Libya

Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on every pro-ban resolution since 1998, including Resolution 66/29 in December 2011

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Did not participate in the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2011 or intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2012

Key Events

No new mine use recorded since the 2011 conflict concluded with the death of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi

Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but officials expressed support for the ban during 2011 and the first half of 2012.

In February 2012, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Special Envoy, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, visited Libya as part of a delegation from Jordan and discussed Libya’s Mine Ban Treaty accession with the interim prime minister, who Mired described as “extremely forthcoming and interested” in the matter.[1]

In October 2011, two Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials informed the ICBL that there is support for joining the Mine Ban Treaty, but the matter must wait until the new government is established and for the legislative body to consider accession.[2] The officials made a commitment to review Libya’s voting record on the Mine Ban Treaty, considering that it has abstained from voting on every pro-ban resolution since 1998. On 2 December 2011, Libya abstained from the vote on Resolution 66/29 supporting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Previously, on 28 April 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), then the opposition authority in Libya, issued a statement formally pledging that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.”[3] The NTC committed to “destroy all landmines in their possession” and to “cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.” The communiqué also stated that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”[4]

Prior to being removed from office in 2011, the government of Muammar Gaddafi showed interest in the Mine Ban Treaty, but made no effort to join it; Libyan officials often criticized the treaty and called for it to be revised.[5]

Libya did not attend the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh in November–December 2011 or intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in May 2012.

Libya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, trade, and stockpiling

Prior to 2011, Libya consistently stated that it had never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and that it no longer stockpiled the weapon.[6] Yet abundant evidence has emerged showing how, under Gaddafi’s leadership, Libya accumulated a stockpile of hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and used tens of thousands of mines during the 2011 conflict. Antipersonnel mines manufactured by Belgium and Brazil have been identified in Libya.[7]

As the Gaddafi government progressively lost control of the country in 2011, massive weapon and munitions depots containing mines were abandoned by government forces and left unsecured.[8] Local and international mine action organizations have worked with Libyan authorities and the UN since mid-2011 to collect and destroy abandoned ordnance, but it is unclear how many landmines were removed by anti-government rebels, civilians and others. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other organizations have urged the Libyan government to emphasize to all militias and local authorities the importance of handing over their landmines for destruction.[9]

In mid-February 2012, the post-Gaddafi government in Libya began to destroy the stockpile with the destruction of nearly 20,000 landmines.[10]

Use

The first reports of pro-Gaddafi forces using mines emerged in late March 2011 in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west. In 2011, HRW confirmed the use of five types of mines in six separate locations and reported that three types of mines had been found abandoned at three other locations. In late 2011, Colin King (a British expert on explosive ordnance) provided information on two additional types of antivehicle mines found in storage in Benghazi: Yugoslav TMA-5 and the Czech PT Mi-Ba-III, both minimum-metal antivehicle mines. The Belgian NR413 antipersonnel mine has also been found in Libya.[11]

Mine Types identified in Libya during the 2011 conflict

Name

Type

Country of production

Location used/User

T-AB-1

Antipersonnel

Brazil

Used by government forces in Ajdabiya, Khusha, Misrata, al-Qawalish (three separate locations)

Type-72SP

Antivehicle

China

Used by government forces in Ajdabiya, al-Qawalis; abandoned stockpiles in Tripoli

Type-84A

Antivehicle

China

Used by government forces in Misrata

TMA-5

Antivehicle

Yugoslavia

Abandoned stockpiles in Benghazi

PT Mi-Ba-III

Antivehicle

Former Czechoslovakia

Abandoned stockpiles in Benghazi

PRB-M3 and

PRB-M3A1

Antivehicle

Belgium

Used by rebels in Ajdabiya; abandoned in storage in Benghazi

NR-442

Antipersonnel

Belgium

Abandoned stockpiles in Ajdabiya and Tripoli

NR-413

Antipersonnel

Belgium

Abandoned stockpiles in Tripoli

The Brazilian T-AB-1 personnel mine is another frequently-used antipersonnel mine favored by pro-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 conflict. Its low metal content makes the mine particularly challenging for detection and clearance efforts.[12] In December 2011, Brazil condemned the new landmine use in 2011 and said it intends to make a financial contribution to Libya’s mine action program and provide technical cooperation.[13]

There were multiple instances of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines laid together with Chinese Type-72 antivehicle mines.[14] One report stated that antivehicle mines were being buried under antipersonnel mines “to make them easier to trip and to ‘double the bang.’”[15]

Remotely delivered “parachute mines” were delivered by surface-fired 122mm Grad rockets into the port area of the city of Misrata by Gaddafi forces on 5 May 2011. The Chinese-produced Type-84 scatterable antivehicle mines had markings indicating a 2009 manufacture date.[16] In March 2012, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya reported that senior Gaddafi military officers interviewed by the commission had “confirmed that there were several attempts, some of them successful, to mine the Misrata port.”[17]

The commission also reported that the exhumation of a mass grave could not be completed until 30 landmines were removed from the site (located in the Al-Mela’b forest on the edge of Al Qalaa in western Libya, near Yafran in the Nafusa Mountains).[18]

Prior to the NTC’s no-use pledge, there was one recorded instance of antivehicle mine use by opposition rebel fighters. In April 2011, a BBC news report showed rebel fighters removing Belgian-produced PRB-M3 mines from their vehicles and then planting them on the side of the main road into Ajdabiya.[19]

Several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties condemned or expressed grave concern about the Libyan government’s use of antipersonnel mines in 2011.[20]

Prior to 2011, Libya last used antipersonnel mines during its 1980–1987 war with Chad. Libya is contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance from World War II, as well as from wars with Egypt (1977) and Chad (1980–1987). Minefields are said to exist in desert, port, and urban areas; however, no nationwide survey has ever been conducted. Some facilities are protected by minefields, such as an ammunition storage area outside of Ajdabiya that HRW confirms is partially surrounded by a minefield marked solely by a deteriorating fence.

 



[1] Statement by Special Envoy on Universalization, Prince Mired of Jordan, to Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 21 May 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/en/intersessional-work-programme/may-2012/general-status-and-operation-of-the-convention/statements/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=14376.

[2] ICBL meeting with El-Mahdi El-Maghreby, Director, International Organisations, and Salaheddin El Mesalati, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya, New York, 18 October 2011.

[3] HRW, “Libya: Rebels Pledge Not to Use Landmines,” Press release, 29 April 2011.

[4] The text of the communiqué can be found at, www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/29/libya-rebels-pledge-not-use-landmines.

