Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar[1] has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 30 March 2011, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta that ruled the country since 1988, dissolved and handed power to a new government dominated by the military-sponsored Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP).[2]  

Myanmar was one of 17 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/29 on 2 December 2011, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on similar annual resolutions since 1997.

In July 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs U Wunna Maung Lwin told the president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that Myanmar was considering accession to the Mine Ban Treaty as part of its state reforms. The treaty’s Implementation Support Unit also reported that the minister said his government is no longer using landmines and is pursuing a peace pact with non-state armed groups which would include banning the weapon.[3]

Myanmar attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh in November–December 2011, making a statement at a treaty meeting for the first time.[4] Myanmar previously attended meetings of States Parties in 2003 and in 2006. It has never attended an intersessional meeting of the convention. It made one of its most detailed statements on the mine ban at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South East Asia in April 2009.[5]

In February 2012, during visits by government delegations from Norway and Luxembourg, President Thein Sein requested assistance for mine clearance. This was the first time that Myanmar requested bilateral assistance for mine action.[6] According to the government-owned New Light of Myanmar, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed the desire to assist in mine clearance through cooperation with the UN Development Program.[7]

The landmine issue was also raised in Myanmar’s national parliament and in the legislatures of some constituent states. In February 2012, in the Amyotha Hluttaw (the upper house of parliament), members U Bo Yel of Kayah/Karenni State, U Mahn Kan Nyunt of Kayin/Karen State, and U Hla Swe of Magway Division proposed that mine clearance should be undertaken in support of peace talks occurring in ethnic areas, which could then be followed up by other development activities to improve health, education and livelihood. The proposal was adopted during that session of parliament but it is unclear what the decision means in practical terms.[8]

On 10 February 2012, a Kayah State member of parliament raised a question in the Kayah State Parliament on behalf of constituents in six villages, all of whom are currently residing in Myaingbwe as internally displaced people. The member asked when and how the landmines in those villages could be removed so that his constituents could return to their homes. On 23 February, the State Minister of Security and Border Affairs stated that the landmines were in an area controlled by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and that the Myanmar Army (commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym, Tatmadaw) had not laid mines there. The minister suggested that since the landmines must have been placed by the DKBA, the DKBA could ask for assistance from the government to remove the landmines.[9]

In September 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar again urged Myanmar to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. He noted that he continues to receive disturbing reports of landmine use by both the government and non-state armed groups, and subsequent casualties throughout the country, and requested that the government of Myanmar “work with international organizations to develop a comprehensive plan to end the use of landmines and to address their legacy, including the systematic removal of mines and rehabilitation of victims.”[10] In August 2011, Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana met with Union Minister for Defense Major General Hla Min and recommended that the Tatmadaw avoid landmine use. The Defense Minister stated it was insurgents who used landmines since they had no strength to face the Tatmadaw.[11]

In March 2011, the chair of the National Democratic Force (NDF) informed the ICBL that his party’s policy was supportive of the mine ban, and that the NDF would raise the issue in parliament.[12] In February 2011, a former commander-in-chief of the army stated to the ICBL “Mines must be banned according to both humanitarianism and religion in a civilized world.”[13] Also in February 2011, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, now a member of parliament, called on all combatants to “cease the way of mines” and all groups to “start to ban landmines in their operations without waiting for their opponent to start to do it.”[14]

The Halt Mine Use in Burma/Myanmar campaign, which was launched by the ICBL in 2003, distributed 1,500 copies of the Burmese-language translation of the Myanmar Country Profile for 2011. The Monitor cooperated with the UN Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) in Yangon to produce an updated map of townships with identified mine contamination.[15]

Myanmar is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Myanmar acceded to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in December 2011.

Use

Since the publication of its first report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the extensive use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and by non-state armed groups (NSAG) in many areas of Burma/Myanmar. During this reporting period (from mid-2011 to mid-2012) however, information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of incidence of new mine use and what use there is occurs in more limited geographic areas. It is unclear whether this is the beginning of a trend resulting from reforms occurring inside the country or other factors. One possibly positive step occurred in July 2012 when Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin claimed that government forces are no longer using landmines.[16]

In summary, there is only a single allegation of mine use by the Tatmadaw in Kachin State in October 2011, and the apparent use of mines into late 2011 by a new actor, former opposition combatants who have now been formed into government-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF). There are no reports in 2012 concerning mine use by the Tatmadaw.  Additionally, reports of mine use by opposition NSAG have diminished in the reporting period, with the only incidents of new use emerging from Kachin and Karen states. One troublesome trend observed is the use of, or fabrication of improvised mines by civilians.

