Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 5 July 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2003.

Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. A new constitution to replace the interim constitution (in effect since the country’s independence in 1975) was approved by the National Assembly of Angola on 21 January 2010 and promulgated by the President on 5 February 2010.[1] Under Article 13 of the Constitution, any international law approved and ratified by Angola is an integrated part of Angolan law and automatically enters into force at the national level after its publication and entry into force at the international level.[2]

As of July 2010, Angola had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report, due 30 April 2010.  Angola did not provide a report in 2009 or 2008.  According to a representative of the national mine action coordination body, the Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), Angola will submit a report once the CNIDAH database has been updated.[3]  Angola previously submitted four transparency reports between 2004 and 2007.[4]

Angola attended the Third Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines held in Pretoria, South Africa, from 9–11 September 2009. It also participated in the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009, where it made a statement on victim assistance. Angola did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in June 2010 in Geneva.

Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines.[5] It is not believed to have exported them in the past. There have not been any confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines since Angola ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.[6]

Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 28 December 2006, just ahead of its 1 January 2007 treaty deadline. It destroyed 81,045 mines between October and December 2006, in addition to 7,072 antipersonnel mines of 12 types apparently destroyed between September and December 2003.[7]

In its last Article 7 report submitted in 2007, Angola reported retaining 2,512 antipersonnel mines under Article 3.[8] Angola has not provided an update on mines retained since 2007, and has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at review conferences held in 2004 and 2009.

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008. Angolan officials have said on several occasions that ratification of the convention may be completed prior to the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.

In June 2009, Angola stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requesting a report on Angola’s inventory of cluster munitions from the Ministry of Defense, and it would then proceed with ratification.[1] In March 2010, Angola said the process of ratification was “moving fast” and should be completed in 2010. Consultations were taking place among the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and interior, the Armed Forces, and others. After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finishes its consideration of ratification, it must be sent to the National Assembly and the President’s Office for approval.[2]

In June 2010, a government official indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was waiting to receive a formal request from the President that the National Assembly approve ratification. The official believed that ratification could occur before the First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.[3]

Angola has engaged in the work of the convention in 2009 and 2010. It participated in the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions in June 2009, the Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Pretoria, South Africa in March 2010, and the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010. At each meeting, Angola gave updates on the status of ratification.

Angola participated extensively in the Oslo Process from the outset in February 2007, but did not attend the formal negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Angola is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, stockpiling, transfer, and production

Cluster munitions have been used in Angola, although it is unclear when they were used during the various conflicts in Angola or by whom.   

An official with the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), who had seen cluster munitions remnants in Huambo province near Caala and Bailundo, probably from the heavy fighting during 1998–1999, said he believed the cluster munitions were used by the Angolan Armed Forces because only they used aircraft during this conflict, not the rebel UNITA forces.[5]

In June 2010, a CNIDAH official told the CMC that Angola had destroyed its stockpile of cluster munitions between 2003 and 2010 in a joint initiative of the government and HALO Trust, and that the Armed Forces no longer held any stocks.[6] She later confirmed this statement, noting that the Air Force headed up a task force responsible for the program.[7]

HALO reported that it had destroyed 7,215 submunitions (likely from cluster bombs numbering in the hundreds) and 501 submunition dispensers. It noted that all of these came from government stores and almost all were in serviceable condition. It said that it has visited about 16 Air Force bases and destroyed all of the cluster munitions that had been held at each.^[8]

The government itself has not yet provided any details on stockpile destruction, or made an official determination and public announcement that all stocks have been identified and destroyed.

In the past, Jane’s Information Group has noted that KMG-U dispensers that deploy submunitions were in service for Angolan aircraft.[9]  Deminers operating in Angola have documented the presence of casings of RBK 250/275 cluster bombs among abandoned ammunition.[10] It is likely the KMG-Us and RBKs were of Soviet origin.

Angola is not believed to have produced or exported cluster munitions. 

Cluster Munition Remnants

Whether Angola continues to be affected by cluster munition remnants is unclear. Prior to 2009 at least two types of cluster munitions had been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. According to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH in February 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 unexploded submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kwanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 unexploded submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 unexploded submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.^[11] As of June 2010, demining NGOs in Angola reported they had not found unexploded submunitions since those reported in February 2008.^[12]

Contamination and Impact

Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002.

