Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

In May 2012, Angola participated in the Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, where it confirmed that the ratification “will be done soon.”[1] In September 2011, Angola informed States Parties “we are now finalising the preparation of all documents” for ratification to be submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers for consideration and then referred to the National Assembly for approval.[2] Previously, in June 2011, an official informed the Monitor that the ratification process was being reviewed and discussed by relevant ministries and other stakeholders.[3]

Angola participated extensively in the Oslo Process and, while it did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, Angola signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo in December 2008. [4]Angola has continued to actively engage in the work of the convention. It attended the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011, where it provided an update on ratification. Angola participated in intersessional meetings of the convention in April 2012, but did not make any statements.

Angola attended the Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2012 and endorsed the Accra Universalization Action Plan, which among other actions, encourages states not party to the convention to take “all necessary steps” to ratify by the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2012.

Angola is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Angola is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but participated in the CCW Fourth Review Conference in November 2011 as an observer. Angola did not comment on the chair’s draft text of the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions, but on the final day of the conference, Angola joined a group of 50 countries in endorsing a joint statement declaring that the chair’s draft text does not fully address fundamental concerns and is unacceptable from a humanitarian standpoint, and therefore does not command consensus.[5]

The Review Conference ended without agreement on a draft protocol, thus marking the conclusion of the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Angola is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions have been used in the past in Angola, but it is unclear when or by whom. An Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) official who had seen cluster munitions remnants in Huambo province near Caala and Bailundo, probably from the heavy fighting during 1998–1999, said he believed that the Angolan Armed Forces used cluster munitions because only they used aircraft during this conflict, not the rebel UNITA forces.[6]

The government has not yet provided any details on stockpile destruction and it has not made an official determination and public announcement that all stocks have been identified and destroyed.

In June 2010, a CNIDAH official told the CMC that Angola had destroyed its stockpile of cluster munitions between 2003 and 2010 in a joint initiative of the government and HALO Trust, and that the Armed Forces no longer held any stocks.[7] In addition, HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal teams, which operate in all 18 provinces destroying police, army, navy, and air force weapons caches, found and destroyed 51 abandoned explosive submunitions in military warehouses.[8] The location of these warehouses has not been reported. As of May 2011, HALO has reported the destruction of 7,267 submunitions (likely from cluster bombs numbering in the hundreds) and 506 submunition dispensers between 2006 and 2011.[9] According to HALO almost all the munitions it has destroyed were in serviceable condition.[10]

In the past, Jane’s Information Group noted that KMG-U dispensers that deploy submunitions were in service for Angolan aircraft.[11] Deminers operating in Angola have documented the presence of casings of RBK 250/275 cluster bombs among abandoned ammunition.[12] It is likely the KMG-Us and RBKs were of Soviet origin.

Angola is also reported to possess BM-21 Grad and RM-70 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if these include ammunition with submunition payloads.[13]

 

Contamination and Impact

Angola is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which may include cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002.

Mines

Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 indicated millions of mines littering one-third of the country’s land.[1] It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a better assessment of contamination in each of the country’s 18 provinces—all of which were contaminated—was achieved.[2]

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas (districts) covering approximately 1,025km². These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people, or 17% of the population.[3] Since the LIS ended in 2007 the number of SHAs has gradually decreased as a result of clearance and additional technical and non-technical surveying. In March 2009, the national database managed by the National Intersectorial Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had been canceled by non-technical survey (NTS) or released through technical survey or clearance.[4]

In December 2010, CNIDAH reported 2,515 SHAs remained covering an estimated 923km².[5] The numbers were further updated in January 2011 when CNIDAH and the Survey Action Center (SAC) convened a workshop in Washington, DC to clean up the database, and concluded 2,242 SHAs remained, impacting 1,400 communities. An associated update of the estimate of contaminated area was not provided at the time.[6]

At the end of 2011, CNIDAH reported a further reduction in the number of SHAs with 2,017 SHAs in all 18 provinces, of which 85% were either low impact or did not impact the community where the SHA was located. The 2,017 SHAs cover an estimated 793km².[7] However, as an illustration of the long running problems with the national database, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust report different figures than CNIDAH for the remaining SHAs in their operational areas. NPA has completed NTS in Kwanza Sul and reports there are 179 SHAs covering 50km² remaining; in Uige, where surveying is ongoing as of September 2012, there were 144 SHAs covering 79km² for a total of 323 SHAs and 129km², compared to 258 SHAs and 226km² reported by CNIDAH for the same provinces in its Article 5 Extension Request^.[8] HALO Trust reports their database indicates there are 166 SHAs remaining in Bié province rather than the 246 reported by CNIDAH. HALO and CNIDAH planned to hold a joint workshop on the database discrepancies between them in November 2012.[9]It is planned that the ongoing national Non-Technical Survey and the Mapping Project described in Angola’s Article 5 Extension Request will clarify the extent of the contamination throughout Angola by 2016.[10]

