United States

Last Updated: 02 November 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on Resolution 65/48 on 8 December 2010, as in previous years

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Attended as an observer the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2010 and intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011

Key developments

Mine policy review still underway

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. A review of US policy on banning antipersonnel mines was continued in 2011.

The US was the first nation to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines in September 1994 and participated in the Ottawa Process that led to the creation of the treaty, but did not sign in 1997. The Clinton administration set the goal of joining in 2006. However, in 2004 the Bush administration announced a new policy that rejected the treaty and the goal of the US ever joining.[1] Until the Obama administration’s policy review is completed, the 2004 Bush policy remains in place, permitting the indefinite use of self-destructing, self-deactivating antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world. In accordance with the Bush policy, as of 31 December 2010 the US would no longer use antipersonnel mines that do not self-destruct and self-deactivate (sometimes called “persistent” or “dumb” mines) anywhere in the world, including in Korea.

In November 2009, the administration of President Barack Obama publicly acknowledged that a comprehensive review of US mine policy was underway.[2] The US said in December 2009 that “it will take some time to complete, given that we must ensure that all factors are considered, including possible alternatives to meet our national defense needs and security commitments to our friends and allies to ensure protection of US troops and the civilians they protect around the world.”[3] According to then-National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones, the purpose of the review is “to specifically examine the costs and benefits that would be involved in a decision to accede to the Ottawa Treaty.”[4]

During 2010, the Department of State coordinated a series of interagency meetings with representatives of civil society, the ICRC, UN agencies, and other international organizations, as well as former Clinton and Bush administration officials responsible for mine policy. The administration has also reached out to US political and military allies, including States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, for input into the policy review. In 2011, the pace of the review slowed and one official admitted in June 2011 that the US response to the “Arab Spring” was one reason for the delay in concluding the review.[5]

Since the US participated in the Second Review Conference in November 2009, it has continued to attend Mine Ban Treaty meetings as an observer.[6] The US attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2010 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011, both in Geneva. During the meetings, the US delegation met with ICBL representatives and confirmed the policy review was continuing.[7] At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, the US made a brief statement on universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, confirming that the policy review was still ongoing and noting there was no specific date by when it would be concluded.[8]

On 8 December 2010, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 65/48 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in previous years. It was one of only 17 nations to abstain.

A US Department of State cable made public by Wikileaks in August 2011 showed how the US worked to convince Pacific nations not to join the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the diplomatic cable issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2009, US officials met representatives from the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau on 2 December 1997, on the eve of the Mine Ban Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa, “at the latter three’s request to discuss their potential signature/ratification.” During the meeting, US officials warned that “the U.S. would not adhere to the Ottawa Convention and that adherence by the other three states could conflict with defense provisions of the respective bilateral Compacts of Free Association.”[9]

More than two-thirds of the US Senate wrote to President Obama in May 2010 to state strong support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and expressed confidence that, “through a thorough, deliberative review the administration can identify any obstacles to joining the Convention and develop a plan to overcome them as soon as possible.”[10]

On 30 November 2010, 16 Nobel Peace Prize laureates sent a letter to President Obama urging a US decision to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Signatories included Wangari Mathaai, Mohamed El Baradei, Shirin Ebadi, Aung San Suu Kyi, His Holiness Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Elie Wiesel, and Jody Williams.[11]  On 8 September 2010, the presidents of more than a dozen leading health associations wrote to President Obama calling on the US to join the Mine Ban Treaty.[12] 

On 1 March 2011, the 12th anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL continued its outreach campaign launched one year prior to encourage US accession to the treaty.[13] Campaigners requested visits with over 60 US embassies worldwide, resulting in 35 meetings between US officials and ICBL representatives.[14] The US Campaign to Ban Landmines and Georgetown University co-hosted an event in Washington, DC on 1 March 2011, which included the launch of a new book on the Ottawa Process to ban mines by US mine survivor Ken Rutherford.[15]

In 2011, Handicap International, which coordinates the US Campaign to Ban Landmines, was awarded the $1.5 million Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize. It used the occasion to call for the US to join the Mine Ban Treaty.[16]

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted an annual national report on 31 March 2011, as required under Article 13. The US ratified CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 21 January 2009 and submitted its initial national annual report as required by Article 10 on 6 July 2011.

