Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. Afghanistan has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1] In May 2013, Afghanistan informed States Parties that they had “developed a regulation in line with the Article 9” of the convention, “which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of mines and cluster munitions in Afghanistan. This regulation is now being reviewed by lawyers in the Ministry of Justice. Once it passes the Ministry of Justice, it will be sent to the Cabinet and then to parliament for their review and approval.”[2]

Afghanistan has submitted 10 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. Its most recent report covered the period of 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012.[3]

Afghanistan participated in the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2012 in Geneva, where it made interventions on victim assistance, on preventing and suppressing prohibited activities and facilitating compliance, and on stockpile destruction; it also presented its request for an extension on its Article 5 obligations.

Afghanistan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013 where it made statements on its efforts to meet its Article 9 obligations and provided an update on its clearance progress since receiving an extension on its Article 5 obligations.

Afghanistan also attended the Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation & Assistance in June 2013 in Bangkok.

Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and so is not party to the CCW or its protocols on mines and explosive remnants of war.

Use

There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by Coalition or Afghan national forces. However, there was a significant increase in the use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed groups in 2012, resulting in a significant increase in casualties to such devices.

Non-state armed groups

There has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, that oppose the Kabul government and the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a steep rise in incidents caused by pressure-plate IEDs (PPIEDs) which had been planted on roads routinely used by civilians. However, in the first six months of 2013 UNAMA recorded a decrease in incidents caused by victim-activated IEDs compared to the same time period in 2012. UNAMA stated that the majority of IEDs used in Afghanistan now are victim-activated IEDs, most of which utilize pressure plates.[4]

UNAMA shares the view of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that victim-activated IEDs are de facto mines; that is, they function as antipersonnel mines. Use of victim-activated IEDs is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty because they function like antipersonnel mines, but use of command-detonated IEDs is not banned.

In 2012, UNAMA reported that the majority of PPIEDs are set to detonate when walked on or driven over and frequently contain up to 20kg of explosives, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine. As a result of this design and configuration, these explosive weapons “effectively act as a massive antipersonnel landmine with the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step or drive over these IEDs have no defense against them and little chance of survival. Additionally a significant number of IEDs are encountered with explosive weight of approximately 2–4kg specifically designed to maim or kill individuals on foot.”[5] Reportedly some PPIEDs use carbon rods instead of metal contacts to make the explosive device difficult to detect. In other cases insurgents use an arming device that allows them to switch on the pressure plate when targets are in the area.[6] UNAMA has called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their members from using PPIEDs.[7]

In October 2012 on the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the allegation and said their explosive devices are command-detonated.[8] In some areas, insurgents have advised locals to avoid areas where they have placed IEDs.[9] Throughout 2012 and in the first half of 2013, the Taliban have continued to claim responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[10]

Antipersonnel mines continue to be recovered by Afghan and ISAF forces. A  partial media survey by the Monitor found that 404 antipersonnel mines were reported to have been recovered between June 2012 and July 2013 by Afghan or combined forces.[11]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. In recent years, there were no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups. Afghan security forces capture weapons, including landmines, during their everyday operations.[12] For example, in December 2012 Afghan border police captured a shipment of 360 PMN type antipersonnel mines being smuggled into the country from Pakistan at the main border crossing between Baluchistan and Kandahar provinces.[13]

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007,[14] eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[15] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as of April 2007, and later reported that it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines in calendar year 2007.[16]

In Afghanistan’s Article 7 report covering calendar year 2012, it reported that mine stockpiles continue to be recovered during military operations,  surrendered during disarmament programs, and discovered by civilians. A total of 2,276 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2012.[17] Since Afghanistan’s stockpile destruction deadline, it has discovered and destroyed 73,668 antipersonnel mines in previously unknown stockpiles.[18]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan does not retain any mines. It stated in its 2013 Article 7 report that “Afghanistan does not require retention of live mines for its training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques. All mine bodies used in these programmes have had their fuzes removed and destroyed and are no longer capable of being used.”[19] In June 2011, the chief of operations of the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[20] All mines retained by Afghanistan are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[21]

 

 

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 8 September 2011. Afghanistan became a State Party on 1 March 2012.

In May 2013, Afghanistan reported that draft legislation banning antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions has been developed and is being reviewed by the Ministry of Justice. Once the review is completed, the draft legislation will be sent to the cabinet and then parliament for review and approval.[1] The draft legislation was prepared with the assistance of a committee comprised of representatives from the Department of Mine Clearance, the ICRC, and mine action NGOs.[2]

Afghanistan submitted its initial Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 August 2012 and its annual updated report on 19 May 2013, covering the calendar year 2012.[3]

Afghanistan participated in most meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but despite actively supporting the ban objective it did not endorse the Wellington Declaration which would have committed it to participate fully in the formal negotiations of the convention; it also did not attend the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, not even as an observer.[4] Afghanistan came to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 again only as an observer but unexpectedly signed the convention near the end of the conference after the representative announced that he had received instructions and authorization to do so.[5]

Since 2008, Afghanistan has played a positive and active role in the work of the convention. Afghanistan participated in the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, where it made statements on national legislation, victim assistance, clearance, and international cooperation and assistance. Afghanistan also attended intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in April 2013 where it co-chaired a technical workshop on victim assistance.

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but since it has never ratified, it is not party to the CCW.

