United Kingdom

Last Updated: 31 August 2012

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

State Party

National implementation measures

Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010

Stockpile destruction

Expects to complete destruction by the end of 2013

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2012

Key developments

Submitted annual updated Article 7 report in April 2012

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 4 May 2010. It became a State Party on 1 November 2010. 

The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 entered into force on 25 March 2010 and creates criminal offenses for violations of the prohibitions contained in the convention.[1] In November 2010, the UK stated that under its Export Control Order of 2008, cluster munitions are considered in the highest category of prohibited exports.[2]

The UK submitted its annual updated Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2012, covering the period from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.[3]

The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster bombs, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.[4]

The UK continued its active engagement with the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2011 and the first half of 2012. The UK attended the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011. Its head of delegation, UK Ambassador to Lebanon Tom Fletcher, gave a strong statement drawing on his personal experience of the Oslo Process as “part of the UK team in Downing Street that worked flat out with our mission in Geneva,” noting, “[t]he arguments were fierce. But the humanitarian and moral case prevailed.”[5] The UK made a number of interventions during the meeting, including on stockpile destruction and retention, international cooperation and assistance, and universalization.

The UK participated in the convention’s second intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2012, where it made statements on universalization, stockpile destruction and retention, and the convention’s architecture.

Promotion of the convention

In 2011 and the first half of 2012, the UK repeatedly stated its commitment to working towards the universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In cooperation with the ICRC and NGOs, the UK held a workshop in London in October 2011 to promote universalization of the ban convention with Commonwealth countries.[6] Also in October 2011, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alistair Burt stated, “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has consistently taken opportunities to lobby counterparts from Russia, China and the US to prohibit cluster munitions and to join the convention. This has included discussions in London, at relevant international meetings, and direct lobbying through our overseas network.”[7]

The UK says it is taking “all appropriate opportunities, be they bilateral or multilateral” to promote universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[8] In September 2011, the UK said that it was looking at using the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings “as another means of encouraging fellow Commonwealth Countries, not yet States Parties, to join the Convention.”[9] In April 2012, the UK expressed its “hope that we can increase the value of co-ordination between states and civil society in our work to promote the convention.”[10]

At the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2011, the UK cautioned, “we must not be complacent. The fact that countries are still using cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians should enrage us. We should not have to have this conversation again. … [L]et this end, enough is enough.”[11] In February 2011, a UK Foreign Office spokesperson expressed “serious concern” at reports of Thai use of cluster munitions in its border conflict with Cambodia, stating, “We condemn in the strongest terms the use of cluster munitions that causes unacceptable harm to the civilian population.”[12] In March 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron stated, “we do not use [cluster munitions] and we do not believe that others should either.”[13]

Interpretive issues

The UK expressed its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of key provisions in the convention during the process of preparing its national legislation, including the prohibition on foreign stockpiling, the prohibition on transit, the prohibition on investment in cluster munitions producers, and the prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations. A number of ministerial statements are on record clarifying the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues and recognizing the positive obligations under the convention.[14] Additionally, during late 2010 several questions were raised in Parliament in response to reports in the British media based on US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks.

Foreign stockpiling

In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK said it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention.[15] In December 2009, the government stated that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[16] In November 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[17] 

Transit

In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”[18]

In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.”[19] In January 2011, a Minister of State, Lord Howell of Guildford, clarified that this provision had been used only once, stating that “the one exception was made very properly by the previous Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Miliband, allowing the US a temporary extension of its right to keep cluster munitions while it went through the process of getting rid of them as part of the running down of cluster munitions stores in UK territory and in the United Kingdom. That is the only exception that has ever been made. For the future, we will consider bringing to Parliament and recording any decisions that may be proposed for temporary extension, and we will do that on a case-by-case basis. I have to say that in a number of instances it could be governed and limited by security considerations.”[20]

In November 2011, UK officials confirmed that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory.[21]

A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, stated that the head of the Foreign Office's Security Policy Group, Nicolas Pickard, had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted.” According to the cable, the UKs position was that any U.S. cluster munitions currently stored on British territory (either UK territory proper, Diego Garcia, or elsewhere) would be permitted to stay until 2013, while any new cluster munitions the USG [US Government] wanted to bring to those sites after the treaty's entry into force for the UK - either before or after 2013 - would require the temporary exception. Any movement of cluster munitions from ships at Diego Garcia to planes there, temporary transit, or use from British territory also would require the temporary exception after entry into force.”[22]

The cable quoted a UK Foreign Office official as telling US officials that: “It would be better for the USG [US government] and HMG [Her Majesty’s Government - UK] not to reach final agreement on this temporary agreement understanding until after the CCM ratification process is completed in Parliament, so that they can tell parliamentarians that they have requested the USG to remove its cluster munitions by 2013, without complicating/muddying the debate by having to indicate that this request is open to exceptions.”

