Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.

In May 2012, a government official informed the ICBL that Iraq has drafted legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and expected to introduce it in parliament.[1] Iraq had not previously indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically was being pursued or if existing laws were considered adequate.[2]

In 2012, Iraq submitted its fifth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering calendar year 2011.

In November-December 2011, Iraq attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. Iraq provided an update on victim assistance, indicating that it was in the process of finalizing a new strategy.[3] Iraq also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in May 2012 and made an intervention concerning clearance and victim assistance.[4] In October 2010, Iraq hosted a conference on the national strategy for mine action in coordination with donor countries in Baghdad.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 conflict. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the coalition bombing campaign in 2003.[5] Iraq reported that it has no intention to reconstruct its production capacity.[6]

For the third year in a row, there were not any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government or insurgent forces. No allegations of any mine transfers from Iraq have surfaced since the 1990s.

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines was 1 February 2012.[7] In June 2011, Iraq stated that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[8] In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2011, Iraq reported that an additional 50 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the Kurdistan region.[9]  

The manner in which Iraq has reported on the number of mines it retains for training and research purposes has been inconsistent and confusing. It appears that at least 45 mines were retained in the Kurdistan region for training purposes since the end of the stockpile destruction programs. Adding to this confusion is a claim in its most recent Article 7 report wherein Iraq states that 793 mines were retained for training after the mines were recovered during clearance operations.[10] The Monitor cannot sufficiently assess the manner by which Iraq implements Article 3 based solely on the information provided by Iraq in its annual transparency reports.

In previous Monitor reports, substantial but decreasing numbers of antipersonnel mines were recovered by foreign and Iraqi forces from caches. The Monitor has not found any information regarding seizures during the current reporting period. Iraq also reported that it destroyed 4,295 antipersonnel mines from mined areas in 2011.[11] The Iraqi government had not previously reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009.

In a May 2012 letter to the Monitor and an April 2012 meeting with CMC, Iraqi officials confirmed that the Council of Representatives (parliament) is still considering Iraq’s ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1] The ratification package was referred to parliament shortly after Iraq signed the ban convention, but has been delayed by elections and other legislative priorities.[2]

Iraq has stated that it continues to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions despite not yet ratifying.[3] It is not known if specific legislative measures will be undertaken to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but attended both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer.[4] In December 2008, Iraq pledged to sign the convention as soon as possible after completing national and constitutional processes.[5] It subsequently signed the convention at the UN in New York in November 2009. 

Iraq has continued to engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It attended the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011, where it made a statement. Iraq also participated in convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011 and April 2012.

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability and other civil society groups have continued to campaign in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including its ratification.

Iraq is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Iraq is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but attended the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011 as an observer. Iraq did not comment on the chair’s draft text of the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions under negotiation. The Review Conference concluded without concluding a protocol, thus marking the end of the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. According to one source, Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984.[6]

Coalition forces used large numbers of cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States (US), France, and the United Kingdom (UK) dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions were used in the conflict.[7] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[8]

In May 2011, Iraq stated that “There are no facilities that produce cluster munitions in Iraq.”[9] Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs: the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[10] It was also involved in joint development of the M87 Orkan (known in Iraq as Ababil) with Yugoslavia.[11] 

Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[12] Jane’s Information Group has listed it as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[13] The current status of the stockpile is not known.

Iraq has stated on several occasions that it does not stockpile cluster munitions. In a May 2012 letter, Iraq stated that it does not have a cluster munitions stockpile.[14] In an April 2012 meeting with the Monitor, an Iraqi official cited the Monitor’s inclusion of Iraq on a list of countries believed to stockpile cluster munitions and clarified that that Iraq never manufactured cluster munitions and has no stockpiles.[15] Previously, in May 2011, a government official stated “The Iraqi Army does not possess any stockpiles of cluster munitions at the present time.”[16] In June 2011, Iraq stated that its Civil Defense team had destroyed 20,819 “cluster items” from 2009–2010, and the Ministry of Defense had destroyed 6,265 “cluster items” in 2010.[17]

Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded submunitions, the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition, and the subsequent internal conflict that continues today, albeit less intensely. The resulting contamination has severely affected Iraq’s oil industry reconstruction and production as well as its agriculture.[1]

Mines

The mine contamination in Iraq is among the worst in the world, but Iraq has yet to determine the extent. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004–2006, identified 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,730km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and a population of 1.6 million. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2010 but the findings have not been released.

