Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. While it has not adopted national implementation legislation,[1] in August 2012 a committee was established to develop a “regulation” for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Committee members include the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, as well as the NGOs Mine Detection Dog Center and the Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization.[2]

Afghanistan has submitted nine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports.[3] Its most recent report covered the period of 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011.

Afghanistan participated in the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2010 in Phnom Penh, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012. Afghanistan participated extensively in the sessions on victim assistance, and made presentations on mine clearance at both meetings.  

Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and so is not a party to the CCW or its protocols on mines and explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. There have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups in recent years.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007,[4] eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[5] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that as of April 2007, it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines,[6] and later reported that in calendar year 2007, it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines.[7] How many of those were found and destroyed after the October 2007 declaration of completion is not known.

In Afghanistan’s Article 7 report covering calendar year 2011, it reported that mine stockpiles continue to be recovered during military operations, turned in during disarmament programs, and discovered by civilians. A total of 2,850 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2011, including 1,001 Iranian-produced YM-1 mines and 124 improvised mines.[8]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan does not retain any mines. It stated in its 2012 Article 7 report that “Afghanistan does not require retention of live mines for its training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques. All mine bodies used in these programmes have had their fuzes removed and destroyed and are no longer capable of being used.”[9] Previously, in June 2011, the chief of operations of MACCA confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[10] All mines retained by Afghanistan are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[11]

Use

Conflict in Afghanistan intensified in 2011, but decreased somewhat during the first half of 2012. There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by Coalition or Afghan national forces, but an increase in the use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed groups has been recorded.

Non-state armed groups

There has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces.

In February and July 2012, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released reports stating that armed groups in Afghanistan are deploying large numbers of pressure-plate, victim-activated, explosive devices.[12] UNAMA shares the view of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that victim-activated IEDs are de facto mines; that is, they function as antipersonnel mines. In 2011, UNAMA reported that the majority of pressure-plate IEDs are set to detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and frequently contain up to 20kg of explosive, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine. As a result of this design and configuration, these explosive weapons “effectively act as a massive antipersonnel landmine with the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step or drive over these IEDs have no defense against them and little chance of survival. Additionally a significant number of IEDs are encountered with explosive weight of approximately 2–4 kg specifically designed to maim or kill individuals on foot.”[13]  Two vehicles carrying 5,000 IEDs were captured by Afghan border patrol officers in Kandahar province in March 2012.[14] UNAMA has called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their members from using pressure-plate IEDs.[15]

Previously, in July 2011, on the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the allegation and said their explosive devices are command-detonated and do not use pressure plates.[16] Throughout 2011 and in the first half of 2012, the Taliban have continued to claim responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[17]

Use of victim-activated IEDs is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, because they function like antipersonnel mines, but use of command-detonated IEDs is not banned. Previously, the Monitor has reported that the vast majority of IED attacks did not involve victim-activated antipersonnel mines, even though media reports frequently attributed attacks to “landmines.”

Antipersonnel mines continue to be recovered by Afghan and ISAF forces. A non-exhaustive media survey by the Monitor found that 369 antipersonnel mines were reported to have been recovered in 26 different incidents between June 2011 and July 2012 by either ISAF, Afghan or combined forces.[18]

 

Contamination and Impact

In terms of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), Afghanistan remains one of the most contaminated countries in the world. This is mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[1] The Article 5 deadline extension request prepared by the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) estimated the number of remaining hazards as of November 2011 at 5,661, covering 617km².[2] By April 2012, after further clearance and cancellation, MACCA’s estimate had greatly decreased to 571.73km².[3]

Remaining Contamination by Device[4]

*AIED = abandoned improvised explosive device; AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle. Since submitting the Extension Request, MACCA has dropped the term ‘abandoned IEDs’ and refers only to IEDs.[5]

Mines

Afghanistan is affected by a wide array of mine types but mostly by Iranian, Pakistani, and Soviet antipersonnel mines and much smaller numbers of antivehicle mines, including Italian minimum-metal mines. Areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines account for almost half the total contaminated area and impact around 70% of Afghanistan’s total mine/ERW-affected population. Antivehicle mines pose another distinct problem. Although far fewer in number, mined areas containing only this mine-type are spread across some 254km² and the minimum metal content of most antivehicle mines further complicates detection.

However, estimates of the extent of mine contamination have fluctuated in recent years as a result of new finds by returning refugees, further survey, and an audit of data by MACCA.[6] A 2005 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified some 715km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) for mines/ERW that affected 2,368 communities and more than four million people.[7] Estimates peaked at 852km² at the end of 2007, but a year later the estimate dropped to 689km². Afghanistan reports clearing more than 863km² of mine and battle area in the last five years, but as a result of new finds, the overall estimate of contamination has remained close to 600km². In April 2012, MACCA estimated antipersonnel mine contamination at 308.2km².[8]

Cluster munition remnants

Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request reports 22 remaining submunition hazards covering a total of 7.64km²,[9] contaminated with US BLU-97 submunitions.[10] US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002.[11]

Improvised explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war

Afghanistan contends with extensive ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as some abandoned explosive ordnance. Most date back to the period of Soviet occupation and the ensuing civil war, but increasing conflict in recent years has resulted in additional ERW contamination.[12] The US Air Force recorded 4,896 sorties with weapons releases in 2011, albeit marginally less than the previous year (5,101).

The insurgency has also resulted in growing contamination by improvised explosive devices (IEDs); some of these are designed to be victim-activated while others are designed to be triggered by remote control. Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request identified 28 abandoned IED hazardous areas covering a total of 5.21km² (data as of November 2011), but the full extent of the problem is not known.[13] The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan does not disclose precise data on the types of IEDs it clears or the location of IED incidents or suspected IED hazards in contested areas.