[5] For example, in September 2010, Libya stated: “…anti-personnel mines are a weapon that the vulnerable States use to defend their territories against invading forces. The powerful States do not even need to use them since they possess arsenals of advanced Weapons. In this framework, the [Mine Ban Treaty] should be amended, taking into account the interests of the small States. The legislators of this convention should have made the States concerned committed to compensate those affected by mines planted in their lands and to provide legal and political assurances for the protection of small States due to the lack of possession of neither defensive nor offensive weapons.” Statement by Musa Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UNGA General Debate, New York, 28 September 2010.

[6] Interview with Col. Ali Alahrash, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 March 2004.

[7] HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011, www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/19/landmines-libya-technical-briefing-note.

[8] This included the 60-bunker Hight Razma facility near Benghazi, a 35-bunker facility near Ajdabiya, and a smaller facility near Tobruk. In September 2011, HRW visited in a Khamis Brigade base in the Salahadin neighborhood of Tripoli that included a farm compound holding approximately 15,000 antipersonnel mines and a nearby storage facility housing more than 100,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011; and HRW, “Libya: Secure Unguarded Arms Depots,” 9 September 2011.

[9] HRW, “Libya’s Government Destroys Landmines,” Press release, 29 March 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/29/libya-s-government-destroys-landmines.

[10] Ibid. In March 2012, Human Rights Watch witnessed the destruction of Type-72SP antivehicle landmines.

[11] Colin King, “Landmines in Libya,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011, http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/15.3/notes/c_king/c_king.htm.

[12] Brazil has declared in its Article 7 reports that production and exports of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines ceased in 1989, even before Brazil joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. There is no export record of the shipments, because arms export records are not held for longer than 10 years. An internal investigation has been opened into the origins and transfer of the T-AB-1 mines to Libya. HRW meeting with Brazilian delegation to intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 27 June 2011. In June 2011, the ICBL asked that Brazil publicly condemn the use of antipersonnel mines in Libya and provide detailed information on the transfer of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines to Libya, including the date of manufacture and transfer, as well as the number of mines exported. The ICBL had not yet received a reply as of 23 September 2011. ICBL letter to Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 13 June 2011.

[13] Statement of Brazil, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 2 December 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[14] HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011. In July, unconfirmed reports by rebel forces claimed that Gaddafi troops were laying T-AB-1 and Type-72SP mines around the western towns near the Tunisian border, including at Ghazaya, Ruwas, and Kiklah. “Land mines slow Libyan rebels’ march toward Tripoli,” The Washington Post, 26 July 2011.

[15] In August 2011, a rebel fighter said that the mine squad in his unit found 750 antivehicle mines around Brega in July 2011 in an area under a square mile and noted that many of the bigger explosives were buried under anti-personnel mines. John Jensen, “Libya: Gaddafi's land mines still a threat,” Global Post, 27 August 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/110827/libya-gaddafis-land-mines-still-threat.

[16] These mines are equipped with a sensitive magnetic-influence fuze, which also functions as an inherent anti-disturbance feature, as well as a self-destruct mechanism that can be set for a period of four hours to three days. These characteristics pose special problems as the mines sit on the ground and complicate clearance efforts. The magnetic influence fuze explodes the mine when it detects a change in its immediate magnetic environment, such as a vehicle passing over it or a person approaching the mine who is wearing or carrying a sufficient amount of ferrous metal, like military equipment or a camera. Additionally, given the sensitivity of the fuze, any change in orientation or movement of the mine may cause the fuze to function.

[17] The Commission stated that it “found remains of Chinese-manufactured Type-84 rocket-dispensed scatterable anti-tank mines and their rockets at the port.” UNOHCHR, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 15, Para. 72, http://bit.ly/yBvmCR.

[18] UNOHCHR, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 65, Para. 161, http://bit.ly/yBvmCR.

[19] Two witnesses told HRW that rebel forces had transferred the antivehicle mines from Benghazi to Misrata. HRW, “Libya: Rebels Pledge Not to Use Landmines,” Press release, 29 April 2011, www.hrw.org.

[20] ICBL, “Landmine Use in Libya in 2011: Frequently Asked Questions,” www.icbl.org.


Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Monitor is not aware of any statements on the cluster munition ban by the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya, which announced the liberation of the country on 24 October 2011. The NTC is an interim government, and Libyans are scheduled to elect a 200-member assembly to oversee writing a new constitution and form a government in 2012.

The previous government of Libya participated in three regional conferences held during the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that developed the convention, but attended the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 as an observer only and did not join in the consensus adoption of the convention.[1] Libya did not attend the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008. It participated in a regional conference on cluster munitions in Pretoria, South Africa in March 2010 and attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 as an observer, but did not make any statements.

No representatives from Libya participated in any meetings of the convention in the second half of 2011 or the first half of 2012.

Libya is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 28 April 2011, the NTC formally pledged not to use landmines.[2]

Libya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Libya is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. 

Libya possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions, but its current status and composition are unknown. Jane’s Information Group in the past listed Libya as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and RBK-500 aerial cluster bombs, again presumably of Soviet/Russian origin.[3] It also possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is also not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[4]

From the recent conflict, it is now also known that Libya has stockpiled RBK-250 cluster bombs, MAT-120 mortar projectiles with submunitions, and an unidentified type of cluster munition with dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.

In June 2011, Spain confirmed that it had transferred a total of 1,055 MAT-120 cluster munitions containing 22,155 submunitions to Libya in 2006 and 2008.[5]

Use

During the 2011 conflict, government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi used three different types of cluster munitions at locations including Ajabiya, Misrata, and in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan. NATO air strikes on a military depot at Mizdah created unexploded ordnance from munitions stored by Libya, including unexploded submunitions.

In April 2011, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and The New York Times documented the use of MAT-120 mortar cluster munitions by government forces loyal to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in residential areas of the city of Misrata.[6] The clearance agency Mines Advisory Group (MAG) estimated a dud rate of 9.5% for the MAT-120s used in Libya.[7]

In February 2012, The New York Times reported that MAG clearance staff had found the remnants of an RBK-250, an air-dropped cluster munition, and about 30 PTAB-2.5M submunitions, “some exploded, others not,” a month earlier in the desert 20 miles south of the city of Ajdabiya. Manufactured in the Soviet-era, the cluster munition was found “where journalists witnessed low-elevation airstrikes by Libyan government aircraft” in March 2011 “often against convoys and concentrations of anti-Qaddafi fighters who roamed the highway between Ajabiya and Ras Lanuf.” [8]

On 8 March 2012, Human Rights Watch found two different types of intact submunitions that had been scattered from their storage site in bunkers at Mizdah military depot, 160 kilometers south of Tripoli, during NATO air strikes in 2011. HRW found approximately 15 PTAB bomblets and about three dozen DPICM submunitions of an unidentified type.[9]

In March 2012, the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Libya reported that the same unidentified DPICM and 122mm cargo rockets used by the Libyan government were also found in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan.[10]

The European Union and at least ten States Parties and signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions condemned or expressed grave concern about the Libyan government’s use of cluster munitions in 2011.

