Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001.

National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.[1] In relation to the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia has also passed laws on victim assistance, land restitution, and civilian humanitarian demining operations. Law 1421 of 2010 permits NGOs to conduct humanitarian demining operations in the country.[2] On 13 July 2011, the Colombian Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) published the draft regulatory decree of Law 1421.[3] On 10 October 2011, the President of Colombia, through the Ministry of Defense, approved decree 3750 which promulgated Law 1421 regulating demining by civil society organizations.[4]

Colombia submitted its 13^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2013, which covered calendar year 2012.[5] Under national implementation measures, Colombia listed Law 1448 of 2011, the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Victimas y de Restitución de Tierra), in its 2012 report.[6] The section remained unchanged in its 2013 report. In the 2011 report, Colombia listed its “main operational results” against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) during 2010, including the number of demobilizations and captures.[7]

Colombia attended the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, where it made several statements. Colombia also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.

Colombia has continued its activity in support of the Mine Ban Treaty at the highest levels. It hosted the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena in November–December 2009. Colombia served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in 2011. Colombia is part of an informal working group of States Parties from Latin America that monitors implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan.[8]

Colombia is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted a CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 annual report.

The Colombian Campaign against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) has continued its work to increase awareness of the country’s mine problem and its solutions.[9] It has called on the government to use military demining teams to clear coca crops because civilians employed by the Colombian government to eradicate the crops have become casualties due to explosive devices.[10]

The Colombian NGO Fundación Arcángeles partnered with the ICBL and the UN Mine Action Service to again hold a global “Lend Your Leg” campaign from 1 March until 4 April 2013. The activity, which involves people making the symbolic gesture of rolling up a pant leg in support of efforts against landmines and in solidarity with victims, was inspired by the Remangate (“Roll-up”) activity first organized by Fundación Arcangeles in Colombia in 2011.

In 2012, Colombian music star Juanes joined the Convention’s Special Envoy, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, to participate in a high-level group in support of the Mine Ban Treaty’s universalization.[11]

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998 and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.[12]

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines.

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 18,531 antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.[13]

Since 2007, Colombia has retained a total of 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes. It declared a total of 586 MAP-1 mines retained for training purposes in its 2009 Article 7 report. In the 2010, 2011, and 2012 reports, Colombia did not provide a number but declared “no change in the quantity of retained antipersonnel mines” since 2009.[14] Colombia has not destroyed or consumed any mines in training activities since a total of 300 retained mines were destroyed in three separate events in 2006.[15] In March 2007, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) said that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training.[16]

Colombia has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties. However, in May 2011, it informed the Monitor that the 586 retained mines were “used for training the humanitarian demining units [of the armed forces], in the use of equipment for mine clearance.” In the event it was to destroy these mines, Colombia said it would account for this change in its Article 7 report.[17]

Antipersonnel mines discovered during mine clearance are destroyed on site and not kept for training purposes.[18]

Transfer and production by non-state armed groups

There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but the Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are experts in the production of explosive devices. Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) manufacture antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are both victim-activated and remotely-controlled.

Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content; the reports also include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore-type directional mines, as well as IEDs. The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.[19]

Use by non-state armed groups      

FARC has continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. Government forces continued to recover mines from the ELN, which has been documented as an antipersonnel mine user. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia until its disbandment in 2006.[20]

In August 2012, the ELN again called for peace talks with the government, but the vice-president stated that the ELN should halt mine use before commencing peace talks.[21] In September, the ELN confirmed that the landmine issue must be an element of peace talks and that it was willing to collaborate to facilitate demining activities in certain areas in the southwest of the country.[22]

FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. Peace talks between the government of Colombia and FARC continued in Havana in the first half of 2013. The CCCM has called for a special agreement to be reached to demine areas along Colombia’s border areas and southern provinces where the fighting with the FARC has been most intense.[23]

Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their campsites or bases, on other paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as paths to main transit routes along mountain ridges) and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.[24] NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts, causing casualties among coca eradicators.[25] In 2012, the ICBL expressed concern to the government of Colombia regarding the use of civilians to undertake coca eradication when these areas are increasingly known to be mined.[26]

The areas of Colombia where armed conflict has been intense and landmines have been planted often coincide with areas from which internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled and to which they are now seeking to return. In September 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that, according to the Restitution Unit, the government has recorded landmine incidents in approximately 70 percent of the municipalities where IDPs have filed land restitution claims.[27]

Media reports and statements by the armed forces show how the Colombian Army has continued to recover mines from FARC and the ELN in its operations in 2012 and the first half of 2013. According to media reports, in August 2012 the Colombian army found 20 antipersonnel mines reportedly planted by FARC in Tolima and Arauca.[28] A dozen antipersonnel mines allegedly belonging to FARC were discovered in September 2012 in a minefield in Cordoba[29] and in a military raid of a FARC camp in Norte de Santander.[30] In October, four antipersonnel mines were found by the army in different departments.[31] An antipersonnel mine and five IEDs reportedly laid by the ELN were also discovered by the army in the same month.