In the meantime, a non-technical survey (NTS) of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk confirmed hazardous areas totaling 70.03km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450.1km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.[2] More recently, a multi-agency NTS of Thi Qar province was completed in 2011. The Directorate of Mine Action has not released the results.

Despite the lack of data from these unreleased findings, there is known to be substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts which were therefore not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[3] Iraq’s initial Article 7 report claimed that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another 1 million mines ahead of both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[4] In addition, security forces continue to find substantial caches of abandoned landmines.[5]

Cluster munition remnants

Submunition contamination is significant but the extent is unknown. A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[6] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[7] Cluster munition remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken for the creation of access to oilfields, the development of infrastructure, and for humanitarian reasons.[8] In the north, coalition air strikes around Dohuk in 1991 left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[9] In 2010, a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq has extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining from past conflicts; it also continues to accumulate contamination from ongoing conflicts in the north, where in 2010 and 2011 Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups (NSAGs).[11] Security forces have also continued to find substantial caches of weapons and ordnance accumulated by NSAGs.[12]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance; the DU ordnance includes “bunker-buster” bombs and tank-fired shells used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[13] Britain acknowledged in 2010 that it used 1.9 metric tons of DU ammunition during the 2003 war.[14] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, DU munitions have been claimed to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components since the US-led invasion in 2003. In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), mine action was managed until 2012 by (IKMAA) in the Erbil and Dohuk governorates and by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) in the Sulaymaniyah governorate. In April 2012, under KRG Decree 1010, the two organizations merged, leaving IKMAA as an umbrella organization with four mine action offices in Duhok, Erbil, Garmian (formerly under GDMA), and Slemani (Sulaymaniyah).[16]

In central and southern Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority assigned responsibility for mine action to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, which worked through a National Mine Action Authority. By 2007, this mechanism had ceased to function and in 2008 the cabinet transferred responsibility to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA).[17]

As of October 2011, the DMA, given responsibility for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database, had a total of 124 staff in its headquarters in Baghdad. Throughout 2011, however, it had no director general. It is supported by the Regional Mine Action Center-South (28 staff) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south.[18] 

In practice, however, national security concerns meant the ministries of defense and interior continued to exercise key responsibilities, which severely limited the role of the DMA. In August 2009, the ministries of defense and environment signed a Memorandum of Understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[19] The agreement said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD [Ministry of Defense] will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[20]

In May 2011, a prime minister’s order established a Higher Committee for Mine Action (HCMA) under the Prime Minister’s office comprising the ministers of defense, environment, interior, and oil, together with representatives of the KRG and National Security Council. The HCMA, which has met twice since it was set up, is intended to create a policy framework and strategy for mine action. It is supported by a Technical Committee with the National Security Council’s Directorate for International Policy functioning as its secretariat. No supporting legislation has yet been drafted.[21]

Land Release

Land release is reported to have accelerated significantly in 2011 and 2012, particularly through southern oilfield clearance by commercial companies,[22] but lack of reporting by the DMA, RMAC-South, or most operators in central and southern Iraq means it is not possible to make a meaningful determination of its extent. In KRG areas, where authorities have consistently maintained reporting on the progress of mine action, the amount of land released by clearance was little more than half the level of 2010, and the number of UXO items destroyed about one-quarter.