Suspect hazardous areas as of 31 December 2011

Cluster munition remnants

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by unexploded submunitions is unclear. As of March 2012, only HALO had reported finding unexploded submunitions since February 2008.[11] In April 2011, NPA reported that the impact of cluster munition remnants was “very low” in Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.[12] HALO and the National Institute for Demining (INAD) claim, however, that unexploded submunitions remain to be cleared in Kuando Kubango.[13]

At least two types of cluster munitions have been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. According to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH as of February 2008, NPA had reported clearing 13 unexploded submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kwanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 unexploded submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO reported clearing 230 unexploded submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.[14]

Other explosive remnants of war

Angola is significantly contaminated with ERW across all 18 provinces. Demining operators expend considerable assets on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks. The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) reported finding 65,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2011 and more than 2.4 million since 1996.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Angola has two mine action management structures. CNIDAH serves as the de facto national mine action authority. It reports to the Council of Ministers, or in effect to the president of Angola. Since 2002, CNIDAH has been responsible for the coordination of mine action in the country. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies.[16] CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province), under the vice-governor of the province, determine annual priorities based on demining NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.[17] The annual operating budget for CNIDAH is approximately US$15 million.[18]

In an internal review of the 2006–2011 Strategic Plan, CNIDAH found that it failed to execute half of its planned activities for 2011. CNIDAH blamed lack of funding for the failure.[19] For example, CNIDAH has cited the Minister of Finance’s failure to transfer funds budgeted for the survey to them as one of the impediments in beginning the ongoing NTS in 2011.[20] CNIDAH priorities in 2012 and beyond, however, include further training for its managers, a new strategic plan, better internal collaboration, and the creation of a special fund to allow CNIDAH to engage national NGOs more rapidly.[21]

The other mine action body is the CED, established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan. It is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS).[22] The 2011 CED budget for demining was approximately $45 million, or more than three times that of CNIDAH’s approximately $15 million budget.[23]

 

Demining assets of the government of Angola under CED are considerable. At the end of 2011, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the Military Office of the President (CMPR), INAD, and the Police Border Guard of Angola (PGFA) had 53 manual demining brigades and two mechanical brigades, comprising a total of more than 3,200 personnel. Mechanical assets included 20 Bozena-5 remote control flail machines, 12 Hitachi flails, six Minewolfs, four Casspir armoured vehicles, and 1 Komatsu demining machine.[24]

Government of Angola Mine Clearance Operators[25]

Under CNIDAH there are 77 registered commercial demining companies, 16 national NGOs, and five international NGOs. In 2011, 55 commercial demining companies were accredited, although only nine were contracted by CNIDAH or the CED to conduct clearance. The commercial companies engaged in demining in 2011 were the Sociedade de Seguranca e Desminagem (SEDITA), ICL, VDS, KUBUILA, SINCARPE, TNT, Spod, OJK, EUCLESMAR, and Cassamba TELESERVIC. Angolan Mine Action Professionals Association (APACOMINAS) is the national NGO and the international NGOs are DanChurchAid (DCA), HALO, MAG, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), and NPA.[26]

UNDP support to mine action in Angola ended in December 2011.[27]

Mine action information management

The lack of a functioning national mine action database is one of the most protracted problems in the mine action program in Angola. The problem has two aspects. One is the database at CNIDAH does not match the NGOs’ own records even though the database is largely based on their records. The other problem, and arguably the more severe one, is the lack of standardized reporting between CNIDAH and the CED.

All stakeholders have put considerable time and resources into building sustainable capacity at the CNIDAH database unit. In August 2010, HALO, DCA, INAD, MAG, MgM, and NPA provided a list of 2,000 completed tasks to CNIDAH in an effort to match the database with the demining operators’ own records. Through this process it was discovered that only around 1,000 of the tasks were recorded in the database and the NGOs had reported canceling nearly as many SHAs as they had cleared.[28]In January 2011, at a workshop in Washington DC, the Survey Action Center (SAC) and CNIDAH identified 1,056 SHAs associated with 588 impacted communities from the LIS that should be considered cleared or canceled. This represented one-third of the total originally identified in the LIS. Based on this database clean-up in January 2011, 1,400 impacted communities and 2,242 SHAs remained from the LIS.[29]

The CED, with INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces, the border police and commercial companies, as its operators, use a different reporting format than the NGOs under CNIDAH, making it impossible for Angola to present an accurate picture of its landmine problem and an adequate plan to address it. Angola identified an action plan in its March 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request to correct the database problem by training the CED operators in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and converting old records to IMSMA.[30] A more fundamental problem that also needs correction is that CED uses both the metric and the imperial system of measurement (inches and feet) in its reporting.[31]

Unless CNIDAH is able to manage the database correctly, it is questionable whether the Non-Technical Survey and Mapping Project, the two key activities in the extension request, can be properly documented. In March 2012, Angola reported that 2,017 SHAs remained while in June, in response to a question from the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance regarding the database, CNIDAH said while inconsistencies still remained in the database, they were fewer.[32]  

Evaluations

Angola is the only major mine action program in the world that has not been formally evaluated since its inception.