Government Forces

Units of Myanmar’s army have laid mines in numerous parts of the country every year since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. The only allegation of use of antipersonnel mines by the Tatmadaw, in 2011, was in Kachin State, where Tatmadaw units were accused of laying mines in their armed conflict with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Human Rights Watch reported that the KIA encountered mines laid by the Myanmar army in Momauk township in October 2011.[17]

In March 2012, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) called for mine risk education for people in camps due to reports of landmines in their villages of origin in Kachin State laid during armed conflict.[18] In December 2011, the newly formed Myanmar National Human Rights Commission issued a report on investigations in Kachin State which stated, “The Commission urges the avoidance of the use of landmines which cause grievous harm to innocent civilians.”[19] This was the first time an entity of government, albeit civilian and ostensibly independent, called for a halt to use of landmines. Additionally, in July 2011, the KIA claimed to have seized landmines from captured Tatmadaw soldiers.[20]

Border Guard Forces

The government demanded that all ethnic armed groups transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF)[21] under the command of the Tatmadaw prior to the October 2010 election. Some armed groups did so. Although BGF are required to be under the control of the regional Tatmadaw commander, they maintain the force structures and areas of operation they had previously as an armed group. It is not clear how often BGF units are operate under Tatmadaw instructions or undertake independent activities. The newly organized BGF appear to have been using antipersonnel mines since that time.

On 3 January 2012, the local NGO the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) reported that BGF forces had told the villagers of Pra Day Mu Village, Hpapun Township, not to return to their village because of landmines the BGF had laid there.[22]

In October 2011, according to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), a BGF unit laid mines near fields in Myawaddy Township to interdict movement by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). One villager serving in the BGF stepped on one of the BGF-laid mines. The BGF reportedly stated that they were under orders to lay 500 mines in the area.[23]

In September 2011, the BGF reportedly laid mines in Htee Klay, Noh Kay, and T’poh Kyaw village tracts of Hpa-an Township. They also are alleged to have forced villagers to carry the mines as porters when they did so. Several farm animals were also killed by the mines.[24] Villagers in Myawaddy Township also stated that both the KNLA and the BGF were laying mines in the area in September.[25]

In August 2011, villagers stated that the BGF laid landmines in eastern Hpapun Township, leading to the deaths of at least four civilians, and that the villagers had been forced to be guides and clear mines for the BGF. The villagers state that the BGF laid 200-300 mines in the area.[26]

In January 2011, a unit of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army which had transformed into a BGF unit in southwest Hpapun Township was rotated out of the area, but it left behind mines it laid at the slope of a hill to prevent access to a gold mine. The mines have prohibited access to fields of local farmers.[27]

Use by non-state armed groups

At least 17 NSAG have used antipersonnel mines since 1999. However, some of these groups have ceased to exist or no longer use mines. No armed group has renounced antipersonnel mine use in the last five years. Previously some armed groups unilaterally renounced the use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment administered by the Swiss NGO Geneva Call.[28] In March 2012, Geneva Call held a workshop on humanitarian mine action with the KNLA.[29]

The government announced its intention to seek peace agreements with armed groups during 2011. In November 2011, it met with four anti-government armed groups to launch discussions on a peace settlement. Since that time, several meetings have been held. The need for mine clearance has been mentioned in some of these meetings. And, as noted above, in July 2012, the foreign minister said that the government is pursuing peace agreements with all ethnic armed groups, which he stated would include banning mine use.[30] However, a halt on new mine use has not been formally adopted by any side as part of a ceasefire as of 1 September 2012. Conflict, including mine warfare, by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and the use of mines in conflicts between different NSAG in Karen State has continued. For example, in April 2012 villagers in Myawaddy Township of Karen State stated to the KHRG that the KNLA was using mines near their villages.[31]

In October 2010, the KIA released a statement that warned the public of mines laid as a result of increased tensions over the KIA’s refusal to transform into a BGF under central military command.[32] In May 2011, state media reported the seizure by the army of 30 home-made antipersonnel mines in the possession of a member of the KIA in Myitkyina Township.[33] In October and December 2011, the government claimed to have seized 17 mines of an unknown type among other weapons from the KIA during operations.[34] State media also reported the recovery of mines during the surrender of members of the Shan State Army (SSA) and the KNLA in late 2011.[35]

Civilian mine use

In some eastern zones of the country, there have been reports of use of mines by ordinary citizens and village guard groups. The KHRG has reported some use of antipersonnel mines by ordinary villagers, ostensibly to prevent the Tatmadaw’s entry into their villages. This practice is especially prevalent in four village tracts of northern Hpapun Township. Villagers in this area have stated their desire for access to mines, according to the KHRG. Villagers have stated that the KNLA has provided them with materials for mines and instructions for mine construction, as well as some completed mines, but not enough for their needs. The KHRG attributes use of mines by villages in this particular area to the fact that they are surrounded on all sides by Tatmadaw military camps and have no other areas to which they can flee. The KHRG notes that in other areas, villagers are more likely to see mine use by any party as a threat to their well-being.