In November 2012, the Colombian Army discovered nine antipersonnel mines reportedly planted by FARC in the departments of Narino,[32] Antioquia,[33] La Cordillera,[34] and Buenaventura.[35] The army also discovered an antipersonnel mine laid by the ELN in Casanare.⁵¹

In December 2012, nine landmines attributed to FARC were discovered in Caqueta[36] and Norte de Santander.[37]

FARC and the ELN continued to use landmines in 2013, with the greatest number of media reports appearing between June and August. Relatively few incidents were reported during the first half of 2013, although in April the Army discovered two weapons caches in Albania in the department of Caqueta containing a total of 7,345 antipersonnel mines.[38]

In June 2013, the Colombian Army located a minefield near a home in village of Crucero near Tulua in Cauca;[39] found and destroyed seven IEDs in the municipalities of Sardinata, Teorama, and Tibú in Norte de Santander[40]; destroyed 31 IEDs in the municipalities of Jambalo, Morales, and Suarz in Cauca department[41]; destroyed 14 IEDs installed by the FARC in the departments of Cauca, Antioquia, and Meta[42]; reportedly found 18 explosive devices belonging to FARC in Antioquia and 2 IEDs belonging to FARC in Calamar, Guivare[43]; and destroyed eight IEDs in the departments of Bolivar, Santander, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and Meta.[44]

In July 2013, the army destroyed six explosives found in the rural area near Patio Bonita village in the municipality of Buenos Aires in the department of Cauca[45]; destroyed four IEDs that had been laid by FARC at La Punta in the municipality of Tumaco in Narino department and in the village of Plan de Zuniga in the municipality of Caldono in Cauca department[46]; and destroyed three IEDs “belonging to Captain Mauricio Front of the ELN” in the village of Amalfi Areiza in Antioquia.[47]

In August 2013, in less than a week, 70 IEDs were found by the army in the town of La Paz in the Cauca department, and a minefield containing eight explosives was found in a rural area near the village of Bolo Blanco in the municipality of Pradera in the department of Cauca.[48] Also in August 2013, the army found and destroyed a mined area of five IEDs “installed by narco-terrorists of Antonia Santos Mobile Column of the FARC” in the village of El Placer, Sardinata municipality.[49]

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

As of 1 July 2013, Colombia’s ratification legislation for the convention was awaiting a Constitutional Court review to ensure its compliance with the Constitution of Colombia.

Law 1604 approving ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions was enacted on 12 December 2012, concluding a lengthy process of legislative approval.[1] The House of Representatives approved the draft ratification legislation, Bill 244, on 15 November 2012, after it received Senate approval as Bill 174 on 30 August 2012.[2] Civil society has been consulted in the course of process to ratify the convention.[3] Colombia has provided regular updates on its ratification efforts throughout the process.[4]

Law 1604 incorporates the Convention on Cluster Munitions into domestic law, but separate implementation legislation is also planned.

Colombia participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that produced the convention and said that its decision to join stemmed from its concern about the “humanitarian impact” of cluster munitions.[5]

Colombia has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It attended the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012 and made two statements. Colombia attended intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in April 2013, but did not make any statements.

Colombia has not made a national statement to express concern at Syria’s cluster munition use, but it voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 15 May 2013 that strongly condemned “the use by the Syrian authorities of…cluster munitions.”[6]

The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) promotes the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including its ratification. On 1 August 2012, CCCM representatives and landmine survivors visited the Colombian Congress and promoted ratification of the ban convention with key politicians, including the President and Vice President of the Second Commission of the Chamber of Representatives.[7]

Colombia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Colombia provided its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention in a March 2010 response to a Monitor questionnaire.[8] The government “absolutely rejects and prohibits any manner of transfer or storage of foreign cluster bombs in Colombian territory,” as well as “military operations with states not party to the convention in which they carry out exercises or actions prohibited by the Convention.” It also prohibits investment in production of cluster munitions. In addition, “Colombia considers that the countries that are still not a part of this convention can take steps toward honoring the spirit of the convention.” Colombia reaffirmed its position on all these interpretive issues in a May 2011 response to the Monitor.[9]

Production and transfer

In May 2011, Colombia affirmed in a letter to the Monitor that it has never produced cluster munitions.[10] In the past, it imported them from Chile, Israel, and the United States (US). In March 2010, Colombia stated that it “has not transferred Cluster Bombs to a third state.”[11]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of a total of 191 cluster bombs to Colombia in 1994 (55 250kg cluster bombs, four air-dropped 250kg cluster bombs, and one fin stabilizer for a CB-250kg cluster bomb) and in 1997 (132 250kg cluster bombs).[12]

Past use

In May 2009, Colombia’s Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos acknowledged that the Colombian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” but noted the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”[13]

In an April 2012 letter to the Monitor, a Ministry of External Relations official stated that the Colombian Air Force decided to stop using cluster munitions after an evaluation found that they did not meet the operational requirements or needs of Colombia.[14] According to the letter, every military operation carried out by the Colombian Air Force includes a process of evaluation, planning and execution, based on the requirements under international humanitarian law. The letter states that a background check and review of historical records are being undertaken to investigate the use of cluster munitions, in order to comply with the ban convention on the clearance of remnants if there are any. The letter noted that to date there have been no reports of accidents caused by cluster munition use.

