Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It continues to insist on the military necessity of antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging their negative humanitarian impact.

On 2 December 2011, South Korea abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/29 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has in previous years. South Korea has stated for many years that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula prohibits it from acceding to the treaty.[1] In June 2011, a foreign ministry official told the Monitor that South Korea’s policy in relation to the Mine Ban Treaty remains unchanged.[2]

South Korea has never sent an observer delegation to a meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, including in 2011. Its last attendance at an intersessional Standing Committee meeting was 2008.

In April 2011, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein, the Special Envoy on Universalization for the Mine Ban Treaty, visited South Korea where he met with the deputy minister for policy of the Ministry of National Defense, the deputy minister of multilateral and global affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the chief of the high court of the Korean Armed Forces to explore ways that South Korea may wish to engage in the work of the treaty.[3]

An April 2010 draft bill, designed to allow civilian companies to clear mines, did not pass through the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly prior to its dissolution in April 2012. In July 2012, the Ministry of National Defense asked the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (Korean CBL) for comments on the next draft bill before it is to be submitted to the new assembly.[4] The Korean CBL is also preparing to resubmit a draft of the Act for Compensation for Civilian Mine Victims, a prior submission, which did not pass prior to dissolution of the previous assembly.[5]

South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. On 30 March 2012, South Korea submitted its annual CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report.[6]

In March 2012, ICBL Youth Ambassador Song Kosal urged Korean authorities to join the Mine Ban Treaty during his visit to Korea to receive the 2012 Tji Hak-soon Justice and Peace Award.[7]

Use, production, and transfer

South Korea informed the Monitor that it did not engage in any new use of antipersonnel mines, including replacing mines in existing mine fields.[8] South Korea has previously maintained that they have not used mines in many years.

South Korea reported to the Monitor that it did not use, import, export, or purchase antipersonnel mines from foreign companies during 2011 or early 2012.[9]

However, production of mines has continued. In 2011, a private South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, produced 4,000 KM74 antipersonnel mines.[10] Previously, in 2007, the Hanwha Corporation produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown number of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[11]

In both 2012 and 2011, Foreign Ministry officials have stated that the government has commissioned the development of remotely-controlled mines which will replace antipersonnel mines and that the newly developed mines will meet the requirements set out in the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.[12]

South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of the moratorium on the export of AP [antipersonnel] mines since 1997.”[13]

Stockpiling

In 2012, Korean officials declined to reveal to the Monitor the size of South Korea’s stockpile and the types of mines stockpiled.[14] In 2011, Korean officials stated that information regarding its stockpile was classified.[15] However, South Korea said in 2006 and 2008 that its stockpile consisted of 407,800 antipersonnel mines.[16] Previously, the government stated that it held a stockpile of about 2 million antipersonnel mines.[17]

South Korea told the Monitor in 2012 that it did not destroy any stockpiled mines during 2011.[18] However, South Korea reported in 2011 that it had destroyed 18,464 antipersonnel mines (5,132 M14; 12,086 M16; and 1,246 M18) in the ammunition units where they were stored during 2010. The date(s) of the destruction and reason for this action was not specified.[19]

The United States (US) military keeps a substantial number of remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 VOLCANO, and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.[20]

For many years, the US military also stockpiled about 1.1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea, with about half the total kept in South Korea and half in the continental US.[21] Most of the US-owned mines located in South Korea have been part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). On 30 December 2005, the US enacted a law authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program would be terminated, which occurred at the end of 2008.[22] In June 2009, the South Korean government told the Monitor, “AP [antipersonnel] mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”[23] In June 2011, a Foreign Ministry official stated that South Korea safeguards a stockpile of antipersonnel mines that belongs to the US military on its territory as part of the WRSA-K program. These mines are planned to be gradually transferred out of South Korea.[24] In June 2012, a Foreign Ministry official stated that the antipersonnel mines are in ammunition storage within Secure Areas of the USFK (US Forces Korea).[25]

The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”[26] Moreover, US policy has prohibited the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea since 2010. The US has previously destroyed all non-self-destructing mines not dedicated for potential use in Korea.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In November 2011, South Korea stated that it “shares the international community’s concerns about humanitarian impact caused by the irresponsible use of cluster munitions” and expressed its support for a new protocol on cluster munitions in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) “that strikes the right balance between humanitarian considerations and legitimate security needs.”[1] It is not known if South Korea intends to review its position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions following the CCW’s failure to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions (see the Convention on Conventional Weapons section below).

