Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

In May 2013, a government representative informed the CMC that the ratification was sent to the National Assembly for approval, but referred to the Ministry of Defence for further consideration.[1] Previously, in May 2012, Angola informed a regional conference on the convention that its ratification would “be done soon.”[2] In 2011, Angolan officials indicated that the ratification package was being prepared for submission to the Council of Ministers for consideration and then to the National Assembly for approval.[3]

Angola participated extensively in the Oslo Process and, while it did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, it signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo in December 2008.[4]

Angola has continued to participate in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It attended the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, intersessional meetings of the convention in April 2013, and a regional conference on universalization of the convention held in Lomé, Togo in May 2013.

Angola did not make statements at any of these meetings, but at the regional meeting in May 2013 it endorsed the Lomé Strategy on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which commits governments to undertake specific and concerted actions to ensure that all African countries that have not yet ratified or acceded to the convention to do so at the earliest opportunity. The Lomé Strategy also expresses “grave concern over the recent and on-going use of cluster munitions” and calls for the immediate end to the use of these weapons.[5]

Angola is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and use

Angola is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions were used in the past in Angola, but it is unclear when or by whom. An Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) official who had seen cluster munitions remnants in Huambo province near Caala and Bailundo, probably from the heavy fighting during 1998–1999, said he believed that the Angolan Armed Forces used cluster munitions because only they used aircraft during this conflict, not the rebel UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces.[6]

Stockpiling and destruction

The government has not made an official determination and public announcement that all stocks have been identified and destroyed.

In June 2010, a CNIDAH official said that Angola had destroyed its stockpile of cluster munitions between 2003 and 2010 in a joint initiative of the government and HALO Trust, and that the armed forces no longer held any stocks.[7] In addition, HALO’s weapons and ammunition disposal teams, which operate in all 18 provinces destroying weapons caches belonging to the police, army, navy, and air force, found and destroyed 51 abandoned explosive submunitions in military warehouses.[8] The location of these warehouses has not been reported.

In the past, Jane’s Information Group noted that KMGU dispensers that deploy submunitions were in service for Angolan aircraft.[9] Deminers operating in Angola have documented the presence of casings of RBK 250-275 cluster bombs among abandoned ammunition.[10] It is likely the KMGU and RBK were of Soviet origin.

Angola is also reported to possess BM-21 Grad and RM-70 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if these include ammunition with submunition payloads.[11]

 

Contamination and Impact

The Republic of Angola is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which may include cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002.

Mines

Angola continued to report different datasets describing the extent of its remaining landmine problem, although the National Intersectorial Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) is making progress in addressing the problem. In June 2012, in response to a question from the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance regarding the database, CNIDAH said that while inconsistencies still remained in the database, they were fewer than the 2,017 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) reported in its Article 5 Extension Request in March 2012.[1]

In May 2013, CNIDAH reported there were 1,110 SHAs and 965 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) or a total of 2,075 SHA and CHA covering a combined 1,246,700km², an area considered widely inaccurate by all stakeholders. However, discrepancies continue to exist between the NGO operator data and the information in the database at CNIDAH on the number of tasks completed and on the number of remaining SHAs and CHAs. The discrepancies are tasks identified by operators that are not in the database and also tasks that are in progress or completed that are different in the two databases.[2] For example, HALO Trust reports that in April 2013 there were 544 CHA remaining in the five provinces in which they work, while CNIDAH reports there are 705 SHA/CHA remaining; Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported in September 2013 that 280 SHAs remain in the five provinces they work in, while CNIDAH reported there were 491 remaining. Both HALO and NPA are working closely with CNIDAH to correct the differences[3] (described in more detail below in the Survey section of this report).

Despite the ongoing discrepancies and the high number of remaining contaminated areas, 49% of SHAs/mined areas have been eliminated since the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was completed in 2007; two-thirds of these in areas monitored by HALO.[4]

Ten of the 18 provinces have at least 80 SHAs, indicating the extent and high level of contamination remaining, though half of the remaining contamination is just in the four provinces of Moxico, Kuando Kubango, Bié, and Kwanza Sul.

