Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, as well as directives from Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey submitted its ninth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2012, covering calendar year 2011.[2] The report includes voluntary Form J with information on casualties and victim assistance.

Turkey participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012 and in the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November–December 2011, where it announced the completion of its stockpile destruction process.

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey submitted its annual report required by Article 13 in May 2012. Turkey is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

In May 2012, Turkey restated its strongly held view that engagement by NGOs with non-state armed groups with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty requires the prior consent of the relevant State Party.[3]

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the transfer of mines in January 1996. Its production facilities were then phased out of service.[4] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported mines from Germany and the United States (US).

Use

Turkish Armed Forces

Even prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, the chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.[5] However, serious allegations remain unresolved of at least two instances of use by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23^rd Gendarmerie Division Command; it indicated that on 9 April 2009 members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province.[6] Turkey did not announce that an investigation into this incident was underway until May 2012.[7]

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca on 27 May 2009.[8] The Turkish army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009, the Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before the detonation.[9] An investigation by the chief prosecutor in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish commander.[10] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff military prosecutor’s office.[11] 

According to media accounts, a report on the incident in September 2010 to the Military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the placement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish martial court.[12] General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.[13] In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning.[14] In February 2012, the Turkish General Staff’s martial court continued hearing the case against two generals and four other officers.[15]

Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must take every measure to prevent the use of antipersonnel mines, including the application of penal sanctions. The ICBL has previously called on Turkey to investigate the use allegations and undertake measures to prevent further use.[16] It has also emphasized the need to establish the origin of the mines used, which could have been lifted from the ground and re-laid, or taken from stocks retained for training purposes.[17]

In recent Mine Ban Treaty meetings, Turkey has stated that it cannot comment on the mine use allegations while the judicial proceedings are underway.[18] In May 2012, Turkey announced that an investigation had been initiated on the allegation of mine use not currently under judicial process, an apparent reference to the 9 April 2009 incident.[19]

PKK/Kongra Gel

Turkish officials have continued to accuse the PKK/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.[20] According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report, 21 military personnel and civilians were killed and 85 wounded in 2011 by landmines laid by the PKK/Kongra Gel. Turkey’s transparency reports do not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor do they distinguish between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs.[21] The Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the use of antivehicle mines, or command-detonated antipersonnel explosive devices.

Previously, the Turkish General Staff published information on mines recovered, without specifying the types and locations of the mines.[22] The Turkish General Staff no longer lists this information on its website. Turkey did not specifically report on recovered mines and their disposition in previous transparency reports.

The Monitor has not been able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of the use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK/Kongra Gel or of specific incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines.

Previously, the PKK/Kongra Gel had admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices which can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[23] In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the PKK had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey announced in December 2011 that its stockpile destruction program was completed on 21 June 2011. It had missed its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for over three years. Turkey had previously reported that its munitions disposal facility was not officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[24]

Turkey has stated that in 2004, when it became a State Party, it had a stockpile of 2,973,481 antipersonnel mines. In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy. In its transparency report issued after the announcement of the completion of the destruction program, Turkey stated that 2,938,060 mines had been destroyed in total.[25]

In the first half of 2011, Turkey declared that its remaining 631 stockpiled ADAM artillery projectiles (each containing 36 mines, or a total of 22,716 ADAM mines) had been transferred for destruction.[26] On behalf of Turkey, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) had signed a contract in November 2010 with Spreewerk Lübben GMBH, a company in Germany, to destroy the ADAM mines as Turkey’s Munitions Disposal Facility could not complete this task. Destruction of the first ADAM mines began in Germany in March 2011 and the program concluded on 21 June 2011.[27]

In the past Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in 2007 it reported that M18 mines were removed from its stockpile destruction list due to their “specific technical features” and “will not be used as victim activated.”[28] In 2008, officials said that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed.

Mines retained for research and training

On becoming a State Party in 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[29] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2012, Turkey reported that it currently retains 15,100 mines for demining training, as well as for research on a modification project for mine-proof boots.[30]

Turkey continues to retain the largest number of antipersonnel mines among States Parties. It has said that the “large size, as well as the different types of mine action units, necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes.”[31] Between 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2011, Turkey reported consuming a total of 900 retained mines for permitted purposes, including 850 in 2005 alone.[32] Mines were last used for training and research purposes in 2010.

