Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 28 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation—the Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-personnel Mines—took effect on 28 May 1999.[1] In 2013, Cambodia submitted its 14^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2012.[2]

Cambodia continued in its role as president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties until December 2012.[3] As President, Minister Prak Sokhonn provided the analysis of the requests for extension of Article 5 deadlines at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva.[4] During the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister, U Wunna Maung Lwin, met with Minister Sokhonn, where the latter encouraged Myanmar to accede to the convention.[5]

Cambodia participated in the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, where it made an intervention on victim assistance and provided an update on its clearance progress since receiving an extension on its Article 5 obligations.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2013, Cambodia made an intervention on compliance regarding joint clearance of its border with Thailand and provided an update on its clearance progress since receiving an extension on its Article 5 obligations.[6]

Cambodia also attended the Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation & Assistance in June 2013 in Bangkok.

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Use

Cambodia, acting on a request made by the ICBL, conducted a fact-finding mission from 10–12 May 2013 regarding an incident in March 2013 in which three Thai soldiers were injured by what the Thai military alleged were newly planted mines near the Ta Kwai Temple in Phanom Dong Rak district.[7] Cambodia informed States Parties that its fact-finding mission determined that the Thai soldiers were injured by mines laid in the past during the Cambodian civil war. Cambodia’s investigation stated that its soldiers found indications of the incident on the same day, and provided a GPS reference that was different to the GPS reference where the Thai military stated the incident took place. The Cambodian fact-finding mission stated that the incident took place to the side of, not on, a specially cleared path used for meetings between the Thai and Cambodian military in that particular area. The Cambodian delegation informed States Parties that it had discussed its investigations with the ICBL. Cambodia provided a copy of its investigation report to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit and the ICBL at the May 2013 intersessional meetings, and to the Government of Thailand through diplomatic channels.[8]

Previous allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodian forces on the Cambodian-Thai border, made by Thailand in 2008 and 2009, were never resolved.[9] In May 2011, in response to a request by the Monitor for an update regarding the Fact Finding Mission Report into the allegations, a government official stated:

Cambodia has been waiting for the responses from Thailand to five core questions, without which the result of the investigation conducted by the Fact Finding Commission of Cambodia cannot be substantiated and evidently concluded. Thailand has not responded to…neither answered nor substantiated the allegation it first made. The allegation made by Thailand regarding Cambodia’s use of new landmines can be summarized as baseless at best.[10]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The government has reported that it does not have any antipersonnel mine production facilities, and that it has not exported antipersonnel mines.[11]

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999, the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.[12] In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police that were subsequently destroyed.[13] In 2013, Cambodia reported that while there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001, “police and military units are still finding and collecting weapons, ammunitions and mines from various sources, locations and caches.”[14] Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction.[15] A Cambodian official has previously stated that newly discovered stocks are destroyed immediately.[16]

Previous Article 7 reports document a total of 133,478 stockpiled antipersonnel mines that were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008; this included 9,698 by CMAC, 2,713 by HALO Trust, and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Cambodia stated that these mines were “reported by local communities.”[17] It is not clear why significant numbers of stockpiled mines were discovered each year through 2008, but none have been discovered since.

As in its previous article 7 reports, for the calendar year 2012 Cambodia marked as “not applicable” the obligatory declaration for mines retained for development and training purposes.[18] However, Cambodia has each year reported transfer of mines removed from mined areas to the CMAC training center and other operators for training purposes.[19] In June 2011, the deputy secretary general of the CMAA told the Monitor that all mines held by Cambodia are fuzeless and that Cambodia retains no live mines for training.[20] In 2012, Cambodia reported the transfer for training purposes of 1,190 antipersonnel mines “found in the Mined Areas and retained for training and development purposes” but did not state if the mines had been neutralized.[21]

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In September 2012, a government representative repeated Cambodia’s April 2012 statement that “Cambodia is still assessing the impact of signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions on its defense capability and the ability to comply with all obligations.”[1] Cambodia first indicated it was assessing the impact of joining in September 2011, at the time stating, “We sincerely hope that the ultimate signing is just…a matter of time.”[2]

Cambodia has said that the question of accession to the convention is “in the hands of our top leadership.”[3] In November 2011, Prime Minister Hun Sen met with a group of survivors of landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded ordnance who requested that Cambodia accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Prime Minister responded that he is continuing to receive advice from government authorities on the matter.

