Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 28 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation—the Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-personnel Mines—took effect on 28 May 1999.[1] In 2012, Cambodia submitted its 13^thMine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2011.[2]

Cambodia hosted the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties (11MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh in November–December 2010 at Vimean Santepheap (the Peace Palace). Prak Sokhonn, Minister Attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-Chair of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), was elected president of the 11MSP.

Upon opening the meeting, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated, “For Cambodia, this presidency is a privilege to serve and a major responsibility to fulfill. And for the mine ban movement, it is a special and unique milestone. With the 11 [MSP] in Phnom Penh, the Convention is returning to a place where it all started 20 years ago from human tragedy and suffering of the victims in Cambodia as well as in similar regions of Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the commitment to put an end to these inhumane and deadly weapons was born.”[3]

As president-designate, Prak Sokhonn undertook universalization missions in the region to encourage accessions to the Convention, including to Vietnam in August 2011 and Singapore in October 2011. In May 2011, the Cambodian Prime Minister called upon all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations to join the convention, or at a minimum engage in the work of the 11MSP at a high level.[4]

A joint Cambodian-ICRC-UNDP workshop on universalization was held in Phnom Penh in September 2011. Representatives from states not party China, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Vietnam participated in the meeting.  President-designate Prak Sokhonn stated, “This week’s Asian regional seminar seeks to enhance international dialogue in the region regardless of whether States are part of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.”[5]

As president of the meeting, Cambodia presided over the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012. In July 2012, during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin met with Prak Sokhonn, where the latter encouraged Myanmar to accede to the convention. Myanmar’s foreign minister replied that his government is seriously considering the Mine Ban Treaty, as part of its state reforms.[6]

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, retention, use

The government has reported that it does not have any antipersonnel mine production facilities, and that it has not exported antipersonnel mines.[7]

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999, the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.[8] In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police, which were subsequently destroyed.[9] Cambodia also reported that while there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001, “police and military units are still finding and collecting weapons, ammunitions and mines from various sources, locations and caches.”[10] Informal (“village”) demining and the scrap metal trade also accounted for some of the newly discovered stocks of mines. In its 2012 transparency report, Cambodia repeated a statement originally made in its report submitted in 2011 that no further stockpiles have been discovered in the past four years.[11] Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the CMAA and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction.[12] A Cambodian official has previously stated that newly discovered stocks are destroyed immediately.[13]

Previous Article 7 reports document a total of 133,478 stockpiled antipersonnel mines that were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008; this included 9,698 by CMAC, 2,713 by HALO Trust, and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Cambodia stated that these mines were “reported by local communities.”[14] It is not clear why significant numbers of stockpiles mines were discovered each year through 2008, but none have been discovered since.

As in previous years, in its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2011, Cambodia marked as “not applicable” the obligatory declaration for mines retained for development and training purposes.[15] However, Cambodia has each year reported transfer of mines removed from mined areas to the CMAC training center and other operators for training purposes.[16] In June 2011, the deputy secretary general of the CMAA told the Monitor that all mines held by Cambodia are fuzeless, and that Cambodia retains no live mines for training.[17] In 2011, Cambodia reported the transfer for training purposes of 1,118 antipersonnel mines “found in the Mined Areas and retained for training and development purposes,” but did not state that the mines had been neutralized.[18]

Previous allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodian forces on the Cambodian-Thai border, made by Thailand in 2008 and 2009, were never resolved.[19] In May 2011, in response to a request by the Monitor for an update regarding the Fact Finding Mission Report into the allegations, a government official stated:

Cambodia has been waiting for the responses from Thailand to five core questions, without which the result of the investigation conducted by the Fact Finding Commission of Cambodia cannot be substantiated and evidently concluded. Thailand has not responded to…neither answered nor substantiated the allegation it first made. The allegation made by Thailand regarding Cambodia’s use of new landmines can be summarized as baseless at best.[20]

 

Contamination and Impact

Cambodia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. The precise extent of contamination is not known. An ongoing two-year Baseline Survey (BLS), due for completion before the end of 2012, estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,624km² after surveying 89 out of 124 districts.[1]