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2011

A NTS of southeastern Thi Qar governorate was conducted in 2011 on behalf of the DMA by a range of NGO and commercial operators, including Danish Demining Group (DDG), The Iraqi Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), G4S, Arabian Gulf and Al-Safsafa with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The survey reportedly identified 98km² as confirmed hazardous area (CHA).[23] The DMA did not respond to requests for details of the results. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Iraq noted the contamination found by the Thi Qar NTS was substantially less than in the ILIS and it planned to undertake further NTS in the southern governorates of Basra, Maysan, and Muthanna in 2012.[24]

DDG reported canceling 7.43km² through NTS in 2011 and releasing a further 0.26km² through technical survey (TS).[25]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2011

Compared to 2010, mine clearance in the northern Kurdish governorates (conducted by IKMAA, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and companies contracted by GDMA) dropped 44% in 2011 to 5.68km². GDMA led the way, reporting clearance in its area of operations of only a quarter of the mined land cleared in 2010, although the number of UXO items cleared was one-third higher than the previous year because spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks were more emphasized.[26]

IKMAA, operating with a total of 35 teams, including 15 manual demining teams (120 deminers), two EOD teams, 12 mechanical and two mine detection dog teams, increased the amount of clearance of mined area by more than half compared with 2010, to 1.1km², but destroyed fewer mines. It attributed higher clearance numbers to better planning and task assessment. IKMAA’s battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD also resulted in destroying 17% more UXO items. After focusing in the past on humanitarian mine action, IKMAA was contracted by Kalegran Oil Company in September 2011 to clear 0.6km² and provide permanent marking on another 1.16km². IKMAA also reported negotiating with the KRG Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction on undertaking clearance to support construction of a highway between Choman and Haj Omran on the Iranian border.[27]

MAG, after fluctuations in funding and personnel numbers in 2010, continued working with 301 staff in 2011 and achieved higher area clearance results. MAG also reported a 31% increase in UXO items cleared through roving tasks, to 93,101 items, in addition to the 8,298 cleared through mine and BAC. Overall, MAG accounted for by far the highest UXO clearance of any operator in Iraq. However, MAG also foresaw a significant decrease in donor funding in 2012 and the likelihood of a cut in personnel numbers.[28]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2011

In southern Iraq, the only international NGO actively clearing in 2011 was DDG, which conducted only BAC in Basra governorate working with a total staff of 181, including 73 technicians in eight EOD and two BAC teams, together with two TS and 10 community liaison teams. DDG reported lower area clearance in 2011 than the previous year but higher numbers of UXO items destroyed. With recruitment of additional staff in November 2011 and the deployment of seven large-loop detectors, DDG expected higher productivity in 2012.[29] The national NGO Iraq Mine Clearance Organization was active in the south but did not respond to requests for data.

The army and Civil Defense are reportedly active on mine clearance and EOD respectively,[30] but neither organization, nor the DMA, reported on the extent of their activities.

Most clearance in central and southern Iraq, however, has been conducted commercially under contract to the oil industry. Shell reported battle area surface clearance of 6.54km² by al-Safsafa (6.54km²) and Taaz (1,112m²) in 2011 and subsurface clearance of 2.37km² by al-Safsafa (1.69km²), Taaz (0.7km²) and IMCO (51,702m²). The default depth for subsurface clearance was 0.5m, but operators went deeper on specific tasks to a maximum of 6m. Operators cleared a total of 4,112 ERW, including 930 submunitions, 1,297 mortar shells, and 1,008 explosive projectiles.[31] Hans Nijkamp, Shell Vice President and head of operations in Iraq, was quoted in June 2012 as saying clearance was proceeding at a rate of 70,000m² a day.[32]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The DMA provides no data on mine clearance, and incomplete reporting on mine clearance by operators makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations. However, Deputy Environment Minister Kamal Latif stated in 2012 that Iraq will not meet its 2018 clearance deadline.[33]

The significant lack of information available on mine action in Iraq itself points to weakness in the institutions and management of mine action that raise concerns about the government’s appreciation of what is required to fulfill its treaty obligations as well as the mine action program’s ability to meet them.

More than four years after adhering to the treaty, and thus nearly half-way towards its initial Article 5 deadline, the government of Iraq has yet to put in place a functioning mechanism for directing, planning, or upholding the standards of mine action. Although the KRG’s more experienced mine action program has conducted survey and manages clearance in the north, in central and southern Iraq the survey needed for clearance planning has barely started and clearance continues without effective coordination or oversight.

