Colombia

Last Updated: 13 October 2010

Mine Ban Policy

Commitment to Mine Ban Treaty

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures

Law 759; in effect since 25 July 2002

Transparency reporting

30 April 2010

Key developments

Colombia hosted the Second Review Conference in Cartagena in November–December 2009

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.[1]

Colombia submitted its tenth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2010, covering the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2010.[2] Under national implementation measures, Colombia lists its “main operational results” against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) during 2009 (for example, the number of demobilizations and captures), and says these should be considered as official measures to prevent activities prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[3]

From 29 November–4 December 2009, Colombia hosted the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena. A total of 128 governments (108 States Parties, one signatory, and 19 states not party) participated in the conference, also known as the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World, including over 40 high-level political representatives and, for the first time, the United States.[4] The ICBL delegation of 419 participants from 73 countries included 171 Colombian campaigners and survivors.  More than 35 events were held parallel to the Second Review Conference, including field visits to affected areas, a quad rugby match, and a Youth Leaders Forum.[5]

Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón presided over the opening ceremony of the Second Review Conference, delivered Colombia’s speech in the high-level segment, and participated throughout the week of events.  Ambassador Clara Inés Vargas Silva of Colombia was designated Secretary General of the conference. Colombia made statements on victim assistance, cooperation and assistance, and mine clearance.

Throughout 2009, Colombia played a central role in meetings held to prepare for the Second Review Conference. It spoke at formal preparatory meetings held in Geneva on 29 May and on 3–4 September 2009. Colombia co-convened a special event at the UN in New York on 23 October 2009.[6]  Colombian officials also attended regional meetings held in Managua, Nicaragua (24–26 February 2009), Bangkok, Thailand (1–3 April 2009), Pretoria, South Africa (9–11 September 2009), and Tirana, Albania (7–9 October 2009).[7]

During the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, Colombia served as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies. It also made statements on mine clearance, and cooperation and assistance.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Colombia has never submitted an Article 13 annual report. Colombia is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) operates a network of local coordinators in 22 departments and was heavily involved in the Second Review Conference, as were the Colombian Center for Integrated Rehabilitation (Centro Integral de Rehabilitacion de Colombia, CIREC) and other NGOs. CCCM has continued to promote the end of landmine use by Colombian NSAGs and, in 2009, became involved in a new project on humanitarian demining.[8]

In 2009, the Ottawa Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo de Ottawa, GTO-14), a group of NGOs who work on the landmine issue, was established to ensure coordinated civil society activities around the Second Review Conference and to help bring about a mine-free Colombia.[9]

Production and transfer

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.[10]

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content, and also include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.[11] Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) manufacture antipersonnel mines and IEDs.

Stockpile destruction and retention

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 18,531 antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.[12]

Colombia retained 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes as of April 2010, the same number as reported since 2007.[13] In March 2007, the coordinator of the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) said that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training.[14] A total of 300 retained mines were destroyed in three separate events in 2006, but Colombia has not destroyed any, or consumed any in training activities, since that time.[15] Colombia has never reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004 and again at the Second Review Conference in 2009.

Use

There have been no allegations of mine use by government forces in 2009 or early 2010. An allegation of possible antipersonnel mine use by government forces in La Florida, Valle del Cauca municipality in June 2008 was refuted by the government in August 2009.[16]

Use by non-state armed groups

FARC and ELN continue to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia until its disbandment in 2006.[17]

According to a demining expert in Colombia, NSAGs mainly lay mines near their campsites or bases, on paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as paths to their bases, or paths to main transit routes along mountain ridges), and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.[18]

In a growing problem, NSAGs also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts.[19] According to the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA), of the 240 civilian mine victims recorded in 2008 and 2009, 123 were manual coca eradicators. They came from 12 municipalities, and in seven of these (namely Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamez, Tarazá, Anorí, Puerto Libertador, and Tibú), they made up between 75% and 100% of all recorded civilian mine victims.[20]

The Colombian army has frequently reported on the use of antipersonnel mines by and the recovery of antipersonnel mines from FARC and ELN, as well as on the destruction of explosives factories. One study asserts that NSAGs have laid more than 50,000 antipersonnel mines, but the precise number is not known.[21]

FARC

FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world.  FARC Commander Alfonso Cano has reportedly defended FARC mine laying as “the best way to stop the advance of military operations.”[22] In April 2010, the army reported that two former FARC combatants had provided information on their activities in the construction and laying of mines.[23]

On 2 July 2010, Panama’s Minister of Public Security told media that landmines had been found on the Panama side of the border with Colombia, in the remote, densely forested province of Darien. Two Panamanian border police were injured in a mine blast there the previous week. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who was visiting Panama at the time, said FARC was responsible for planting the mines.[24]

From mid-2009 to mid-2010, the Colombian army reported recovering mines in military operations against FARC forces in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Guaviare, Meta, Putumayo, Tolima, and Valle.[25] Most notably, in December 2009, the army reported recovering 2,700 antipersonnel mines from a FARC camp in Tolima.[26] This is one of the largest seizures of mines ever reported by any State Party.

 In September 2009, the army reported the recovery of 18 antipersonnel mines from a FARC combatant in Valle,[27] and nine antipersonnel mines from a FARC camp in Putumayo.[28] In May 2009, the army reported the recovery of 194 antipersonnel mines from arms caches belonging to FARC in Guaviare.[29]

ELN

From mid-2009 to mid-2010, the army reported recovering mines in military operations against ELN forces in the departments of Boyacá and Nariño.[30]

In June 2009, the army blamed the ELN for a civilian mine casualty in the municipality of Samaniego, Nariño department, near the border with Ecuador.[31] In May 2009, a military spokesperson claimed the ELN was responsible for planting mines that injured a teenaged girl and her daughter and killed four soldiers in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department, close to the border with Venezuela.[32]



[1] See Article 7 Report, Form A, 6 May 2005; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 255, for details on penal sanctions and other aspects of the law.

[2] The reporting period overlaps by three months the previous reporting period that ended 31 March 2009. Previous reports were submitted on 30 April 2009, in April 2008 and April 2007, and on 29 June 2006, 6 May 2005, 11 May 2004, 27 May 2003, 6 August 2002, and 15 March 2002.

[3] “Tal como se ha señalado en los informes anteriores, Colombia cuenta con todos los mecanismos jurídicos para prevenir y reprimir el empleo, producción, comercialización, cesión y almacenamiento de minas antipersonal por personas particulares. De otro lado, y en el entendido que son los miembros de los GAML [grupos armados al margen de la ley] quienes hacen un uso continuo y sistemático de dichos artefactos para atacar a la Fuerza Pública colombiana e intimidar a la población civil, el Estado colombiano considera que las operaciones conducentes a desarticular dichas estructuras criminales deben ser consideradas como medidas oficiales para prevenir las actividades en cuestión. Al respecto, la Tabla 1 relaciona los principales resultados operacionales contra las GAML en 2009.” See Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2010.

[4] UN, “Final Report, Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Cartagena, 30 November–4 December 2009, APLC/CONF/2009/9, 17 June 2010. See also ICBL, “Report on Activities: Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World, 29 November to 4 December 2009,” May 2010, www.icbl.org.

[5] Second Review Conference, “Cartagena Action Plan adopted by international community,” Press release, 4 December 2009, Cartagena, www.cartagenasummit.org.

[6] ICBL, “Campaign urges hold-out states to ban landmines,” Press release,  23 October 2009, New York. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 288–325 for additional events.

[7] For more information on these meetings see www.cartagenasummit.org.

[8] Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM; and email from Alvaro Jiménez Millán, National Coordinator, CCCM, 6 August 2009.

[9] GTO-14 members: CCCM, CIREC, Fundación Restrepo Barco, Fundación Retorno y Vida, Fundación Mi Sangre, Fundación REI, Handicap International, Pastoral Social, la Asamblea Permanente Por la Paz, Colombian Red Cross, United For Colombia, British Council, Mercy Corps, and Moviment Per la Pau. gto14.org.

[10] Interviews with Eng. Sergio Rodríguez, Second Technical Manager, INDUMIL, 5 July 2000 and 24 July 2001. As of 2001, INDUMIL was still producing Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines. Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

[11] Presentation by the Colombian Armed Forces, “Desarrollo Compromiso con la Convención de Ottawa” (“Development Commitment with the Ottawa Convention”), Bogotá, 6 March 2006. Antipersonnel mines and IEDs manufactured by armed groups are constructed out of everything from glass bottles to plastic jerry cans. The explosive used is normally ANFO (made from fertilizer), but sometimes is a conventional explosive such as TNT. The mines are initiated by pressure-activated syringe fuzes (chemical initiation), or by battery-operated fuzes and electric fuzes activated by both pressure and trip-wires. These mines often have high levels of metal fragmentation in them.

[12] In addition to these 18,531 mines destroyed, the government has reported three other destructions of a total of 3,404 antipersonnel mines. Over the years, there have been many inconsistencies and discrepancies in Colombia’s count of stockpiled mines and their destruction. The Ministry of Defense sent a letter to Landmine Monitor in September 2005 to clarify many of the problems. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 302.

[13] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2010. See also, Form D of Article 7 reports submitted in April 2009, April 2008, and April 2007.