Land Release

CNIDAH has variously reported that in 2003–2011, 40 different operators cleared between 240km² and 454km² of mined area, roads, bridges, railways, airports and other infrastructure.[33] In addition 12,933km of roads have been verified free from mines, allowing access throughout the country. According to CNIDAH, all the main roads of the country have been cleared with only some secondary and tertiary roads remaining.[34]

More than 1,200 SHAs have been released through clearance or survey since the completion of the LIS in 2007. The NGOs—HALO, MAG, NPA, DanChurchAid, and MgM—are largely responsible for this reduction. These NGOs combined have cleared or cancelled over 300 SHAs in 2011.[35]

MAG in Moxico province has re-surveyed 188 of the 290 impacted communities and 323 of the 522 SHAs that had been identified during the LIS. From the survey, MAG has cancelled 28 SHAs, which is approximately 10% of the SHAs re-surveyed, a far smaller cancellation rate than re-surveys in other countries where an LIS had been conducted and released 94km² of land. MAG also reported its NTS team identified 18 new impacted communities with 38 previously unrecorded SHAs. Additionally, according to MAG, refugees returning from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have resettled in newly created villages, which may result in identifying new impacted communities and SHAs.[36] In contrast HALO canceled more than 75% of the SHAs in Huila during re-surveying[37]; NPA, in Uige, cancelled 81% of the SHAs and reduced the estimated contaminated area from 82km² to 5km².[38] DCA has cancelled 45% of the SHAs it has re-surveyed in Moxico.[39]

In 2011, four international demining operators cleared 4km² of mined area. The amount of battle area clearance (BAC) conducted in 2011 remained low as very few areas remain that require major BAC. In 2011, HALO completed two BAC tasks and NPA completed one.[40]CED does not report its tasks by methodology but the 65,000 UXO found by CED indicate BAC may have been conducted.[41]

Survey in 2011

General and Non-Technical Survey

The follow-up to the LIS is the “Levantamento e actualização dos dados de areas suspeitas de contaminação com minas terrestres” (“Survey and update of data concerning suspect hazardous areas”), commonly referred to as LIS II, although CNIDAH has indicated a more accurate description is “general survey.”[42] Most stakeholders believe the LIS overestimated the landmine problem by a wide margin; however, based solely on the size of SHAs, it is clear from the CED demining teams that the LIS failed to capture any of the mine contamination associated with the country’s infrastructure and that the LIS missed many mined areas (because most infrastructure was too far from the communities to have impacted their daily lives).[43]A combination of the ongoing NTS and standardizing the now-incompatible report formats used by CNIDAH and CED may result in a more accurate picture of mine contamination in Angola, which judged by the results in the past ten years indicate mine contamination has been severe.

CNIDAH describes the “general survey” as one that will both identify new SHAs in all 18 provinces and confirm (or discredit) those already in the database. The remaining 2,017 SHAs as of June 2012 will be visited to confirm whether it is a mined area and, if so, whether the contaminated area as estimated during the LIS can be reduced. CNIDAH, in fact, describes the survey methodology as a “municipality approach” where 186 municipalities will be visited.[44]

Both national and international NGOs will conduct the survey under CNIDAH supervision. In 2011, CNIDAH trained the national NGOs Clube de Jovens da Huila, Apacominas, ODAH, Saving Association of People (ASASP), and Angola Livre de Minas to conduct NTS.[45] DCA, MAG, and MgM each have one team dedicated to the survey in Moxico and Kuando Kubango provinces.[46]

The survey teams use community-based survey methodology similar to that of a typical LIS. Data is collected based on interviews in the community using two forms provided by CNIDAH. One form is used for communities being revisited and the other for new SHAs. Each visit consists of four main activities:

1) Identify an appropriate number of key informants for a group interview.

2) Produce a sketch map of the area, the suspected areas and document any accidents.

3) Record the responses in the questionnaire.

4) Based on the information collected, visit the SHA and produce a sketch map of the area and document any accidents. The survey teams also record the geographic coordinates of the SHA using a global positioning system from a safe point of observation.

In an unusual approach to the survey, CNIDAH has not asked the NTS teams to estimate the size of the SHAs they identify. Instead, CNIDAH has created a separate mapping project whereby trained technicians will visit each SHA after the NTS teams have identified them and conduct polygon mapping. CNIDAH estimates the cost of this separate activity to be $5.4 million, and combined with the estimated $2.7 million for the NTS, it will require more than $8 million to complete the survey and map the SHAs, more than the $6.8 million the LIS cost.[47]

In June 2012, CNIDAH reported they were engaged in discussions with HALO and NPA on whether the 10 provinces where they have long operated need to be surveyed again or if the re-survey results from the two NGOs can be considered as the latest data for the provinces.[48] In 2011, HALO deployed three “combined” teams which handled survey, mine risk education (MRE), and EOD; these teams worked across the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo and Kuando Kubango.[49] HALO is already on record saying it will not participate in the LIS II as part of its EC contract because, in the original LIS, HALO carried out a full non-technical “polygon” survey of all the SHAs it identified.[50] The findings from HALO’s polygon surveys in the LIS are said to be well documented. According to HALO, CNIDAH and the European Commission have already acknowledged that it would not be necessary for HALO to re-survey in the four provinces. Instead, HALO will continue its regular resurvey of all confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) to update information prior to clearance.[51] According to CNIDAH, the Young Technicians Club of Huila, trained in 2010, will be deployed for the purpose of rechecking data provided by HALO in Huila.[52]