Quality management

In northern Iraq, IKMAA and GDMA conducted quality assurance (QA) of operators in their respective areas of operation in 2011. IKMAA operated eight QA teams that conducted 1,318 QA visits, sampling 22,482m², and reportedly finding 59 explosive items. GDMA operated 12 two-member QA teams which conducted 2,432 visits. Both authorities renewed accreditation for operators already present and accredited a total of seven new commercial companies.[34]

Safety of demining personnel

In central and southern Iraq, demining incidents and casualties were not reported.

In northern Iraq, IKMAA reported four missed-mine incidents, including one resulting in detonation, but no casualties resulted. A deminer reportedly sustained minor injuries from an antipersonnel mine detonation in November 2011.[35] GDMA reported 10 accidents involving mines and UXO but gave no details of casualties.[36]

Risk Education

UNICEF coordinates national and international NGOs in providing risk education (RE) in support of IKMAA and GDMA in the north and the DMA in central and south Iraq. Its main partners in 2011−2012 included Bustan Association, Handicap International, Iraq Alliance for Disability Organization, Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), Iraqi Red Crescent Society, the ICRC, and demining operators including MAG, IMCO, NPA and Rafidain Demining Organization.[37]

In northern Iraq, IKMAA and GDMA worked with UNICEF on developing an RE curriculum for schools and published a range of RE posters, booklets, and card games. IKMAA teams delivered RE directly to people and communities identified as at-risk, including children, shepherds, nomads, and herb collectors, as well as through broadcasting messages on local radio and television.[38] GDMA conducted RE sessions in 128 villages in 2011 and 25 schools as well as conducting summer school programs in four areas. GDMA noted that RE activities generated 35 reports on the location of UXO items for clearance teams.[39]

The government approved an RE strategy for Iraq as well as RE standards in January 2011; since then UNICEF has given priority to developing a work plan and to building capacity to implement it. The target audience for RE initiatives was both high- and medium-impacted communities in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleymaniyah, and the southern governorate of Missan, working through community focal points and media. UNICEF reported that it was working with the DMA and the Ministry of Environment on developing messages for central and southern Iraq.[40]

Among the challenges to RE, however, UNICEF included the inadequate commitment of national and regional governments to mine action in general and their weak leadership in supporting RE, as well as the lack of a single database, poor information exchange, and the slow accreditation of organizations willing to undertake RE. Ministries were not fulfilling their roles and responsibilities and the national capacities available “do not meet international commitments.”[41]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2011, the Monitor identified 141 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Iraq.[1] Of these, 56 occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) with the remaining 85 in central and southern Iraq.

Media monitoring identified 85 casualties in central and southern Iraq. In 2011, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) established a new casualty data collection mechanism which recorded 46 casualties in the same geographic areas of Iraq during the year.[2] However, due to the lack of detail available from the DMA data, it was impossible to distinguish those casualties from the casualties identified through media reports. It is certain that there are many more casualties in Iraq that are not identified due to the limited capacity of the newly established casualty data collection mechanism and because media coverage of casualties is far from comprehensive.[3]

Children made up at least 41% of civilian casualties for which the age was known (50 of 121), a significant increase from the 32% of casualties identified in 2010.[4] Of the total child casualties, most (29) were known to be boys; at least four were girls.[5] Two thirds of child casualties (33) were caused by ERW, including unexploded submunitions (11). As in previous years, men made up the single largest casualty group, representing 44% of civilian casualties for which the age was known; 13 casualties were women. There were 20 casualties among deminers,[6] a significant increase from the five in 2010. Of these, 10 occurred in Kurdistan, including a female deminer. Mines, including victim-activated IEDs, caused 16 of the 20 demining casualties.[7] Non-deminer civilians made up the majority of reported casualties (119) with just two casualties confirmed among security forces.