MACCA previously applied the term “abandoned IEDs” to devices left in locations that were no longer contested. In 2012 it dropped the term “abandoned” and now reports only IEDs. As a majority of IEDs are victim-activated, MACCA records IED-contaminated areas in the database as minefields with IEDs shown in the ‘type of device’ field.[14]

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government elements used IEDs “more frequently and more widely” in 2011. IED explosions recorded by the UN in 2011 were 6% higher than in 2010, with an average of 23 IED explosions every day, killing 967 civilians and injuring 1,567. This made IEDs the biggest single cause of civilian deaths, accounting for one-third of the total. Most casualties were caused by victim-activated IEDs.[15] The number of civilian casualties from IEDs dropped by 15% in the first six months of 2012; however, UNAMA reported that “most IEDs causing civilian casualties had not been directed at a specific military objective, but rather were placed routinely on civilian roadsides, resulting in indiscriminate deaths and injuries of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law. As a result, many IED incidents that resulted in civilian casualties could amount to war crimes.”[16]

ISAF, cited by UNAMA, reported that about two-thirds of the devices it deals with are victim-activated and that many have 20kg of explosive charge, double the standard charge of an antivehicle mine, but they have a trigger mechanism with the sensitivity of an antipersonnel mine.[17]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), set up by the UN in 1989 and coordinated by MACCA,[18] is a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS); until 2012 it was under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management supported by an UNMAS project office, providing technical advice; administering donor funds provided for clearance and coordination through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF); and monitoring and evaluating project implementation [19]

As of January 2012, MACCA had eight international staff members and 339 national staff members. From April 2012, no international staff remained in MACCA and UNMAS expected the number of international staff in its project office to fall to four by March 2013.[20]

MACCA’s restructuring is taking place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had “entrusted interim responsibility” for coordinating mine action to the UN.[21] In 2008, a government interministerial board assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), which reports to the Office of the Second Vice President.[22] The DMC moved its offices into MACCA’s Kabul headquarters in May 2008 and, as of March 2012, had 13 civil servants occupying posts partnering MACCA staff.[23]

DMC participation in these posts was seen as a step towards developing DMC capacity to match the mine action expertise of MACCA’s Afghan staff and take up a management role. However, Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request notes that “it has gradually been accepted by the government, the UN and other stakeholders that this is not possible and a better way forward would be to find modalities to absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.”[24]

MACCA continues to coordinate planning and delivery of mine action, to set priorities, and to maintain a national database of hazards recording the results of humanitarian mine action while also advocating for donor support.[25] It has seven sub-offices called Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs)[26] to coordinate and monitor mine and ERW clearance activities in the provinces and also to liaise with other UN and international agencies, government departments, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.[27]

Since 2009, MACCA has shifted its role from assigning clearance tasks for implementing partners (IPs) to focus instead on oversight, strategic planning, and coordinating operations while encouraging IPs to plan and manage tasks within the strategic framework.[28] MACCA now provides IPs with a list of planning criteria, priorities, and a dataset of hazards. Funds provided through the VTF are allocated to specific projects. IPs submit work plans to MACCA setting out the tasks they propose to undertake. MACCA assesses and, where necessary, negotiates amendments to these plans with IPs to ensure they address MACCA priorities, achieve a geographic balance, and avoid duplication or overlap. MACCA tells donors and IPs that “an output reported only in terms of square meters cleared is not … acceptable.”[29]

Afghanistan’s mine action program for the 11 years to March 2023 is set down in the Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted in March 2012. The request provides for clearing all antivehicle mines and ERW hazards as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidates the 5,661 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 314 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects will be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.[30]

The request plans for 94 of the tasks to be tackled in the first two years,[31] underlining how clearance is heavily frontloaded in the initial years of the extension period. According to its clearance milestones, almost three-quarters (72%) of antipersonnel mine hazards covering 55% of the antipersonnel-mine-affected areas will be cleared by 2015, the third year of the extension period, together with 52% of antivehicle mine hazards covering almost one-third of antivehicle-mine-affected land, and 85% of battle area hazards covering 73% of battle-area-type land.[32]

Land Release

Despite escalating insurgency in many parts of the country, MAPA released a total of 181km² through mine and battle area clearance (BAC) in 2011, 6.5% more than the previous year. Eight humanitarian organizations accounted for almost all mined area clearance as well as more than 70% of battle area hazards.

Five-year summary of clearance[33]

Increased productivity was helped by financial support that allowed the program’s staffing to increase to 14,764, up from around 14,000 the previous year. MACCA recorded total funding of US$132.6 million for the Afghan year 1390 (April 2011 to March 2012), including approximately $20 million in multi-year funding that would be used in Afghan year 1391. A further $45 million was for commercial operators and MACCA expected the commercial figure to rise.[34]

However, operators expressed concern that funding appeared likely to decline with the accelerating departure of international forces in 2013, and this will necessitate cuts in manpower.[35] HALO Trust, the biggest operator in Afghanistan, expected to reduce the number of clearance teams by 37 from 161 to 124 in 2012 because of reduced funding.[36]

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); the two international NGOs are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO.[37] Three more demining NGOs were accredited in 2011, including Mines Advisory Group, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, and the Organization for Project Service in Afghanistan.[38]

Ten new Afghan commercial companies were accredited with MACCA in 2011: Afghan Greenfield Demining (AGD), Kawoon Demining Co. (KDC), Koshan Mine Action (KMA), Nasir Mine Clearance Co. (NMCC), Nejat Demining Co. (NDC), Storm Afghanistan Demining Co., Starlight Afghan Demining Co. (SADC), Standard Demining Co. (SDC), Dalam Mine Clearance Co. (SMCC), and Wahdat Demining Co. (WDC).[39]