As of August 2012, it had not yet been determined whether the mapping teams need to survey the 10 provinces where HALO and NPA have long operated and re-surveyed. The other provinces will be covered by national NGOs. CNIDAH planned to complete the survey in 2013.[53]

The government of Angola will cover an estimated $2.7 million needed for equipment, vehicles, operational and administrative costs of the five national operators, and the cost of monitoring by CNIDAH during the survey.[54] Although it is expected the survey will identify some new SHAs, it is also expected the survey will reduce the overall contaminated area that was estimated to be 793km² as of December 2011.[55]

In June 2012, CNIDAH released a small sample of results showing 250 communities had been visited and 36 SHAs were cancelled while eight new SHAs were identified.[56] CNIDAH did not report how many SHAs already in the database in the 250 communities had been confirmed.

Mine clearance in 2011

Mine clearance operators in Angola include the international NGOs DCA (Moxico), HALO (Bie, Huambo, Benguela, Huila, Kuando Kubango), MAG (Moxico), MgM (Kuando Kubango), NPA (Malange, Uige), and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), commercial companies, and INAD, which operate in all 18 provinces. In 2011, four NGO operators cleared approximately the same amount of land as in 2010.[57]

Clearance in Angola is divided into priority clearance for development under CED and humanitarian demining under CNIDAH. The two types of clearance sometimes overlap but inconsistent reporting formats used by CED and the NGOs under CNIDAH make the extent of the overlap unclear.

Priorities of the state entities are determined by the government of Angola’s national plan to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Thus, most of the clearance work targets roads, bridges, ports, airports, water sources, electric towers, and land for the laying of fiber optic cables and constructing housing. Humanitarian demining by the NGOs and supported by international donors (at an ever-decreasing level) uses the LIS as its baseline. While much of the land cleared by demining NGOs is then used for farming and housing, the progress made based on the LIS has been the sole measurement of Angola meeting its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations and is the basis of Angola’s Article 5 deadline extension request. Even though reports from INAD and CED since 2006 indicate thousands of landmines have been found and hundreds of square kilometers of contaminated area have been cleared, this effort has not reduced the amount of contaminated area from the baseline established by the LIS. One of the limitations of the LIS in Angola was that as a community-based survey, infrastructure not associated with a local community was not assessed, with the exception of making an estimate of the extent of mine-affected primary and secondary roads.

This lack of coordination between development demining and humanitarian demining occurs in all 18 provinces. The ongoing NTS and the conversion of the state clearance records into IMSMA is an attempt to put all known mined areas and results into one database at CNIDAH. Both CNIDAH and CED have said the state entities will be conducting more humanitarian demining in the future and are an integral part of the extension request.[58]

Still, one of the main problems with the parallel demining structures is that the two institutions use different reporting formats. CNIDAH and the NGOs use IMSMA to record tasks, while operators under CED led by INAD record tasking information in another format, making it impossible to enter any of the CED completed tasks into the national database. One of the aims of a three-year EC project described below is to train mine clearance operators working under CED to use IMSMA and send their reports to CNIDAH.

CED demining in 2011

INAD, the FAA, the border police and commercial companies clear mines in support of Angola’s national development plans in order to re-build the infrastructure damaged by the conflict that ended in 2002. CED’s priorities include demining in support of efforts to build or rehabilitate airports, railways, bridges, hydroelectric power, schools, hospitals, roads, and communications, highlighted by the clearing of land to lay fiber optic cables. Much of the demining by INAD, the commercial companies, and the FAA involves verifying land as not being contaminated rather than actually clearing contaminated land of mines.[59]

In 2011, CED reported clearing 40.23km² in 17 provinces. There was no mine action in Namibe where the LIS had identified three SHAs. CED also verified 36.91km of roads, and 12.61km of powerlines.

CED clearance of mined area results in 2011[60]

CED verification of infrastructure in 2011[61]

Demining by commercial companies in 2011

The CED reported commercial demining companies cleared approximately 6.6km² and verified hundreds of kilometers of roads area in eight provinces. CED did not disaggregate clearance from verification or report the number of mines found.[62]

NGO demining in 2011

In 2011, four international NGOs cleared almost 4.4km² of mined area and found 4,135 antipersonnel mines, 1,167 antivehicle mines, and 6,878 items of UXO, a similar output to 2010. MgM cleared 2.29km of road while verifying 19.2km. During road clearance, MgM found two antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines.[63]

NGO mine clearance in 2011[64]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013.