Mines

Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 spoke of millions of landmines littering one-third of the country’s land.[1] It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a better assessment of contamination in each of the country’s 18 provinces—all of which are contaminated—was achieved.[2]

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas (districts). These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people, or 17% of the population.[3] Three-quarters of all impacted communities and casualties were in eight provinces: Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Kuando-Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Malanje, Moxico, and Uíge, with Moxico the most heavily impacted province. Cabinda, Luanda, and Namibe provinces were found to have the least impact from mines.[4]

The Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), for planning purposes, based on the results of HALO Trust’s polygon mapping of SHAs (a more accurate delineation of the boundaries of contamination), estimated the total area might be as little as 242km² compared to the 1,239km² measured by the LIS.[5] The former UNDP Information Management Advisor, Mohammad Qasim, however, could not see any consistent pattern when analyzing tasks completed by all demining operators since the LIS in early 2009, and he concluded it was “premature” to estimate there was as little as 242km² of contaminated area.[6] However, in 2009, international NGO operators reported cancelling 205.8km² of SHAs through survey.[7]

In March 2009, the national database managed by CNIDAH showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had either been cancelled or released through technical survey or clearance, or that clearance was either ongoing or had been completed but CNIDAH had not received a completion report.[8] In April 2010, CNIDAH was unable to provide an updated figure on the remaining contaminated area because many clearance reports from 2008 and 2009 have not been entered into the database.[9] CNIDAH was unable to say what has been achieved in demining and what remains to be done, while predicting that it is unlikely to meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2013.[10]

Two World Bank papers written in 2009 on Angola address the impact of landmines. The Environmental and Social Management Framework Final Report concludes that the presence of landmines throughout the country inhibits access to land and is an environmental limitation that undermines development.[11] The report found that the areas cleared are primarily being used for housing and farming; sometimes construction and farming begins before formal handover tasks with local officials are completed.[12] Government of Angola funding is primarily used for the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) and local commercial companies clear and verify roads and other infrastructure that supports the national development plan.[13]

Mine contamination in Kuando-Kubango province was cited as one of the obstacles to creating the new Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, the world’s largest game park on the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe where more than 130,000 elephants are waiting to be allowed to move from Botswana through the park. This process has been held up until the park is free of the threat of mines.[14]

Cluster munition remnants

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by unexploded submunitions is also unclear. Prior to 2009 at least two types of cluster munitions had been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. According to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH in February 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 unexploded submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kwanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 unexploded submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 unexploded submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.^[15] As of June 2010, demining NGOs in Angola reported they had not found unexploded submunitions since those reported in February 2008.^[16]

HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams, which operate in all 18 provinces destroying police, army, navy, and air force weapons caches, disposed of 501 cluster munition dispensers and 7,215 explosive bomblets between 2006 and the end of May 2010.[17] This included the destruction of 374 explosive bomblets in 2009.

Other explosive remnants of war

Angola is significantly contaminated with ERW across all 18 provinces. Demining operators expend considerable assets on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks.[18] For example, during callouts in 2009, HALO’s EOD teams found 598 items of abandoned explosive ordnance and 13,214 items of stray ammunition. The WAD teams found 54,990 pieces of stray ammunition, 14 aircraft bombs, 93 guided missiles, 20 tons (20,000kg) of small arms ammunition, and destroyed over 50,000 units of small arms and light weapons (SALW).[19] NPA conducted a total of 187 EOD callouts in Kwanza Sul and Malanje in 2009 and removed and destroyed more than 1,500 items.[20] In 2009, MAG responded to 766 EOD callouts disposing of 22 antivehicle mines, 200 antipersonnel mines, 2,240 SALW, and 88 items of UXO.[21]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Ministry of Finance has, for the first time, released figures for national expenditure on mine action. In 2009, the government contributed nearly US$30 million to mine action (see Support for mine action section of this Country Profile) and INAD reported its 2009 expenses were $12 million.[22]

CNIDAH serves as the national mine action authority. It is responsible for accrediting NGOs and commercial demining companies and, in principle, these companies send their clearance reports to CNIDAH.[23] CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province) determine annual priorities based on NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.[24]

In 2005, the government established the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), which is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration, to manage the demining operations of the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN), and INAD. INAD is a public institute responsible for demining operations under the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS).[25] It also operates the national demining training center near Viana, a town approximately 20km from Luanda.[26]