Foreign Secretary Hague said there was “no evidence that Parliament was misled” during the development of the national implementation legislation.[23] The minister of state responsible for the legislation in the previous Labour government said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”[24]

Interoperability

The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability, the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions, are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation.[25] In June 2011, the UK said that its interpretation of the Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with nonStates Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[26]

During the development of the UK’s implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions.[27] When pushed by members of parliament to clarify just exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control,” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[28]

Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military.[29] The government responded that, “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged…. We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.”[30] A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.

In May 2011, Foreign Secretary William Hague, responding to a parliamentary question about use of cluster munitions in Libya, said, “We are aware of media reports of the use of cluster munitions by Gaddafi regime forces, in particular around Misrata. We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.”[31]

Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs

The 2010 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act makes it an offence for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition” or “to make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.

In September 2011, the issue of advertising of cluster munitions at arms fairs in the UK again emerged when Green Party leader Caroline Lucas MP raised concern that the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibition (DSEi) in London were displaying promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions.[32] Lucas stated that she was “shocked that the British Government seems unable or unwilling to police arms sales happening here on its own soil.”[33]

DSEi permanently shut down both exhibits after the materials were found to “breach UK government export controls and our own contractual requirements.”[34] NGOs had raised concerns about the same Pakistani companies for advertising cluster munitions at DSEi in 2009.[35]

In December 2011, the government said, “provided companies which produce cluster munitions do not engage in such promotional activities in the UK the Government have no plans to prohibit such companies from attending UK trade events.” The government placed responsibility with the event organizers, noting that “major UK defence exhibitions are commercial events and the admission of companies is a matter for the commercial organisers.”[36]

In February 2012, Lord Dubs questioned the government on actions they had taken following the display of promotional material for cluster munitions at DSEi in September 2011. The government asserted that the display was in breach of the terms of conditions of the fair, and noted that they would continue to emphasize to the organizers the importance of exhibitors complying with such conditions. The government failed to mention that advertising cluster munitions in the UK is contrary to UK law under the 2010 Cluster Munitions Act.[37]

Investment

While direct investment in cluster munitions is considered prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed. Previously, in January 2011, the UK government recognized the need for further work to address “the problem of remote financing” and said that it had set up a working group to look into the matter.[38] The working group is not believed to have met as of July 2012. In October 2011, Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Alistair Burt, stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.”[39] Other parliamentary statements suggest little work by the government to address the issue of indirect investment.[40]

Financial institutions have responded to public pressure and campaigning actions by NGOs calling for disinvestment from cluster munition manufacturers. Research by IKV Pax Christi and Fairfin (formerly Netwerk Vlaanderen),[41] together with public campaigning led by Amnesty International UK,[42] received strong media interest in the second half of 2011 and first half of 2012.

In August 2011, The Independent newspaper reported that “The Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, Barclays, and HSBC have all provided funding to the makers of cluster bombs, even as international opinion turns against a weapons system that is inherently indiscriminate and routinely maims or kills civilians.”[43] On 1 September 2011, Reuters reported that the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) had changed its policy and issued a statement that “after discussions with various NGO (non-governmental organization) groups, we have identified some defence sector clients whose activities could be considered to be outside the spirit of the Convention. As a result, we will be suspending all further services to any client where we cannot be certain that they are in compliance with our policy.”[44] In October 2011, a treasury official stated that with respect to Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, “[b]oth publicly-owned banks have issued denials that they knowingly support or provide finance to companies who manufacture weapons that would be in breach of the convention. RBS has publicly stated that it will not knowingly support or provide finance to companies who manufacture weapons that would be in breach of the letter or the spirit of the convention.”[45]

On 14June 2012, IKV Pax Christi and FairFin launched their updated report “Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions.” The report highlighted significant progress in UK financial institutions moving away from investment in cluster munition manufacturers, noting in particular positive developments in the positions of Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Aviva, Co-operative Financial Services and HSBC.[46] However, some nine UK financial institutions were criticized by the report for continuing to undertake investments in companies producing these weapons.[47] The NGO Handicap International (HI) reinforced the report’s release with an online petition action “Don’t let the government stay silent on cluster bomb investments.”[48]

In July 2012, Transport for London faced criticism in the media and from HI UK for accepting advertisements from US arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin, a known producer of cluster munitions.[49]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

The UK is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). After actively supporting a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions for several years, the UK played a more passive role in both the preliminary and final negotiations during the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in Geneva in November 2011. The UK’s dwindling level of activity came after a significant domestic debate on the merits of the draft protocol under consideration.

In August 2011 when it appeared that the chair’s draft text of a cluster munitions protocol might be agreed upon at the Review Conference, UK NGOs coordinated by the NGO Article 36 worked in partnership with parliamentarians from the All Party Parliamentary Group on Weapons and Protection of Civilians to undertake intensive outreach aimed at ensuring that the UK would not support a legal instrument in the CCW that established a lower standard than that of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[50]

Member of Parliament Martin Caton (Labour, Gower) presented a cross-party motion in the House of Commons on 7 November that affirmed the “historic” Convention on Cluster Munitions and expressed alarm “at the attempt by the US and others to use the United Nations Convention on certain Conventional Weapons to negotiate a new protocol on cluster munitions that would ban some older weapons but allow, indefinitely, some of the worst offenders.”[51] While initiating a parliamentary debate in the House of Commons on 9 November 2011, Caton expressed concern that a CCW protocol “would be a major step backwards, as it would effectively undermine” the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[52]