It is planned that the national non-technical survey (NTS), begun in 2011, and the mapping project described in Angola’s Article 5 Extension Request that commenced in May 2013 will clarify the extent of the contamination throughout Angola by 2016, establishing a new baseline for planning and the submission of second extension request.[5]

Remaining contaminated area according to CNIDAH as of May 2013[6]

Cluster munition remnants

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by unexploded submunitions is unclear. Clearance operators have not found cluster submunitions in over five years. As of March 2013, only HALO had reported finding unexploded submunitions since February 2008.[7] In April 2011, NPA reported that the impact of cluster munition remnants was “very low” in Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.[8] However, HALO and the National Institute for Demining (INAD) claim that unexploded submunitions remain to be cleared in Kuando Kubango.[9]

At least two types of cluster munitions have been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 KO and the AO-2.5 RT. According to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH as of February 2008, NPA had reported clearing 13 unexploded submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kwanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 unexploded submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO reported clearing 230 unexploded submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Angola is contaminated with ERW across all 18 provinces. Demining operators expend considerable assets on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks. The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) reported finding 65,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2011 and more than 2.4 million since 1996.[11]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Angola has two mine action management structures. CNIDAH serves as the de facto national mine action authority. It reports to the Council of Ministers, or in effect to the President of Angola. Since 2002, CNIDAH has been responsible for the coordination of mine action in the country. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies.[12] CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province), under the vice-governor of the province, determine annual priorities based on demining NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.[13]

The other mine action body is the CED, established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan that includes mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority. It is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS).[14] The 2012 CED budget for demining was approximately US$62 million, or more than four times that of CNIDAH’s approximately $14 million budget.[15]

Priorities of the state entities are determined by the government of Angola’s national plan to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Thus, most of the clearance work targets roads, bridges, ports, airports, water sources, electric towers, and land for the laying of fiber optic cables and constructing housing. Humanitarian demining by NGOs and supported by international donors (at an ever-decreasing level) uses the LIS as its baseline.

This lack of coordination between development demining and humanitarian demining occurs in all 18 provinces. The ongoing NTS and the conversion of the state clearance records into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is an attempt to put all known mined areas and results into one database at CNIDAH. Both CNIDAH and CED have said the state entities will be conducting more humanitarian demining in the future and are an integral part of the extension request.[16]

Mine action information management

The lack of a reliable national mine action database is one of the most protracted problems in the mine action program in Angola. The problem has two aspects. One is the database at CNIDAH does not match the NGOs’ own records even though the database is largely based on their records. The other problem, and arguably the more severe one, is the lack of standardized reporting between CNIDAH and the CED. The extent of the problem has been described in previous editions of the Monitor and the problem persisted in 2012 and into 2013, though some progress has been made in addressing the problem.

One of the major problems in recording national survey and clearance data is that the CED and its operators (INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces, the border police, and commercial companies) use a different reporting format than the NGOs under CNIDAH, making it impossible for Angola to present an accurate picture of its landmine problem and an adequate plan to address it. Angola identified an action plan in its March 2012 Article 5 deadline Extension Request to correct the database problem by training the CED operators in IMSMA and converting old records to IMSMA.[17] A more fundamental problem that also needs correction is that CED uses both the metric and the imperial system of measurement (inches and feet) in its reporting.[18]

However, there has been some progress in resolving the discrepancies between the NGO and CNIDAH databases. HALO and CNIDAH worked together to analyze the two datasets covering Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, and Kuando Kubango provinces. HALO has 544 CHAs in their database for the five provinces. To simplify the analysis from the long list of records (that include clearance, re-surveying, new mined areas, and cancelled SHA records) that have built up over the years—especially after the LIS was completed in 2006—HALO electronically transferred their dataset to CNIDAH and provided a paper copy for backup. According to HALO, both datasets matched in March 2013 when the joint effort was completed and a process was in place to identify future discrepancies when HALO adds new data. To ensure the two datasets remain the same, the HALO database manager and CNIDAH will regularly meet in Luanda and compare datasets.[19] However, in May 2013 CNIDAH reported there were 705 SHA/CHA remaining in the areas where HALO works and not 544, the number in HALO’s database.

The joint effort between CNIDAH and HALO also provided an opportunity to train the CNIDAH information management team on IMSMA as well as provide additional reporting tools for them to query and extract information from IMSMA. HALO is providing ongoing assistance.[20] NPA planned to compare their data with CNIDAH as well.[21]

MAG and DCA also met with CNIDAH on comparing datasets. The most frequent causes of discrepancies with the operators are the following:

-    Error code finder (or its format; solved in most email exchanges);
- New areas that were not in the CNIDAH database;
- Discredited areas that were not entered in the CNIDAH database;
- Completion reports that were not processed;
- Reports were missing;
- Reporting on overlapping mined areas;
- Treating a completion report of a road task the same as a mined area.[22]

While CNIDAH has made considerable progress in addressing database discrepancies with the NGO operators, it still needs to address numerous database and reporting issues with INAD, the largest demining operator in Angola.