Cambodia was an early, prominent, and influential supporter of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It hosted the first regional forum on cluster munitions in Southeast Asia, in Phnom Penh in March 2007. Cambodia advocated strongly for the most comprehensive and immediate ban possible and joined in the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the Dublin negotiations in May 2008. Yet, despite Cambodia’s extensive and positive leadership role, it attended the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo on 3 December 2008 only as an observer and did not sign, stating that it needed more time to study the security implications of joining.[4]

Throughout 2009 and 2010, Cambodia cited several reasons, mostly security-related, for not joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] Cambodia’s position on accession to the convention began to show signs of change after Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodian territory on the border near Preah Vihear temple in February 2011, killing two men and injuring seven.[6] The CMC has urged both Thailand and Cambodia to immediately commit to no future use of cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[7]

Despite not joining, Cambodia has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has attended every meeting of States Parties of the convention as an observer, including the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012. Cambodia has participated in every round of intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva, including in April 2013.

At the intersessional meetings in April 2013, Cambodia was the only state not party to the convention to express concern at Syria’s use of cluster munitions, stating that as a country contaminated by cluster munition remnants, Cambodia “expresses deep regret at the loss of life” from Syria’s cluster munition use.[8]

After the death of Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihanouk, landmine survivors issued a statement in in January 2013, acknowledging his “strong support” for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and urging the government to join the convention “as a mark of respect to the late King and a sign of Cambodia’s commitment to peace in the region.”[9]

Cambodia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Cambodia is not known to have used, produced, or exported cluster munitions. In June 2011, it stated, “Despite being confronted and threatened by forces, so far we have refrained from employing cluster munitions in our response.”[10]

The size and precise content of Cambodia’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In December 2008, a Ministry of Defense official said that Cambodia has “some missile launchers that use cluster munitions that weigh more than 20 kg” and said there were also stockpiles of cluster munitions weighing 250kg left over from the 1980s that Cambodia intends to destroy.[11] Weapons with submunitions that weigh more than 20kg each are not defined as cluster munitions by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are not prohibited.[12]

According to standard international reference publications, Cambodia also possesses BM-21 Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[13] Cambodian officials have asked representatives from states that have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as NGOs, if BM-21 rocket launchers are banned under the convention. BM-21 multiple barrel rocket launchers are capable of firing rockets with a variety of warheads, one of which is a cargo warhead containing explosive submunitions. The CMC has informed Cambodia that the rocket delivery system itself is not prohibited by the convention, and the convention would allow use of the BM-21 with unitary munitions; however, under the terms of the convention, a BM-21 rocket launcher could not be used to deliver any rockets containing explosive submunitions.[14]

 

Contamination and Impact

The Kingdom of Cambodia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. The full extent of contamination is not known. A Baseline Survey (BLS) of Cambodia’s 124 mine affected districts completed in 2012 found a total of 1,914.81km² of mine and ERW contamination, and was extended in 2013 to cover all landmine and ERW contaminated districts.

Baseline Survey: 2012

Mines

Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand, which accounted for more than 90% of casualties in the three years to 2009. Contamination includes the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s to block insurgent infiltration, which ranks among the densest contamination in the world with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.[1]

Cambodia’s 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request estimated mined areas needing full clearance at 648.8km² and the National Mine Action Strategy released   2010 identified a further 1,097.8km² of suspected land to be released “through baseline survey and technical survey.”[2] Survey of mined areas as part of the BLS identified a total of 1,005.74km² affected to some degree by antipersonnel mines, of which 650.82km² (65%) was “land containing scattered or nuisance” antipersonnel mines. A further 66.07km² was contaminated by antivehicle mines.[3]

Antivehicle mine casualties consistently cause more casualties than antipersonnel mines, including some casualties from incidents that occurred outside land identified as contaminated by the BLS, prompting the Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority (CMAA) to call on local mine action planning units to pay attention to areas such as old road alignments that may have antivehicle mines.[4]

