Mine ban policy overview

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines, and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the treaty since 1997.

Georgia has participated in most Mine Ban Treaty meetings, including those in 2011 and 2012, although its last statement at such a meeting was in 2007, when it told States Parties that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty, that it “is well aware that the negative humanitarian impact of landmines far outweighs their military value,” and that it “tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat.”[1] In the past, Georgia has insisted that its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—prevents it from acceding.[2] In a meeting with the Monitor in June 2011, a Georgian government official stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was beginning to consider the mine issue.[3]

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and joined CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 22 December 2008. It had previously said it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons given for the Mine Ban Treaty.[4]

Campaigners in Georgia participated in the Lend Your Leg global action on 18 February 2012 when NGOs and the Ministry of Sport and Tourism organized a backgammon tournament with survivors of landmines.[5]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia does not produce, import, or export mines.[6]

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union.[7] The Ministry of Defense completed an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in 2010, but will not make information on the size and composition of the stockpile publicly available. The ministry does not plan to destroy its stocks, but commits to safeguard them in a way to avoid dissemination or transfer to another state or non-state actors.[8] 

Use

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[9] In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”[10]

Despite its repeated denial of past use, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006, mostly in the Upper Kodori Gorge area adjoining the breakaway region of Abkhazia.[11]Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007, but the Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations.[12] There were additional allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008. Each side denied the allegations, and investigations by Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines.[13]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia.[14] South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine ban and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor mine problem, and there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In May 2009, South Ossetian authorities reportedly recovered mines from a cache in Yeredvi village which they alleged were from Georgia.[15]

Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Georgia did not make any statements on the convention in the second half of 2011 or first half of 2012. Previously, in 2010, an official stated, “The Georgian government has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munitions Convention, but the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region didn’t allow us to adjoin the mentioned conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.”[1]

Georgia participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but did not make any formal statements.[2] Since 2008, Georgia has shown limited interest in the convention. It participated in an international conference on the convention held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010, but has not participated in any meetings since.

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has attended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, but has rarely made any statements.

Georgia has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. It inherited some air-dropped cluster bombs from the Soviet Union, but these appear to be obsolete and slated for destruction.[3] Georgia acquired 160mm surface-to-surface rockets equipped with cluster munition payloads from Israel in 2007.[4]

Cluster munitions were used by both Georgian and Russian forces during their conflict in August 2008 resulting in a small residual threat. Georgian forces used M85 submunitions delivered by Mk.-4 160mm unguided surface-to-surface rockets, weapons that it bought pre-packaged from Israel. The Ministry of Defense said Georgia launched 24 volleys of 13 Mk.-4 rockets each.[5]

On 31 August 2008, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that the Georgian Armed Forces used cluster munitions against the Russian military near the Roki tunnel.[6] However, remnants of Georgian cluster munitions were also found by Human Rights Watch in civilian areas in the north of Gori district, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[7]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Georgia is contaminated with mines around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflicts with the breakaway republics of Abkhazia[1] and South Ossetia.

Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the residual mine problem has not been reported publicly.[2] According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 suspected mined areas were located at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totaled more than 4.5km² in estimated area.[4] Of these 15 areas, 10 have been identified as having a direct humanitarian impact, five of which had been cleared by the HALO Trust as of August 2012.[5] It is not known if any of the other five active military areas have been cleared.

There is also an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[6]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a mountainous region of approximately 70,000 people. Since the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. According to HALO, there has been persistent low-level mine-laying, primarily in areas between Georgian- and South Ossetian-controlled villages. Although HALO has been unable to gain sufficient access to South Ossetia to assess the mine threat fully, it notes that at least 15 mine casualties were reported there in 2008–2010.[7] HALO has planned to conduct a non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but it had not been granted access to the area as of July 2012.[8]

Cluster munition remnants

There may be a small residual threat from cluster munition remnants in the South Ossetia region of Georgia. Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which Georgian and Russian forces both used cluster munitions. After the conflict, HALO conducted a survey in Georgian-controlled territory to identify the level of contamination, which estimated that some 37km² were contaminated with unexploded submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[9] HALO reported completion of clearance of unexploded submunitions in its tasked areas in December 2009.[10] NPA completed clearance of its tasked areas in May 2010.[11]

 According to the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) conducted several risk-assessment missions in 2010 to survey potential new hazardous areas; this included one mission in October 2010 to Perevi village in Georgian-controlled territory at the western border with South Ossetia. The ERWCC reportedly found evidence of the use of cluster munitions as well as the presence of other ERW in the area and recommended follow-up action in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[12] Based on interviews it conducted with villagers on the Georgian side, a news channel in Russia specializing in the Caucasus region claimed there were no residual effects from the bombing.[13] 