Evaluations

The mine action program in Angola has never had an external evaluation since its inception.

Land Release

Angola reported in 1997 that there were over 4,000 SHAs in the country. At the end of 2011 they reported there were just over 2,000 SHAs.[23] In addition, almost 13,000km of roads have been verified free from mines, allowing access throughout the country. According to CNIDAH, all the main roads of the country have been cleared with only some secondary and tertiary roads remaining.[24] There is no doubt Angola has made considerable progress in reducing contamination, especially since the LIS was completed in 2006, and the much lower casualty numbers in recent years also indicate a substantial reduction of contaminated area; however, the various problems with the national database described above, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, prevent any description of an accurate picture of landmine contamination.

Survey in 2012

General and Non-Technical Survey

The follow-up to the LIS is the “Survey and update of data concerning suspect hazardous areas” (“Levantamento e actualização dos dados de areas suspeitas de contaminação com minas terrestres”), commonly referred to as LIS II, although CNIDAH has indicated a more accurate description is “general survey.”[25] Both national and international NGOs will conduct the survey under CNIDAH supervision.[26] In 2011, CNIDAH trained the national NGOs Clube de Jovens da Huila, APACOMINAS, ODAH, Saving Association of People (ASASP), and Angola Livre de Minas to conduct NTS.[27] DCA, MAG, and MgM each have one team dedicated to the survey in Moxico and Kuando Kubango provinces.[28] Data from HALO and NPA will be used in lieu of their participating in the survey as both operators have completed surveying in the 10 provinces they operate. CNIDAH’s decision to accept the HALO and NPA data as the latest data should make 2014 a more realistic goal to achieve for the completion date of the survey.[29] A combination of the ongoing NTS and standardizing the now-incompatible report formats used by CNIDAH and CED may result in a more accurate picture of mine contamination in Angola, which (judged by the results in the past 10 years) has been severe. Although it is expected the survey will identify some new SHAs, it is also expected the survey will reduce the overall contaminated area.[30]

Survey results from HALO and NPA illustrate the impact the ongoing NTS (that CNIDAH is coordinating) could have on the new baseline that will result from the survey. HALO reported that as of December 2012, in Bié, Benguela, Huambo, Huila, and Kuando Kubango there were 544 CHAs covering 39km² remaining.[31] This compares to 705 SHAs and 105km² in the CNIDAH database.[32]

NPA completed re-surveying the SHAs identified in the LIS in Malange, Kwanza North, Kwanza Sul, Uige, and Zaire in April 2013 that identified 280 SHAs remaining covering 60km²; a reduction in SHAs and contaminated area was expected. However, the database at CNIDAH contained 491 SHAs covering 280km² for the same provinces. NPA planned to meet with CNIDAH before the end of 2013 and go through the same exercise as HALO did with CNIDAH to correct the discrepancies in the CNIDAH database.[33]

Combined, HALO and NPA have completed surveys in 10 provinces and identified 824 SHAs/CHAs covering 99km² compared to CNIDAH’s records of 2,017 SHAs covering 385km².

In a parallel activity, CNIDAH planned to start a mapping project in June 2013 whereby trained technicians visit, measure, and map each SHA. CNIDAH estimates the cost of this separate activity to be $5.4 million.[34]The government of Angola will cover an estimated $2.7 million needed for equipment, vehicles, operational, and administrative costs of the five national operators, and the cost of monitoring by CNIDAH during the survey.[35]

Roads

During the long conflict and for several years afterwards, primary, secondary, and tertiary roads were inaccessible due to a fear of mines. Vast amounts of roads have since been checked for mine contamination and, according to INAD, all major roads have been cleared and were being paved with asphalt as planned by the Ministry of Public Works and Road Institute of Angola, who are responsible for the road project.[36] CED reports over 13,000km of road have been verified and MgM continues to clear and verify roads in Kuando Kubango province while HALO clears and verifies roads in Bié and Kuando Kubango provinces.