Turkey said in June 2010 that “these mines which are held for permitted purposes will be subject to review, once the stockpile destruction process comes to an end.”[33] Similarly, in May 2006, it stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[34] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[35]

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey did not make any statements on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2011 or first half of 2012. In 2010, government officials informed the Monitor that Turkey’s position on joining the ban convention had not changed from the position previously articulated in 2009.[1] In March 2009, Turkey said it shared the “humanitarian concerns behind the efforts limiting the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” but “for the time being, [it was] not considering to sign the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions” as its primary aim was to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.[2] Turkey is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 21 June 2011, Turkey completed the destruction of its remaining stockpile of antipersonnel landmines, after missing the initial deadline in 2008.

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but participated as an observer only in both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and in Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 and did not sign the convention.[3]

Turkey has continued to show interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It attended an international conference on the convention in Santiago, Chile, in June 2010. Turkey attended the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 as an observer. A representative from Turkey’s embassy in Lebanon participated in the Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut in September 2011, but did not make any statements. Turkey did not attend intersessional meetings of the convention in June 2011 or April 2012.

The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey, a CMC member, has continued its work to garner domestic support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), where it supported the conclusion of a CCW protocol on cluster munitions on the basis that it would include the major users and producers of the weapon.

At the outset of the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, Turkey expressed its support for the draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions being negotiated, stating that it “will further strengthen the overall UN disarmament machinery” and “would significantly contribute to reducing humanitarian concerns arising from cluster munitions” by having a “tangible positive impact on the ground.”[5]

The Review Conference ended without reaching agreement on the draft protocol, thus concluding the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In June 2010, a government official informed the Monitor that “Turkey does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[6] In August 2011, a different official told the Monitor, “Turkey no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[7]

A US Department of State cable from February 2008 made public by Wikileaks in May 2011 states that “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all out war.’”[8]

In March 2009, Turkey stated that it “is not making use of cluster munitions.”[9] It is not known if Turkey used cluster munitions in the past.[10]

In the past, Turkey has produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions; and it currently has a stockpile.

According to its website, the Turkish company Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) produces an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile which contains self-destructing M85 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[11] MKEK has also produced, under license from the US, M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions.[12] It is unclear if this latter projectile is still in production.

The firm Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[13] Turkey sold 3,020 of the TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007.[14]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each with 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[15] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers.[16] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In October 2004, the US announced its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons, each with 145 submunitions.[17] In September 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[18]

Slovakia reported the export of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[19]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of Defense provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996.[20]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Mines were laid in 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq to prevent illegal border crossings and to create a barrier around security installations.[1]According to Turkey, all the mines previously laid along its borders with Bulgaria, Georgia, and Greece have been cleared.[2]

Turkey reported in 2012 that a total of 977,163 mines remained to be cleared from its territory at the end of 2011, a modest 244 less than at the end of the previous year. Most mines were along the border with Syria (613,715 mines), followed by the borders with Iran (194,755), Iraq (69,033) and Armenia (21,856). Turkey reported another 77,804 mines were laid at various locations inside the country. Compared with the situation at the end of 2012,most of the reduction was in mines inside Turkey.[3] A notice of intention published by the Ministry of National Defense in March 2011 to call tenders for clearance of minefields on the Syrian border said the minefields totaled 212,000km².[4]

Landmines were also laid by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[5] Turkey’s Armed Forces General Staff reported finding 92 PKK mines in the first seven months of 2011, but it did not specify whether they were victim-activated devices or command-detonated.[6]

During the 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus, Turkish armed forces laid minefields to create a barrier on the northern side of the buffer zone which divides the island and also in areas adjacent to the buffer zone. The UN identified 26 minefields laid by Turkish forces in the buffer zone.[7] Cyprus reported in 2011 that one minefield remained in the buffer zone after clearance of 78 mined areas and 26,000 mines.[8]

Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war

Turkey is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily UXO, but has not identified the affected areas. Human Rights Foundation reports cited by Landmine Action in 2005 claimed that the areas most affected were Batman, Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, and Van.[9] There is no evidence of any problem with cluster munition remnants.

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

There is not yet a national mine action authority or mine action center in Turkey. In March 2010, Minister of National Defense Vecdi Gönül told parliament that the government had set up a Top Project Board (TPB) to oversee mine action and a Project Implementation Board (PIB) to act as a national mine action center. The TPB would include representatives of the ministries of agriculture, finance, foreign affairs, internal affairs, and rural affairs, with other ministries participating when necessary. The ministry was said to be preparing a directive setting out the respective responsibilities of the TPB and PIB.[10] The government said in June 2011 that the initiative is “still in an initial process.” It said the Prime Minister had instructed all concerned government departments to prepare to participate and that the Ministry of Defense was coordinating preparations.[11]

Turkey informed the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties that it had created an Inter-ministerial Coordination Board (IMCB) in the Ministry of National Security that had started working on 26 October 2010 and would function as a National Mine Action Authority once the government had enacted the necessary legislation. Turkey said the IMCB would:[12]

·         Comprise among other institutions the Prime Minister’s office, the ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Health, Energy, National Resources, Agriculture, Interior, Transport, Environment and Culture;

·         Issue instructions to and coordinate all government agencies involved in mine action;

·         Discuss key issues, ranging from appropriate mine clearance methodologies, risk education and planning local infrastructure to preserving cultural assets; and

·         Elaborate Turkish mine action standards.