Interpretive issues

Afghanistan has yet to provide its views on several important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 outlined the US interpretation of the convention, but the Afghan government has not yet stated its views (see section on Foreign stockpiling). In a December 2008 State Department cable, the US outlined its concern over how Afghanistan would interpret the convention’s prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling, as well as Article 21 on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party to the convention. According to the cable, the US has interpreted the convention as allowing “U.S. forces to store, transfer, and use U.S. cluster munitions in the territory of a State Party.”[6]

Use, production, and transfer

In its initial Article 7 report, Afghanistan declared that it “has not any production industry” for producing cluster munitions and explosive submunitions.[7] In the same report, Afghanistan also stated that no cluster munition or submunitions were transferred to or from the country and none had been retained.[8] In September 2011, Afghanistan stated that it “does not use, produce, or transfer Cluster Munitions in the country.”[9]

According to the second Article 7 report provided in May 2013, no munitions were retained, acquired, or transferred in 2012.[10]

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989, while a non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[11] Between October 2001 and early 2002, US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 bomblets in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country.[12] The Monitor is not aware of additional cluster munition strikes since that time.

Stockpiling and destruction

Although Afghanistan had previously stated that it did not possess a stockpile of cluster munitions, both its initial Article 7 report and the May 2013 report contain information in the stockpile destruction forms indicating significant destruction has taken place during the period from 2005–2011 and in 2012.[13] However, it does not appear that all of these items were actually stockpiled weapons under the jurisdiction and control of the Afghan government; rather, they were a combination of cluster munitions that had been abandoned by other combatants in the past and recently discovered, along with failed cluster munitions and unexploded submunitions. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions. The munitions were destroyed by the government or clearance operators. Some of the items may be residual stockpiles, but it is not possible to segregate the data presented and provide a clear accounting.

The initial Article 7 report details the destruction between 2005 and 2011 of over 271,000 submunitions of various types.[14] The Article 7 report submitted in May 2013 details the destruction of 724 munitions and submunitions discovered during 2012. It also provides an updated and more thorough accounting of the destruction of the various submunitions between 2005 and 2011, listing five types of munitions that were not included in the initial report.[15] There remain, however, some discrepancies between the two reports.[16] The figures presented in each report are detailed in the following table.

The May 2013 Article 7 report states that Afghanistan “has not officially announced completion of stockpiled Cluster Munitions programme however the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.”[17] This would appear to indicate that while there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, the government anticipates that it may discover additional stocks abandoned by other combatants in the past.

There was no clear accounting of former stockpiles in Afghanistan. In August 2010, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense informed the Monitor that it had no cluster munitions in its depots but that “about 113,196 items containing 29,559 kilograms” of old Soviet stocks had been destroyed.[18] Jane’s Information Group has listed Afghanistan as possessing KMG-U dispensers and RBK-250/275 cluster bombs.[19] Standard international reference sources also list it as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[20]

Foreign stockpiling

Some International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions, but the current status of any possible stockpiles is not known. According to the December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[21] In February 2011, an Afghan human rights group called on the US government and NATO to reveal if it has stockpiled or has used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since the 2002 conflict.[22] In 2011, an ISAF spokesperson told media, “ISAF conducts operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. All weapons, weapons systems, and munitions are reviewed for legality under international law.”[23] A spokesperson for the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) said, “We have no evidence of NATO/US using cluster munitions [in Afghanistan] since 2002.”[24] For several years, ISAF has had a policy against using cluster munitions.[25]

 

Contamination and Impact

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[1]

Afghanistan’s 2012 Article 5 extension request, based on data as of the end of November 2011, estimated total contamination at 617km². By the end of 2012, cancellation through survey and clearance had reduced that figure by 9% to 558.6km².[2]

Remaining contamination as of end of 2012[3]

Mines

Afghanistan is affected by a wide array of mine types, but mostly by Iranian, Pakistani, and Soviet antipersonnel mines and much smaller numbers of antivehicle mines, including Italian minimum-metal mines. Areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines account for almost half the total ERW-contaminated area and impact around 70% of Afghanistan’s total mine/ERW affected population. Antivehicle mines pose another distinct problem. Although far fewer in number, mined areas containing only antivehicle mines are spread across some 253km² and the minimum metal content of many of these mines further complicates detection.

While estimates of mine contamination have fluctuated sharply in recent years as a result of survey and the addition of previously unreported hazards to the database, they have appeared to be on a steadily downward trajectory in the past two years. At the start of 2013, Afghanistan estimated that it had 270.7km² affected by antipersonnel mines out of total ERW contamination of 558.6km², which also included 253.3km² affected by antivehicle mines, and a further 34.7km² by other forms of ordnance, including 7.6km² by cluster munition remnants. Survey in 2012 added 204 hazards totaling 15.4km² of mine and battle area hazards to the database, but also resulted in cancellation of 258 suspected hazards totaling 19.6km. As a result of clearance and survey, the extent of mine contamination was nearly 12% less at the end of 2012 than a year earlier and total ERW contamination was down 9%.

Mine contamination

Data from the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) shows that 10 provinces account for 87% of all ERW contamination.[4] Almost one-third of the area affected by antipersonnel mine contamination and a quarter of antivehicle mine contamination is in the central region around the capital, Kabul. The northeast and south also have extensive antipersonnel mine-affected areas, and the southern areas are the most heavily affected by antivehicle mines. But more than half the affected districts (126 out of 234) have less than 10 hazards. Twenty-eight districts have only one hazard, while 28 others have more than 50 hazards. A little over half the ERW hazards are in areas ranked as insecure and 44% in areas where the UN deems the security threat low or minimal, but 84% of the highest impact hazards are in areas ranked as highly or extremely insecure.[5]

Cluster munitions

Soviet forces used cluster munitions during the decade-long war of resistance to the Soviet-backed government, and US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions, containing some 248,056 submunitions, between October 2001 and early 2002.[6] Afghanistan reported 22 remaining submunition hazards, covering a total of 7.64km², in the assessment of all ERW contamination submitted for its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request.[7] These are contaminated with US BLU 97 submunitions and block access to grazing and agricultural land.[8] Submunition contamination appears to be more widespread, however, as some demining operators say they continue to find submunition remnants on demining tasks.[9]

Improvised explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war

Afghanistan contends with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as some abandoned explosive ordnance. Random items of UXO are scattered over much of the country and will continue to be found for decades, but concentrated contamination recorded as battlefield areas now account for only about 5% of total contamination.