In 2011, the Monitor reported on the case of alleged cluster munition use by the Colombian Air Force at Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame (Arauca) on 13 December 1998.[15] At the time, the incident was attributed to a car bomb detonated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), but a subsequent investigation showed that a World War II-era “cluster adapter” of US origin was used to disperse several 20lb (9kg) fragmentation bombs during the attack.[16]

In its April 2012 letter to the Monitor, the Ministry of External Relations noted that separate judicial processes concerning the events of 13 December 1998 were before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Justice and said “we do not find it appropriate to make pronouncements in the Monitor reports while the judicial process is still taking place and while there is not a clear definition of all the aspects related to the case. We estimate that to ratify that this weapon has been used by the military force, without first knowing a final court decision, would undermine the role of the courts in the determination of the judicial truth.”[17]

On 18 December 2012, the Inter-American Human Rights Court published its 30 November 2012 verdict on the Santo Domingo case, which found: (1) the ANM1A2 bomb meets the definition of a cluster munition; and (2) the bomb was used by the Colombian Air Force.[18] Under Section 210 of the verdict, the Inter-American Human Rights Court concluded, “taking into consideration the conclusions of the sentence of the Penal Court 12 and confirmed by the Superior Tribunal in its sentence of 15 June 2011, that the ANM1A2 device landed at 10:02:09 in the morning of 13 December 1998 fell on the main street of Santo Domingo, causing the death of 17 alleged victims and injuring 27 others.”[19]

According to the Inter-American Human Rights Court decision, Colombia has victims of cluster bombs and should be viewed as a state that should implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions provisions requiring victim assistance.

Together with Santo Tomas University, the CCCM conducted a detailed study on the characteristics of the bombs used in Santo Domingo that concluded they fall within the definition of a cluster munition in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[20]

Stockpiling and destruction

On 24 November 2009, Colombia announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of cluster munitions.[21] In total, Colombia destroyed 72 cluster munitions (31 ARC-32 and 41 CB-250K cluster bombs) containing 10,832 submunitions during 2009.[22]

In 2012, Colombia confirmed that it has not retained any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or development purposes.[23]

Contamination and Impact

The precise extent of the Republic of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, which is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs), remains unclear, though the national database contains information indicating that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. The most affected departments are believed to be Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Tolima.[1]

In 2012, the Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) received reports of 3,328 “events”[2] which include accidents from mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), mined areas, suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and military demining operations, in 27 of 32 departments.[3] Meta and Antioquia departments accounted for 25% of all events. Each event is recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at PAICMA and is marked for further investigation to confirm the suspicion.[4] At the end of 2012, over 80% of the events recorded from 2007–2012 still needed follow-up to determine what occurred in each location.[5]

Landmines are also used as a means to attack the security forces and control areas including coca plantations.[6]

Mines

Given the irregular nature of mine-laying and the continued use of mines, especially improvised mines, it is impossible to obtain a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that a lack of reliable information that only can be obtained from a systematic non-technical survey (NTS) prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline Extension Request.[7]

In its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Colombia describes a complex situation with a substantial humanitarian impact resulting from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs laid by NSAGs.[8] Grant Salisbury, the Program Manager in Colombia for HALO Trust (the only NGO currently accredited to clear mines in Colombia) has commented that “Colombia is the first country that we’ve worked in, indeed the first country that I know of, where all the mines used are improvised [explosive devices] – every other country where we work, the vast majority of mines come from state factories.”[9]

The Organization of American States (OAS) has reported that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. Nuisance mines have been found in schools, water sources, pathways, and stream crossings in order to allegedly intimidate or displace the local population.[10]

On 19 April 2013, the Interagency Humanitarian Demining Group (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario), commonly referred to as the Instancia Interinstitucional, approved interventions by demining organizations in 381 locations in 11 municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, and Santander for clearance that correspond to “events”[11] in the database; these events include accidents from mines, IEDs and UXO, mined areas and SHAs. The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Battalion (Fuerzas Armadas del Batallón de Desminado Humanitario, BIDES) is conducting clearance operations in some of these areas.

Minefields approved by the Instancia Interinstitucional for clearance[12]

In September 2013, HALO became the first NGO to conduct demining in Colombia when it began clearance operations at the El Morro minefield in Antioquia Department.[13]

Other explosive remnants of war

Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombing.[14] Explosive devices and other ERW are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is trying to destroy coca plantations.[15] According to PAICMA, clearance operations in communities where mines have a strategic value can put a community at risk because the NSAGs view demining as a hostile act that gives the Colombian Army a military advantage.

The precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known. In 2012, 6% of all recorded casualties from antipersonnel mines and ERW were from incidents involving ERW, compared to 4% in 2011.[16] For the period 2002–2012, it was estimated that 3% of all explosive ordnance incidents resulting in injury or death were caused by ERW.[17] The ICRC, however, based on its victim surveillance system and its integration into IMSMA, believes the true rate may be closer to 40%.[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, CINAMAP is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

PAICMA, the technical secretary of CINAMAP, is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, with the overall strategy to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[19]

The Instancia Interinstitucional is the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining comprised of the director of PAICMA, the Minister of Defense, and the Inspector General of the army. It approves accreditations, national standards, tasks, and clearance priorities. The OAS and UNMAS are advisors to the Instancia Interinstitucional on accreditation and national standards.[20]

The BIDES known as Coronel Gabino Gutiérrez from Engineer Battalion No 60 of the National Army has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005, when it began clearance of 35 military bases since completed in 2010.[21]

The OAS, in an agreement with the government of Colombia, serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS reports to PAICMA and is responsible for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system on behalf of the Instancia Interinstitucional.”[22] The OAS also serves as an advisor to the Instancia Interinstitucional in the accreditation of NGOs in Colombia.[23]

Through 2012, the OAS had equipped and certified 27 teams with 360 deminers from the army, and provided administrative and logistical assistance to sustain clearance operations in the municipalities of Granada, San Carlos, and San Francisco in Antioquia department; El Dorado in Meta department; Zambrano in Bolivar department; Carmen and San Vicente del Chucurí in Santander; and Samaná municipality in Caldas.[24]

Since 2010, UNMAS has been advising PAICMA on the legal and technical mine action framework to allow NGOs to conduct mine clearance. UNMAS also assists PAICMA in accreditation and monitoring procedures as well as management processes.[25]