Survey in 2011

HALO had nine survey teams working in 2011 which identified 542 new mined areas, covering 32.09km², and 90 battle areas, covering 44.1km², most of it in the Panjshir Valley in areas that were not covered by the 2003 Afghan LIS. HALO believes mined areas identified in the Panjshir Valley’s Khawak Pass are the last antipersonnel mined areas of “truly significant size” remaining in Afghanistan. Survey teams also resurveyed 197 mined areas, resulting in cancellation of 11.79km² and five battle areas resulting in cancellation of 1.7km². Through additional survey, HALO teams cancelled 56 mined areas covering 10.37km² and 99 battlefields over 101.54km². The net result of HALO’s survey activity was to add 486 mined areas covering 9.94km² to the database of contaminated areas and to remove nine battle areas covering 59.16km².[40]

MCPA operated 13 ‘Landmine Impact Assessment Teams’ (LIATs) and reported they conducted polygon surveys on 12.35km² and post-clearance impact assessments on a further 14.5km².[41]

In view of the extensive cancellation of hazards and new discoveries of mined areas in recent years, MACCA committed in its Article 5 deadline Extension Request to undertake a non-technical survey (NTS) of the whole country, including communities that previous survey indicated did not have any ERW. The “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey,” conducted mainly by teams from HALO and MCPA (the two operators with most experience and survey capacity), started in April 2012 and is planned to take two years to complete. All survey teams will have explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity to conduct spot clearance of most types of UXO and will call teams with enhanced capacity to deal with any UXO they are unable to dispose of. Uncertain funding meant it was unclear what capacity would be available to implement the survey. MACCA said it required at least 35 teams but as of May planned for 17 teams from HALO and 12 from MCPA (while also reporting that DDG could provide three survey teams).[42]

In response to the shortfall, HALO and MCPA conducted training in NTS on behalf of MACCA for senior operations staff of ATC, DAFA, MDC, OMAR and Sterling International to enable the EOD capacity of these organizations to participate in the survey.[43]

MACCA expected teams to survey 10 affected and 40 unaffected communities each month. It also planned to retain three survey teams in each of Afghanistan’s seven regions throughout the plan period to conduct regular survey of recorded hazards, assess new requests for clearance, conduct assessments needed for large development projects, and respond to EOD call-outs.[44]

The survey will fulfill a number of other objectives. Unlike previous surveys, it aims to cover all 32,448 officially-defined communities in Afghanistan and to progress towards an end state by getting communities with no known hazard to sign a statement to that effect, drawing on the experience of HALO’s completion initiative in Mozambique. The survey also provides setting up community focal points to open lines of communication in the event of subsequent ERW finds. MACCA has established a telephone hotline and email address for communities to report ERW hazards or casualties.[45]

Completion of the survey in two years, however, will be challenged by issues of access and security and also by the discovery of more communities than those in the official listings, an issue already encountered by HALO and MCPA in the initial months of the survey.[46] Implementing partners involved in the survey meet monthly to review progress and address any issues arising.

Mine clearance in 2011

After substantial increases in capacity and productivity in 2010, mine clearance rate stayed level in 2011, with the amount of land cleared marginally up (0.1%), while the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed fell by about the same amount.

Mine clearance in 2011[47]

ATC, DAFA, and MCPA reported increased productivity in 2011 but all other IPs saw their clearance rate level or slightly reduce. After a significant rise in capacity and clearance results in 2010, HALO operated with significantly fewer staff in 2011 (3,600 at the end of 2011, down from 3,724 a year earlier), and cleared slightly less mined areas. HALO noted that, due to the security concerns, it was unable to operate in Samangan and Kunduz provinces where it has traditionally worked; instead, HALO concentrated resources in other areas of the north. In these areas, progress was slowed by high levels of metal contamination.[48]

One-fifth of known mine hazards representing 43% of mine-contaminated land are in areas ranked by the UN Department of Safety and Security as highly or extremely insecure, but MAPA operated in districts in every region of the country, including areas inaccessible to international organizations, as a result of their perceived political neutrality. In areas too insecure even for the Afghan IPs’ core staff, IPs supported so-called community-based demining (CBD). MACCA reported that the number of CBD teams increased from 137 in 2010 to 167 in 2011, operated by ATC, DAFA, MCPA, MDC and OMAR. In 2011, they accounted for US$24.57 million, almost one-fifth of humanitarian mine action spending.[49] Some IPs acknowledge difficulties in monitoring and managing CBDs, but an additional concern is the inclination in some communities to treat minefields as an economic and job creation opportunity.[50]

After delays over contract negotiations, the commercial demining firm EOD Technology (EODT) started work on a United Arab Emirates-funded project designed to clear Kandahar, one of Afghanistan’s most conflicted provinces, of all high- and medium-priority hazards within two years ending in November 2013. The project involves clearing 216 hazards estimated to cover a total of 25.27km². As of March 2012, MACCA reported it had cleared 0.88km², destroying five antipersonnel mines and 3,096 ERW.[51] However, operational start-up proved challenging because of difficulties encountered in recruiting clearance staff in local communities and security. A senior Afghan staff member was shot dead in Kandahar city in 2011, and EODT is unable to access two of the province’s 10 districts because of security problems. The project had targeted clearing 1km² a month but had been achieving 0.3km² to 0.4km².[52]

Among projects contracted by UNOPS in 2010, OMAR ended work in Ghazni City in December 2011 after clearing 29 hazards covering 3.27km² and destroying 101 antipersonnel mines, 71 antivehicle mines, and 8,073 items of UXO. ATC also completed a one-year, US$3 million project clearing 44 priority hazards covering 2.34km² as the first phase of a Kabul City Clearance Plan, designed to finally remove all hazards from the capital and free land for its rapidly expanding population. Plans for a second phase, focused on 26 medium and low priority hazards covering 1.53km², were awaiting funding.[53]

MDC and DAFA continued clearance of abandoned IEDs at Nowzad in Helmand province under a US-funded project to clear 7km² using community-based demining teams which was started in April 2010. After two years, MDC reported the project had destroyed 430 IEDs, 101 antipersonnel mines, 25 antivehicle mines, and more than 2,330 ERW, opening the way for civilian resettlement. DAFA won a second contract in 2012, also US-funded, for clearance at Kajaki in Helmand province, the location of a hydroelectric dam, which also involved clearance of abandoned IEDs as well as other ERW; as of May, DAFA had started training community-based teams for demining and EOD.[54]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013.