The international NGOs in Angola are tasked with humanitarian priorities, while INAD, the commercial companies, and the FAA are tasked with clearing infrastructure for economic development, which is fully funded by the government of Angola.[27] The FAA does not allow international NGOs to clear battle or mined areas in close proximity to military bases even if the local population is at great risk.[28] A decline in international funding since 2008 has resulted in two international demining NGOs closing their operations and the five remaining—DCA, HALO, MAG, MgM, and NPA—reducing the number of their clearance teams.[29]

UNDP has supported mine action through three separate projects, of which only one remained as of April 2010: a three-year direct execution project with INAD funded by Japan and, since the beginning of 2010, with a contribution from the government of Italy, which was to be used before the end of the year. INAD planned to submit a proposal to UNDP to continue work beyond 2010.[30]

In March 2009, the UNDP capacity-building project with CNIDAH ended, although the national technical assistant in the database department was retained. The UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery program has submitted another capacity-building project to the Angolan government, an integrated program, including mine action, disarmament, and disaster risk reduction, but major personnel changes throughout the government in early 2010 limited UNDP contact with the government and delayed approval of the proposed project.[31]

In December 2009, Angola announced it would hold a “Mine Action Summit” in 2010 to review the mine action program and identify priorities for the future.[32] The summit was due to take place on 9–10 August 2010 in Luanda.[33] UNDP is supporting CNIDAH’s organizing of the summit with the recruitment of two consultants: one who was hired in April 2010, to assesses the strengths and weaknesses within CNIDAH and to develop a clear understanding of how CNIDAH should optimize its role as the national coordinator for mine action over the next several years, and the other a data management and presentation skills consultant hired in July 2010, who was tasked to prepare a presentation on CNIDAH’s future role as the national demining coordinator and its commitment, plans, and support for clearing all mined areas in Angola.[34] UNDP believes that CNIDAH must strengthen its coordination role among the mine action actors and, the program’s very visible database problems notwithstanding (see below), it also believes that the government of Angola is strongly committed to mine action.[35]

Mine action information management

The lack of a functioning national mine action database is one of the most protracted problems in the mine action program in Angola. Despite years of international technical assistance, huge quantities of data from surveys, trained data entry personnel, the provision of computer equipment, and the establishment of provincial CNIDAH offices to facilitate data management, Angola is unable to accurately report its annual achievements or to state its remaining problem in quantifiable terms such as the number of SHAs, the number of impacted communities, or the estimated size of the contaminated area. In May 2009, Angola appealed for international assistance under Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty to help it solve its data management problem.[36] Balbina da Silva, CNIDAH’s coordinator, told Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor in April 2010 that Angola would not submit an Article 7 report until the database problems were sorted out.[37]

There are different views of why the database is so problematic. The CNIDAH liaison officer in Huambo, Jorge Repouso Leonel Maria, noted that demining operators are required to give the data to the CNIDAH provincial liaison officers who then send it to Luanda. He believed it would be more efficient if the operators were to send their data directly to Luanda and provide a copy to the provincial office. As of April 2010, improvements in the data transmission system were still being discussed. Other problems at the provincial level are said to be that Luanda does not send updates of the database to the provinces and that a lack of financial support from CNIDAH has left the provincial offices without adequate electricity and office equipment to do its job properly. It was observed during a Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor visit to the CNIDAH Huambo office in April 2010 that the computers were not working.[38]

 All of the international NGOs hand deliver deliver monthly minefield clearance reports to provincial CNIDAH offices. CNIDAH signs a receipt for each delivery. However, the provincial vice governor must sign off on each completion report, and this cannot be done until CNIDAH conducts quality control. In the absence of quality assurance after clearance, the results cannot be entered into the national database. According to HALO, CNIDAH has not conducted quality control in Bie, Benguela, Huambo, or Kuando-Kubango provinces since 2008. HALO also delivers new minefield survey reports by hand on a CD-ROM to CNIDAH in Luanda. CNIDAH similarly signs a receipt of delivery. HALO sends a monthly statistics update to CNIDAH in Luanda but never receives confirmation that the email was received.[39] DCA, MAG, NPA, and MgM reported following similar systems and experiencing slow follow-up on quality control and handover by CNIDAH, although MAG reported they do not receive clearance certificates.[40]

The database manager at CNIDAH, Manuel Domingo Jose, claimed that only 11 of almost 40 operators submit data to CNIDAH in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) format.[41] He said INAD and the CED do not send IMSMA reports to CNIDAH. The INAD’s director general, Engineer Leonardo Sapalo, however, said all INAD provincial teams simultaneously send data to the INAD Luanda office and the CNIDAH provincial office. INAD then consolidates the provincial data and forwards it to CNIDAH, essentially sending the same INAD data to CNIDAH from two different channels.[42] He did not say if the INAD reports were sent in IMSMA format.

