Commitment to Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001.

National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.[1] In relation to the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia also passed laws on victim assistance, land restitution, and civilian humanitarian demining operations.[2] Law 1421 of 2010 permits NGOs to conduct humanitarian demining operations in the country.[3] On 13 July 2011, the Colombian Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) published the draft regulatory decree of Law 1421.[4] On 10 October 2011, the president of Colombia, through the Ministry of Defense, approved decree 3750, which promulgated Law 1421 regulating demining by civil society organizations.[5]

Colombia submitted its 12^thMine Ban Treaty Article 7 report on 25 April 2012, which covered calendar year 2011.[6] Under national implementation measures, Colombia listed Law 1448 of 2011, the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Victimas y de Restitución de Tierra).[7] In its previous report, Colombia listed its “main operational results” against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) during 2010, including the number of demobilizations and captures.[8]

Colombia attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November–December 2011, where it made several statements. Colombia also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012.

Colombia has continued its activity in support of the Mine Ban Treaty at the highest levels.[9] It hosted the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena in November–December 2009. Colombia served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in 2011. Colombia is part of an informal working group of States Parties from Latin America that monitors implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan.[10]

Colombia is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted a CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 annual report.

The Colombian Campaign against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) has continued its work to increase awareness of the country’s mine problem and its solutions.[11] It called on the government to use military demining teams to clear coca crops because civilians employed by the Colombian government to eradicate the crops have become casualties due to explosive devices.[12]

The Colombian NGO Fundación Arcangeles partnered with the ICBL and the UN Mine Action Service to hold the global “Lend Your Leg” campaign from 1 March until 4 April 2012. The activity, which involves people making the symbolic gesture of rolling up a pant leg in support of efforts against landmines and in solidarity with victims, was inspired by the Remangate (“Roll-up”) activity organized by Fundación Arcangeles in Colombia on 4 April 2011. Lend Your Leg activities were held in 74 countries and territories in 2012. In Colombia, the CCCM collaborated with Fundacion Arcangeles to hold an array of activities that resulted major media coverage, including the production of a special song and an 11km run in Bogota on 1 April, involving 4,000 participants including the president of Colombia and the United States ambassador.[13]

Production, transfer, use and stockpiling

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998 and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.[14]

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines.

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 18,531 antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.[15]

Since 2007, Colombia has retained a total of 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes. It declared a total of 586 MAP-1 mines retained for training purposes in its 2009 Article 7 report. In the 2010 and 2011 reports, Colombia did not provide a number but declared “no change in the quantity of retained antipersonnel mines” since 2009.[16] Colombia has not destroyed or consumed any mines in training activities since a total of 300 retained mines were destroyed in three separate events in 2006.[17] In March 2007, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) said that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training.[18]

Colombia has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties. However, in May 2011, it informed the Monitor that the 586 retained mines were “used for training the humanitarian demining units [of the armed forces], in the use of equipment for mine clearance.” In the event it was to destroy these mines, Colombia said it would account for this change in its Article 7 report.[19]

Antipersonnel mines discovered during mine clearance are destroyed on site and not kept for training purposes.[20]

Transfer and production by non-state armed groups

There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but the Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) manufacture antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content; the reports also include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore mines, as well as IEDs. The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.[21] In June 2011, a member of the Colombian army’s demining battalion informed the Monitor that a FARC weapons cache found in June 2011 included homemade mines made entirely from plastic and chemical materials which are pressure-activated by a syringe triggering a chemical reaction.[22]

NSAG production of explosive devices continued in 2011 and the first half of 2012. During that period, there was at least one article published every week on the discovery and confiscation of explosive devices, including homemade antipersonnel mines.[23] In July 2012, the Colombian army announced the discovery of a FARC production center for explosive weapons in Bolivar department, from which 38 mines were recovered.[24] In June 2012, the Colombian army reported their discovery of a facility in Cachira, Norte de Santander department, used by FARC to manufacture explosive devices.[25]

Use by non-state armed groups

FARC continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. Government forces continued to recover mines from the ELN, which has been documented as an antipersonnel mine user. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia until its disbandment in 2006.[26]

In August 2012, the ELN again called for peace talks with the government, but the vice-president stated that the ELN should halt mine use before commencing peace talks.[27] In September, the ELN confirmed that the landmine issue must be an element of peace talks.[28]

FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. In August 2012, the president of Colombia announced that exploratory meetings have been held to seek peace with the FARC.[29] During 2011 and early 2012, the army reported finding FARC combatants skilled in the construction and laying of mines.[30] In September 2011, the Colombian army demobilized a FARC combatant in Neiva, who had reportedly been tasked with overseeing the mine defenses of a FARC camp after losing his leg to a mine near a FARC base.[31] In September 2011, the army stated that it had found 1,961 mines planted by FARC in Putumayo department on Colombia’s southern border with Ecuador and Peru and said that it had seized 3,882 kilograms of explosives in Putumayo this year, enough for “more than 10,000 explosive devices.”[32] In February 2012, the army reported recovering 48 fan mines (minas tipo abanico) from a FARC cache in Caquetá department.[33]

Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their campsites or bases, on other paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as paths to main transit routes along mountain ridges) and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.[34] In 2012, FARC was accused of laying mines near destroyed infrastructure to prevent or delay its reconstruction.[35] NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts, causing casualties among coca eradicators.[36] In February 2012, the ICBL expressed concern to the government of Colombia regarding the use of civilians to undertake coca eradication when these areas are increasingly known to be mined.[37]