Demining law and standards[26]

Mine action in Colombia operates in a heavily regulated legal framework. For several years, PAICMA, its partners, various parts of the government of Colombia, and stakeholders have been consumed with passing and interpreting laws and decrees. In a landmark vote, Congress passed Law No. 1421 in December 2010 that allows NGOs to carry out humanitarian demining.[27] Almost a year later in October 2011, in support of Law No. 1421, Decree No. 3750 established internal rules and procedures of the Instancia Interinstitucional to ensure that NGO humanitarian demining activities are conducted in accordance with international standards. The Instancia Interinstitucional is also responsible for approving demining tasks for NGOs based on local priorities and humanitarian principles after the NGOs are accredited.[28]

In January 2012, in an unexpected development, the Procuraduría General de la Nación[29] issued a legal opinion claiming that humanitarian demining in Colombia was a violation of international humanitarian law, as it would put deminers in danger.[30] As a consequence of this surprising opinion, HALO discontinued its NTS work, and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) suspended their operations in Colombia due to the uncertainty caused by the opinion.[31]

In June 2012, the Procuraduría issued a new directive on NGO demining that urged caution in tasking clearance in dangerous areas, and recommended that the army both increase its humanitarian demining capacity and adopt the same national standards for humanitarian demining as apply to NGOs. The directive also allowed NGO accreditation to proceed.[32] By 22 June 2012, HALO had submitted its paperwork for desk accreditation, the first step in the process.[33] A year later in April 2013, and almost three years after the law allowing NGOs to clear landmines was passed, the Instancia Interinstitucional accredited HALO and tasked them to clear mines in San Rafael Narino and San Rafael in Antioquia Department. However, further delay occurred when the Instancia Interinstitucional determined that the insurance requirements established in Decree No. 3750 of 2011 were inadequate and that a new decree was required.[34] This issue was resolved on 24 July 2013 when the President signed Decree No. 1561 into law.[35]

Also in 2012 and following Decree No. 3750 on Rules and Procedures, PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Command (Commando General) approved national standards that regulate demining.[36]

Land Restitution Law

Land reform is arguably the issue at the core of the long Colombian conflict. Landmines have prevented displaced people from returning home and long absences from home have raised questions over ownership when they do return.[37] For example, a common situation is where people were forced to sell their land at low prices to NSAGs and upon return find their land occupied, or when internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home after mine clearance operations were completed to find their land was purchased by someone claiming to be the owner. On 10 June 2011, President Juan Manuel Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Law 1448).[38]

In July 2013, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the International Organization for Migration visited Colombia to research the relationship between mine clearance, land rights, and ownership as well as the possible impact on implementing the Victims and Land Restitution Law.[39] A report on the mission is due later in 2013.

Land Release

PAICMA has been unable to conduct a nationwide survey to determine the true extent of the mine problem because NSAGs use mines in some areas, making them inaccessible.[40] However, smaller and more localized surveys have been conducted. The army conducts clearance operations in government-controlled areas.

Non-technical survey

Surveys are a priority for Colombia in order to better define the scope of landmine contamination as well as to assist in planning and calculating the needed clearance capacity from both military and civilian sources.[41]

The surveys are providing initial indicators of the quality of the information in the national database that constitute events as well as what comprises an SHA and a confirmed mined area in the Colombian context.

In 2012, BIDES conducted 138 NTSs in eight municipalities in five departments. Of the 138 SHAs surveyed 62 (or 45%) were cancelled. HALO discontinued conducting NTSs in 2011 but will resume them as soon as all legal issues with the government of Colombia are resolved.[42]

Non-Technical Surveys in 2012[43]

CHA = confirmed hazardous area

In order to gain a better understanding of the landmine problem at the vereda (community) level, from September–December 2012 PAICMA conducted a survey based on consolidated data from IMSMA reports, secondary reports within PAICMA, workshops conducted with local authorities, and information from NGOs and other national agencies. As a result of the Local Opinion Survey[44] in nine departments,[45] PAICMA was able to geo-reference 4,279 veredas, information not previously available. Of these 4,279 veredas, 12,745 (64%) were determined to be unaffected by landmines and IEDs. The results are similar to the NTSs conducted by BIDES and HALO, where high percentages of suspected area were also either cancelled or considered not affected.[46]PAICMA planned to conduct the same survey in the departments of Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Meta in 2013.[47]

Mine clearance in 2012

In 2012, BIDES cleared 98 “mined areas” with another 31 (covering 261,116m²) still undergoing clearance in four departments and nine municipalities in January 2013, while finding 175 IEDs and 15 items of UXO. BIDES continues to clear a significant number of suspected areas that do not contain any ordnance.[48]

Humanitarian mine clearance in 2012[49]

Of the 98 areas cleared, 59 (60%), covering 148,946m² (73%) of the land cleared, did not contain any hazards. From 2010–2012, 39% of the mined areas cleared and 25% of the land contained no hazards.[50]

In 2012, Colombia declared the municipalities of San Carlos in the department of Antioquia and El Dorado in Meta free from suspicion of mines.[51] Of 660 municipalities (out of a total of 1,100) suspected to contain SHAs, San Carlos was the first to be declared free of SHAs.[52]

In an announcement on 13 March 2012, Colombia’s President declared San Carlos “free of the suspicion of landmines,”[53] a term that does not appear in the International Mine Action Standards and is unique to Colombia. Surveys and clearance had begun in San Carlos in February 2009 with OAS assistance. Since then, a total area of 1.3km² was released; of this amount, 155,425m² (approximately 10%) was released through clearance while the other 90% was released through NTS. During clearance, 69 IEDs and unexploded munitions were removed.[54]