Use, transfer, production, and stockpiling

The last known US use of antipersonnel mines was in 1991 during the first Gulf War.[17] There were reports in 2009 and 2010 of US forces in Afghanistan using Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[18] However, these munitions are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty if used in command-detonated mode.[19]

In February 2011, a Defense Department official confirmed to media that the US Army in December 2010 directed its field operations “to assign all stocks of persistent landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, for demilitarization (destruction).” A State Department official said, “We have ended the use of all persistent mines,” and said that Defense Department personnel in the field had been notified that “these were off the table, that they’re being moved to the inactive stockpile and are no longer an option for use.” This confirmed implementation of the 2004 policy directive to end the use of so-called persistent mines by the end of 2010. [20]

The US is retaining a small quantity of “persistent mines” for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[21]

On 26 December 2007, the comprehensive US moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines was extended for six years until 2014.[22] US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992, through a series of multi-year extensions of the moratorium.

The US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. It is one of just 12 countries left in the world that either actively produces the weapon or reserves the right to do so.[23] However, the US currently has no plans to produce antipersonnel mines in the future. There are no victim-activated munitions being funded in the procurement or the research and development budgets of the US Armed Services or Department of Defense. 

Two programs that once had the potential for victim-activated features (thereby making them antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty), but that are now solely “man-in-the-loop” (command-detonated, and therefore permissible under the treaty) are being funded: XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and IMS Scorpion.[24]

In light of the termination in 2008 of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) program, and the US policy of prohibiting use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in Korea after 2010, it appears that the approximately half a million mines stored in South Korea will be removed and destroyed.[25]

The Monitor has been reporting, based on official 2002 data, that the US has a stockpile of approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[26] However, knowledgeable sources have indicated to the Monitor that the current active stockpile is far smaller, and that millions of stockpiled mines have been removed from service and have been or will be destroyed.

 



[1] See, US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2004, www.fas.org.

[2] David Alexander, “U.S. landmines policy still under review,” Reuters (Washington, DC), 25 November 2009. The review got off to a fitful start. In what was later termed a mistake, on 24 November 2009, a US Department of State spokesperson responded to a question by stating that the Obama administration had completed a review of national mine policy and concluded the existing Bush-era policy would remain in effect and the US would not join the Mine Ban Treaty. Ian Kelly, Department Spokesperson, “Daily Press Briefing,” Department of State, Washington, DC, 24 November 2009, www.state.gov.

[3] Statement of the US, Second Review Conference, Mine Ban Treaty, Cartagena, 1 December 2009.

[4] Letter from Gen. James L. Jones, US Marine Corps (Ret.), National Security Advisor, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, 26 March 2010. He also stated they were reviewing “all mission requirements for which mines may still have a doctrinal utility. Our review seeks to determine whether each of those missions and tasks can be accomplished without the use of mines, whether through operational adaptation, the use of existing alternative systems, or the development of new technologies.”

[5] ICBL meeting with Steven Costner, Deputy Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, in Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[6] Previously, the last time the US had attended even an informal Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting (intersessional Standing Committee meeting) was in June 2005.

[7] ICBL meeting with Steven Costner, US Department of State, and Katherine Baker, Political Adviser, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, in Geneva, 1 December 2010; and ICBL meeting with Steven Costner, US Department of State, in Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[8] ICBL, “Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties: Universalizing the Treaty, 2 December 2010,” www.icbl.org.

[9] Palau acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 18 November 2007 after, according to the cable, Palau “determined that the Ottawa Convention did not conflict with the Compact of Free Association.” Micronesia remains outside the Mine Ban Treaty. The Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. The diplomatic cable provides “talking points” for US officials to respond to a “request” from the Marshall Islands for clarification on the US position on its potential ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. “Concerns on Marshall Islands Ratification of the Ottawa Convention,” US Department of State cable 09STATE91952 dated 3 September 2009, released by Wikileaks on 26 August 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net.

[10] The Senate letter was organized by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D–VT) and Sen. George Voinovich (R–OH). Letter to President Barack Obama from 68 US Senators, 18 May 2010. To join an international treaty, two-thirds of the 100-member US Senate must “provide their advice and consent.” An identical letter organized by Rep. Jim McGovern (D–MA) and Rep. Darrell Issa (R–CA) was sent to President Obama on 18 May 2010 by members of the House of Representatives. Letter to President Barack Obama from 57 members of the House of Representatives, 18 May 2010. Human Rights Watch, “US: Two-Thirds in Senate Back Landmine Ban,” Press release, 8 May 2010.

[11] The letter is available at www.nobelwomensinitiative.org.

[12] The letter is available at physiciansforhumanrights.org.

[13] ICBL, “Groups Worldwide Urge the U.S. to Ban Landmines,” Press release, 1 March 2011; and ICBL, “Time for United States to Join the Mine Ban Treaty,” Press release, 1 March 2010, www.icbl.org.