There has been no evidence of cluster munition use in Libya by countries that were involved in the NATO military action, including by the US and other states that have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11] In its formal response to the UN Commission of Inquiry, NATO confirmed that it did not use cluster munitions in the Libya operation.[12]

Previously, Libyan forces used aerial cluster bombs, likely RBK bombs of Soviet/Russian origin, containing AO-1Sch and PTAB-2.5 submunitions, at various locations during its intervention in Chad during the 1986–1987 conflict.[13] On 25 March 1986, US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs; on the night of 14–15 April 1986, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on the airfield at Benina.[14] On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb) and an explosive ordnance disposal expert subsequently identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[15]

 



[1] At the Livingstone Conference on Cluster Munitions in April 2008, Libya endorsed the Livingstone Declaration, which called on African states to support the negotiation of a “total and immediate” prohibition on cluster munitions. At the Kampala Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2008, Libya endorsed the Kampala Action Plan, which called on all African states to sign and ratify the convention as soon as possible. For more details on Libya’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 220–221.

[2] HRW press release, “Libya: Rebels Pledge Not to Use Landmines,” 29 April 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/29/libya-rebels-pledge-not-use-landmines.

[3] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 842.

[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 320. Libya has demonstrated that it possesses at least one type of 122mm cargo rocket. HRW and The New York Times also documented the use by government forces of Type-84A scatterable antivehicle mines (made in China) delivered by 122mm rockets into the port area of Misrata on the night of 14–15 April 2011.

[5] The transfer took place before Spain instituted a moratorium on export of cluster munitions and prior to its adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Statement of Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 29 June 2011. In the statement, Spain confirmed information provided to the New York Times by the Deputy Director General for Foreign Trade of Defense Materials and Dual Use Goods, Ramon Muro Martinez, that: “One license to Lybia [sic] consisting of 5 cluster munitions for demonstration was issued in August 2006. The export took place in October 2006. There were two more licenses issued in December 2007 with a total amount of 1,050 cluster munitions. They were sent in March 2008.” C.J. Chivers, “Following Up, Part 2. Down the Rabbit Hole: Arms Exports and Qaddafi’s Cluster Bombs,” The New York Times – At War Blog, 22 June 2011.

[6] Chivers, “Qaddafi Troops Fire Cluster Bombs Into Civilian Areas,” The New York Times, 15 April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/world/africa/16libya.html?pagewanted=all; and HRW press release, “Libya: Cluster Munitions Strike Misrata,” 15 April 2011, www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/15/libya-cluster-munitions-strike-misrata.

[7] UNOHCHR, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 173, Para 664, http://bit.ly/yBvmCR.

[8] Chivers, “More Evidence of Cluster-Bomb Use Discovered in Libya,” The New York Times – At War Blog, 13 February 2012, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/more-evidence-of-cluster-bomb-use-discovered-in-libya/#.

[9] Statement by HRW, CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meeting on Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, 25 April 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/25/statement-explosive-remnants-war-libya-and-implementation-convention-conventional-we. The New York Times reporter Chivers has led an effort to identify the DPICM submunition and the type of 122mm cargo rocket that carried it found at Mizdah, which could be of China or North Korean origin, but still did not have a confirmed identification as of 1 June 2012. Chivers, “A Code, of Sorts, to the Mystery Cluster Bomb from Libya,” The New York Times – At War Blog, 16 February 2012, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/a-coda-of-sorts-to-the-mystery-cluster-bomb-from-libya/.

[10] UNOHCHR, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 168, Para 665, http://bit.ly/yBvmCR.

[11] At the outset of the conflict, the CMC urged all countries that have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions to help ensure that cluster munitions are not used by states that have not yet joined the Convention in any military action in Libya. See CMC statement, “States parties should warn against use of cluster munitions in Libya,” 18 March 2011, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=3067.

[12] NATO letter to the Commission, 15 February 2011. Cited in UNOHCHR, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 168, Para 638, http://bit.ly/yBvmCR.

[13] Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, 2007), p. 48.

[14] Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War: 1975–1986, An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 423.

[15] Daily report by Jan-Ole Robertz, EOD Technical Advisor, Countermine Libya, 27 November 2009.


Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Libya is contaminated with mines, cluster munition remnants, and a wide array of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of internal and international armed conflict in 2011, as well as earlier conflicts with neighboring countries. As of mid-2012, ERW were believed to pose the main threat to the population.[1]

Mines

Before the 2011 conflict, Libya faced contamination from mines left by the desert battles of World War II and by conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980−1987, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. In the past year, it has become apparent that mines had also been laid around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.[2]

The conflict in 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of Muammur Qaddafi was marked by use of antipersonnel and/or antivehicle mines by government and rebel forces. The only reported instance of mine use by rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.[3] The most commonly used antipersonnel mine type was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 442). Antivehicle mines used by government forces have included Chinese Type 72SP and Type 84 mines that were scattered by rockets over the port city of Misrata and Belgian PRB-M3 and PRB-M3A1 antivehicle mines, as well as minimum-metal mines. Sea mines were also used by government forces in the port of Misrata.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

The 2011 conflict saw use of at least three types of cluster munition. These included the Chinese dual-purpose Type 84 cluster munition, which also functions as an antivehicle mine, and the Spanish MAT-120, which holds 21 submunitions. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has identified Russian PATB cluster bombs[5] and international media reported the presence of a fourth cluster-munition type that has remained unidentified.[6] The extent of contamination by submunitions is unknown.

