Vietnam. The bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, including BLU-24, BLU-26, BLU-36, BLU-42, BLU-43, BLU-49, and BLU-61 submunitions.[5] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that in northeastern Stueng Traeng province unexploded submunitions constitute up to 80% of the ERW encountered by its clearance team.[6]

A clearer understanding of the extent of unexploded submunition contamination is expected from the second and third phases of the Baseline Survey, which will cover eastern and northeastern districts.

Other explosive remnants of war

The US also dropped more than a million tons (one billion kg) of general purpose bombs during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern Cambodia. In other parts of the country, operators encounter mainly land-fired ordnance, including artillery shells, rockets, and mortars. A 2006 study of ERW in Cambodia found that more than 80% of the ordnance being cleared was ground artillery and munitions, and less than 20% was air ordnance.[7]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC).[8] The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, quality control, and coordinating mine/ERW risk education (RE) and victim assistance.[9] Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and a senior government minister (Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers, Prak Sokhonn), brought in as second CMAA Vice-President in June 2005, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Mine Action Technical Working Group.[10]

The CMAA’s day-to-day management is in the hands of its Secretary-General, Chum Bun Rong, who was appointed in December 2008.[11] A sub decree (92) issued in August 2009 specifies that CMAA has five departments: regulation and monitoring; socio-economic planning and database management; mine victim assistance; public relations; and general administration.[12]

UNDP has supported mine action through “Clearing for Results,” which included technical assistance to CMAA management, planning and funding for clearance, and for the Baseline Survey. In 2009, UNDP also recruited a technical advisor to support CMAA’s quality assurance and in drafting standards. “Clearing for Results” was due to finish at the end of 2010 and UNDP was in the process of negotiating a new approach to its program in Cambodia expected to focus on CMAA capacity strengthening and mine clearance in support of local development.[13]

In August 2009, Cambodia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline committing itself to identify all remaining contaminated land and to release land through survey and clearance “with a primary focus on casualty reduction and poverty alleviation.” To fulfill its treaty obligations, it also committed itself to a series of actions, including a Baseline Survey, developing a policy on land release, and finalizing a new National Mine Action Strategy (NMAS).^[14]

The CMAA, in consultation with mine action stakeholders and with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), drafted the NMAS for 2010–2019, setting out a framework for tackling both mine and ERW contamination as well as for RE. It also provided for support to the national plan of action for persons with disabilities.^[15] The CMAA told a Mine Action Technical Working Group in May 2010 that the strategy, which will provide the basis for preparing annual workplans, had been submitted to the Council of Ministers for review and was expected to receive their approval in the third quarter of 2010.^[16]

The draft NMAS set out a vision of “Cambodia free from the impact of mines and ERW” and identified four strategic goals and four enabling objectives:^[17]

·         Reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts; allocating demining assets to the most impacted communities and promoting RE.

·         Contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction; supporting local, subnational, and national development priorities, supporting access to care for survivors and securing the land rights of intended beneficiaries of clearance.

·         Promote international and regional disarmament and stability; supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, and signing the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on explosive remnants of war and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

·         Ensure sustainable national capacities to adequately address the residual mine/ERW contamination; review the institutional framework to address the residual problem, plug gaps, and maintain sustainable capacity.

The CMAA is to prepare annual workplans in consultation with development partners to fulfill the NMAS objectives. The NMAS also describes itself as a “living document” and provides for a mid-term evaluation in 2013 in order to align NMAS with the 2014–2019 National Strategic Development Plan.^[18]

The CMAA, with UNDP support, drafted a new Cambodian Mine Action Standard (Chapter 15, CMAS) on land release in 2009–2010 laying down guidelines for non-technical survey (referred to as Baseline Survey) and technical survey. This Standard supersedes Cambodia’s 2006 policy on area reduction and reiterated the need to “target the available resources onto the areas with the greatest need through clearly defining the actual contamination status.” The draft includes a statement for the first time in Cambodia accepting that “no liability shall rest with an accredited operator for land that is released” provided they have complied fully with the new CMAS and the land released had been subject to CMAA quality assurance. As of August 2010, the CMAS on land release had been translated into Khmer and was awaiting final government approval.^[19]

Eight provincial Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) have been responsible for setting and prioritizing clearance tasks, under guidelines laid down by a subdecree issued in November 2004, and operational guidelines issued by CMAA in February 2007.[20] MAPUs work with local authorities to identify community priorities, and with operators to prepare annual task lists which are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Councils. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. However, more than half the clearance tasks in 2009 were outside the MAPU workplans.[21] The NMAS calls for the planning and prioritization system to be “enhanced” to incorporate results of the Baseline Survey and ensure demining assets are concentrated on worst affected villages.[22]