In March 2011, one villager in Ler Muh Bplaw village tract, in Hpapun Township, informed the KHRG that the villagers use mines in order to facilitate farming near the front line, close to Tatmadaw camps. “If the SPDC (Tatmadaw) soldiers step on a landmine when they come, they will go back after they were hit by the mine, or we can turn back [flee]. We do it for alertness.” When asked how many mines they had laid in that area the villagers replied “over a hundred.” Another villager, from the same village, stepped on a mine laid by the civilian village guards. He stated, “I went back and farmed my hill field at the front line and stepped on a landmine. I was hit by our people’s landmine. Not an SPDC Army landmine.”[36] In October 2011, a villager in Hpapun Township described to KHRG how they manufactured landmines from white and black gunpowder, but obtained detonators from others, in order to use the mines to prevent access by the  Tatmadaw to their village.[37]

Production, stockpiling, and transfer

Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Ka Pa Sa), a state enterprise at Ngyaung Chay Dauk in western Pegu (Bago) division, produces fragmentation and blast antipersonnel mines, including a non-detectable variety.[38] Authorities in Myanmar have not provided any information on the types and quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The Monitor has previously reported that, in addition to domestic production, Myanmar has obtained and used antipersonnel mines of Chinese, Indian, Italian, Soviet, and United States manufacture, as well as some mines whose origin has not been unidentified.[39] Myanmar is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines.[40]

Non-state armed group production, transfer, and stockpiling

The KIO, KNLA, DKBA, Karenni Army, and the United Wa State Army have produced blast and fragmentation mines. Some also make Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, mines with antihandling fuzes, and explosive booby-traps. All units of the KNLA are reportedly able to manufacture and deploy bounding mines after training by a foreign technician.[41] Armed groups in Myanmar have also acquired mines by removing mines laid by others, seizing Tatmadaw stocks, and obtaining mines from the clandestine arms market.[42] Although some former combatants have non-hostility pacts with the ruling authorities, they have not disarmed and some still possess antipersonnel mines.[43] In October 2011, the authorities announced that they had recovered landmines among other weapons in operations against the KIA.[44]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Mines are believed to be concentrated on Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh and Thailand, but are a particular threat in eastern parts of the country as a result of decades of post-independence struggles for autonomy by ethnic minorities. Some 47 townships in Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, as well as in Pegu (Bago) and Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) divisions[1] suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from antipersonnel mines. Karen (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are suspected to contain the heaviest mine contamination and have the highest number of recorded victims. The Monitor has also received reports of previously unknown suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in townships on the Indian border of Chin state.[2]

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but the Monitor identified SHAs in the following divisions and townships:

·         Karenni state: all seven townships;

·         Karen state: all seven townships;

·         Kachin state: Mansi, Mogaung, Momauk, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw;

·         Mon state: Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye;

·         Pegu division: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin and Taungoo;

·         Rakhine state: Maungdaw;

·         Shan state: Hopong, Hsihseng, Langkho, Mawkmai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan Tachileik, Nanhkan, Yaksawk, and Ywangan;

·         Tenasserim division: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung and Yebyu; and

·         Chin state.

Explosive remnants of war

Myanmar is also affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including mortars, grenades, artillery and ordnance dating back to World War II,[3] but the location or full extent of such contamination is not known. There have been no reports of cluster munition remnants.

Mine Action Program

Myanmar does not have a national mine action program, but as a result of reforms initiated by the government in the past year, ministers have engaged with local and international humanitarian agencies on developing mine action.

