Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In the past, the government has stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process, and an agreement to ban landmines by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).[1] The civil war in Sri Lanka ended on 20 May 2009.

Sri Lanka has not made any formal statements regarding the Mine Ban Treaty since 2009 when it said that it “fully subscribes to the humanitarian objectives of the treaty.”[2]

More recently however, during discussions with ICBL campaigners, officials note that the decision to accede has been made at the “policy level,” but new “constraints” involving Sri Lanka’s ability to clear contaminated land appear to be hindering its accession progress.[3] A Geneva based diplomat noted in November 2010 that Sri Lanka does not want to be in a situation where it would need to file an extension request.[4]

In September 2010, the Ministry of Economic Development published a plan that would, “advocate for a ban of landmines and cluster munitions” by “disseminating public information on the risks of explosive devices.”[5]

Sri Lanka sent an observer to the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, but did not make any statements. Sri Lanka did not participate in the June 2011 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

Sri Lanka voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 65/48 on 8 December 2010 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has for every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted an annual Article 13 transparency report. It has not joined Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Since the end of armed conflict in May 2009, the Monitor has not received any reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by any entity.

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has a stockpile, but its current size and composition are not known.

In April 2009, Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) acknowledged that the army had used antipersonnel mines in the past, but stressed that such use was only in the past. He said the army had used non-detectable Belgian, Chinese, and Italian mines, as well as bounding and fragmentation mines of Pakistani, Portuguese, and United States (US) manufacture.[6] The Monitor had previously reported that Sri Lanka acquired antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the US, and others.[7]

Subsequently in October 2009, Army Commander Lieutenant General Jayasuriya said that, “the use of mines by the Sri Lankan military is strictly limited and restricted to defensive purposes only…to demarcate and defend military installations....” He said mines are “marked accordingly and relevant records systematically maintained….”[8]

Prior to the end of armed conflict, in particular in 2008 and 2009, the LTTE laid large numbers of mines throughout the north. In October 2009, the SLA’s commander stated, “With the end of conflict in Sri Lanka, large quantities of mines laid by the LTTE in the former LTTE dominated areas have been recovered and are continuing to be recovered by the Army during the past five months.”[9] Throughout 2010 and into 2011, the SLA was reported to continue finding numerous caches of LTTE antipersonnel mines, including a cache containing 18,000–20,000 antipersonnel mines.[10] 

Prior to its demise, the LTTE was considered an expert in making explosive weapons. It was known to produce several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), fragmentation antipersonnel mines from mortars, and variants of some of these antipersonnel mines, including some with antihandling features (including Rangan 99 antipersonnel mines with a motion sensor),[11] as well as Amman 2000, MK1, and MK2 antivehicle mines.[12]

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Sri Lanka has never made a public statement on its policy toward joining the convention.

Sri Lanka participated in one meeting of the Oslo Process that created the convention (Vienna in December 2007) and attended a regional meeting on cluster munitions in November 2009 in Bali, Indonesia. Sri Lanka was invited to, but did not attend, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010.

Sri Lanka is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war or actively participated in CCW discussions on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

There were media reports of Sri Lanka using cluster munitions against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2008 and 2009, but Sri Lanka strongly denied the claims, and there has been no compelling evidence of such use.[1] In October 2009, Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General J. Jayasuriya stated, “Where the cluster munitions are concerned, I wish to categorically state that such inhumane weapons have never, and will never be used by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces.”[2]

A March 2011 report by a UN panel of experts on Sri Lanka noted Sri Lanka’s denial of use of the weapon and said that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the credibility of the allegation of use of cluster munitions by Sri Lanka.[3]

Sri Lanka has said that it does not possess cluster munitions.[4] The Sri Lankan government’s Media Center for National Security issued the following statement on its website in February 2009: “The Government wishes to clarify that the Sri Lanka army do not use these cluster bombs nor do they have facilities to use them.”[5] The Ministry of Defence website posted a statement saying Sri Lanka never fired cluster munitions and never brought them into the country.[6] In February 2009, a military spokesperson was quoted stating, “We don’t have the facility to fire cluster munitions. We don’t have these weapons.”[7]

Sri Lanka possesses both aircraft and rocket launchers capable of deploying cluster munitions. In February 2009, the CMC wrote a letter to Sri Lankan President Rajapaska asking the government to officially state whether Sri Lanka possesses cluster munitions and to provide “clarification on whether Sri Lanka has imported either cluster bombs for use in Kfir attack aircraft or 122mm cluster rockets for RM-70 rocket launchers.”[8] Sri Lanka did not respond.