Consistent with that goal, the CMAA in April 2010 issued a draft “Interim Directive on targeting demining resources for clearance in 2011.” The directive said demining for development should not be overlooked but “more weight should be given to the demining for casualty reduction and it should be directed to the villages where casualty rates are highest.” The directive proposed that CMAA would issue a list of high-priority villages based on analysis of casualty data and that MAPUs should assign 80% of clearance resources to listed villages and 20% to support development priorities in the province.[23] The directive was incorporated in policy guidelines for socio-economic management of mine clearance at a workshop with stakeholders in May 2010.[24]

UNDP also assisted CMAA in developing partnership principles with a view to achieving greater harmonization between donor funding, CMAA objectives, and operators’ clearance activities.^[25]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) supported the CMAA database in consolidating and auditing data ahead of the submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2009 and in preparing the database to receive the results of the Baseline Survey. In 2010, it continued to support the database in developing a planning and monitoring capacity.[26]

Recent program evaluations

A Capacity Assessment of the CMAA, written by an external consultant in November 2009 and based on stakeholder perceptions and expectations found that “although the majority of stakeholders accept CMAA as the national mine action authority they believe it is seriously lack[ing in] enough trained staff and under-resourced.” The assessment recommended that CMAA should have:

·         A clearer leadership mandate in order to remove conflict between CMAC (set up by a law) and CMAA (set up by decree) over which exercises authority, that “impedes effective coordination and orderly work processes.”[27]

·         A “tighter organizational structure aligned to the National Mine Action Strategy.” This should include four departments: Planning; Regulation and Monitoring; Mine Risk Education; and Administration and Finance. It also recommended setting up a Public Relations and Mine Advocacy Unit under the CMAA Secretary-General.[28]

·         Additional and highly qualified staff. The assessment notes a consensus that “CMAA was established without analysis of its human and funding resource needs, and without a funding strategy.” Strengthening the technical and management capacities of CMAA staff is “a major requirement.” [29]

·         Stronger coordination mechanisms, including stronger linkages to MAPUs, frequent coordination meetings with operators on a formalized basis, and a revision of the Mine Action Technical Working Group process to provide for follow-up action to resolve issues identified in its meetings. The assessment also suggests that “in order for it to ensure that mine action priorities are being followed, proposals from donors and NGOs should be submitted to CMAA to check planned mine actions against priorities.”[30]

Land Release

Humanitarian demining operators released 44.73km² through mine and battle area clearance (BAC) in 2009, 18% more than the previous year.[31] CMAC also reported that it had “identified for release” another 384.73km² through what it called “technical survey using integrated tools” in the first half of the year.[32] In the previous two years all three operators had sought to identify and record land shown as suspect in the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) that was now under cultivation, which had led to removal of 1,039km² from the CMAA database. In 2009, however, the survey priority for CMAA and all three operators became the Baseline Survey.

Five-year summary of land cancelation and release[33]

* Figures in brackets show results including clearance reported by the RCAF

Survey in 2009

Cambodia’s Article 5 deadline extension request outlined plans for a Baseline Survey to determine more precisely the extent of remaining mine contamination and end the uncertainty that has existed since the discredited findings of the LIS. The CMAA’s new standard on land release indicates the Baseline Survey data will supersede the LIS and other surveys, which will be deleted from the database. The outcome is expected to provide a platform for future planning and prioritization and to allow much more focused application of clearance assets.[34]

The CMAA and operators agreed to common standing operating procedures, and after training survey teams, operators started a pilot survey in June 2009 to field test the agreed survey methodology. In August 2009, operators started the first phase of the survey covering 21 districts in western Cambodia that have accounted for most casualties (93%) over the preceding five years. Survey data collection was expected to last about a year and CMAA expected analysis of Phase 1 would be completed by the end of 2010.[35]

HALO, which surveyed six districts, reported that one of them, Thmar Puok, had 350km² of suspect land in the CMAA database at the start of the Baseline Survey and that survey reduced the area to 75km², a 78% reduction.[36] In Malai, another district HALO surveyed, the Baseline Survey resulted in a 70% reduction of the suspect area.[37] CMAC (13 districts) and MAG (two districts) also said the Baseline Survey had resulted in some reduction in polygons.[38]

Phase II of the Baseline Survey covering 42 districts in central, northern, and southeastern Cambodia, was due to start in 2010 and also to last about a year. CMAA allocated CMAC five districts and HALO four districts to survey in 2010 and expected to assign the remainder at the start of 2011 when it became clear what funding would be available to operators. During Phase I, CMAA also amended the land classification matrix to disaggregate the type of contamination encountered.[39]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009