On 31 March 2012, Angola submitted an extension request for five years through 1 January 2018 in order to complete a general survey and a mapping certification and confirmation project as well as to train state organizations led by INAD and the FAA, and to train commercial demining companies in IMSMA. This is planned to result in an updated, and robust, national database and a more accurate assessment of the remaining mine problem.[65] In response to a question from the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance about shortening the extension period in June 2012, CNIDAH replied they could not shorten the period, partly due to the uncertainty of when the mapping project could begin.[66]

At the end of the proposed extension period, Angola plans to submit another extension request based on the ongoing surveys and clearance, but has stated that it already predicts it will need more than ten years beyond 2018.[67]

The Angola Mine Action Program has had numerous disappointments since 2002 when CNIDAH was established, none more so than the state of its mine action database. The extension request is extremely ambitious, in that in addition to survey, mapping and conversion of several years of data to IMSMA, it foresees adding a projected 300km² of new completion records in 2013–2018. Angola’s record in mine action raises doubts that they can accomplish what they plan to do within five years.

Battle area clearance in 2011

The amount of BAC conducted in 2011 remained low, as in previous years.[68] In 2011, only HALO and NPA conducted BAC. NPA reported one task of 80,000m² where just one item of UXO was found.[69]According to HALO, BAC is limited to areas covered by a large concentration of ammunition that pose a threat to the population. In such situations, HALO temporarily re-deploys mine clearance teams to conduct BAC. In 2011, HALO conducted BAC in Kuando Kubango and Huila provinces, clearing 670,000m² and finding 36,653 ERW, mostly ammunition, weighing approximately 95 tons.[70]

CED reported state operators found 65,000 UXO in 2011, with 19,000 in Luanda, 12,500 in Kunene, and 12,000 in Zaire, comprising most of the UXO.[71] However, CED did not provide sufficient detail regarding these large numbers. For example, in Luanda province CED reported it cleared 126,985m² at the Cacuaco race track; 150,000m² in area related to the oil industry; 9,240m² at the premises of the presidential guard and 2,807m² at the Grafanil military training area. Since there were no battles in Luanda during the long conflict, the origin of the 19,127 ERW found in Luanda is unclear. Similarly, in the province of Zaire, where eight demining tasks covering 443,658m² of land and 67km of road occurred, mostly for the purpose of new housing, 12,000 items of UXO were found.[72]

Battle area clearance in 2011[73]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area[74]

Since 1994, only a very few cluster bomb strikes have been identified by HALO, which has therefore concluded that the impact of submunitions is minimal in Angola. Clearing submunitions has been mainly EOD call-out/spot tasks.

More typical is the destruction of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which have already been earmarked for subsequent disposal by the FAA. Since 2005, HALO WAD teams have destroyed a total of 7,273 submunitions, but only seven in 2011.

Roving clearance/explosive ordnance disposal in 2011

HALO, MAG, and NPA have EOD teams attached to their survey component. DCA does not have dedicated EOD teams and assigns mine clearance to spot clearance call-outs as needed. In 2011, spot clearance in Moxico province resulted in 168 items found.[75] CED did not report having dedicated EOD teams in 2011.

Roving clearance/explosive ordnance disposal in 2011

Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Program[76]

Since 2005, HALO Trust has been destroying unwanted stockpiles of weapons and ammunition held by the FAA with funding from the US Department of State. HALO has been the main implementing partner for the Angolan Disarmament Campaign, which was launched in December 2008. The government of Angola extended the campaign through 2012 with the possibility of a further extension.

In 2011, HALO deployed three mobile WAD teams and destroyed 21,733 ERW, seven submunitions, 15 aircraft bombs, 31 guided missiles, and 269 landmines found in various storage areas as well as a large quantity of small arms ammunition. In addition, the HALO WAD teams destroyed 420 heavy weapons systems (e.g. BM-81 rocket launchers), released to them by the Angolan Air Force.[77]

Quality management

Each international demining operator and INAD has its own internal quality management system. After a clearance task has been completed, CNIDAH is responsible for quality control (QC). CNIDAH admits there is lack of a funding for QC/quality assurance, which limits what CNIDAH can do. In 2011, eight CNIDAH teams conducted 53 QC visits and certified 528 kilometers of road 47km² of cleared area.[78]

 Safety of demining personnel

In an incident during a mine clearance task in Menongue, Kuando Kubango, a HALO deminer, suffered an amputation of his right hand. He has been fitted with a prosthetic hand and has received a full insurance payment.[79]

The other NGO operators, CNIDAH, and CED, did not report any accidents during demining in 2011.