Commercial demining companies are said to be not proficient in using IMSMA and often send reports full of errors, which delays entering the data.[43] Overall, the UNDP database technical advisor, Pedro Toko, said in an interview that reporting is inconsistent and it is time consuming to transfer the data from reports to the database.[44] According to UNDP, it is estimated that clearance data from hundreds of SHAs from the NGOs have not yet been entered in the database.[45]

Recent program evaluations

Angola is the only large mine action program in the world that has not been evaluated since its inception. In September 2009, the European Commission (EC) completed an evaluation of its 2005–2008 €31 million (US$46 million[46]) emergency mine action program where it provided support to CNIDAH, INAD, HALO, NPA, MAG, MgM, and INTERSOS. The evaluation highlighted many structural problems and with respect to the capacity-building project concluded the €2.7 million ($3.98 million[47]) for 22 personnel at CNIDAH was not an efficient use of EC money.

Moreover, the UN Technical Advisor hired for the project was forced to reduce his role after the government protested he was interfering in areas of project management CNIDAH considered their domain, including coordination. Subsequently, after discussions involving the government and the EC, it was decided the Technical Advisor would concentrate on working with INAD and the CED. The evaluation also found that over the three-year period, the NGOs had improved efficiency and had, on average, reduced the cost of clearing 1m² from €11 ($16) to €5 ($7).[48] This level of output costs is still extremely high.

In 2009, the EC in Angola issued a tender for €20 million ($28 million[49]), of which €16 million ($22 million) was for demining and the remaining €4 million ($6 million) was for technical assistance to CNIDAH and INAD.[50] As of 16 July 2010, the EC had not made an announcement on whom it was awarding the contracts to.

Land Release

In 2009, five international demining operators and INAD cleared eight km² of mined area, and cancelled or released through survey a further 205.8km². There is no available information on survey or clearance by the FAA and commercial demining companies. The amount of battle area clearance (BAC) conducted in 2009 remained low as it had in previous years as there are very few areas that require BAC.[51] The amount of mined area cleared in 2009 is approximately the same as in 2008. International demining operators released through survey 14km² more than in 2008.

Angola has been trying—so far without success—to adopt a land release policy since the completion of the LIS in 2007. Data from the LIS indicated that the Angolan landmine problem could take decades to resolve if clearance capacity was not increased and if the same methods of operation continued.[52] A field manual on land release has been finalized and awaits the signature of General Petroff, CNIDAH’s president, before it is made available and used. It includes regulations and methodologies for both non-technical and technical survey.[53]

Five-year summary of land release

Survey in 2009

In 2009, international NGO operators in Angola reported a variety of survey activities and cancelled 205.8km² of area.

Survey in 2009[54]

CNIDAH planned to conduct a second LIS beginning before the end of 2010 and covering all 18 provinces. The survey would take two years to complete. The purpose of the second survey is to update the national database and visit the 19 comunas, which comprise more than 300 settlements not surveyed during the first LIS. The survey will also assist in the marking of low-impacted communities and SHAs identified during the first LIS, and possibly release land for agriculture and other community uses.[55] Leonardo Sapalo, INAD’s director, believes the LIS was conducted too soon after the conflict and that access is better now in Cabinda and Lunda Norte than it was during the first LIS.[56] Demining operators believe that many mined areas remain to be identified.[57]

According to CNIDAH, the second LIS would be funded by the government as well as by UNDP and the EC. In 2009, the EC issued a tender for mine clearance covering 2010–2013 in which there was a “survey” component.[58] The NGOs who bid on the tender were not familiar with the second LIS and had not been informed of its purpose, methodology, or timeframe. They were not certain that contracts awarded under the tender would allow for a survey like the LIS.[59] UNDP believes the problems with the database should be fixed before another survey is conducted.[60]

In 2009, HALO cancelled 91 SHAs after re-survey in Huila province; the SHAs had been first identified by INTERSOS during the LIS.[61] NPA resurveyed 180 SHAs from the LIS covering 197km², cancelled 58 SHAs covering 91km², and reduced the area of confirmed 122 SHAs by 89km².[62]

