Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Lao officials have stated on many occasions that the government made a decision in 2004 to accede, but that the country needs time to prepare to meet the treaty’s obligations. At the May 2012 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Lao PDR told States Parties that it “will accede to the Ottawa Convention as it has announced some time ago and it will continue to work toward that goal.”[1]

In July 2011, Lao PDR provided a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for the first time. It has long said that its voluntary Article 7 report, when submitted, would allow the international community to “understand the facts and reality on the ground.”[2] Form A of the Article 7 report notes that sanctions in the penal code prohibit production, possession, use, or trade of war weapons, although not specifically mines, unless legally sanctioned. Form B states that the information will be provided when it is available. Form C notes that “no survey on anti-personnel mines has been carried out, therefore the information on the locations of mine fields are lacking.” Form D states that the Ministry of Defense retained a “small quantity of APMs [antipersonnel mines] for the training in mine detection…” On Form E, Lao PDR stated that it has no antipersonnel mine production facilities. Forms F, G, and H state that no information is available. Form I states that “there is no specific warning about APMs, but only UXOs [unexploded ordnance] that could be also valid for landmines. Since the contamination areas are so wide UXO marking signs were set up only at the project areas.” Form I includes a total of mine victims as a percentage of a casualty figure from 1964–2008, and notes that Lao PDR will continue to destroy mines when they are found during the course of UXO clearance.[3]

Previously the Lao government has cited the treaty’s mine clearance obligation and deadline under Article 5 as an obstacle to accession. Lao PDR also expressed concern regarding the possible diversion of resources from UXO clearance activities to a focus on antipersonnel mines.[4]

In March 2010, a representative of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) told the Monitor that the only concern the country has regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is implementation of Article 5. He noted that Lao PDR is the country most affected by explosive remnants of war, and as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is concerned it may not be able to comply with both conventions’ obligations at the same time due to limited resources.[5]

Lao PDR sent observers to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh in November–December 2011 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in May 2012. It made statements at both meetings on its efforts toward accession to the Convention.

On 2 December 2011, Lao PDR voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 66/29, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the fifth consecutive year it has voted in favor of the annual resolution, after abstaining in all previous years.

Lao PDR is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer

In 2008, Lao PDR acknowledged that it has used mines in the past “to protect its borders.” It also said that the government does not export antipersonnel mines, although it holds a small stockpile.[6] Lao PDR’s voluntary Article 7 report states that it has not used antipersonnel mines for more than two decades and that the country has no production facilities.[7]

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 18 March 2009. It was among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the entry into force of the convention on 1 August 2010.

In September 2011, Lao PDR informed States Parties that it is preparing to draft a 10-year plan for the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including new legislation to impose penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any prohibited activity in accordance with Article 9 of the ban convention.[1] Previously, Lao PDR stated that the relevant articles of its penal code would be amended in order to reflect its national implementation obligations as required by Article 9 of the convention.[2] 

Lao PDR’s initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, submitted on 25 January 2011, describes existing legislative measures and regulations relevant to the ban convention.[3] In November 2011, the Lao PDR Prime Minister issued Decree No. 406/PM providing the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine action in the Lao PDR with responsibility for implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4]

Lao PDR submitted its annual updated Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report on 22 March 2012, covering the period from 1 December 2010 to 31 December 2011.[5]

As the most heavily contaminated country in the world in terms of cluster munition remnants, Lao PDR’s support was a crucial element in the success of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated extensively in the Oslo Process and advocated strongly against proposals to weaken the treaty text.[6]

Lao PDR has continued to play a leadership role in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2011, Lao PDR continued to engage in its capacity as president of the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties after hosting the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane in November 2010. This included outreach in support of the multi-year Vientiane Action Plan, which serves to guide States Parties’ implementation of the ban convention. In September 2011, Lao PDR became co-chair on clearance and risk reduction together with Ireland.

Lao PDR’s delegation to the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011 was led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thongloun Sisoulith, who served as president of the First Meeting of States Parties. Lao PDR made several statements during the meeting, including on national implementation measures, cooperation and assistance, universalization, clearance, and victim assistance.

Lao PDR also actively participated in the intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2012, where it served as co-chair on clearance and risk reduction, and made statements on universalization, victim assistance, cooperation and assistance, transparency measures and national implementation measures.