South Korea did not make any public statements on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, 2011, or the first half of 2012. Previously, in October 2009, an official said, “The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the need to reduce humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions,” but “due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, my government is unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[2] In December 2008, South Korea stated, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[3]

South Korea has also described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[4]

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In September 2011, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable from January 2007 that stated that South Korea apparently considered participating in the first meeting of the Oslo Process as an observer, because it was reportedly concerned that the cluster munition “issue will be co-opted just as the landmine issue was in the Ottawa process.”[5] South Korea did attend the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and made a statement.

South Korea has not participated in any meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011.

A local peace group called “Weapon Zero Team” has undertaken several actions to call on the South Korean government to ban cluster munitions.[6]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

South Korea is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It opposed any efforts to address cluster munitions in the CCW until after the 2007 launch of the Oslo Process.[7]

At the outset of the CCW's Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, South Korea expressed its hope that the conference will find “common ground” on the chair’s draft text of the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[8] South Korea consistently sought to either preserve or further weaken many of the weakest aspects of the chair’s draft text during the negotiations, and opposed proposals that would make the CCW effort more compatible with the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In particular, South Korea wanted an exception to allow transfers of cluster munitions in order “to implement obligations pursuant to its security cooperation agreement” with the United States.[9]

The Review Conference ended without reaching agreement on the draft protocol, thus concluding the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In April 2012, South Korea confirmed that it has not used cluster munitions.[10] It produces rockets, bombs, and projectiles containing submunitions and has licensed the production of artillery projectiles containing submunitions in Pakistan. South Korea has also exported cluster munitions. It has imported and licensed the production of cluster munitions from the United States. It is thought to possess a significant stockpile of cluster munitions.

Production

In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[11] According to a US diplomatic cable dated April 2007, a senior Ministry of National Defense official informed the US that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions were of the non-self-destructing kind and “the cost of retrofitting them would be prohibitive.”[12] In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[13]

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[14] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced two M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[15] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that Hanwha produced 42,800 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) extended range (base-bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[16]

Poongsan’s website has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[17] In April 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DP-ICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[18]

Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan at Wah Cantonment. While the ammunition is primarily being produced for Pakistan’s army, the two firms will also co-market the projectiles to export customers.[19]

The United States concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets.[20]  

According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” at least 22 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions. Hanwha receives funds from at least 16 Korean financial entities, including six US financial entities, one in the United Kingdom, and one in Switzerland. Poongsan receives investment from at least 15 Korean financial entities, including eight US financial entities, two in France, and one each in Switzerland and Singapore.[21]

Transfers

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[22] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US.[23]In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[24] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[25]

In December 2011, Korea’s National Assembly set aside 236 billion won ($205 million) for the procurement of some 350 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons from the United States.[26] On 1 June 2012, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible sale of 367 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons at an estimated cost of $325 million including associated parts, equipment and logistical support. The agreement requires “a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that the cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology will be used only against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[27] While US law bans the export of nearly all US cluster munitions, it permits the export of Sensor Fuzed Weapons. The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans the export of Sensor Fuzed Weapons.

In March 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[28]

Stockpile

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “There are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings…. Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[29] In April 2012 Korea informed the Monitor that it had destroyed 27 cluster munitions during the previous year.[30]

Contamination and Impact

The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in southern Korea, and because of a security threat, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) laid barrier minefields along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north.

Mines

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km² in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.[1]

A report by the National Defense Committee in 2010 said South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km² and some 209 unconfirmed or suspected mined areas covering 97.82km². This latter figure was repeated in a draft bill on demining, which was submitted to Parliament in January 2010 (see below).[2]

South Korea also contends with mines displaced from military bases by rain and mudslides and from across the border in North Korea. Authorities reported around 10 mines missing from an air defense position at Seoul’s Mount Umyeon after mudslides in July 2011. Landmines and other explosives were also swept away from an ammunition depot north of Seoul, although the landmines were later reported to have been recovered.[3]

In July 2010, wooden box mines were found on South Korea’s Kanghwa Island, in the estuary of the Han river, and in the Samichon river area in Yonchon-gun, Gyeonggi province, apparently washed down from North Korea by heavy rains. A box mine caused the death of one man and injuries to another in the border town of Yeoncheon, northeast of Seoul. Parts of North Korean wooden box mines were also found on the banks of a river in Cheolwon on the South Korean side of the DMZ.[4]

Explosive remnants of war

Many parts of South Korea are also contaminated by ERW, particularly unexploded ordnance from the Korean War, although the precise extent is not known.