The 141 casualties identified in 2011 represented a significant increase in the number of reported annual casualties as compared with the 82 casualties identified for 2010.[8] The increase was due to a significantly higher number of casualties identified in central and southern Iraq, from 16 in 2010 to 85 in 2011, whereas the total number of casualties recorded in Kurdistan declined from 66 in 2010 to 56 in 2011. The increased casualty rate in central and southern Iraq was likely due to an improved security situation which enabled greater access for the media to larger areas of the country, rather than an actual change in the number of casualties occurring.[9]

The total number of casualties in Iraq remained unknown, though there were known to be many thousands. By the end of 2011, 20,300 casualties were confirmed, including 14,500 casualties registered in Kurdistan (6,000 killed; 8,500 injured).[10] In central and southern Iraq, 5,800 casualties were identified in Maysan province, the first province completed through the Iraqi survivor needs assessment launched in 2011.[11] It was estimated that 25% of all mine/ERW casualties were children under the age of 14 at the time of the incident.[12]

By the end of 2011, 1,688 casualties of cluster munition remnants were reported (754 killed; 930 injured; four unknown) and submunitions caused another 935 casualties with no further details on use (411 killed; 507 injured; 17 unknown). At least 388 cluster munition casualties occurred during strikes (128 killed; 260 injured).[13] However, due to the level of contamination, it was estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes, and that children made up one quarter of these casualties.[14]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is estimated to be 48,000–68,000.[15] There were 8,500 survivors identified in Iraqi Kurdistan.[16]

Victim assistance since 1999

Decades of armed conflict prior devastated the formerly well-functioning medical system in Iraq. The 10 major hospitals and 15 primary health care centers renovated and supplied by the ICRC between 1999 and the start of the Iraq war in March 2003 were damaged again during the related period of civil unrest. Continued armed violence prevented the rebuilding of critical victim assistance services and contributed to the emigration of some 75% of qualified medical personnel; by 2008 healthcare had deteriorated to being in “worse shape than ever.”[17] The situation worsened as the growing number of mine/ERW survivors and other war-wounded increased the use of the deteriorating services available.

Starting in 2009, a slowly improving security situation allowed for some renovations to medical facilities and the building of one new physical rehabilitation center. Survivors were more able to access available services, and some survivors in central and southern Iraq with the means to cover transportation costs could access free victim assistance services in Kurdistan. However, through to the end of 2011, the volatile security situation in many areas continued to prevent many survivors from having access to needed services.

In 2006, the national Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) appointed a Victim Assistance Director to address the absence of national victim assistance coordination, but harmonization with relevant ministries remained essentially nonexistent up until 2010 when the first national victim assistance meeting was held. Iraq had no victim assistance plan throughout the period. In 2011, however, the second annual national victim assistance meeting resulted in a set of recommendations for improving victim assistance.

The situation for survivors in Kurdistan was significantly better than in the rest of Iraq throughout the period. Numerous NGOs operated in the region providing medical services, physical rehabilitation, and social and economic inclusion programs, including several funded through the UN Oil-for-Food program up to 2010. Victim assistance services were coordinated, together with the regional Ministry of Health, by the two mine action authorities operating in the Kurdistan region, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA), which had merged into the IKMAA by 2012. Nevertheless, available services were not fully able to address the needs of the large number of survivors in the region, a situation worsened by the arrival of survivors from the south starting in 2009.

Victim assistance in 2011

In 2011, the collection of data relevant to victim assistance improved significantly in Iraq with the launch of a mine/ERW survivor needs assessment, the establishment of a casualty data collection system through the DMA for central and southern Iraq, and the expansion of a pilot injury survey. A set of recommendations for improving victim assistance (“VA recommendations”) was developed, though this fell short of a comprehensive victim assistance plan. There were no significant changes in access to or availability of services in 2011 in southern and central Iraq, though improvements in the security situation in 2010 were sustained. These constant improvements made possible the continued reconstruction of medical and rehabilitation centers and greater mobility for mine/ERW survivors. In Kurdistan, the establishment of “Disability Information Points” increased knowledge of services available for mine/ERW survivors.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2011, the DMA launched a survivor needs assessment survey that was planned to cover the 15 provinces of central and southern Iraq by February of 2015. The survey in the first province, Maysan, was completed by January 2012. The needs assessment was designed to identify survivors, determine their needs, and connect survivors to available medical and rehabilitation services.[18] The DMA casualty data collection system, launched in 2011, collected information from medical facilities, individuals, and NGOs including mine clearance operators.[19] However, the detailed data was not shared for victim assistance purposes.