Promotion of the convention

Lao PDR has undertaken many efforts to promote the universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which it views as “one of the key aspects of the Convention that can assure its legitimacy.”[7] At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2011, Lao PDR urged all UN member states that have not yet done so to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[8]

At the 16^th Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in Bali, Indonesia in May 2011, Lao PDR cooperated with Lebanon to secure language in the final declaration on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At the NAM ministerial meeting held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt on 7-10 May 2012, the NAM ministers “recognized the adverse humanitarian impact caused by the use of cluster munitions and expressed sympathy with the cluster munitions-affected countries,” acknowledged the entry into force of the convention, and noted its Second Meeting of States Parties held in Lebanon in September 2011.[9]

Lao PDR has also promoted the universalization of the convention within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In June 2012, ten ASEAN ambassadors visited the Xieng Khouang province (a province heavily contaminated by cluster munition remnants and unexploded submunitions) in order to learn more about the problems posed by cluster munition remnants and unexploded submunitions.[10]

In April 2012, Lao PDR said that it made a universalization visit to neighboring Vietnam and were informed that “the leadership of Vietnam is very much supportive of the spirit and objective” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11]

On 11 July 2012, during the first visit to Lao PDR by a United States (US) Secretary of State since 1955, Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the US commitment to eradicating UXO in the country and met with survivors of cluster munitions.[12]

In 2011, Lao PDR expressed its “dismay” at the use of cluster munitions by Libya and Thailand, which it said “undermines the ban” and noted the need to condemn new use “in line with our core commitments under the convention.”[13]

Lao PDR has organized meetings, workshops and seminars across the country with local and provincial authorities; it has also broadcast a series of TV and radio spots aimed at increasing public awareness about the ban convention and its provisions, especially its obligations on clearance, risk reduction education and victim assistance.[14]

In August 2011, several activities were organized to increase awareness on the one-year anniversary of the Convention on Cluster Munitions’ entry into force, including a football tournament in Vientiane.[15]

Lao PDR is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Interpretive issues

Lao PDR has expressed its views on several important matters related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. In June 2011, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official informed the Monitor, “With regard to your question on relations with states not party to this convention, we are aware of the different interpretations of the Article 21. For us it is clear that we strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including those activities during the joint military operations, transiting, foreign stockpiling and investment in the production of cluster munitions.”[16]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Lao PDR is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and actively engaged in CCW work on cluster munitions in 2011.

At the outset of the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, Lao PDR said that the chair’s draft text of the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions “has not lived up to the expectations of many, especially the affected countries” and “strongly” urged that the text be strengthened to “complement the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not weaken it.”[17]

During the negotiations, Lao PDR expressed its concern “as the most affected country per capita in world” that the chair’s draft text “would create negative precedent” in international humanitarian law as it was “asking for a legalization of the use of cluster munitions that have indiscriminate and wide area impact, high failure rates and leave killing toys for civilians long after conflict ended.”[18]

On the final day of the Review Conference, Lao PDR endorsed a joint statement by 50 countries declaring that the chair’s draft text does not fully address the fundamental concerns and is unacceptable from a humanitarian standpoint and therefore does not command consensus.[19] The Review Conference ended without reaching agreement on the draft protocol, thus concluding the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its Article 7 report, Lao PDR stated that it “has no stockpiles” of cluster munitions and indicated that it is not retaining any cluster munitions for training and research.[20] Lao PDR also reported that it had no production facilities to decommission.[21] Lao PDR has stated that it has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[22]

Historic photographic and testimonial evidence shows that the former Royal Lao Air Force used US-supplied cluster munitions during the Indochina War.

 

Contamination and Impact

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history during the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s which left it with the world’s worst contamination from unexploded submunitions. The extraordinary intensity of that bombing has tended to obscure the extent of other forms of contamination left by the war on the ground; Lao PDR also has extensive air-dropped and ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

After more than 15 years of UXO/mine action, Lao PDR still lacks a credible estimate of the total area contaminated in the country or the extent of land that is a priority for clearance. In September 2011, at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR said that a total of 304km² had been cleared between the start of mine action in 1996 and June 2011.[1] According to the National Regulatory Authority (NRA), 10 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are “severely contaminated” by explosive remnants or war (ERW), affecting up to a quarter of all villages.[2]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States dropped more than two million tons of bombs between 1964 and 1973,[3] including more than 270 million submunitions. Lao PDR has reported 652,447 unexploded submunitions were cleared between 1996 and June 2011[4] but there is no reliable estimate of the extent of contamination remaining.