Mine Action Program

There is no national mine action authority or mine action center. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCW and has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas.[5] In January 2010, the government submitted a draft bill on mine clearance to the national assembly that would allow private companies to engage in demining. The draft law stipulated clearance tasks must be requested by the government, local government, a public institution, or a landowner, while clearance must be authorized by the secretary of defense and conducted under the supervision of the army commander in charge of the area.[6] The bill was still pending before the Defense Committee of the National Assembly in March 2012.[7] In 2009, the government stated that clearance which had been planned to finish in 2009 would continue until 2015.[8]

Land Release

South Korea said it spent US$1.8 million on demining in 2011 but reported clearing less than half the amount of land and landmines cleared the previous year. It said more than 32,300 soldiers participated in mine clearance operations.[9] It also reported demining was under way on eight sites located between the CCZ and Seoul and that it expected to clear a similar amount of land in 2012 as in 2011.[10]

Troops were deployed in July 2011 to locate mines missing from an air defense position at Seoul’s Mount Umyeon after heavy rain and mudslides. Troops near the frontline with North Korea in Gyeonggi Province also reported finding 16 box mines apparently washed down from North Korea in August 2012.[11]

Mine clearance in South Korea, 2006–2011[12]

Risk Education

The government reported in 2009 that “the military holds meetings with local people to provide specific information on landmines.”[13] It said it provides two types of mine/ERW risk education (RE): one for the armed forces and the other for civilians, mainly as community liaison prior to clearance.[14] South Korean NGOs have disputed the government’s description of RE activities, which are believed to be limited to the placement of mine warning signs in the CCZ and displaying models of mines at the entrance gates to the CCZ.[15]

Casualties

In 2011, the Monitor identified two new antipersonnel mine casualties in Gyeonggi-do province, South Korea. In July, a man was injured while supervising drain excavation work in Yeoncheon-gun[1]; in November, another man was injured in Yangju County.[2] In 2010, four mine casualties were identified in the same province.[3]

The number of mine/explosive remnants of war casualties is unknown, but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there were at least 500 civilian survivors.[4] In 2009, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties and the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.[5] The Monitor identified 69 mine casualties between 1999 and 2011 (eight killed, 61 injured). At least 20 of these casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001. Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.[6]

Victim Assistance

There have been at least 112 survivors in South Korea though reasonable estimates indicate that the number is between 1,000 and 2,000, with both civilian and military survivors.[7]

Between March and August 2011, the Korean Peace Sharing Association (PSA) carried out a survey and needs assessment of mine victims in Gangwon province, one of two South Korean provinces bordering North Korea. PSA identified 228 civilian victims of mines from incidents dating from the 1950s to present, of which 116 were killed and 112 were injured; of these, 190 (83%) were men. The survey found that 46% of survivors lived below the poverty level and more than half had a primary school education or less. Many survivors had significant debt, often related to paying medical expenses related to their injuries. A prevalence of severe depression and alcohol dependence at a rate higher than the population average was also documented.[8]

Results of the survey were shared with provincial authorities and the media in October 2011.[9] The provincial government used the survey results to secure funding from the Samsung Corporation to assist at least 60 of the survivors in Gangwon province in obtaining follow-up surgery and other medical care.[10]

Victim Assistance Coordination

South Korea has no victim assistance coordination; the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (MIHWAF) is the lead ministry responsible for persons with disabilities.[11]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

While South Korea has a national health care system, mine victims are frequently not eligible for assistance due to the fact that their disability is considered conflict-related and/or self-inflicted.[12] Soldiers injured on duty, including those injured by mines, receive free medical services and a monthly pension that depends on the degree of disability—estimated, for example, to be about US$1,000 for a partial limb amputation.[13] Civilian mine survivors can apply for government compensation through the Ministry of National Defense Special Compensation Commission but few claims have been successful.[14]

The PSA needs assessment found that 88% of victims identified in Gangwon province (survivors and the family members of people killed by mines) did not seek compensation following the mine incident, most because they were not aware that a state compensation program existed. Others did not seek compensation either because they lacked money for legal assistance or because they feared reporting their incident to the government.[15]

In 2012, the Law for Removal of Mines and Reparation for Mine Victims was introduced for consideration by the Korean National Assembly for the fourth time since 2003.[16] If approved, it would provide financial compensation to mine victims for loss of income as a result of disability or loss of life (awarded to surviving family members) and would provide subsidies for medical care for survivors.[17]

In 2009, an act was adopted with the aim of preventing discrimination against persons with disabilities and providing remedies for those suffering from such discrimination.[18]

South Korea ratified the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 11 December 2008.

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed US$290,000 in mine action funding through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) and International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security (ITF, formerly the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance). South Korea’s contributions to the VTF went towards support to Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Libya, while its contributions through the ITF went to Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Gaza, as well as to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for regional mine action coordination in Central Asia.[1]

Recipients of contributions in 2011

Korea’s 2011 contribution was a small increase on its support for mine action in 2010. Since 2009, Korea has contributed $740,000 to mine action.

Summary of contributions: 2009–2011[2]