The overall 18% increase in area clearance by humanitarian demining organizations in 2009 was largely a product of better results by CMAC, the biggest of the three operators with some 2,400 personnel, but it occurred against a background of financial constraints that limited clearance. CMAC reported a funding shortfall of more than US$1 million in 2009 that resulted in temporary suspension of some teams.[40] 

CMAC’s mined area clearance of 24.25km² marked an 8% increase from the 22.42km² of mined area it cleared the previous year. CMAC, however, almost tripled the battle area it cleared from 3.16km² in 2008 to 9.28km² in 2009, when it also cleared an additional 1.99km² through spot clearance tasks.[41] CMAC reported that it also responded to 11,559 calls for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) interventions in 2009, accounting for nearly half (47%) of the total number of landmines it destroyed, and more than three-quarters (79%) of the UXO it destroyed. [42]

The results reflect growing recognition of the long-term problem posed by UXO, which account for more casualties than landmines, and CMAC’s growing commitment of human resources to BAC. The third of its six demining units was trained in BAC in 2009 before being moved from western to northern Cambodia (Preah Vihear). CMAC has cross-trained about half its deminers for BAC and in 2009 had six teams and four UXO detection dogs working in eastern Cambodia, which was heavily bombed during the US wars in Indochina.[43]  

 HALO and MAG were also forced to cut capacity because of reduced funding and saw a danger that this would continue into 2010. MAG cleared almost one-fifth less area in 2009 after a 40% drop in overall funding resulted in a proportional drop in capacity from March 2009, losing 11 mine action teams, two EOD teams, one technical survey team, two Tempest scrub-cutting teams, and three community liaison teams. MAG also closed a field support office in Siem Reap and runs all operations from Battambang. Like CMAC, MAG has also deployed to northern and eastern areas, operating two teams in Stueng Traeng and Kampong Cham.[44]

HALO reported a 26% cut in overall funding in 2009 and thought 2010 could see a further 20% drop. In 2009, it managed to keep the resulting capacity cuts to about 100 staff, from 1,200 at the beginning of 2009 to 1,100 at the end of the year, and the area cleared dropped by 10%. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed by HALO dropped by more than half in 2009 because of restricted access to the densely mined K5 mine belt that resulted from border tensions with Thailand.[45]

RCAF’s National Centre for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC) accredited one demining platoon with the CMAA in 2009. However, it made clear “we are not under CMAA control but under government control.” The platoon had gained training and experience working with the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan and said it had undertaken commercial tasks in Cambodia under contract to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. NPMEC said it had never received funding to undertake any humanitarian demining and did not report publicly details of tasks undertaken for the government.[46]

 Demining and battle area clearance in 2009[47]

* Operators do not distinguish in their reporting between UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance.

** It is not known how much of RCAF’s reported mine clearance is a result of area reduction or cancellation.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the deadline extension request granted in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

At the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009, Cambodia said that in the preceding 17 years it had cleared more than 515km² of land of some 850,000 antipersonnel mines, 20,000 antivehicle mines, and two million items of UXO but “the size and complexity of mine problems in our country did not allow us to fulfill in time our obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.”[48]

In the past decade, humanitarian demining organizations have cleared 266.4km² of mined and UXO contaminated areas[49] leaving 648.8km² of mined areas to be released, according to Cambodia’s Article 5 deadline extension request. That figure will be revised by the findings of the Baseline Survey but the impression of CMAA and operators from initial results was that Baseline Survey results would not dramatically alter the estimate of remaining contamination.[50]

Community liaison

At the end of 2009, MAG had six two-person (one male, one female) community liaison teams collecting pre-clearance data through village surveys and liaising with local authorities and development agencies to identify community needs and pass this information to clearance teams. The teams were also supporting local authorities in determining priorities and in specific projects delivering RE.[51]

Quality management

The CMAA is responsible for quality management with support from a UNDP Technical Advisor. By the start of 2009, CMAA operated with four quality assurance (QA) teams, two of them based in the provincial capitals of Battambang and Kampong Cham. The CMAA added two more QA teams to monitor the Baseline Survey and was considering adding two more teams intended to focus mainly on quality control of land release.[52]

Safety of demining personnel

HALO reported three demining accidents in 2009 but none resulted in serious or long-term injury.[53] A MAG supervisor received minor injuries during the excavation of a Vietnamese MD82 B mine.[54]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