Lao PDR’s initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2010 (unchanged in 2011) cites an estimate of contamination that is “within 87,000km².”[5] At the Second Meeting of States Parties, Lao PDR said that on the basis of an estimate of 70,000 individual cluster bomb strike locations and an estimate putting the footprint of each strike at 12 hectares (120,000m²), the NRA estimated contamination by submunitions at approximately 8,470km². It added that research by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) suggested the size of individual cluster strike footprints – and therefore total submunition contamination – may be smaller.[6]

Clearance teams have found 19 types of submunition.[7] Unexploded submunitions accounted for just over half (52%) of all items cleared in 2011.[8] UXO Lao, a civilian government body and Lao PDR’s largest clearance operator, reported in 2011 that during 15 years of operations, submunitions had accounted for 49% of all items cleared.[9]

The NRA identifies submunitions (known locally as bombies) as the most common form of remaining ERW contamination and responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[10] Submunitions are also said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[11] UNDP reports that as a result of submunition contamination “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive.”[12] The extent of their impact has given rise to calls for a survey – and clearance – strategy that gives priority to tackling cluster munition remnants.[13]

Other explosive remnants of war

Clearance operators have encountered at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR, but the extent of residual contamination from other ERW is not known.[14] A partial survey by Handicap International (HI), published in 1997, although acknowledged as out of date, continues to be used as a primary source of reference.[15] It found that 15 of the country’s then-18 provinces—all those it surveyed—had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO. These reportedly range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 2,000lb general-purpose bombs and sometimes bigger items.[16] Other major causes of incidents are artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, and air-dropped bombs.[17]

Mines

All sides in the war laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,[18] and clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.[19] The remote location of many of these areas means that mines had little impact, and made up only 94 of the more than 63,000 items of ERW cleared by operators in 2011.[20]

Official figures presented in 2010 show landmines are responsible for 17% of victims since 1998, almost as many as bombies (20%), but few mine victims have been reported in recent years.[21] The NRA has, however, recognized that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”[22]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, has an interministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 10 government ministries.[23] Until 2011, the NRA was under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. A decree issued in June 2011 appointed a minister in the prime minister’s office responsible for rural development and poverty reduction as vice-chair of the board together with the vice-minister of foreign affairs.[24]

The NRA’s role includes setting policy, coordinating and regulating the sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management. It also has the mandate to serve as the technical focal point for matters relating to international weapons treaties.[25] The NRA has two sections: Operations, with units handling clearance, mine/ERW risk education (RE), victim assistance, and information management; and Policy, Administration and Standards. With US Department of State funding, ArmorGroup North America provided a technical advisor supporting quality management and operations. As of April 2012, Sterling International LLC took over the contract to provide an advisor.[26]

The NRA experienced significant staff turnover in 2011−2012, with the retirement of two deputy directors and the resignation of quality management staff. In April 2012, the NRA announced it was appointing Bounpheng Sisawath as deputy director for Policy and Administration. A second deputy director was to be appointed for Operations.[27]

UXO Lao, the civilian government body, had primary responsibility for coordinating and regulating all UXO/mine action, including clearance, until 2004, and remains the largest clearance operator in Lao PDR, working in nine provinces.[28] A draft decree drawn up early in 2012 provided for oversight of UXO Lao to be transferred from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to the same minister in the Prime Minister’s office who is responsible for the NRA. Donors expressed concern at the lack of consultation and the risk of a conflict of interest, emphasizing the need for a clear distinction between regulator and operators. As of August 2012, the transfer had not been finalized.[29]

Lao PDR embarked in 2010 on “Safe Path Forward 2” (SPF), a plan for 2010−2020, finally approved by the government on 22 June 2012. The strategy identified six goals:[30]

·         to reduce the number of casualties from 300 a year to less than 75 a year;

·         to ensure medical and rehabilitation needs of survivors are met in line with obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions;

·         to release priority land and clear UXO in accordance with national standards and treaty obligations;

·         to ensure effective leadership, coordination and implementation of the national program;

·         to establish sustainable national capacity integrated fully into the regular set-up of the government; and

·         to meet international treaty obligations.