In response, Minister of State David Lidington said “we are a long way from seeing a protocol that we regard as worth debating or as acceptable in any way” and affirmed that the UK’s participation in the Review Conference would be “guided by our determination to deliver a significant humanitarian outcome and, crucially, not to undermine the progress made under the Oslo treaty.”[53] In response to a parliamentary question, Foreign Secretary William Hague stated, “[W]e certainly do not want to weaken what has been agreed in the past.”[54]

In a debate in the House of Lords on 10 November 2011, Lord Elton asked the government to explain how its support for the CCW protocol was consistent with its obligations under Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions to promote the ban with states not party. In response, Lord Howell asserted that the UK would “not sign up to anything that would undermine the gold standard … of the existing convention,” stating that “we do not want to legitimise lower standards or undermine or dilute the Convention on Cluster Munitions in any way.”[55]

During the two weeks of negotiations on the chair’s draft text at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2011 the UK did not make any notable statements or undertake any significant activities either in support of or opposition to the draft text. On the final day of the conference, the UK did not join with a group of 50 states that issued a joint statement declaring that the draft CCW protocol did not enjoy consensus and was unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective.[56]

The conference ended without adopting a protocol and with no proposals to continue negotiations in 2012, marking the end of the CCW’s work on cluster munitions. By remaining silent during the review conference, the UK was acknowledged by some as opposing the CCW protocol, even though it did not provide its views in support or against the consensus on adopting it.[57]

Use, production, and transfer

The UK used cluster munitions extensively in the past, including in the Falkland Islands in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.[58]

The UK has also produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions.

The UK produced several variants the BL-755 bomb with 147 submunitions, and has also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries.[59]

BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise finally possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[60]

The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.[61]

Stockpiling and destruction

The UK has declared the possession of a stockpile of 191,128 cluster munitions and 38,758,898 submunitions.[62] The stockpile was withdrawn from service by 30 May 2008 and the majority had been destroyed as of July 2012.

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK is required to declare and destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2018.

In September 2011, the UK affirmed, “it is our intention that all UK stocks will be destroyed by the end of 2013,” and said the destruction schedule “reflects the limited destruction capacity available to destroy the munitions in a safe, secure, environmentally friendly and responsible manner.”[63]

In April 2012, the UK reported that 71.51% of the UK stockpile had been destroyed. It reported the destruction of 5,561,556 explosive submunitions in the reporting period (1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012).[64] In its initial Article 7 report (April 2011), the UK indicated that some 16,605,750 explosive submunitions remained in stocks as of 31 March 2011 (excluding those retained for training and research).[65] Therefore, this reporting period saw the destruction of approximately one-third of the remaining UK stockpile. As of 31 March 2012, the UK reported that 11,044,194 explosive submunitions were still to be destroyed.[66]

Cluster munitions stockpiled and destroyed by the UK

Munition type

Submunition type (and quantity per weapon)

Quantity destroyed before entry into force

Quantity destroyed after EIF to 31 March 2011

Quantity destroyed 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012

Quantity reported in stock at 31 March 2012

Status

 

BL-755 bomb

No2 Mk1 (147)

351,771

 

-

-

-

All stocks destroyed

IBL-755 bomb

No2 Mk1 (147)

588

-

-

-

All stocks destroyed

RBL-755 bomb

No2 Mk1 (147)

189,630

-

-

-

All stocks destroyed

CRV-7 M261 rocket

M73 (9)

41,139

-

-

-

All stocks destroyed

M26 rocket

M77 (644)

10,510,082

3,234,166

4,459,056

9,934,344

Destruction ongoing

L20A1 projectile

M85 (49)

120,197

410,375

1,102,500

1,109,850

Destruction ongoing

M483 projectile

M42/M46 (88)

7,295,200

-

-

-

All stocks destroyed

Total

 

18,508,607

3,644,541

5,561,556

11,044,194

 

The stockpile destruction is being conducted by German company NAMMO Buck (for the L20A1 projectiles) and by the Italian company Esplodenti Sabino (for the M26 rockets).[67] The UK has estimated the cost of destruction at approximately £40 million.[68]

Retention for training

In its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (April 2011), the UK declared that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four different types and reported that 12 of the M42 explosive submunitions had been consumed within the reporting period to 31 March 2011.[69]

The UK’s second Article 7 report (April 2012) lists the same 956 explosive submunitions of four different types retained for training.[70]

In September 2011, the UK informed States Parties that “it is the UK's current intention to not retain any prohibited munitions from our own, former operational, UK stocks. We will however, retain a small number of prohibited sub-munitions for trials, development and training activities for the advancement of counter measures to any uncertain future threats; acting, of course, within the requirements of Article 3.6.” The UK stated that while “the numbers that the UK may retain in the future may vary as operational circumstances dictate” it will “always remain the minimum necessary.”[71]

The “Starstreak” missile

Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous relationship of the “Starstreak” high velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, to the terms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act.[72] In 2012, these missiles became a focus of public attention in the UK after it was announced that a number of these systems would be situated on London residential rooftops as part of the air-defense security arrangements for the 2012 London Olympics. In addition to protest marches and petitions, the deployment led residents in one of the sites to seek a judicial review of the placement of the missiles on the grounds that it may make the residences a target for terrorist attack. However, their appeal for such a review was rejected.[73]

 



[1] House of Lords, Hansard, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, HMSO, 25 March 2010), Column 1057, www.publications.parliament.uk; and “Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, 2010 Chapter 11,” www.opsi.gov.uk. See, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/11/contents. A person guilty of an offense under this section is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or a fine, or both. For analysis of the legislation, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111.