Most of the contamination dates back to the period of Soviet occupation and the ensuing civil war, but the UN reported an increase in casualties attributed to ordnance left by the conflict of recent years. US Air Force sorties involving weapons releases dropped slightly in 2012 to 4,092 (from 5,102 in 2010 and 5,411 in 2011),[10] but the UN also expressed concern over casualties resulting from “ISAF’s inconsistent clearing and documentation practices regarding clearance of unexploded ordnance from military bases and firing ranges.” The UN noted that international and Afghan forces did not take steps to mark, or to notify MACCA or the government of, areas where military operations had resulted in release of duds or UXO. The UN said that casualties among children collecting scrap metal on former military bases appeared to be rising and identified clearance of military firing ranges as a matter “of particular urgency.”[11]

The biggest threat to the population, however, comes from use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by anti-government elements. The UN recorded 782 IED incidents in 2012 (3% more than the previous year), killing 868 civilians and injuring 1,663. Most incidents appeared not to have been targeted at the military, and more than one-third were identified as involving pressure-plate, victim-activated devices placed on roads routinely used by civilians. These caused a total of 993 casualties in 2012 (393 deaths and 520 injuries), compared with 141 casualties (74 deaths and 67 injuries) in the previous year. Most pressure plate IEDs had a 20–25kg explosive charge, double the charge in most antivehicle mines, with many capable of being activated by the weight of a child.[12] In the first half of 2013, IEDs caused 1,360 civilian casualties, one-third more than in the same period of 2012, including 443 people and 917 injured, although the UN reported casualties resulting from victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs dropped 24% in the first half of the year.[13]

Afghanistan’s extension request identified about 5km² affected by IEDs, but the UN noted that “the impact of IEDs on the lives of Afghan children, women and men extends well beyond the immediate threat to their right to life. Legacy IEDs—planted but undetonated IEDs—in community spaces hindered access to health and education, and created an environment of insecurity with civilians living under the constant threat of death, maiming, serious injury and destruction of property.”[14]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by MACCA.[15] Since 2001, this has been a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management, supported by an UNMAS project office.[16]

As of January 2013, MACCA had a total staff of 199, reduced from 339 a year earlier as a result of cuts, particularly in the staffing of area mine action centers (AMACs) which are now named MACCA regional offices. By March 2013, the number of international support staff providing technical support to MACCA—administering donor funds provided for clearance and coordination through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) and monitoring and evaluating project implementation—had fallen to four from eight a year earlier.[17]

MACCA’s restructuring is taking place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had “entrusted interim responsibility” for coordinating mine action to the UN.[18] From 2008 onwards, a government Interministerial Board assigned the lead role in mine action to the DMC, a department of the ANDMA that reports to the Office of the Second Vice-President.[19] The DMC moved its offices into MACCA’s Kabul headquarters in May 2008 and, as of March 2012, had 13 civil servants occupying posts partnering MACCA staff.[20] But by 2012 the aim had changed to “absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.”[21] Discussions continued among key stakeholders on the best formula for future management of mine action in 2012 and the first half of 2013.[22]

Afghanistan’s clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 is set down in the Article 5 deadline Extension Request it submitted in March 2012 and revised in August 2012. The request provides for clearing all antivehicle mines and battlefield areas as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidates the 4,442 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects will be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.[23]

The request envisaged that 94 of the projects will be tackled in the first two years, underlining how clearance is heavily frontloaded in the initial years of the extension period but is subject to review every six months to take account of prevailing circumstances.[24] According to its clearance milestones, almost three-quarters (72%) of antipersonnel mine hazards covering 55% of the areas affected by such mines will be cleared by 2015 (the third year of the extension period), together with 52% of antivehicle mine hazards covering almost one-third of the areas affected by antivehicle mines, and 85% of battlefield hazards covering 73% of such affected land.[25]

The MAPA program for the Afghan year 1392 (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014), prepared by MACCA and implementing partners (IPs), targeted clearance of 712 hazards covering a total of 78.09km², including 483 antipersonnel hazards over 24km², 195 antivehicle mine hazards covering 43.7km², and 34 ERW hazards covering 10.4km². If fulfilled, the plan would result in 17 districts becoming mine-free, but achieving those targets depended on receiving funding at the levels projected by IPsin the process of preparing the plan. By the end of March 2013, 42 of the 57 projects planned for the year had been fully funded, but delays in delivery of funds by the US, by far the biggest single donor of mine action in Afghanistan, appeared likely to impact implementation.[26]

Land Release

MACCA reports that humanitarian and commercial operators released a total of 147.86km² in 2012, but although mined area clearance conducted mainly by humanitarian operators rose by 9% to 77.15km, battle area clearance (BAC) was less than half the 2011 level.[27]

Five-year summary of clearance[28]

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national NGOs and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: ATC, DAFA, MCPA, MDC, and OMAR; the most active international NGOs are DDG and HALO. In the past two years, FSD established a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.[29]