Colombia declared El Dorado, Meta free of suspicion from mines on 29 November 2012 after more than three and a half years of mine action consisting of NTSs conducted by the army’s humanitarian demining teams. The army cleared two CHAs measuring almost 21,000m² in the community of Jesus del Rio.[55]

Humanitarian mine clearance in 2010–2012[56]

As of May 2013, the BIDES consisted of nine platoons with 41 deminers and three national supervisors each, for a total of 369 deminers and 27 supervisors. The platoons operate independently as teams of 12 to 15 deminers, for a total of 27 teams. In its revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request of August 2010, Colombia reported plans to increase the number of demining platoons from nine to 14 in 2013. PAICMA and the Ministry of Defense continued discussions about increasing the number of teams in 2013, which depends on the Ministry of Defense being allocated additional funding from the national budget.[57] However, the number of platoons will only be increased to 10. It was also planned that all BIDES platoons would need to obtain accreditation against national standards beginning in September 2013.[58] As of August 2013, BIDES had cleared 279,000m², exceeding the amount cleared in 2012.[59]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The operational plan plus the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at the equivalent of 17 NGO teams and US$25 million, both of which have not been met. During this period the government of Colombia also planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining platoons.[60] As of May 2013, the army had nine demining platoons and planned to add three more in 2013–2014, including one from the navy.[61]

The Extension Request projects that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[62] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan was to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities with contamination covering an estimated 15km² by 2013.[63] So far, Colombia is far below these targets. At the end of 2012, BIDES had cleared 218 areas covering 768,000m².

Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s Extension Request, Colombia will submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013.[64]

Quality management

OAS is the body with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for accredited demining organizations in Colombia. The OAS also investigates demining accidents, verifies community liaison activities, and does quality assurance on NTSs.[65] UNMAS supported both PAICMA and the members of the Instancia Interinstitucional to put in place the required national standards in line with international standards and to ensure that the entire quality management system reflects international norms. UNMAS is also assisting PAICMA and the OAS in the accreditation and monitoring procedures and processes and also provides field technical assistance as required for operations.[66]

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary findings

·         Declining international funding for targeted victim assistance programs reduced access to physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and economic inclusion programs for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and other persons with disabilities

·         Coordination for victim assistance for mine/ERW survivors was mainly replaced by efforts to coordinate the implementation of the Law of Victims and Restitution of Land (Law 1448, referred to below as the Victim’s Law); this shift raised concerns that the specific needs of mine/ERW survivors might be lost within the much larger group of armed conflict victims with divergent needs, such as displaced persons

·         Improvements were made in the registration process for mine/ERW victims, increasing the number of mine/ERW victims who should be able to access assistance under the Victim’s Law

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Colombia is responsible for a significant number of landmine and ERW survivors who are in need. Cluster munition victims have also been reported. Colombia has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and as a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties[1]

Casualties Overview

In 2012, the Presidential Program for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) recorded 496 casualties from antipersonnel mines and ERW.[2]

There were 279 military casualties in 2012.[3] Civilian casualties (217) made up 44% of the total, an increase compared to 37% in 2011 as well as to other recent years; civilians made up 34% of all casualties in 2010 and were 41% of all casualties in 2009 and 2008. Of civilian casualties, 30% (66) were children (45 boys; 21 girls). Continuing the trend of increasing child casualties observed in 2011, this was an increase of over 50% from the number of child casualties (44) in 2011, when they were 22% of civilian casualties. Child casualties in 2012 were more than double the number (28) of child casualties in 2010. There were 32 casualties among women, a 50% increase from the 22 women casualties in 2011. The remainder of the casualties, and the majority of recorded civilian casualties (65%), were men.

In 2012, there were 55 civilian casualties among manual coca eradicators employed by the Program for the Eradication of Illicit Cultivation (Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos, PCI).[4] This was a significant increase compared with the 21 casualties among coca eradicators in 2011 but similar to the number (58) reported for 2010. This was despite the fact that PAICMA continued to work with the PCI, as required by the Attorney General’s Office, to ensure that safety standards, a security protocol, and preventive education were developed and implemented during manual coca eradication.[5] Annual variations in the number of casualties were explained by the variability in the armed conflict in Colombia, which makes violence and the use of mines difficult to predict; in 2012 there was an intensification of the conflict and a change in strategies used. In addition, the number of coca plants under cultivation increased so there was a corresponding increase in eradication efforts.[6] The number of casualties among security forces (police or military) occurring during coca eradication in 2012 was unknown.[7]

From 2006 through the end of 2012, there were at least 342 civilian casualties recorded among coca eradicators; 42 died, 297 were injured, and it was unknown whether the remaining three casualties survived.[8]

The overall mine/ERW casualty total in 2012 represents a slight decrease (10%) in annual casualties as compared with the 549 casualties recorded in 2011. Between 2006 and 2010, the Monitor identified a trend of declining annual casualty rates, a decline that had been ongoing since the peak of almost 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006.[9] Since 2010, annual casualty totals have been fairly consistent, ranging between 496 and 549 casualties per year.

Between 1982 and the end of 2012, PAICMA recorded 10,184 casualties (2,119 killed, 8,065 injured).[10] Civilians accounted for 38% (3,880) of the total and children accounted for 26% (994) of civilian casualties. Casualties have been recorded in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments. The departments of Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, and Nariño registered the highest number of casualties and accounted for more than half of the total (54%).