[2] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 12 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[3] The UK submitted its initial Article 7 report on 28 April 2011, for the period ending 31 March 2011.

[4] Statement by Gordon Brown, Prime Minister, “Breakthrough on cluster bombs draws closer,” 28 May 2008. For more details on the UK’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 173–180.

[5] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 13 Sept 2011, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/statement_uk.pdf.

[6] In April 2012, the UK stated that “30 out of 54 Commonwealth countries are signatories [to the Convention on Cluster Munitions] and we anticipate the accession or ratification of others in the near future.” Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 April 2012, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/04/UK_Universalisation.pdf.

[7] Statement by Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 11 October 2011), Column 323W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111011/text/111011w0001.htm#11101191000224.

[8] Statement by Jo Adamson, Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 19 October 2011; and Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 April 2012, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/04/UK_Universalisation.pdf.

[9] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 Sept 2011, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/univ_uk.pdf.

[10] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 April 2012, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/04/UK_Universalisation.pdf.

[11] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 Sept 2011, http://ukinlebanon.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=PressR&id=654890882.

12 Andrew Spooner, “UK Government condemns Thai use of cluster munitions,” Asian Correspondent, 13 April 2011.

[13] House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 18 March 2011), Column 626.

[14] See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111.

[15] Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, FCO, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79.

[16] Statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

[17] Statement of UK, First Meeting of States Parties, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Vientiane, 10 November 2011.

[18] Statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

[19] Statement by Lord Astor of Hever, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence, Conservative, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 21 December 2010), Column 278W.

[20] Statement by Lord Howell of Guildford, FCO, Conservative, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 31 January 2011), Column 1186, www.theyworkforyou.com. See also, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, 9 December 2010, c427W, Secretary of State, Defence, Liam Fox: “Neither I nor any other Secretary of State in this Government has issued any authorisation under Article 8 of the Act. Article 8 does not require such requests to be scrutinised by Parliament. However, in the event of a future request, we would consider on a case-by-case basis how best we can keep Parliament informed within the constraints of classification and operational planning.”

[21] Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111101/text/111101w0004.htm#1111024001854.

[22] “UK CLUSTER MUNITIONS DIALOGUE,”  US Department of State cable 052368 dated 21 May 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010, www.guardian.co.uk.

[23] House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 14 December 2010), Column 814.

[24] House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 15 December 2010), Column 913. In June 2008, Minister of State for the FCO, Lord Malloch-Brown, stated that although the UK did not read the prohibition on foreign stockpiling as a legal requirement under the treaty, it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention. The government later told parliamentarians that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.” Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, FCO, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79; statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.

[25] The clause states: “It is a defence for a person charged with an offence specified in any of paragraphs 1 to 6 of Schedule 2 [the prohibitions of the convention] to show that the person’s conduct took place in the course of, or for the purposes of, an international military operation or an international military co-operation activity.” Members in the House of Commons went to great lengths to seek clarification on the scope of this clause.

[26] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Session on Other Implementation Measures, Geneva, 30 June 2011.

[27] See for example, statement by William Cash, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 160; statement by Jo Swinson, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 906; and statements by John Redwood and William Cash, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Columns 902–903.

[28] Statements by John Redwood and Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 162.

[29] Statement by John Redwood, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 163.

[30] House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Columns 161–164.

[31] Statement by William Hague, Foreign Secretary, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 May 2011), Column 447W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110523/text/110523w0004.htm#11052422000728.

[32] Pakistan Ordnance Factory advertised the 155mm dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM), an artillery shell containing 45 submunitions, while Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organisation advertised the 155mm Improved Conventional Munition M483A1, an artillery shell containing 88 submunitions.

[33] Green Party web story: “Green MP calls for London arms exhibition to be shut down after cluster bombs promoted,” undated, http://www.greenparty.org.uk/news/green-mp-calls-for-dsei-to-be-shut-down.html.

[34] Nick Hopkins, “Companies ejected from London arms fair for ‘promoting cluster bombs’: Violation of Oslo accord discovered by MP who calls for action to investigate ‘what other breaches are occurring’ at the fair,” The Guardian, 16 September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/16/ejected-arms-fair-cluster-bombs.

[35] Article 36 statement, “Cluster bomb promotion at DSEi reveals serious shortcomings,” 16 September 2011, http://www.article36.org/weapons/cluster-munitions/cluster-bomb-promotion-at-dsei-reveals-serious-shortcomings/.