Mines

Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand, which accounted for more than 90% of casualties in the three years to 2009. Contamination includes the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s to block insurgent infiltration, which ranks among the densest contamination in the world; it reportedly has up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.[2]

Cambodia’s 2009 Article 5 deadline extension request estimated mined areas needing clearance at 648.8km² and the National Mine Action Strategy released in 2010 identified a further 1,097.8 km² of suspected land to be released “through baseline survey and technical survey.”[3] The total estimate of contamination, however, has risen sharply as a result of the BLS showing an extensive residual problem of scattered or nuisance mines. By July 2012, the ongoing BLS mentioned above reported more than 945km² affected to some degree by antipersonnel mines (see Survey section below), of which 614km² was scattered mines. A further 63.1km² was identified as contaminated only by antivehicle mines.[4] 

Antivehicle mine incidents have highlighted the threat posed by these devices, which caused twice as many casualties as did antipersonnel mines in 2011. That danger has increased as population pressures increase demand for land and increasingly heavy farm vehicles are used along old roads, some of them abandoned in the years of conflict.[5]

Casualties by device in 2009–2011[6]

* Included four people killed and 12 injured by cluster submunition remnants in 2011.

** In addition, three people were killed and three injured in 2011 by unidentified devices.

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped at least 26 million explosive submunitions on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern and northeastern areas bordering the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam. The bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, including unexploded BLU-24, BLU-26, BLU-36, BLU-42, BLU-43, BLU-49, and BLU-61 submunitions.[7] 

Cross-border shelling by Thailand in April 2011 of Cambodia’s northern province, Preah Vihear, resulted in additional submunition contamination. An assessment by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) immediately after the shelling identified 12 strike sites and contamination by unexploded M42, M46, and M85 submunitions over an area of approximately 1.5km², impacting four villages and affecting between 5,000 and 10,000 people.[8] NPA said evidence in the area suggested about one in five of the submunitions had failed to detonate.[9]

The BLS, as of early July 2012, had identified 708 areas suspected to be contaminated by cluster munitions covering an area of 327.4km².[10] An ERW survey conducted by CMAC with support from NPA in eastern Cambodia, focusing particularly on determining the extent of cluster munition remnants contamination more precisely than the BLS, had confirmed hazardous areas of 3.9km² and identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) of 12.2km² as of early September 2012.[11]

The Cambodia Mine/Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 16 submunition casualties in 2011, including four fatalities.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

By July 2012, the BLS had identified 227.67km² affected by ERW, not including cluster munitions.[13] The US also dropped more than a million tons (one billion kilograms) of general purpose bombs during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern Cambodia. In other parts of the country, operators encounter mainly land-fired ordnance, including artillery shells, rockets, and mortars.[14] ERW now account for just over half the casualties caused by all types of explosive ordnance in Cambodia.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the CMAC.[16] The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, quality control, as well as coordinating mine/ERW risk education (RE) and victim assistance.[17] Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA president, and a senior government minister, Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers, Prak Sokhonn, who is CMAA vice-president, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Mine Action Technical Working Group.[18]

The CMAA’s management is overseen by its Secretary-General, Chum Bun Rong, who was appointed in December 2008.[19] A subdecree (No. 92), issued in August 2009, specifies that CMAA has five departments: regulation and monitoring, socio-economic planning and database management, mine victim assistance, public relations, and general administration.[20]

A National Mine Action Strategy 2010−2019 (NMAS), drawn up by the CMAA and UNDP and approved by the government in November 2010, sets four main goals:[21]

·         reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts by allocating demining assets to the most impacted communities and promoting RE;

·         contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting local, subnational, and national development priorities, supporting access to care for survivors and securing the land rights of intended beneficiaries of clearance;

·         promote international and regional disarmament and stability by supporting the Mine Ban Treaty and adhering to the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on explosive remnants of war; and

·         ensure sustainable national capacities to adequately address the residual mine/ERW contamination by reviewing the institutional framework to address the residual problem, plugging gaps, and maintaining sustainable capacity.