Survey in 2012

Starting in May 2012, MACCA coordinated three operators conducting the “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) as proposed in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request, but as a result of funding constraints, operators worked with a total of 34 survey teams in 2012 (HALO 17 teams, MCPA 12 teams, and DDG five teams) instead of the 58 planned.[30] MEIFCS had allowed for 5% more communities than those listed in the official gazetteer, but surveyors encountered far more unlisted communities. Survey teams were also cross-trained for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and, in the course of 2012, destroyed 3,674 items of UXO.[31]

HALO reported it visited 4,336 villages in 2012 and completed the survey of all communities in 22 districts, of which 14 have since been declared mine- and ERW-impact free. In the process, HALO identified 9.29km² of new hazard and canceled 11.71km² for a net decrease of 2.41km². HALO’s survey-EOD teams destroyed 719 UXO items and 8,825 items of stray ammunition.[32] MCPA said its teams surveyed 270 hazards, covering a total of 17.2km², resulting in a net decrease in the hazardous-area estimate of 56,367m². The teams also destroyed 67 UXO items.[33]

Overall, MACCA reported that in 2012, MEIFCS completed survey of 71 districts identifying 208 new hazards covering a total of 15.4km², and canceling 258 hazards covering 19.6km², a net reduction of 4.2km².[34] By May 2013, however, the large number of communities encountered by survey teams that were not listed in the gazetteer, together with a funding shortfall, meant that the survey was behind schedule in terms of the number of districts surveyed. The MEIFCS survey, like mine action in general, also faced challenges from widespread insecurity. By May 2013, survey teams had visited, or were working in, all the secure districts. MACCA reported IPs had not put forward plans for survey in 115 out of a total of 400 districts because of lack of funding or lack of security, and said it was exploring other options for collecting data from these areas such as working through Community Development Councils, local leaders, and other NGOs.[35]

Mine clearance in 2012

Although the area cleared of mines in 2012 rose by more than a quarter over the previous year’s result, the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed dropped by more than half, reflecting the fact that most dense mine belts have already been cleared and operators are shifting to less densely-mined hazards. At the same time, clearance of antivehicle mines, emplaced in smaller quantities and often scattered across large areas, rose more than 10 times, according to MACCA data.[36]

Productivity in 2013, however, appears likely to be hit by funding constraints and staff cuts affecting national and international IPs alike. HALO, Afghanistan’s biggest operator, cut capacity by 25% when it laid off almost 1,000 staff in 2012—mostly in the second half of the year—after Canada’s Department for Aid and International Trade withdrew most of its funding for mine clearance in Afghanistan and other donors, notably the US Department of State, reduced support.[37] DDG, the other international humanitarian operator, lost more than one-third of its capacity after cuts in funding from Denmark, Sweden, and Japan, ending the year with some 900 personnel including 666 deminers, 40 surveyors, and four mechanical teams.[38]

Afghan IPs also sustained major capacity cuts. OMAR reported losing approximately one-third of its capacity in 2012, standing down more than 540 personnel in 28 manual demining teams and a mechanical unit.[39] MCPA ended 2012 with more personnel than a year earlier, but said that it expected a 60% cut in 2013[40]; ATC reported that as of April 2013 it did not have any projects funded through the VTF in hand.[41]

The plan for clearance set out in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request divides remaining contamination into 314 projects, encompassing 5,661 known hazards. In 2012, seven demining NGOs were awarded a total of 29 contracts funded through the VTF and worth $39.48 million, providing for clearance of 612 hazards in 14 provinces, covering an area of 20.42km². Of these, operators completed 19 contracts.[42] IPs find that donors increasingly support projects with a focus on community development and social-economic security, but 22 National Priority Programs presented to donors at a meeting in Tokyo, in July 2012, where they pledged $16 billion over four years, made no reference to mine action.

Among donors that continued funding, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) committed to five years of financial support, starting in April 2013, for demining in Herat province by HALO which is expected to make the province mine-impact free. HALO set up a livelihood survey team in 2012 to conduct pre- and post-clearance impact assessments. HALO also sought to attract support for reintegration of former insurgents through employment in mine action as well as for a weapons and ammunition disposal program on which it employed more than 150 staff in 2012.[43]

Mined area clearance 2012

Against a background of widespread insurgency and violent criminality, Afghan IPscontinued to support community-based demining (CBD) in areas where insecurity is too great to operate their core capacity, though the CBD support was on a smaller scale than in the previous year. IPs operated 160 CBD teams in Afghan year 1391 (2012–13)—only seven teams less than the previous year—clearing a total of 14.53km². CBD operations cost US$11.5 million in 2012, about 14% of mine action expenditure, and less than half the $24.57 million (close to 20% of the mine action budget) in 2011.[44]

DAFA reported that it has stood down most of its core capacity and worked mainly with community-based teams, particularly in the heavily-conflicted southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand; in agreement with local community elders in those provinces, it conducted demining and clearance of old IEDs in Kajaki and Musa Qala.[45] DAFA and MDC cleared a total of 1.4km² of land contaminated by old or abandoned IEDs, destroying 106 devices together with around 25 UXO items.[46]

EODT, also working in Kandahar, reported significant improvements in productivity, implementing a two-year, $25 million contract funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which called for clearance of 25.27km² of high and medium priority hazards by 20 October 2013. After a difficult start in 2011 plagued by security, personnel, and equipment problems that left the program behind schedule, operations accelerated in 2012. Working with close to 900 Afghan personnel in CBD teams supported by mine detection dogs and mechanical assets, the program cleared a mixture of antipersonnel mine and antivehicle mine tasks, covering a total of 7.24km². Although security challenges continued (evident in the kidnapping of nine deminers—returned soon after—and the theft of two vehicles and equipment in April 2013 as well as the presence of IEDs in some areas), productivity increased sufficiently to put the operation on course to meet the October 2013 deadline.[47] It was not immediately clear if the UAE intended to finance additional demining in Kandahar or other provinces.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted last year, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 March 2023.