Risk Education

CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of mine/ERW risk education (RE). UNICEF phased out RE at the end of 2008 because it was no longer a national program priority and casualties had been reduced.[80]

In 2011, the government of Angola failed to authorize spending for RE, creating a funding shortage for national NGOs, the main implementers of RE, and resulting in no formal RE program. According to CNIDAH, the government failed to include RE in its budget appropriation to CNIDAH, which considers it an oversight on the part of the government rather than a policy decision. The lack of funding also left CNIDAH’s RE non-functional, though a complete new staff and head had been hired.[81] In its internal evaluation of its 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategy, CNIDAH attributed the increase in casualties in 2011 to the lack of RE.[82]

CNIDAH’s expected RE funding to be re-instated for 2012.[83] Aside from RE linked with demining sites, there appears to be no active RE program in Angola. CNIDAH officials in Benguela and Kuando Kubango confirmed to the Monitor there was no RE being conducted in their provinces.[84]

CED reported its state operators in 2011 conducted RE in 12 provinces for 4,904 men, 7,608 women and 14,012 children.[85] HALO provided 412 RE sessions for 37,800 beneficiaries.[86]MAG community liaison personnel routinely conduct risk education in all the villages they visit. MAG also trains school teachers in RE in Moxico province.[87]

The Angolan Red Cross conducted a survey in 2010 on the knowledge of the risk of mines among the local population. The findings were surprising for a country considered one of the most mine-affected in the world. The survey found older Angolans knew very little about mines and returnees from Zambia and other neighboring countries were unaware of the risk. The Red Cross concluded there was a continuing need for RE in Huila.[88]

 

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2011, the Monitor identified 89 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Angola.[1] The age or sex was not reported for the majority of the casualties identified, making it difficult to determine incidence rates and trends. The age was known for only 18 casualties; of the total at least six casualties were children (five boys and one girl) and at least two casualties were women.

One casualty was military personnel and all other casualties were reported as civilians. There were no demining casualties in 2011, a significant decline from the six deminer casualties reported in 2010.[2] The casualties identified in 2011 occurred in 14 of Angola’s 18 provinces, with the highest number (21) in Cuanza Sul.

The 89 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2011 represented a significant increase from the 42 casualties identified in 2010.[3] However, given the lack of a reliable casualty collection mechanism, it is not possible to determine trends over time. In evaluating its Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006 – 2011, the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) found that there had been a decline in the overall number of mine/ERW incidents recorded annually during the five-year period, but that the decline was not linear nor did it reach the plan’s goal of reducing the number of incidents to “almost zero”.[4] Based on CNIDAH data, at the start of the Mine Action Plan, there were some 50-80 incidents on average per year. By 2010-2011, the average number of accidents had been reduced to 20-40 per year. The evaluation found that landmine incidents had decreased while those caused by ERW increased slightly.[5] However, when looking at the total annual number of casualties recorded by CNIDAH between 2006 and 2011, it is impossible to discern a corresponding trend. CNIDAH recorded 48 mine/ERW casualties in 2006, 23 in 2007, 247 in 2008, 36 in 2009, one in 2010 and 78 in 2011.[6]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Angola is unknown, though estimates range from 23,000[7] to 80,000.[8] However, no details were available to substantiate these figures. By May 2012, 2,681 survivors had been registered in the provinces of Huila, Namibe, Cabinda and Cunene as part of the national mine/ERW victim survey; 14 provinces remained to be surveyed.[9] Between 2000 and 2011, the Monitor identified 2,823 mine/ERW casualties including 941 people killed, 1,737 injured, and 145 for which the outcome was unknown.[10] Between 2006 and 2011, CNIDAH registered 433 mine/ERW casualties including 77 people killed and 356 injured.[11]

No information was available on the number of cluster munition casualties. Angola expected to have more information on cluster munition survivors after the completion of the national victim survey. However, the survey questionnaire offers just three options as the cause of disability: “a mine,” “an accident,” or “unknown” and has no place to report on cluster submunitions as the cause. [12] As of June 2012, no data on cluster munition casualties in the four surveyed provinces had been reported by Angola.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Angola is unknown, but there are many thousands. As of June 2012, 2,681 survivors had been identified in the first four (of 18) provinces surveyed as part of the national victim survey.[13]

Victim assistance since 1999[14]

When victim assistance monitoring began in 1999, Angola was still in the midst of a series of armed conflicts that began in 1961 and did not officially end until 2002. In 1999, several international organizations, including the ICRC, Handicap International, and the Swedish Red Cross, among others, were providing basic victim assistance services such as emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation. Despite these humanitarian relief efforts, overall care was grossly inadequate throughout the country. This was the result of the destruction or deterioration of infrastructure such as health centers, hospitals and roads during armed conflict. In 1999, a lack of transport meant that mine/ERW victims were often delayed by as much as 36 hours before receiving life-saving care at the nearest medical post.

By 2002, it was estimated that fewer than 30% of Angolans had access to any health care services. Those limited services that were available were located in major cities and provincial capitals while mine/ERW survivors were predominately based in rural areas of the country. With the stabilization of the security situation, the government and international community began investing in rebuilding the country’s health care system and other basic infrastructure, such as roads, which increased access to basic medical facilities around the country, including in rural areas.

In 2005, international organizations began closing victim assistance programs and transferring management of health care facilities and rehabilitation centers, to the government. By 2008, all 11 physical rehabilitation centers were managed by the Ministry of Health. By 2009, production of prosthetics in all centers had declined due to a lack of materials and unpaid staff salaries. This decline continued through the end of 2011.