CCCM has drawn attention to the challenges faced by entire communities cut off by mines laid in their vicinity. In August 2012, FARC distributed flyers in the town of San Miguel in Putumayo department warning of mines in the area, resulting in the community being confined by the threat.[38] In February 2011, the town of Samaniego in Nariño department was isolated after several mines and other explosive devices were laid on the only road leading to it.[39]

Media reports show the Colombian army has continued to recover mines from FARC and the ELN in its operations in 2011 and the first half of 2012. In March 2011, the Colombian army reported recovering at least 370 mines in two operations in La Garrucha, Antioquia department and Neiva, Huila department.[40] In April 2011, the army reported seizing 17 mines from FARC combatants in Neiva and reported finding the bodies of two soldiers allegedly abducted by FARC rebels that were surrounded by “landmine booby traps.”[41] In June 2011, the army recovered 500 mines that it said belonged to the ELN from the village of El Porvenir in San Francisco municipality, Antioquia department.[42]

Contamination and Impact

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, which is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs), remains unclear. In its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, Colombia describes a complex situation with a substantial humanitarian impact resulting from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by NSAGs.[1] Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombing.[2] Explosive devices and other ERW are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is trying to destroy coca plantations.[3]

In 2011, the Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) received reports on 1,094 “events”,[4] which include accidents from mines, IEDs and unexploded ordnance (UXO), mined areas, suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and military demining operations. This compares to an increase of 334 in 2010 and 169 in 2009. Each event is recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at PAICMA and is marked for further investigation to confirm the suspicion.[5]

People living in both rural and urban areas are killed and injured by victim-activated IEDs, unexploded or abandoned munitions, and inappropriately stored ordnance.[6] Civilian personnel hired to manually destroy coca plantations, commonly known as “coca eradicators,” represent one of the highest risk groups in Colombia. Drug traffickers use mines as booby-traps to protect the crops.[7] In 2011, 19 coca eradicators, hired as temporary workers by the Illicit Crops Eradication Department, were injured and two killed while destroying coca plantations.[8]

Colombia’s database is populated with a large number of unconfirmed reports of accidents, incidents, and contamination. Colombia only started conducting non-technical survey (NTS) in 2010 after standard operating procedures (SOPs) were adopted, based on the 08.20 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) series released in July 2009. NTS in Colombia successfully cancel “suspicions” (see the Non-technical survey section below) and provide more of an indication of the quality of the database than of contamination.[9]

Mines

Given the irregular nature of mine-laying and the continued use of mines, especially improvised mines, it is impossible to obtain a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that a lack of reliable information prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline extension request.[10]

The Organization of American States (OAS) has reported that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. Nuisance mines have been found in schools, water sources, or stream crossings in order to allegedly intimidate or displace the local population. The limited humanitarian demining so far conducted by the Engineer Humanitarian Demining Battalion (BIDES) has found only small numbers of mines in each contaminated area.[11]

Nonetheless, the national database contains information indicating that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. The most affected departments are believed to be Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Tolima.[12] Since NSAGs use mines in unpredictable ways and some areas of the country are not accessible, PAICMA has been unable to conduct a nationwide survey to determine the true extent of the problem.[13]

Colombia does not include any coca plantations in its list of confirmed mined areas because not every coca field is a minefield. PAICMA records every accident/incident report related to eradication and schedules further investigation when security conditions allow in order to ensure that no mines have been left behind.[14]

Cluster munition remnants

Contamination in Columbia may include cluster munition remnants. In March 2010, Colombia reported using cluster munitions to target isolated airstrips used by NSAGs in minimally populated areas, without stating the specific time and location.[15] In December 2010, the Colombian Air Force made a presentation on past use and destruction of cluster munitions, claiming that cluster munitions were last used in October 2006.[16] PAICMA reported no cluster munitions were found in 2011.[17] A case against Colombia is before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights relating to the use of cluster bombs by the Colombian Air Force on 13 December 1998 on the hamlet of Santo Domingo, in the municipality of Tame, Arauca department.[18]

Other explosive remnants of war

The precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known. In 2011, 3% of all recorded victims were from incidents involving ERW.[19] For the period 2002–2010 it was estimated that 5% of all explosive ordnance incidents resulting in injury or death were caused by UXO.[20]The ICRC, however, based on its victim surveillance system and its integration into IMSMA, believes the true rate may be closer to 40%.[21]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, the National Intersectoral Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP), is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

The Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA), the technical secretary of CINAMAP, is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, with the overall strategy to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[22]

Since 2010, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been assisting PAICMA in integrating mine clearance NGOs into the national mine action framework with an emphasis on national standards, operational coordination systems, and quality management systems to monitor NGOs. In 2011, in consultation with PAICMA, it was determined that a major restructuring of PAICMA was needed in order to improve coordination. In 2012, UNMAS took the lead in implementing an internal quality management system for PAICMA.[23] UNMAS also assists PAICMA and the OAS in finalizing the accreditation and monitoring procedures and processes and will provide technical assistance as required for clearance operations.[24]