[14] The coordinator said the decision was made primarily because the majority of mines laid in the country are of NSAG design and do not correspond to the MAP-1 mines used for demining instruction. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, Coordinator, Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Bogotá, 16 March 2007.

[15] In 2003 and 2004, Colombia reported it retained 986 mines for training. It reduced that number to 886 in 2005 when it decided the larger number was not necessary. It destroyed 300 more mines in 2006 (100 each in March, September, and December), but the number has not changed since December 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 267–268; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 302–303.

[16] Letter OF109-00090099/AUV 33500 from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director, PAICMA, , 27 August 2009. For more information, see Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 299.

[17] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has not seen reports of mine use by paramilitaries since 2006.  See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 300; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 264; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 324.

[18] Email from Matthew Hovell, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 14 April 2010.

[19] See, for example, Chris Kraul, “Land mines take a toll on Colombia's poor,” Los Angeles Times, 6 March 2010, articles.latimes.com.

[20] Ulrich Tietze, Technical Advisor, “Anti Landmine Action Concept – Data Analysis, IMSMA 2008-2009 to identify ideas for focussing PAICMA’s work in 2010-2014,”  PAICMA, Bogotá, 22February 2010.

[21]Organization of American States (OAS), “National Profile (Colombia), OAS Humanitarian Demining Projects 2009–2010,” www.oas.org.

[22]María del Rosario Arrázola and Juan David Laverde, “La nueva estrategia de ‘Cano’” (“New Strategy of ‘Cano’”), El Espectador, 27 September 2008, www.elespectador.com.  See also Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 300.

[23] Republic of Colombia Army, “Testimonios Fugados” (“Testimonies of the Escaped [former combatants]”), February and April 2010, www.ejercito.mil.co.

[24]Sean Mattson, “Colombian rebels planting landmines in Panama: government,” Reuters (Panama City), 2 July 2010, www.reuters.com. FARC reportedly has turned increasingly to overland routes across the porous border with Panama to smuggle cocaine to the US as more sea and air police patrols cut off traditional smuggling routes northward. 

[25]Media monitoring of news announcements on Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio) website between May 2009 and June 2010, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co.

[26] The mines were reportedly found in a rural area outside the city of Rovira, along with documents belonging to the Cajamarca Unit of the FARC. “Army finds thousands of landmines in southern Colombia,” EFE News Service (Bogotá), 3 December 2009, www.laht.com.

[27]“Operaciones Contundentes contra las FARC en Valle y Cauca” (“Intensive operations against the FARC in Valle and Cauca”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 24 September 2009, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co.

[28]“Colombian army destroys two FARC camps,” Xinhua News Agency, 15 September 2009, www.encyclopedia.com.

[29] “Ejército destruye más de 80 minas en el Guaviare” (“Army destroys more than 80 mines in Guaviare”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 27 May 2009, www.cuartadivision.mil.co.

[30]Media monitoring of news announcements on Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio) website between May 2009 and June 2010, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co.

[31]“Labriego nariñense muere al caer en minado del Eln” (“Nariño farmer dies after falling on ELN mine”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 11 June 2009, www.ejercito.mil.co.

[32] “4 Soldiers killed, 2 civilians wounded in Colombia mine field,” EFE News Service (Bogotá), 17 May 2009, laht.com.


Last Updated: 22 October 2010

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

Signatory

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended global conferences in Berlin in June 2009 and Santiago in June 2010, as well as a regional meeting in Santiago in September 2009

Key developments

Ratification process underway; completed stockpile destruction in November 2009

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008. 

The ratification process is underway. As of August 2010, the ratification of the convention had been analyzed by a Colombian Senate Committee and was due to be considered by the full Senate later in the year.[1] In June 2010, a government official informed the CMC that ratification of the convention had been delayed by congressional elections held in March 2010 and the presidential elections held in May–June 2010.[2]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it had worked in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense during 2009 to prepare documentation for congressional approval of the convention, but due to the busy legislative schedule in 2009, Senate consideration of ratification was postponed until 2010.[3] In June 2009, Colombia had told other states that it was in the initial stages of its ratification process, which was “lengthy due to internal procedures.”[4] 

Since signing the convention, Colombia has shown strong interest in its implementation and universalization. Colombia participated in the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions in June 2009, where it gave a presentation on national planning of stockpile destruction. Colombia also gave a presentation on stockpile destruction at the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions held in Santiago, Chile in September 2009, where it urged states to start their stockpile destruction early. Colombia also attended the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

On 2 December 2009, Colombia co-hosted an event with Lao PDR during the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia to promote the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Colombia’s Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs Dr. Adriana Mejía Hernández spoke at the event.[5]

Colombia is a member of the Lao Support Group, a voluntary group of states which is tasked with advancing preparations for the First Meeting of States Parties to be held in Lao PDR in November 2010. In particular, Colombia is assisting with matters related to international cooperation and assistance.

In a March 2010 response to a Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire, Colombia made known its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention.[6] The government “absolutely rejects and prohibits any manner of transfer or storage of foreign cluster bombs in Colombian territory,” as well as “military operations with states not party to the convention in which they carry out exercises or actions prohibited by the Convention.” It also prohibits investment in production of cluster munitions. In addition, “Colombia considers that the countries that are still not a part of this convention can take steps toward honoring the spirit of the convention.”

Colombia was not an early supporter of a ban on cluster munitions, and did not participate much in the Oslo Process that produced the convention. It did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008. However, Colombia signed the convention when it first opened for signature in Oslo in December 2008, saying that it was the “humanitarian impact” of cluster munitions that led to Colombia’s decision to sign.[7]

Colombia is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. In 2009, Colombia stated its view that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents “significant progress in international humanitarian law” and cautioned that CCW work on cluster munitions not “run counter to international standards” set by the ban convention.[8] Colombia did not make any statements during the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in 2010 through July.

Use, production, and transfer

In March 2010, Colombia confirmed that its armed forces had used and stored cluster munitions in the past, namely CB-250K and ARC-32 cluster munitions, prior to signing the convention. However, it declined to specify the quantity or time period when these weapons were used.[9]  

In May 2009, during an event to destroy the last of Colombia’s stockpile of CB-250K cluster munitions, Colombia’s Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos said the weapon had been used in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” but sometimes the submunitions did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”[10]

Colombia is not known to have produced cluster munitions. It imported them from Chile and Israel. In March 2010, Colombia stated that it “has not transferred Cluster Bombs to a third state.”[11]

Stockpile destruction

On 24 November 2009, Colombia announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of cluster munitions. The commander of the Colombian armed forces, Freddy Padilla de León, said, “Now we can declare with great satisfaction, and in compliance with the Oslo Convention [on Cluster Munitions], that there are no cluster bombs of any type left under the control of the Armed Forces of Colombia.”[12] 

On that day, Colombia finished destruction of its stock of 31 ARC-32 cluster bombs. Earlier, on 7 May 2009, it finished destruction of its stock of 41 CB-250K cluster bombs.[13] In total, it destroyed 72 cluster munitions containing 10,832 submunitions.

The CB-250K bombs were produced by Chile, each contains 240 submunitions. The ARC-32 bomb is apparently a 350kg weapon containing 32 antirunway submunitions produced by Israel.[14]

Colombia destroyed all 41 CB-250K cluster munitions in April and May 2009 at the Marandúa Air Force Base in Terecay municipality, Vichada department. On 7 May 2010, a destruction event was held at Marandúa, with participation by Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, diplomats from 14 countries, and civil society representatives including the Campaña Colombiana contra Minas (CCCM).[15]

Colombia destroyed its stock of 31 ARC-32 cluster bombs in October and November 2009. On 24 November 2009, the last ARC-32 cluster bombs were destroyed Marandúa Air Force Base in an event witnessed by CCCM and others. As noted above, the Commander of the Colombian armed forces declared that Colombia had fulfilled its Convention on Cluster Munition stockpile destruction obligation.[16]

In response to inquiries since then about the possible existence of other stocks of cluster munitions, Colombia stressed that the military forces “currently do not have any type of cluster munitions; the different types of cluster munitions that were under the control of the Military Forces have been destroyed.”[17]

In November 2008, the CMC received information from Colombian military sources that in addition to the CB-250K and ARC-32 cluster bombs, Colombia also possessed M971 120mm mortar projectiles produced by Israel which contain 24 dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) self-destructing submunitions, as well as AN-M41 “cluster adapters.”[18] 

In May 2010, the army’s Director of Artillery replied to a Human Rights Watch inquiry about the M971 mortars that “currently the Tactical Artillery Units do not have the type of munitions mentioned in your letter.”[19] In August 2010, an official stated, “With respect to the M971 munitions, the Army had these in the past, but currently the Tactical Artillery Units do not have this or any type” of cluster munition.[20] It is not known when the mortars were destroyed.

In another May 2010 letter, the commander of the Air Force wrote, “With respect to the AN-M41 bombs, the Air Force currently does not have a stock” and has “abandoned the acquisition” of such bombs. He also noted that “this type of armament is not considered a cluster munition by the Oslo Convention.”[21]

In keeping with its June 2009 declaration, Colombia has decided not to retain any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or development purposes.[22]



[1] Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM, 11 August 2010.

[2] Meeting with delegation of Colombia, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 7–9 June 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010. In March 2009, Ministry of Defense officials stated that the documentation required for Congress to ratify the treaty was being prepared. ICBL/CCCM meeting with the Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 6 March 2009. Notes by CCCM.