Some economic inclusion projects have been available to survivors over the period, either through international organizations, national and local organizations of persons with disabilities, or government agencies such as Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) and CNIDAH, which began coordinating and facilitating victim assistance in 2001. However, the available assistance throughout the period fell far short of the overall need.

International organizations supported the development of local survivor networks and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs). However, these groups were hamstrung by lack of funding and the distances between them that prevented collaboration among the groups. Through the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011, CNIDAH aimed to support the development of a national survivor network but no progress had been made toward this objective by the end of 2011, due to insufficient funding and organizational problems.

There were no significant improvements in the accessibility or quality of victim assistance services in Angola in 2011. The departure of Handicap International (HI) by the end of the year completed the withdrawal of international organizations that had been providing support for victim assistance. A continued lack of government funding for physical rehabilitation in 2011 caused a further decline in both the quality and accessibility of these services.[15] While there continued to be some improvement in the quality of roads in some provinces, a lack of affordable transportation and the poor quality of roads in many parts of the country remained the greatest obstacles to accessing services for survivors living outside the provincial capital. [16]

Assessing victim assistance needs

By the end of 2011, CNIDAH had completed the National Victim Survey and Needs Assessment in four of Angola’s 18 provinces, Cabinga, Cunene, Huila and Namibe, and begun the survey in a fifth, Zaire.[17] Launched in October 2010, the purpose of the survey is to identify and register mine and cluster munition survivors with disabilities, understand their living situation, and determine how to promote their socio-economic inclusion.[18]

Handicap International (HI) reported having received training to assist in the implementation of the survey.[19] However, local participation appeared to be severely lacking; of nine survivor and disabled persons organizations and NGO service providers interviewed by the Monitor in Huila province, just one was consulted in the collection of data in that province. Furthermore, not all the questionnaires completed by this organization were included in survey results.[20] The provincial Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) in Huila, with responsibility for maintaining a registry of all persons with disabilities in the province, was also not contacted during data collection.[21] Survey results were to be shared through a public report released in each province after its completion.[22]

Through the five-year review of the Strategic Mine Action plan, CNIDAH recognized that baseline data on survivors and their needs was needed to determine the impact of government programs to improve health and rehabilitation services on the lives of survivors. The ongoing survey and needs assessment was expected to improve efforts to plan victim assistance and measure impact.[23]

Victim assistance coordination[24]

CNIDAH’s victim assistance coordination efforts in 2011 were focused on implementing the National Victim Survey, improving coordination at the provincial level, and contributing to the five-year evaluation of the implementation of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006-2011.[25] Two meetings of the Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration were held at the national level; one to present preliminary results of the national victim survey and the other to review advances made in victim assistance within the framework of the Mine Action Plan.[26]

CNIDAH continued to work with provincial CNIDAH offices to improve victim assistance planning and implementation.[27] In 2011, workshops were held in Bengo, Humbo and Zaire with provincial CNIDAH representatives and other governmental and nongovernmental victim assistance stakeholders, with the aim of developing provincial victim assistance plans.[28] Similar workshops had been held in Moxico, Kuando Kubango, Cabinda, and Úige in 2010.[29]

The evaluation of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006-2011 found that there was a need to more clearly define the role of CNIDAH in victim assistance, develop a database of mine victims to facilitate planning and the inclusion of mine survivors, strengthen the role of CNIDAH in advocating for the rights of survivors with other ministries, such as MINARS and the Ministry of Health, and mobilize more funding to increase access to medical and rehabilitation services.[30] Progress towards the specific victim assistance objectives within the plan was limited, mainly due to the “economic crisis” in the country during the period. In some areas, such as access to medical services or economic inclusion, the evaluation found that progress could not be quantified due to a lack of data.[31]

In April 2012, the Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration held a national forum to evaluate progress in implementing the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011 and to develop recommendations for a victim assistance plan for 2012-2016. Participants at the forum concluded that progress towards the implementation of the previous plan was limited, most especially in improving access to medical care, in physical rehabilitation, and in economic inclusion, but that more progress had been made in the development of laws and policies to promote the rights of survivors.[32] As of April 2012, the development of a Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan for 2012-2016 had not been completed.[33]

In 2011, Angola did not provide updates on its victim assistance progress at international meetings of states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Angola provided limited information on victim assistance activities in Form J of its 2011 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.[34]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Survivors’ associations and DPOs participated in national and provincial coordination meetings convened by CNIDAH as part of the Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration. Through the Sub-Commission, survivors’ associations contributed to the evaluation of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006 – 2011 and the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007-2011 and contributed recommendations for the next national victim assistance plan.[35]

Some survivors and/or representatives of survivors’ associations collected data for the national victim survey.[36] Survivors implemented socio-economic reintegration projects and were involved in advocacy for the rights of persons with disabilities through survivor associations and DPOs.[37]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[38]

In recent years, the government increased its expenditure on the national health care system, increasing the number of health centers in rural areas, improving accessibility to health services, and increasing the availability of medicines. While it was likely that this would have improved basic health care services for mine/ERW survivors, along with the rest of the population, there was no information available on the impact of these changes in 2011.[39]