Casualties by device in 2009–2012[5]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped at least 26 million explosive submunitions on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, mostly in eastern and northeastern areas bordering Lao PDR and Vietnam. The bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, including unexploded BLU-24, BLU-26, BLU-36, BLU-42, BLU-43, BLU-49, and BLU-61 submunitions.[6]

The BLS of 21 districts identified 990 suspect cluster munition-contaminated areas covering an area of 489.22km², but that figure was expected to rise as the survey continued to other districts not included in the BLS until 2012 when it was expanded to cover all ERW, not just landmines.[7] The CMAA’s casualty data identified one victim of a cluster munitions incident in 2012.[8]

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an ERW survey in eastern Cambodia focused on determining the extent of cluster munition remnants contamination more precisely than the BLS. In 2012, surveyors covered 15 suspected hazardous areas totalling 9.5km² and reducing these to confirmed hazards covering 3.08km²; in 2013 NPA started conducting survey and clearance with two teams, finding mainly BLU-24, BLU-26 and some BLU-61.[9]

Other explosive remnants of war

In its coverage of the most mine-affected districts, the BLS recorded 310.93km² of ERW contamination, not including cluster munitions.[10] The expanded BLS, including coverage of districts close to the borders with Vietnam and Lao PDR that were heavily bombed at the time of the Vietnam War, was expected to add to this estimate.

The US dropped more than a million tons (one billion kilograms) of general-purpose bombs during the war, mostly in eastern Cambodia. In other parts of the country, operators encounter mainly land-fired ordnance, including artillery shells, rockets, and mortars.[11] This contamination has for some years caused most of the ERW casualties.

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the CMAC.[12] The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparation of strategic plans, management of data, quality control, coordination of mine/ERW risk education, and victim assistance.[13] Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President. A senior government minister, Minister of Post and Telecommunication, Prak Sokhonn, who is also CMAA vice-president, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Joint Government-Development Partners’ Mine Action Technical Working Group.[14]

The CMAA’s management is overseen by its Secretary-General, Chum Bun Rong, who was appointed in December 2008.[15] A sub-decree (No. 92), issued in August 2009, specifies that CMAA has five departments: regulation and monitoring, socio-economic planning and database management, mine victim assistance, public relations, and general administration.[16]

CMAA guidelines and criteria for planning and prioritization, which came into effect at the start of 2012, seek to integrate clearance more closely with broader commune development plans. They specify that priority is given to clearing hazardous area polygons identified by the BLS and where there have been casualties in the past five years. The guidelines also include a provision for the CMAA to give guidance and direction to the relevant Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) on the criteria that define clearance priorities.[17] CMAA guidelines also call for MAPUs and operators to deploy 75% of assets to communes identified as priorities leaving the remaining 25% available for other tasks.

Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010−2019 set four general goals:

·         reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts by allocating demining assets to the most impacted communities;

·         contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, by supporting development priorities, access to care for survivors, and the land rights of intended beneficiaries of clearance;

·         promote international and regional disarmament and stability by supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, and adhering to the Convention on Conventional Weapons’ (CCW) Protocol V;

·         ensure sustainable national capacities to adequately address the residual mine/ERW contamination.

However, Cambodia planned to review its demining workplan in light of the findings of the BLS and to present a revised plan to the Meeting of States Parties in December 2013.[18] On the basis of results so far, CMAA estimated the total cost of completing mine clearance in Cambodia at US$450 million, a figure later revised down to $440 million.[19]

MAPUs in Cambodia’s eight most mine-affected western provinces and seven mainly ERW-affected eastern provinces are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working with local authorities to identify community priorities and in consultation with operators. The MAPUs in eastern provinces are less experienced than those in the west, but many are short of resources from vehicles to office computers. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees and the CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities.