The NRA continued working on plans for SPF implementation which provide for developing annual workplans and for setting out annual priorities and targets “in order to provide more detail and to account for up-to-date information and new developments that could impact prioritization.”

A concept paper for Convention on Cluster Munitions implementation also says “the government of Laos will assume funding responsibilities for certain elements of implementation as defined in the workplans.”[31] The NRA reported the government had agreed in principle in 2012 to provide the equivalent of US$1 million a year from its own budget for UXO/mine action but no date had been set to start such funding. It said national funding would also support plans by the army to set up a humanitarian demining team.[32]

Evaluations

An assessment undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) for the NRA in a bid to increase efficiency and accelerate land release found that one-third of all clearance tasks and 94% of technical survey tasks conducted between 2009 and mid-2011 did not find any items of ERW. A fifth of all 2010 tasks and a third of tasks undertaken in the first half of 2011 had fewer than four items.[33]

The assessment observed that Lao PDR’s national standards call for an emphasis in operations on rigorous survey in order to avoid unnecessary clearance but found a “vast difference” in how operators interpreted national standards and how they decided when an area should be subjected to technical survey or clearance. The GICHD noted that local communities have a strong influence on tasking and that operators sometimes fully cleared land without any evidence of contamination.

The GICHD recommended, among other points, that:

·         national standards focus on promoting non-technical survey (NTS) and clarify criteria for proceeding to technical survey or clearance and for deciding when to stop clearance;

·         the NRA examine operators’ different approaches to clearing submunitions and other UXO, identify best practice, and integrate them into national standards;

·         the NRA conduct detector trials with particular attention to probability of detection and reducing the false alarm rate; and that

·         the NRA explore options for use of explosive ordnance detection dogs.

The NRA responded that it was already in the process of implementing many of the recommendations and it expected detector trials to proceed later in 2012.[34]

Land Release

The total amount of land released increased slightly to 43.94km² in 2011, 8% more than the 40.62km² released in 2010. That result broke two consecutive years of falling results, but it was still far behind the level of land release in 2008 as a result of sharp contraction in the work of commercial operators caused by global financial setbacks. Land release in 2011 came from area clearance of 38.74km², compared with just under 35km² in 2010, and technical survey of 5.2km².

Five-year summary of clearance

In the first half of 2011, the NRA and the army general staff discussed plans for clearance linked to a five-year, $7 billion project, but those plans were later postponed pending further negotiation.[35]

Survey in 2011

Survey has become a priority for the NRA and operators in a bid to increase efficiency and evidence-based clearance. Three operators—HI, MAG, and NPA—started implementing the “District Focused Approach for the Management of the UXO Threat” (DFA) in 2011, a NTS initiated by the NRA. Discussions were underway in 2012 on participation of UXO Lao and Solidarity Service international (SODI) in the DFA.[36]

The NRA identified five main objectives for the DFA:[37]

·         identify and confirm all hazardous areas with UXO contamination and land use plans for those areas;

·         prioritize villages and areas for UXO clearance based on contamination and development needs;

·         provide baseline data for the NRA and operators to develop a 10-year plan;

·         provide baseline information to enable monitoring and evaluation of UXO interventions; and

·         develop a methodology for survey to be used in all contaminated districts.

The NRA did not expect the survey to map all contamination but instead to identify all areas of concern to each district, particularly areas of unexploded submunition contamination. It planned that the survey would eventually be extended to cover 85 UXO-contaminated districts in Lao PDR, but aimed to complete survey of the 41 most contaminated districts in 2013.[38]

HI, MAG, and NPA each started a pilot NTS in Nong (Savannakhet province), Boulapha (Khammouane) and Ta Oy (Saravane) respectively. HI, starting in October 2011, completed visits to 17 villages in 2011. It planned to increase its DFA surveyors from eight to 24 in 2012, and after completing Nong, to move on to survey Sepon and Vilabuly districts.[39] MAG, which started work on the DFA in September 2011 deploying nine community liaison teams, reported it led to a significant increase in demand for EOD tasks and expected that demand to grow further as the DFA expanded to new districts.[40] NPA started work on the pilot survey in Ta Oy, but the NRA reported the project was delayed by requests of some villagers for more time due to creation of new settlements and lack of cooperation from local authorities which necessitated several NRA interventions.[41]