Turkey also said it had set up a “Project Implementation Group” that would identify the exact coordinates of the mined areas and convert the data into digital maps.[13]

Turkey is developing plans for mine clearance on its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common border.[14] Turkey says the Syrian border accounts for two-thirds of the mines laid on its territory and its clearance is therefore its “priority.”[15] Officials observe it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[16]

Turkey’s president ratified Law No. 5903 on demining of minefields along the Syrian border on 16 June 2009. The law stipulates that initially the Ministry of National Defense will invite tenders for demining and if this process does not work the Ministry of Finance will have the minefields cleared through the “service procurement method” (the meaning of this is not clear). According to the law, if this method also fails, the government will invite companies to tender for demining in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.[17]

The law also provided for the possibility of “requesting the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency” (NAMSA).[18] Turkey said in June 2011 it had concluded a “sales agreement” with NAMSA providing for quality management and technical support.[19] A NAMSA advisor in Ankara provides technical support on such issues as tendering procedures and contract management.[20]

Turkey reported in June 2010 that the Ministry of National Defense was “taking the necessary steps for a comprehensive programme” of border clearance[21] and in March 2011 it announced on its website that tenders would be invited for clearance of the 911km-long Syrian border divided into six separate areas with a total mined area of 212,000km².[22] Officials say these six areas represent the entirety of mine contamination on the Syrian border but reported that in some of the six areas demarcation of the border is disputed by Syria and work would start in the other areas. The government had initially planned to set a deadline of June 2011 for tender submissions but later extended it. Officials told the ICBL in May that Turkey’s intention was still to start clearance in 2011.[23]

However, Turkey told standing committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012 that bids would be submitted only by 15 June 2012 for the first Syrian border clearance project, involving a 527km stretch between Cizre and Çobanbey. Clearance would continue until 2016. Bidding for the second Syrian border project, involving a 384km stretch of the border between Çobanbey and Denizgören would begin only after “validation of the contract” for the first section. Clearance of the second section is set to continue until the end of 2016.[24]

Minister of National Defense Gönül confirmed in 2010 that after clearing its border with Syria, Turkey planned to clear its other borders.[25] Turkey submitted a proposal to the European Union in 2010 seeking financing for a €50 million project “Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity Through de-mining of the Eastern Borders of Turkey.” The project provides for clearing Turkey’s Armenian border of all remaining mines, an area of 1.64km², and for clearing three areas on its border with Iran north of Lake Van covering 6.4km², 3.5km², and 1.5km², respectively. Under the proposal, Turkey would call for tenders at the end of 2012 or early in 2013 and expected work to start in 2013. Turkey planned to submit a proposal to clear the southern part of the border with Iran in 2012.[26]In May 2012, Turkey said the clearance of its border with Iran would be financed “to a certain extent” by the EU but gave no indication of timing.[27]

Land Release

In the past, demining in Turkey had been conducted by the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish army, using manual and mechanical means.[28] In 2008, a German commercial company, Tauber, working in partnership with the Turkish company Tusan Corporation, won a demining contract by tender to clear the Nusaybin border gate between Turkey and Syria.[29]

Mine clearance in 2011

Turkey’s mine clearance activities slowed in 2011, resulting in clearance of 244 antipersonnel mines in mined areas, according to its latest Article 7 report, compared with 2,310 the previous year. Most (180) of the cleared mines were from locations “other than borders.”[30]Turkey has not included in its Article 7 reports the destruction of antipersonnel mines laid by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, but the Turkish General Staff website has reported clearance of IEDs and said a further 92 antipersonnel mines were cleared in the first seven months of 2011.[31]

In March 2011, Nokta Yatirim Limited Company reported it had demined the ancient city of Karkamış, Gaziantep, clearing an area of 663,800m² and destroying 1,200 mines.[32]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014.