[14] Zach Hudson, “US Landmine Policy Review Moving Forward,” ICBL News, July 2010, www.icbl.org.

[15] Ken Rutherford, Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2011).

[16] Jean-Baptiste Richardier and Elizabeth MacNairn, “U.S. Should Take the Final Step to Ban Land Mines,” Roll Call, 26 July 2011, www.rollcall.com.

[17] The US last used mines in 1991 in Iraq and Kuwait, scattering 117,634 of them mostly from airplanes. US General Accounting Office, “GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on US use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, Appendix I, pp. 8–9.

[18] See for example, C.J. Chivers, “Turning Tables, U.S. Troops Ambush Taliban with Swift and Lethal Results,” New York Times, 17 April 2009, www.nytimes.com; and “Taliban displays ‘US weapons,’” Aljazeera, 10 November 2009, english.aljazeera.net.

[19] The use of Claymore mines in command-detonated mode, usually electrical detonation, is permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty, while use in victim-activated mode, usually with a tripwire, is prohibited. For many years, US policy and doctrine has prohibited the use of Claymore mines with tripwires, except in Korea. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 346.

[20] David Alexander, “U.S. halts use of long-life landmines, officials say,” Reuters (Washington, DC), 14 February 2011, www.reuters.com.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Public Law 110-161, Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Section 634(j), 26 December 2007, p. 487.

[23] The Bush administration mine policy announced in February 2004 states, “The United States will continue to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines.” See, US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2004, www.fas.org.

[24] For background on Spider and IMS, and the decision not to include victim-activated features, see Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 1,131–1,132; Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 1,040–1,041; and earlier editions of Landmine Monitor.

[25] For more details, see ICBL, “Country Profile: South Korea,” www.the-monitor.org.

[26] For details on stockpiling, see Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 1,132–1,133. In 2002, the US stockpile consisted of: Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine/ADAM (8,366,076); M14 (696,800); M16 (465,330); Claymore (403,096); Gator (281,822); Volcano/M87 (134,200); Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System/GEMSS (32,900); Pursuit Deterrent Munition/PDM (15,100); and Modular Pack Mine System/MOPMS (8,824). Information provided by the US Armed Services in spring/summer 2002, cited in US General Accounting Office, “GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on US use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, Appendix I, pp. 39–43.


Last Updated: 08 September 2011

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In 2008, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates explained the US decision not to join, stating, “The elimination of cluster munitions from our stockpiles would put the lives of our soldiers and those of our coalition partners at risk. There are no substitute munitions, and some of the possible alternatives could actually increase the damage that results from an attack.”[1] 

Under the current July 2008 Department of Defense policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO).[2] Until 2018, use of cluster munitions that exceed the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[3] A 10-year transition period was seen as “necessary to develop the new technology, get it into production, and to substitute, improve, or replace existing stocks.”[4] Also, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” were to be removed from active inventories as soon as possible, but not later than 19 June 2009. These excess cluster munitions will be demilitarized as soon as practicable.[5]

The administration of President Barack Obama has embraced the July 2008 cluster munition policy and has been working extensively to achieve a new protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) regulating some cluster munitions (See CCW section below). In March 2010, Senators Feinstein and Leahy, along with 20 other senators, and Representative Jim McGovern, reintroduced the “Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act.” The Act would limit the use and transfer of cluster munitions to those munitions that have a 99% or higher reliability rate, and would prohibit use of cluster munitions in areas where civilians are known to be present. It would also require the president to submit a plan to Congress for cleanup of cluster munition remnants if the US used cluster munitions.[6] The act had not been reported out of committee as of July 2011, although it continued to gather support in the Senate and House of Representatives. 

The US did not directly participate, even as an observer, in the diplomatic Oslo Process in 2007 and 2008 that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in late 2010 and the first half of 2011 show how the US attempted to influence its allies and partners during the Oslo Process.[7] For example, US officials sought assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not join the convention, but President Karzai instructed Afghan officials to sign at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in December 2008.[8] Twelve US diplomatic cables from the period from January 2007 to November 2008 show how the US sought to influence Japan’s engagement in the Oslo Process.[9]

During the Oslo Process the US worked hard to influence the outcome of the negotiations and address its concerns, primarily on the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations among the US and States Parties to the convention).[10] The US diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US sought to influence the draft text of the convention through its allies and how it has sought to interpret key provisions of the convention since its adoption. For example, in a December 2008 diplomatic demarche to Afghanistan, the State Department stated, “The United States reads the phrase ‘military cooperation and operations’ in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party.”[11]

The US has not engaged in any meetings related to the convention, including in 2010 and first half of 2011. It was invited to, but did not attend the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010.