Around the same time as the ERWCC interviews in Perevei in December 2010, a landowner on his property near Zemo Nikozi village in Shida Kartli, the region bordering South Ossetia, discovered a Urugan rocket with 9N-210 submunitions remaining inside the carrier. The Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt with the rocket in January 2011. In May 2011, once the snows had melted, HALO conducted subsurface clearance around the location of the rocket over some four hectares, but no further ordnance was found.[14] The ERWCC claimed to have identified cluster contamination during its risk assessment missions in 2010 that might lead to clearance operations, but it has never presented the evidence to HALO. HALO believes there may be unexploded submunitions in South Ossetia but until it is able to conduct a survey, it is not certain of the presence of remaining contamination.[15]

Despite fears of cluster munition remnants in Poti military harbor, none was found during demining operations by NPA in 2009.[16]

Other explosive remnants of war

Georgia has an ERW problem as a result of the armed conflict with Russia in August 2008. Following the conflict, there was evidence of a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in South Ossetia, although its precise extent remains unclear.

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

In 2008, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and iMMAP to establish the ERWCC.[17] On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Defence issued a decree instructing that mine action be included as part of the State Military Scientific Technical Center, or “DELTA,” an entity within the ministry. The agreement with iMMAP ended on 31 March 2011 and the ERWCC took ownership of the mine action program.[18]

Through the iMMAP project, ERWCC became the Georgian Mine Action Authority tasked to coordinate and execute ERW mitigation. iMMAP conducted training on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) for the QA/QC section of the ERWCC staff, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict with Russia. The lead NATO members of the project have been the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania. In 2012, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish a long-term local capability and capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[19] The project aims to train 66 personnel from the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade in humanitarian demining, battle area clearance (BAC), and explosive ordnance disposal. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers will be given additional training in technical survey, site management, QC, and QA. The contract for training was awarded to the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) in an internationally competitive bidding process. The training took place in the ANAMA training center in Goygol, Azerbaijan in March–October 2011.[20]

Land Release

Mine clearance in 2011

In 2011, HALO cleared 688,252m² of mined area, finding and destroying 2,498 antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine. The majority of the mines were found around the former Soviet military base at Sagaredjo. The base was heavily mined with an inner perimeter of PMN-2s, while PFM-1s were scattered outside the outer fence of the base. The majority of the mines found were PFM-1s. Although the outer perimeter of the base is quite large, HALO was able to define the inner perimeter very clearly by finding the fences and clearing them from the outer fence until no more PFM-1s were found. As a result, the cleared area seems relatively small compared to the number of mines found. HALO reported the Sagaredjo minefields were some of the densest mined areas they have found in Georgia.[21]

In June to September 2011, with funding from the United States (US) Department of State, HALO destroyed eight PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in a minefield in Omalo, a village in Tusheti National Park close to Georgia's northern border with Russia.[22] HALO also completed clearance in minefields at Mtskheta and Telavi in 2010 and 2011 with funding from the government of Japan’s Grassroots Grant Program and the US Department of State.[23] 

During mine clearance operations at Sagaredjo and Telavi airbases, HALO also conducted 645,215m² of BAC during which 340 ERW were found. No unexploded submunition was found. HALO has reported there are very few remaining BAC tasks in Georgia and the Georgian Ministry of Defense did not request HALO to clear any battle areas in 2011 or 2012 through August.[24] In 2012, HALO completed the clearance of the Akhalkalaki and Sagaredjo minefields in large abandoned military bases; these were the fourth and fifth Soviet legacy minefields cleared by HALO in Georgia.[25]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area in 2011

No clearance of submunitions was conducted in 2011. The remaining suspected cluster munition contamination is in South Ossetia, which since the conflict with Russia in 2008 has not been accessible to the Georgian authorities.