RE is conducted by CMAC, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, National Police, RCAF, as well as by the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), clearance operators, and NGOs, including Handicap International-Belgium and Spirit of Soccer. At the provincial level, the Provincial Mine Action Committee prioritizes and coordinates messages.[55] Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System data informs operator activities.[56]

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport continued to provide short training sessions for primary schoolchildren targeting the worst mine-affected provinces in the west and Kampong Speu, Kampong Cham, and Kratie reaching a total of 4,171 children. CRC also made presentations to schoolchildren reaching around 62,588 students. Spirit of Soccer organized five tournaments to promote RE messages and engaged in 121 schools in 2009, reaching 12,089 students and donating footballs, T-shirts, sport kits, and school books.[57]

CMAC’s 36 community-based mine risk reduction (CBMRR) teams in the northwest reportedly conducted 3,334 sessions reaching an audience of 175,478 people in 2009, and its 40 community-based UXO risk reduction teams (CBURR), located mainly in the southeast, held 11,792 sessions for audiences totaling 233,414. Teams worked closely with a network of community volunteers and Mine/UXO Committees providing a link to government officials and local authorities. CBMRRs worked at the commune and village level on delivering RE messages and facilitating access to services for survivors and community development. CBURR teams helped local communities to address UXO contamination and prepare requests for EOD interventions. These activities also generated information on the whereabouts of UXO, and CMAC operated six five-person RE teams that also conducted spot EOD tasks.[58]

The National Police delivered RE in seven provinces[59] reporting holding 1,077 RE sessions that reached an audience of 16,279 people. The police also reported receiving 1,094 calls resulting in clearance of 11,654 items of UXO.[60]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

 

In 2009, the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 244 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW)/cluster munition remnant casualties. Of the total, 87% (211) of casualties were civilians, 11% (28) were military personnel, and 2% (five) were deminers. Children (77) made up 36% of civilian casualties; 65 were boys and 12 girls. Of the total adult civilian casualties (167), 89% (148) were men, and 11% (19) were women. Three casualties in 2009 were Thai nationals (one civilian and two military).[1] The 244 casualties in 2009 represented a 9% decrease from the 269 mine/ERW casualties CMVIS recorded for 2008, and followed a trend in declining annual casualties from 2006. The majority of child casualties continued to occur as a result of ERW incidents.[2]

As of the end of 2009, CMVIS reporting indicated that that there were at least 63,529 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,505 killed and 44,024 injured since 1979.[3]

For the period 1998 to the end of 2009, 155 cluster munition remnant casualties were reported in Cambodia.[4]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Cambodia is thought to be approximately 44,000.

Survivor needs

No systematic needs assessments for mine/ERW survivors were reported in 2009. Disability statistics were not reliable and needed to be improved for better service provision.[5] CMVIS provided ongoing systematic data collection of mine/ERW casualties, including numbers of survivors. Some casualties were also referred by CMVIS data gatherers directly to victim assistance service providers.[6]

Victim assistance coordination[7]

The Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance met four or five times in 2009.[8] In April 2009 it began a transformation into the National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC), under the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and the Disability Action Council (DAC), with a broader coordination role for the disability sector.[9] Members met regularly before approval for the NDCC was granted in August 2009.[10] However, the first official meeting of the NDCC was not held until the first quarter of 2010.[11] At the end of 2009, Cambodia reported that national victim assistance coordination was limited due to the lack of human and financial resources.[12] In November 2009, Cambodia listed cooperation among government, donors, civil society, and disabled peoples’ organizations (DPOs) as a remaining challenge and emphasized the need for constructive partnerships among all actors in victim assistance.[13]

As a result of a subdecree of national disability legislation drafted in 2009, DAC lost its relatively independent status as a national council and become a state body directly under the MoSVY. In its new structure, DAC was to be comprised of three parts; a Council, including government, DPOs, and NGOs; a General Secretariat; and member NGOs.[14] As of the end of 2009, it remained to be seen how the new policy-making mechanism would recognize the input of people with disabilities in the decision-making process.