The OAS, in an agreement with the government of Colombia, serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS is responsible for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system on behalf of the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, commonly called “the Instancia Interinstitucional”), and reports to PAICMA.[25] The OAS is an advisor to the Instancia Interinstitucional (see below) in the accreditation of NGOs in Colombia. This includes evaluation of their structure, staff capacity, SOPs and training. The OAS monitoring section, which is based on Colombian national standards, evaluates the NGOs and recommends to the Instancia Interinstitucional whether an NGO should be accredited. The Instancia Interinstitucional, which reports to CINAMAP, is composed of the representatives from PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the military Inspector General.[26] UNMAS is an observer at the Instancia Interinstitucional.[27] As of 30 June 2011, the OAS had equipped and certified 27 teams with 360 deminers, and provided administrative and logistical assistance to sustain clearance operations.[28]

Demining law and standards[29]

Mine action in Colombia is a heavily regulated framework based on laws passed by Congress, opinions issued by the Attorney General, and decisions of the Constitutional Court. The legal framework was established within the security context of Colombia and with input from stakeholders.

Congress passed Law No. 1421 in December 2010 allowing NGOs to carry out humanitarian demining.[30] This law was the first step of a complex process that would take almost two years before it became operational in June 2012.  

In October 2011, in support of Law No. 1421, Decree No. 3750 established internal rules and procedures of the Instancia Interinstitucional to ensure that civilian humanitarian demining activities are conducted in accordance with international standards as mandated by Article 5 in the Mine Ban Treaty. The Instancia Interinstitucional will be responsible for approving demining tasks for NGOs based on local priorities and humanitarian principles after the NGOs are accredited.

Further progress towards NGOs becoming operational was made in July 2012 when, following on Decree No. 3750 on Rules and Procedures, PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense and the Commando General (General Command) introduced six of the 17 national standards that will regulate demining in Colombia to stakeholders. The six national standards, with technical assistance from UNMAS, cover tasking, non-technical survey, technical survey, accreditation, and manual demining.[31] The accreditation process also includes confirmation of adequate employment contracts, insurance policies, appropriate personal protective equipment, and daily coordination with security authorities.

In January 2012, in an unexpected development, the Procuraduría General de la Nación[32] issued a legal opinion surprisingly claiming that humanitarian demining in Colombia was a violation of international humanitarian law, as it would put deminers in danger.[33] As a consequence of the opinion, HALO Trust discontinued its non-technical survey work, and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) suspended their operations in Colombia due to the uncertainty caused by the opinion.[34]

At a meeting of CINAMAP on 16 May, after five months of discussion among PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the Procuraduría, PAICMA announced the Procuraduría would issue a new directive on NGO demining. The new directive, issued in June 2012, urged caution in tasking clearance in dangerous areas and recommended that the army both increase its humanitarian demining capacity and adopt the same national standards for humanitarian demining as apply to NGOs. The directive also allowed NGO demining to proceed. Under the directive, PAICMA is required to submit semi-annual reports to the Procuraduría. The Procuraduría also intends to follow up and eventually participate in the process.[35] By 22 June 2012, HALO had submitted its paperwork for desk accreditation. Following field accreditation, CINAMAP will assign tasks and HALO will be able to start demining.[36]PAICMA expected that more NGOs will apply for accreditation by the end of the year.[37]

Land Release

Non-technical survey

PAICMA coordinates non-technical survey (NTS) by allocating events in the national database for each municipality to the army battalion and HALO Trust, the only two entities that conducted NTS in Colombia in 2011. In Colombia, non-technical surveys do not cancel unconfirmed reports. Instead, unconfirmed reports are cancelled through general assessment, which generate “suspicions,” which are reports that require further investigation. Also, “suspicions” do not include information on the size of the affected area in the report. NTS teams are tasked by PAICMA to investigate each “suspicion” to determine whether there is evidence to define a dangerous area or to cancel the “suspicion”. Once a dangerous area has been defined, it is then tasked for technical survey.[38]

The surveys are providing initial indicators of the quality of the information in the national database that constitute events as well as what comprises a suspect hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed mined area in the Colombia context.

In 2009, the BIDES was clearing suspected mined areas ranging from 20,000 to 50,000m². In 2011, most confirmed mined areas ranged from 2,000–3,000m² and many were even smaller. The OAS attributes this to better surveying. According to the OAS in 2010, 93 SHAs covering 997,651m² were surveyed and 82% were released without clearance. In 2011, 274 SHAs covering 1,371,800m² were canceled and released.[39] In 2010–2011, HALO cancelled 90% of the “events” from the PAICMA database concerning areas the organization visited.[40]

In its Article 7 transparency report covering 2011, Colombia reported that the army and HALO Trust had conducted NTS on a total of 133 hazardous areas. Of the areas surveyed, 15 were canceled (total area: 142,872m²) while the remaining 118 were “confirmed” as SHAs covering 427,355m². The average size of a canceled hazardous area (7,937m²) was twice the size of a confirmed area (3,716m²). The 133 hazardous areas ranged in size from 5m² to 63,693m², though only eight measured more than 11,000m². The smallest confirmed hazardous area (CHA) was 183m².[41]

The OAS monitors survey operations and reviews all survey reports for accuracy and completeness as part of the monitoring process for demining.[42]

HALO Trust[43]

In March 2010–October 2011, in coordination with PAICMA, HALO Trust investigated 779 IMSMA events in the municipalities of Abejorral, Argelia, Cocorná, Nariño, San Luis, San Rafael, and Sonsón, all in the department of Antioquia. Of these 779 events, 78 were confirmed as hazardous areas and 701 (90%) were recommended for cancelation.[44]

As a result of the poor quality of much of the IMSMA data concerning events, HALO decided it was essential to visit all 459 veredas[45] where the 779 events were located and collect information at the ground level. In total, HALO assessed that 359 veredas did not contain landmines, 55 veredas contained one or more mined areas and 45 veredas were listed as having insufficient information to confirm or cancel an area based on the presence of landmines.