[36] Statement by Mark Prisk, Minister of State, Business, Innovation, and Skills, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 13 December 2011), Column 743W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111213/text/111213w0005.htm#1112141002843.

[37] Statement by Lord Howell of Guildford, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard,  (London: HMSO, 6 February 2012), Column 6W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201212/ldhansrd/text/120206w0001.htm#12020626000033.

[39]Statement by Alistair Burt, Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 11 October 2011), Column 322W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111011/text/111011w0001.htm#11101191000223.

[40] Statement by Mark Prisk, Minister of State, Business, Innovation, and Skills, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 11 January 2012), Column 331W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120111/text/120111w0002.htm#12011196002964.

[41] IKV Pax Christi and Netwerk Vlaanderen, “Worldwide investments in cluster munitions – a shared responsibility.” Utrecht, May 2011, www.ikvpaxchristi.nl.

[42] Amnesty UK, “Cluster Bombs: RBS Responds,” 17 August 2011, http://pthblog.amnesty.org.uk/cluster-bombs-rbs-responds/.

[43] Jerome Taylor, “UK banks fund deadly cluster-bomb industry,” The Independent, 16 August 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-banks-fund-deadly-clusterbomb-industry-2338168.html.

[44] “RBS to cut ties with cluster bomb firms,” Reuters, 1 September 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/uk-rbs-clusterbombs-idUKTRE78041J20110901.

[45] Statement by Mark Hoban, Financial Secretary, HM Treasury, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 10 October 2011), Column 124W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111010/text/111010w0005.htm#11101113000381.

[46] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide investments in cluster munitions – a shared responsibility.” Utrecht, June 2012, pp. 104-105, 108, 110, & 112, http://www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/uploads/pdf/Worldwide%20investments%20in%20cluster%20munitions;%20a%20shared%20responsibility%20June%202012%20Final.pdf.

[47] Ibid., pp. 18-22.

[48] Handicap International UK, “Take Action Now: Don’t let the government stay silent on cluster bomb investment,” undated, http://act.handicap-international.org.uk/lobby/12/.

[49] Adam Bienkov, “Transport for London slammed for ‘cluster bomb’ producer adverts,” The Scoop, 9 July 2012, http://snipelondon.com/scoop/transport-for-london-slammed-for-cluster-bomb-producer-adverts.

[50] Article 36 statement, “Pressure mounts on UK ahead of cluster bomb talks,” 9 November 2011, http://www.article36.org/weapons/cluster-munitions/pressure-mounts-on-uk-ahead-of-cluster-bomb-talks/; “Editorial: No backsliding on cluster bombs,” The Independent, 9 November 2011,

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-no-backsliding-on-cluster-bombs-6259009.html.

[51] The motion was co-sponsored by 36 MPs from different parties, including the Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, Alliance Party, Green Party, Scottish National Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Democratic Unionist Party. Early day motion 2381 on “cluster munitions” tabled by Martin Caton on 7 November 2011, http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2010-12/2381.

[52] Statement by Martin Caton, MP, Labor, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 9 November 2011), Column 413, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111109/debtext/111109-0004.htm#111109105001539.

[53] Statement by David Lidington, Minister of State, FCO, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 9 November 2011), Column 419, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111109/debtext/111109-0004.htm#111109105001546.

[54] Statement by William Hague, Foreign Secretary, in response to a question by Douglas Alexander, MP, Labour, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 9 November 2011), Column 291, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111109/debtext/111109-0001.htm#11110985001640.

[55] Statement by Lord Howell of Guildford, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 10 November 2011), Columns 335 and 337, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/111110-0001.htm#11111078000044.

[56] Joint Statement read by Costa Rica, on behalf of Afghanistan, Angola, Austria, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 25 November 2011. List confirmed in email from Bantan Nugroho, Head of the CCW Implementation Support Unit, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1 June 2012.

[57] See for example, Richard Norton-Taylor, “Britain unites with smaller countries to block US bid to legalise cluster bombs,” The Guardian, 25 November 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/25/us-cluster-bombs-bid-blocked.

[58] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,” vol. 11, no. 6(D), June 1999; HRW, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” vol. 12, no. 1(D), February 2000; and HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: HRW, 2003).

[59] Adam Ingram, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 November 2003), Columns 497W and 498W.

[60] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 468–470; Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008), entries for: Iran, 10 January 2008; Italy, 10 January 2008; Netherlands, 10 January 2008; Oman, 10 January 2008; Pakistan, 10 January 2008; Saudi Arabia, 3 December 2007; Thailand, 10 January 2008; and United Arab Emirates, 10 January 2008; and Landmine Action, Explosive remnants of war: unexploded ordnance and post-conflict communities (London: Landmine Action, 2002), www.landmineaction.org. Croatia, Germany, Montenegro, and Portugal declared stockpiles of BL-755 bombs, or the destruction thereof, in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports submitted in January 2011. BiH disclosed stockpiling BL-755 in a statement to the intersessional meeting on stockpile destruction held in Geneva in June 2011.