CMAA introduced “Partnership Principles” in April 2011 intended to guide relations and improve coordination with donor governments and “to make mine action a driver of growth and poverty reduction within the context of the (2009−2013 National Strategic Development Plan).” The principles state “no mine action programme, project, annual workplan or new initiative should be implemented without prior agreement from the CMAA.” The government, recognizing the impact of mine action on development, “will commit annually a heightened level of support from its own budget resources.” The seven donors that signed the principles, dated 4 April 2011, were Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), and the UN. Austria signed the principles in 2012.[22]

Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in Cambodia’s eight most mine-affected provinces are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working with local authorities to identify community priorities and in consultation with operators. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Councils and the CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. In practice, however, MAPUs have approved many clearance tasks that were decided by operators consulting bilaterally with donors.

The CMAA approved new guidelines and criteria for planning and prioritization in September 2011 for implementation from the start of 2012. The new guidelines seek to integrate clearance more closely with broader commune development plans. They specify that priority is given to clearing hazardous area polygons identified by the BLS and where there have been casualties in the past five years. The guidelines also include a provision for the CMAA to give guidance and direction to the relevant MAPU on the criteria that define clearance priorities.[23]

UNDP supports the CMAA through a “Clearing for Results” program. The first project expired at the end of March 2010 and was replaced from 1 January 2011 by a second project still funded and advised by UNDP but under national management. Project priorities included strengthening CMAA management and technical capacity, conducting the BLS, and promoting cost-effective approaches to land release through competitive bidding for clearance contracts.[24]

CMAA awarded four contracts under “Clearing for Results” in 2011 worth a total of US$2.8 million and projected spending $2.9 million in 2012, including $502,000 for the BLS. The contracts awarded in 2011 included:[25]

·         CMAC: two contracts for clearance and technical survey in Banteay Meanchey and Battambang provinces worth $1 million each covering 4km² and 4.5km² respectively.

·         The RCAF’s National Center for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC): one contract worth $380,000 to clear 1.2km² of Pailin between July 2011 and April 2012, its first involvement in CMAA-coordinated mine action.

·         HALO Trust: one $400,000 contract to provide seven survey teams for the second phase of the BLS.[26]

NPA continues to provide support to CMAA’s database, funding seven national staff under a three-year agreement ending in 2014.[27]

Land Release

Demining operators increased the amount of land released through clearance and survey by nearly one-quarter in 2011 despite a tougher financial environment. Total land released by four humanitarian demining operators and RCAF’s National Center for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC) amounted to 64.52km², of which CMAC reportedly accounted for 51.99km² or 80%.[28] CMAC reported that its total land release included 9.51km² of land released by technical survey and “other” forms of area reduction.[29]

Five-year summary of clearance

The figures have been disaggregated between mine and battle area clearance by the Monitor, and do not include release by technical survey, as CMAA does not perform this task in its reporting.

Survey in 2011

By the end of June 2012, operators had completed surveying 89 of the 124 districts to be covered by the BLS. Survey teams were working in 19 districts and funding was being sought for the remaining 16 districts. The CMAA had planned for the survey to be complete by October 2012 and to present a report to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva at the end of November. Despite delays over funding, the CMAA still expected to complete the survey and prepare a revised work plan on the basis of it by the end of the year.[30]

By the end of June 2012, the survey had recorded dense antipersonnel mine contamination over 50km² and scattered antipersonnel mine contamination over 614km² of “land that is not in productive use.” The BLS land classification matrix states that clearance assets should be deployed on such land only in cases “where there is a development justification.” A further 281km² was contaminated by a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The BLS found almost 60km² of previously suspect land had no verifiable mine threat.[31] It also classified 708 SHAs covering an area of 327km² as B1.2, meaning land where there is “bombing data or evidence that an area contains cluster munitions or bombies [small unexploded bombs].”[32]