Afghanistan’s extension request, prepared in consultation with IPs, provided for clearing the entirety of its ERW contamination, including 4,151 antipersonnel minefields covering 306.81km², 1,319 antivehicle minefields covering 253.9km², and 191 ERW-contaminated areas covering 56.27km².[48] Although among the most comprehensive requests yet submitted, the ICBL concluded that the work plan represents a best-case scenario, and faced a range of challenges, including donor support, security, and political uncertainties.[49]

The funding challenges became particularly evident in 2013. Despite rising productivity in 2012, the program embarked on the first year of implementing the extension request with the equivalent of about 20km² of clearance unfunded. As a result, many IPs were working with lower levels of manpower than in the previous year and with less capacity than was called for in the request’s workplan.[50]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2012

MACCA reported no clearance of cluster munitions in 2012 because no operations were conducted on the 22 hazards identified as contaminated with submunition remnants. IPs, however, report tackling submunitions on demining and BAC tasks, although some operators only record them as UXO. HALO, for example, reported clearing 21 submunitions in the course of mined area clearance, 80 submunitions in the course of BAC, and a further 236 items in spot-EOD tasks. Additionally, HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Destruction teams destroyed a total of 734 cluster munitions, including 635 submunitions along with other ammunition 600 metres from the end of, and directly in the flight path of, Kabul International Airport’s main runway.[51]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022.

MACCA estimates submunitions contaminate a total of 7.64km².[52] This does not take account of the cluster munition remnants found by operators on other tasks. MACCA has not recorded clearance of cluster munitions separately from other types of UXO. However, Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request provides for clearance of all ERW, including submunitions, by 2020.[53]

Battle area clearance in 2012

With battlefields accounting for only around 5% of the remaining contamination identified in Afghanistan, the number of BAC tasks and the amount of clearance is falling. Humanitarian operators cleared 36.17km² in 2012, little more than 40% of the BAC they conducted the previous year.[54] HALO, which accounted for more than half of all battle area cleared in 2012, reduced the number of its BAC teams by half to three in 2012 and also halved the area it cleared, while the items it destroyed were only a quarter of the previous year’s.[55]

Battle area clearance 2012

Commercial companies in past years received contracts to clear or verify land required for airfields, military camps, and police bases, in addition to a variety of tasks related more to infrastructure. With the draw-down of international forces, the amount of such work has declined and the area checked by commercial companies in 2012 dropped 20% from the previous year to 24.47km².

However, Sterling Global Operations announced in February 2013 that it had won a $30 million, 12 month contract to clear mines, UXO, and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) at the US’s Bagram airbase and other bases, as well as “civilian access areas”.[57]

Areas Checked by Commercial Companies 2012

AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle

Seven EOD and weapons disposal teams previously managed by Dyncorps (until March 2011), and later by Sterling International, came under the management of OMAR in April 2013 after it won a one-year, $1.1 million contract following a competitive bidding process. OMAR reported that teams based in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Parwan, and Panjshir would continue emergency call-outs by local communities and security forces, but with total manpower reduced from 100 to around 80 personnel.[58]

Quality management

IPs all have internal quality assurance (QA)/quality control mechanisms. MACCA has conducted external QA through a seven-person unit in Kabul and 40 staff located in the seven regional AMAC offices monitoring the work of IPs through site visits. MACCA reduced its staffing of AMACs in 2012, resulting in less on-site visits and more emphasis being placed on monitoring and evaluation of IPs’ standards and operations through quarterly reviews of each project, and through procedures for renewing accreditation. MACCA has also developed a separate standard for investigating incidents.[59]

The Afghan Institute of Management Training and Enhancement of Indigenous Capacities (AIMTEIC), an Afghan consulting firm, was contracted to undertake external monitoring of IPs conducted in three phases between October 2012 and March 2013. AIMTEIC reviewed headquarter operations of seven IPs and a total of 68 demining teams. AIMTEIC found the IPs’ internal quality mangement functioning well, but raised a range of operational issues; for example, AIMTEIC observed that some IPs had not followed operational plans well and that one IP used mine detection dogs on steeply sloping land. The IPs said they found AIMTEIC’s review of headquarter operations satisfactory but expressed some criticism of its assessment of field operations.[60]

Safety of demining personnel

According to MACCA data, three deminers were killed and 13 injured during demining incidents in 2012, including three people injured in a single incident.

Insurgency and criminality posed a continuing threat. Six deminers were killed and 10 injured in 53 security incidents in 2012, which also saw 20 staff abducted and the destruction or loss of vehicles, radios, and other equipment. All abducted staff were later released, mainly through the intervention of local community elders.[61] Armed elements abducted 11 MDC deminers and seized three vehicles in May 2013, moving them into Pakistan pending the outcome of negotiations for their release.[62] Some IPs also reported interruptions to operations as a result of security incidents or IED attacks in the vicinity of clearance tasks and contend with the presence of IED detonations on roads in their operating areas.