[61] The US supplied the UK with 1,008 CBU-87 cluster bombs at some point between 1970 and 1995, but they do not appear to be in service any longer. US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” obtained by HRW in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) reported in June 2009 that it contracted the destruction 600 CBU-87 bombs for the UK. See, presentation by Peter Courtney-Green, Chief of the Ammunition Support Branch, NAMSA, “Technical Aspects of Cluster Munitions Stockpile Destruction,” Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, 25 June 2009, slide 15.

[62] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012; and UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2011.

[63] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/ssd_united_kingdom.pdf.

[64] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012.

[65] Ibid,, 28 April 2011.

[66] Ibid., 30 April 2012.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/ssd_united_kingdom.pdf.

[69] 576 KV-1 (from the M87 Orkan), 244 M42 (from the M483A1), 96 M46 (from the M483A1), and 40 Alpha submunitions (from the CB470). Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 28 April 2011.

[70] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2012. The report also notes that 12 M42 submunitions consumed in the reporting period, but the total retained was not adjusted as a result of the consumption. In July 2012, a UK official clarified to the Monitor that no submunitions were consumed by the UK in the second Article 7 report’s period and the report’s inclusion of 12 consumed submunitions was an error. Email from Graham Jessup, Conventional Disarmament Officer, Arms Trade Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 July 2012.

[71] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/ssd_united_kingdom.pdf.

[72] Questions had been raised about the status of the “Starstreak” missile, manufactured by Thales Air Defence Limited (TADL) in the UK, in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munition (Prohibitions) Act. Some literature produced by the manufacturer has asserted a utility for the weapon against ground-based targets, which would seem to contradict its exclusion from the Convention on Cluster Munitions on the basis that it has been “designed exclusively for an air defence role.” For a detailed discussion of the “Starstreak” missile, see Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), p. 177.

[73] “London 2012: East London residents march over missiles,” BBC, 30 June 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18658190; and “London 2012: Missile tenants lose legal ruling,” BBC, 10 July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18778723.


Last Updated: 16 December 2012

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Mines

The United Kingdom (UK) is affected by antipersonnel mines by virtue of its control and assertion of full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas,[1] which were contaminated during the armed conflict between the UK and Argentina in 1982. The conflict resulted in many thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, most by Argentina. Following land release in 2011–2012 (see below), it is believed that 113 mined areas remain to be released, covering a total area of more than 9km2, and which contain some 19,000 mines.[2]

No human casualties from mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) have been reported in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas since 1984. The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and two more were injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.

No civilian mine casualties have ever occurred on the islands.[3] Over the years, however, there have been numerous instances where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence has reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.[4] On 6 December 2008, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falklands but were not injured. In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 (then US$1,503) for entering a minefield on Goose Green.[5] It is a criminal offense on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas to enter a minefield.

The socio-economic impact of contamination in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is said to be minimal. All mined and suspected hazardous areas are reported to have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.”[6] According to the UK, the mined areas represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.”[7] A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animal’s deaths.[8]

Cluster munition remnants

There are an unknown number of cluster munition remnants on the Falklands Islands/Malvinas as a result of use of BL755 cluster bombs by the UK against Argentine positions during the 1982 armed conflict.

In February 2009, in a letter to Landmine Action, the Ministry of Defence stated the following: “According to historical records either 106 or 107 Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147 BL755 submunitions and using the higher CBU figure (107), a total of 15,729 sub-munitions were dropped. Using a 6.4% failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15 years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given that 1,378 BL 755s were cleared in the first year after the conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed of since (totaling 1,498), clearly there was a slightly higher failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573 had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands, many of these will have been buried well below the surface. We believe that the majority of those remaining are now contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared in due course.”[9]

Clearance operations in 2009–2010 across four mined areas destroyed two submunitions.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

The precise extent of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is not known, though a number of UXO are believed to remain to be cleared. Clearance operations in 2009–2010 across four mined areas encountered and destroyed 11 ERW, including the two unexploded submunitions noted above.[11] The UK has also noted the presence of booby-traps on the islands.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Authority

NMAA

Mine action center

Falkland Islands DPO

National demining operator

None

A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) composed of both the UK and the Falkland Islands governments was established in 2009 to oversee clearance of mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.[13] The Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted the UK’s undertaking to provide regular reports on the establishment of an NMAA “and other implementation bodies.”[14]

In May 2009, the UK issued a request to tender for the Falkland Islands Demining Programme Office (DPO). The role of the DPO is to execute the policies of the NMAA and to coordinate mine action activities on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.[15] In August 2009, the contract to establish the DPO was awarded to Colin King Associates,[16] which subsequently set up the Office at Tenacres, south of Stanley.[17]

In mid-October 2009, it was announced that the organization Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment and Consultancy International Limited (BACTEC) had been awarded the contract to clear four sites at Fox Bay (East), Goose Green, Sapper Hill, and Surf Bay (near the airport).[18] Operations were initiated at the beginning of December 2009.[19] BACTEC left the islands in 2010, but returned in 2011 for a land release project.[20]

Land Release

The first formal clearance operations since the UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 took place at the end of 2009 through April 2010. Four sites were cleared, destroying a total of 1,246 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.[21] Operations generally used manual techniques, although a mechanical unit was deployed to one site to accelerate clearance in sandy areas.[22] Since then, no mines have been cleared on the islands. A survey project in 2011–2012 canceled/released 3.7km2 of suspect hazardous area.[23]

Mine clearance in 2011

No mines were cleared during the land release work in 2011–2012.[24]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension request granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008), the UK is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 March 2019.