In addition to items used in hostilities, demining organizations have encountered both Type 84s and MAT-120s as a result of destruction of ammunition storage areas. “Street museums” set up by local residents in Misrata and other locations displayed cluster munitions among a wide array of other items of ordnance, but by March 2012 the UN Mine Action Service Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) reported all but one major museum in Misrata had shut down.[7]

There may also be some residual contamination from World War II. On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb). Subsequently, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expert identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[8]

Other explosive remnants of war

Libya emerged from the conflict with extensive contamination by a wide array of unexploded and abandoned ordnance, although the precise extent is unknown. Heavy contamination by unexploded or abandoned ordnance has been reported around towns that became battle grounds between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces stretching from the western Nafusa mountains to Zintan (southwest of Tripoli); in and around Misrata, Zlitan and Bani Walid (to the east and south east of Tripoli); Sirte Ras Lanuf and Brega (along the coast of the Gulf of Sidra) and further east near the town of Ajdabiya; as well as Benghazi and Tobruk (near the border with Egypt).[9]

International organizations have reported encountering air dropped bombs, 107mm (Radima), 122mm (GRAD), and 130mm rockets; surface-to-air missiles; sea mines and torpedoes as well as rocket-propelled grenades; a variety of mortar, tank, and artillery shells; and small arms and anti-aircraft ammunition.[10] International NGOs engaged in urban clearance reportedly found much less UXO in some areas (Misrata) than might have been expected from the intensity of fighting.[11]

NATO said its forces used 7,642 air-to-surface weapons during its seven-month air operation lasting until the end of October 2011[12] and in 2012 gave the UN detailed coordinates of 313 sites of possible UXO, including strikes by aircraft (303), helicopters (six), and naval warships (four), although it failed to provide details of the specific ordnance used or fuzing mechanisms and render-safe procedures.[13] EOD teams have reported clearing a number of large NATO bombs, including one of 900kg.[14]

Additional contamination resulted from air strikes on ammunition storage areas, scattering UXO over surrounding areas, and from sabotage by retreating pro-Qaddafi forces.[15] Schools and hospitals, precisely because they were not targeted by NATO, were often used by pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces, which left large amounts of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) and UXO behind when they departed.[16]

Libya’s transitional authorities and demining organizations also faced a challenge securing huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Qaddafi regime, providing a source of explosives for use in improvised devices.[17]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Authority

Ministry of Defense

Mine action center

Libyan Mine Action Center (LMAC)

International demining operators

NGO: DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group (DDG), Handicap International (HI), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

National demining operators

None

International risk education operators

FSD, Handicap International, ICRC, MAG

National risk education operators

Libyan Red Crescent Society, Aman Foundation, Boy Scouts

Under the former regime of Colonel Muammur Qaddafi, the Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defense reportedly cleared areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit is said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.[18]

As fighting between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces gathered momentum, JMACT became operational in April 2011, working in partnership with international NGOs, initially from Benghazi, but later from a main office in Tripoli with sub-offices in Benghazi and Misrata. As demining operators became established in Libya, JMACT provided coordination, directing teams to areas needing clearance and collecting operational reports from partners, including DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Handicap International (HI), Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), the ICRC, MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and UNICEF.[19]

The Libyan Mine Action Center (LMAC) was reportedly in existence as early as May 2011, comprising some personnel who reportedly had been involved previously in mine action and now were organizing the monitoring of some ammunition storage areas seized from the government.[20] After the change of regime, the Ministry of Defense formally appointed the LMAC (on a date variously reported as November or December 2011) to coordinate mine action, to support efforts to control ammunition storage areas (ASAs), and to decommission weapons.[21] Germany provided funding to support LMAC establishing a head office in Tripoli with regional branches in Benghazi, Zentan, Misrata and Sabha,[22] but mine action sector sources said the breakdown of centralized government as a result of the regime change in 2011 limited the extent of LMAC authority outside Tripoli.[23]

As of mid-2012, LMAC continued to report to the Ministry of Defense and was engaged mainly in registering and coordinating international and national operators, some operational planning and information management (including reporting on operations since March 2012), in risk education data, and in recording of ASAs. LMAC had some 15 staff in management, operations, information management, logistics, and administration.[24] However, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also declared in 2012 that they have oversight roles in mine/ERW action and the demarcation of institutional responsibilities has yet to be agreed.[25]

In mid-2012, JMACT said it worked with LMAC and the Ministry of Education to provide a coordinated response to the ERW threat by coordinating implementing partners, prioritizing clearance tasks, mobilizing resources, and liaising with “the appropriate Libyan authorities.” UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) activities included working with Libyan authorities and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) on developing management of ammunitions storage and light weapons. JMACT reported in early June 2012 that international NGOs included 66 international and 293 national staff, deploying 23 clearance teams and 29 risk education teams.[26]

Land Release

Libya did not formally report land release prior to, or during, 2011. Libyan teams and individuals are credited with having conducted most of the clearance of ERW since the start of the February revolution[27] but international operators recorded almost 20km2 of battle area clearance in 2011, most by MAG and DCA.

Survey in 2011

JMACT reported UNMAS had funded surveys “covering extensive areas previously not visited” in February and March 2012, generating more than 120 reports that would provide a more comprehensive overview of the extent and nature of contamination. JMACT reported the results were being analyzed and provided no details.[28]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2011

Humanitarian mine action in Libya in 2011 started when fighting between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces was still intensifying. Although some mine clearance occurred, the priority for all actors in 2011 was both emergency clearance of ERW in populated areas that had been the scene of battles and also the securing of AXO.

Revolutionary brigades and local populations reportedly engaged in clearing mines and ERW, but no record exists to indicate the extent of their activities.[29] Five international organizations engaged in clearance in 2011, DCA, DDG, FSD, the ICRC, and MAG, and these were joined by HI operating in Tripoli and Sirte from January 2012. The number of clearance teams rose from 10 in October 2011 to 28 in January 2012, but the number dropped after March 2012 and by June stood at 23.[30]

JMACT reported that as of the end of January 2012, its implementing partners had cleared a total of 126,155 landmines and items of UXO, clearing 60 schools and 2,624 houses.[31] Little more than a month later, in early March 2012, JMACT said its partners had cleared 159,060 items, mainly UXO and ERW, covering 63 schools and 205 farms.[32] International demining operators recorded a substantially lower level of clearance in 2011 in their reports to the Landmine Monitor (see table below). In addition, NATO member navies assisted clearing sea mines in and around the port of Misrata and trained Libyan navy personnel.[33]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2011[34]

Operator

Mined area cleared (km2)

Battle area cleared (km2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

DCA

0

3.73

0

2

1,472

89

DDG

0

0

0

0

1,076

0

FSD

0

0.77

0

0

21,583

Not reported

ICRC

0

0

0

0

1,873

29

MAG

0

15.19

43

38

35,491

62

Totals

 

19.69

43

40

61,495

180

DCA started in July 2011 with 35 operators in seven EOD teams, working initially in Misrata, then focusing on the area of Dafniya and Zlitan, and in November starting work in Bani Walid.[35] DDG, operating in Libya from the end of 2011, had four EOD teams, each with four people, working in the Sirte area and as of February/March had funding to maintain two of the teams until the end of 2012.[36]

The ICRC, present in Libya from the end of April 2011, operated two EOD teams, one in Sirte and the other in the Nafusa Mountains.[37] FSD started working in Libya in April 2011 and by the end of the year a total of 70 personnel, with EOD teams deployed in Misrata (one), Sirte (three), Benghazi and Tobruk (two each).[38]

MAG started operations in May 2011 with three multi-task teams (MTTs) conducting battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD in eastern coastal areas but then expanded its program; as of early 2012 MAG had a total of 16 international and 130 national staff, deploying nine MTTs in Zintan, Misrata, Sirte, Brega and Ajdabiya. In addition to clearance, teams worked on destroying structures and bunkers in two ASAs in Misrata and Ajdabiya. Funding available in 2012 supported operations in the Nafusa Mountains, as well as Ajdabiya, Brega, Misrata, Ras Lanuf, and Sirte.[39]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2011

Pro-Qaddafi forces used cluster munitions in a number of locations, most visibly in the port city of Misrata in April.[40] DCA reported clearance of mortar-delivered MAT-120 cluster munitions in Misrata[41] while Type-84 antivehicle submunitions were found by DCA in Dafniya and by FSD in Sirte.[42] However, submunition remnants have made up a relatively small proportion of the ERW encountered by operators (see table above).