In 2012, HALO conducted a post-clearance survey on road use in Bié province to highlight the threat posed by antivehicle mines left buried in roads post-conflict and to measure the impact of their removal. Since 2003, HALO has removed 210 antivehicle mines from 5,580km of mine “suspect” roads across five provinces using Road Threat Reduction (RTR) techniques developed to rapidly reduce accidents and to open up emergency road access.[37]

In Bié province where HALO conducted the post clearance survey, 96 roads, totalling 1,823km had been assessed. From 2003–2011 seven antipersonnel mines and 71 antivehicle mines were found. HALO found from a sample of nine roads totalling 532km that clearance of the roads had impacted 165,127 people. When extrapolated across all 1,823km, HALO estimated as many as 650,000 people may have benefitted from the reduced threat on the roads in Bié province.[38]

According to MgM, there are still roads that need to be demined in some areas of Kuando Kubango province. While MgM considers the possibly mined roads as low to medium risk, their location presents operational challenges. The roads are located between rivers that overflow during the rainy season and there are no bridges crossing the large flood plains, so MgM is building raised bank roads with culverts (dykes). MGM uses armored graders to clear away the surface of secondary and tertiary roads to a depth of 30cm and then uses dogs and manual teams to check for mines that may be laid deeper. MgM demines to a minimum of 8 meters in width, but in many cases demines to a much larger width.[39]

Mine clearance in 2012

Mine clearance operators in Angola include the international NGOs DCA (in Moxico), HALO (in Bie, Huambo, Benguela, and Kuando Kubango), MAG (in Moxico), MgM (in Kuando Kubango), NPA (in Malange and Uige), and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), commercial companies, and INAD which operate in all 18 provinces. In 2012, five NGO operators cleared over 4km²—approximately the same amount of land as in 2011.[40] Clearance figures for the CED, including INAD, were not made available to the ICBL.

NGO demining in 2012

In 2012, five international NGOs cleared 4.39km² of mined area and found 3,615 antipersonnel mines and 338 antivehicle mines. MgM opened 250km of road while clearing 2km of road. During road clearance, MgM found two antipersonnel mines and two antivehicle mines.[41]

NGO mine clearance in 2012[42]

CED demining in 2012

INAD, the FAA, the border police, and commercial companies, coordinated by CED, clear mines in support of Angola’s national development plans in order to rebuild the infrastructure damaged by the conflict that ended in 2002. CED’s priorities include demining in support of efforts to build or rehabilitate airports, railways, bridges, hydroelectric power, schools, hospitals, roads, and communications, highlighted by the clearing of land to lay fiber optic cables. Much of the demining by INAD, the commercial companies, and the FAA involves verifying land as not being contaminated rather than actually clearing mines.[43]

CED demining assets are considerable. In 2012, the CED budget was approximately $60 million and there were 57 demining brigades among four national operators.[44] At the end of 2011, mechanical assets included 20 Bozena-5 remote control flail machines, 12 Hitachi flails, six Minewolfs, four Casspir armoured vehicles, and 1 Komatsu demining machine.[45]

Government of Angola Mine Clearance Operators[46]

In 2012, CED reported assessing 85.8km² while finding 5,586 antipersonnel mines and 511 antivehicle mines.[47] It is not known what amount of these figures was the result of clearing CHA or verifying roads.

Demining by commercial companies in 2012

CNIDAH reported commercial demining companies cleared approximately 10km² in 2012. However, like the CED results it is not known what amount of these figures was the result of clearing CHA or verifying roads.[48]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013.

On 31 March 2012, Angola submitted an extension request for five years through 1 January 2018 in order to complete a general survey; to complete a mapping certification and confirmation project; to train state organizations led by INAD and the FAA; and to train commercial demining companies in IMSMA. This is planned to result in an updated, and robust, national database and a more accurate assessment of the remaining mine problem.[49] In response to a question from the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance in June 2012 about shortening the extension period, CNIDAH replied they could not shorten the period, partly due to uncertainty over when the mapping project could begin.[50]

At the end of the proposed extension period, Angola plans to submit another extension request based on the results of surveys and clearance, but has stated that it already predicts it will need more than 10 years beyond 2018.[51]

The Angola Mine Action Program has had numerous disappointments since 2002 when CNIDAH was established, none more so than the state of its mine action database. The extension request is extremely ambitious because—in addition to survey, mapping, and conversion of several years of data to IMSMA—it expects to clear and/or release 300km² in 2013–2018. CNIDAH’s record in meeting other targets on time raises doubts that they can accomplish what they plan to do within five years.