UNDP has supported the CMAA through a “Clearing for Results” program that started in 2006, awarding contracts for clearance by a process of competitive bidding. In practice, international NGO operators have felt unable to compete with the square meter clearance costs bid by national operators—CMAC and NPMEC—that have lower equipment overheads and, apart from a $400,000 contract awarded to HALO for work on the BLS in 2011, they have largely stayed out of the bidding.[20] In 2013, the program awarded two contracts to CMAC for clearance of 8.9km² in Battambang and 4.93km² in Bantheay Meanchey province worth respectively $1.4 million and $0.95 million. A third contract was awarded to NPMEC for clearance of 2.59km² in Pailin at a cost of $0.55 million.[21]

The first phase ended in March 2010 and a second phase started in January 2011 advised by UNDP but under national management. Project priorities included strengthening CMAA management and technical capacity, conducting the BLS, and promoting cost-effective approaches to land release through competitive bidding for clearance contracts.[22] The program planned expenditure of $24 million over five years between 2011 and 2015 and as of May 2013 had received commitments of $22 million.[23]

Land Release

Cambodia is concerned by decreasing levels of international donor support for its mine action program but continues to show increasing productivity, helped by more emphasis on survey and clearance of antivehicle mines.

The total amount of land released by survey and clearance in 2012 reported by the CMAA amounted to 71.46km², 11% more than the previous year. This included 64.84km² released through mined and battle area clearance (BAC) and 6.62km² through survey.[24] CMAA data did not include a reduction of 6.42km² in the size of cluster munition hazards surveyed by NPA in 2012.[25]

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2012

Operators completed survey of 124 districts included in the original BLS focused on landmine contamination in 2013 which identified antipersonnel mine contamination over some 151.64km² in addition to 891.73km² of scattered antipersonnel mine contamination and 68.19km² of antivehicle mine contamination.[27] Survey capacity came mainly from CMAC, which conducted the BLS with 10 teams in 2012, mostly in central and eastern provinces. HALO deployed seven teams on the BLS in January 2012 but had to suspend its participation because of lack of funding until August. Overall, HALO surveyed 129.93km² of mine- and ERW-suspect land in 2012 and cancelled 6.1km².[28] In addition, MAG had two teams working on the BLS in 2012 that conducted survey in Sihanoukville, Koh Kong, Kampong Cham, and Ratanakiri Provinces.[29]

BLS result for 124 districts[30]

Survey of the 124 original BLS districts also identified a further 803.25km² of ERW contamination, including 492.66km² of contamination by cluster munition remnants, and CMAA decided to extend the survey to cover remaining districts to capture all forms of ERW contamination.[31] Rattanakiri province, one of Cambodia’s most heavily bombed provinces, had not been included in the original BLS because it had no mine contamination. Operators noted the survey questionnaire needed amendment to better address ERW contamination.[32]

In the meantime, NPA, working with four teams seconded from CMAC, conducted its cluster munitions remnants survey in eastern Cambodia covering 15 suspected hazardous areas with a total area of 9.5km² in Kratie province, reducing them by two-thirds to confirmed hazardous areas covering 3.1km².[33]

Mine clearance in 2012

Cambodia reported accelerating mine clearance in 2012 with the amount of land cleared rising to 53.66km² in 2012, up 45% on the result for the previous year and 75% the level two years earlier, although operators recorded substantially lower numbers of items cleared.

Mined area clearance: 2012[34]

UXO = unexploded ordinance; * Destroyed by the BLS teams

Much of the increase in land released through clearance was claimed by CMAC, the biggest of the humanitarian demining operators, which finished 2012 with more than 1,000 deminers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians supported by 32 mechanical teams and 16 mine detection dog teams with more than 150 staff. CMAC attributed a near 40% improvement in its mined area clearance in 2012 to application of updated land release procedures and to deploying more mechanical assets, including brush cutters and Ebinger detectors modified for deep search for antivehicle mines.[35]

HALO, maintaining capacity at the same level as in 2011 with a staff of 1,017, including 788 deminers, also recorded a hefty 50% increase in area cleared in 2012. It achieved this mainly by a greater focus on antivehicle mines cleared with large loop detectors, a faster process than manual clearance of antipersonnel mines. Although clearance of antipersonnel mine-affected land remained close to the previous level at 3.58km² in 2012 against 3.9km² in 2011, HALO cleared 8.96km² of antivehicle mine-affected areas in 2012, compared with 5km² in 2011 and 1.8km² in 2010. In the first two months of 2013, however, HALO also identified 5.8km² of previously unrecorded mine hazards affected mainly by antivehicle mines. During 2012, HALO’s roving EOD teams destroyed 2,222 antipersonnel mines and 86 antivehicle mines in addition to 309 items of UXO and 8,222 items of stray ammunition in addition to small arms and ammunition. In the next two years, HALO planned to expand EOD operations.[36]