[4] Statement of Colombia, Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, 26 June 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010.

[6] Ibid.

[7] For detail on Colombia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 58–59.

[8] Statement of Colombia, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 16 February 2009.  Notes by AOAV.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010.

[10] Carlos Osorio, “Colombia destruye sus últimas bombas de tipo racimo” (“Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs”), Agence France-Presse, 7 May 2009.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid. This document refers in some places to 41 bombs and in other places to 42 bombs. In the past, Colombia has indicated 41.

[14] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is unfamiliar with the ARC-32 bomb and its technical details. The information provided here came from a CMC meeting with the Colombian delegation to the Quito Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 7 November 2008.   

[15] Presentation by Maj. Arnaud Penent d’Izarn, Group Coordinator of Doctrine and Legal Counsel, Ministry of Defense, Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 14 September 2009. Notes by the CMC. See also, “Colombia destruye sus últimas bombas de tipo racimo” (“Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs”), AFP, 7 May 2009; and Luis Alberto Miño Rueda, “Ejercito detonó armamento en Marandúa” (“Army explodes weapons in Marandúa”), El Tiempo, 8 May 2009.

[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010.

[17] Letter No. 48260 from Maj. Arnaud Penent d’Izarn, Ministry of Defense, 3 June 2010.

[18] CMC meeting with the Colombian delegation to the Quito Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 7 November 2008. Notes by the CMC. 

[19] Letter No. 20104300429131 from Lt.-Col. Juan Manuel Sanchez Rosas, Director of Artillery, 31 May 2010.

[20] Email from Diana Rodríguez Uribe, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Department, Ministry of Defense, 12 August 2010.

[21] Letter No. 20102300506963 from Maj.-Gen. Julio Alberto Gonzalez Ruiz, Commander, Colombian Air Force, 31 May 2010.

[22] Statement of Colombia, Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, 25 June 2009. Notes by AOAV.


Last Updated: 13 October 2010

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Mines

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem remains unclear. The government of Colombia has identified 35 military bases as affected by mines, of which 34 had been cleared as of August 2010 from some 160,000m2 of area.[1] The national database contains information that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. Based on the 13,234 events recorded in the national database as of August 2010 there has been at least one event in 65% of the municipios (municipalities) and almost 50%
of the events are concentrated in just 49 of the 1,066 municipalities in the country. Additionally, 58% of the events have been recorded in six of the 32 departments (Antioquia, Meta, Bolívar, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, and Arauca).[2]

However, given the irregular nature of mine-laying, the continued use of mines makes it impossible to get a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that the lack of information prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline extension request.[3]

The army reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and coca production sites.[4] An analysis of mined areas by the Organization of American States (OAS) suggests that NSAGs typically place improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in separate locations approximately 5m apart and connected by plastic wires that cannot be detected by conventional mine detection equipment.[5] The OAS, however, believes that although these devices have been widely emplaced by NSAGs, better information is needed for planning survey and clearance operations. The OAS believes it is imperative that good non-technical survey with land release and overall mine assessment and planning be a priority in Colombia.[6]

In May 2010, the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) estimated that there were about 10,900 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)—only 29% of which had geo-reference coordinates—that required further survey and possibly clearance in 601 (55%) of the 1,098 municipalities. According to PAICMA, most mined areas are only identified after an incident occurs.[7] There are no records, or even reliable estimates, of the number and exact location of mined areas laid by NSAGs. SHAs are generally in isolated locations scattered across the affected departments, and the security situation is so precarious that there is no guarantee that cleared areas can be released as safe areas.[8]

HALO Trust, which has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with PAICMA to survey 11 municipalities, has found that minefields in Colombia tend to be laid in low densities though they can be accurately defined and delineated through good survey. The mines are improvised from ordinary items ranging from glass bottles to plastic jerrycans to larger devices such as gas canisters.[9] As of August 2010 HALO had found one minefield for every four recorded SHAs. It estimates that if the same ratio was applied across Colombia the true number of SHAs may be less than 3,000. Based on extensive assessments in Antioquia, Bolívar, and Sucre departments with a concentration in the seven municipalities of Argelia, Nariño, Sonsón, Cocorná, San Luis, San Rafael, and Abejorral in southeast Antioquia where the government has been in control from two to four years, HALO found mines tended to be placed on tracks to areas previously occupied or transited by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), or around key locations, such as schools, which were previously occupied by NSAGs. As of 23 August 2010, HALO had surveyed 135 village administration areas (mostly on foot), with results showing the average minefield is 7,300m2.[10]

Based on information from the army and PAICMA that the location of most mines is related to strategic purposes—transit routes, sites suitable for ambushes, protecting camps, and illicit crops—Mines Advisory Group (MAG) believes the most suitable land release strategies are community liaison (CL) and non-technical and technical surveys, followed by small rapid response teams to deal with mines, IEDs, and UXO. MAG believes it will be essential to maintain CL throughout all phases of surveying and clearance as the community must have the right to give its opinion as to whether or not it is safe to undertake demining operations in each location.[11] In HALO’s view, the extent of the mine contamination, considering the high number of casualties as an indicator of danger and risk, limits the amount of assistance that can safely be provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs) after they return.[12]  

High casualty rates among coca eradicators in Nudo de Paramillo in the Cordillera Occidental mountain range, the Catatumbo forest reserves in Norte de Santander department, the foothills of the Andes mountains in northwestern Arauca, and several locations in southeastern Colombia indicate additional locations and risks.[13]

Notwithstanding these views and the lack of complete data on the problem, Colombia estimated it would clear 48km2 through mechanical and manual clearance, and release another 73km2 through non-technical survey in 2011–2020.[14]

Explosive remnants of war

Although the precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known, it is estimated that 5% of all mine/ERW incidents resulting in injury or death are caused by UXO.[15] In the 23 municipalities in which MAG is operating in Antioquia and Chocó all but one are contaminated by ERW.[16]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2010

National Mine Action Authority

CINAMAP

Mine action center

PAICMA

International demining and survey operators

OAS (for quality assurance), HALO, MAG, Consortium Col-Lis

National demining operators

Army (Demining Battalion of the Military Forces)

International risk education operators

MAG, ICRC, UNICEF

National risk education operators

ACIN, CCCM, Colombian Red Cross, Seeds of Hope, Restrepo Barco Foundation, Tierra de Paz, and Pastoral Social

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

PAICMA is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, of which the overall strategy is to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[17]

Information management

The database at PAICMA contains information from as far back as 1990. So-called events—a generic term specific to mine action in Colombia that encompasses “incidents,” “accidents,” “suspected hazardous areas,” “UXO,” “deactivation” of devices, and “military demining”—have occurred in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments, the only exception being the Caribbean archipelago department of Providencia, San Andrés, and Santa Catalina.[18] In June 2009, at a workshop in Bogotá bringing together PAICMA, the Colombian army, NGOs, and donors, it was reported that although a considerable amount of data is available, it often cannot be corroborated, collated, or integrated across information management systems.[19] In August 2010, PAICMA reported that with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), progress was being made in the design and implementation of an information management model appropriate to the situation in Colombia.[20]

Demining capacity

Since the initiation of mine action in Colombia the army has been the sole operator for clearing not only the 35 mined military bases, but also for demining in affected communities that they can access safely. Since the beginning of 2009, Colombia has been assessing a legal framework to allow civilian organizations to conduct mine clearance operations. In August 2009, then-Vice-President Francisco Santos Calderón told a workshop sponsored by the NGO Geneva Call that humanitarian demining with civilian organizations was new to Colombia and that it required careful planning as well as a regulatory framework to address such issues as safety of the civilian population and staff, approval of operational areas, sustainability, logistics, funding, accreditation, monitoring, and the use of explosives to destroy landmines.[21]

Colombia’s Article 5 deadline extension request envisions civilian entities conducting mine clearance in 2010–2020. The clearance targets in the extension request are based on increasing military platoons from eight in 2010 to 25 in 2020 and civilian teams from two in 2011 to 49 in 2020.[22] As of August 2010, however, Congress had not passed a law allowing civilian demining organizations to operate in Colombia.[23]

In March 2010, UNMAS and UNDP both hired technical advisors to assist the mine action program.[24]

Land Release

Since 2005, Colombia has reported clearance of 454,454m2 of contaminated land at 30 military bases and in 24 communities, with 2009 the most productive year to date. In 2009, 16 military bases and SHAs in 22 communities covering a total of 170,218m2 were cleared. With the increase in demining teams in the Colombian army from four to eight, humanitarian clearance by June 2010 had exceeded the clearance output at the military bases. PAICMA reported that as of June 2010, 34 of the 35 bases had been cleared. It is planned the remaining base will be cleared by the end of 2010.[25]

Summary of clearance of military bases: 2005 to June 2010[26]

Year

No. of military bases cleared

Mined area cleared (m2)

June 2010

4

18,232

2009

16

45,949

2008

7

38,578

2007

4

18,382

2006

2

3,259

2005

1

4,831

Total

34

129,231

Summary of land release of humanitarian demining: 2005 to June 2010[27]

Year

No. of communities

Mined area cleared (m2)