Cluster munition casualties

As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre versus the Republic of Colombia), heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition strike in Santo Domingo, Colombia on 13 December 1998.[11]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 8,065 mine/ERW survivors in Colombia as of the end of 2012.[12] Of 608 mine/ERW victims registered within the Registry of Victims by March 2013, 51% were survivors with at least one type of disability, while 49% had no disability.[13]

Victim assistance since 1999[14]

Since monitoring began, mine/ERW survivors in Colombia have faced serious obstacles in accessing emergency medical attention, ongoing medical care, and physical rehabilitation because these services have been available only in major cities while most mine incidents occur in rural and remote areas, as well as in inaccessible conflict zones. In 1999, social and economic inclusion and psychological support for survivors was virtually nonexistent, even in most major cities, with the exception of two facilities in Bogota: the military hospital served military survivors and the Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC) served civilian survivors. Both facilities have consistently provided comprehensive rehabilitation services, including psychological support.

Throughout the period, a series of laws have outlined the rights of mine/ERW survivors as victims of terrorism or conflict through a process termed the “Route of Attention,” which is the legal framework through which victims can access their rights to compensation, rehabilitation, and other components of assistance by registering as victims and having the cost of assistance paid for or reimbursed through special government funds. However, complicated procedures to register as a mine victim and delayed reimbursements have meant that many survivors could not access the care they needed, or had to depend on support from the ICRC and NGOs to facilitate access or pay for services.

In 2006, the ICRC began a mine action program in Colombia that included collecting data on mine/ERW casualties, helping survivors to access victim assistance, and strengthening the physical rehabilitation sector to improve the quality and accessibility of these services. In 2009, the NGOs Mercy Corps and the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (CCCM) worked to decentralize physical rehabilitation services by supporting the opening of four new rehabilitation centers and improving the capacity of prosthetic technicians during the three year period of the project.

Through the work of CIREC, CCCM, and others, more than 60 local disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) and survivor associations have been formed since 1999, increasing opportunities for peer-to-peer support as well as social and economic inclusion.

Government coordination of victim assistance began in Colombia in 2002 through the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, which was replaced in June 2007 with PAICMA. Throughout the period, victim assistance coordination has been variable and at times lacking in continuity, a result of changes and restructuring within PAICMA and changes with the legal frameworks that outline the rights and assistance available to mine/ERW survivors.

The Victim’s Law was approved in 2011; it is considered one of the most comprehensive legal instruments to address the needs of mine/ERW victims, along with other victims of Colombia’s armed conflict. The adoption of the law heightened expectations of immediate assistance among many survivors. The regulations needed to begin implementing the law were passed at the end of 2011.[15]

Victim assistance in 2012

Overall, there was less access to victim assistance in 2012 as international funding decreased for NGOs, who filled gaps in existing care and facilitated access by paying for transportation and accommodations.[16]

In 2012, governmental and non-governmental actors made concerted efforts to inform survivors and their family members of their rights and how to access comprehensive assistance through the newly regulated Victim’s Law. In addition, actors worked to identify and resolve barriers to access in the most mine- and ERW-affected departments of the country. These actions were expected to generate a long-term improvement in overall access to victim assistance but, for the most part, their impact was not yet apparent in 2012.[17]

Assessing victim assistance needs

As a result of the improvement of data collection efforts in recent years, NGOs and service providers said that mine/ERW victim registries in 2012 were more complete than in previous years, most especially for victims of recent mine/ERW incidents; this improvement in the registries was as a necessary step for mine/ERW survivors to access government-supported services and programs.[18]

However, as of the end of 2012, not all mine/ERW victims registered with PAICMA had been transferred to the registry managed by the Unit for the Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a Víctimas, or Victim’s Unit) due to a backlog in processing data.[19] Also, during 2012, victims of mines laid by criminal gangs were not covered under the Victim’s Law and thus not included in the registry of conflict victims. However, as of May 2013, the Constitutional Court of Colombia was reviewing the law to suggest amendments so that these victims would be included.[20]

In addition, survivors from remote areas, those who died as a result of the mine/ERW incident, and casualties of ERW remained undercounted.[21] There was a lack of awareness that victims of ERW had the same right as the victims of landmines to register for victim assistance.[22] It was also reported that there remained a lack of up-to-date information about the needs of victims from previous years, in part due to the lack of resources within departmental governments to access data held at the national level.[23]

In 2012, PAICMA began working with the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to adapt and expand the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database so it could be used as a tool to monitor the needs of mine/ERW victims and their ability to access their rights. PAICMA worked with the Victim’s Unit to align the monitoring system with the implementation of the Victim’s Law. In defining the needs of victims, PAICMA included consideration of the family members of a victim.[24] A pilot of the adapted IMSMA database as a victim assistance monitoring tool was planned for the department of Antioquia in the second half of 2013.[25]

In 2012, in order to collect and verify information about survivors of recent mine/ERW incidents, PAICMA worked with departmental governments in Antioquia and Putamayo, the PCI, the ICRC, the Organization of American States (OAS), Handicap International (HI), CIREC, Awa Indigenous peoples, and CCCM. All actors collected information in different geographic areas or sectors.[26] To facilitate the verification of incident and casualty details and to register new victims, PAICMA also worked with departmental offices of the National Institute of Health, municipal and department authorities, health centers, and NGOs. Casualty data was available through the PAICMA website and was regularly provided to relevant government agencies and NGOs.[27] PAICMA also continued to identify and report on available victim assistance services online.[28]