Contamination and Impact

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Most of the contamination is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Contamination posed a major obstacle to resettlement of nearly 300,000 people who were left displaced at the end of the conflict and to economic and social rehabilitation of the north.

At the end of 2010, Sri Lanka’s national mine action authority estimated that hazardous areas totaling 506.82km² remained to be cleared, down from 537.7km² six months earlier.[1] By the end of July 2011, however, estimates of total remaining contamination had dropped to 255.22km², mostly as a result of cancelation by non-technical survey, despite some discoveries of previously unrecorded hazardous areas.[2]

Remaining hazardous area (end December 2010)[3]

In the aftermath of the conflict and resettlement of the internally displaced, Sri Lanka’s national mine action strategy observes that “many of the people resettled in the North are currently living near, if not directly adjacent to, mine/ERW contaminated land. Mines/ERW are blocking access to some residential areas and surrounding land, including gardens and paddy fields, thereby preventing people from effectively re‐engaging in livelihood activities, as well as from having access to firewood. Despite the clear demarcations of un‐cleared and potentially contaminated land and sustained MRE efforts, there is a very high and probable risk that returnees will increasingly start foraying into un‐cleared lands (especially into arable lands) in order to meet their basic and livelihood needs. This will increase the likelihood of mine/ERW accidents.”[4]

Mines

Both sides in the conflict made extensive use of mines, including belts of Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and long defensive lines using a mixture of mines and booby-traps laid by the LTTE defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi. The LTTE also left extensive nuisance mining in many northern districts, particularly in areas of intense fighting and often emplaced as its fighters retreated in the face of army offensives.[5]

Operators encounter a wide range of LTTE devices, including antipersonnel mines with antitilt and antilift mechanisms, and often containing a larger explosive charge (up to 140g) than Pakistani-made P4 MK1 mines (30g). They also encountered tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, antivehicle mines.[6] HALO Trust said evidence from survey and subsequent clearance operations confirmed what had been suspected, that the LTTE significantly increased production of mines after the conflict escalated in 2006. The majority of new mines were based on the basic Jony 99 or Rangan 99 type.[7] Military and police operations in the north and east in 2011 continued to recover abandoned antipersonnel mines along with other items of ordnance, weapons, and ammunition.[8]

Cluster munition remnants

Operators said in 2010 they had not encountered cluster munition remnants.[9] The National Strategy says cluster munitions were not used in Sri Lanka at any time in the conflict.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Renewed conflict in 2006 is believed to have resulted in extensive new unexploded (UXO) contamination, particularly in the northern Vanni region, as a result of government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks, which reached a peak in 2009 as government forces sought to capture the last LTTE positions. Both the SLA and operators reported finding caches of mines and AXO. Operators also reported encountering mortars, grenades, air-delivered rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices or booby-traps, including mortar shells rigged with tripwires and sometimes linked to mines.[11] The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), for example, reported clearing 1,084 wells in 2010 and removing 19 antipersonnel mines, 186 items of UXO, and 33,688 ERW.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Ministry of Economic Development (until mid-2010 the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development) under the Minister, Basil Rajapakse, also a special advisor to the President, is the lead agency for mine action as the chair of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), providing policy oversight to the sector. The NSCMA is made up of government ministries and departments with a stake in mine action, including notably, agriculture, disaster relief, resettlement, education, social affairs, and foreign affairs and is supposed to “manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors.”[13]

The NSCMA is not a permanent body. Its policies and decisions are implemented by the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), set up in 2010[14] with responsibility for liaising with government ministries and development partners to determine mine action priorities, preparing a strategic plan and setting annual work plans to put it into effect. The NMAC is also responsible for accrediting mine action operators, setting national standards, and acting as the secretariat of the NSCMA.[15] Clearance operations in the field are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAO) working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action chaired by the Government Agents who head district authorities.[16]

UNDP supports Sri Lanka’s mine action through two main activities, strengthening capacity at the NMAC to manage and coordinate the program, paying particular attention to data management, and through technical assistance to field operations. UNDP provides an international technical advisor to the NMAC, supporting the preparation of mine action standards and the drafting of the mine action strategy. UNDP also provides funding and two international technical advisors to the two RMAOs in Jaffna and Vavuniya. In September 2010 at the government’s request, UNDP set up two regional sub-offices in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu in addition to the sub-office already operating in Mannar.[17]