June 2010

19

120,781

2009

19

106,037

2008

3

83,648

2007

2

15,757

2006

0

0

2005

0

0

Total

43

326,223

Survey in 2009

In the absence of a well-defined landmine problem, surveys and assessments initiated in 2009 have added to the growing body of knowledge and understanding about the mine and ERW problem in Colombia. In March 2010, PAICMA estimated that about 10,900 SHAs required further survey and possibly clearance.[28]

Landmine impact survey

In December 2008, the European Commission (EC) awarded a contract to an international consortium consisting of universities in Belgium and Colombia and three companies, one in Spain and two in the United Kingdom, to conduct a pilot study of the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO on affected communities in Colombia.[29] Although it is called a Landmine Impact Survey, Colombia has adopted methodologies and processes not used in other such surveys and thus cannot be equated to the branded Landmine Impact Survey.[30]

As a pilot project, one of the purposes of the survey was to identify a systematic data collection methodology that could be used to survey all of the mine/ERW-suspected areas of the country. The areas to survey were selected on the basis of being a representative sample of the landmine problem in Colombia rather than areas with the most incidents found in the database.[31] In July 2009, PAICMA identified the southeast of the Antioquia department; Catatumbo in Norte de Santander department close to the Venezuelan border; Montes de María (a mountainous region on the Caribbean coast); and the western region of Nariño department as the four areas where the survey would begin in September 2009.[32] Data collection began in November 2009 and ended in June 2010. The survey identified 59 impacted communities from the 697 communities surveyed. The survey found landmines primarily blocked farmland, roads, hunting, and foraging areas. The survey identified 17 victims in the two years prior to the survey. Security issues are said to have limited the scope of the survey in Catatumbo and Nariño.[33]

Preliminary survey results as July 2010[34]

Areas

Total no. of communities

No. of communities visited

No. of impacted communities

% of communities visited that were impacted

No. of recent victims

Montes de María region

146

106

16

15

7

Southeastern Antioquia department

95

76

24

32

4

Western Nariño department

297

22

15

68

3

Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department

159

30

4

13

3

Total

697

234

59

25

17

The survey was not without its problems and challenges. Surveys were not conducted at the same administrative level in all areas. Depending on access, the survey was conducted in the capital city of the municipality, at the populated centers (“centros poblados”) level, or the vereda level, the lowest level, equivalent to a village.[35]

Lack of access to SHAs due to fear or actual security threats resulted in high area estimates of contaminated areas, although measuring SHAs was not a priority of the survey. Often the survey teams could not get within 500m of the SHA. Coordinates of the SHAs were not taken.

According to the director of PAICMA, during the pilot survey the surveyors and community interviewees were very cautious in deciding whether to make a visit for a survey. In some instances in Norte de Santander and Nariño departments the survey teams elected not to go to certain locations. Moreover, due to security concerns the survey was eventually abandoned in Nariño.[36]

Non-technical survey

It is reported that three platoons from the Colombian army cancelled 7.97km2 of land in 2009.[37]

The mined areas at the six bases of Cerro Luna, El Hobo, La Fortaleza, Argelia, La Riqueza, and Yatacue were cancelled after non-technical survey.[38] According to Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator for the OAS Integrated Mine Action Program (Programa de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), it is likely that mines were never laid in these locations.[39] Pablo Parra, PAICMA’s Mine Action Advisor, thought no landmines were found in these six locations because years ago the base commanders had ordered that the mines be removed but never reported it.[40]

HALO has an MoU with PAICMA to conduct non-technical survey in 11 municipalities in Antioquia department and Montes de María (an area which spans Bolívar and Sucre departments). In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), during non-technical survey HALO delineates and maps a polygon within the SHA to establish the borders of the mine threat, thereby creating a confirmed hazardous area (CHA). As noted above, preliminary survey results, which show no pattern of mine-laying, have led HALO to conclude that full clearance of a CHA will typically be necessary.[41]

Survey in 2009[42]

Operator

Area covered by non-technical survey (km2)

SHA cancelled by non-technical survey (km2)

Second platoon

N/R

1.938

Fourth platoon

N/R

4.856

Fifth platoon

N/R

1.178

Totals

N/R

7.972

N/R = Not reported

MAG has an MoU with PAICMA to conduct non-technical survey in as many as 10 municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó departments. MAG planned to begin survey before the end of 2010.[43]

Mine clearance in 2009

As of June 2010, the Demining Battalion of the Military Forces had manually cleared 34 of the 35 military bases including 16 in 2009, destroying in the process 1,779 antipersonnel mines.[44] As of August 2010, the only remaining military base was El Tigre, which will be cleared by the end of 2010.[45] The Demining Battalion also cleared 22 communities in 2009 where NSAGs had laid mines to facilitate the return of IDPs and the economic development of the community.[46] As of June 2010, the Humanitarian Demining Battalion consisted of eight squads, each with 24 deminers, making a total capacity of 192 deminers. The army planned to add one more squad before the end of the year.[47]

Mine clearance of military bases: 2009 through June 2010[48]

Department

Municipality

Mined area

Area cleared (m2)

No. of antipersonnel mines destroyed

No. of items of UXO destroyed

Status

Amazonas

La Pedrera

La Pedrera

4,785

488

8

Finished

Amazonas

Puetro Nariño

Puerto Nariño

1,385

208

1

Finished

Amazonas

Tarapacá

Tarapacá

3,781

476

0

Finished

Bolívar

Santa Rosa

Santa Rosa

6,485

86

0

Finished

Caldas

Villa María

Quali

1,170

0

0

Finished

Cauca

El Tambo

Munchique

5,076

27

0

Finished

Chocó

Cerro Atrato

El Sireno

9,977

0

1

Finished

Cundinamarca

San Juaquin

Mochuelo

7,041

188

5

Finished

Huila

Guadalupe

Gabinete

3,247

20

5

Finished

Meta

San Juanito

El Tigre

1,396

10

4

Finished

Putumayo

La Tagua

La Tagua

3,291

30

18

Finished

Risaralda

Pueblo Rico

Montezuma

2,357

0

8

Finished

Tolima

Icononzo

La María

3,439

32

4

Finished

Valle del Cauca

El Cerrito

Pan Azúcar

6,506

30

1

Finished

Valle del Cauca

Dagua

Cerro Tokio

4,245

86

0

Finished

Valle del Cauca

Dagua

La Fortaleza

Cancelled

0

0

Finished

Valle del Cauca

Dagua

Cerro Luna

Cancelled

0

0

Finished

Valle del Cauca

Dagua

Yatacue

Cancelled

0

0

Finished

Valle del Cauca

Dagua

Cerro Curva

Cancelled

0

0

Finished

 Total

 

 

64,181

1,681

55

 

In 2009, the Demining Battalion of the Military Forces, in coordination with PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social), local authorities, and local community leaders, completed humanitarian demining in 22 communities in San Carlos and San Francisco municipalities in Antioquia; Samaniego municipality in Nariño; El Dorado municipality in Meta; and Chaparral municipality in Tolima over a total of 106,037m2 of land. Humanitarian demining sites are selected based on development priorities, the likelihood of IDPs returning home after clearance, and safety. During clearance operations 114 IEDs functioning as landmines (the OAS no longer uses the term landmine to describe the problem in Colombia)[49] and 45 items of UXO were found and destroyed.[50]

Clearance is followed by activities to facilitate the return of IDPs. With support from the national and local governments infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads, education, and health is rebuilt. Additionally, the OAS and NGOs provide agricultural inputs through micro projects to rehabilitate the cleared areas.[51]

 Humanitarian mine clearance in 2009[52]

Department

Municipality

Mined area

Area cleared (m2)

No. of IEDs

No. of UXO

Status

Antioquia

San Carlos

Vereda La Hondita

(La Verraquera)

3,140

2

0

Finished

Antioquia

San Carlos

Vereda Calderas

670

6

0

Finished

Antioquia

San Carlos

Vereda La Hondita (El Polo)

1,115

6

0

Finished

Antioquia

San Carlos

Vereda La Hondita (Guaduales)

927

4

0

Finished

Antioquia

San Carlos

Vereda El Chocó

4,562

3

0

Finished

Antioquia

San Carlos

El Vergel

16,711

9

1

Finished

Antioquia

San Francisco

Vereda El Boquerón

27,988

33

1

Finished

Antioquia

San Francisco

Vereda El Jardín

4,960

17

0

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

El Dorado

10,144

5

4

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

Vereda San Pedro

8,449

13

39

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

La Caja

1,965

3

0

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

La Miranda

1,872

0

0

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

La Campaña

1,197

5

0

Finished

Meta

El Dorado

La Orquidea

2,817

0

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Samaniego

6,327

3

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Vereda Alto las Cochas (Bocatama 1)

805

0

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Vereda Alto las Cochas (Camina al Bracho)

1,126

1

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Vereda Alto las Cochas (Bocatama 2)

3,544

3

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Vereda Alto las Cochas (Casa Álvaro Andrade)

1,776

0

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Vereda Alto las Cochas (Casa Alfredo Martínez)

1,272

0

0

Finished

Nariño

Samaniego

Chuguldi

2,770

1

0

Finished

Tolima

Chaparral

Santa Bárbara

1,900

0

0

Finished

 Total

 

 

106,037

114

45

 

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a ten-year extension to its deadline and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and the revised extension request were the decrease in the number of NGO demining teams from 85 to 49 in 2014–2020, and required funds needed during the same period decreased by almost US$150 million. The operational plan and the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 however remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia would contribute $21 million for 14 demining squads.[53]