Civil society groups in the US have continued to take action in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[12]

The US has not joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but in late 2009 the Obama administration began a comprehensive review of US policy on banning antipersonnel mines and accession to the treaty. Nearly two years after the policy review commenced, it had not concluded as of August 2011. 

Convention on Conventional Weapons

The US is party to the CCW and its Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. The US continued to play a leading role in the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in 2010 and in the first half 2011. 

In November 2010, the US reiterated its commitment to conclude a legally-binding instrument on cluster munitions that covers, in their view, a large proportion of cluster munitions not captured by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It supported continued CCW work on cluster munitions in 2011 and said, “We are closer to reaching agreement on admittedly difficult decisions.” However, in its statement the US representative noted that it viewed the Fourth Review Conference of CCW in November 2011 as the “end game” for CCW negotiations on cluster munitions.[13] In March 2011, the US continued to insist that a draft protocol that would provide a “substantial and immediate impact on the ground is an essential and achievable goal.”[14]

In November 2010, the US delegation claimed that the draft protocol under consideration at the time would require it to destroy nearly 50% of its stockpiles.[15] By the session in February 2011, the US clarified that a prohibition on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as proposed by the meeting chair, would capture “over 40 percent” of its current stockpiles and total nearly 2.8 million cluster munitions.[16] 

Throughout the CCW deliberations in 2010 and 2011, the US has worked intensively, including in private and during intersessional periods between meetings, to forge a compromise for a CCW protocol on cluster munitions.  It has worked to develop, as it put it in September 2010, “meaningful requirements” while accommodating proposals for a transition period, opposing a deadline for stockpile destruction, and opposing a broad definition of “cluster munition victim.” Also at this time, the US asked for “a little bit of homage to reality” from states regarding the immediate and significant humanitarian benefits of the protocol.[17]

In March 2011, the US stated that a protocol that contains an immediate prohibition on all cluster munitions produced before January 1980, contains a deadline for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, and a requirement that parties at all times use only cluster munitions with lowest possible UXO rate would “provide substantial and immediate impact on the ground.”  However, during the same session, it noted that a transition period was essential for implementation.[18]

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); and Iraq (2003).[19] The US has apparently not used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since 2002 or in Iraq since 2003.  

In June 2010, Amnesty International (AI) published a series of photographs and stated that it appears the US used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” in al-Ma’jalah in the al-Mahfad district of Abyan governorate of Yemen on 17 December 2009.[20] Neither the US nor Yemeni governments have publicly responded to AI’s allegations. An August 2010 New York Times story on US military involvement in Yemen referred to the AI report on the cruise missile cluster munition attack, noting that a “Navy ship offshore had fired the weapon in the attack.” [21] On 8 June 2010, the CMC called on the US to confirm or deny this reported use of US-manufactured cluster munitions in Yemen, but there has been no response.[22]

In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 that acknowledged the US had a role in the 17 December strike, and said that Yemeni government officials:

…continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.[23]

Production

In 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a policy memorandum stating that all submunitions reaching the “full rate” production decision by fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a failure rate of less than 1%.[24]  The US has not budgeted any money for producing new cluster munitions since 2007.[25]  Research and development activities, at the applied research level, for improving the reliability of existing submunitions as well as the development of new types of submunitions continue with programs being conducted by the Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[26] 

Transfer

The omnibus budget bill (HR 1105) signed into law on 11 March 2009 by President Obama contains a provision banning nearly all cluster bomb exports by the US.[27] The legislation also requires the receiving country to agree that cluster munitions “will not be used where civilians are known to be present.”[28] 

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual.  According to this policy, the US can only export cluster munitions that leave behind less than 1% of UXO. According to the US agency that administers weapons transfers, “At present the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). The CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban.”[29]

The most recent US exports of cluster munitions include sales to the United Arab Emirates[30] (announced September 2006 of 780 M30 GMLRS rockets), India[31] (announced September 2008 of 510 CBU-105 SFW), and most recently to Saudi Arabia (announced in June 2011 of 404 CBU-105D/B SFW). It is not known if these weapons have been delivered to the recipient countries yet.[32]

While the historical record is incomplete, the US has transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Seven signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions have declared that they possess or have already destroyed US-produced cluster munitions, including Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.