Battle area clearance in 2012

The amount of Battle Area Clearance (BAC) conducted in 2012 remained low, as in previous years.[52] In 2012, only MgM and NPA conducted BAC. NPA reported one task of 34,788m² and MgM reported one task of 14,734m².

BAC: 2012[53]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area[54]

Since 1994, only a very few cluster bomb strikes have been identified by HALO, which has therefore concluded that the impact of submunitions is minimal in Angola. Clearing submunitions has been mainly EOD call-out/spot tasks.

More typical is the destruction of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which have already been earmarked for subsequent disposal by the FAA. Since 2005, HALO WAD teams have destroyed a total of 7,284 submunitions, including 12 in 2012.[55]

Quality management

Each international demining operator and INAD has its own internal quality management system. After a clearance task has been completed, CNIDAH is responsible for quality control.[56]

Safety of demining personnel

HALO reported two of their deminers were injured in separate incidents in 2012 during mine clearance operations. On 8 May 2012 in Cuito Cuanavale, Kuando Kubango province a 34-year-old male broke his collarbone when a R2M2 antipersonnel mine exploded. In October in Bie province a 31-year-old male lost two fingers when Type 72A antipersonnel mine exploded.[57]

The other NGO operators, CNIDAH, and CED, did not report any accidents during demining in 2012.

 

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary findings

·         An evaluation found that there was a need to better define the role of the Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) in victim assistance, to increase the inclusion of mine survivors, to strengthen the role of CNIDAH in advocating for the rights of survivors with other ministries, and to mobilize more funding

·         A continued lack of government funding for physical rehabilitation in 2012 caused a further decline in both the quality and accessibility of these services

·         An ongoing victim survey and needs assessment was expected to improve efforts to plan victim assistance and measure impact; as of mid-2013, six of 18 provinces had been surveyed

·         An assessment of the Republic of Angola’s 2007–2011 victim assistance plan found that implementation was limited, particularly in improving access to medical care, in physical rehabilitation, and in economic inclusion; more progress had been made in the development of laws and policies to promote the rights of survivors

Victim assistance commitments

Angola is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Angola has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2012, the Monitor identified 34 mine and ERW casualties in Angola.[1] Boys represented the largest group of casualties (20: eight killed; 12 injured), a change from 2011 when men were the largest casualty group.[2] Casualties included five women and five girls. Incomplete data for age and sex of recorded casualties in previous years makes identifying incidence rates and trends across time difficult.

Two of the reported casualties were deminers, which represents an increase from the zero reported demining casualties in 2011 but is lower than the six deminer casualties recorded in 2010.[3] All casualties were civilians in 2012. A total of 15 incidents were reported and occurred in four provinces, with the highest numbers of casualties occurring in both Bié and Moxico. In 2011, casualties were identified in 14 of Angola’s 18 provinces. This could indicate a lack of casualty reporting from some provinces in 2012.

The 34 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2012 represented a significant decrease from the 89 casualties identified in 2011 and the 42 in 2010.[4] Given the lack of a reliable collection mechanism for casualty data and the fluctuating casualty totals as identified by the Monitor, it is not possible to determine trends over time. However, in evaluating its Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011, CNIDAH found that there had been a decline in the overall number of mine/ERW incidents recorded annually during the five-year period, but that the decline was not linear and did not reach the plan’s goal of reducing the number of incidents to “almost zero.”[5] Based on CNIDAH data, at the start of the Mine Action Plan in 2006 there were some 50–80 incidents on average per year. By 2010–2011, the average number of incidents had been reduced to 20–40 per year. The evaluation found that landmine incidents had decreased while those caused by ERW increased slightly.[6] However, when looking at the total annual number of casualties recorded by CNIDAH between 2006 and 2011, it is impossible to discern a corresponding trend. CNIDAH recorded 48 mine/ERW casualties in 2006, 23 in 2007, 247 in 2008, 36 in 2009, one in 2010, and 78 in 2011.[7]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Angola is unknown, though estimates range from 23,000[8] to 80,000.[9] No details were available to substantiate these figures. By June 2013, 4,770 survivors had been registered in the provinces of Cabinda, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Namibe, and Zaire as part of the national mine/ERW victim survey.[10] Between 2000 and 2012, the Monitor identified 2,857 mine/ERW casualties, including 950 people killed, 1,762 injured, and 145 for which the outcome was unknown.[11] Between 2006 and 2011, CNIDAH registered 433 mine/ERW casualties, including 77 people killed and 356 injured.[12]