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[54] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. Colombia had cleared 34 of the 35 mined military bases as of June 2010, and planned to clear the remaining base by the end of 2010, in advance of its treaty-mandated deadline.[55] Fifteen out of 660 possibly mine-affected municipalities in five of the 32 departments, covering an estimated 15km2, have been identified as priority for clearance by 2013.[56]

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of civilian demining organizations.[57]

Village demining

German Valencia, a representative of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca, ACIN), an organization of indigenous people in the department of Cauca, reported at a workshop in Bogotá that local communities have their own demining teams but lacked formal training. He also reported that as a result of indigenous groups conducting demining in Cauca, armed groups had responded by killing six people. Nonetheless, a representative of the Awa, an indigenous people severely impacted by mines in Nariño and Amazonas departments, thought civilians should conduct demining rather than the military.[58]

MAG has an MoU with PAICMA to begin training the Indigenous Guard (Guarda Indígena) in Cauca in the steps leading up to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) level 1 (recognition, marking, safe movement, and safe storage of explosives).[59]

Community liaison

Community liaison is an important component of the mine action program in Colombia. The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM), Corporación Paz y Democracia, Fundación Restrepo Barco, Tierra de Paz, Pastoral Social, and the OAS have been engaged in community liaison for many years.[60]

MAG, in partnership with CCCM and a local NGO in Antioquia, Paz y Democracia, started a community liaison project in August 2009 in 14 municipalities. As of August 2010, it was being implemented in 23 municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó departments delivering risk education (RE), developing focal points, determining the most vulnerable groups, and engaging communities and local authorities in assessing the possibility of further mine action in the current political and security context in the two departments.[61]

Several representatives at a conference sponsored by Geneva Call in August 2009 on “integral” mine action called for more community involvement in identifying clearance priorities and the recruitment of deminers from local communities.[62]

Quality management

OAS AICMA is the monitoring body for humanitarian demining, with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for all accredited demining organizations. The OAS monitors humanitarian demining operations to ensure procedures are consistent in all demining organizations and that they conform to national and international mine action standards. The OAS also investigates demining accidents and verifies community liaison activities.[63]

During 2009, officers from the Brazilian army ran the quality management program and trained and supervised 21 members of the Colombian army that conducted quality control in military bases and in clearance operations around mine-affected communities.

Safety of demining and survey personnel

Violence or the fear of violence is prevalent in rural Colombia where landmines are used by NSAGs.[64] Deminers, survey, and RE teams and the local population are all affected to one degree or another.[65]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

In 2009, the government, national NGOs, the Colombian Red Cross, and the ICRC conducted RE in 16 departments and 50 municipalities in coordination with PAICMA. Support was provided by UNICEF.[66] According to CCCM, there is considerable focus on RE because there are many regions and areas in the country where demining is not possible.[67] Pending clearance, it is necessary to implement “interim” activities that seek to protect civilians from death and injury and to facilitate safe access to food, water, land, and other basic necessities of life in contaminated areas.[68]

One area where demining is limited is southern Colombia. PAICMA commissioned an external evaluation of the two-year Pastoral Social RE project, which operated in five departments in southern Colombia. The evaluation concluded that combining RE, psychosocial assistance, and human rights was an innovative approach to RE and should be replicated in other regions in the country. However, it was recommended that project length should be longer than two years to achieve full impact. One of the project’s strengths was its direct intervention in areas where incidents had occurred rather than requiring participants to travel to the nearest town or urban area for RE. The evaluation found that 70% of the targeted population was knowledgeable about the threat of mines.[69]

Antioquia is the only department to take an active role in RE; it has contributed funding to RE projects and produced materials.[70] Since January 2010, the Colombian Red Cross has undertaken a total of 41 activities directly benefiting 967 members of vulnerable communities and during the same period the ICRC has carried out 60 prevention activities on safe behavior and victims’ rights with 1,741 community members and municipal authorities in conflict areas affected by weapon contamination.[71]

PAICMA and the National Park Service held eight RE workshops for 292 park employees, and 16 parks incorporated risks associated with landmines into their security plans.[72] A four-day international seminar on RE funded by the EC to build capacity in Colombia was held in May 2009. Almost 20 organizations and more than 100 people participated.[73]

Conducting RE during an ongoing conflict has posed an array of challenges and problems in Colombia, including armed confrontation, lack of access, sometimes due to disability, difficulty in attending RE programs because of cost and threats from NSAGs, political bias in RE programs, lack of context and analysis in RE materials, and sessions on the level of risk from the armed conflict, poor training of facilitators, and facilitators from outside the area who lack knowledge of local conditions.[74]

MAG, undertaking RE through its national partners in 23 municipalities in two departments, reported that it is addressing some of the challenges in delivering RE by selecting trusted residents with no political affiliation with any NSAG from the municipalities in which they will work; ensuring sufficient funds for the facilitators to be able to travel to the most affected communities; regularly reviewing internal security policies and guidelines in light of the changing nature of the conflict; developing materials to IMAS which have been field-trialed; and implementing an external quality control and quality assurance system, including a monitoring visit to facilitator at least once every two months in the field.[75]

In April 2010, PAICMA said RE materials were being developed to address the dangers coca eradicators face in destroying coca crops.[76] Casualty rates among coca eradicators are said to be very high compared to other groups.[77]



[1] Email Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[2] Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, p. 19.

[3] PAICMA, “Colombia Facing the Challenge of Anti-Personnel Mines,” Bogotá, 2009, p. 6, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 2, 32.

[4] Article 7 Report, April 2008, Form A; see also PAICMA, “Monthly Newsletter, Special Edition,” Bogotá, April 2008, pp. 13, 15; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Colombia, “Informe Mensual Febrero–Marzo 2007” (“Monthly Report, February–March 2007”), p. 2, www.colombiassh.org. According to Colombia’s Article 7 report submitted in April 2008, 52 farmers were injured in the first three months of 2008 while eradicating coca plants in national parks.

[5] OAS, “Section I: National Mine Action Profile – Colombia, OAS Mine Action Project Portfolio 2006–2007,” www.aicma.oas.org.

[6]Carl Case, “A Mine-free Central America: How Can We Improve on Success?” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 14.2, Summer 2010, maic.jmu.edu.

[7] Statement of Colombia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[8] Presentation by Colombia, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Hovell, Programme Manager, HALO, 14 April 2010.

[10] Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 23 August 2010.

[11] Email from Richard Hartill, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 12 August 2010.

[12] Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 25 August 2010.

[13] According to Colombia’s Article 7 report submitted in April 2008, 52 farmers were injured in the first three months of 2008 while eradicating coca plants in national parks. Chris Kraul, “Land mines take a toll on Colombia’s poor,” Los Angeles Times, 6 March 2010, latimes.com; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, p. 13.

[14] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, Annex 3, p. 56.

[15] PAICMA “Situation National 1990-June 2010,” www.accioncontraminas.gov.co.

[16] Email from Richard Hartill, MAG, 25 August 2010.

[17] PAICMA, “Colombia Facing the Challenge of Anti-Personnel Mines,” Bogotá, 2009, p. 3, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co; and email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[18] Statement of Colombia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008.

[19] Mine Action Information Center, James Madison University, “Executive Summary,” Colombia Humanitarian Demining Planning Workshop, Bogotá, 9–12 June 2009, maic.jmu.edu.

[20] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[21] Geneva Call, “Summary Report on the Conference on Integral Mine Action in Colombia, 13–14 August 2009,” www.genevacall.org, p. 13.

[22] Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, p. 4

[23] Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM, 20 August 2010.

[24] Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 14 April 2010.

[25] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator, AICMA, OAS, 13 May 2010. Colombia’s Article 5 extension request reports that 110,999m2 have been cleared from 30 military bases. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, p. 8.

[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, MAG, 13 April 2010.

[29] EC, “Anuncio de Licitación de Contrato de Servicios, Estudio de Impacto Socioeconómico de las Minas Antipersonal y Munición sin Explotar en Colombia–EISEC Colombia–América del Sur” (“Announcement of Tender, Landmine and UXO Socio-economic Impact Survey–EISEC Colombia–South America”), ec.europa.eu.

[30] Interview with Ulrich Tietze, EC Technical Advisor to PAICMA, in Cartagena, 29 November 2009.

[31] Interview with Ulrich Tietze, EC Technical Advisor to PAICMA, in Geneva, 24 June 2010.

[32] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 12 August 2009.

[33] Consortium Col-LIS, “Landmine Impact Survey Final Report,” 8 July 2010, www.col-lis.info.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Consortium Col-LIS, “Landmine Impact Survey Final Report,” Consortium Col-LIS, “Landmine Impact Survey Final Report,” 8 July 2010, www.col-lis.info.

[36] Interviews with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 14 April 2010; and with Ulrich Tietze, EC, in Geneva, 24 June 2010.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[38] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[39] Email from Guillermo Leal, OAS, 30 June 2009.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 19 May 2009.

[41] Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 14 April 2010.

[42] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[43] Email from Richard Hartill, MAG, 12 August 2010.

[44] Formerly known as the Demining Department of the Military Forces, it was upgraded to the level of Battalion on 2 October 2009, because of the greater number of demining units it now has. The operations, the standing operating procedures, and the coordination with PAICMA and OAS are still the same as in the past.