In preparation for a Landmine Impact Survey, PAICMA carried out a Preliminary Opinion Collection (POC) in 1,522 local communities across nine departments with suspected mine hazard areas. The study included questions about the availability of “victim assistance” for that community. Victim assistance was defined generally to include anything from emergency medical assistance to financial or social assistance. Just 13% of local communities indicated the availability of any victim assistance while the remaining 87% said they were not aware of any victim assistance being available.[29]

CCCM continued to organize meetings of survivor networks and/or individual survivors in the most heavily mine-affected departments to assess survivor needs and identify gaps in available services.[30] The OAS Mine Action Program in Colombia collected information on the needs of survivors in several departments and facilitated access to services for those most in need.[31]

Other NGOs collected information about the needs of survivors taking part in their rehabilitation and economic inclusion programs.[32]

In 2012, mine incidents and victim assistance services provided to survivors continued to be recorded within the Epidemiological Monitoring System (Sistema de Vigilancia Epidemiológica, SIVIGILA) in the department of Antioquia. During the year, PAICMA and the National Institute of Health worked to further define the information to be collected, and the procedure for information-sharing at the local and departmental levels; they selected the departments of Meta, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño, and Córdoba to introduce the system in 2013.[33]

Victim assistance coordination[34]

PAICMA held departmental and municipal mine action meetings in 2012 to coordinate victim assistance. In addition, PAICMA formed a subcommittee to address the issue of child mine victims which included the participation of relevant government and non-government representatives.[35] The outcomes of these meetings included the development of new programs for accessing victim assistance or “routes of attention,” for addressing regionally specific geographic accessibility; and for the needs of children and adolescents; coca eradicators; and the Awa indigenous people. Victim assistance coordination meetings improved data collection and verification process. Coordination also resulted in the election of a national survivor representative for the Victim’s Law.[36]

In 2012, there was no progress in the development of a national plan for mine/ERW victim assistance. However, in 2013 PAICMA launched a process to develop the “National Plan for Comprehensive Assistance to Victims of Landmines, ERW and IEDs” with financial support from the European Union.[37]

In 2012, the victim assistance coordination role of the National Victim Assistance Committee and its sub-committees was replaced, for the most part, by the Executive Committee for Reparations and its subcommittees, which are also the coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the Victims’ Law.[38] PAICMA, as a member of the Executive Committee for Reparations, worked to include victim assistance actors in coordination at all levels. It participated in multisectoral coordination meetings of the following seven subcommittees for the implementation of the Victim’s Law: 1) Assistance and Care; 2) Information Systems; 3) Administrative Compensation; 4) Prevention, Protection and Guarantees of No Repetition; 5) Differentiated Approaches (focused on specific needs of persons with disabilities and indigenous populations as sub-sets of victims); 6) Rehabilitation (including physical and psychosocial); and 7) Restitution of Land.

CCCM participated regularly in meetings of the sub-committee on Prevention, Protection and Guarantees of No Repetition.[39] In September 2013, the CCCM was elected to participate in the national committee of victim participation, as one of six designated national organizations in defense of the rights of victims.[40] HI participated in sub-committees on Information Systems and Rehabilitation.[41]

Some concerns were raised among victim assistance actors about the shift away from specific coordination of mine/ERW victim assistance to the broader framework for conflict victims. HI found that the meetings of the sub-committees of the Executive Committee for Reparations did not have significant outcomes for mine/ERW victims due to their lack of visibility as compared with the much larger numbers of displaced persons and other armed-conflict victims.[42] The national NGO Pastoral Social found that the “disappearance” of dedicated mine/ERW victim assistance coordination, particularly at the departmental and municipal levels, resulted in decreased opportunities for local coordination and that national coordination mechanisms for the Victim’s Law lacked sufficient knowledge of varying local contexts.[43]

On the other hand, the ICRC saw improvements in intersectoral victim assistance coordination and felt that PAICMA’s work to ensure the visibility of mine/ERW and IED victims within the Executive Committee on Reparations, alongside the broader group of armed-conflict victims, was “crucial.”[44] The ICRC worked to ensure that the definition of victims of explosives was not limited to victims of antipersonnel mines but also included victims of ERW and IEDs.[45]

The coordination committees for the Victim’s Law contributed to the development of the National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence, adopted in August 2012.[46] The plan was supported by a strategy for implementation, guidelines, and a monitoring mechanism. The plan’s implementation has a budget assigned through relevant government entities.[47] Ongoing monitoring of the plan is the responsibility of each thematic subcommittee under the executive committee.[48] As of September 2013, the route of attention for mine/ERW victims was in the process of being adapted in line with the national plan for the implementation of the Victim’s Law.[49]

To promote the integration of mine/ERW survivors in the National Disability System, during 2012 PAICMA continued participating in meetings of the National Disability Council. PAICMA worked to ensure the inclusion of the perspective of mine/ERW survivors in developments relating to other persons with disabilities and connected survivors with the National Disability System at departmental and national levels.[50]

The Victim’s Unit also participated in meetings of the National Disability Council.[51] However, it was reported that mine/ERW survivors continued to remain outside of efforts by the National Disability Council and the Ministry of Health to address issues of disability.[52]

Colombia provided detailed updates on the progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2013, and through its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report submitted for calendar year 2012.[53]

Survivor inclusion and participation

In 2012, mine/ERW survivors, their representative organizations, and organizations working with conflict victims[54] participated in the sub-committee on victim participation and other sub-committees of the Executive Committee for Reparations.[55] The representative organizations also worked directly with the Victim’s Unit to develop the protocol for the effective participation of conflict victims.[56]