In March 2012, Afghanistan submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline which set a precedent by committing itself on humanitarian grounds to clear not just antipersonnel mines as required by the treaty but all antivehicle mines and ERW, which MACCA reports accounts for 80% of accidents. The request states that “the target for Afghanistan to reach Ottawa Convention compliance is clearance of 4,151 AP [antipersonnel] minefields covering 306.81km². From a humanitarian perspective, Afghanistan cannot focus only on AP removal at the expense of AT [antitank] and BF [battlefield] removal. There are AT minefields and BF with a higher priority for clearance than some AP minefields. Therefore, 1,319 AT minefields covering 253.9km² and 191 ERW contaminated areas (BF) covering 56.27km² are also included in the work plan.”[55]

Remaining contamination[56]

The work plan, prepared in consultation with and endorsed by all IPs, concentrates clearance in the early years of the extension period. It provides for removing 1,137 hazards and releasing 92.17km² in Afghan Year 1391 (2012–2013), substantially less than in 2011, dropping to removal of 188 hazards and release of 32.29km² in 1401 (2022–2023). Budget estimates similarly drop from US$86.2 million in 1391 to $45.5 million in Year 1401. The request clarifies the number of clearance teams needed for the different hazardous areas (whether from antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW), and plans for the total to drop from 626 teams in the first year to 250 in the last. MACCA believes the clearance targets are conservative and that although Afghanistan is one of the most heavily contaminated countries, it may be possible with sustained international financial support to complete clearance of all mine and ERW hazards before the extension deadline.[57]

Though the ICBL concluded the plan is among the most thorough and comprehensive extension requests yet submitted to the Meeting of States Parties, it also concluded that the plan represents a best-case scenario. Sustained funding for both the clearance role and MACCA’s important coordinating role are uncertain because international forces are preparing to start pulling out of Afghanistan in 2014. Other key challenges include high levels of insecurity, continuing new finds of legacy minefields, and the transition to national ownership in a period of political transition for Afghanistan.[58]

Contamination by victim-activated IEDs is a growing issue for Afghanistan’s mine action program presented by the insurgency; these IEDs are recognized by UNAMA and MACCA as antipersonnel mines and are therefore part of Afghanistan’s Article 5 clearance obligations.[59] It is uncertain who will clear them. MACCA, following UNMAS safety guidelines, distinguishes between “operational” IEDs in areas of conflict and “remnants.” If an IP has appropriate training and equipment, MACCA considers it acceptable for an IP to undertake IED clearance provided sufficient time has passed between the time an IED was laid and the clearance; this waiting period is to avoid compromising the partner’s neutrality.[60]

Most civilian mine action organizations, humanitarian and commercial, believe that primary responsibility for IED clearance lies with security forces and that current UNMAS guidelines are inadequate. As mentioned above, MACCA and the implementing partners see a risk that involvement in any IED clearance would undermine their perceived neutrality, expose them to attack by anti-government elements, and curtail access to areas where they can now operate. Moreover, information held by security forces on the locations of, types of, and disarming procedures for IEDs is classified and not accessible to civilian demining organizations. The US has spent tens of millions of dollars training Afghan National Army and Police in IED disposal but capacity remains insufficient; with the approaching withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, the US started promoting the idea of implementing partner engagement in IED clearance in 2012.[61]

 Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2011

MACCA reported no clearance of cluster munitions in 2011. HALO reported that known cluster munition tasks in its operating area were in the areas of the northeast that were inaccessible due to security problems.[62] RONCO reported its operators had found an old cache of 200 barrels of cluster munitions buried at Kabul International Airport.[63]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022.

MACCA estimates submunitions contaminate a total of 7.64km².[64] The request Afghanistan submitted for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline provides for clearance of all ERW, including submunitions, by 2020.[65]

Battle area clearance in 2011

Total battle area clearance (BAC), conducted mainly by 10 humanitarian organizations, was slightly higher in 2011 than the previous year, but the number of UXO items destroyed was only one-third of the number in 2010. That reflected a sharp drop in UXO destroyed by HALO, which had accounted for 45% of all UXO cleared through BAC in 2010, partly because HALO reduced their BAC and EOD teams and partly because some of the remaining teams were used on a surface and sub-surface sampling project in the second half of the year. However, all operators recorded lower clearance of items.