The US also licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Stockpiling

In November 2009, a US Department of State official said, “The current stockpile is huge; the Department of Defense currently holds more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.  Using our current demilitarization capabilities, it will cost $2.2 billion to destroy this stockpile.”[33]

An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the Department of Defense provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.[34]

US Stockpile of Cluster Munitions (as of 2004)[35]

Type

Number of Submunitions Per Munition

Munitions in Active Inventory

Submunitions in Active Inventory

Munitions in Total Inventory

Submunitions in Total Inventory

Rocket

ATACMS 1

950

1,091

1,036,450

1,304

1,238,800

ATACMS 1A

400

405

162,000

502

200,800

M26 MLRS

644

369,576

238,006,944

439,194

282,840,936

M26A1 MLRS

518

4,128

2,138,304

4,128

2,138,304

M261 MPSM

9

74,591

671,319

83,589

752,301

Totals

449,791

242,015,017

528,717

287,171,141

Projectile

M449 APICM

60

27

1,620

40

2,400

M449A1 APICM

60

24

1,440

49

2,940

M483/M483A1

88

3,336,866

293,644,208

3,947,773

347,404,024

M864

72

748,009

53,856,648

759,741

54,701,352

M444

18

30,148

542,664

134,344

2,418,192

Totals

4,115,074

348,046,580

4,841,947

404,528,908

Bomb

Mk-20 Rockeye

247

58,762

14,514,214

58,762

14,514,214

CBU-87 CEM

202

99,282

20,054,964

99,282

20,054,964

CBU-103 CEM WCMD

202

10,226

2,065,652

10,226

2,065,652

CBU-97 SFW

10

214

2,140

214

2,140

CBU-105 SFW WCMD

10

1,986

19,860

1,986

19,860

CBU-105 SFW P3I WCMD

10

899

8,990

899

8,990

AGM-154A JSOW-A

145

669

97,005

1,116

161,820

Totals

172,038

36,762,825

172,485

36,827,640

 

Grand Total

4,736,903

626,824,422

5,543,149

728,527,689

In February 2011, the US stated that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal for a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation.  Several of the types, such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1 were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

The October 2004 Department of Defense report to US Congress provides details on a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types that contain about 728 million submunitions.[36] However, this figure does not appear to be a full accounting of cluster munitions available to US forces. The tally apparently does not include cluster munitions that are located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[37]

The Department of Defense had not publicly reported on the removal of excess cluster munitions from stocks by June 2009, as called for in the July 2008 policy. But it appears that action has been taken. For example, the UK government told parliamentarians that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[38] In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and titled “US-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” which reported on a proposal that would provide a temporary exception to this timeline for new cluster munitions that the US brought to British territory after the 2013 deadline.[39]

Since 2000, the US has destroyed on average 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) per year at an average annual cost of $7.2 million. For fiscal year 2012, the funding for the destruction of non-missile cluster munitions and submunitions consumes 24% of the annual budget allocation for the destruction of conventional ammunitions.[40] 

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The army has requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[41]

 



[1] Letter from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Sen. Patrick Leahy, 12 September 2008.

[2] The policy memorandum was dated 19 June, but not formally released until 9 July 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defenselink.mil.  

[3] The new policy requires cluster munitions used after 2018 to meet a 1% UXO rate not only in testing, but in actual use during combat operations within the variety of operational environments in which US forces intend to use the weapon. Combatant Commander is the title of a major military leader of US Armed Forces, either of a large geographical region or of a particular military function, formerly known as a commander-in-chief.

[4] Statement by Stephen Mathias, “United States Intervention on Technical Improvements,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 15 July 2008.

[5] Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, www.defenselink.mil.  The US has not reported any details on the removal of stocks, or whether the undertaking has been completed.

[6] Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009, S. 416 and H. 981. It was first introduced in February 2007, and reintroduced in February 2009.

[7] As of early August 2011, Wikileaks had made public a total of 57 US diplomatic cables originating from 24 locations, all relating to US concerns over the Oslo Process initiative. See www.cablegatesearch.net.

[8] “Afghan Views on Cluster Munitions and Oslo Process, US Department of State cable 0STATE167308 dated 12 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 20 May 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net; and “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[9] See www.cablegatesearch.net.

[10] For detail on US policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[11] “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.wikileaks.ch.

[12] For example, US civil society groups organized several events to commemorate the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force. In Portland, Oregon, campaigners held a drumming event in the park to celebrate the occasion, and the West Virginia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Proud Students Against Landmines and Cluster Bombs made presentations to city and state government leaders, encouraging them to sign the People’s Treaty on cluster munitions.

[13] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[14] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 28 March 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[15] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[16] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 21 February 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[17] Statement by US, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 September 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[18] Statement by US, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 28 March 2011. Notes by AOAV.

[19]  For historical details on the use of cluster munitions by the US, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 262–263.

[20] The remnants in the photographs included images of the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. AI, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010, www.amnesty.org.  See also, “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010.