Another risk of operating in an environment of conflict was also apparent with the death of a community-based deminer working for the Emirates Mine Clearance Program Afghanistan (EMCPA) in the Panjawi district of Kandahar in June 2013 who was hit by two missiles fired by international forces, apparently after mistakenly being identified as engaged in planting IEDs.[63]

 

Summary findings

·         More accurate and detailed information on casualties of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) need to be collected and shared in order to address the need of survivors.

·         The national disability plan is being revised and the new plan needs to be adopted and implemented with some form of monitoring.

·         Access to physical rehabilitation needs to be expanded, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to receive rehabilitation is difficult for survivors.

Victim assistance commitments

Afghanistan is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Afghanistan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

*the number of victim-activated IED casualties in 2012 was adjusted based on updated data from UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reporting in February 2014, resulting in a significant increase and almost doubling the annual casualty total, which was initially recorded by the Monitor as 780 (see below).

For 2012, the Monitor identified at least 1,422 casualties due to mines, victim-activated IEDs, and ERW in Afghanistan.

As in past years, the vast majority of recorded casualties in 2012 were civilians, making 93% (1,329) of the total.

Children made up a third (34%) of the total civilian casualties where the age was known (432 including at least 91 girls).[1] In 2011, children (373) accounted for 52% of civilian casualties.

Another 848 civilian casualties in 2012 were adults, including at least 71 women.[2] In 2012, clearance accidents caused 16 casualties among deminers, a decrease from 25 deminer casualties in 2011. Another 77 casualties were military and security personnel. As in 2011, landmines of all types, including victim-activated IEDs, caused the most casualties recorded by the Monitor (1,280).

The 2012 casualty total of 1,422 represented a significant increase from the 812 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor identified in Afghanistan for 2011. However, due to a newly available source for data on IED casualties this may not represent a trend.

Of the casualty total for 2012, 363 casualties (91 killed; 272 injured) were reported by MACCA, including 96 adults and 267 children. Of the MACCA total, 329 casualties were caused by ERW, only 17 by antipersonnel mines and another 17 by antivehicle mines.[3] ERW left at the former bases of coalition forces was reported to have killed more than 50 civilians since 2008, with “nearly all of them” killed in 2012.[4] MACCA recorded 433 mine/ERW casualties for 2011. The decrease in casualties recorded by MACCA marked a significant achievement of the overall efforts of mine action operations. However, due to several factors, it is possible that the number of mine/ERW casualties in 2012 could be greater than that registered by MACCA. Casualty data is mostly collected by mine risk education teams, particularly by the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). At the end of March 2012, the number of mine risk education teams decreased due to lack of donor support, resulting in less access to the places where mine/ERW incidents may have occurred, particularly in remote areas. HI’s community-based mine risk education program, which was involved in casualty data collection in 18 southern districts, also stopped operating by the end of March 2012 due to insufficient funds; this may have resulted in a decrease in the data collected in those areas.[5]

The total number of victim-activated IED casualties for 2012, as reported in 2014, was far higher than those identified in previous years. UNAMA reported 913 civilian victim-activated IED casualties (393 killed and 520 injured) in total in 2012.[6]

MACCA data indicated that between 1979 and 2012 there had been 21,719 mine/ERW casualties (4,165 people killed and 17,554 injured), not including victim-activated IED casualties.[7]

Cluster munition casualties

Some 745 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded between 1980 and the end of 2012. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[8] MACCA casualty data contained detailed information on 222 submunition casualties in incidents since 1984. No cluster munition casualties have been recorded by MACCA since 2010.[9]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown, but in 2006 the number was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[10]

Victim assistance since 1999[11]

Access to victim assistance in Afghanistan was hampered by a severe lack of services, poor to non-existent infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. However, Afghanistan did make progress in victim assistance and disability issues, supported by significant international funds that were needed to improve services and conditions. A lack of coordination among donors funding services for persons with disabilities alongside other competing priorities for assistance was identified as a challenge. Ministries demonstrated more national ownership of services for persons with disabilities, which were integrated into ministry policies and strategic planning with the assistance of MACCA technical advisors. National NGOs, disabled person’s organizations (DPOs), and survivors’ organization became increasingly active and participated regularly in disability coordination.

Movement restrictions (due to conflict, lack of roads, and the cost of transport) were persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country that continued through 2012. Geographic coverage of healthcare expanded. Physical rehabilitation coverage remained insufficient despite improvements. Physical rehabilitation services were almost entirely operated by international NGOs and the ICRC under the coordination of the government. Psychosocial support services increased from almost non-existent, as did peer-to-peer support, though they were still insufficient to meet demand and needs. A community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network grew and became better coordinated. Economic reintegration projects were limited and conducted mostly by NGOs under the coordination of relevant ministries, while ministries paid some disability pensions and ran some vocational training. Inclusive education has increased since 2008. Disability legislation was adopted, but parts of the legislation were discriminatory against persons with disabilities.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No new national survey or needs assessment was conducted for mine/ERW survivors in 2012. MACCA technical advisors worked with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) to develop an agreement on the inclusion of mine casualty data collection and reporting in the health management information system.[12]

Most service providers collected information on the needs of survivors for use in their own programs. All recent assessments were carried out at local or regional levels focusing on specific issues such as physical rehabilitation or accessibility. The last comprehensive disability survey was in 2005.[13]

In 2012, HI conducted a CBR Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice (KAP) survey in some districts of Kabul.[14] Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR) also conducted KAP surveys in Kabul in 2012.[15]

Victim assistance coordination[16]

MoLSAMD is the focal point for victim assistance issues. The MoPH and the MoE are involved in disability services and advocacy activities. MoPH coordinates CBR and provides physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support services. The MoPH also coordinates training programs for physiotherapists and healthcare providers.[17] The work of these three key ministries is supported by MACCA technical advisers, who are funded by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