Three international commercial operators, G4S, RONCO and RELYANT, accounted for more than three-quarters of the total BAC reported by 16 commercial companies. G4S continued to work as a subcontractor to ECC International on a contract for expansion of the US base at Bagram (expected to run to the end of 2012), but commercial operators expect the approaching withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan will cut back much of the work related to military and police base development that has sustained commercial companies in recent years. RONCO, undertaking a contract for the US Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) until March 2011, had already reduced staff from around 1,000 in 2011 to a little over 100 by May 2012.[66]

Battle area clearance in 2011[67]

Dyncorps International, working under contract to the US Department of State, operated seven 12-member EOD teams doing village-by-village clearance of UXO, tasked by MACCA’s AMACs and responding to local calls until the end of March 2012. From April, management of the teams was taken up by Sterling International, which deployed six teams to provinces, with a seventh standing by for deployment where requested.[69]

Quality management

Every IP is believed to have internal quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) mechanisms. MACCA has conducted external quality assurance through a three-person unit in Kabul and 40 staff located in the seven regional AMACs offices monitoring the work of IPs through site visits. MACCA reported that external QA visits have averaged more than 3,000 a year since 2006. In 2012, MACCA has reduced its staffing of AMACs, resulting in less on-site visits and placing more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of IPs’ standards and operations through quarterly reviews of each project and procedures for renewing accreditation. MACCA has also developed a separate standard for investigating incidents.[70]

Since 2009, MACCA has operated a “balanced scorecard” measuring the performance of IPs on a quarterly basis against a set of four indicators (operations, quality management, demining accidents, and reporting) for assessing demining operations and three indicators (operations, quality management, and reporting) for risk education (RE). Data on performance drawn from the IMSMA database is shared with IPs who then confirm the score.[71]

Safety of demining personnel

MACCA reported 22 demining casualties among seven humanitarian operators and one commercial company, G4S, in 2011. The casualties included four fatalities, two of them deminers working for DDG and two for MDC. Two MDC deminers from a community-based team were killed in separate incidents clearing abandoned IEDs at Nowzad in southwestern Helmand province in January 2012. An accident investigation said that in one incident the deminer had detonated an abandoned IED by working with a pick axe instead of a bayonet while not wearing a visor but concluded the main contributing factor was inadequate supervision by the demining team’s command group.[72]

Two copper mine laborers were injured in December 2011 by the explosion of a fuze that had been missed on a site cleared by MDC.[73]

Insurgency and banditry continued to pose the main threat to the safety of deminers in 2011, when 13 personnel were killed and 33 injured in 43 security incidents and a total of 227 mine action staff were abducted, of whom 222 were later released. A range of equipment was lost in those incidents, including 14 vehicles and 83 mine detectors, along with mobile phones, GPS devices and cameras.[74] Among the security incidents in 2011, five DAFA deminers were killed in an attack in western Farah province in July when anti-government elements abducted 31 staff. Two other DAFA staff were killed in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. An MDC staff member was killed in a shooting incident in Logar, an Afghan staff member of EODT was shot dead in Kandahar City, and a HALO driver was killed in Kapisa province in November 2011 when a 107mm rocket hit the vehicle in which he was sleeping.[75]

Risk Education

Mine/ERW RE is coordinated by MACCA according to plans drawn up by the Ministry of Education, MACCA, and the DMC, focusing on developing long term, community-based RE. MACCA assigns communities priority for RE according to a set of indicators giving the highest score to areas with recent casualties. The Ministry of Education has already adopted RE in the school curriculum for grades 7 and above, and schools have RE committees that include teachers, parents, and students. MACCA and the Ministry of Education coordinate training of teachers; by the end of 2011 nearly 20,000 teachers had been trained. The Ministry of Education has established focal points in 20 provinces to provide RE training to teachers, parents and students and has launched an additional initiative in June 2011 calling on schools to contribute to reporting of casualties. The Ministry of Education and AAR Japan also broadcast RE messages on radio and television.[76]

MACCA aims to integrate RE into the activities of key governmental and social organizations; since 2010, MACCA has also been working with the ministries of religious affairs, and information and culture, and the National Solidarity Programme of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to strengthen delivery and public reach of RE messages.[77]

MACCA has also started to address the issues of IEDs in RE materials, although given the political/security sensitivity of the issue, materials do not refer to IEDs but to “suspicious objects.” Distribution of kits containing action cards and posters to schools in Kabul and to centers for returnees started on a trial basis.[78]

A 2012 study of RE recommended that priority should be given to community mine action liaison that focuses on all aspects of mine action, not on delivering either RE or clearance. The study found that communities have shown a desire and capacity to spread RE and noted that mass media campaigns, although effective in raising the profile of an issue, do not produce lasting behavioral change and are very expensive. It said all deminers should be trained to share basic RE messages when interacting with communities and that RE trainers and local volunteers should be kept informed of local clearance activity. The study found that communities had a high level of trust in deminers, and that threats and attacks on deminers are not a result of broad-based dissatisfaction but “driven by financial incentives, political motivations, and a general opposition to ‘outsiders’ or ‘unknowns.’”[79]

 

Casualties Overview

For 2011, the Monitor identified at least 812 casualties due to mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Afghanistan. Mines of all types, including victim-activated IEDs, caused the most casualties (436). The vast majority of casualties in 2011, 716 or some 88% of the total, were civilian. Children (373) made up at least 52% of the civilian casualties where the age was known.[1] At least 49 civilian casualties were girls and 51 were women. There were 71 military casualties, including two women.[2] Clearance accidents caused 25 casualties among deminers.

Media monitoring identified 331 casualties of victim-activated IED/undefined mine types  in 2011,[3] a slight decrease from the 383 casualties recorded in 2010, which had marked a rise of more than 30% from 2009. In 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was quoted as saying that “two-thirds of all IEDs used in Afghanistan, and the vast majority that kill civilians, are designed to be triggered by a weight of between 10-100 kilograms,”[4] which places them clearly within the definition of anti-personnel mines.[5]

This total of 812 casualties identified in 2011 was a significant decrease from the 1,211 (33%) mine/ERW casualties the Monitor identified for 2010 but similar to the 859 casualties recorded for 2009.[6] The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) recorded 433 mine/ERW casualties for 2011; this was some 34% less than the 661 casualties that MACCA recorded for 2010.[7]

The ICRC recorded beneficiaries who were injured by mines/ERW. However, this information was not collected by the casualty data collection system and these appeared to be unique casualties which had not been included Monitor totals.[8] Based on field knowledge during the year, Handicap International (HI) regarded that it was more difficult to access casualty data and so the number of casualties in 2011 had likely not declined as compared with 2010 despite available casualty figures.[9]