MAG’s clearance of mined land increased slightly in 2012, attributed to more use of mine detection dog teams in conjunction with mechanical assets and the acquisition of a number of Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMID) detectors. MAG conducted “development-enabling” clearance in Battambang and Bantheay Meanchey provinces and in Pailin on the Western border with Thailand, working on a number of projects that it said did not necessarily have a high threat but had significant post-clearance development impact. It also established a risk reduction project in conjunction with CARE in the northern province of Rattanakiri, hoping to attract support to resurrect EOD teams that it was forced to stand down in 2011 because of financial cuts. In addition to area clearance, spot tasks undertaken by MAG in 2012 resulted in destroying 6,524 UXO items.[37]

The CMAA reported that it accredited four more NPMEC demining platoons in 2012, bringing its total accredited capacity to 13 platoons and two EOD teams.[38] So far, however, the only NPMEC clearance contributing to a reduction of Cambodia’s recorded mine contamination has been through contracts awarded through the Clearing for Results program on tasks in the western district of Pailin which have involved only a small number of platoons. No information is available on other clearance or verification work NPMEC has reportedly conducted on behalf of the government or state entities.

Battle area and cluster munitions clearance in 2012

CMAC has in recent years been more active in eastern Cambodia, conducting BAC since relocating its Demining Unit 5 to Kompong Cham province two years ago. In 2012, CMAC reported clearing 5.73km², in the process destroying 1,799 items of UXO and 681 cluster munition remnants. In addition, it reported clearing 34 cluster munition hazards covering 5.45km², destroying a further 549 cluster munitions and 659 UXO items.[39]

In the last two years, NPA focused on developing survey of cluster contaminated areas in association CMAC, but in March 2013 started training two NPA teams, each with five women deminers and supported by five other staff, proposing to deploy teams for clearance in Rattanakiri province in the second half of the year.[40]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

Cambodia’s national strategy for 2010−2019, which was released in 2010, called for demining operations to clear some 648.8km of mined land and to release 1,097.8km of suspected land “through baseline survey and technical survey.”[41] With completion of the BLS in 2013, Cambodia was due to present an updated strategy for achieving its Article 5 goals.[42] That had not been released as of August 2013.

After completion of the BLS in the 124 mined districts originally proposed for survey, the CMAA opted to extend the survey to all forms of ERW contamination and similarly proposed to broaden its operational plan to deal with all forms of ERW. The CMAA believes funding will be a key determinant of whether or not it is able to complete clearance within its extended Article 5 deadline. Through application of new land release methods, CMAA believed completion may be achieved at less than the $455 million estimate set out in its Article 5 deadline Extension Request.[43] The outlook for donor support, however, looks uncertain, particularly after 2015, as does the government’s willingness to increase funding for humanitarian mine action.

Other risk factors identified by the ICBL included border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia that have halted demining activity in some border areas. A Cambodian-Thai joint working group agreed in principle in 2012 to clear landmines from a contested border area in Prey Vihear and assigned the Thailand Mine Action Centre and the CMAA to plan a joint demining operation.[44]

Quality management

The CMAA is responsible for quality management, operating six quality assurance teams: two teams are based in Battambang, two in Bantheay Meanchey, one in Siem Reap, and one in Kampong Cham, concentrating on clearance operations.[45] The CMAA reports that two other quality control teams have deployed since 2011. A UNDP-funded advisor supporting quality management left at the end of 2012 and as of September 2013 had not been replaced.[46]

Safety of demining personnel

Operators did not report any demining accidents in 2012.