NPA, in addition to participating in the DFA, has focused on developing and testing standard operating procedures for a Cluster Munition Remnants Survey, which it describes as a quick technical survey tailored to conditions in Lao PDR where bombing data often bares little relation to contamination on the ground. The survey is designed to establish confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) of cluster munition remnants. NPA is also developing this survey methodology in neighboring Cambodia and Vietnam. Its survey teams in Lao PDR covered a total of 20.14km² in 2011, confirming hazards over a total of 3.62km², destroying 2,514 items of ERW, with teams averaging 4km² of survey area a month. As teams gained experience and confidence, NPA expected the ratio of CHAs to land surveyed to go down.[42] 

Battle area and roving clearance in 2011

Five humanitarian NGOs have accounted for most clearance, particularly since the sharp contraction in work for commercial operators in the financial crisis of the last three years. In 2012, two new NGOs, HALO Trust and DanChurchAid, applied for NRA approval to start operating. HALO received NRA approval­ to operate in Laos in February 2012 but as of August was still discussing a memorandum of understanding to work in Savannakhet province.[43] DCA received a permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2012, and expected to set up two nine-person roving teams in two districts of northern Phongsaly province.[44]

The army set up a 15-strong humanitarian demining unit in February 2012, which the NRA said would receive EOD training from the US military at the UXO Lao training center. Once trained, the unit would be accredited with the NRA and subject to NRA quality assurance.[45]

Battle area clearance in 2011[46]

UXO Lao, the biggest operator which has maintained capacity at about 1,000 staff, increased productivity in terms of area by 11% in 2011 but it saw the number of ERW items cleared decrease by more than one-fifth from 2010 levels and the number of submunitions it cleared drop by 28%.[47] UXO Lao was expected to coordinate detector trials by GICHD in late 2012, with the participation of MAG and NPA.[48]

MAG, which started 2012 with 237 staff including 182 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts and technicians, embarked on a review of its survey, clearance and community liaison methodologies, differentiating its approach to tackling bombies (submunitions), aircraft bombs, as well as land ammunition, and taking a more evidence-based approach to tasking. It operated nine “UXO clearance teams” as of July 2011, later expanded to 12 teams, in addition to two roving/rapid response EOD teams and 26 community liaison teams. In 2011, it increased the area cleared by one-third in 2011 and items destroyed by 14%. MAG said it expected the introduction of new techniques and approaches to result in higher productivity in 2012.[49]

HI, operating with 23 EOD/clearance staff, restructured operations in 2011, switching assets from undertaking roving/spot clearance tasks five days a month to having a permanent roving team which followed up the findings of a survey team conducting the DFA. HI reported a sharp increase in items cleared in the first two months of 2012 as a result of the change. It planned to double its survey and roving team capacity in 2012 and to adopt NPA’s land release methodology to accelerate productivity.[50]

NPA focused in 2011 on the DFA and developing the Cluster Munitions Remnants Survey methodology working with 150 technicians in eight teams cross-trained for survey, area clearance and spot EOD. UXO found during survey are treated as spot tasks. NRA data showed it increased the area it cleared to 1.11km² and had the highest “bombie” per m² ratio. In 2012, it expected to add another five teams and continue its focus on survey.[51]

BACTEC did not appear in NRA data for 2011 but reported clearing 80,000m² and destroying 45 bombies and 26 items of UXO while operating under contract to Italthai and the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric power project.[52]

Roving clearance operations 2011[53]

*MAG reported conducting 1,666 roving tasks, destroying 3,323 submunitions and 1,550 other items of UXO.