As of April 2013, the national victim survey had identified at least 354 cluster munition survivors in the province of Huambo.[13] While this number was reported to be incomplete for the province, it was the first available data from Angola with confirmed casualties from cluster munitions. Data collected from the four other provinces surveyed did not include specific information regarding the number of cluster munition victims.[14] The survey questionnaire developed in 2011 offered just three options as the cause of disability: “a mine,” “an accident,” or “unknown” with no place to report on cluster submunitions as the cause. [15] It was not known if the questionnaire had been revised for use in Huambo province.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Angola is unknown, but there are many thousands. As of June 2013, 4,770 survivors had been identified in the first six (of 18) provinces surveyed as part of the national victim survey.[16]

Victim assistance since 1999[17]

When victim assistance monitoring began in 1999, Angola was still in the midst of a series of armed conflicts that began in 1961 and did not officially end until 2002. In 1999, several international organizations, including the ICRC, Handicap International (HI), and the Swedish Red Cross, among others, were providing basic victim assistance services such as emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation. Despite these humanitarian relief efforts, overall care was grossly inadequate throughout the country. This was the result of the destruction or deterioration of infrastructure such as health centers, hospitals, and roads during armed conflict. In 1999, a lack of transport meant that mine/ERW victims were often delayed by as much as 36 hours before receiving life-saving care at the nearest medical post.

By 2002, it was estimated that fewer than 30% of Angolans had access to any healthcare services. Those limited services that were available were located in major cities and provincial capitals while mine/ERW survivors were predominately based in rural areas of the country. With the stabilization of the security situation, the government and international community began investing in rebuilding the country’s healthcare system and other basic infrastructure, such as roads, which increased access to basic medical facilities around the country including in rural areas.

In 2005, international organizations began closing victim assistance programs and transferring management of healthcare facilities and rehabilitation centers to the government. By 2008, all 11 physical rehabilitation centers were managed by the Ministry of Health. By 2009, production of prosthetics in all centers had declined due to a lack of materials and unpaid staff salaries. This decline continued through the end of 2012.

Some economic inclusion projects have been available to survivors over the period, either through international organizations, national and local organizations of persons with disabilities, or government agencies such as Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) and CNIDAH which began coordinating and facilitating victim assistance in 2001. However, the available assistance throughout the period fell far short of the overall need.

International organizations supported the development of local survivor networks and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs). However, these groups were hamstrung by lack of funding and the distances between them that prevented collaboration among the groups. Through the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011, CNIDAH aimed to support the development of a national survivor network, but no progress was made toward this objective within the timeframe of the plan due to insufficient funding and organizational problems.

In 2012, there were no significant improvements in the accessibility or quality of victim assistance services in Angola. The departure of HI by the end of 2011 completed the withdrawal of international organizations that had been providing support for victim assistance. A continued lack of government funding for physical rehabilitation in 2012 caused a further decline in both the quality and accessibility of these services.[18]

While there continued to be some improvement in the quality of roads in some provinces, a lack of affordable transportation and the poor quality of roads in many parts of the country remained the greatest obstacles to accessing services for survivors living outside the provincial capital. [19] A new collaborative project was initiated in 2012, working with the police and fire department to facilitate emergency medical transport to hospitals.[20]

Assessing victim assistance needs

The data collection phase of the National Victim Survey and Needs Assessment was suspended in 2012 due to funding constraints and potential confusion of those surveyed with the national election registration process that occurred in 2012.[21] Launched in October 2010, the purpose of the survey is to identify and register mine and cluster munition survivors with disabilities, to understand their living situation, and to determine how to promote their socio-economic inclusion.[22] The survey resumed in 2013 in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico; by June, 4,770 survivors with a disability had been registered in a total of six provinces.[23] The timeline for completing the survey in the remaining twelve provinces had yet to be determined.[24]

In 2011, HI reported having received training to assist in the implementation of the survey.[25] However, local participation appeared to be severely lacking; of nine DPOs, survivor associations, and NGO service providers interviewed by the Monitor in Huila province in 2011, just one was consulted in the collection of data in that province. Furthermore, not all the questionnaires completed by this organization were included in survey results.[26] The provincial MINARS in Huila, with responsibility for maintaining a registry of all persons with disabilities in the province, was also not contacted during data collection.[27] A local NGO assisted in the data collection in 2013 but it was not an organization working with survivors or with people with disabilities. In provinces where the survey had been conducted, training was provided to the local CNIDAH offices in data collection to assist with the national survey and for ongoing casualty data collection.[28] In 2011, it was reported that survey results were to be shared through a public report released in each province after its completion.[29]