[45] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010; and email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.

[47] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010

[48] Ibid.

[49] Email from Matthieu Laruelle, Regional Coordinator for Latin America, ICRC, 26 August 2010. 

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[51]Carlos J. Orozco, “Micro-projects Help Socioeconomic Recovery of Cleared Areas,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 14.2, Summer 2010, maic.jmu.edu.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[53] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 52–53; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, pp. 57–58.

[54] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 41–42.

[55] Statement of Colombia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[56] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, Annex 3, Table 12, pp. 57–58.

[57] Ibid, p. 60.

[58] Geneva Call, “Summary Report on the Conference on Integral Mine Action in Colombia, 13–14 August 2009,” www.genevacall.org, pp. 20, 27.

[59] Email from Richard Hartill, MAG, 12 August 2010.

[60] Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, CCCM, 20 August 2010.

[61] Email from Richard Hartill, MAG, 12 August 2010.

[62] Geneva Call, “Summary Report on the Conference on Integral Mine Action in Colombia, 13–14 August 2009,” pp. 28–29, www.genevacall.org.

[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Guillermo Leal, OAS, 13 May 2010.

[64] United States Department of State, “2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2010, p. 1.

[65] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, MAG, 13 April 2010.

[66] Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 24 August 2010; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, p. 31.

[67] Interview with Álvaro Jiménez Millán, National Coordinator, CCCM, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.

[68] Email from Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 26 August 2010.

[69] Econometría S.A., “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education Project,” 22 December 2009, pp. 37–40.

[70] PAICMA, “2010 Risk Education Workplan,” 4 February 2010; and Secretaría de Gobierno de Antioquia – Dirección de DDHH y DIH, Programa de Acción Contra Minas, Informe de Gestión 2008 (Office of Governance, Department of Antioquia, Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Mine Action Program Management Report 2008), “Programa de Acción Contra Minas, Informe de Gestión 2008” (“Mine Action Program, Management Report 2008”), Medellín, March 2009, p. 1.

[71] Email from Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 26 August 2010.

[72] PAICMA, “Mine Risk Education,” www.accioncontraminas.gov.co.

[73] Interview with Álvaro Jiménez Millán, CCCM, in Geneva, 29 May 2009; and telephone interview with Camilo Serna Villegas, CCCM, 3 August 2009.

[74] Geneva Call, “Summary Report on the Conference on Integral Mine Action in Colombia, 13–14 August 2009,” pp. 28–29, www.genevacall.org.

[75] Email from Richard Hartill, MAG, 12 August 2010.

[76] PAICMA, “Ayuda de Memoria” (“Aide-Mémoire”), minutes of meeting with Vice-President Calderón on assistance provided to coca eradicators injured by landmines, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[77] Chris Kraul, “Land mines take a toll on Colombia’s poor,” Los Angeles Times, 6 March 2010, latimes.com.


Last Updated: 02 February 2011

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties[1]

Casualties in 2009

Casualties in 2009

674 (2008: 798)

Casualties by outcome

117 killed; 557 injured (2008: 157 killed; 641 injured)

Casualties by device type

674 unknown device type

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 674 casualties from explosive devices, all of which were recorded by the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) as having been caused by antipersonnel mines.[2] This represented a 16% decrease in annual casualties as compared with the 798 casualties recorded in 2008, a continuation of the trend of declining casualty rates since the peak of close to 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006.[3] Suspected reasons given for the declining casualty rate included a reduction in overall violence in the country, an increase in emergency demining, and more effective risk education programs.[4]

Civilian casualties (232) made up 34% of the total, similar to the 35% in 2008. There were 442 military casualties.[5] Of civilian casualties, 21% (49) were children (41 boys and 8 girls), up from 17% in 2008.[6] Men made up 93%, or 170, of the 183 adult civilian casualties, and 97% (653) of all casualties were male.

Nearly one-third (52 of 183) of the adult civilian casualties were manual coca eradicators, employed by the Program for the Eradication of Illicit Cultivation (Programa para la Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos, PCI).[7] While this is a reduction from the 76 coca eradicator casualties registered in 2008, this was an increase as a proportion of total casualties.[8] Since 2008, coca eradicator casualties have occurred in 12 municipalities and in seven of these, they made up between 75% and 100% of all recorded civilian casualties.[9]

In 2009, casualties were recorded in 23 of Colombia’s 32 departments; however, 57% of all casualties occurred in just four departments: Antioquia (166), Caquetá (78), Nariño (73), and Meta (69).

As of 28 February 2010, PAICMA had recorded 8,305 casualties (1,827 killed and 6,478 injured) since 1990. Civilians accounted for 35% (2,940) of the total and children accounted for 27% (786 casualties) of civilian casualties. The departments of Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, and Norte de Santander registered the highest numbers of casualties and accounted for 47% of the total.[10] Improvements in casualty data sharing and collection in 2009 were believed to have increased the number of registered casualties, resulting in a more accurate representation of the overall situation.[11] However, as of April 2010, there were still 680 suspected casualties from prior to 2005 that had not been verified by PAICMA and thus not included in total figures[12] and the ICRC had information on 22 casualties that were not in the PAICMA database because of requests of confidentiality.[13] Despite improvements, it was still likely that incidents occurring in remote locations, particularly within indigenous communities, and some incidents resulting either in very minor injuries or in death went unreported.[14]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 6,478 mine/ERW survivors in Colombia as of 28 February 2010.[15]

In 2009, no comprehensive efforts were identified to determine the needs of mine/ERW survivors. At the national level, PAICMA carried out a mapping of available victim assistance services and disseminated results to all victim assistance stakeholders.[16] In early 2010, the Office of the Vice President investigated the assistance received by coca eradicators who had been injured by landmines; a commitment was made to register all those outside existing benefits systems so that they could receive compensation, healthcare, and physical rehabilitation.[17] In the department of Antioquia, a pilot project was carried out in three municipalities to register victim assistance services provided to survivors within the national Epidemiological Monitoring System (Sistema de Vigilancia Epidemiológica, SIVIGILA).[18] The questionnaire was developed with input from governmental and non-governmental representatives.[19] Participation by all health care professionals in SIVIGILA was obligatory. Following the successful pilot, implementation was extended to the entire department by the end of 2009.[20]

Victim assistance coordination[21]

Government coordinating body/ focal point

PAICMA

Coordinating mechanism

National victim assistance committees on information management, socio-economic reintegration, and psychosocial support with governmental and non-governmental representatives; Ottawa Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo de Ottawa, GTO-14), forum for coordination among NGOs working in mine action

Plan

None: victim assistance is included in the National Mine Action Plan 2009–2019

In 2009, there was increased coordination between government and civil society victim assistance stakeholders at the national level, and among civil society, mostly related to preparations for the Second Review Conference, held in Cartagena in November–December 2009.[22] During the year, just one general, national victim assistance meeting was held with government and civil society representatives, to introduce a human rights framework for victim assistance.[23] Additional meetings were held through thematic victim assistance committees. Two new victim assistance committees were formed to bring together government and civil society actors. One focused on socio-economic reintegration and one on psychosocial support.[24] In 2009 the National Committee for Information Management—established in 2008—met three times, began to implement a common workplan,[25] and was seen as a “great advance” in the coordination of attention for survivors.[26]

Coordination within the government itself was mainly focused around facilitating survivors’ access to reparations through the Ministry of Social Protection and the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social).[27] There were few concrete activities to integrate victim assistance within a broader disability framework.[28] However, at the end of 2009, PAICMA was invited to participate in the National Disability Council (Consejo Nacional de Discapacidad, CND), due to be operational starting in 2010, which was expected to improve this integration.[29] Coordination at the local and departmental level varied throughout the country, depending on the interest and capacity of local government officials.[30] The department of Antioquia, with the highest number of casualties, was seen as the most active in coordinating victim assistance activities, though the working group of the Departmental Mine Action Committee (Comité Departamental de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal) met less regularly compared with previous years.[31] In the lead up to the Second Review Conference, NGOs working in mine action formed the GTO-14 “to unify [their] efforts and achieve more concrete benefits for the victims” of antipersonnel landmines.[32]

Colombia provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Second Review Conference in November–December 2009, at the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2010 and through Form J of its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2010, with considerable detail on coordination activities and service provision.[33]

Survivor inclusion

Survivors’ associations were represented at national victim assistance meetings. Survivors and other persons with disabilities contributed to the implementation of victim assistance activities but this was not widespread and was mostly limited to peer support, survivors’ associations and some limited NGO participation.[34] Numerous Colombian mine/ERW survivors participated in the Second Review Conference as part of the Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) delegation.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[35]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2009

PAICMA

National government

Coordination, data management, and awareness-raising for governmental and non-governmental actors on available victim assistance efforts and how to access them

Established new agreement with coca eradication program to track casualties among, and attention to, coca eradicators

Ministry of Social Protection

National government

Administration of the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA) to cover rehabilitative care for victims of “terrorism,” including mine/ERW survivors

Stricter application of regulations regarding access to FOSYGA funds created gaps in rehabilitation coverage for survivors

Acción Social

National government

Administration of one-time compensation to mine/ERW survivors as victims of conflict

No change, deadline to apply for compensation was April 2010

Ministry of Health

National government

Emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation

No change

Council of Medellín

City government

Psychosocial support to survivors as part of its Program of Attention for Victims of Conflict (Programa de Atención a Víctimas del Conflicto Armado)