Cluster munition casualties

Some 745 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded between 1980 and the end of 2011. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[10]

MACCA reported that between 1979 and 2011 there have been a total of 21,100 mine/ERW casualties recorded (17,097 people injured, 4,003 killed).[11]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown but, in 2006, was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[12]

Victim assistance since 1999[13]

Access to victim assistance in Afghanistan was hampered by a severe lack of services, poor to non-existent infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. However, Afghanistan did make progress in victim assistance and disability issues, supported by significant international funds that were needed to improve services and conditions. A lack of coordination among donors funding services for persons with disabilities alongside other competing priorities for assistance was identified as a challenge. Ministries demonstrated more national ownership of services for persons with disabilities, which were integrated into ministry policies and strategic planning with the assistance of MACCA. National NGOs, disabled person’s organizations (DPOs), and survivors’ organization became increasingly active and participated regularly in disability coordination.

Movement restrictions (due to conflict, lack of roads, and the cost of transport) were persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country that continued through 2011. Geographic coverage of healthcare expanded. Physical rehabilitation coverage remained insufficient despite improvements. Physical rehabilitation services were almost entirely operated by international NGOs and the ICRC under the coordination of the government. Psychosocial support services increased from almost non-existent, as did peer-to-peer support, though they were still insufficient to meet demand. A community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network grew and became better coordinated. Economic reintegration projects were limited and conducted mostly by NGOs, under the coordination of relevant ministries, while ministries paid some disability pensions and ran some vocational training. Inclusive education has increased since 2008. Disability legislation was adopted, but parts of the legislation were discriminatory against persons with disabilities.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No new survey or needs assessment was conducted for mine/ERW survivors in 2011. Existing data was used to support the delivery of services to survivors. MACCA supported the key government ministries to produce quarterly and annual reports from service providers and government implementing partners. In 2011, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) developed both a standard for the reporting of physical rehabilitation data and a format for the collection of that data; these were also used by organizations working for person with disabilities or implementing healthcare. Data was used by MACCA and the ministries for planning, strategies, policy development and reporting.[14] In May 2012, Afghanistan reported that it was “working on tools to help us track and report on disability services more effectively.”[15]

The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MoLSAMD) started a pilot survey project of persons with disabilities in three provinces (Nangarhar, Logar and Bamyan provinces). The registration of people with war-related disabilities at MoLSAMD, including survivors, was ongoing; data was used to refer people to a disability commission where they would be assigned a category for determining their disability pension or compensation payment.[16]

Several service providers collected information for their own programs. The Afghanistan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) in southern Afghanistan and the provincial and regional hospitals also submitted data to the Area Mine Action Centers (AMAC).[17] Community Based Mine Risk Education teams from HI collected data on mine/ERW casualties in Helmand and Kandahar province, which was shared with the regional AMAC and the MACCA.[18] In order to inform its work plan, Clear Path International (CPI) collected program-specific data records concerning survivors, other persons with disabilities, and the general community in the regions where its partners implemented programs; this data was collected to assess changes in knowledge, attitude, and behavior; in the quality of life; and in daily living activities.[19]

ICRC centers continued to register and assess all survivors assisted; information was used to make appropriate referrals to rehabilitation, economic and social inclusion activities.[20]

Victim assistance coordination[21]

The MoLSAMD is the focal point for victim assistance issues. The MoPH and the Ministry of Education (MoE) are involved in disability services and advocacy activities. MoPH coordinates CBR and provides physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support services. The MoPH also coordinates training programs for physiotherapists and healthcare providers.[22] The work of these three key ministries is supported by advisers funded through the MACCA. The ministries’ advisors have the main roles of promoting the role of victim assistance and disability internally in each sector. However, their positions did not allow them to authorize or implement activities, and there remained a large need to strengthen the implementation and decision-making aspects of ministerial coordination.[23]

Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group (DSCG) meetings, lead by the MoLSAMD, were held regularly in 2011. Meetings were used to coordinate activities, share relevant information and ideas, and advocate for adequate legislation for persons with disabilities at national and regional levels. MACCA supported the organization of the DSCG meetings with technical assistance; the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action (UN VTF) sponsored the meetings. Monthly meetings were held in Kabul. DSCG regional meetings were also held in Herat, Faryab, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad and Bamyan; in most regions, these were held on a quarterly basis. In 2011, the Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan 2008-2011 (ANDAP) remained the key strategic planning document in the field of disability and victim assistance. At the national level, disability stakeholders worked to coordinate services according to the plan, despite resource challenges.[24] However, ANDAP was not universally used at the regional level.[25]

In December 2012, Afghanistan reported that the government was in the process of revising the ANDAP. An ANDAP progress report showed that out just under half of all 158 action points where achieved by the stakeholders. [26]

The Inter-ministerial Task Force on Disability was established to improve coordination between the different ministries. The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department chaired the Disability Task Force and meetings were hosted by MoLSAMD. Two meetings of the Inter-ministerial Task Force were held in 2011 to work on specific issues including CBR development, raising awareness of disability issues, advocating for the inclusion of people with disabilities and mainstreaming disability issues into broader ministry programs.[27]

The MoPH’s Disability and Rehabilitation Department coordinated the CBR network and was responsible for reporting on rehabilitation services.[28] In early 2012, the MoPH approved a Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Strategy to prioritize disability and rehabilitation programs and social inclusion of persons with disability.[29] ICRC and the Swedish Committee for the Disabled provided quarterly reporting to the MoPH for coordination purposes.[30] HI also provided regular reporting to the MoPH and had memoranda of understanding with the MoPH in each region in which it operated health and rehabilitation services.[31]