The government approved in January 2011 a National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka that sets out a vision of Sri Lanka “free from the threat” of mines and ERW. It sets out a mission to establish a “sustainable national mine action programme able to plan, coordinate, implement and monitor all aspects of mine action.”[18]

The strategy gives top priority to clearance of land required for resettlement of the internally displaced; high priority to land used for livelihood activities, giving access to schools, hospital or temples, with essential infrastructure or within 3km of villages or main roads; medium priority goes to land required for developing new infrastructure, land around military installations and land 3–5km from villages.[19]

The Ministry of Economic Development reportedly allocated LRK660 million (US$5.84 million)[20] for demining in northern and eastern provinces in 2010. NMAC’s Director, Monty Ratanunga, said that as a result of expansion in humanitarian demining the government expected to complete demining operations by 2020.[21]

Land Release

The amount of land released through mined and battle area clearance (BAC) in 2010 amounted to 269.12km², 59% greater than in 2009, according to official figures,[22] although some debate has continued within the mine action community about how some of the activities undertaken should be recorded. In August 2011, the mine action technical working group comprising all operators set up a sub-working group to examine the issue.[23]

The government priority for clearance and land release in 2010 continued to be land needed for resettlement of the internally displaced; however, as this process came to completion during 2010 the priority heading into 2011 increasingly shifted to demining land needed to support livelihoods and infrastructure.[24]

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2010

Many operators conducted extensive assessment or non-technical survey in support of government efforts to resettle displaced people and some reported “releasing” land, but where no specified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been previously identified.[25] FSD reported releasing 114.59km² through cancellation by non-technical survey in 2010, while assessing 71 villages and confirming 80 hazardous areas.[26] Horizon says it conducted non-technical survey on 186.4km² and released 142.9km².[27] MAG reported that it was assigned 32 task areas and surveyed 776km², confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 80.6km^2, and released 562km² for resettlement through cancelation by non-technical survey.[28]

Land released through non-technical survey is deemed “low threat,” not mine-free.[29] The national strategy acknowledges that the lack of population during the initial phase of survey in many areas affected by conflict means re-survey of some CHAs will be necessary as people move back and more information becomes available.[30] HALO noted the completion of resettlement in 2010 meant there was sufficient information to significantly reduce hazardous areas recorded in the database through evidence-based non-technical survey.[31]

HALO reported its surveys added 190 new mined areas to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in 2010. It also reported working with the RMAO to resurvey minefields in formerly LTTE-controlled areas that had been cleared during the 2002−2006 ceasefire between the government and LTTE. It said the results of clearance in this period had often not been recorded due to a breakdown in communication between agencies working in LTTE-controlled areas and the national IMSMA team and that most of the recorded minefields it resurveyed were cancelled.[32]

The National Strategy says non-technical survey of areas requiring resurvey was to be completed by January 2012. Non-technical survey of SHAs identified before 2009 was due to be undertaken by the end of 2012; technical survey of all medium-priority CHAs was to be completed by the end of 2014; and technical survey of all low-priority CHAs should be completed by the end of 2018. The strategy foresees significant reduction in the size of the total SHA in the course of these activities.[33]

Mine clearance in 2010

Although mine clearance in 2010 appears to have fallen sharply below that of 2008, detailed comparison with the previous year’s results is not possible because some 2009 reporting on mined area clearance is believed to have included BAC results. Moreover, a mine action Technical Working Group meeting in August 2011 noted that some ground preparation activity in 2010 had been recorded as clearance and some activity that qualified as surface BAC had also been reported as mine clearance.[34]

Three-quarters of the mined area reported cleared in 2010 was in Mannar (5.96km²) and Mullaitivu (4.08km²), according to government figures. Most of the remainder was in Kilinochchi (1.46km²) and Vavuniya (1.36km²).[35] Of total mined area clearance by six international and two national operators, the SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) accounted for well over one-third (38%), but even operators reporting clearance of relatively small areas of land were destroying considerable quantities of antipersonnel mines (see Table below).[36]

The HDU provides the biggest demining capacity, operating with up to 1,290 deminers and 60 flail operators, but as of March 2010, 750 deminers were assigned to humanitarian demining, mostly in Mannar district. The HDU said the remainder operated under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and the SLA.[37] After acquiring 29 flails in 2009, 10 of them through international funding, the HDU received LKR30 million-worth ($265,510) of vehicles and equipment from UNICEF in 2010[38] and a pledge of $500,000 worth of vehicles from the United States (US), including seven lorries and five ambulances.[39]