 

Victim Assistance Commitments

Cambodia is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Cambodia has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2012, the Cambodia Mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 186 casualties from mines, ERW, and unexploded submunitions. The vast majority of the total casualties (176, which is 95%) were civilians. Some 35% of the civilian casualties were children (61), including 46 boys and 15 girls. This represents an increase in the overall number of child casualties and percentage of total civilians casualties compared to 27% (51) of civilian casualties in 2011. Thirty-three percent of all casualties were female, reporting the highest known percentage of female casualties to date in Cambodia. Of the total adult civilian casualties, 98 were men and 27 were women.[1] One casualty was a deminer. Another nine casualties were security personnel, including two Thai nationals.[2]

The 186 casualties recorded in 2012 represented a continuing trend of significant decreases in the number of annual casualties, with 211 recorded in 2011 and 286 in 2010. This trend was also represented in a reduction of mine/ERW incidents by a quarter, from 104 incidents in 2011 to 77 in 2012.[3] However, the number of people killed in 2012 remained constant when compared with 2011 at 43. In 2012, antivehicle mines continued to cause a greater number of casualties than antipersonnel mines, following a trend that began in 2010.

As of the end of 2012, CMVIS reported at least 64,202 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,662 people were killed and another 44,540 injured since 1979.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

One casualty from an unexploded submunition was recorded in 2012. This is a decrease compared to previous years, with 16 cluster submunition casualties recorded in 2011 and 17 in 2010.[5] For the period from 1998 to the end of 2012, 191 cluster munition remnant casualties were reported in Cambodia.[6] However, data collection on cluster munition casualties has been limited and the total number, although not known, is thought to be much higher. Cambodia is among the countries considered to be among the states “worst affected” by cluster munitions with responsibility for significant numbers of cluster munition victims.[7]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Cambodia is not known. Over 44,000 people have been reported to have been injured by mines/ERW.[8]

Summary of victim assistance efforts since 1999[9]

The Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) delegated responsibility for the coordination of victim assistance to the Ministry of Social Action (MoSVY) and its support mechanism, the Disability Action Council (DAC). Despite hopes for improved national disability representation following a long restructuring process by DAC, the DAC was placed directly under ministerial authority in 2010. The focus of coordination changed from survivors to broader disability needs when the National Coordination Committee on Disabilities (NCCD) replaced the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance in 2009.

Survivors had increased opportunities to access free healthcare programs. However, emergency transportation to save lives was not widely available. Through NGO efforts to expand services and geographical coverage, physical rehabilitation improved in both quality and in the number of services available from existing service providers. Since 1999, services in physical rehabilitation have been available throughout the country from both government agencies and NGOs. Gradual improvements were made in the availability of employment opportunities, social inclusion activities, and accessibility of existing services. Inclusive education programs provided by the government and relevant organizations increased. There were more vocational services for survivors in 1999 than in 2012, as programs were phased out due to resource availability. There has been an increased emphasis on community based rehabilitation efforts. Coordination among governmental bodies responsible for the provision of victim assistance steadily improved.

Reaching survivors in remote and rural areas remained a challenge for service providers and generally these populations did not receive adequate assistance. Many survivors lacked education and literacy and had no work or land from which to make a living. Overall, they received little or no support and did not have full access to social services and healthcare.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2012–2013, the CMAA, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), the Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL) Survivor Network, and the NGO Aarrupe carried out an intensive survey of survivor needs and quality of life. Survey teams involved village leaders and the survey included discussion of disability rights laws and issues.[10]

CMVIS provided ongoing systematic data collection of mine/ERW casualties, including numbers of survivors and referrals to services.[11] The Community Database, maintained by the Ministry of Planning, is used for annual planning and to assess the allocation of funding to communes. The CMAA department of Victim Assistance cooperated with the Ministry of Planning to have its victim assistance questionnaire integrated into the Commune Database in 2011 and its use continued throughout 2012 and 2013.[12] Lack of reliable statistics on disability was reported to be among the main issues of concern for the promotion of disability rights in Cambodia.[13]

Victim assistance coordination[14]

The NDCC is co-chaired by both the MoSVY and the DAC; the DAC itself operates directly under the MoSVY. In 2012, coordination of both the NCCD and DAC were the responsibility of just one person. The roles were to be separated by 2013. The NDCC included some victim assistance service providers as well as other disability actors. In 2012, the 2009 National Plan of Action was extended until the end of 2013. A government decree assigned responsibility to the Ministry of Social Affairs for the development of a new national strategic plan, implementation mechanism, and advisory body for the period 2014–2018. The process was supported by Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).[15]

In 2012 and 2013, the CMAA was expanding its projects from targeted assistance for landmine survivors to include people with disabilities more generally by focusing on community-based reintegration projects that would support poverty reduction.[16]