The UN Protection working group, chaired by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), created a subgroup focused on the threat of antipersonnel mines in 2009, but in the absence of willingness on the part of the military government to permit any form of mine action this remained inactive. In March 2012, the group decided to reconvene to explore new possibilities for risk education following peace talks between the government and ethnic minority armed groups.[4]

International demining organizations, including DanChurchAid (DCA), HALO Trust, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), pursued contacts with the government in 2012 to explore possibilities for conducting survey and clearance, but as of June 2012 had not reached the point of establishing formal programs in Myanmar.[5]

A proposal by Norway to support resettlement of communities displaced by conflict, including non-technical survey of SHAs, was agreed by Minister of Railways Aung Min in April 2012.[6] Under that agreement, Norwegian People’s Aid conducted a three-day non-technical assessment of the pilot area of Kuyak Kyi in Bago Division in May 2012 confirming that areas considered for resettlement were affected by mines. As of June 2012, NPA was awaiting permission to conduct a more detailed non-technical survey of the area.[7] NPA had established an office in Yangon due to be staffed full-time from July 2012 and appointed an operations officer due to take up the post in September 2012.[8]

The State Minister for Border Affairs, responding to a parliamentary question submitted by an MP from Kayin/Karen State on clearing mines from six villages in his constituency, said in February 2012 that since the six villages were in an area under the control of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the DKBA would remove the mines, but that the Army was available for assistance if requested.[9]

Mine clearance in 2011

Sporadic mine removal has been reported in recent years by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s army), villagers, and ethnic minority organizations. Child soldiers in the Tatmadaw interviewed in 2011 said that all soldiers were trained to handle mines and that they witnessed many mine casualties in Bago Division and Mon and Shan States.[10]

The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) include a course on mine identification and emergency clearance procedures for their relief teams. Mines encountered on their missions have either been removed by FBR personnel, who turn them over to anti-government militias, or are removed by militia members.[11] FBR reported that two Karenni Army soldiers were killed on 2 April 2011 when a mine they had removed detonated, also fatally wounding a member of the FBR.[12]

“Atrocity” or forced labor demining[13]

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomas Quintana, reported in September 2011 that he had received reports of the “use of civilian porters to carry equipment and walk or drive ox-carts in front of military trucks, to clear for landmines.”[14]

A report documenting forced labor demining by convict porters published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) in July 2011 said one major use of convict labor occurred in January 2011 when the Tatmadaw took an estimated 700 prisoners from 12 prisons and labor camps.[15] The report cited interviews with former porters who escaped to Thailand in 2010–2011, including:

·         A former prisoner who estimated that by the time he escaped only 200 of his original group of 800 porters remained, with some 600 escaping, falling ill, being killed by landmines, and ambushed or executed.[16]

·         A porter who stated that he had witnessed at least 10 porters step on mines, and said that some died, others lost their legs or eyes and were left where they were injured.[17]

·         A former prisoner who described how “All of us were separated: three went to a medical unit, some to carry supplies. Others went into a mine clearance unit. The soldiers had metal detectors, but we were given sticks to check for mines.”[18]

·         A former porter who said “Every day we had to walk ahead of the soldiers. They [soldiers] said, “Walk head, go first, there are landmines.” It was our duty, we couldn’t say anything. Sometimes porters were injured by landmines and we carried them back. Other times they were shot.”[19]

Additional detailed reports of villagers forced by the Tatmadaw to clear mines or serve as a human shield against landmines by walking or driving vehicles ahead of soldiers through suspected mined areas were collected by FBR,[20] the KHRG,[21] and the Karen National Union.[22]

Risk Education

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) is inadequate and often non-existent in areas with reported casualties. Very limited activities are carried out in Karen (Kayin) state by the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People, in Karenni (Kayah) state by the Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre, in Shan state by the Lahu Development Union, and in Chin State by the Chin Peoples Action Committee. Throughout 2011 these groups reportedly made presentations reaching about 8,099 people.[23]

DCA, on behalf of the Ministry of Social Welfare and UNICEF, conducted four RE workshops in the first half of 2012. The first two in February were in Yangon and in Mandalay for township medical and education officials, and NGO staff.[24] DCA held two more workshops in late May and early June, in Taunggyi for staff in southern Shan State and in Lashio for officials from northern Shan State. The second two workshops included officials from the Home Affairs Ministry and the police.[25] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that it provided RE in its training programs for staff working in internally displaced camps in Kachin State in October and November 2011.[26]

Casualties[1]

Casualties Overview

In 2011, there were at least 381 new mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Myanmar, based on state and independent media reports as well as information provided by NGOs and other organizations. Of the 2011 total, 207 casualties were civilians and 133 were military; there were 41 for which the civilian status was unknown. At least three boys were injured and 13 casualties were adult women.[2]

Most mines causing casualties were recorded as antipersonnel mines. It has been reported by local risk education providers that victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or “craft” antipersonnel mines are among the mine types causing casualties. People involved in mine and IED incidents are often not able to distinguish between these types of victim-activated explosive items so the type is not recorded.[3]

Past reporting by the Monitor has indicated that there are a significant number of military casualties recorded, but that such records are not generally available to the public.[4] There were no unpublished reports of large scale military casualties in 2011: some 200 were reported in 2010.[5]