After the survey, HALO developed clearance plans for 78 CHAs. The average size of a CHA in the seven municipalities surveyed is 6,000m², each containing, on average, fewer than two mines. HALO estimates the 78 contaminated areas could be cleared by 90 deminers within 18 to 24 months.[46]

HALO discontinued its surveys in late 2011 after the director of PAICMA determined that HALO should first be accredited before continuing to survey, in order to avoid future problems for PAICMA.[47]

Mine clearance in 2011

Humanitarian demining in Colombia is conducted only in safe areas where the army is not involved in operations against non-state armed groups (NSAGs).[48] BIDES has commenced clearance in 12[49] of the 14 municipalities designated as priorities in the 2011–2013 operational plan, as set out in Colombia’s Article 5 deadline extension request.

In 2011, the Battalion cleared 74 “mined areas” covering 329,950m² in five departments and nine municipalities, finding 194 IEDs and nine items of UXO. No mines were found. Of the 74 areas cleared, 32 covering 110,092m² did not contain any hazards while another eight contaminated areas contained only one UXO. In 2010–2011, a combined 39% of the mined areas cleared and 25% of the land contained no hazards, including a 37,000m² area cleared in Meta department in 2011.[50] On 31 March 2012, US support for the Demining Battalion through the OAS ended until the US Congress authorized more funding. In April 2012, Canada provided stop-gap funding for operations, but clearance operations and NTS were suspended in May and June. On 1 July 2012, after the US Congress authorized US$1.9 million of new funding through the OAS, the Demining Battalion resumed operations.[51]

Humanitarian mine clearance completed in 2011[52]

On 12 March 2012, Colombia declared the municipality of San Carlos to be free from the suspicion of landmines, a category unique to Colombia and not found in the International Mine Action Standards, after it had cleared 15 SHAs covering 88,318m². Of the 660 municipalities out of 1,100 suspected to contain SHAs, San Carlos, in the department of Antioquia, was the first municipality to be declared free of SHAs.[53]

As of December 2011, the Humanitarian Demining Battalion consisted of nine platoons with 41 deminers and three national supervisors each, for a total of 369 deminers and 27 supervisors. The platoons operate independently as squads or teams of 12 to 15 deminers, for a total of 27 teams. PAICMA and the Ministry of Defense are in discussions about increasing the number of teams in 2013, which depend on the Ministry of Defense being allocated additional funding from the national budget.[54] In both opinions on humanitarian demining, the Ombudsman in the Procuraduría  recommended that the army increase the number of demining teams in the national interest of the country.[55] In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request of August 2010, Colombia reported plans to increase the number of demining platoons from 9 to 14 in 2013.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and revised requests were the decrease in the predicted number of NGO demining teams in 2014–2020 from 85 to 49, and the reduction in required funds for the same period of almost $150 million. The operational plan plus the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining platoons.[56] As of July 2012, the army had nine demining platoons and the NGOs did not have any due to the work stoppage caused by the Attorney’s report that delayed accreditation and deployment of NGOs and the deliberate decision-making process at CINAMAP. The Attorney’s report also postponed commitments from donors to fund humanitarian demining.

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[57] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. It was planned to address dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities with contamination covering an estimated 15km² in five of the 32 departments, by 2013.[58]Although demining platoons have commenced operations in 13 municipalities, the overall targets for clearance capacity by the end of 2013 for the army and NGOs are unlikely to be met.

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs.[59]Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s extension request, Colombia will submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013.[60]

Clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2011

No cluster munition remnants were found or destroyed in 2010 or 2011.[61]

Quality management

OAS Program for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) is the body with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for accredited demining organizations in Colombia. The OAS also investigates demining accidents, verifies community liaison activities and does quality assurance on non-technical surveys.[62]

 In 2011, PAICMA formalized the quality management role of the OAS in accreditation, monitoring, and quality control of NGOs clearing mines in Colombia. In response, the OAS established the External Monitoring Component to assist in implementing the quality management system and planned to hire 24 personnel in 2012 to support the component. External monitoring responsibilities in Colombia are defined in the relevant national standard, which was approved in April 2012.[63] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) will accompany and advise the OAS Colombia External Monitoring Component in the various phases of accreditation, QA/QC processes, and ensure the required standards are in place.[64]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Coca eradicators

One of the most vulnerable groups in Colombia, based on casualty rates, are those killed or injured by mines while manually clearing coca plantations with hoes. In October 2011, ICBL conducted an advocacy mission to Colombia to address the rights of the injured coca eradicators and explore ways with the government of Colombia to better protect the eradicators while clearing coca plants. The ICBL recommended that the government of Colombia completely clear contaminated areas before sending in coca eradicators to remove coca plants.