The National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011 (National Action Plan) was adopted by the Prime Minister of the government of Cambodia in August 2009.[15] There was little or no progress reported against the National Action Plan for 2009 and stakeholders were still being informed about it.[16] Non-governmental stakeholders expressed concerns that the plan was unspecific and in some cases unrealistic due to the limited capacity of the MoSVY to implement its responsibilities.[17]

In late 2009, disability issues were included in a draft update of the National Strategic Development Plan for 2009–2013.[18]

Cambodia provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance in 2009 at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009 and the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2010. Cambodia provided updates on physical rehabilitation and medical services provided in 2009 through Form J of its Article 7 transparency report, but information on community-based rehabilitation services was repeated from the previous year’s report.[19]

Survivor inclusion

Representative organizations of survivors and persons with disabilities were included in coordination and planning activities through the Steering Committee on Landmine Victim Assistance and now through DAC. Survivors were included in implementation of services by NGOs.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[20]

No significant improvements in the quantity of victim assistance services were reported for 2009. This was particularly apparent in emergency medical care, where the emergency medical services system required renovation and response activities were inefficient.[21] Cambodia stated that many survivors were still not able to meet basic needs for shelter, food, health, physical rehabilitation, vocational training, job opportunities, and education. The government’s budget remained limited.[22]

No change was reported in the overall accessibility and availability of physical rehabilitation and prosthetics. As in previous years, there were 11 physical rehabilitation centers and orthopedic workshops covering 24 provinces.  However, the number of lower and upper limb prostheses for mine/ERW survivors provided in 2009 increased by 15%, from 3,612 in 2008 to 4,151 in 2009, and repairs to prostheses for survivors increased significantly, from 3,011 in 2008 to 8,198 in 2009.[23] During 2009, slower than planned progress was reported in transferring rehabilitation management capability and responsibility to national ownership under the MoSVY by 2011. This was due mainly to a lack of funding at the MoSVY.[24] The financial difficulties were reportedly compounded by the global financial crisis and the MoSVY appealed to the representative NGOs to continue their support to the sector. No information was provided on how sustainability of the physical rehabilitation sector would be ensured.[25]

Limited psychological support services continued to be offered through the Ministry of Health’s mental health units or referral hospitals, but these did not function well. Psychosocial support activities expanded through the community-based rehabilitation network and the development of self-help groups.[26] The number of self-help groups, most supported by NGOs, grew in 2009.[27] In 2009, VI started to facilitate the formation of federations among self-help groups so they could better advocate for access to development initiatives in their communities.[28]

There were no reports of significant improvement in availability of economic inclusion services other than those provided by NGOs.[29]  Cambodia did not update its Article 7 reporting for 2008 in which it had stated that many economic inclusion projects had been postponed or ended due to the lack of funding.[30] Two CWARS vocational training centers closed (in Kampong Thom and Pursat) after CWARS deemed they had completed training for the project’s target beneficiaries in those areas. CWARS, in collaboration with the government, continued to operate three other centers.[31] No significant changes were reported for other vocational training centers for persons with disabilities and the number of mine/ERW survivors in mainstream vocational training institutions remained very small.[32] However, HI-F and OEC continued their 2008–2010 economic inclusion project through which peer training, apprenticeships, and community-based trainings were organized as an alternative to vocational training centers. Mine/ERW survivors and family members of survivors made up 70% of beneficiaries, of which 49% were women. [33]

In 2009, DAC, with the MosSVY’s Rehabilitation Department, visited vocational training centers for persons with disabilities to ensure the effective implementation of the Circular on Improving the Quality of Vocational Training Centers for Persons with Disabilities (2008).[34]

In May 2009, the National Assembly passed the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, prohibiting discrimination, neglect, exploitation, or abandonment of persons with disabilities.[35] The law did not adequately address comprehensive employment and economic inclusion needs for people with disabilities, but did specify a quota system.[36] By the end of 2009, guidelines for the law’s implementation were not yet in place and the MoSVY was drafting subdecrees to support the law.[37] Throughout 2009, people with disabilities continued to lack equal access to education, training, and employment and were not fully included in their communities.[38]

The 2009 law requires that buildings and government services be accessible to persons with disabilities.[39] However, in 2009 inaccessibility to public buildings, transport, facilities, and referral systems prevented persons with disabilities from actively participating in social and economic activities in Cambodia.[40]

Cambodia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 1 October 2007 but had not yet ratified it as of 1 August 2010.

 

In 2009, 12 donors contributed US$33,275,769 for mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[1] This represents an increase of more than $5 million from 2008 and the highest annual contribution received in the past five years.

Japan, the United States, Australia, Finland, Norway, and Luxembourg contributed $2,565,116 for victim assistance.^[2]Japan’s contribution included $5,841,160 for demining equipment for the Cambodian Mine Action Center.^[3]

Cambodia reported a contribution of $3,500,000 to its mine action program in 2009, representing an increase of $1 million from 2008.[4]

Since 2006, international donors have contributed approximately $30 million each year. In June 2010 Cambodia reported that in order to meet its Article 5 obligations it would need to maintain the same level of funding from international donors until 2020, totaling $300 million for 10 years.[5]

International government contributions: 2009[6]

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[7]