[21] Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Robert F. Worth, “Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents,” New York Times, 14 August 2010, www.nytimes.com.

[22] CMC, “US: Confirm or deny use of cluster munitions in Yemen,” Press release, 8 June 2010, www.stopclustermunitions.org. 

[23] “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010, www.guardian.co.uk.

[24] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. In other words, submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 must meet the new standard. According to an October 2004 Pentagon report to Congress on cluster munitions, submunitions procured in past years are exempt from the policy, but “[f]uture submunitions must comply with the desired goal of 99% or higher submunition functioning rate or must receive a waiver.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004, p. ii.

[25] For detail on the production of cluster munitions by the US from 2005 to 3007, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 263.

[26] For example, see US Air Force, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number PE 0602602F: Conventional Munitions,” February 2011, p. 6;  US Army, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602624A: Weapons and Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 5; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602000D8Z: Joint Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 13.

[27] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105), became Public Law No. 111-8, 11 March 2009. See also, Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Dianne Feinstein, “FY2009 Omnibus Bill Includes Leahy-Feinstein Provision to Prohibit Sale or Transfer of Most U.S. Cluster Munitions,” Press release, 12 March 2009, Washington, DC, feinstein.senate.gov. The sponsors of the provision characterized it as a permanent ban on exports. This view has been disputed by others, who have said that it can only apply to the one-year period funded in the bill.  Sen. Leahy included the provision again in the fiscal year 2011 appropriations bill, which had not yet been acted on by Congress as the Monitor went to print. A one-year US export ban was first enacted in a budget bill in December 2007, and extended the following year.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764), 110th Congress, 2007. In September 2008, Congress passed a continuing resolution to extend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and thus the moratorium, through 6 March 2009.

[28] US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in combat by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in Western Sahara and possibly Mauritania, by the UK, and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, and by the UK in Iraq.

[29] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Guidance on the Sale of Cluster Munitions, DSCA Policy 11-33,” Memorandum, 19 May 2011, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[30] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “United Arab Emirates: High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems,” Transmittal No. 06-55, 21 September 2006, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil. While the export of these cluster munitions is not allowed under the ban legislation, an Army officer told the trade publication Inside the Army in 2009 that the deal was signed in 2007, well before the export ban legislation was introduced, and that the army obtained legal opinions that confirm the validity of the final sale. It is not publicly known how or when this situation was resolved.

[31] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “India: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, 30 September 2008, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[32] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Press release, “Saudi Arabia: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, 13 June 2011, Washington, DC, www.dsca.mil.

[33] Statement by Harold Hongju Koh, US Department of State, Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to CCW Protocol V, 9 November 2009, geneva.usmission.gov.

[34] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[35] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004.

[36] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[37] Under this program, munitions are stored in foreign countries, but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and allied forces in the event of hostilities. The 2004 Department of Defense report also does not include SADARM cluster munitions (thought to number 715) and an unknown number of TLAM-D cruise missiles with conventional submunitions. In 1994, the stockpile, including WRSA, consisted of 8.9 million cluster munitions containing nearly 1 billion submunitions, see US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Study,” April 1996.

[38] Statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

[39] “U.S.-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” US Department of State cable 09STATE52368 dated 21 May 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010. See David de Sola, “UK offered exceptions for U.S. cluster munitions despite treaty,” CNN, 3 December 2010, edition.cnn.com.

[40] Figures and averages are compiled from annual editions of Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2012.

[41] Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” February 2011, pp. 729–730.


Last Updated: 19 June 2010

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties[1]

Thirty-seven US soldiers were killed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and 132 in Afghanistan in 2009, compared to 131 soldiers killed in Iraq, and 72 in Afghanistan in 2008.[2] It was not known how many incidents were caused by victim-activated IEDs.[3] In addition, five US soldiers were killed or injured by mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW). One US soldier was killed by a mine in Afghanistan;[4] one US soldier was killed and two were injured by an item of ERW at Camp Hansen in Okinawa, Japan;[5] and one US soldier was killed by a mine in Baghdad, Iraq.[6]

Between 1999 and 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor recorded 212 US mine/ERW/IED casualties (83 killed, 129 injured).[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW/IED survivors in the US is likely to number in the thousands. From 2001 to 1 March 2010, 967 soldiers lost at least one limb in Iraq and Afghanistan.[8]

Survivor needs

In 2009, the Joint Department of Defense/Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Disability Evaluation System (DES) piloted a single disability examination at 21 sites to assess whether 337 injured active duty soldiers should be discharged from the military based on injuries, wounds, or illnesses incurred during their service. Based on the information collected, it assisted the pilot participants in transitioning to civilian life with access to the benefits and services available to them through the DVA.[9]