In December 2011, the Procuraduría, the same office that issued two opinions on humanitarian demining in Colombia, had indicated it was preparing an opinion on coca eradicators and demining.[65] It again informed CINAMAP on 16 May that it was preparing an opinion, but as of 10 July 2012, PAICMA had not received one.[66] In October 2011, the Colombian National Public Defender’s Office had already advised the government that the recruitment of civilians for the manual eradication program should be suspended.[67]

There were 58 casualties among coca eradicators in 2010 and 54 in 2009.[68]In 2011, PAICMA reported 21 casualties from mines during coca eradication.[69]It is not certain why there were so many fewer casualties in 2011, although far fewer hectares of plantations were cleared of coca than in 2010.[70]The decrease in casualties did not address ICBL’s overall concerns.

In May 2012, PAICMA replied to the ICBL mission report by saying the coca eradicators are recruited through job advertisements and sign labor contracts before beginning the work. Risk education is provided to all coca eradicators and the coca eradicators are under the protection of the armed forces. PAICMA further added that coca eradicators injured by mines are eligible for assistance under Article 3 of Law No. 1448 of 2010 that defines a victim from conflict, but there is, as yet, no mechanism to register coca eradicators as victims; PAICMA does enter the victim data into the National Information System for Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims.[71] On 15 June 2012, seven coca eradicators between 19 and 52 years of age were injured and one was killed while manually conducting eradication as a result of an incident involving an antipersonnel landmine in the municipality of Roberto Payán in Nariño department.[72]

Risk Education

The ongoing conflict has posed an array of challenges and problems in Colombia.[73] The national government chairs a coordination meeting on mine/ERW risk education (RE) that includes both national and international stakeholders. Its participants include the Colombia Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC), Colombian Red Cross, ICRC, UNICEF, UNDP, Fundación Restrepo Barco, OAS, National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA), the Ministry of National Education, PAICMA and representatives from the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo. This group provides guidance to PAICMA on the national strategy for RE and the guide to RE in Colombia.[74] UNMAS attends the meeting as an observer.[75] The strategy is partly the result of a Constitutional Court ruling in 2004 that said the government of Colombia must provide humanitarian assistance to all internally displaced persons.[76]

UNICEF’s strategic focus is to promote national guidelines for RE strategies and to partner with national NGOs for community-based activities. In collaboration with PAICMA and the Ministry of Education, UNICEF promotes RE as part of the school curriculum. UNICEF also provides technical and financial support on Mine Risk Education and to the Risk Education section at PAICMA.[77]

In 2011, UNICEF, through its partners, provided RE to 24,331 people (including 17,914 children) who live in affected areas in the departments of Arauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Putumayo. Approximately 18% of the participating population belongs to indigenous groups and 12% are Afro-Colombians. Additionally, 870 teachers in the departments of Chocó, Cauca, Nariño, Sucre/Bolívar have been trained in RE. In 2012, the RE programme continued to be developed in the departments of Arauca, Meta, Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Córdoba and will continue to be developed in other territories prioritized by UNICEF. The main implementing partners include Corporación Paz y Democracia and the CCCM.[78] In 2012, UNICEF planned to start building a quality assurance model for RE operators.[79]

In 2010–2011, Geneva Call piloted a project in Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo to determine what approaches to take in RE among indigenous people. Primarily, Geneva Call concluded that a one-size-fits-all approach to an ethnic-based RE program would not work because “every people has its own mental, spiritual and organizational structure.” This was illustrated when one group suggested the land should be included as a victim along with individuals, families and communities. An external assessment of the project concluded there was great value and strength in indigenous organizations recognizing the impact of the conflict on their culture and livelihoods and that the process started by Geneva Call should continue.[80] The project trained 86 RE trainers (27% women) from six different indigenous organizations, who reached out to 5,700 persons (43% women) in highly conflict affected areas. The second phase of the project was initiated in early 2012 and aims at leaving indigenous organizations with the capacity installed by training persons to be trainers of future RE trainers.[81]

The ICRC has integrated weapons contamination into all assessment and planning procedures. It implemented an integrated safe behavior program whereby it incorporated RE, victims’ rights, and first aid in community-based activities.[82]

In 2011, the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross conducted 423 workshops on safe behaviors for 10,500 community members and local authorities. The workshops focused on how to avoid accidents involving IEDs and ERW. The ICRC also explains to communities, local authorities and health services how to provide care for victims of violence (including victims of weapon contamination) and the rights such victims have. Additionally, to reduce risk, the ICRC provided various projects that provide alternatives to risk-taking for communities living in contaminated areas and where clearance is not possible. For example, the ICRC constructed a temporary school to accommodate children unable to attend their regular school due to the threat of IEDs and mines.[83]

The OAS conducted RE in Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, Meta, Nariño, Santander, and Tolima through home visits and education centers.[84]

CCCM, with the support of the US State Department, carries out RE in the departments of Arauca and Norte de Santander. This process complements the intervention made with the support of UNICEF Colombia. Some of its results include 81 people trained as RE facilitators in rural communities and 2,051 children trained in safe behaviors.[85]

Casualties[1]

Casualties Overview

In 2011, the Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA) recorded 538 casualties from antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[2] This represented the same level of annual casualties as compared with the 540 casualties recorded in 2010. Previously, the Monitor had identified a trend of declining casualty rates recorded between 2006 and 2010, a decline that had been ongoing since the peak of almost 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006.[3]

There were at least 348 military casualties in 2011.[4] Casualties recorded as civilians (190) made up 35% of the total, similar to rates from previous years; civilians made up 30% of all casualties in 2010 and were about a third of all casualties in 2009 and 2008. Of civilian casualties, 21% (40) were children (32 boys; eight girls); this was nearly double the number of child casualties (21) in 2010, when they were 14% of civilian casualties. There were 10 casualties among women. The remainder, and the majority of recorded civilian casualties at some 74%, were adult men.