There was no specific coordination of victim assistance. Several groups, including those noted above, regularly held meetings relevant to victim assistance in Kabul and at the regional level:[32]

·         DSCG

·         MACCA coordination

·         The Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

·         Disability taskforce

·         UN health and education clusters[33]

·         CBR network

·         The Afghan National Society for Orthotics and Prosthetics

 Many of the service providers attending the DSCG meetings were also involved in the other related coordination activities listed above. [34]

Recognizing the importance of maintaining good relationships at the community level in addressing disability issues in Afghanistan, HI and CPI with its partner organizations worked with community councils and community leaders to raise awareness about disability and rights of persons with disabilities.[35]

MACCA bolstered coordination for the victim assistance-related activities of the key ministries, MoLSAMD, MoPH and MoE, through financial and technical support. More specifically, MACCA support included representatives placed in the three key ministries. It also provided accreditation for victim assistance operators. CPI, the Development and Ability Organization (DAO), and the Afghan Disabled Vulnerable Society (ADVS) became accredited organizations in 2011. Through MACCA, the UN VTF provided financial support to approved victim assistance projects proposed by accredited organizations.[36] In early 2011, the MACCA and UNMAS began a sub-project to increase support to the government through the Afghanistan Disability Support Program (ADSP). However, continued financial support for ADSP was not secured and in 2012 ADSP activities were reintegrated into MACCA’s program responsibilities.[37]

The MoLSAMD had a five-year National Action Plan approved in March 2012 which directs ministries to provide vocational training, establish empowerment centers, distribute food, build accessible ramps in some government offices, conduct public awareness programs about the disabled, and to take other steps to assist Afghans with disabilities.[38]

Overall, many organizations noted that international funding to victim assistance and the disability sector decreased and was insufficient to meet their needs in 2011. There was a need for improved donor coordination to ensure that disability issues were not lost amongst competing priorities and changes in the geopolitical focus of donors. A potential for attracting the sub-group of disability donors which meet to support the National Priority Program, including MoLSAMD activities, was identified in 2012.[39] It was also noted that MoLSAMD had not been able to attract funding for disability services probably because it lacked a national strategy.[40]

Afghanistan provided information on progress in and challenges to victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2011 and also at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in May 2012. Afghanistan included detailed reporting on victim assistance activities in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report and its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report.[41]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Afghanistan reported on the inclusion of mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations in the planning and provision of victim assistance in 2011.[42] Persons with disabilities were included in the DSCG meetings; DPOs, including mine/ERW survivors’ groups, led or participated in representative umbrella bodies that negotiated with the government. Persons with disabilities and survivors’ organizations were consulted on the strategic plans of ministries and were part of their ongoing development processes. The MoLSAMD advisor remained an active member of many disability stakeholders’ coordination groups and this gave survivor’s organizations and persons with disabilities access to government decision-makers.[43] However, survivors were not always seen to be closely consulted in decision making.[44]

Mine/ERW survivors were included in the implementation of peer support, rehabilitation, and other services. Persons with disabilities employed by MACCA supported the activities of the key ministries and were included in NGO activities that MACCA supported. Persons with disabilities, including MACCA staff, participated in international meetings and had input to the preparation of government statements and reports.[45]

The ICRC Orthopedic Program maintained a policy of “positive discrimination”, employing and training only people with disabilities; all service provision was entirely managed by survivors. The ICRC Orthopedic Program continuously consulted with and involved the survivors in the decision-making process as survivors were fully integrated into its operations.[46] Of HI Afghanistan’s 200 national staff members, 15% were persons with disabilities.[47] Among CPI’s 38 direct employees, more than one third (37%) were persons with disabilities.[48] Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO), Accessibility Organization for Afghan Disabled (AOAD) and many other NGOs had a significant proportion of employees who were persons with disabilities.[49]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[50]

Ongoing conflict slowed down the delivery of services by disability stakeholders and remained a significant challenge to victim assistance. Security limitations made it difficult to reach some mine/ERW survivors to provide health services, rehabilitation, and social assistance. Female personnel, in particular, were prevented from working in remote and unsecured areas; this resulted in the availability of disability services being inadequate and unequal, especially for women and girls.[51]

Patients in certain areas of Afghanistan, mainly in the south, were prevented by conflict, landmines or IEDs from reaching medical facilities.[52] No ICRC service provision was completely stopped, but occasionally the providing of services was reduced due to the poor security in some areas. The deteriorated security situation forced the ICRC Home Care Program and the Social Program to categorize some areas as off-limits.[53] The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA-RAD) reported that the implementation of disability services in their areas of operation was not significantly affected by conflict or the security situation.[54]

In some case, survivors with limited economic resources may not have been able to reach health facilities or gain benefits from available services, though many did. The MoPH lacked transportation facilities for poor people with disabilities and there was no outreach program to provide home-based health services.[55] The ICRC transported patients living in remote areas to its rehabilitation centers.[56]

No significant difference in the quantity of prostheses production was reported for 2011. However, the long-term availability of services increased in August 2010 when a new ICRC-run orthopedic center opened and began prosthetic production in Lashkar Gah, in the Helmand province which is highly affected by conflict. The center is the first rehabilitation facility in the province and is designed to manufacture some 50 prosthetic devices per month. All employees were persons with disabilities. Those in need of specialized treatment were referred to the HI center in Kandahar or ICRC in Kabul.[57]

Physical rehabilitation centers continued to be run by the same organizations, primarily ICRC and SCA, and others including the Kabul Orthopedic Organization (KOO), Empor Organization (EO), DAO and the MoPH-run Khost Orthopedic workshop which opened in 2011. The needs for physical rehabilitation were significant in other provinces where the NGOs do not operate and rehabilitation services are not available.[58] The newly-opened Khost Orthopedic Workshop and its physiotherapy department faced problems of procurement and human resources.[59] The ICRC center was still in the process of being established in early 2012.[60]