Following opposition from a number of States Parties, as well as the ICBL and ICRC, to the UK’s blanket 10-year extension request at its initial presentation, the UK had revised its request to make it explicit that Scenario 5 of the Field Survey (part of the Feasibility Study conducted by Cranfield University) was its clearance plan for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations.[25] Scenario 5 proposed clearance of all mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas within a 10-year period, beginning with the establishment of a project office on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and ending with the handover of all cleared land to a fully-fledged mine action center.[26] The UK decided to disregard the Field Survey’s recommendation for trials of clearance methods and to proceed directly to full clearance.[27]

While “a number of substantive concerns were raised,” the Ninth Meeting of States Parties decided to grant the request for an extension until 1 March 2019. The meeting took note of the UK’s agreement to provide as soon as possible (but not later than 30 June 2010) a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5.[28] The meeting also noted that the UK will keep the possibility of reducing the time necessary to fulfill its obligations under annual review. A number of States Parties expressed the wish that the UK proceed with the implementation of Article 5 much faster than suggested by the amount of time requested.[29]

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the UK stated, “We are delighted to announce that the 4-site pilot project started on 4 December 2009, completed on 4 June.”[30] The UK stated that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) “will now analyse the data gathered from this project and make recommendations for future work based on this analysis to the new Government. We intend to report the findings of our analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.”[31]

The UK did not announce any further clearance plans at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties. In a statement to the meeting, the ICBL regretted the failure of the UK to meet its undertaking to provide “as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010 a detailed explanation of … the implications for future demining” in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.[32]

The UK still has more than 110 mined areas to clear or otherwise release in less than seven years. The ICBL has called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It has also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a humanitarian impact.[33] In response, in June 2011 the UK stated that it had planned a two-year pilot project in its extension request before it would be in a position to set out a full plan to meet its legal obligations.[34] 

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2020.

As noted above, the Falkland Islands/Malvinas are believed to be still affected to a limited extent by unexploded submunitions. In its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, the UK states that “there are no UK areas contaminated by cluster munitions or explosive sub-munitions.”[35] The UK seems to consider the possible contamination in the Falklands to be residual in nature and not amenable to being addressed in terms of “contaminated areas.” With significant amounts of clearance already completed, such an assessment may be reasonable. This assessment could be further clarified by the release of any data on the locations of strikes using BL-755 cluster munitions to determine if any strikes were targeted inside the mined areas. Any strike sites inside mined areas would likely not have been addressed in the earlier phase of clearance due to the challenge of access.

Quality management

The clearance program was said to be working to a set of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), originally drafted by Cranfield University and closely related to International Mine Action Standards. Following award of the contract for the DPO, a full review of NMAS was carried out and a number of amendments to points of detail were recommended for consideration by the NMAA based in London.[36]

The DPO conducted quality control over BACTEC’s demining activities to ensure that they met the required standards.[37]

 



[1] There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falklands Islands/Malvinas with Argentina.

[2] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2. The estimate of the number of mines remaining to be cleared was higher than the 16,000 reported by Argentina in 2006. See Argentina Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 May 2006.

[3] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[4] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.

[5] Lisa Johnson, “Lucky minefield incident for landing crew in Falklands,” MercoPress, 9 December 2008, www.mercopress.com.

[6] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 1.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.

[9] Letter from Lt.-Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.

[10] Statement of the UK, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2010.

[11] Ibid.

[12] See, for example, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 April 2007.

[13] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[14] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[15] FCO, “UK-London: mine sweeping services 2009/S 97-140126, Contract Notice,” 19 May 2009.

[16] Email from Colin King, Programme Manager, DPO, 19 November 2009.

[17] Juanita Brock, “Falklands: Falklands are ‘Go’ for Demining,” Falkland Islands News Network, 13 October 2009, www.falklandnews.com/public/story.cfm?get=5512&source=3.

[18] BACTEC, “BACTEC Awarded Falkland Islands Project,” 20 October 2009, www.bactec.com

[19] “Mine Clearance Begins In The Falklands,” Blog of UK Amb. John Duncan, www.flickr.com.  

[20] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

[21] Email from Kathryn Lindsay, Policy Officer, FCO, 3 March 2010; Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 21 June 2011; and “First minefield cleared in Falkland Islands – thanks to Zimbabweans,” MercoPress, 25 March 2010, http://en.mercopress.com.

[22] Email from Kathryn Lindsay, FCO, 3 March 2010.

[23] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2011); and Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

[25] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[26] Cranfield University, “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” 9 July 2007, Executive Summary.

[27] Statement of the UK, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[28] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 22 June 2010.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[33] Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 21 June 2011.

[34] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 21 June 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[35] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 28 April 2011, p. 19.

[36] Email from Kathryn Lindsay, FCO, 3 March 2010.