Victim assistance coordination

Government coordinating body/ focal point

DVA

Coordinating mechanism(s)

None

Plan

DVA 2006―2011 Strategic Plan

 

The DVA is the lead government agency that assists all veterans, including those disabled from mines/ERW/IEDs, with offices in each of the 50 states, the Philippines, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.[10] The DVA Office of Survivors Assistance is the primary advisor to the government on policies and programs affecting survivors and dependents of deceased veterans and service members.[11]

Survivor inclusion

In February 2009, Tammy Duckworth, a disabled US veteran, was appointed as an assistant secretary of the DVA, helping to “overhaul the agency” with a goal of reducing bureaucratic obstacles to disability benefits.[12]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2009

DVA

Government

Advocacy, rehabilitation, disability benefits, medical, reintegration

Increased  the available number of prosthetic providers, and capacity of mental health services

Department of Labor

Government

Economic inclusion

New employment project for disabled veterans

Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans for America

NGO

Advocacy

No change

Wounded Warrior Project

NGO

Advocacy

No change

 

In 2009, the DVA increased the number of local accredited orthopedic and prosthetic providers to ensure decentralized access to physical rehabilitation care. As of March 2010, it had contracted more than 600 local orthopedic and prosthetic providers.[13] The DVA also added additional mental health clinicians and increased its psychological support capacity to treat veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), though stigma around mental health prevented many veterans from accessing available services.[14]

In January 2009, the Department of Labor initiated the “America’s Heroes at Work” employment pilot project to coordinate employment opportunities for veterans with Traumatic Brain Injury and/or PTSD and document best practices to help employers hire, accommodate, and retain veterans in the workplace.[15]

In 2009, the Wounded Warrior Project identified a number of shortcomings in the DVA’s Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment program. These included insufficient, temporary support payments for disabled veterans; too few counselors attending to program participants; insufficient reimbursement of program participation expenses; and a lack of long-term measurement mechanisms to quantify program success.[16]

On 30 July 2009, the US signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but had not ratified it as of June 2010.



[1] In 2009, no mine/ERW casualties were identified on US territory; three ERW casualties were identified in 2008. Previously, Landmine Monitor did not report such incidents. Steve Szkotak, “Civil War cannonball kills Virginia relic collector,” The Boston Globe (Chester), 2 May 2008, www.boston.com; and Chelsea J. Carter, “Military cracks down on scrap-metal scavengers,” The Seattle Times (Twentynine Palms), 13 May 2008, seattletimes.nwsource.com.

[2] “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count: IED Fatalities by Cause of Death,” icasualties.org.

[3] Like landmines, victim-activated explosive devices are triggered by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor analysis of media reports and US Department of Defense casualty reports from 1 January to 31 December 2009.

[4] Stephanie Gaskell, “As family says goodbye to Bronx marine who fell in Afghanistan, brother blames himself for loss,” Daily News (New York), 9 January 2009, www.nydailynews.com.

[5] Eric Talmadge, “60 years after Second World War, Okinawa still rife with bombs,” Canada East, 3 May 2009, www.canadaeast.com.

[6] US Department of Defense, “DoD Identifies Army Casualty,” Press release, No. 224-09, 7 April 2009, www.defense.gov.

[8] “As amputee ranks grow, wounded warriors bond,” Watertown Daily Times, 25 March 2010; and Kimberly Hefling, “Military sees increase in wounded in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, 11 November 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com.

[9] DVA, “Fiscal Year 2009 Performance and Accountability Report: VA’s Performance,” www4.va.gov, p.20.

[10] DVA, www.va.gov.

[11] DVA, Office of Survivors Assistance, www.va.gov/survivors.

[12] Ed O’Keefe, “She is the face of the new generation: At VA and among vets, Duckworth is trying to reshape perceptions,” Washington Post, 11 November 2009, www.washingtonpost.com.

[13] DVA, Prosthetic and Sensory Aids Service, Orthotic & Prosthetic Services, www.prosthetics.va.gov.

[14] Alex Parker, “Back home, veterans fight different kind of war,” Chicago Tribune, 6 November 2009, www.chicagotribune.com.

[15] US Department of Labor, “America's Heroes at Work Employment Pilot,” www.americasheroesatwork.gov.

[16] Wounded Warrior Project, “2010 Policy Agenda,” www.woundedwarriorproject.org, pp.13–14.