Inclusive education training by the MoE for teachers, as well as for children with disabilities and their parents, increased in 2011. Accessibility of education for children with disabilities improved. Monitoring visits to provinces showed increased enrollment of children with disabilities into general mainstream schools; awareness of disability issues among staff improved in the areas where inclusive education trainings were conducted. However, in 2011 national organizations providing education to persons with disabilities were affected by a shortage of funding and reduced their activities slightly.[61] ALSO and AOAD both expanded computer training, including for girls, in 2011.[62]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, though some national and international NGOs provided these services.[63] A severe lack of peer support services for mine/ERW survivors was reported due to discontinued international funding in 2012.[64] No measures were taken to provide additional services to address the lack of psychosocial support, including peer support, in 2011. The second Inter-country Psychosocial Rehabilitation Conference between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was organized and held in Tajikistan.[65]

Several organizations, including ICRC and NGOs, provided educational and vocational training as well as other social- and economic-inclusion opportunities. Although the ICRC’s services remained stable, many NGOs activities in the area were reduced due to the decrease in international funding. A great need for economic-inclusion services remained.[66] Ongoing peer support to enhance economic inclusion activities was found to be successful, improving the successful sustainability of small business projects.[67]

As part of a new program in 2011, the ICRC Orthopedic Program imported sports wheelchairs to be used in sports programs by persons with disabilities; these sports included volleyball, soccer, and basketball. The activities were held in Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat with both male and female teams.[68]

Physical accessibility remained a significant challenge because persons with disabilities in Afghanistan lacked access to many existing services. In Kabul, for example, some 95% of public buildings were not accessible for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[69] The buildings of the department of MoLSAMD that provides services to persons with disabilities were not physically accessible to persons with disabilities; many parts were unreachable for wheelchair users.[70]

To address accessibility challenges in the long term, CPI created and registered the Physical Accessibility Projects Consortium for Afghanistan, partnering with the Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR), ALSO, and AOAD in 2011.[71]

CPI coordinated and planned its own program activities together with its partner organizations. CPI devised objectives that matched those of the ANDAP and included geographic priorities presented by relevant ministries and the MACCA. The resulting work plan addressed the victim assistance needs as set out in the ANDAP, and in addition focused on creating physical accessibility in schools, health care facilities, mosques, and key government buildings in consultation with local community members (a total of 350 buildings in 2011). CPI combined specific site-adapted physical accessibility projects with awareness-raising on disability issues in the community. CPI’s extensive network of project partners included: AABRAR, the Afghan Disabled Vulnerable Society (ADVS), AOAD, ALSO, the Afghan Volunteer Doctor Association (AVDA), DAO, EO, the Engineering and Medical Department for Afghan Development (EMDAD), ROAWV, the Sustainable Alternative Economic Development for Afghans (SAEDA), and the Welfare Organization for Afghan People (WOAP).

The National Law for the Rights and Privileges of Persons with Disabilities was authorized in August 2010. In order to implement the law, MoLSAMD trained regional directorates in Kabul on its contents.[72] However, the National Disabilities Law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).[73] In December 2011, a fifth national disability workshop was held in Kabul to review the disabilities laws. Participants, including government representatives, DPO representatives, and the Advocacy Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, all attended and contributed to recommendations for amending of the law.[74] By December 2012 the Law was under review in order to “bring it into conformity with the CRPD.”[75]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, which include healthcare and financial protection. The constitution also requires the state to adopt measures to reintegrate and to ensure the active participation in society of persons with disabilities.[76]

Differences in treatment in Afghanistan were often not based solely on need but were influenced by the economic and social situation of survivors, as well as their gender and the cause of their disability. Women and elderly persons with disabilities received fewer services for these reasons, with no perceivable change during 2011.[77] MACCA did not note discrimination within ministry work or policies.[78] The MoPH maintained an inclusive policy and strategy enabling all Afghans to have access to any available services in the health facilities; it reported that there was no discrimination in the health services with regard to age, sex or disability.[79]

Ensuring the wellbeing and rights of people with disabilities, including survivors, in emergency situations became an issue due to factors such as the terrain and climate conditions and extensive flooding in 2012.[80]

Afghanistan ratified the CRPD on 18 September 2012.

 

Support for Mine Action

Since 2007, Afghanistan has received US$500 million in international assistance for mine action. In 2011, it received $98.7 million from 19 donor governments and the International Road Union.[1] The United States (US) contributed $40 million in 2011, representing some 40% of the total international assistance. Thirteen donors contributed more than $1 million each.

Victim assistance is integrated within the broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector.[2] Consequently, overall funding to victim assistance is under-reported. Only the US (almost $4 million) and Norway (NOK5 million/US$892,507) contributions were reported.[3] Additionally, funding from Australia to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which included clearance and victim assistance, is not disaggregated.

Afghanistan also reported that US$128 million was spent from April 2010 to 31 March 2012 to check for landmines over a total of 100km² in conjunction with development and construction activities. This included a $42.6 million payment to 21 international and national commercial companies from April 2011 to March 2012, which found four antipersonnel mines, 40 antivehicle mines, 23,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 71,000 pieces of small arms ammunition while checking a total of 48km². The Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) records outputs on checking for mines in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) but separates the results from progress made against known hazards.[4] Funding for checking for mines comes primarily from the US through the Army Corps of Engineers, as mandated by the US Congress.[5]

The government of Afghanistan committed US$4.1 million from December 2010 to July 2012, to be paid in quarterly installments. Of the $4.1 million, $94,435 is for clearance at the Eshposhta coal mine.[6] In 2011, the MACCA reported the Government of Afghanistan had contributed $3.9 million to mine action.[7]

International contributions in 2011[8]

 

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011 (US$)[9]