After rapid expansion in 2009, DDG downsized from 570 deminers to 420 in the course of 2010 because of uncertainty over funding for 2011, losing five manual demining teams and two mechanical ground preparation teams. Two of the demining teams transferred to DASH, a national NGO that began clearance operations in September 2010 with DDG support,[40] operating around Elephant Pass in Kilinochchi with 37 deminers and four other staff.[41] MMIPE, the other national NGO, had 100 staff, including 80 deminers, working in Mannar and Vavuniya.[42]

FSD expanded in 2010 from 514 to 628 personnel, including 434 deminers, working in Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya, supported by four mini-flails and a range of other mechanical assets. In addition to area clearance, it destroyed 3,444 items of UXO through roving clearance.[43] HALO more than doubled the capacity of its program from 426 personnel at the end of 2009 to 920 (821 deminers and 99 support staff) a year later and in 2010 shifted the main focus of its operations from Jaffna to Kilinochchi, where it now has three-quarters of its staff. It reports just over a quarter of its Kilinochchi deminers are women. The program also reported a sharp increase in area cleared, partly due to conditions in Kilinochchi favorable to the use of detectors.[44] Horizon, an Indian NGO staffed by ex-servicemen, maintained the number of deminers at 202 but added mechanical assets engaged particularly on clearance for the Medawachchiya–Talai Mannar railway line.[45]

 Mine clearance in 2010[46]

* FSD reported clearance of 0.31km² and destroying 20,201 antipersonnel mines.[47]

** HALO reported clearing 1.2km² and 19,209 antipersonnel mines through mine clearance, as well as 2,493 antipersonnel mines through BAC and 14,034 in EOD call-outs (total 35,736).[48]

Battle area clearance in 2010

The HDU accounted for close to 80% of BAC reported in 2010, according to NMAC figures, and two Indian NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, for another 15%.[49] To date, most BAC is believed to be surface clearance only.[50] HALO, which cleared more than 14km² in 2009, shifted its efforts largely to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-out, which it viewed as a more effective response to tackling ERW, but it also reported destroying 2,493 mines in the course of BAC operations. HALO conducted 2,640 roving tasks resulting in destruction of 5,213 items of UXO and 3,564 items of AXO.[51]

Battle area clearance in 2010[52]

Quality management

Quality assurance (QA) of demining operations in 2009 was conducted by eight staff operating from UNDP sub-offices in Vavuniya (five staff) and Jaffna (three staff). By July 2010, UNDP had 28 staff for QA and was preparing to open sub-offices in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.[53] Operators report that task sites are visited regularly by QA staff from the RMAOs which also conduct post-clearance checks before handover.[54]

Safety of demining personnel

An international Technical Advisor working for FSD died in hospital in May 2010 from injuries sustained when an item of UXO exploded.[55] HALO reported three accidents in 2010, but none resulted in permanent injury.[56]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) supported by UNICEF was conducted in eight districts. An emergency RE program started by UNICEF at the government’s request in October 2009 continued until July 2010 involving direct community-based RE, RE in schools, and dissemination of information through the mass media. In addition to Community Trust Fund (CTF), Sarvodaya, Rural Development Foundation (RDF), EHED-Caritas, and SOND, Internews, a US-based NGO supporting media in emergency situations, became involved, broadcasting reports and public service announcements on ERW hazards.[57] International demining NGOs also provided emergency RE in newly resettled areas.

In 2010, the program expanded further and by 2011 UNICEF-supported RE was being conducted in eight districts: Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi in the north and Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee in the east.[58] Implementing partners included the RDF, focusing on northern districts, and CTF, Internews, RDF and Sarvodaya.[59] Internews conducted a RE “road show” touring communities in Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi between June and September 2010 and has also developed a Tamil-language, interactive computer game for children delivering RE information.[60] In December 2010, the Ministry of Education’s academic affairs board approved an RE curriculum for schools paving the way for training teachers in the new curriculum in 2011.[61]

The National Strategy for Mine Action notes that the general level of understanding of the threat from mines and UXO is high, but the need for continuing RE remains as many communities in the north remain close to contaminated or un-surveyed areas and because of large numbers of people from the south visiting northern districts.[62]