Safety of demining personnel

Six deminer/EOD staff were reported injured in clearance operations in 2011 and one was killed in March 2012. Two of DCA’s international staff were hospitalized in November 2011 as a result of injuries suffered as they tried to defuse a Type 84 in Dafniya town.[43] An ambulance driver for MAG received minor fragmentation injuries from an unknown ERW blast at a BAC site in Ajdabiya in November 2011 and three other MAG staff members were injured in December 2011 when a fuze exploded as the team prepared a demolition pit. Two nationals sustained minor injuries and an international staff member was hospitalized but released the following day.[44]

A DCA international deminer was killed by a Type 84 submunition in Dafniya in March 2012 in the course of clearing buildings of ERW.[45]

Risk Education

Risk education (RE) started in April 2011 as a key part of the emergency response to the increased threat to civilians. Since then, JMACT partners have consistently deployed more RE teams than clearance teams. The number of RE teams increased from 25 in October 2011 to 35 by March 2012 before slipping back to 29 in June 2012. UNMAS and UNICEF provided early coordination in 2011, staging coordination meetings in September and October. The Ministry of Education appointed a focal point for RE in December.[46]

The ICRC focused on raising awareness through billboards, posters and leaflets, and on training Libyan Red Crescent volunteers in priority locations, including Nalut, Al Baida, Tobruk, Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Sirte, Misrata, Zlitan, Bani Walid, Khoms, and Tripoli. It also launched a three-week RE campaign on the radio in November 2011, with three spots each broadcast twice a day.[47]

HI, operating in Libya since April 2011, started in Benghazi before expanding to other towns, training 216 people in six priority towns as community mobilisers to raise public awareness delivering RE messages on mines, ERW and small arms and light weapons. HI also provided training and materials for NGOs in Benghazi. In the first two months of 2012, HI prepared a draft training curriculum for teachers at the request of the Ministry of Education and provided RE training for teachers. The training was mainly in Ajdabiya (26 out of 30 schools) but also Brega (four schools) and included the distribution of leaflets, posters and booklets. HI also trained Libyan scouts in Zlitan; the scouts movement was seen as an important potential network with 23 branches and 15,000 members across Libya.[48]

MAG delivered RE through community liaison officers integrated into their clearance teams who also collected information on dangerous areas and ERW casualties. It also trained community focal points in its operating areas to continue RE delivery and casualty data collection. Between July and December, MAG ran a project for Libyan refugees in Tunisia and returnees in Western Libya, later extended to Sirte.[49] FSD also started RE for refugees in Tunisia, moving the program later to Jadu in the Nafusa mountains. It also supported 14 Libya Red Crescent volunteers in Sirte, starting a campaign in December 2011 to distribute leaflets house-to-house and at busy locations in the town.[50]

The Croatian Mine Action Center provided training for a Libyan NGO, Aman Foundation, operating in Tripoli and Misrata, but was constrained by lack of funding.[51]

 



[2] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,”19 July 2011.

[3] Ibid.; and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[4] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, Communications Officer, JMACT, Tripoli, 20 March 2012; HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,”19 July 2011; Colin King, “Landmines in Libya,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011; Christopher John Chivers, “Land Mines Descend on Misrata’s Port, Endangering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” New York Times, 6 May 2011.

[5] Email from Nina Seecharan, Desk Officer for Iraq, Lebanon and Libya, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[6] Christopher John Chivers, “Name the Cluster Bomb, an Update,” New York Times, 2 February 2012.

[7] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[8] Daily report by Jan-Ole Robertz, EOD Technical Advisor, Countermine Libya, 27 November 2009.

[10] See, for example, JMACT Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011; “Libya fails to secure arms depots,” HRW, 9 September 2011; email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[11] Robert Keeley, “Urban land release in Libya: BAC and Land Release in Urban Areas,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 16.2, Summer 2012, p. 35.

[12] HRW, “Unacknowledged deaths,” 14 May 2012, p. 6. NATO reported that bombs of 500lb or less accounted for 82% of the ordnance used, 500 to 1,000lb bombs for over 7%, and 1,000 to 2,000lbs for about 10%.

[13] C. J. Chivers, “List of Unexploded Arms in Libya Is Seen as Limited,” The New York Times, 25 June 2012.

[14] JMACT, Weekly Report #20, 10 October 2011; email from Jenny Reeves, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[15] JMACT, Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011.

[16] Andy Smith, “UNMAS in Libya, another critical failure,” Landmines and Humanitarian Mine Action (website), updated July 2012.

[17] Interview with Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director, HRW, Geneva, 4 January 2012; Adrian King, “Conflict in Libya and the Future Risk to the Demining Community,” Journal of Mine Action. Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[18] Interview with Dr. Taher Siala, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, in Tripoli, 12 May 2005.

[19] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012; and interview with Max Dyck, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.

[20] Andy Smith, “UNMAS in Libya – another critical failure”, Landmines and Humanitarian Action, updated July 2012.

[21] Ibid.; and email from Stephen Bryant, Programme Manager, NPA, Libya, 23 July 2012.

[22]Libya: Securing weapons and destroying land mines, munitions and explosive remnants of war,” German Federal Foreign Office website, last updated 30 December 2011.

[23] Telephone interview with international mine action operator in Libya requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.

[24] Email from Stephen Bryant, NPA, Libya, 23 July 2012.

[25] Telephone interviews with international mine action sources, Tripoli, 1−5 August 2012.

[27] Emails from, and telephone interviews with international mine action sources, Tripoli, 1−5 August 2012.

[28] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[29] See, for example, comments by Ian Martin, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, A visit to Brega and Ajdabiya,” UNSMILPICS, 21 March 2012; Robert Keeley, “Urban land release in Libya: BAC and Land Release in Urban Areas,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 16.2, Summer 2012, p. 35.