The national Ministry of Health expanded the national injury surveillance system, started in 2010, to cover eight of Iraq’s 18 provinces/governorates in 2011.[20] The surveillance system recorded injuries caused by mine/ERW among other causes.[21]

In 2011, the Ministry of Health launched the national disability registry which covered eight of Iraq’s provinces/governorates, including all of Kurdistan, by the end of the year. Data was collected from rehabilitation centers and all relevant ministries and was to be used to develop a plan for improving services for all persons with disabilities.[22]

No specific needs assessment for mine/ERW survivors was undertaken in Kurdistan during 2011, though service providers continued to collect data when survivors accessed services. The GDMA and IKMAA provided data on mine/ERW survivors to the national disability registry of the Ministry of Health. Both of Kurdistan’s mine action centers made casualty data available based upon written request from relevant government ministries and service providers.[23]

Victim assistance coordination[24]

The second annual National Victim Assistance meeting, held in September 2011, was the only instance during the year where victim assistance stakeholders from both Kurdistan and from central and southern Iraq met to discuss victim assistance through the whole of Iraq. The meeting developed a set of 32 VA recommendations to improve victim assistance in Iraq.[25] The VA recommendations covered specific suggestions to improve interministerial coordination, enhance the capacity of medical and rehabilitation professionals, increase the availability of emergency medical care, enhance the implementation of existing laws and policies to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, and dedicate funding for ministerial budgets to increase economic inclusion opportunities for mine/ERW survivors.[26] VA recommendations were distributed to relevant government ministries in Kurdistan, central and southern Iraq, and to UN agencies.[27]

In the absence of a comprehensive national victim assistance plan, the DMA used the VA recommendations as its work plan. As of May 2012, eight of the 32 recommendations had been completed.[28] The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 included as its third objective to “establish an integrated and capable programme for mine/UXO victims rehabilitation and reintegration in the society.”[29] However, in 2011, Iraq continued to lack a mechanism to monitor progress toward that objective within a given timeframe.[30] The national Ministry of Health’s plan included objectives designed to improve medical and physical rehabilitation services for all persons with disabilities throughout Iraq.[31]

Victim assistance coordination had improved and was more effective throughout Iraq in 2011,[32] though it still required an increase in strengthening both in Kurdistan and in the rest of Iraq.[33] The community liaison department of the DMA served as the focal point for victim assistance coordination for south and central Iraq, though no coordination mechanism existed nor were regular coordination meetings held.[34]

Throughout 2011, there remained a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of different Ministries to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors. The DMA developed a proposed coordination mechanism to clarify roles of all relevant actors, including ministries, service providers and NGOs. The proposed mechanism was “in the final stages of approval” in May 2012.[35] During 2011, the DMA coordinated bilaterally with the national Ministry of Health and several other Ministries to implement the VA recommendations.[36]

In May 2012, the merger of GDMA and IKMAA, which had been underway since 2009, was completed to form a single mine action authority for the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. The merged mine action authority retained the name Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).[37] Throughout 2011, GDMA continued to hold regular meetings to share information about victim assistance activities and planning.[38]

In Kurdistan, a Protection Working Group was established by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) in anticipation of the approval of a law on the rights of persons with disabilities. The working group, which included both the regional mine action centers and survivor organizations, was to determine the needs of persons with disabilities and fill gaps in available services. Monthly meetings began in mid-2011.[39]

In southern and central Iraq, the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation (HCPR), a branch of the Ministry of Health, held several coordination meetings in 2011 involving relevant stakeholders.[40] The Iraqi parliament approved the establishment of a national disability council that would include all relevant stakeholders such as victim assistance coordinators from the mine action authorities, but as of May 2012 it had not yet been formed.[41]

Iraq provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh on 29 November 2011, at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Group of Experts meeting on 24 April 2012, and at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2012.[42] Iraq also provided limited casualty data through form J of its Article 7 report.[43]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Mine survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in the annual national victim assistance meeting and contributed to the VA recommendations.[44] In Kurdistan, survivors and other persons with disabilities and their representative organizations participated in monthly meetings of the Protection Working Group.[45]