Casualties were recorded in 19 of Colombia’s 32 departments; however, more than half of all casualties occurred in just five departments: Antioquia (97), Nariño (62), Tolima (60), Cordoba (46) and Meta (46).

There were 21 civilian casualties among manual coca eradicators, employed by the Program for the Eradication of Illicit Cultivation (PCI), in 2011.[5] The number of casualties among security forces (police or military) was unknown.[6] This was a significant decrease compared with the 58 casualties among coca eradicators in 2010. Possible explanations for the reduced casualty rate among coca eradicators included improved safety procedures during manual eradication and a decrease in the area of land eradicated during the year.[7] From 2006 through the end of 2011, there were at least 287 civilian casualties recorded among coca eradicators; 37 died, 247 were injured, and it was unknown whether the remaining three casualties survived.[8]

Between 1982 and the end of 2011, PAICMA recorded 9,661 casualties (2,038 killed, 7,623 injured).[9] Civilians accounted for 38% (3,636) of the total and children accounted for 25% (919 casualties) of civilian casualties. The departments of Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, and Norte de Santander registered the highest numbers of casualties and accounted for almost half of the total (47%).

Cluster munition casualties

As identified in Case No. 12.416, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Republic of Colombia, filed before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster strike in Santo Domingo, Colombia on 13 December 1998.[10] As of May 2012, Colombia stated that there had been no reported cases of cluster munition victims in the country as a result of cluster munitions use by the Colombia Air Force.[11]

Victim Assistance

Colombia is known to have landmine survivors and survivors of other types of ERW. Cluster munition victims have also been reported. As a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Colombia has made a commitment to implementing victim assistance.

There were at least 7,623 mine/ERW survivors in Colombia as of the end of 2011.[12]

Victim Assistance since 1999[13]

Since monitoring began, mine/ERW survivors in Colombia have faced serious obstacles in accessing emergency medical attention, ongoing medical care and physical rehabilitation because these services have been available only in major cities while most mine incidents occur in rural and remote areas as well as in inaccessible conflict zones. In 1999, social and economic inclusion and psychological support for survivors was virtually nonexistent, even in most major cities, with the exception of two facilities in Bogota: the military hospital served military survivors and the Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC) served civilian survivors. Both facilities have consistently provided comprehensive rehabilitation services, including psychological support.

Throughout the period, a series of laws have outlined the rights of mine/ERW survivors as victims of terrorism or conflict through a comprehensive “Route of Attention”, which is the legal framework through which victims can access their rights to compensation, rehabilitation and other assistance by registering as victims and having the cost of assistance paid for or reimbursed through special government funds. However, complicated procedures to register as a mine victim and delayed reimbursements have meant that many survivors could not access the care they needed or had to depend on support from the ICRC and NGOs to facilitate access or pay for services.

In 2006, the ICRC began a mine action program in Colombia that included collecting data on mine/ERW casualties, helping survivors to access victim assistance and strengthening the physical rehabilitation sector to improve the quality and accessibility of these services. In 2009, the NGOs Mercy Corps and the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (CCCM) worked to decentralize physical rehabilitation services by supporting the opening of four new rehabilitation centers and improving the capacity of prosthetic technicians during the three year period of the project.

Through the work of CIREC, CCCM and others, more than 60 local disabled persons’ organizations and survivor associations have been formed since 1999, increasing opportunities for peer-to-peer support as well as social and economic inclusion.

Government coordination of victim assistance began in Colombia in 2002 through the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, which was replaced in June 2007 with PAICMA. Throughout the period, victim assistance  coordination has been variable and at times lacking in continuity, a result of changes and restructuring within PAICMA and changes with the legal frameworks that outline the rights and assistance available to mine/ERW survivors.

Victim Assistance in 2011

Overall accessibility to victim assistance  decreased in 2011. International funding to NGOs which facilitated access to victim assistance  services, and/or provided those services, declined for 2011. In addition, the Law of Victims and Restitution of Land (Law 1448, also referred to below as the Victims Law), which was approved mid-way through the year, caused confusion for survivors and service providers regarding what assistance was available to mine/ERW survivors. The adoption of the law also heightened expectations of immediate assistance, although the regulations needed to begin implementing the law were only passed at the end of the year.[14] As of April 2012, the impact of this law had not yet been felt by mine/ERW survivors.[15]

As in previous years, registered survivors were entitled to a range of services through the “Route of Attention,” paid for through the government-managed Solidarity and Guarantee Fund, but most survivors relied on the ICRC, the Organization of American States (OAS) and numerous international and national NGOs to navigate complicated legal procedures and cover transportation and accommodation costs needed to access these services.