Through the five-year review of the Strategic Mine Action Plan, CNIDAH recognized that baseline data on survivors and their needs was necessary to determine the impact of government programs to improve health and rehabilitation services on the lives of survivors. The ongoing survey and needs assessment was expected to improve efforts to plan victim assistance and measure impact.[30]

Victim assistance coordination[31]

CNIDAH’s victim assistance coordination efforts in 2012 were focused on implementing the National Victim Survey, improving coordination at the provincial level, and contributing to the development of the CNIDAH National Strategic Mine Action Plan 2013–2017 and the concurrent PNIAVM for 2013–2017.[32] In April 2013, CNIDAH reported that the PNIAVM 2013–2017 was “successfully completed and the assistance sector now has an updated plan in accordance with CNIDAH Strategic Plan.”[33]

In April 2012, the Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration held a national forum to evaluate progress in implementing the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011 and to develop recommendations for a victim assistance plan for 2013–2017. Participants at the forum concluded that progress towards the implementation of the previous plan was limited, particularly in improving access to medical care, in physical rehabilitation, and in economic inclusion, but that more progress had been made in the development of laws and policies to promote the rights of survivors.[34] A subsequent regional workshop was hosted in the second half of 2012 by the Sub-Commission in Lunda Sul and attended by government and non-government representatives from Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Lunda Norte provinces. The regional workshop sought to improve coordination between provincial offices and activities, as well as to evaluate priorities for inclusion in the national victim assistance plan for 2013–2017.[35] The updated PNIAVM was developed in consultation with representatives from international NGOs, church groups, UN agencies, foreign embassies, and private enterprises.[36]

During 2012, CNIDAH continued to work with the provincial offices to improve victim assistance planning and implementation. Towards this end, a provincial level workshop was held in Kuando Kubango, following similar workshops held in Bengo, Humbo, and Zaire in 2011.[37] Provincial CNIDAH representatives and other governmental and nongovernmental victim assistance stakeholders attended the workshops, evaluating the outcomes of the 2007–2011 national victim assistance plan and contributing to the drafting of provincial victim assistance plans and to the 2013–2017 national victim assistance plan.[38]

The evaluation of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 found that there was a need to more clearly define the role of CNIDAH in victim assistance, to develop a database of mine victims to facilitate planning and the inclusion of mine survivors, to strengthen the role of CNIDAH in advocating for the rights of survivors with other ministries such as MINARS and the Ministry of Health, and to mobilize more funding to increase access to medical and rehabilitation services.[39] Progress towards the specific victim assistance objectives within the plan was limited, mainly due to the “economic crisis” in the country during the period. In some areas, such as access to medical services or economic inclusion, the evaluation found that progress could not be quantified due to a lack of data.[40]

In 2012, Angola provided an update on victim assistance activities in a statement at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and a further update at the Intersessional Meeting in Geneva in May 2013.[41] Angola provided information on victim assistance activities in Form J of its 2012 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, including an update on its planning and coordination activities.[42]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Survivor associations and DPOs participated in national and provincial coordination meetings convened by CNIDAH as part of the Sub-Committee for Social Support and Reintegration. Through the sub-committee, survivor associations contributed to the evaluation of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 and the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011 and also contributed recommendations for the next national victim assistance plan.[43]

Some survivors and/or representatives of survivor associations collected data for the national victim survey in 2011.[44] Survivors implemented socio-economic reintegration projects and were involved in advocacy for the rights of persons with disabilities through survivor associations and DPOs.[45]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[46]

In recent years, the government increased its expenditure on the national healthcare system, increasing the number of health centers in rural areas, improving accessibility to health services, and increasing the availability of medicine. While it was likely that this would have improved basic healthcare services for mine/ERW survivors along with the rest of the population, there was no information available on the impact of these changes.[47]

In 2012, all 11 national physical rehabilitation centers faced difficulties in responding to the demand for their services.[48] In most centers, production of prosthetics decreased due to a lack of supplies. In 2012, the majority of the prosthetic/orthotic centers reported receiving no financial support for material supplies from the National Rehabilitation Program, with one center successfully seeking funds directly from the Ministry of Finance.[49] Others were unable to produce any prosthetics whatsoever and could only respond to the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities by dispensing medication and providing physiotherapy.[50] A number of centers reported insufficient funds were available to meet the needs of patients in 2012.[51]