Turkey has been slow to fulfill its obligations under Article 5 and has not reported in sufficient detail on either the remaining contamination or the clearance it has undertaken to date. In June 2010, Turkey said that “the Ministry of National Defense is taking the necessary steps for a comprehensive programme and timelines of clearance, in collaboration with NAMSA, to comply with the deadline set for 2014” but at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties Turkey announced that clearance of the Syrian border, which it has identified as its priority, would not be completed until 2016.[33]

Although Turkey has initiated plans for clearance of its border minefields,it has made no announcement of any plans to clear the 77,984 mines it has identified as being laid within its borders.[34] Turkey also still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet its treaty requirements, including areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Some mine warning signs have been placed near settlements between Nusaybin and Midyat in the southeastern province of Mardin, according to Turkish media reports.[35]

Risk Education

Turkey undertakes little mine/ERW risk education (RE). In 2007, the Minister of Internal Affairs summed up RE activity by commenting that, “the citizens in the region are being warned periodically that they should inform the security forces when they encounter suspicious things.”[36]

Casualties Overview

Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 59 new casualties in 2011 due to mines/victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Turkey.[1] Of the identified casualties,[2] 19 were civilians, including eight children, and the rest were security personnel. At least one individual from a non-state armed group (NSAG) was reported; the number of paramilitary “village guards” among casualties in 2011 was not recorded.[3]

Analysis of IMFT data identified at least 94 mine/ERW casualties in 2010, 95 in 2009[4] and 100 casualties for 2008.[5]

The government of Turkey reported 106 mine casualties (21 killed; 85 injured) for 2011. No details on military status, gender, or age were provided in the reporting.[6] This represented an increase from the 104 mine casualties Turkey reported for 2010 and from the 83 casualties in 2009,[7] but was still lower than the 158 mine casualties reported by Turkey for 2008.[8]

The total number of mine/IED and ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey reported 4,189 mine/ERW casualties, including 855 people killed and 3,334 injured, as of the end of 2011.[9] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people were killed (625 security personnel, 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people were injured (with the number of civilians compared to the security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[10] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed and 7,000 injured).[11]

Victim Assistance

Turkey is known to have landmine survivors and survivors of other types of ERW. As a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey has made a commitment to implementing victim assistance.

By April 2010, at least 5,091 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984.[12]

Victim assistance in 2011

No significant changes in the accessibility or quality of services were reported for 2011.[13] Mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities in affected areas did not have access to the same level of services as other persons with disabilities in larger cities in Turkey.[14]

IMFT initiated the first national mine survivors network in Turkey in 2011; survivor representatives began advocacy and peer support activities in Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Mardin.[15]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey were reported in 2011. There was no system in place to collect data on mine survivors or their needs. The IMFT collected the most comprehensive information available through media scanning and cross checking with other organizations and local sources.

The office of the Prime Ministry Administration for Disabled People collected data on all persons with disabilities, but did not distinguish the cause of disability or mine/ERW survivors.[16] The European Commission (EC) continued to report that a lack of broader data and research on persons with disabilities remained a barrier to informed policymaking in Turkey.[17] The last major survey of persons with disabilities in Turkey was in made in 2002.[18]

The Diyarbakir Lawyer’s Bar Association collected information on mine/ERW casualties in the affected regions and continued to offer legal assistance to mine survivors who were eligible due to their financial circumstances.[19] The Human Rights Association collected records on survivors and casualties’ families who contacted the organization’s branches for assistance; information collected included needs.[20]

In February 2011, Ufuk Uras, one of the members of parliament for Istanbul, asked follow-up questions in parliament about the situation for mine/ERW survivors, including questions about what kind of health, social or economic assistance had been provided to mine victims and about the number of survivors had accessed that assistance.[21] By the time parliament halted sessions to prepare for an election, no response had been given and the time period for a response had expired.

In 2006, Turkey had reported that it was initiating a program of transition to an international injury classification system that would include mines and ERW.[22] No further progress on this transition was reported as of mid-2012.

Victim assistance coordination

In June 2011, a new government entity responsible for protecting persons with disabilities, the Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General, was formed under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.[23] In April 2012, the IMFT visited the Minister of Family and Social Policy, Fatma Sahin, regarding the issues of rehabilitation, employment and education for mine survivors, and the activities of the new directorate. The IMFT presented the need for a national action plan, corresponding with the Cartagena Action Plan, for the implementation of victim assistance commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty. The Minister indicated that work on victim assistance should be implemented under the new directorate.[24]

The Administration for Disabled People, under the prime minister, was previously the central government body responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The main functions of the administration were coordinating between national and international institutions, formulating disability policy to promote the full participation into society and equality of persons with disabilities, and defining and solving problems faced by persons with disabilities.[25] The opportunity for fulfilling a victim assistance focal point role was reportedly within the existing mandate of the Administration for Disabled People.[26] The administration was established in 1997; however, until 2011 it had not followed, and had not been aware of, victim assistance issues.[27]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting on victim assistance is updated annually by Turkey, but only the reports on survivors who receive treatment at military medical facilities are updated. Article 7 (and Convention on Conventional Weapons Article 13) reporting did not include information on services available to civilian mine/ERW survivors at civilian facilities, or on survivors injured in previous years.[28] Turkey did not make statements on victim assistance at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2011 or at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012.