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

The NRA worked in 2011 on preparing an implementation plan for the convention, which it said covered the period 2012 to 2020 and was “designed to demonstrate to States Parties our commitment to fully implement the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions].”[54] However, with contamination estimated at thousands of square kilometers and clearance progressing at a rate of approximately 40km² a year, it is already apparent Lao PDR will not meet its initial Article 4 deadline. A GICHD assessment (see Evaluations section above) makes clear that clearance resources have been used to clear land with no contamination and can be used far more productively. The NRA has initiated a district level survey that can target clearance more effectively and provide a baseline for prioritizing clearance taking better account of national development as well as local needs.[55]

Quality management

The NRA had one quality assurance team working as of April 2012 instead of the planned capacity of three teams, due to staff turnover and recruitment difficulties. It acknowledged it was unable to undertake as much quality assurance as called for by national standards and focused resources on commercial operators.[56]

Risk Education

The NRA’s Technical Working Group on Mine Risk Education (TWGMRE) coordinates planning and implementation of risk education, which in 2011 was delivered in nine of the worst-affected provinces in Lao PDR by six organizations (CARE, Catholic Relief Service, Empower for All, Norwegian Church Aid, Spirit of Soccer (SOS), and World Education); and four clearance operators (UXO Lao, HI, MAG, and SODI).[57]

At the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in June 2011, the NRA reported that risk education (RE) strategies “are evolving, from the provision of traditional awareness‐raising sessions on the consequences of unexploded ordnance to more complex and targeted processes focused on behavior change. Such processes involve data analysis to identify high‐risk groups, development of new MRE [mine risk education] materials (in local languages where appropriate), community liaison, development of government policies on scrap metal, as well as teacher training programmes and the growing involvement of Buddhist monks.”[58]

The NRA completed a survey of “Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices” (KAP) of high-risk populations in three provinces (Xieng Khouang, Khammouan and Savannakhet) in October 2011 to assess the effectiveness of RE materials and strategies. More than 75% of the 1,800 people surveyed had found UXO in the preceding 12 months. Close to 90% said UXO of all kinds should not be touched or moved but nearly 30% had collected scrap metal in the previous 12 months, and among the adults of this group, 41% had a metal detector at home. The survey concluded RE had targeted the right audience and had been successful in building knowledge about the risks of UXO, but found a significant proportion still engaged in risky behavior. The survey expected to interview around 100 scrap metal dealers but encountered only 10, of whom only two agreed to be interviewed; the report therefore did not include any findings on the scrap metal trade. The report said this group might need to be resurveyed.[59]

 

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The National Regulatory Authority for the unexploded ordnance (UXO)/Mine Action Sector in the Lao PDR (NRA) reported 99 landmine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties for 2011. As in past years, the majority of casualties (56) were children: 51 boys and 5 girls. Civilian adult casualties included 30 men and 11 women. The 99 casualties recorded for 2011 represented a decrease from the 117 casualties for 2010.[1] However, data was not considered to be accurate; even after six years of work on the NRA casualty data collection system, there was little or no improvement in the quality of the data available.[2]

As of the end of 2011, the NRA had identified at least 50,469 mine/ERW (including unexploded submunitions) casualties, including 29,491 people killed and 20,978 injured since 1964. The majority of casualties recorded (30,128) occurred during the conflict years from 1964 to 1973. Most casualties were caused by landmines.[3] The first phase of a nationwide casualty survey recording retrospective data was completed in 2008. It identified 50,136 mine/ERW casualties which, not including unexploded submunitions, caused the most casualties, followed by landmines and then unexploded submunitions.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

Unexploded submunitions were reported to have caused 7,580 casualties in the period 1964–2011 (3,176 were killed; 4,371 injured; 33 outcome unknown).[5]

Victim Assistance

Lao PDR has estimated that there are some 12,500–15,000 mine/ERW survivors still alive, including approximately 2,500 survivors of unexploded submunitions.[6] 

Victim assistance since 1999[7]

The assistance provided to survivors in Lao PDR remained inadequate throughout the period.[8] Landmine/ERW survivors represent a significant proportion of people with disabilities in Lao PDR. Most survivors come from the poorer remote areas, belong to ethnic minorities, and are disproportionately disadvantaged by the existing limitations in the provision of services. In Lao PDR, financial constraints are the main barrier to accessing healthcare. Emergency medical care throughout Lao PDR remained inadequate to meet survivors’ needs for most of the period, although progress was made with the development of a system of village health volunteers, in addition to an Asian Development Bank project with the Ministry of Health that improved primary health care services in northern provinces by 2008. More recently, World Education and the Ministry of Health improved the availability of healthcare to survivors significantly.

Physical rehabilitation services, run by the government in association with the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), showed improvement. With a new outreach program introduced in 2010, they were better able to reach survivors in rural areas. Retaining prosthetics staff remained a key challenge for the rehabilitation sector services because government salaries for health care workers were very low, but better paid opportunities were available in the private sector.