[32] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[33] See, for example, “NATO and Libya – Mine clearance in and around the port of Misrata,”, natochannel.tv, 29 July 2011; Oliver Holmes, “French warships in Libya to train navy, demine oil ports,” Reuters, 31 January 2012.

[34] Emails from Knut Furunes, Program Manager Libya, DCA, 19 March 2012; Paul McCarthy, Operations Manager Tripoli/Sirte, DDG, 24 February 2012; Tony Fish, Program Manager, FSD, 2 August 2012; Jenny Reeves, ICRC, 22 February 2012; and Nina Seecharan, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[35] Email from Knut Furunes, DCA, 19 March 2012.

[36] Email from Paul McCarthy, DDG, 24 February 2012.

[37] Email from Jenny Reeves, ICRC, 22 February 2012.

[38] Email from Tony Fish, FSD, 2 August 2012.

[39] Email from Nina Seecharan, Desk Officer Iraq, Lebanon and Libya, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[40] Christopher John Chivers, “Landmines Descend on Misurata’s Port, Endangering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” The New York Times, 6 May 2011; Libya: cluster munitions strike Misrata,” HRW, 15 April 2011.

[41] Andy Mattingly, “DCA resumes clearance work in Libya,” DCA website, 9 September 2011.

[42] Marcus Rhinelander, “Deadly cluster bomb thought to have killed Estonian mine expert,” Libya Herald, 11 March 2012.

[43] Emails from Knut Furunes, DCA, 19 March 2012; and Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[44] Emails from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 5 March 2012; and Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[45]DCA staff killed in explosion in Libya,” DCA website, 5 March 2012; email from Richard McCormack, Head of Mine Action Unit, DCA, 3 August 2012.

[46] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, Tripoli, 20 March 2012.

[47] Email from Jenny Reeves, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[48]Libya, Explosive Remnants of War and Small Arms: A New Challenge for Libya,” HI, 2 February 2012; “Handicap International Final Report for UNICEF,” HI, undated but 2012; and email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012.

[49] Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 5 March 2012.

[50] Email from Tony Fish, FSD, 2 August 2012.

[51] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, Tripoli, 20 March 2012.


Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2011

Unknown, many thousands

Casualties in 2011

184 (2010: 1)

2011 casualties by outcome

47 killed; 131 injured; 6 unknown (2010: 1 injured)

2011 casualties by device type

7 antipersonnel mines; 8 antivehicle mines; 169 ERW

In 2011, the Monitor identified 184 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Libya.[1] All identified casualties occurred after 17 February, the start of the 2011 armed conflict in Libya. Children made up 64% (76 of 119) of all civilian casualties in cases in which the age was known. Most child casualties were boys (56); there were also 13 casualties among girls.[2] While the majority of adult casualties were men, there were at least seven women casualties. There were two casualties among Pakistani nationals, both adult males.

The vast majority of casualties were civilians: 124 of 140 for which data on civilian or military status was available. There were also 12 casualties among military personnel. There were four casualties among deminers in just two separate accidents. Deminer casualties included two British deminers.[3]

The total number of casualties in Libya is not known; all available estimates pre-date the 2011 conflict, when many new casualties occurred. The Libyan Demining Association (LDA)[4] and the Libyan Civil Defense Department had registered 1,852 mine casualties by the end of 2006. Previous estimates were approximately 12,000, with the Libyan police reporting 11,845 casualties between 1940 and 1995 (6,749 killed; 5,096 injured) and the Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies reporting 12,258 (3,874 killed; 8,384 injured) between 1952 and 1975.[5]

Cluster munition casualties

The number of cluster munition casualties in Libya is not known. There was no available information on casualties during the cluster munition strikes which occurred in 2011. Media reports identified four casualties from unexploded submunitions between April and June 2011, three in Ajdabiya, Al Wahat, and one in Misrata.[6] However, it was not possible to distinguish the devices that caused these casualties from other types of ERW. Two of the four reported submunition casualties, boys of 10 and 15 years old who were injured in Ajdabiya, were also later reported to have been injured by a hand grenade.[7] The explosive item type of the remaining two casualties could not be confirmed and were recorded as ERW casualties by the Libyan Mine Action Center (LMAC).[8]

Victim Assistance

Libya is responsible for survivors of landmines and other types of ERW. The total number of survivors is unknown. Outdated estimates ranged from 5,000 to 8,000 survivors through 1995. [9]

Victim assistance since 1999[10]

Throughout the period since 1999, mine/ERW survivors were able to receive free medical care through the reasonably well-developed Libyan health care system. Between 2000 and 2008, Italy provided support through building renovations, training and planning to the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center, the only physical rehabilitation center in the country. However, during the period, the center was unable to operate at full capacity due to a lack of qualified staff, materials, and a data management system. When Italy withdrew support in 2008, the center stopped producing prosthetics and orthotics.

There was no information available on economic and social inclusion initiatives or psychological support to survivors during the period. At several Meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Libya called on countries who had used mines in Libya to “provide…assistance to the victims, and to rehabilitate them.”[11]

Victim assistance in 2011

All victim assistance, but most especially emergency and ongoing medical care, was disrupted by the armed conflict that started in February 2011. International organizations responded to this disruption and assisted hospitals to resume care to the increasing numbers of new mine/ERW survivors. In August 2011, the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center resumed production of prosthetics and orthotics and became the only fully functioning prosthetics and orthotics center in the country. No victim assistance coordination or planning was possible in 2011; national and international efforts were focused on providing immediate relief to the large numbers of war-wounded, including mine/ERW survivors.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2011, the government was not able to differentiate the needs of mine/ERW survivors from the needs of all conflict victims in the country.[12]

Victim assistance coordination[13]

Government coordinating body/focal point

Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of Culture and Civil Society (MCCS)

Coordinating mechanism

None

Plan

None

On 1 December 2011, the LMAC was established within the Ministry of Defense to manage all mine action activities in the country.[14] Responsibility for victim assistance lay with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society (MCCS).[15] There was no coordination of victim assistance during the year nor was there a national plan for victim assistance.