Quality management

The ERWCC under the control of DELTA conducts QA and QC.[26]

Risk Education

The ERWCC has reported conducting community liaison attached to its QC activities as well as implementing a project with UNICEF/the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office along the Abkhazia/Georgia border. It reports that ICBL Georgia has also conducted a number of community liaison interventions covering affected areas.[27]

The HALO Trust ended formal risk education (RE) in 2009, having run a program across Shida Kartli following the 2008 war, and consequently it does what current RE provision there is in Georgia. HALO includes RE as part of its community liaison and mine clearance operations when beginning to clear a new minefield.[28]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

In 2011, the Monitor identified one explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty in Georgia. This represented a significant decrease from the 11 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2010.[1]

The ICRC and the Georgian Red Cross Society (GRCS) collected data on 760 casualties as of the end of 2011.[2] The ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) collected information on 864 mine/ERW casualties as of the end of 2011.[3] No other details, such as the numbers of people killed and injured, were available. The Monitor identified 409 casualties (109 killed; 284 injured; 16 unknown) between 2001 and the end of 2010.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

In Georgia, there have been at least 70 casualties due to cluster munitions; all were reported in 2008, including 61 casualties during strikes and nine due to unexploded submunitions.[5]

Victim Assistance

Georgia is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims and survivors of other types of ERW. Georgia has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Convention on Conventional Weapons.[6]

The total number of survivors in Georgia is unknown, though there are estimated to have been more than 700 since the late 1980s.[7]

No significant changes in the quality of victim assistance services were reported for Georgia in 2011.

Assessing victim assistance needs

ICRC/GRCS data collection on mine/ERW survivors and their needs assessment continued in 2011. Some 760 survivors had been visited by the volunteers of the GRCS since needs assessment survey began in 2010. The data collected was entered into an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database managed by the ICRC.[8] Data collection continued in 2012.

Victim assistance coordination

There is no victim assistance coordination mechanism in Georgia. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs coordinates disability issues, including those related to the mine/ERW survivors who have official disability status.[9]

In 2009, the Georgian government approved the Action Plan on Social Integration of People with Disabilities 2010-2012. In the same year, the parliament created a State Coordinating Council focusing on disability issues. Annual reporting by the Georgian Public Defender’s Office (Ombudsperson) demonstrated that concrete steps had not been taken to implement the plan during 2011.[10] The first meeting of State Coordinating Council on the issues of persons with disabilities took place on 1 December 2011.[11]

As in past years, no inclusion of survivors or their organizations in planning, coordination, or the implementation of services was reported in 2011.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[12]

There was an increase in prostheses delivered to mine survivors in 2011. The Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR) reported providing 99 prostheses in 2011, compared to 151 in 2010, representing an ongoing decrease overall. However, of these, 54 prostheses were for mine/ERW survivors compared to just four prostheses for survivors in 2010.[13] In 2011, GEFPOR conducted a clinical evaluation and further improved physical rehabilitation treatment of mine/ERW victims, with the financial support of the ICRC, including covering the cost of orthopedic and assistive devices and housing, food and transport during the time of treatment.[14] After 17 years of involvement in the physical rehabilitation sector in Georgia, the ICRC reported having successfully completed its gradual transfer of managerial, technical and financial responsibilities to GEFPOR. The ICRC believed that GEFPOR had all the necessary means to provide effective physical rehabilitation services itself.[15] In early 2012, GEFPOR was forced relocate its premises due to a disagreement with the new management of the Gudushauri National Medical Center where the GEFPOR had built its facilities with ICRC support.[16]

The ICRC increasingly assisted survivors through micro-economic initiatives in Georgia. In 2011, ICRC supported families affected by mines/ERW in pursuing small businesses and agricultural activities in western Georgia and Shida Kartli and provided business skills training.[17] These activities were ongoing in 2012.

The International Organization for Migration and the International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security[18], which operated an economic inclusion project for mine/ERW survivors, hosted a regional conference on socio-economic assistance for mine survivors in Tbilisi in late 2011. Representatives from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan discussed social and economic reintegration initiatives in the Caucasus region.[19]

There was a continuing lack of psychological support and social reintegration activities in Georgia.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities; however, discrimination in employment, education, access to health care, and in the provision of other state services continued. Legislation required access to buildings for persons with disabilities and stipulated fines for noncompliance. However, very few public facilities or buildings were accessible.[20]

In 2011, the Ombudsperson said that buildings, public transport, and streets were still not adapted for people with disabilities in towns in country areas of Georgia. The Ombudsperson requested greater efforts from local authorities to improve accessibility.[21]

Georgia signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 10 July 2009.

Support for Mine Action

Prior to the August 2008 conflict with Russia, there was no there was no formal mine action program in Georgia.[1] In response to the August 2008 conflict, a mine action program was established and international funding was initiated.[2]

 In 2011, international contributions towards mine action in Georgia totaled more than US$1.28 million, a decrease of almost $2.3 million from 2010, largely the result from less funding from the United States (US) and Japan.[3]

Georgia has never reported contributions to its own mine action operations.

International government contributions: 2011[4]

Summary of international government contributions in 2008–2011 (US$)[5]