CMAC deployed between six and 16 survey teams at different times of the year, depending on availability of funding, and as a result of shortfalls it demobilized some teams and assigned others to different tasks.[33] In addition to the BLS, NPA conducted a survey focused on determining the extent of contamination by cluster munition remnants in eastern provinces, working with three international staff and 71 nationals, including six CMAC survey teams, reduced in March 2012 to four.[34] 

HALO completed 14 districts for the BLS, deploying seven survey teams under a CMAA “Clearing for Results” contract between May and December, covering 1,042 villages and surveying 1,825 SHAs. HALO also operated two survey/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams which surveyed 104 SHAs with a total area of 12.9km².[35] Survey teams from the UK NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) worked in four districts of Pursat province in 2011.[36]

Mine clearance in 2011

Total mined area clearance in 2011 amounted to almost 38km² in 2011, a one-quarter increase on the 30km² reported by operators in 2010. In addition to CMAC, HALO, MAG, and NPMEC, the CMAA also for the first time reported clearance by Cambodian Self Help Demining (CSHD).[37]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2011[38]

CMAC, the biggest demining operator, reported manually clearing 25.32km² in 2011, 14% more than in 2010, despite what it said was the most difficult year for funding in the last decade.[39] Although Japan approved an equipment grant worth US$16.8 million, including brush cutters and global positioning system technology, CMAC faced shortfalls and delays in funding that held up clearance projects and caused fluctuations in demining team deployments. CMAC reported 2,017 staff actively employed at the start of 2011, dropping to 1,387 in April, and then finishing the year with 1,715 personnel. In addition to mined area clearance, CMAC also cleared 17.14km² of battle area in eastern Cambodia and nearly 70,000 items of UXO through roving EOD. In addition, CMAC, working in partnership with Golden West, recovered 10 tons of UXO and AXO in underwater operations in the Tonle Sap river.[40] 

HALO also reduced capacity as a result of reduced funding, dropping from 1,100 employees at the end of 2010 to around 578 in 2011 and operating on average six demining teams less each month than in 2010. Despite the personnel cuts, HALO reported a 53% rise in the area it demined, largely achieved by clearing significantly more antivehicle mined areas (5km² in 2011 compared with 1.8km² in 2010) while clearing almost the same amount of antipersonnel mined areas (3.87km², down from 3.99km² in 2010). HALO’s work plan for 2012 provided for a similar focus on antivehicle mines, proposing total clearance of 12.72km² of which 8.23km² would be antivehicle mined areas.[41]

MAG also reported a 42% rise in clearance to 2.34km² in 2011, helped by increased funding. The funding increase allowed a staff increase to a total of 338 at the end of the year and an increase in the number of demining teams from nine to 13; the teams worked in western provinces along with four mechanical teams and one mine-detection dog team. MAG discontinued two EOD teams which had been operating in eastern Cambodia in May 2011 but continued with two roving teams in the west, completing a total of 1,464 tasks which destroyed 8,352 items of UXO.[42]

Despite the financial constraints facing donor-dependent humanitarian demining organizations in 2011, the CMAA awarded a US$380,000 contract funded by the UNDP’s “Clearing for Results” program to the armed forces’ NPMEC, which completed clearance of 0.89km².[43] In 2011, NPMEC accredited another five demining platoons and an EOD team, bringing their total accredited strength to nine demining platoons and two EOD teams.[44]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010−2019 states that “For the purpose of the Extension Request, Cambodia will require demining operations over the next 10 years to clear some 648.8km² of mine affected land and to release 1,097.8km² of suspected land through baseline survey and technical survey.”[45] Partial results of the BLS, however, suggest a bigger clearance task than that predicted in the Extension Request. As of the end of June 2012, survey had still to be completed in 35 of the 124 districts covered by the BLS, but results received already showed a total area of more than 945km² affected by antipersonnel mines (see Survey section above).[46]