At the end of 2011, the MoH requested support from the World Health Organization (WHO) to develop a plan for the reconstruction of the Libyan health system, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders.[16] There was no information available on whether mine/ERW survivors, their representative organizations or disabled persons organizations would participate in this planning process.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[17]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2011

Ministry of Social Affairs

Government

Managed Benghazi Rehabilitation Center

Resumed prosthetics production in August, after a hiatus of three years

Ministry of Health

Government

Managed Janzour Rehabilitation Centre in Tripoli

Ongoing basic rehabilitation services

Merlin

International NGO

Health care and physical rehabilitation at Nalut Hospital, Nafusa mountains

Began in April

Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF)

International NGO

Emergency surgeries for war wounded, including mine/ERW survivors, basic medical care, psychological support and training in psychological care for health professionals, in Misrata, Benghazi, Tripoli, Zintan and Yefren

Began in February in Misrata, expanded services during the year

International Medical Corps (IMC)

International NGO

Basic medical care, psychological support, strengthening physical rehabilitation and community outreach in Benghazi

Began in February, increased focus on physical rehabilitation by end of year

International Trust Fund: Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

International Organization

Physical rehabilitation through the University Rehabilitation Institute of Slovenia

Support provided in December

ICRC

International Organization

War surgery training, evacuation of mine/ERW survivors and other war wounded, training and materials to Benghazi Rehabilitation Center to resume prosthetics production

Established ICRC delegation in February; began support for Benghazi Rehabilitation Center in August

Prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2011, Libya had a well-functioning medical system. The availability of medical care declined significantly during the year as thousands of medical professionals working in Libya returned to their countries of origin, and power cuts, lack of funding and a lack of medical supplies prevented the remaining medical professionals from responding to the increased demand for emergency care from mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the conflict.[18] Medical professionals lacked experience in addressing traumatic war injuries, such as those caused by mines/ERW.[19] The ICRC began evacuating mine/ERW survivors to ensure access to emergency medical care, and also trained medical professionals in war surgery.[20] Also, the WHO and Doctors Without Borders (Médecins sans Frontières, MSF) brought teams of medical professionals to increase the capacity for emergency medical care.[21] All three organizations provided emergency medical supplies to treat the injuries of mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the armed conflict. By the end of 2011, the MoH began to plan for the reconstruction of the health care system with a focus on ensuring basic medical care throughout the country, including in rural and remote areas.[22]

Prior to the conflict, there were no physical rehabilitation centers capable of producing, fitting and maintaining prosthetics and orthotics. The only such center, the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center, ceased producing prosthetics in 2008. Until August 2011, mine/ERW survivors had to be sent outside the country for physical rehabilitation. In August, the ICRC began providing support to the center, supplying materials and training, to resume prosthetics services. Between August and December, 22% of the people who received prosthetics at the center were mine/ERW survivors.[23]

The International Medical Corps (IMC) supported the strengthening of physical rehabilitation at the center and developed a community and mobile outreach service to increase access.[24] Merlin, an international organization, provided physical rehabilitation services to mine/ERW and other war victims in the Nefusa mountains.[25] Through an agreement between the MoH and the International Trust Fund: Enhancing Human Security (ITF), a group of mine/ERW survivors received comprehensive rehabilitation in Slovenia.[26] In a second project that began in January 2012, the ITF agreed to provide additional immediate rehabilitation treatment for mine/ERW survivors outside Libya and to strengthen rehabilitation capacities in Libya.[27]

In early 2011, Libya had very few psychologists and other mental health professionals.[28] Psychologists lacked training and experience in addressing trauma related to war and explosive-related injuries. In June, MSF established a network of psychologists in Misrata, provided training in war trauma and therapeutic tools and supported their efforts through counsel members of the community.[29] IMC established a mental health and psychosocial support program in Benghazi, Misrata and Sirte to increase access to war trauma counseling and develop long-term mental health capacity in the country.[30]

There was no information available on economic inclusion initiatives for mine/ERW survivors in 2011.

The rights of persons with disabilities were protected by a law passed by the previous government.[31] As of the end of 2011, the interim government had not made any changes to existing disability laws or policies. Few public buildings were accessible to persons with disabilities.[32]

Libya signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 1 May 2008.

 



[1] Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by: emails from Jennifer Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 16 July 2012; Abdulmonem Alaiwan, Director, Libyan Mine Action Center (LMAC), 17 June 2012; Alexandra Arango, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 20 March 2012; Teresa Tavares, Risk Education Project Manager, Handicap International (HI), 16 March 2012; Jonas Herzog, IMSMA Officer, Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT), 8 March 2012; and media monitoring 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011.

[2] The gender of seven child casualties was not known.

[3]Explosives experts injured disarming mines,” British Forces News, 3 November 2011, www.bfbs.com/news/worldwide/explosives-experts-injured-disarming-mines-53101.html, accessed 18 July 2012.

[4] Prior to February 2011, the LDA had been part of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF), and was formerly known as the Anti-Mines Association.

[5] Ahmed Besharah, “World War II mines planted in Libya and its socio-economic impact,” Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies, Tripoli, 1995, p.153.

[6] UNICEF, “Libya: Protecting children from unexploded ordnance,” Misrata, 6 June 2011, www.unicef.org.au/Discover/Field-Stories/May-2011/Libya--Protecting-children-from-unexploded-ordnanc.aspx, accessed 15 August 2011; Ruth Sherlock, “Unlucky camel finds Libya's largest minefield,” Al Jazeera, 28 June 2011, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162892022264206.html, accessed 15 August 2011; email from James Wheeler, Photographer, 10 August 2011; and UNICEF, “UNICEF Situation Report # 19 - Sub-regional Libya crisis,” 29 June 2011, www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Document1_18.pdf, accessed 15 August 2011.

[7] UNICEF, “Libya: Protecting children from unexploded ordnance,” Misrata, 6 June 2011, www.unicef.org.au/Discover/Field-Stories/May-2011/Libya--Protecting-children-from-unexploded-ordnanc.aspx, accessed 15 August 2011.

[8] Casualty data provided via emails from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012; and Jennifer Reeves, ICRC, 16 July 2012.

[9] Ahmed Besharah, “World War II mines planted in Libya and its socio-economic impact,” Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies, Tripoli, 1995, p.153.

[10] See previous Libya country profiles at the Monitor, www.the-monitor.org.

[11] Statement of Libya, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007; and statement of Libya, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[12] Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012.

[13] Ibid.

[14] UNMAS, “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=109, accessed 18 July 2012.

[15] Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012.

[16] WHO, “Rebuilding the Libyan health system, post-revolution,” February 2012, www.who.int/features/2012/libya_health_system/en/index.html, accessed 17 July 2012.

[17] Following the start of conflict in February 2011, numerous international organizations began providing humanitarian relief to the Libyan population. The organizations listed here are those whose response included a focus on the care and rehabilitation of injuries from explosive weapons such as mines and ERW. Merlin, “Extending our reach in Libya,” 6 September 2011, www.merlin.org.uk/extending-our-reach-libya, accessed 19 July 2012; Catriona Davis, “Libyan children pay high price for curiosity over weapons,” CNN, 4 January 2012, www.edition.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/africa/libya-gun-accidents/, accessed 19 July 2012; IMC, “Our work in Libya,” www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/where-we-work/middle-east/libya/, accessed 18 July 2012; MSF, “Libya: An Update on MSF Activities Amidst the Ongoing War,” 18 August 2011, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5495&cat=field-news, accessed 18 July 2012; MSF, “Libya: A Precarious Situation for Vulnerable Populations,” 23 March 2012, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5844&cat=field-news, accessed 18 July 2012; ICRC, “Annual Report 2011,” May 2012, Geneva, pp. 138-140; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2011,” May 2012, Geneva, p. 36.