Newly recorded mined areas not previously identified

NGOs also identified mined areas that had not been previously identified. New mined areas and roads were found and surveyed largely because people were moving into previously uninhabited and unused areas where there had been no information or indication that a threat from mines existed. This migration of people included newly returned refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, as well as people who had moved from the overcrowded cities to the rural areas. Additionally, communities are expanding, resulting in new land being used. In Kuito in Bié province, according to HALO, there was an antivehicle incident in an area where new houses are under construction. Prior to the housing project the land had never been used.[63]

In 2009 HALO identified 76 mined areas covering 2.5km² of land in Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, and Kuando-Kubango, and from January–June 2010, 17 more mined areas measuring 744,551m². NPA identified 14 new mined areas in Kwanza Sul and Malanje covering 826,000m² in areas that were not accessible during the LIS from January–June 2010.[64] In Moxico province MAG did not identify new mined areas in 2009.[65]

Newly recorded mined areas identified in January 2009–June 2010

Mine clearance in 2009

Clearance results and the amount and variety of mines and ERW found and destroyed illustrate the longevity and intensity of the conflict in Angola. The results also reflect the problems with the database as the international NGOs and INAD reported different achievements than CNIDAH.

INAD demining in 2009

INAD clears mines in support of Angola’s national development plans in order to re-build the infrastructure damaged by the conflict that ended in 2002. INAD’s priorities include demining in support of efforts to build or rehabilitate airports, railways, bridges, hydro-electric power, schools, hospitals, roads, and communications, highlighted by the clearing of land to lay fiber optic cables. Much of the demining by INAD involves verifying the land is not mined rather than clearing it of mines.[66] Luke Atkinson, CNIDAH and INAD’s Chief Technical Advisor, said “The INAD data reflects the vast amount of verification that they have done rather than clearance.”[67] INAD does not differentiate clearance from verification in its reporting. In 2009 INAD purchased with government funding 10 Bozena 5 and two Hitachi BM 305-V33 flail machines to support its demining operations.[68] It has approximately 200 more deminers than the combined capacity of the international NGOs.

Yet, for 2009, INAD reported it had released 4.27km² of land by manual demining and 100km² by mechanical demining at airports, sites of future oil refineries, border posts, railways, schools, and other infrastructure with 53% of the results achieved in Benguela and Cunene provinces alone.[69] In addition, INAD verified 124km of railway, 422km of road, and a total strip of land 3,423km in length in order to lay fiber optic cables in 11 provinces, and found 2,222 antipersonnel mines, 154 antivehicle mines, and 32,724 items of UXO in the process.[70] To illustrate the problem with the national database, CNIDAH reported 60km² cleared by INAD with over 2,000km of road verified in 2009.[71]

At the end of 2009, INAD had 22 demining teams and approximately 1,000 personnel operating in 16 provinces.[72] It planned to add 450 more deminers in 2010.[73] INAD expenses in 2009 reportedly totaled AOA1,080,093,643 ($13,933,207).[74]

NGO demining in 2009

In 2009, five international NGOs and INAD cleared almost 802km² and found 6,190 antipersonnel mines, 1,821 antivehicle mines, and 7,812 items of UXO.[75] INAD reported finding 2,222 antipersonnel mines and 154 antivehicle mines in all its mine clearance, road and land verification, and EOD activities.[76] As of the end of 2009, humanitarian demining capacity consisted of five international NGOs comprising 62 teams and 562 deminers.

Mine clearance in 2009

N/R = Not reported

Demining by commercial companies in 2009

According to CNIDAH, the work performed by certain commercial companies does not follow the priorities set out in CNIDAH’s annual workplan. Private contractors take orders from their client, the National Reconstruction Office (GRN), whose mandate is funding infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, schools, and other buildings under the national development plan.[77] CNIDAH conducts quality assurance (QA) on commercial demining projects and determines when the cleared land should be handed over to the community for use.[78] There are 95 accredited commercial demining operators in Angola, but only 38 are considered operational. CNIDAH conducted quality control (QC) on 28 companies in 2009 that had finished tasks. QC with the other 10 operators was scheduled for 2010 after they finished clearance.[79] CNIDAH reported that although the commercial companies use IMSMA, they did not send reports to CNIDAH in IMSMA format, and there were many errors in the reports.[80]