The 2011 total represented a significant increase in casualties compared to the 274 from 2010 identified through similar reporting sources.[6] The Monitor casualty data for Myanmar represents an aggregate composition from available sources.[7] However, due to the lack of systematic data collection and varying sources of annual data, reporting is believed not to reflect the full extent of mine/ERW incidents and casualties in the country. As in the past, the data contained insufficient details to distinguish trends or to ensure that the details for all casualties were correctly recorded.[8] The actual number of casualties is thought to be much higher. The United States (US) Department of State reported that there were up to 600 mine casualties (100 killed, 500 injured) in Myanmar during 2010.[9] In 2012, upon request by the Monitor, the US State Department found that it could not verify this data.[10]

The total number of casualties in Myanmar is unknown. The Monitor has identified 3,242 casualties (303 killed, 2,738 injured, and 201 unknown) between 1999 and the end of 2011.

In addition to human casualties, village livestock and elephants are also affected by landmines in Myanmar. Most elephants killed and injured by mines are those used in the illegal cross-border timber trade. In August 2011, a mine-injured elephant was treated at the Thai Elephant Conservation Center.[11] One elephant died due to a mine injury in October 2011.[12]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Myanmar is unknown, but at least 2,738 survivors have been identified since 1999.[13]

Victim Assistance in 2011

In 2011, there was a slight increase in rehabilitation and economic inclusion services available to survivors, both within Myanmar and in the border area in Thailand. Availability of emergency medical services increased along the border with Thailand slightly in 2011,[14] but as in previous years remained extremely limited in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar. Accessibility to rehabilitation services improved in 2011 due to increased geographical coverage of outreach services.[15]

Restrictions remained in force on ICRC assistance for civilians in violence-affected areas along the border. However, in early 2012 an agreement was reached between ICRC and the government of Myanmar to restart ICRC support to the six government-run rehabilitation centers operating without external support since 2007.[16] The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched a livelihoods program for survivors in some townships in the southeast of the country late in 2011.[17]

In Thailand, most services continued at similar levels to the previous year. However, significantly, more conflict-injured patients, including mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar, received treatment at Thai hospitals with ICRC support in 2011 than in 2010.[18]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No assessment of survivor needs has been carried out in Myanmar. The Ministry of Health does not disaggregate injuries due to mines/ERW incidents from other traumatic injuries.[19] The First Myanmar Basic Disability Survey 2008-2009 was published and released in 2010. The survey covered few mine-affected areas.[20]

Victim assistance coordination

Myanmar does not have a victim assistance program or strategy. No structure or mechanism was responsible for the coordination and provision of victim assistance services specifically. The Ministry of Health is responsible for disability issues and facilitates rehabilitation while the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement is responsible for vocational training.[21]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

No inclusion of survivors in planning victim assistance activities was reported in 2011.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[22]

No changes to the quality of services provided by the government were reported.

Some New Light of Myanmar reports mention assistance to new mine/ERW casualties and in some cases their hospitalization, although details of the types of assistance provided were not mentioned.[23] In 2011, continued government restrictions imposed on the ICRC prevented it from carrying out assistance activities for civilians in violence-affected areas along the Myanmar-Thailand border. However, discussions between ICRC and government concerning restarting support to six prosthetic centers run by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense led to technical visits in September and October 2011: in early 2012 the ICRC reached an agreement to restart its assistance to the centers.[24]

Myanmar has no laws to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities. The government did not provide social protection for private sector workers who became disabled. However, veterans with disabilities received benefits on a priority basis and non-military persons with permanent disabilities were also entitled to a benefit payment. There was inadequate state funding for services to assist persons with disabilities. Myanmar had no laws to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities.[25] However, in September 2011 the upper house of Parliament approved a proposal for a Disability Rights Law.[26]

Within its limited geographical scope, the First Myanmar Basic Disability Survey 2008-2009 found that 85% of persons with disabilities were unemployed and their level of education was far below the national average.[27]

On 7 December 2011, Myanmar acceded to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Convention entered into force on 6 January 2012.

Services in Thailand

Victim assistance activities on Thai-Myanmar Border and in Thailand for Myanmar nationals[28]

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, Denmark gave DKK2 million (US$373,587),[1] the United States (US) gave US$189,106,[2] and Norway gave NOK625,623 (US$111,675)[3] for a total of almost $675,000 towards mine action activities in Myanmar.

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provided funding to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2011 to begin projects in several countries, including in Myanmar.[4] The specific amount allocated for Myanmar, however, is not available.

International contributions in 2011

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011[5]