CNIDAH conducted training for technicians in 2012 in several rehabilitation centers for a range of staff, including 41 senior and intermediary physiotherapy technicians and 30 orthopedic technicians.[52] In May 2013, a new physical rehabilitation project was initiated by CNIDAH seeking to improve the quality of services in five provinces, funded by the National Rehabilitation Program. Project activities include re-establishing physical therapy units in hospitals to meet basic needs and referral systems to the rehabilitation centers for more complex cases as well as training for orthopedic technicians and provision of new equipment for manufacturing of orthopedic devices.[53]

There was some limited progress in planning the development of psychological support services for survivors in 2012. CNIDAH recruited a psychologist who coordinated meetings with partner organizations to develop a strategic plan to establish services.[54] However, no improvements were reported on the availability of psychological support services for survivors, which had been found to be essentially non-existent as of May 2012.[55] As in previous years, some DPOs and survivor associations provided peer support services.[56] The ongoing national victim survey did not include any questions regarding access to, or need for, psychological support.[57]

In 2012, CNIDAH continued to provide vocational training and support for income-generating activities for a small number of mine survivors, directly or in coordination with MINARS.[58] However, the number of beneficiaries was minimal compared with the number of survivors in need of this assistance throughout the country.[59] Numerous national NGOs, including DPOs, provided training and support for the development of small businesses, even though their budgets were limited.[60]

During 2011, HI transferred its community-based rehabilitation (CBR) activities to local partners before closing its program in December. Former staff of HI formed a national organization, Podemos, which continued to train local authorities on CBR and to meet with beneficiaries, albeit at reduced capacity due to a lack of funding. Throughout 2012 and continuing in 2013, the staff was only working part time and on a voluntary basis due to a lack of funding.[61]

In 2012, the Protection Law for Persons with Disabilities was approved by the National Assembly, along with a national strategy to implement the law and establish the National Council of the Disabled Person.[62] While the law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, it was not enforced and discrimination remained prevalent.[63] Despite legislation entitling persons with disabilities to a pension, just 1% of respondents to the national victim survey in 2011 had received any financial support.[64] Persons with disabilities continued to face barriers to access public or private facilities, employment, and education.[65] Improvement was made in the political access of persons with disabilities by the government who provided voting assistance to persons with disabilities in the national elections of August 2012.[66]

As of May 2013, Angola had not joined the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), although national regulation was approved in 2012 by the National Assembly bringing Angola closer to joining the convention.[67]

 

The Republic of Angola has been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. In 2008–2012, it received a total of US$110 million, or an average of more than $22 million per year. In 2012, Angola received $13.7 million of which the United States (US) provided 63%.[1]

The European Union (EU) is also a major donor in Angola. In 2010, the EU awarded five international NGOs and one French commercial company €20 million ($26.5 million) for 2010–2012.[2] In 2013, the EU office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action from 2013–2017.[3]

The government of Angola has contributed $230 million to mine action since 2008, an average of $46 million per year. In 2012, it contributed $76.7 million resulting in a $90 million overall budget, a level similar to the mine action program in Afghanistan.[4] National funding supports the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), with funding going to coordination (salaries), quality control, and provincial offices. In 2012, the CNIDAH budget was approximately $14 million or 20% of national funding. The remaining 80% of the $76.7 million went to the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), which was established in 2005 to fund development projects and provide financial support to the demining operations of the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas), the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional), and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD).[5] While a separate budget for INAD is not available, with its 57 demining brigades INAD is the largest demining operator in Angola and conducts most of the demining for the CED.[6]

Despite having one of the highest landmine casualty rates in the world, Angola did not receive international support for victim assistance in 2012. Angola’s national budget has several line items that potentially benefit landmine survivors. In 2011, CNIDAH budgeted AOA250 million ($2.7 million) for a national victim survey.[7] The Ministry of Health budgeted AOA1.04 billion ($11.1 million) for its annual support to the National Rehabilitation Hospital and Centre in Viana, outside Luanda, while the Ministry of Veterans Affairs budget to assist disabled veterans was AOA702 million ($7.5 million).[8] There is no available information on the number of landmine casualties that benefit from these facilities and programs. Budget information for 2012 is unavailable.

International contributions: 2012[9]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[10]