[37] Juanita Brock, “Falklands: Falklands are ‘Go’ for Demining,” Falkland Islands News Network, 13 October 2009, www.falklandnews.com/public/story.cfm?get=5512&source=3.


Last Updated: 18 October 2010

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 76 British military casualties (all killed) in Afghanistan from improvised explosive devices (IEDs); based on information available it was not possible to determine how many of the casualties were caused by victim-activated devices.[1] No casualties from landmines or explosive remnants of war (ERW) were identified.[2] This compares to 33 British military casualties (all killed) in Afghanistan from IEDs and landmines in 2008.[3] With the limited data available, it is not possible to determine incidents specifically caused by victim-activated landmines, ERW, or IEDs. Total figures on British mine, ERW, and victim-activated IED casualties abroad were not available, though given military casualty statistics, it is likely that they number in the hundreds.[4] In 2009, non-governmental sources tracking casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq criticized the Ministry of Defence for the lack of transparency and accuracy in reporting British casualties.[5]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in the United Kingdom is unknown, but the vast majority are thought to be disabled veterans who were injured on foreign soil and who receive compensation through the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS). Other benefits to which military survivors claiming AFCS compensation may have been eligible (depending on the severity of their injuries) included income support, housing benefit, and free medical prescriptions, among others.[6]



[1] Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org. Most media reports seemed to refer to casualties from incidents involving command-detonated devices, such as roadside bombs, which are not included in Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor casualty totals.

[2] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor media for calendar year 2009; and Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org. In addition, 157 British soldiers were seriously or very seriously injured in Afghanistan during this period, but no information was available as to the cause of these injuries. Ministry of Defence, “Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables: 7 October 2001 to 31 July 2010,” updated 31 July 2010. In Iraq, one British soldier was killed and one was seriously injured; the causes of these casualties were unknown. Ministry of Defence, “Operation Telic Casualty and Fatality Tables: 1 January 2003 to 31 July 2009,” undated, www.mod.uk.

[3] There was insufficient information in the data available to determine how many, if any, of these casualties were caused by victim-activated versus command-detonated explosive devices. Another 65 British soldiers were seriously or very seriously injured in Afghanistan in 2008 though no details were available as to the cause of the injuries. Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org; and Ministry of Defence, “Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables: 7 October 2001 to 31 July 2010,” updated to 31 July 2010, www.mod.uk.

[4] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

[5] Casualty Monitor, “Monitoring and analysis of data on civilian and military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 10 February 2009, www.casualty-monitor.org.

[6] Ministry of Defence, “Table Of Wider Benefits Potentially Available To AFCS Claimants,” undated, www.mod.uk.


Last Updated: 08 December 2012

Support for Mine Action

Support for Mine Action

In 2011, the United Kingdom (UK) contributed £11,208,567 (US$17,981,905) in mine action funding to 10 states and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF),[1] an increase of 10% from that in 2010. The largest contribution in 2011 (£1,942,586/$3,116,491) went to the VTF managed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), in un-earmarked funds, with four states (Cambodia, Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and South Sudan) each receiving more than £1 million. The UK provided funding to 10 countries through the UK-based NGOs, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and HALO Trust.[2]

The UK allocated all of its mine action support in 2011 for clearance activities.[3]

Contributions by recipient: 2011[4]

Recipient

Sector

Amount (£)

Amount ($)

UNMAS

Clearance

1,942,586

3,116,491

Cambodia

Clearance

1,476,671

2,369,023

Afghanistan

Clearance

1,422,075

2,281,435

Lao PDR

Clearance

1,205,618

1,934,173

South Sudan

Clearance

1,154,368

1,851,953

DRC

Clearance

813,251

1,304,699

Mozambique

Clearance

807,086

1,294,808

Vietnam

Clearance

739,665

1,186,645

Sri Lanka

Clearance

592,526

950,589

Libya

Clearance

548,269

879,588

Iraq

Clearance

506,452

812,501

Totals

 

11,208,567

17,981,905

In its 2010–2013 mine action strategy, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) stated it does not support programs that specifically target mine survivors, and that victim assistance is best provided through health services available to all persons with disabilities.[5]

Since 2001, DfID has contributed at least £10 million per year for mine action.[6]

Summary of contributions: 2007–2011[7]

Year

Amount (£)

Amount ($)

2011

11,208,567

17,981,904

2010

10,573,232

16,337,760

2009

11,440,275

17,916,610

2008

13,451,597

24,945,990

2007

12,586,513

25,198,200

Totals

59,260,184

102,380,464

 

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hannah Binci, Security and Justice Team, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, UK Department for International Development (DfID), 9 May 2012.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Average exchange rate for 2011: £1=US$1.6043. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.

[6] DfID, “UK steps up landmine fight,” Press release, 25 November 2008, London, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk.  

[7] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: UK: Support for Mine Action,” www.the-monitor.org, Accessed 25 August 2011. Average exchange rate for 2011: £1= US$1.6043; 2010 £1=US$1.5452; 2009: £1=US$1.5661; 2008: £1=US$1.8545; and 2007: £1=US$2.0020. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.