In 2011, all 11 national physical rehabilitation centers faced “immense difficulties” in responding to the demand for their services.[40] In most centers, production of prosthetics decreased due to a lack of supplies. Others were unable to produce any prosthetics whatsoever and could only respond to the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities by providing medication and physiotherapy.[41]

During a monitoring visit in June 2011, all four physical rehabilitation centers visited reported that they had insufficient materials to meet the demand for mobility devices and that services had declined compared with previous years.[42] Two centers also noted that the poor condition of their facilities and lack of vital equipment and services, such as electricity, restricted their ability to provide adequate rehabilitation services.[43] While the Benguela Rehabilitation Center reported an improvement in staff capacity following training through the Don Bosco School in El Salvador, the Luena Rehabilitation Center had to withdraw staff from the same training program before completion due to insufficient funding.[44] Among respondents to the national victim survey in Huila province, between 50% and 70% stated that they had mobility devices; however, the majority of those with relevant mobility devices responded that the devices were in poor condition. Just 20% of survivors requiring prosthetic arms or hearing devices had these items.[45]

No improvements were reported on the availability of psychological support services for survivors, which had been found to be essentially non-existent as of April 2011.[46] As in previous years, some survivor and disabled persons’ organizations provided peer support services.[47] The ongoing national victim survey did not include any questions regarding access to or need for psychological support.[48]

In 2011, CNIDAH continued to provide vocational training and support for income-generating activities for a small number of mine survivors, directly or in coordination with MINARS. However, the number of beneficiaries was minimal compared with the number of survivors in need of this assistance throughout the country.[49] Numerous national NGOs, including DPOs, provided training and support for the development of small businesses, though their budgets were limited.[50] Fewer than 15% of victim survey respondents in Huila province had formal employment.[51]

During 2011, HI transferred its community-based rehabilitation (CBR) activities to local partners before closing its program in December. Former staff of HI formed a national organization, Podemos, that continued to train local authorities on CBR and to meet with beneficiaries. However, as of May 2012, the staff was only working part time and partly on a voluntary basis due to a lack of funding.[52]

While the law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, it was not enforced and discrimination remained prevalent.[53] Despite legislation entitling persons with disabilities to a pension, just 1% of respondents to the national victim survey had received any financial support.[54] There was no legislation mandating accessibility for persons with disabilities to public or private facilities.[55] In 2011, the Protection Law for Persons with Disabilities, drafted in 2000, was approved by the finance subcommittee and by the end of the year, was still pending approval by the National Assembly.[56]

As of June 2012, Angola had not signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

 

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, the government of Angola contributed AOA1.33 billion (US$14.2 million) to the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH). National funding supported the activities of CNIDAH, with the funding going to coordination (salaries), quality control, and provincial offices. In addition, national funding contributed AOA4.25 billion ($45.4 million) to the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), established in 2005 to fund development projects and provide financial support to the demining operations of the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN), and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD). Total national funding for mine action was AOA5.5 billion/$59.6 million.[1]

Angola has been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. In 2007–2010 it received a total of $103 million, or more than $25 million per year. In 2011, international assistance, however, dropped to $13.27 million from five donors.[2] In 2009, there were 13 international donors, while in 2010 there were 11. In 2010–2011, the United States (US) and the European Commission (EC) provided 80% of the international assistance.[3]

The EC 2008–2013 country strategy for Angola includes support to mine action. The funding source for mine action is from the European Development Fund (EDF).[4] In 2010, the EC awarded the French company Civipol Conseil[5] a three-year, €3 million ($3.9 million) contract awarded for a capacity-building project with CNIDAH and INAD; capacity building was covered previously with UNDP support. A consortium led by Civipol Conseil, which has no previous mine action experience, includes Cesoci (Portugal), Geomine (France), MAT Mondial, (United Kingdom),[6] and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (France).[7] The purpose of the EC project is to provide technical support to monitor NGO clearance operations in Bié, Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Malange, and Moxico; technical support also goes to CNIDAH for coordination, strategic planning, and quality management; support goes to INAD for database and information management.[8] In 2010, the EC awarded five international NGOs and one French commercial company €20 million ($26.5 million) for 2010–2012.[9]

Despite having one of the highest landmine casualty rates in the world, Angola’s total international support for victim assistance in 2011 was less than $2 million. Angola’s national budget has several line items that potentially benefit landmine survivors. CNIDAH budgeted AOA250 million/$2.7 million for a national victim survey[10] which was ongoing in August 2012. The Ministry of Health budgeted AOA 1.04 billion/$11.1 million for its annual support to the National Rehabilitation Hospital and Centre in Viana, outside Luanda, while the Ministry of Veterans Affairs budget to assist disabled veterans was AOA702 million ($7.5 million) in 2011.[11] There is no available information on the number of landmine casualties that benefit from these facilities and programs.

International contributions in 2011[12]

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011 (US$)[13]