All Afghan ministries are supposed to addresses the rights of persons with disabilities as a crosscutting issue. The MoPH is responsible for medical treatment and physical rehabilitation. Its plan of action consists of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS); physiotherapy services are included in both, while prosthetic services were only included in the EPHS. The MoPH Strategic Framework 2011–2015 counted improving disability services among its priorities, and the Ministry’s focal point for disability, the Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Department (DRD), had an implementation strategy for the framework. MoLSAMD was responsible for the social inclusion of persons with disabilities through benefits and the pension system, while the MoE worked toward ensuring access to education. MACCA assists with overall coordination in the areas of disability and victim assistance.[18]

In 2012, there was no specific coordination body for victim assistance. Several groups, including those noted above, regularly held meetings relevant to victim assistance in Kabul and at the regional level. These meetings resulted in improved coordination and cooperation between actors, strengthened support and cooperation between the responsible ministries and other stakeholders, as well as improved advocacy and awareness-raising. Most victim assistance service providers and actors reported having attended most meetings.[19] The various coordination group meetings included the following: [20]

·         DSCG meetings, led by MoLSAMD and supported by MACCA technical advisors, were held regularly in 2012. Thirteen meetings of the DSCG were held during the year to coordinate activities, share relevant information and ideas, and advocate for adequate legislation for persons with disabilities;

·         The Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce, coordinated by the MoPH, included more than 15 members from the relevant directorates and ministerial departments, international and national organizations, and DPOs. Four taskforce meetings were organized in 2012;

·         The Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ACPD), which consisted of representatives of civil society and relevant ministries, promoted implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The ACPD held 24 meetings and advocacy events in 2012;

·         The Afghan CBR network conducted four meetings in 2012. The MoPH-DRD coordinated the CBR network and was responsible for reporting on rehabilitation services;

·         The Afghan National Society for Orthotics and Prosthetics also had four meetings during 2012;

·         The Inclusive Child Friendly Education-Coordination Working Group (ICFE-CWG), chaired by the MoE, met six times in 2012. Most stakeholders in inclusive education attended ICFE-CWG meetings where activities and challenges were shared and discussed;[21]

·         The Inter-ministerial Taskforce on Disability, chaired by the MoPH-DRD and hosted by MoLSAMD, held irregular taskforce meetings on an as-needed basis; five meetings were organized in 2012. As a result of the meetings, a review of BPHS guidelines was ongoing through 2012. Another result was that a training manual for health workers on disability and national rehabilitation was reviewed; it was being finalized in 2013.

In 2012, Afghanistan was in the process of revising the Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan (ANDAP) 2008–2011. The revision process was led by MoLSAMD, which drafted the Afghanistan National Policy for Persons with Disabilities that was to be implemented through the revised ANDAP . There was no review of ANDAP when it expired at the end of 2011 and no comprehensive monitoring of the plan was made up to June 2013.[22]

There was a need for improved donor coordination to ensure that disability issues were not lost among competing priorities of donors.[23]

Afghanistan provided information on progress in and challenges to victim assistance at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Meeting of States Parties in 2012, the Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2012, and also at the meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in May 2013. Afghanistan made extensive use of all sections of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, using form H to present victim assistance achievements, the overall state of assistance, ministry contacts, and the budget required to further implement assistance. Afghanistan included detailed reporting on victim assistance activities in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting for 2012.[24]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Afghanistan reported that mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were included in the planning and provision of victim assistance in 2012.[25] Persons with disabilities and their representative organizations were included in decision-making and participated in the various coordination group meetings.[26] Survivors and their representative organizations were also involved in the plan development process for the next ANDAP.[27] However, it was previously noted that survivors were not always seen to be closely consulted in decision-making.[28] It was also reported that survivors are not sufficiently integrated in the planning of victim assistance in 2012.[29]

Parents of children with disabilities were involved in MoE inclusive education training in Kabul, which resulted in increased enrollment of children with disabilities into mainstream schools.[30]

Many NGOs had a significant proportion of employees who were persons with disabilities. Mine/ERW survivors were included in the implementation of peer support, rehabilitation, and other services. Persons with disabilities employed by MACCA supported the activities of the key ministries and were included in NGO activities that MACCA supported.[31] MoPH-DRD data, collected from national physical rehabilitation sources, indicated that 63% of all technical and administrative staff in the rehabilitation sector were persons with disabilities.[32]

The ICRC Afghan physical rehabilitation project was managed by persons with disabilities. Through 2012, the rehabilitation project maintained a policy of “positive discrimination,” employing and training only people with disabilities. Service provision was entirely managed by survivors and persons with disabilities. ICRC continuously consulted with and involved the survivors in the decision-making process as survivors were fully integrated into its operations.  The positive discrimination policy also aimed to demonstrate that people with disabilities are an asset to society, not a burden.[33]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[34]

Emergency and continuing medical care

The ICRC reported that obtaining appropriate and timely medical treatment in conflict-affected areas remained difficult for much of the population. Attacks on medical personnel and facilities further impeded services.[35]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation was not available in all provinces and, in many cases, traveling to other provinces to receive rehabilitation services was difficult for survivors and other persons with disabilities.[36] Based on meetings with different stakeholder organizations, AABRAR found that the quantity of physical rehabilitation had increased, however the quality of physical rehabilitation, including for prostheses, required improvement.[37]