In 2012, the MoSVY continued to have core responsibility for disability issues and rehabilitation services. The Disabled Fund, created in 2012 under the MoSVY, was given the following responsibilities in regard to people with disabilities: management of rehabilitation centers; provision of funds for implementing various projects such as support to education, vocational training, and job placement services; and preparation of policy for assisting and supporting people with disabilities.[17] The Fund remained under development in 2012 with no specific activities reported.[18]

Several other ministries were involved in disability issues, including the Ministry of Health, which promoted physiotherapy services; the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, with a Special Education Office responsible for promoting inclusive education for children with disabilities; the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; and the Ministry of National Defense.[19]

Cambodia provided updates on progress in the coordination of victim assistance at both the meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in May 2013 and at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2012. It made a detailed statement on victim assistance activities at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that was held in Oslo in September 2012.[20] Cambodia also included updates on physical rehabilitation and medical services provided to persons with disabilities in 2012 in  of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.[21]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Representative organizations of survivors and persons with disabilities were included in coordination and planning activities through the NDCC. Survivors were engaged in the implementation of many services provided by NGOs and extensively involved in the village-level disability survey in 2012–2013.[22]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Emergency and continuing medical care

Health services provided to new mine/ERW survivors remained similar to 2011, which had improved in some mine/ERW affected communities.[23] There was an urgent need in Cambodia for free hospital care for vulnerable people with disabilities.[24]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

While some centers reported an increase in services provided, others reported decreases overall including in the number of mine/ERW survivors accessing the services.[25] A decrease in the number of services reported in 2012 as compared to 2011 was attributed to a combination of financial constraints on the centers in transition to MoSVY management, to a reduction in outreach services, and to less assistance than previously available to cover transportation and lodging costs for beneficiaries to access services.[26] Yet, in 2012, the number of prostheses provided by rehabilitation centers was recorded to have increased from 2011, while the number of repairs to prostheses fell dramatically.[27] DAC reported that, due to a lack of statistical data, MoSVY could not provide exact details, or even estimates, of the number of people receiving assistance from rehabilitation centers.[28]

Economic and social integration and psychological support

More than 50 NGOs, in cooperation with MoSAVY, provided economic and social reintegration services to persons with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors. Such assistance included living support allowances, income generating activities, house repairs, transportation, and the creation of self-help groups.[29]

Persons with disabilities continued to lack equal access to education, training, and employment. Cambodia lacked a national integrated system for psychological or psychiatric assistance.[30] Self-helps groups, mostly supported by NGOs, provided local services at the provincial level and were monitored by the CBR network.[31] Lack of awareness, understanding, funding, human resources, and leadership, as well as poor coordination of groups working in mental health, were reported to be among the biggest challenges to accessing adequate psychological support.[32]

Due to a lack of financial and human resources, many vocational training centers were not functioning and there was a need for increased opportunities for vocational training and micro-credit.[33]

Laws and policies

The 2009 Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. The law also requires that buildings and government services be accessible to persons with disabilities.[34] However, inaccessibility to public buildings, transport, facilities, and referral systems continued to prevent persons with disabilities from actively participating in social and economic activities.[35]

Cambodia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 20 December 2012.

 

In 2012, the Kingdom of Cambodia received US$21.5 million of international assistance from 13 donors, illustrating comprehensive global support.[1] This represents a decrease of almost $14 million, most of which is accounted for by the lower contribution from Japan, which decreased from ¥1.363 billion ($17.1 million) in 2011 to ¥259 million ($3.2 million) in 2012.[2]

Donors contributed to victim assistance and risk education as well as to clearance. Australia contributed A$1,325,000 ($1,372,568) to victim assistance through the Australian Red Cross, while the United States (US) contributed $867,000 through several NGOs. Finland also contributed €125,000 to victim assistance through the ICRC.[3] The only contribution for risk education was from the US to the US-based NGO, Spirit of Soccer.[4]

The government of Cambodia reported a contribution of $2,542,000 to the Cambodia Mine Action Centre in 2012.[5] It does not include the government’s contribution to the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority or for mine clearance in support of infrastructure development.[6] These figures were unavailable.

International government contributions: 2012[7]

Thematic totals

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[8]