Resolution to include survivors passed in 2009; implementation of program delayed to 2010

CCCM

National NGO

Assistance (transportation and accommodation) to access services; legal advice; and awareness-raising on survivors’ rights and advocacy

No change

Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de

Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC)

National NGO

Physical rehabilitation, including mobile outreach to remote regions;  social and economic inclusion through formation of survivors associations, peer support, income-generating projects and capacity-building

New program, with Fundación Mi Sangre, income-generation projects for female heads of households (survivors or families of survivors and those killed)

Pastoral Social

National NGO with link to international organization

Psychosocial support, income-generating projects

Increased inclusion of psychosocial support alongside economic inclusion initiatives

Tierra de Paz

National NGO

Assistance (transportation and accommodation) to access services, and legal advice for survivors in Cauca department

New project launched during the year

Fundación Restrepo Barco

National NGO

Information collection, assistance to access medical attention, support to access rights

No change

Fundación Mi Sangre

National NGO

Support for psychosocial care, educational inclusion, socio-economic inclusion and local capacity-building

Launching of the National Committee for Psychosocial Support; child survivors prioritized as beneficiaries at the end of 2009

Colombian Association of Antipersonnel Mine Survivors

Local survivor association

Peer support, referrals, and assistance to access services

No change

Mercy Corps

International NGO

Capacity-building for rehabilitation services for mine/ERW survivors in southwestern Colombia (Nariño, Cauca, and Putumayo departments), in cooperation with CCCM

Opening of Comprehensive Rehabilitation Center in Nariño

Handicap International (HI)

International NGO

Training for health professionals on attending mine/ERW survivors; raising-awareness of survivors’ rights and available benefits; formation of peer support groups; psychosocial assistance; facilitating access to services; income-generating projects; and inclusion of survivors in local government committees

No change

Organization of American States (OAS)

International organization

Assistance (transportation and accommodations) to access services; support for services not covered through government support or for people unable to register; and economic inclusion activities

Inclusion of seven survivors in the Iberoamerican Special Olympics

ICRC

International organization

Materials and training support to five physical rehabilitation centers; accommodation, transportation, and food for survivors and family members to support access to services

No change

The most significant overall change in the accessibility of victim assistance services in 2009 was the increased regulation of benefits available to survivors through FOSYGA, administered by the Ministry of Social Protection. These regulations narrowed coverage, preventing service providers from administering needed medical and rehabilitation care since FOSYGA would no longer reimburse for this care.[36] Gaps in coverage included devices for auditory/visual impairments, regular replacement of mobility devices, and follow-up care. Many NGOs assisting survivors identified their role as one of filling these gaps in government services.[37] By the end of 2009, reforms to the FOSYGA regulations to address these gaps were under government consideration.[38] As in previous years, the greatest obstacles to accessing services more generally remained a lack emergency assistance in remote locations, limited support for transportation and accommodation, complicated bureaucratic procedures to register for benefits, and an unwillingness of some service providers to assist survivors because of slow and incomplete reimbursements by FOSYGA for this care.[39]

Access to physical rehabilitation services in southwestern Colombia, an area with a high number of mine/ERW survivors, increased in 2009 with the opening of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation Center at the Nariño University Hospital in February.[40] The quality of services in the five ICRC-supported centers improved with the arrival of an additional ICRC surgeon, a prosthetic/orthotic technician and a physiotherapist.[41]

Some efforts were identified to improve both the availability and quality of psychosocial care for survivors, though most efforts lacked the inclusion of survivors themselves in the provision of care.[42] In 2009, the City Council of Medellín approved a resolution requiring the provision of psychological care to survivors.[43] Victim assistance and risk education projects implemented by Pastoral Social and the Colombian Red Cross both prioritized psychological support to survivors in 2009; in the case of Pastoral Social, psychologists were newly employed in two project sites.[44] Fundación Mi Sangre supported the development of a model of intervention in psychosocial care, published as a manual for practitioners in February 2010.[45]

For 2009, survivors, including military survivors, identified economic inclusion as the greatest gap in victim assistance services.[46] However, income-generating projects increasingly were accompanied by vocational counseling and capacity-building to improve business success rates.[47]

Throughout 2009, various victim assistance service providers worked to identify survivors and assist them in applying for compensation under Decree 1290, before the expiration of the statute of limitations in April 2010. As an indirect result of these efforts, many previously unregistered survivors were identified and made aware of other benefits available to them.[48] As of February 2010, 65% of registered survivors injured prior to February 2009 had applied and/or received compensation as victims of conflict.[49]

In 2009, one of PAICMA’s central focuses was the promotion of a human rights framework for victim assistance, providing trainings to local authorities and NGOs on the legal instruments designed to protect the rights of mine/ERW survivors both as victims of conflict and as persons with disabilities.[50] Colombia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities but the law does not mandate access to public buildings.[51]

Colombia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 30 March 2007. The convention was approved by Congress (Law 1346, issued on 31 July 2009) and ratified by the Constitutional Court on 22 April 2010, but as of September 2010 Colombia had not deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN.[52]



[1] Unless otherwise noted, all casualty data based on Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor analysis of PAICMA, “Situación Nacional 1990–Febrero 2010” (“National Stuation 1990–February 2010”), undated, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co.

[2] In previous years, PAICMA recorded casualties caused by ERW though, since 1990, most device types have been recorded as antipersonnel mines. This can be explained by the fact that all explosives that are victim-activated and can be triggered by an individual are referred to as antipersonnel mines in Colombia. Many of these could also be considered improvised explosive devices that are designed to act as antipersonnel mines. Most sources that collect casualty data are not trained to distinguish antipersonnel mines from ERW. Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010; and interview with Ana María Hernández Montoya, Deputy, Department Against Arms Contamination, and Stéphane Jacquier, Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[3] Casualty data for 1982–2008 provided by email from Mariany Monroy Torres, Data Management Advisor, PAICMA, 5 June 2009; and from Ulrich Tietze, EC Technical Advisor to PAICMA, 17 June 2009; and see the Colombia chapter in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

[4] Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010.

[5] There were 442 military casualties, 67 of whom were killed and 375 injured. PAICMA did not identify any casualties among non-state armed groups.

[6] Ulrich Tietze,  “Anti Landmine Action Concept–Data Analysis, IMSMA 2008–2009 to identify ideas for focusing PAICMA’s work in 2010–2014,”  Bogotá, 22February 2010.

[7] Email from Alejandro Espitia, Advisor, PAICMA, 22 February 2010.

[8] Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010.

[9] Ulrich Tietze,  “Anti Landmine Action Concept–Data Analysis, IMSMA 2008–2009 to identify ideas for focusing PAICMA’s work in 2010–2014,” Bogotá, 22February 2010. The six municipalities with the highest rates were: Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamez, Tarazá, Anorí, Puerto Libertador, and Tibú.

[10] PAICMA, “National Antipersonnel Mine and Unexploded Ordnance Situation 1990 to 28 February 2010” (“Situación Nacional Por Minas Antipersonal y Municiones Sin Explotar 1990 a 28 Febrero del 2010”), 12 March 2010.

[11] Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010; interview with Ana María Hernández Montoya and Stéphane Jacquier, ICRC, Bogotá, 13 April 2010; and interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, National Mine Action Coordinator, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[12] It was suspected that this figure would be reduced following verification because of the elimination of duplicate data. Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010.

[13] Interview with Ana María Hernández Montoya and Stéphane Jacquier, ICRC, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[14] Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010; and interview with Ana María Hernández Montoya and Stéphane Jacquier, ICRC, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[15] PAICMA, “National Antipersonnel Mine and Unexploded Ordnance Situation 1990 to 28 February 2010” (“Situación Nacional Por Minas Antipersonal y Municiones Sin Explotar 1990 a 28 Febrero del 2010”), 12 March 2010.

[16] PAICMA, “Manual for Good Practices in Assistance to APM, UXO and IED Victims: Colombia 2007–2009,” Bogotá, November 2009.

[17] A special emphasis was placed on this employment group because of the known risk for mines/ERW and high rate of incidents. Those eradicators who were injured prior to 2007 were found to have received the least assistance, since eradicators went from being independent contractors to government employees in that year. “PAICMA, “Ayuda de Memoria” (“Aide-Mémoire”), minutes of meeting with Vice-President Calderón on assistance provided to coca eradicators injured by landmines, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[18] Letter from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 6 April 2010; and interview with Magda Yolima Portilla Ferrer, Victim Assistance Coordinator, CCCM, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[19] Interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[20] Interview with Lilibet Arismendy Flórez, Coordinator, Mine Action Program, Departmental Government of Antioquia, Medellín, 16 April 2010.

[21] PAICMA, “Informe De Gestión Programa Presidencial De Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) Enero–Diciembre de 2009” (“Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA) Management Report January–December 2009”), 2010; GTO-14, “What is the GTO-14,” gto14.org; and PAICMA, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal 2009–2019” (“National Policy for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 2009–2019”), v. 7.0, Bogotá, 9 October 2008.

[22] Interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010; and interview with Catalina Cock Duque, Director, Fundación Mi Sangre, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[23] The national meeting, held in April 2009, was officially called an international meeting because of the participation of international experts. Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010, p. 30.