Cambodia has asserted that such figures cannot be compared to the estimate of 648.8km² because the different BLS land categories may include antivehicle mines and ERW.[47] Still, mined area clearance, although nearly one-quarter higher in 2011 than the previous year at 36.88km², continues to lag behind the clearance targets presented in Cambodia’s extension request, which predicted 40.18km² for 2011.[48]

An additional complication for Cambodia has been heightened insecurity along its border with Thailand, including cross-border clashes in April 2011, which has led to interruption of demining in some border areas, including parts of the K5 mine belt.[49] 

Quality management

The CMAA is responsible for quality management, operating six quality assurance (QA) teams: two teams are based in Battambang, two in Bantheay Meanchey, one in Siem Reap, and one in Kampong Cham, concentrating on clearance operations. The CMAA also has two QA teams monitoring the BLS. It set up two more quality control teams in February 2012 to focus on land releases by technical survey in order to assure safety and help maintain public confidence, one in Battambang province and the other in Bantheay Meanchey province.[50]

Safety of demining personnel

HALO reported one demining accident resulting in injury in 2011 but the deminer subsequently returned to work.[51]

Risk Education

CMAA is responsible for planning, coordinating and overseeing mine/ERW risk education (RE) which is conducted by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, CMAC along with clearance operators, the National Police, as well as by the Cambodian Red Cross and NGOs, including HI-Belgium and Spirit of Soccer. At the provincial level, the Provincial Mine Action Committee prioritizes and coordinates messages.[52]

CMAC delivered RE through networks of community-based mine risk reduction and UXO risk reduction teams. CMAC reported that these teams made more than 12,000 presentations during 2011 and also helped generate requests for spot clearance.[53] HALO operated one RE team in 2011 which made 44 presentations supporting the BLS.[54] MAG delivers Risk Reduction Education (RRE) through community liaison teams, increasing the number of these teams from six to eight during 2011 and conducting 221 sessions. MAG’s two EOD teams also provided basic RE in the course of roving operations.[55]

 

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2011, the Cambodia Mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 211 casualties from mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and cluster munition remnants. Of the total casualties, 88% (186) were civilians. Some 27% of the civilian casualties were children (51), 44 boys and seven girls. Of the total adult civilian casualties, 125 were men and 10 were women. Six casualties were deminers. Another 19 casualties were security personnel, including one Thai national. Eight of the 18 Cambodian security casualties were off-duty military personnel and the remaining 10 were police involved in an incident with an unexploded submunition.[1]

The 211 casualties recorded in 2011 represented a significant decrease from the 286 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2010. Mine/ERW incidents decreased by almost a third, from 150 incidents in 2010 (and 2009) to 104 in 2011. The 2011 total marked the lowest number of annual casualties recorded.[2] The highest proportion of mine casualties in Cambodia since 2000 was recorded in 2011(51%), when ERW casualties first became the majority.[3] This was due to a continuing high number of antivehicle mine incidents, which caused multiple casualties, despite an ongoing decrease in antipersonnel mine casualties.[4]

As of the end of 2011, CMVIS reported at least 64,017 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,619 people were killed and another 44,398 injured since 1979.[5]

Cluster Munition Casualties

For the period from 1998 to the end of 2011, 190 cluster munition remnant casualties were reported in Cambodia.[6] However data collection on cluster munition casualties has been limited and the total number, although not known, is thought to be much higher. Cambodia is among the countries considered to be among the states “worst affected” by cluster munitions with responsibility for significant numbers of cluster munition victims.[7]

Victim Assistance

Cambodia is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims and other survivors of ERW. Cambodia has made commitments to provide victim assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Over 44,000 people are known to have been injured by mines/ERW; however, the actual number of living survivors is not known.[8]

Summary of victim assistance efforts since 1999[9]

The Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) delegated responsibility for the coordination of victim assistance to the Ministry of Social Action (MoSVY) and its support mechanism the Disability Action Council (DAC). Despite hopes for improved national disability representation following a long restructuring process by DAC, in 2010 the DAC was placed directly under ministerial authority. The focus of coordination changed from survivors to broader disability needs when the National Coordination Committee on Disabilities (NCCD) replaced the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance in 2009.