In Kurdistan, disabled persons organizations (DPOs) and survivors implemented physical rehabilitation programs and peer support; they also participated in projects to raise awareness of the rights of persons with disabilities and provide information on available services.[46] No information was available regarding the involvement of mine/ERW survivors in the implementation of victim assistance in central and southern Iraq.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[47]

In 2011, information about services available to persons with disabilities in Kurdistan, including mine/ERW survivors, increased through the opening of “Disability Information Points” in each of the three governorates of the region. With support from Handicap International, local DPOs managed the information points providing service referrals and information about the rights of persons with disabilities.[48]

The Ministry of Health was better able to provide the supplies necessary for emergency medical attention; a decrease in the level of armed violence also resulted in a small reduction in the need for emergency care. The ICRC completed its three-year project to strengthen emergency medical response throughout Iraq and was able to expand its activities into areas that had previously been restricted due to ongoing conflict. Hospitals relied less on ICRC emergency medical supplies.[49] However, Iraq still lacked both sufficiently trained staff and the ability to provide prompt evacuations of mine survivors. This resulted in some amputations and medical conditions which may have been avoided with a rapid medical intervention.[50]

The ongoing improved security situation and communications allowed survivors from southern and central Iraq to continue seeking physical rehabilitation services in Kurdistan. The Kurdistan centers offered free transportation and accommodation that were not available in centers in the south. Waiting lists that had grown in 2010 had been reduced somewhat by early 2012.[51] A newly built rehabilitation center, with accommodation, was opened in January 2012 in Nasiriyah, southeastern Iraq.[52] Construction of three additional rehabilitation centers by the Ministry of Health in three mine/ERW affected provinces was in progress throughout 2011.[53]

Despite these improvements, available rehabilitation services remained insufficient to meet demand. In 2012, the Ministry of Health estimated that existing rehabilitation centers produced just 25% of the prosthetics needed for the population due to a lack of materials and trained staff.[54] Access to medical facilities and rehabilitation centers for survivors in rural areas, especially those living close to the Iraq/Iran border, remained difficult due to the distances to services and a lack of affordable transportation.[55] To address the lack of trained medical and physical rehabilitation specialists, the Ministry of Health and the ICRC supported the training of hundreds of technicians.[56]

Economic inclusion activities continued to be carried out on a limited basis in Iraqi Kurdistan by NGOs[57] and by the ICRC through the rehabilitation center in Erbil.[58] In south and central Iraq, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs began a new program to find job placements for persons with disabilities; the Iraqi Red Crescent Society continued to provide seed support to mine survivors to start small businesses and to provide psychological support through door-to-door outreach.[59] As with medical care and physical rehabilitation services, Iraq lacked sufficiently trained professionals to provide appropriate psychological support to mine survivors during and after their medical treatment.[60] Participants in the second annual National Victim Assistance meeting highlighted the importance of increasing the number of psychologists working in rehabilitation centers and the need for increased opportunities for social inclusion, including through disability centers and sports and recreation programs.[61]

Iraq had no legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities; access to public buildings, schools and places of work was very limited.[62] In December 2011, the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament approved a law protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. DPOs in the region advocated for the effective implementation of the new law.[63]

On 23 January 2012, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a law ratifying the Convention the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[64]

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, 10 donors contributed a total of US$34.8 million to clearance, victim assistance (VA), and risk education (RE).[1] The United States (US) contributed $22 million or 65% of the total international assistance. Only Norway (NOK5,070,000/$905,002), the US ($900,000), and the Netherlands (€35,217/$49,060) supported VA. The US ($500,000) and Australia (A$500,000/$516,600) supported RE. Australia contributed A$1.5 million ($1,549,800) for clearance to UNDP and A$500,000 ($516,600) to UNICEF for RE.

The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 assumes international donors will fund clearance operations and that the government—the ministries of defense, interior, and the environment—will contribute approximately US$21.7 million over three years for VA, RE, strategic planning, and information management personnel.[2] As in the two previous years, none among the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, the Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, and the General Directorate of Mine Action reported making financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program in 2011.

In 2011, the UN Mine Action Portfolio Iraq Country Team based its plans on continued international support at least until 2015.[3]

International contributions: 2011[4]

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011 (US$)[5]