Last Updated: 29 July 2011

Support for Mine Action

In 2010 the United States contributed US$129,579,834 in mine action funding.[1] Afghanistan and Iraq received the largest US contributions, and together they constituted 45% of US funding in 2010, a 2% increase from 2009. Seven recipients each received at least $4.5 million.

The US provided support to two institutions engaged in victim assistance activities globally and provided support to 30 states and four areas through 50 organizations, and one trust fund—the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).[2]

The US was the largest victim assistance donor in 2010 with a contribution of $15,012,376 to nine  countries, the ICRC,[3] the International Society of Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO), and the US-based NGO Motivation. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund provided more than $8 million of the contributions for victim assistance. The State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) provided an additional $7 million to eight countries[4] for victim assistance.

In addition to the $129.6 million in mine action funding, the US also contributes to mine action through its military-to-military humanitarian mine action training program and the provision of new demining equipment for field testing in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. In 2010 these activities were valued at more than $12 million.[5]

Contributions by recipient: 2010[6]

Recipient

Sector

Amount
($)

Afghanistan

Clearance; victim assistance

33,820,000

Iraq

Clearance; victim assistance; risk education

24,914,000

Angola

Clearance

9,850,000

Cambodia

Clearance;  victim assistance; risk education

5,542,000

Lao PDR

Clearance; victim assistance; risk education

5,102,000

Sri Lanka

Clearance; victim assistance

4,717,000

Vietnam

Clearance; victim assistance

4,533,000

Colombia

Victim assistance; clearance; risk education

4,026,000

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Clearance

3,800,000

Sudan

Clearance

3,600,000

Lebanon

Clearance; victim assistance

2,750,000

Tajikistan

Clearance

2,478,390

Croatia

Clearance

2,130,000

Jordan

Clearance; victim assistance

2,106,000

Georgia

Clearance

2,000,000

Mozambique

Clearance

2,000,000

Peru

Clearance; victim assistance

2,000,000

Serbia

Clearance

1,480,000

ISPO, Motivation

Victim assistance

1,350,672

Ethiopia

Victim assistance

1,328,000

Somalia

Clearance

1,200,000

Kosovo

Clearance

1,100,000

Yemen

Clearance; victim assistance

1,065,000

Guinea Bissau

Clearance

1,000,000

Nagorno-Karabakh

Clearance

1,000,000

Azerbaijan

Clearance; victim assistance

893,000

Abkhazia

Clearance

850,000

Somaliland

Clearance

800,000

Pakistan

Risk education

516,407

Nepal

Victim assistance

500,000

Senegal

Clearance

500,000

Ecuador

Clearance

183,000

Albania

Victim assistance

167,704

Montenegro

Clearance

150,000

Macedonia

Clearance

127,661

Total

 

129,579,834

The US allocated 87% of its mine action support in 2010 for clearance activities.

Contributions by thematic sector: 2010[7]

Sector

Amount
($)

% of total contribution

Clearance

113,256,051

87.40

Victim assistance

15,012,376

11.59

Risk education

1,311,407

1.01

Total

129,579,834

100

USAID Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund: 2010[8]

Recipient

Amount
($)

Colombia

1,500,000

Ethiopia

1,328,000

Lao PDR

1,180,000

ISPO

1,012,824

Vietnam

1,000,000

Lebanon

750,000

Cambodia

500,000

Nepal

500,000

Motivation

337,848

Sri Lanka

300,000

Total

8,408,672

The US allocates the majority of its mine action funding through the WRA. Additional funding is allocated through the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID and the Department of Defense’s Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program.

The US contribution in 2010 increased by 9% from 2009. From 2006–2010 the US contribution for mine action totaled $497.53 million, with an annual contribution averaging $99,506,733.

Summary of contributions: 2006–2010[9]

Year

Amount
($)

% change from previous year

2010

129,579,834

+9

2009

118,703,831

+40

2008

85,000,000

+22

2007

69,800,000

-26

2006

94,500,000

+15

Total

497,533,665

N/A

N/A = not applicable

 



[1] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2011,” Washington, DC, July 2011.

[2] The US contributions to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia were made via the ITF.

[3] The US contribution to Ethiopia was to support the ICRC's rehabilitation centers in the country.

[4]  The WRA funded victim assistance projects in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Colombia, Lao PDR, Peru, and Vietnam.

[5] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2011,” Washington, DC, July 2011.

[6] Ibid; and USAID, “Leahy War Victims Fund,” www.usaid.gov.

[7] Contributions for 2009 are for the 1 September 2008 to 30 October 2009 US fiscal year.

[8] USAID, “Leahy War Victims Fund,” www.usaid.gov.

[9] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: United States: Support for Mine Action,” www.the-monitor.org, 18 October 2010.