Survivors had increased opportunities to access free healthcare programs. However, emergency transportation to save lives was not widely available. Through NGO efforts to expand services and geographical coverage, physical rehabilitation improved in both quality and in the number of services available from existing service providers. Since 1999, services in physical rehabilitation have been available throughout the country from both government agencies and NGOs. Gradual improvements were made in the availability of employment opportunities, social inclusion activities and accessibility of existing services. Inclusive education programs provided by the government and relevant organizations increased. There were more vocational services for survivors in 1999 than in 2011. There has been an increased emphasis on community based rehabilitation efforts. Coordination among governmental bodies responsible for the provision of victim assistance steadily improved.

Reaching survivors in remote and rural areas remained a challenge for service providers and generally these populations did not receive adequate assistance. Many lacked education and literacy and had no work or land to live from. Overall they received little or no support and did not have full access to social services and healthcare.

Victim assistance in 2011

In 2011, emergency medical care continued to improve. Though there was an ongoing decrease in the number of prosthetic devices produced for survivors, most survivors surveyed reported having the devices they needed. The availability of economic inclusion activities was, for the most part, maintained. However, this was an area that required significant expansion.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No comprehensive, systematic needs assessment for mine/ERW survivors was reported by the government in 2011.[10] In June 2012, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), the Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL) Survivor Network, the CMAA and the NGO Aarrupe initiated an intensive survey of survivor needs and quality of life in the six most severely affected provinces. Survey teams involve village leaders and the survey includes discussion of disability rights laws and issues. A directory of services for people with disabilities actually provided in districts was made in 2011 and planned to be released in each province through 2012.[11] In 2011, Handicap International (HI) also published referral directories of all health, livelihood and social services available in two provinces, Battambang and Kampong Cham.[12]

CMVIS provided ongoing systematic data collection of mine/ERW casualties, including numbers of survivors and referrals to services.[13] There was no mechanism in Cambodia to collect comprehensive data on persons with disabilities more generally.[14] In 2011, an agreement between the key government ministries to standardize the classifications of disability they use was also intended to assist the development of data collection.[15] In 2011, the CMAA department of Victim Assistance cooperated with the Ministry of Planning to have its victim assistance questionnaire integrated into the Commune Database which contains key information on the demographic, socioeconomic and physical assets of each commune and is used for annual planning. The Community Database, maintained by the Ministry of Planning, is also used to assess the allocation of funding to communes.[16]

Victim assistance coordination[17]

The NDCC, co-chaired by both the MoSVY and the DAC and included some victim assistance service providers as well as other disability actors, held sub-committees on key issues.[18] The DAC operates directly under the MoSVY. In 2011, this relationship was further complicated because coordination of both the NCCD and DAC were the responsibility of a single person, leading to concerns that the DAC no longer functioned in an independent advisory role to the MoSVY. It was decided that the roles would be separated in 2012 and a new candidate to lead the DAC was identified.[19]

Based on the recommendations of a multi-stakeholder implementation report of the current National Plan of Action, the plan was extended until the end of 2013 while a new strategic plan was to be developed for the period 2014-2018.[20] When it was established in 2009, the NDCC was assigned responsibility for monitoring implementation of the National Plan of Action.[21] However, in 2011, Cambodia reported that it lacked the financial and human resources for monitoring the Plan.[22]

The MoSVY and DAC, in collaboration with partner NGOs, organized several provincial level workshops throughout 2011 to disseminate the disability law and National Plan of Action; a national workshop for reviewing CBR achievements was conducted in December 2011.[23]

In 2011, the MoSVY continued to have the core responsibility for coordinating rehabilitation services and training in vocational skills for persons with disabilities. Several other ministries were involved in disability issues, including the Ministry of Health (MoH), which promoted physiotherapy services; the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, with a Special Education Office responsible for promoting inclusive education for children with disabilities; the Ministries of Public Works and Transport; and National Defense.[24]