Clearance of infrastructure in 2009

The LIS identified blocked roads as a nationwide problem with a particularly high impact in Bié, Huambo, and Moxico provinces.[81] According to INAD, all major roads have been cleared and were being paved with asphalt as planned by the Ministry of Public Works and Road Institute of Angola, who are responsible for the road project. The clearance of secondary roads over the next four years is one of the current reconstruction priorities.[82]

Vast amounts of roads have been checked for mine contamination. In 2008, Angola reported 423km of road had been cleared or verified, and in 2009 94km of road in three provinces was verified.^[83]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013. Angola is unlikely to meet its deadline and will therefore need to request an extension.[84]

Despite the completion of a national survey in 2007 and a major mine action program averaging between $30 million and $50 million per year since 2002, it is not known how much mined area remains to be cleared and significant numbers of previously unrecorded mined areas continue to be identified.

The Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty adopted the Cartagena Action Plan, under which States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, “will do their utmost to … [i]dentify, if they have not yet done so, the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced, report this information as required by Article 7, no later than the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, and incorporate the information into national action plans and relevant broader development and reconstruction plans.”[85]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area

No area containing unexploded submunitions was cleared in 2009, although HALO destroyed a number of abandoned cluster munitions, as noted above.

 Battle area clearance in 2009

There is very limited BAC in Angola. MgM reports that since 1996 they have never been tasked to do BAC.[86] In 2008, NPA reported BAC on 270,000m² of land but it did not conduct BAC in 2009. In 2010 as of June, NPA had conducted BAC on 14,000m².[87] No other operator, including government, national NGOs, and commercial companies reported BAC in 2008 or in 2009. In June 2010, HALO identified a site in Huambo province that had been used by unknown actors after the war to dispose of ammunition. The demolition resulted in UXO contamination as far as 500m from the site. HALO planned to conduct BAC to clear the area.[88]

Quality management

Each international demining operator and INAD has its own internal quality management system. After completing a clearance task CNIDAH is responsible for QA. However, the CNIDAH budget for QA covers only local salaries, leaving funding gaps for fuel, vehicle maintenance, and per diems.[89] The national budget line for QA available on the website of the Ministry of Finance is AOA19,879,544 ($256,446), or approximately $14,000 per province.[90] Since completion reports cannot be entered into the database until CNIDAH performs QA and the provincial governor signs off on the report, it is widely believed that the lack of QA after completion is the primary reason why the national database is not up to date. In 2009, the Huambo CNIDAH QA team concentrated all of its work on commercial demining operators that cleared railways and roads and some INAD tasks. CNIDAH does not quality assure FAA clearance.[91]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of mine/ERW risk education (RE). UNICEF phased out RE at the end of 2008 because it was no longer a national program priority and casualties had been reduced.[92] CNIDAH coordinates RE through its provincial offices.[93] Organizations are accredited to carry out RE activities by CNIDAH.[94]

In 2009, RE was implemented by seven national NGOs (down from 14 in 2008), as well as by the CVA and the demining operators in 15 provinces. INAD has an RE team in each of its 22 brigades operating throughout the country.[95] The Ministry of Education is no longer involved in RE as a result of changes within the Ministry because of elections in 2008, and then in early 2010 when a new constitution required changes in ministry personnel. The changes broke the link between CNIDAH and Ministry of Education.[96]

DCA, HALO, MAG, and NPA are engaged in survey and impact assessment and respond to reports of contamination from local communities.[97] Community marking is supported by UNICEF and implemented by Handicap International (HI) and the CVA.[98]

Casualties

Casualties in 2009

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified at least 28 mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Angola.[1] Data provided by the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) indicated that there may have been many more casualties, possibly as high as 88, but poor data quality made it impossible to confirm.[2] The 28 casualties in 2009 is a decrease compared with 52 in 2008, however, given the problems with data collection and management it is impossible to determine trends.

The majority of the confirmed casualties were adult men (15), of which two were security forces and one was a deminer injured by an antipersonnel mine. There was also one deminer of unknown gender involved in an incident with an unknown device. There were four child casualties (two boys killed and two girls injured).[3]

The total number of mine casualties in Angola is unknown, though estimates range from 23,000[4] to 80,000.[5] However, no details were available to substantiate these figures and it was reported that fewer than 300 casualties were entered in CNIDAH’s central database.[6] Between 2000 and 2009, Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,692 mine/ERW casualties including 885 killed, 1662 injured, and 145 for which the outcome was unknown.[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Angola is unknown but there are many thousands. In just one province, Huambo, one organization had over 2,500 mine/ERW survivors registered as beneficiaries.[8]