Assessing victim assistance needs

As a result of improved data collection efforts, NGOs and service providers said that mine/ERW victim registries in 2011 were more complete than in previous years, most especially for victims of recent mine/ERW incidents, a necessary step towards accessing government-supported services and programs for mine/ERW survivors.[16]

In 2011, PAICMA worked with departmental governments, the ICRC, the OAS, Handicap International (HI), CIREC, and CCCM to collect and verify information about survivors of recent mine/ERW incidents, with each organization collecting information in different geographic areas. CCCM held meetings of survivor networks and/or individual survivors in six heavily-affected departments to assess survivor needs and identify gaps in available service; CCCM then made the newly-collected information available to government representatives and service providers at the regional and national level.[17] The OAS Mine Action Program in Colombia collected information on the needs of survivors in several municipalities in the department of Antioquia and facilitated access to services for those most in need.[18] CIREC continued to collect data on the needs of mine survivors taking part in their rehabilitation programs.[19]

Casualty data was available through the PAICMA website and by request for government agencies and other service providers. In 2011, PAICMA began developing a process to cross-reference its casualty data with data managed by the victim assistance  unit of the Department of Social Prosperity, the government agency responsible for the administration of reparations.[20]

In 2011, PAICMA increased cooperation with victim assistance  stakeholders in the departments of Chocó and Putamayo and established agreements with the Awa people and with the National Parks System to improve data collection in these geographic areas and among Colombia’s indigenous population.[21]

PAICMA continued to identify and report on available victim assistance  services online.[22]

In 2011, mine incidents and victim assistance services provided to survivors continued to be recorded within the Epidemiological Monitoring System (Sistema de Vigilancia Epidemiológica, SIVIGILA) in the department of Antioquia. Despite plans to expand the adaptation to the SIVIGILA to include mine incidents and victim assistance services at the national level and interest expressed within two other mine-affected departments in particular, no steps were taken in this direction in 2011.[23]

Victim assistance coordination[24]

In 2011, PAICMA, as the national victim assistance focal point, focused coordination efforts in three areas: 1) monitoring access to victim assistance for mine/ERW survivors; 2) strengthening the capacity of local and departmental authorities to promote the rights of mine/ERW victims; and 3) facilitating interministerial coordination. More specifically, PAICMA worked during the year to include the needs of mine/ERW victims in the implementation of the Victims Law and to reform the Route of Attention to align it with those benefits proscribed by the law.[25] Overall, NGOs felt that victim assistance coordination was not rigorous and lacked continuity, which prevented it from having a greater impact on improving victim assistance efforts.[26]

The National Victim Assistance Committee, facilitated by PAICMA, met twice during 2011. In March, the Committee met to identify obstacles preventing mine/ERW survivors from exercising their rights and accessing services and to develop a strategy to overcome those obstacles.[27] Some participants found this meeting to be ineffective due to its political nature and lack of follow-up.[28] With the passage of the Victims Law in June, the focus of the committee changed; it met in July to consider the implications of the law and to determine the best process to provide input into the regulations for and implementation of the law.

PAICMA facilitated decentralized victim assistance coordination in at least nine departments. Department-level mine action coordination meetings were held by PAICMA to provide trainings on the Route of Attention and also on the Victims Law for mine/ERW survivors and family members.[29] PAICMA also convened departmental meetings of the information management commission (which includes local government officials and representatives of NGOs) in Antioquia, Cauca and Nariño departments, among others. Meetings were designed to increase the capacity to collect, verify and exchange information about survivors and their needs at the departmental level.[30]

Several bilateral meetings were held between PAICMA and CCCM throughout the year to coordinate information on needs for victim assistance by civilians injured by mines during in coca eradication.[31]

The Executive Committee for Reparations is the government focal point for the implementation of the Victims Law. In order to ensure that the implementation of the law would address the needs of mine/ERW victims, along with other victims of conflict, PAICMA, survivors and organizations representing survivors participated in national and regional meetings of three subcommittees developing regulations for the law in the following areas:

·         information systems;

·         attention, assistance and rehabilitation; and

·         restitution, administrative compensation, protection and guarantees of non-repetition.

The subcommittees contributed to the development of the regulatory decree of the Victims Law, Decree 4800, approved 20 December 2011, and to the draft National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence, pending approval as of April 2012.[32]

To ensure the integration of mine/ERW survivors in the National Disability System during 2011, PAICMA continued participating in meetings of the National Disability Council, established in 2010. Disability Council meetings focused on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[33]

Colombia provided detailed updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance (with information on the legal framework for victim assistance and coordination activities) at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh in December 2011, at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011, and through its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report submitted for calendar year 2011.[34]

Survivor inclusion and participation

In 2011, survivors and their representative organizations participated in both meetings of the National Victim Assistance Committee and various departmental victim assistance coordination meetings. Survivors also participated in subcommittee meetings convened by the Executive Committee for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence.[35] Since they were not provided with information on the topics to be discussed prior to subcommittee meetings, survivors were not prepared to participate actively.[36] Survivors and other persons with disabilities contributed to the design and implementation of victim assistance activities through NGOs and survivors associations, most particularly concerning economic inclusion programs and peer support.[37] The city government of Medellin included survivors in the provision of psychological support.[38]

Within the framework of the Victims Law, the Colombian government convened seven regional meetings of conflict victims (including mines/ERW survivors) and NGOs to discuss the needs of conflict victims and to consider the best way to address these needs through the implementation of the law.[39] Information collected during these meetings was used in the development of a National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence.[40]

Survivors or their representative associations were not invited to contribute to the government statements on progress in victim assistance in 2011 that were prepared in anticipation of international meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, nor did any survivors participate as members of the official Colombian delegation to such meetings or to intersessional Standing Committee meetings.[41]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[42]