In September 2011, the Persons with Disabilities Foundation was launched under a sub-decree of the 2009 Disability Law.[25] The Foundation’s many responsibilities include securing and administering funding from the government and donors for rehabilitation and economic inclusion services, as well as managing rehabilitation centers and developing policies for the social integration of persons with disabilities.[26]

Cambodia provided updates on progress in the coordination of victim assistance at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2011 and the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in May 2012. Cambodia also included updates on physical rehabilitation and medical services provided by NGOs in 2011 in Form J of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report. However, unlike previous year’s reporting, it did not specify the services provided to survivors and therefore was not useful for measuring progress.[27] Cambodian governmental organizations and NGOs also reported significantly on national victim assistance activities during the Victim Assistance Parallel Programme during the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh.[28]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Representative organizations of survivors and persons with disabilities were included in coordination and planning activities through the NDCC. However, there was a recognized need for greater involvement of all stakeholders, especially persons with disabilities, in all areas of coordination and planning in order to achieve real positive change.[29] Cambodia had not included survivors in its official delegations to Mine Ban Treaty meetings since the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2006.[30] Survivors were involved in the implementation of many services provided by NGOs.[31]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[32]

In 2011, Cambodia reported that health services provided to new mine/ERW survivors improved in some mine/ERW affected communities.[33] Emergency services were free; however, ongoing medical care was not, and there was an urgent need for the provision of free hospital care for vulnerable people with disabilities.[34]

In 2011, the number of services provided by rehabilitation centers was unclear.[35] A decrease in the number of services reported in 2011 as compared to 2010 was attributed to a combination of incomplete monitoring of disability data, financial constraints on the centers in transition to MoSVY management, and limited assistance to cover transportation and lodging costs for beneficiaries to access services.[36] However, in 2012, CCBL survey teams reported that among survivors interviewed in villages only very few were without a prosthetic of choice.[37]

Management of rehabilitation centers remained a key issue for victim assistance. With a goal of building national ownership of the rehabilitation sector, MoSVY and international organizations which operate physical rehabilitation centers had formally agreed that MoSVY was to become responsible for the management of all provincial rehabilitation centers by 2011. Standard operating and management procedures for physical rehabilitation centers were drafted in 2011. Stock management and patient management systems were also introduced to the centers.[38] However, as of mid-2012, most international organizations continued to provide management and financial and technical support while operating centers under MoSVY coordination.[39] MoSVY lacked the capacity and finances to sustain services once it assumed management.[40] In 2011, a local NGO questioned whether appropriate exit strategies for a sustainable handover had been made by the NGOs that receive the most funding and resources for providing rehabilitation.[41]

In 2011, the ICRC continued cooperation with the MoSVY for the two centers it supported as well as the national prosthetic-orthotic component factory. The MoSVY continued to gradually take over increased financial and managerial responsibilities for running the two centers and the component factory.[42]

In January 2011, VI signed a memorandum of understanding with the MoSVY that extended the transition period for handover of rehabilitation centers from 2011 to 2013, in order to create sustainability through the process. VI planned to handover all three centers (Kien Khleang, Prey Veng and Kratie) to government management, while continuing financial support and capacity building for three years after the 2013 handover. The government did not go through with plans to relocate VI’s Kien Khleang center to Phnom Penh Thmey in 2011 due to concerns raised over the impact the move would have on accessibility for beneficiaries.[43]

In 2011, HI Belgium, which operated rehabilitation centers in Siem Reap and Takeo, joined the HI Federation, which operated the rehabilitation center in Kampong Cham. The two HI offices planned to merge into a single HI Federation office in Cambodia by 2013.[44] In 2011, operational and financial management of the physical rehabilitation centers in Siem Reap and Takeo, formerly operated by HI, was handed over to the local Provincial Department of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (PoSVY) under the MoSVY. Both centers received support from HI in 2011, which was used to maintain their overall operations. However, in 2011 services at the centers no longer included outreach activities and the number of people served had decreased from the previous year.[45]