In 2009, no needs assessment of mine/ERW survivors was carried out in Angola. CNIDAH began preparations for an 18-month survivor survey and needs assessment to plan victim assistance activities. The survey was due to begin in 2010.[9]

Victim assistance coordination[10]

In 2009, CNIDAH held at least one meeting of the Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration, which was used to evaluate progress in implementing the victim assistance action plan.[11] It was recommended that CNIDAH should do more to encourage the involvement of relevant ministries in victim assistance.[12] CNIDAH reported coordinating with NGOs with regard to the planning of the survivor survey. However, key NGO stakeholders were not aware of plans.[13] Reportedly, there was little coordination in general between CNIDAH and NGOs.[14]    Coordination of physical rehabilitation services by the National Rehabilitation Program was said to have ceased in 2009.[15]

By the end of 2009, about half of the objectives in Angola’s victim assistance action plan remained “in process,” and activities to achieve the remaining stated objectives by 2011 had not yet begun. The one exception was in the advanced training of 11 orthopedic technicians, an objective met in 2008.[16]

Angola did not provide updates on victim assistance progress at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Colombia in November–December 2009 or at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2010.

Some survivors’ associations and disabled persons organizations were included in the meeting of the Sub-Commission.[17] Recommendations regarding disability rights made by disability networks to the Constitutional Reform Commission were mostly included in the new constitution.[18] Survivors were involved in the implementation of victim assistance activities including peer support through NGOs.[19]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[20]

No significant improvements were reported in the accessibility or quality of victim assistance services in Angola in 2009. A lack of transportation remained the greatest obstacle to accessing services for survivors living in rural areas.[21] A decline in funding and a lack of materials led to a decrease in the quality or availability of services, most especially physical rehabilitation services.[22]

2009 saw an increase in the number of rural medical posts. However, these centers lacked the specialists needed to treat mine injuries and patients were transferred to provincial medical centers.[23]

At least six of 11 rehabilitation centers were facing financial problems in 2009, and another two were forced to close because of the deterioration of the physical infrastructure.[24] A lack of transportation prevented many survivors from accessing services.[25] The Luena Rehabilitation Center reported that irregular and insufficient delivery of materials from the National Rehabilitation Program was affecting the quality of rehabilitation services.[26] Other service providers also reported a lack of materials.[27] Construction had not begun, as of the end of 2009, for a new physical rehabilitation center planned for Malanje province, for which funds had been raised in 2007 and 2008.[28] The return of orthopedic technicians from training contributed to improved quality of prosthetic and orthotic devices.[29]

Two community-based rehabilitation projects were closed in Gabela, Kwanza Sul province and Viana, a town outside Luanda, because of a lack of funds.[30]

There was no progress in the availability of psychological support. Numerous survivors suffered from trauma, low self-esteem, and substance abuse. The only psychosocial support available in 2009 was through peer support groups.[31] There were also no significant changes in economic inclusion. 

While the law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, it was not enforced and discrimination was prevalent.[32] The approval procedure for the Protection Law for Persons with Disabilities, drafted in 2000, remained stalled.[33]

As of 27 July 2010, Angola had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

In 2009, for the first time, Angola reported its mine action contribution. It provided AOA3,488,191.042 (US$44,997,664). Government of Angola funding supported the activities of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) to coordinate mine action. CNIDAH-funded activities included support to 17 provincial offices of the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) for survey and clearance by Angolan commercial companies in support of the country’s national development priorities. INAD reported its 2009 expenditures were AOA1,080,093,643 ($13,933,208).^[1]

Government funding included AOA1,025,678,589 ($13,231,254) for victim assistance.^[2] Most victim assistance funding went towards equipment and the orthopedic center in Viana, while at least six of 11 rehabilitation centers faced financial problems, and another two closed in 2009 due to a lack of funding.^[3]

National contributions: 2009[4]

Angola has been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. In 2005–2006 it received $83.9 million and in 2007–2009 another $60.7 million. Although the contributions in 2007–2009 represent a significant decline in funding from international donors, the decline is partly the result of the expiration of large UNDP-supported capacity-building projects and smaller donor contributions. In 2009, 13 donors contributed $18,842,472 to mine action in Angola, compared to 18 donors and $35,771,510 in 2005.[5] Almost all contributions were for clearance; only Japan provided funding for victim assistance.

International government contributions: 2009[6]

N/R = not reported

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[7]

N/R = not reported