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors reported that they were not included in the planning or implementation of services relevant to their needs.[29] The Turkish mine/ERW Victims’ Network objectives were presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Administration for Disabled People at a meeting in Ankara in May 2011.[30]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[31]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access the free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. Those without social insurance can apply for a special “green card” to be eligible for what were previously free services in 2008. However, in practice those persons with disabilities eligible for the green card medical insurance still had to contribute to part of their medical expenses, eliminating the availability of free services.[32] Regulations in the Healthcare Application Notice, issued by the Social Security Organization of Turkey, restricted access to medicines, equipment, and mobility devices for persons with disabilities, even when deemed necessary by medical professionals.[33]

Healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected region (other than the largest cities) are underfunded, have inadequate staff levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergency or ongoing medical needs.[34]

Rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors was limited to centers in Ankara and Dicle. There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established locally in other mine/ERW-affected provinces. There was also a need to establish facilities which could address the needs for child survivors.[35] Holders of the green card could only apply for new prostheses every five years, which was detrimental to the rehabilitation of child mine/ERW survivors.[36]

The Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center remained the only such center for all mine-affected regions. Since 2009, when survivors were assisted by an NGO to receive prostheses, financial constraints prevented survivors from reaching the Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center; no progress to improve access was reported in 2011. Dicle University also had a dedicated research department for disability issues, but it was not fully functional due to a lack of staff.[37]

Institutions promoting social inclusion remained dispersed and weak in 2011. Further measures were needed to increase the employability of persons with disabilities in both the public and private sectors, including promotion of alternative methods of employment.

The Diyarbakir Lawyers’ Bar Association continued to help mine/ERW survivors access benefits to which they were entitled, such as compensation, and to promote victim assistance.[38] In order to receive free legal assistance from one of the Lawyers’ Bar Associations, survivors must pass a means test; this test, however, excludes even the poorest survivors if they own any assets such as a small holding of land for subsistence farming.[39] Survivors called for a review of the compensation process to ensure timely and appropriate outcomes. Survivors must have made the claim and presented a case within one year of the date of the incident in order for it to proceed.

In early 2011, members of the National Medical Association of Turkey started a group to address mine issues, including the needs of survivors.[40] However, by 2012 the overall responsibilities and professional autonomy of the Turkish Medical Association had been drastically reduced. According to the World Medical Association “the Government had removed from the [Turkish] medical association's mandate the words to ensure ‘that the medical profession is practiced and promoted in line with public and individual well-being and benefit.’ As a result of this, the association could no longer challenge actions that adversely affected the right to health, the provision of health care, public health, and individual patient well-being. This diminished the independence of physicians, as well as the health of their patients.”[41]

A need for specific policies to address the social support needs of child mine/ERW survivors was identified in 2009.[42] No progress was reported by the end of 2011.

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, and in the provision of other state services. The government did not always enforce the law effectively. The Disability Act (2005) states that all existing public buildings and roads, pavements, pedestrian crossings, open and green areas, sports areas, and similar social and cultural infrastructure serving the public must be made accessible for people with disabilities by 2012. However, almost no progress was reported in 2011 and the deadline for the act’s application had been extended by three years to 7 July 2015. Physical barriers that blocked access to public buildings were a particular problem. Access to basic rights, including education, health, social, and public services for persons with disabilities, were still critical issues despite existing legislation.[43]

Positive discrimination in favor of persons with disabilities was made possible by an amendment to the Constitution passed by referendum in September 2010. However, in 2011 these constitutional changes had not yet been applied to specific measures which could benefit persons with disabilities.[44] Further measures were needed in both the public and private sectors, including the creation of new jobs and the encouragement of working from home. Efforts to increase employment of persons with disabilities had made some progress in the public sector.[45]

Turkey ratified the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 28 September 2009.[46] A strategy paper on accessibility for persons with disabilities was adopted, along with a related national action plan. However, in 2011 Turkey had not yet established a national mechanism for monitoring implementation of the CRPD and its optional protocol.[47]