[18] “Overstretched health service needs sustained support,” IRIN News (Benghazi), 1 September 2011, www.irinnews.org/Report/93627/LIBYA-Overstretched-health-service-needs-sustained-support, accessed 18 July 2012; and WHO, “Libya Crisis Update,” August 2011.

[19] ICRC, “Annual Report 2011,” May 2012, Geneva, pp. 138-140; and “Overstretched health service needs sustained support,” IRIN News (Benghazi), 1 September 2011, www.irinnews.org/Report/93627/LIBYA-Overstretched-health-service-needs-sustained-support, accessed 18 July 2012.

[20] ICRC, “Annual Report 2011,” May 2012, Geneva, pp. 138-140.

[21] WHO, “Libya Crisis Update,” August 2011; MSF, “Libya: A Precarious Situation for Vulnerable Populations,” 23 March 2012, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5844&cat=field-news, accessed 18 July 2012.

[22] WHO, “Rebuilding the Libyan health system, post-revolution,” February 2012, www.who.int/features/2012/libya_health_system/en/index.html, accessed 17 July 2012.

[23] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2011,” May 2012, Geneva, p. 36.

[24] IMC, “Our work in Libya,” www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/where-we-work/middle-east/libya/, accessed 18 July 2012.

[25] Merlin, “Extending our reach in Libya,” 6 September 2011, www.merlin.org.uk/extending-our-reach-libya, accessed 19 July 2012.

[26] International Trust Fund: Enhancing Human Security (ITF, formerly International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance), “ITF Being Successful in Providing Support to Libya,” 1 December 2011, www.itf-fund.si/News/ITF_Being_Successful_in_Providing_Support_to_Libya_388.aspx, accessed 20 July 2012.

[27] ITF, “Memorandum of Understanding Signed with Libyan Ministry for War Wounded, Martyrs and Missing Persons,” 20 January 2012, www.itf-fund.si, accessed 20 July 2012.

[28] WHO, “Libya Crisis Update,” August 2011.

[29] MSF, “Libya: MSF Helps Build Psychological Network In Misrata,” 14 July 2011, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=5440&cat=field-news, accessed 17 July 2012.

[30] IMC, “Our work in Libya,” www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/where-we-work/middle-east/libya/; and IMC, “Q&A: Addressing the Mental Health Consequences of War in Libya,” 29 March 2012, www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/latest-news/qa-addressing-the-mental-health-consequences-of-war-in-libya/, accessed 17 July 2012.

[31] US Department of State, “2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya,” Washington, DC, 24 May 2012.

[32] Ibid.


Last Updated: 19 September 2012

Support for Mine Action

Support for Mine Action

In response to the conflict in Libya that led to the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi as well as to the discovery of large weapon and ammunition storage facilities that included antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, the international community provided more than US$19 million in 2011 from 15 donors,[1] including South Korea and Romania. Of this amount, donors designated more than $16 million to address the presence of unexploded submunitions, though ultimately most of the funds were used to clear all types of ERW and landmines.

During the conflict, government forces loyal to Gaddafi used three different types of cluster munitions at locations including Ajabiya, Misrata, and in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan. NATO air strikes on a military depot at Mizdah created unexploded ordnance from munitions stored by Libya, including unexploded submunitions. Media reports and Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented finding cluster munition remnants in residential areas of the city of Misrata and in the desert 20 miles south of the city of Ajdabiya.[2] It was reported, however, that only 184 submunitions were found in 2011.[3]

The Libyan Ministry of Health contributed US$459,000 to the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security to provide for rehabilitation of 25 amputees at the University Rehabilitation Institute (URI) in Ljubljana and for the URI to assess rehabilitation capacity in Tripoli and Benghazi.[4]

International contributions: 2011[5]

Donor

Sector

Amount

Amount (US$)

Australia

Clearance/risk education

A$3,500,000

3,616,200

US

Clearance

$3,000,000

3,000,000

Canada

Clearance

C$2,200,000

2,225,144

European Commission

Clearance, risk education

€ 1,470,000

2,047,857

Netherlands

Clearance

€ 1,420,000

1,978,202

Denmark

Clearance

DKK9,000,000

1,681,143

Italy

Clearance

€ 950,000

1,323,445

UK

Clearance

£548,269

879,588

Spain

Clearance

€ 550,000

766,205

Germany

Clearance, risk education, stockpile

€ 435,404

606,561

Austria

Victim assistance

€ 200,000

278,620

Switzerland

Clearance

CHF232,000

261,792

Sweden

Clearance

SEK1,020,000

157,218

Romania

Clearance

US$117,369

117,369

South Korea

Clearance

US$100,000

100,000

Total

19,039,344

 

 



[1] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Christine Pahlman, Mine Action Coordinator, AusAID, 24 April 2012;

and from Wolfgang Bányai, Unit for Arms Control and Disarmament in the framework of the UN, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria, 1 March 2012; Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2012; Response to Monitor questionnaire from Katrine Joensen, Head of Section, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 1 May 2012; email from Carolin J. Thielking, Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, European External Action Service, European Commission, 15 April 2012; Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Alessandro Pirrone, Emergency Response Desk Officer, Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Emergency Office, Italy, 21 March 2012; by Claudia Moser, Section for Multilateral Peace Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 19 June 2012; and by Maria Linderyd Linder, Deputy Director, Head of Section, Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 24 April 2012; email from Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Assistant, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UN Mine Action Service, 30 May 2012; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2011,” Washington, DC, July 2012; and Spain Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, March 2012; ITF, “Donors: Korea.”

[2] See Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Libya: Cluster Munition Ban Policy, updated 31 July 2012.

[3] See Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Libya: Mine Action.”

[4] ITF, “2011 Annual Report,” pp. 110–111, www.itf-fund.si/Documents/Info/Annual_Reports_53.aspx.

[5] Australia average exchange rate for 2011: A$1 = US$1.0332. Canada average exchange rate for 2011: C$1 = 0.9887. Denmark average exchange rate for 2011: DKK5.3535 = US$1. Euro average exchange rate for 2011: €1 = US$1.3931. Sweden average exchange rate for 2011: SEK6.4878 = US$1. Switzerland average exchange rate for 2011: CHF0.8862 = US$1. UK average exchange rate for 2011: £1 = US$1.6043. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.