[24] The National Committee on Psychosocial Support was established in March 2009 by Fundación Mi Sangre. By the end of 2009, PAICMA had expressed its interest and willingness in assuming responsibility for the coordination of the committee. Interview with Catalina Cock Duque, Fundación Mi Sangre, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[25] PAICMA, “Informe De Gestión Programa Presidencial De Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) Enero–Diciembre de 2009” (“Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA) Management Report January–December 2009”), 2010, p. 44.

[26] Interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010; and interview with Magda Yolima Portilla Ferrer, CCCM, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[27] Observation during Monitor field mission, 11–17 April 2010; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010.

[28] Letter from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 6 April 2010.

[29] Ibid; and interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, Bogotá, 12 April 2010.

[30] Interview with Sharon Ball, Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, Bogotá, 13 April 2010; interview with David Alejandro Ardilla, Coordinator, Pastoral Social, Villavicencio, 14 April 2010; and interview with Jorge Enrique Quesada Ortega, Coordinator, CIREC, in Villavicencio, 14 April 2010.

[31] Interview with Olga Lucía Jimenez, Director, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[32] GTO-14, “What is the GTO-14,” gto14.org.

[33] Statement of Colombia, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 30 November 2009; statement of Colombia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 June 2010; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010.

[34] Observation during Monitor field mission, 11–17 April 2010; and interview with Luz Adriana Zapata, Director, Colombian Association of Antipersonnel Mine Survivors, Medellín, 16 April 2010.

[35] There are numerous service providers, both public and private, throughout Colombia that provided assistance to persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, during 2009. Only those that had some focus on mine/ERW survivors and provided updated information have been included here. PAICMA, “Informe De Gestión Programa Presidencial De Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) Enero–Diciembre de 2009” (“Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA) Management Report January–December 2009”), 2010; letter from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 6 April 2010; PAICMA, “Manual for Good Practices in Assistance to APM, UXO and IED Victims: Colombia 2007–2009,” Bogotá, November 2009; presentations by Luis Fernando Correa Serna, General Director of Quality of Services, Ministry of Social Protection and by Marlén Mesa, Deputy Director of Victim Assistance, Acción Social, Preparatory Meeting to the National Committee on Victim Assistance, Bogotá, 13 April 2010; interview with David Alejandro Ardilla, Pastoral Social, Villavicencio, 14 April 2010; interview with Catalina Cock Duque, Fundación Mi Sangre, Medellín, 15 April 2010; Fundacion Mi Sangre, “Management Report 2009,” Medellín, 2010, p. 8; interview with Ginna Andrea Lozano, Victim Assistance Officer, OAS, Bogotá, 12 April 2010; response to Monitor questionnaire by Jorge Enrique Quesada Ortega, CIREC, 2 April 2010; HI, “Informe de Handicap International Acción Contra Minas” (“Handicap International Report: Action Against Mines”), undated but 2009; Fundación Restrepo Barco, “Intervención de corto y mediano plazo frente a la afectación por Minas Antipersonal (MAP) y Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI) en el municipio de Samaniego, Nariño” (“Short and Medium term interventions in response to Mine and IED contamination in Samaniego, Nariño”), presented by Margarita Martinez at the meeting of the GTO14, 11 March 2010; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2009,” Geneva, May 2010, p. 312.

[36] Interview with Adriana Velasquez, Social Worker, Hospital San Vicente de Paul, Medellín, 16 April 2010; and interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[37] Observations during Monitor field mission, 11–17 April 2010; and interview with Ginna Andrea Lozano, OAS, Bogotá, 12 April 2010.

[38] Presentation by the Luis Fernando Correa Serna, Ministry of Social Protection, Preparatory Meeting to the National Committee on Victim Assistance, Bogotá, 13 April 2010.

[39] Interview with Olga Lucía Jimenez, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Medellín, 15 April 2010; and interviews with survivors during Monitor field mission to Meta (14 April 2010) and Antioquia (16 April 2010) departments.

[40] The opening of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation Center was a component of the joint project implemented by Mercy Corps, CCCM, and the Nariño University Hospital.

[41] ICRC, “Annual Report 2009,” Geneva, May 2010, p. 312.

[42] Interviews with survivors during Monitor field mission to Meta (14 April 2010) and Antioquia (16 April 2010) departments.

[43] Letter from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 6 April 2010; and interview with Lilibet Arismendy Flórez, Departmental Government of Antioquia, Medellín, 16 April 2010.

[44] Interview with Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM, Bogotá, 15 April 2010; and interview with David Alejandro Ardilla, Pastoral Social, Villavicencio, 14 April 2010.

[45] Interview with Catalina Cock Duque, Fundación Mi Sangre, Medellín, 15 April 2010; and Jorge Ospina Duque, et al., “Manual de Intervención Psicosocial para Víctimas de Minas Antipersonal y Municiones Sin Explotar en Colombia: Teoría y Práctica a Partir de la Evidencia Clínica” (“Manual of Psychosocial International for Victims of Antipersonnel Mines and Unexploded Ordnance in Colombia: Theory and Practice Based on Clinical Evidence”), February 2010.

[46] Military survivors receive comprehensive care, including a pension. However, military survivors who wanted to return to work complained that there was no assistance for economic inclusion initiatives. Interviews with survivors during Monitor field mission to Meta (14 April 2010) and Antioquia (16 April 2010) departments.

[47] Interview with Luz Adriana Zapata, Colombian Association of Antipersonnel Mine Survivors, Medellín, 16 April 2010; and interview with Gustavo Alberto Hincapié, Director General, Corporación Discapacidad Colombia, 16 April 2010.

[48] Interview with Camilo Serna Villegas, CCCM, Bogotá, 15 April 2010; and interview with Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, Medellín, 15 April 2010.

[49] Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010, p. 39.

[50] PAICMA, “Informe De Gestión Programa Presidencial De Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) Enero–Diciembre de 2009” (“Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA) Management Report January–December 2009”), 2010.

[51] United States Department of State, “2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2010.

[52] Email from Jorge Enrique Rojas Vanegas, Advisor to Director, PAICMA, 24 August 2010.


Last Updated: 13 October 2010

Support for Mine Action

In 2009, the Colombian government contributed COP35.48 billion (US$16,674,734) to mine action. For the first time the Ministry of Defense reported its contribution to clearance operations, and the Ministry of Social Protection reported its support for disability pensions through the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund.[1] Colombia is the first mine-affected country to report government disability and other payments made to survivors and their families.

International contributions in 2009 from 11 countries for clearance, victim assistance, and risk education totaled $10,502,603. The United States, Canada, Spain, and Italy dedicated approximately $2,600,000 to mine action in Colombia through the Organization of American States (OAS). Eight donors provided $6,054,527 for victim assistance.

National contributions: 2009[2]

Institution

Sector

Amount (COP)

Amount
($)

Ministry of Social Protection

Victim assistance

16,720,157,901

7,858,474

Ministry of Defense

Clearance

10,837,000,000

5,093,390

Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation

Victim assistance

4,984,000,000

2,342,480

Presidential Program for Mine Action

Clearance, victim assistance, risk education, advocacy

2,937,000,000

1,380,390

Total

 

35,478,157,901

16,674,734

International contributions: 2009[3]

Donor

Sector

 Amount (national currency)

Amount
($)

US

Clearance, victim assistance, risk education

$3,258,163

3,258,163

Spain

Clearance, victim assistance, risk education

             €1,588,315

2,213,317

Norway

Victim assistance

NOK10,052,000

1,597,866

Japan

Clearance, victim assistance

¥141,388,000

1,508,610

Canada

Clearance, victim assistance

C$646,819

566,788

Switzerland

Victim assistance

CHF551,000

507,366

Belgium

Risk education, survey

€208,659

290,766

Germany

Victim assistance

€200,000

278,700

United Kingdom

Clearance

£101,270

158,599

Italy

Victim assistance

€50,627

70,549

Netherlands

Clearance

€37,229

51,879

Total

 

 

10,502,603

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[4]

Year

National contributions

($)

International contributions

($)

Total
contributions

($)

2009

16,674,734

10,502,603

27,177,337

2008

942,000

9,139,472

10,081,472

2007

1,332,500

8,785,053

10,117,553

2006

1,127,280

4,336,602

5,463,882

2005

213,000

2,332,300

2,545,300

Total

20,289,514

35,096,030

55,358,544

 



[1] Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation, “Subdirreción de Atención a Víctimas de la Violencia” (“Sub-directorate for Assistance to Victims of Violence”), www.accionsocial.gov.co; FOSYGA, www.fosyga.gov.co; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 271.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2009: COP1=US$0.00047. Oanda, www.oanda.com.

[3] Email from Klaus Koppetsch, Desk Officer, Mine Action Task Force for Humanitarian Aid, German Federal Foreign Office, 8 April 2010; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ira Amin, Intern, Multilateral Peace Policy Section, Directorate of Political Affairs, Political Affairs Division IV, Human Security, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 20 April 2010; email from Miki Nagashima, Conventional Arms Division, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2010; Italy Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 25 September 2009; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010; response to Monitor questionnaire by Vilde Rosén, Advisor, Humanitarian Disarmament Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2010; and US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2010,” Washington, DC, July 2010. Average exchange rates for 2009: €1=US$1.3935; NOK=US$0.15896; ¥=US$0.01067; C$=US$0.87627; CHF1=US$0.92081; £1=US$1.5661. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2010.