The MoPH reported that there were no changes in the accessibility to or quality of rehabilitation services, including prosthetic devices, in 2012. However, steps were taken to make rehabilitation services more sustainable. A list of priority provinces where there was a need to maintain, or establish, orthopedic workshops was developed and also included in the revised EPHS package for funding in the future through the national development budget.[38]

KOO increased its geographic coverage to cover three locations in Kabul and the surrounding district.[39] SRA-RAD increased beneficiaries, including the number of women and children provided with transportation and accommodation at their facilities with an outreach program and mobile orthopedic workshop. The quality of the prosthetics components and materials increased due to improved supply and additional staff training.[40] The number of people benefiting from HI’s physical rehabilitation services in Kandahar increased by 16%. The number attending BPHS clinics in Herat also increased in 2012 compared to 2011, in part due to greater community awareness, a new community based referral system, and closer links with partners.[41] The number of new patients registered with the ICRC increased by 27% from 2011, while the total number of patients assisted increased by 9%.[42]

Social and economic inclusion and psychological support

Inclusive education training by the MoE for teachers, as well as for children with disabilities and their parents, continued to increase in 2012. More than 2,000 teachers and children with disabilities and their parents received inclusive education training coordinated by the MoE with financial support from UNMAS through MACCA; 60% of schoolteachers trained were female.[43]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, though some national and international NGOs provided these services.[44] Psychosocial rehabilitation counselors are included in each district hospital and provide services to the population in general, including survivors.[45]

Three thousand persons with disabilities were supported by the ICRC social reintegration program in the areas of education, microfinance, vocational training, employment, and sport. Wheelchair basketball teams were created, two new basketball courts built (Kabul and Jalalabad), and players’ training and tournaments organized. [46] In most of the ICRC rehabilitation centers, sport became a consolidated activity to effectively address physical rehabilitation and social reintegration.

To develop a strategy for victim assistance projects in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, an expert consultant carried out a CBR assessment and situation analysis for HI in October 2012. The recommendations included training of community workers on basic rehabilitation techniques, psychosocial support through use of peer support groups, awareness-raising on disability, and increased access to livelihood opportunities.[47]

Accessibility

Physical accessibility remained a significant challenge because persons with disabilities in Afghanistan lacked access to many existing services. In Kabul, for example, some 95% of public buildings were not accessible for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[48] The buildings of the department of MoLSAMD that provides services to persons with disabilities were not physically accessible to all persons with disabilities; many parts were unreachable for wheelchair users.[49]

In 2012, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission conducted a survey on accessibility in 22 provinces.[50] advocacy and awareness-raising sessions on the importance of making the physical environment, especially hospitals and health facilities, accessible to survivors were ongoing activities of the MoPH-DRD.[51] To address accessibility challenges in the long term, CPI created the Physical Accessibility Projects Consortium for Afghanistan, partnering with the AABRAR, ALSO, and AOAD in 2011. CPI combined specific site-adapted physical accessibility projects with awareness-raising on disability issues in the community. CPI’s extensive network of project partners in 2012 also included: ADVS, AVDA, DAO, EO, the Engineering and Medical Department for Afghan Development (EMDAD), ROAWV, the SAEDA, and WOAP.[52]

Laws and policies

The National Law for the Rights and Privileges of Persons with Disabilities was authorized in August 2010. However, the law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the CRPD.[53] In 2013, a review of the legislation was proposed by disability stakeholders in order to make it consistent with the CRPD.[54]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, which include healthcare and financial protection. MoLSAMD accorded special treatment to families of those killed in war.[55]

Afghanistan ratified the CRPD on 18 September 2012.

 

Since 2008, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has received more than US$500 million in international assistance for mine action. In 2012, it received $90.6 million from 18 donor governments and the European Union (EU), more than any other country both in the amount of the contributions and the number of donors. The United States (US) contributed $40 million in 2012, the same as in 2011, representing some 40% of the total international mine action assistance in Afghanistan. Six donors contributed more than $4 million each.[1]

In September 2011, in its continuing support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan that began in 1997, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) committed $25.83 million to mine action to conduct community-based mine action services in Kandahar province.[2] The UAE selected the US-based company EOD Technology to implement the project.[3] The first installment, paid in late 2011, was for $1,999,975.[4] In 2012, the UAE allocated $13,397,300 to the company, Sterling Global Operations to continue clearance operations in Kandahar province.[5]

Afghanistan also reported that $128 million was spent from April 2010 to 31 March 2012 to check for landmines over a total of 100km² in conjunction with development and construction activities. This included $42.6 million in payments to 21 international and national commercial companies from April 2011 to March 2012, which found four antipersonnel mines, 40 antivehicle mines, 23,000 items of unexploded ordnance, and 71,000 pieces of small arms ammunition while checking a total of 48km².[6]

The government of Afghanistan committed $4.1 million to mine action from December 2010 to July 2012, to be paid in quarterly installments. Of the $4.1 million, $94,435 is for clearance at the Eshposhta coal mine.[7] In 2012, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) reported that the government of Afghanistan had contributed $1.8 million to mine action.[8]

International contributions: 2012[9]

Victim Assistance

Victim assistance is integrated within the broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector.[10] Consequently, overall funding to victim assistance is under-reported. The US, Norway, Germany, and Italy reported direct funding from mine action sources to NGOs for victim assistance in 2012. Additionally, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that from the contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund earmarked for Afghanistan, $1,141,322 was allocated to victim assistance, of which approximately half came from earmarked funds from Italy. The remaining victim assistance funding through UNMAS came from contributions from Australia, Denmark, Germany, and Japan.[11]

Contributions for victim assistance: 2012

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[12]