There was only limited psychosocial support for mine/ERW survivors, however, peer support increased. Social and economic reintegration programs for mine/ERW survivors, provided by NGOs, remained limited but had increased since 2009. Regulations protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination and requiring accessible buildings did not have the force of law.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2011, Lao PDR continued to lack sufficient information about survivors’ needs.[9] The second phase of the national victim survey, which started in June 2009, was intended to complete information on all survivors of incidents occurring since 2008, but the needs assessment component was not implemented.[10] One of the UNDP’s main objectives in 2011 was to support the NRA in their efforts to improve data on ERW casualties disaggregated by sex and age and to develop a system of registering survivors’ needs in the areas of medical care, physical rehabilitation, economic inclusion, and psychosocial support.[11] The Survivor Tracking System was intended to establish the survivors’ needs. By June 2012, training workshops for provincial and district focal points had been held in all of the 10 provinces planned for survey and 30% of the expected survey forms had been returned. Data and a summary report were planned to be distributed to all operators and stakeholders upon completion.[12]

The data collected on new casualties lacked detail on survivor’s injuries and needs; the data was not used by service providers to implement victim assistance activities.[13] The NRA shared data on survivors with members of the Technical Working Group on Victim Assistance (TWGVA) upon request. Data was mainly requested in order to develop work plans.[14]

Victim assistance coordination in 2011

The TWGVA held six regular meetings in 2011. TWGVA participants included the NRA, other relevant government agencies, national and international NGOs, and survivors. The meetings were mostly concerned with data collection.[15]

The Victim Assistance Strategic Plan, which had been under development by the NRA Victim Assistance Unit since 2008, was not used by the NRA or the TWGVA; a revised plan was being drafted in 2012.[16] The Victim Assistance Strategic Plan was to have been finalized after the completion of six position papers (on data collection, medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, vocational training, and advocacy). In mid-2012 the position papers remained in draft form and had not been translated or reviewed by the NRA or the TWGVA. Some of the draft documents were reported to need updating.[17]

Victim assistance is one of the three main components of the NRA strategy entitled “Safe Path Forward II 2011-2020.”[18] The Safe Path Forward II was approved by the Office of Prime Minister in June 2012.[19] The strategy and its victim assistance component were included in Lao PDR’s Millennium Development Goals Compact of 2010.[20] A key indicator for progress under these Millennium Development Goals includes “the number of survivors receiving proper assistance.”[21]

National standards for victim assistance developed in 2007 remained in draft form pending the completion of the national victim assistance strategy.[22]

The Ministry of Health held primary responsibility for  services related to the needs of persons with disabilities more generally. Because of the large number of mine/ERW survivors with disabilities in Lao PDR, the ministry worked extensively on victim assistance and rehabilitation in coordination with international NGOs.[23] Reinforcement of linkages between victim assistance and the broader disability sector was still needed in 2011.[24]

Lao PDR reported on the international funding received by NGOs that provided victim assistance in 2011 in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, made statements on victim assistance at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in Beirut in October 2011, and also at the Convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2012.[25]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Survivors, persons with disabilities and their representative organizations participated in TWGVA meetings. Survivors provided input into the development of the survivor tracking system questionnaires through the TWGVA.[26] Throughout 2011 and into 2012, increasingly more survivors participated in the delivery of services, particularly those supported by World Education, including economic inclusion, peer support, referral through provincial survivor committees and other sharing of information on available services. [27]

Lao PDR has not included a survivor on its delegation at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Meetings of States Parties or Intersessional Meetings.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[28]

Overall, there was a continuing lack of access to health services in Lao PDR. The health care system was underdeveloped and under-funded, and health workers had inadequate skill levels. This directly contributed to shortfalls in the quality of services across the health system.[29] The NRA reported that, by the end of 2011, World Education had committed to providing assistance to all new survivors from the 17 provinces of Lao PDR, subject to availability of funds. World Education reimbursed hospitals for the cost of survivors’ treatment through the requests of the NRA.[30]

COPE increased the number of beneficiaries of prosthetic and orthotics services in 2011 and continued to provide the five government-managed rehabilitation centers in the country with both financial and technical support. A new training project was established in 2011 to further develop the range of orthotic devices produced by the centers in order to address a greater range of patient needs.[31]