In 2011, the bureaucratic procedures necessary to register for victim assistance benefits remained complicated; some service providers were unwilling to assist survivors due to slow and incomplete reimbursements for medical and rehabilitative care by the Administration of the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA).[43] Numerous NGOs continued making ongoing efforts to assist survivors in the process of registering for government support.[44] Despite these efforts, 385 survivors were unable to access government support because they lacked the proper documentation to register and instead received comprehensive assistance from the ICRC in 2011.[45]

To improve emergency medical care, particularly the management of injuries from weapons, the Ministry of Social Protection, with support from the ICRC, produced and provided both a technical guide and trained surgeons from regional hospitals in mine-affected departments.[46] The ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross provided community-based first aid training in 12 regions of the country.[47] NGOs reported that their work with medical professionals to raise awareness about the rights of survivors to use emergency medical care resulted in improved access to these services.[48] Most hospitals were able to provide emergency medical care specific to the needs of child survivors, though access to ongoing medical care for children was difficult.[49] No significant changes in access to or quality of ongoing medical assistance for mine/ERW survivors were identified and the CCCM found that only 20% of survivors received the specialized medical attention that they needed.[50]

The availability of physical rehabilitation services increased in 2011 with the opening of a new rehabilitation center in Florencia, Caqueta, a department with some of the highest levels of mine/ERW survivors in Colombia.[51] Training opportunities for rehabilitation technicians increased with a new program by the ICRC to offer training to technicians from all rehabilitation centers. It also continued to support long-term professionalization of technicians from ICRC-supported centers.[52] The CCCM, along with Mercy Corps, continued to support training for prosthetists in mine-affected departments.[53] In the second half of the year, there were multiple cases identified of mine/ERW survivors who were refused rehabilitation services to which they were entitled on the mistaken basis that such benefits were suspended until the beginning of the implementation of the new Victims Law.[54]

In 2011, as part of its program for victims of conflict, the Medellin city government trained the leaders of several survivor associations in the provision of psychosocial attention for survivors.[55] Several NGO programs continued to provide psychosocial support, including peer support, as part of assistance programs for survivors.[56] As in previous years, nearly all psychological support programs were provided by NGOs with international support. These efforts, while numerous, were insufficient to meet the level of need and were hampered by decreasing levels of international support for NGOs.[57]

Overall, decreasing levels of international funding to NGOs were identified as also causing decreased availability of economic-inclusion opportunities.[58] Government support for economic inclusion was limited to vocational training that was not considered to be adapted to the needs of survivors or other persons with disabilities.[59] With the completion of the Mercy Corps/CCCM economic inclusion program in six mine affected departments, opportunities for this kind of support declined in 2011.[60]

Schools in rural areas were not adapted to the needs of children with disabilities and a scarcity of school transportation in these areas prevented child mine/ERW survivors from fulfilling their right to education.[61] Two articles of the Victims Law relate to the situation of child landmine survivors and require the provision of age-appropriate services to war victims. While the impact of this law had not yet been felt in 2011, it held the potential to improve access to assistance for child survivors.[62]

As of April 2011, 64% of registered mine/ERW survivors had accessed compensation and other benefits through assistance programs for victims of conflict.[63] Almost all newly registered civilian survivors were informed about their rights to apply for government assistance.[64] No information was available on how many of these new survivors submitted applications or received benefits.

Colombia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities and efforts were made to enforce these rights in 2011. There is no law requiring access to public buildings, to information, or to telecommunications, but there were some national and local government programs underway during the year to increase accessibility.[65]

During the second half of 2011, PAICMA set out to make mine/ERW survivors aware of their rights under the new Victims Law.[66] However, more and clearer information was needed; as of the end of the year, a great deal of confusion and misinformation remained around the law’s implications for survivors.[67]

Colombia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 5 May 2011.

National

In 2011, the Colombian government contributed a total of almost COP17.4 billion (US$9.57 million) to support the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) and victim assistance.

PAICMA Budget in 2011[1]

National contributions for victim assistance in 2007–2011[2]

International

In 2011, international contributions to mine action in Colombia totaled $11 million, a slight decrease from 2010.[3] The largest single contribution ($5.7 million) was provided by the United States (US), including $1.89 million through the Organization of American States (OAS) to support the Engineer Regiment demining teams and the OAS quality assurance teams. Colombia is one of the world’s largest recipients of mine action funding for victim assistance and risk education (RE). In 2011, Germany, Norway, and the US contributed $5.4 million to the ICRC as well as national and international NGOs. Risk education accounted for $1.86 million (17%) of the total international funding.

European Commission

In November 2011, the European Commission (EC) announced it was contributing €55 million (US$77 million) to Colombia for land restitution, peace-building, and rural development. Of this, €6 million ($8.4 million) was for mine action in 2011–2014.[4] This three-year EC contribution supports PAICMA in monitoring humanitarian demining, coordinating victim assistance and risk education and also supports providing logistical support to the OAS. The co-financing agreement includes €1.2 million ($1.67 million) from the government of Colombia.[5] The contract between the EC and the government of Colombia includes 24 tasks under four main activities: information management, land release, victim assistance and mine RE.[6] However, the contract was not finalized until November 20211 and as of September 2012 no EC funds had been expended under the contract. As a result, there was no EC funding for mine action in Colombia in 2011. In 2007–2010, EC funding for mine action totaled COP18.48 billion (US$9.24 million).[7]

International contributions in 2011[8]

Thematic contributions in 2011

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011 (US$)[9]