In order to facilitate handover of rehabilitation center management, the MoSVY was in communication with the Ministry of Finance to find the funding to support the centers, but the government wages were much lower for staff (falling from approximately US$200-300 paid by the NGOs to just $50-60 per month).[46] This resulted in staff leaving after the handover. In 2011, the local PoSVY contributed 19% of total operational budget for the Takeo center. HI supported costs for beneficiaries at the Takeo center through 2011 and then ended its support in March 2012. From April 2012, the center has almost completely closed as no technical staff remained.[47]

In Siem Reap, HI continued to sustain the overall operations and quality of services at the center by supplementing staff salaries, staff capacity building and costs of imported material. The number of beneficiaries coming from Kampong Thom and Prea Vihear provinces to attend the center dropped compared to previous years due to the discontinuation of outreach activities in both provinces in 2010. In Siem Reap, the PoSVY contributed only 9% of the center’s total operational budget. The PoSVY was supposed to cover up to 50% of the total operational budget in 2012 including all operational costs except for imported raw material and staff capacity building.[48]

Although the HI physical rehabilitation center in Kampong Cham was still in the process of the handover to government management, through 2011 the center remained nearly 100% managed by HI. HI no longer had a plan or timeframe to complete the handover of Kampong Cham center to government management, which was originally agreed to be done by 2011.[49] The Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics (CSPO), a project of the Cambodia Trust, was integrated into the National Institute of Social Affairs in 2011 after having become fully nationally-operated in 2010.[50] Cambodia Trust increased local staff salaries and reported that the quality of CSPO operations remained at previous levels, although overall funding to the CSPO decreased with no expatriate salaries in the budget.[51]

Cambodia lacked a national integrated system for psychological or psychiatric assistance, and most available services were provided by a limited number of NGOs.[52] Self-helps, groups mostly supported by NGOs, continued to provide local services at the provincial level and were monitored by the CBR network.[53] Village level survey indicated that in some areas the majority of self-help group participants were not persons with disabilities.[54]

Cambodia reported that many vocational training centers were not functioning due to a lack of financial and human resources and that there was a need for more interest in vocational training and micro-credit by international partners and NGOs. As of May 2012, the Persons with Disabilities Foundation, established in September 2011, did not yet have the capacity to provide micro-credit and income generation projects itself.[55]

Persons with disabilities continued to lack equal access to education, training, and employment. In 2011, Cambodia reported that survivors and other persons with disabilities were given priority access to vocational training in both the public and private sector.[56] However, although Cambodia has had a quota system for the employment of persons with disabilities since 2009, into 2012 the system was not yet being implemented effectively in either the public or the private sector.[57]

The 2009 Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. By September 2011, the Council of Ministers had approved four sub-decrees to support the law.[58] It was reported that some 14 sub-decrees were needed for the law to be effectively implemented.[59] The 2009 law requires that buildings and government services be accessible to persons with disabilities.[60] However, inaccessibility to public buildings, transport, facilities, and referral systems continued to prevent persons with disabilities from actively participating in social and economic activities.[61]

Cambodia signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 1 October 2007.

 

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, Cambodia was the second largest recipient of international assistance after Afghanistan. It received almost US$35.8 million for mine action from 13 donors.[1] Japan provided the largest contribution (¥1,363,803,048/US$17,111,707), which includes ¥1,100,538,247 ($13,808,510) for demining machines and related equipment.[2] The largest recipient in Cambodia was the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC). Germany, Japan, and the United States (US) also provided some of their support to CMAC.

Although donors contributed to four sectors, the combined total amount for victim assistance, risk education, and advocacy was only US$1.1 million, including $453,180 reported for victim assistance out of the total international support of more than $35 million.

Cambodia reported a contribution of $2,874,000 to CMAC in 2011. It does not include the government of Cambodia’s contribution to the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) or for mine clearance in support of infrastructure development.[3] These figures were unavailable.

CMAC reported expenditures of $11 million in 2011, of which approximately 40% was for personnel costs such as salaries and other employee compensation.[4]

International government contributions: 2011[5]

Thematic totals

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011 (US$)[6]