In 2011, resources from donors, together with funds raised through the COPE Visitor Centre, enabled COPE to cover the cost of services, local transportation and food allowances during treatment for all those who attended the centers. However, the need for services was greater than the numbers of people attending the clinics since many survivors were not aware of, or unable to reach, the available services. COPE enlarged “Cope Connect,” its outreach and community awareness raising project, into Luang Namtha province in the north of Lao PDR in 2011.[32]

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) conducted quality assessment of services at three government-managed prosthetic and rehabilitation centers in 2011 (Vientiane, Xieng Khuang, and Pakse), which resulted in an improvement in the quality of devices. In the first quarter of 2011, just one third of devices assessed at the Xieng Khuang center and some three quarters of devices assessed at the center in Vientiane met quality standards. Measures to correct this were taken and a second round of assessments in 2011 indicated a significant improvement, with between 90% and 100% of devices at the three centers fulfilling minimum quality standards.[33]

The AAR Japan closed down its office in Vientiane and transferred wheelchair production facilities and capacity, including all former AAR employees, to the government-operated Centre for Medical Rehabilitation wheelchair workshop.[34] The government sector took over management while all funding continued to be provided by Deseret International Charities as it had under AAR. The scale of production remained similar to the previous year.[35]

Psychological support was generally not available to survivors. However, World Education staff continued providing peer support in conjunction with other project activities.[36] Basic Needs also provided some limited psychological social support to survivors.[37]

World Education supported the establishment of a survivor-led NGO, the Quality of Life Association, in Xieng Khouang province, which was registered in September 2011 by local World Education staff. In addition to operating a visitors center selling handicrafts, the Quality of Life Association began to carry out assistance activities formerly undertaken by World Education in the province. By mid-2012 Quality of Life Association income-generation projects were still in the early stages of development.[38]

In late 2011, a forum was held by the LDPA in conjunction with HI to encourage businesses in Lao PDR to employ people with disability in the workplace. Starting in 2009, the LDPA, with HI support, ran a project linking people with disabilities with employers. As of 2012, the project had registered some 300 people with disabilities as jobseekers, of which about 10% had secured employment.[39]

In 2011, it was reported that there was an increase in the social inclusion of people with disabilities, including survivors, particularly those living in Vientiane and other cities.[40] In January 2012, the first ever national sporting event for people with disability, involving over 200 people, was organized in Luang Prabang province.[41]

As of April 2012, civil society was still an emerging concept in Lao PDR, where a decree for establishing not-for-profit associations was first enacted in 2009. The developing relationship between state and civil society was also a complicating factor in progress toward fulfilling the needs of persons with disabilities.[42] The LDPA, the national umbrella organization for disability groups that was established in 2001, was officially recognized as a civil society organization by the Ministry of Home Affairs in September 2011.[43] The Lao Association of the Blind, which was formed in September 2007, also finally received government approval to hold their inaugural general assembly in September 2011.[44]

A draft decree on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, prepared at the beginning of 2008, was still pending government approval by mid-2012.[45] Regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the Lao National Commission for Persons with Disabilities protect persons with disabilities against discrimination, however the regulations lacked the force of law. In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare established regulations regarding physical accessibility and some ramps were built in Vientiane. Legislation adopted in 2009 requires that the construction of buildings, roads, and public places provide facilities for persons with disabilities. The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings built before its enactment. There were no reports of discrimination in the workplace. [46]

Lao PDR ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 25 September 2009.

 

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, 12 donors contributed more than US$21.5 million to support mine action in Lao PDR,[1] compared to 13 donors and $20.8 million in 2010.[2] Australia and the United States (US) together provided almost half (46%) of all international funding in 2011. Of the $21.5 million, $1 million went towards victim assistance and $1.35 million supported risk education.

In 2011, the government of Lao PDR reported a contribution of LAK250 million (US$30,888) to the mine action program.[3] This is the first-ever reported Lao PDR contribution.

In June 2012, the US announced it had increased its support to Lao PDR from $5 million in 2011 to $9 million in 2012 and earlier in the year Norway announced a commitment of $20 million over five years.[4]

International contributions in 2011[5]

Summary of international contributions in 2007–2011[6]