In August 2012, PAICMA, working with the Victim’s Unit and the CCCM, convened elections for the national representative of victims of mines, ERW, and IEDs to an interim coordinating committee for the first year of the implementation of the Victim’s Law. Representatives of mine victim associations from the departments of Huila, Caquetá, Cauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Santander, and Cundinamarca participated in the elections.[57]

In an effort to address weaknesses in the effective participation of survivors and their representative organizations in previous years,[58] PAICMA launched a pilot program to strengthen the capacity of three survivor associations from Antioquia, Cauca, and Bogota. The program focused on developing leadership and communication skills.[59] A representative of one of the three associations noted that the project remained in a development stage as of September 2013, without concrete outcomes.[60]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[61]

Improvements in victim assistance that had been expected under the Victim’s Law were limited during 2012, with the national plan for the law’s implementation only having been approved in August. PAICMA reported improvements in departmental planning and coordination for the implementation of the Victim’s Law and expected that the impact would begin to be felt on the ground in the second half of 2013.[62] The ICRC noted some exceptions to the lack of progress, reporting improvements in access to emergency medical care and increased efficiency through which registered victims received reparations payments.[63]

In order to receive government support, survivors were assisted by PAICMA and numerous NGOs to register as victims of armed conflict and some improvements were seen in the number of people registering.[64] In 2012, just 105 survivors were unable to access government support because they lacked the proper documentation to register and instead received comprehensive assistance from the ICRC, as compared with 385 survivors in 2011.[65]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

In 2012, PAICMA worked with the Emergency Regulation Centers (Centros Reguladores de Urgencias y Emergencias, CRUE) to improve first response at the departmental level and to ensure that PAICMA is informed immediately following an incident so that victims can be registered and made aware of their rights “in real time.”[66]

The ICRC provided health facilities with emergency-treatment kits and also trained medical personnel and community-based first-responders in caring for the weapon-wounded, including landmine/ERW survivors. It worked with the authorities to improve the protection of health services during armed conflict or violence. The ICRC also helped with the emergency evacuation of people wounded by weapons.[67]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

In the departments of Antioquia and Norte de Santander, survivors noted some improvements in accessing physical rehabilitation or having the costs reimbursed by FOYSGA, the national healthcare fund responsible for paying for these costs.[68] However, in most parts of the country, the bureaucratic hurdles to having rehabilitation costs covered by FOYSGA remained the greatest obstacle to mine/ERW survivors seeking care.[69] Physical rehabilitation service providers lacked information about their obligations to mine/ERW survivors, forcing many survivors to undertake a long claims process for reimbursement. The CCCM worked with cases in which survivors ultimately failed to be reimbursed for rehabilitation costs.[70] The ICRC was recognized for playing a major role to fill gaps in rehabilitation for survivors.[71]

In 2012, a new rehabilitation center opened in the department of Caqueta, the result of a joint CCCM and Mercy Corps victim assistance project implemented from 2009–2011. It allowed mine/ERW survivors who previously had to travel to Bogota to access physical rehabilitation in their own region.[72] However, there remained a lack of rehabilitation centers, especially outside of major cities.[73]

The quality of physical rehabilitation improved in 2012 in the departments of Antioquia and Valle del Cauca with the introduction of a model of rehabilitation based on “Daily Life Activities” by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).[74] The Ministry of Health and the ICRC worked with various providers of physical rehabilitation services to improve the quality of care so as to meet national standards established in 2010; service providers failing to meet these standards would be forced to cease operations by the end of 2013.[75]

In order to address the lack of trained rehabilitation specialists, the ICRC supported the training of several Colombians at the University of Don Bosco in El Salvador, and the professional prosthetics and orthotics course started in cooperation with SENA in 2010.[76]

Economic inclusion

The availability of economic inclusion activities for mine/ERW survivors decreased in 2012 due to the drop in international funding for targeted victim assistance programs. PAICMA sought greater inclusion of survivors in mainstream income-generating programs.[77] However, the results of this were not evident as of the end of 2012. In 2012, victim assistance actors in the department of Antioquia, with support from PAICMA, published a resource on lessons learned from the socioeconomic inclusion for mine/ERW survivors in Antioquia to raise awareness of best practices in income-generating activities.[78]

CCCM provided seed capital to mine/ERW survivors in Meta and in Bogota to start or grow small businesses.[79]

Psychological support, including peer support

Professional psychological support to mine/ERW survivors, as part of a comprehensive rehabilitation program, remained limited in 2012.[80] A study by Doctors Without Borders (Medicos Sin Fronteras, MSF) of Spain found that insufficient funding for psychological support was “particularly acute, further undermined by unclear procedures, roles and responsibilities.” In addition, mental health services were generally only available in larger hospitals in urban centers.[81]

In 2012, as part of its program for victims of conflict, the Medellin city government trained members of the community, including the leaders of survivor associations, in the provision of psychosocial assistance for survivors as well as other victims of armed conflict.[82] Several NGO programs provided psychosocial support, including peer support, as part of assistance programs for survivors.[83] As in previous years, nearly all psychological support programs were provided by NGOs with international funding. These efforts, while numerous, were insufficient to meet the level of need and were hampered by decreasing levels of international support for NGOs.[84]

The Victim’s Law requires the Ministry of Health to develop a program of psychosocial support to conflict victims though this was seen as a long-term solution.[85] In 2012, the Victim’s Unit created a guide on the psychological support that should be available to registered victims and created a coordination mechanism for psychosocial support in the department of Cauca.[86] The plans and programs developed in Cauca were to be expanded to other departments.[87]

Laws and policies

Colombia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, though efforts to enforce these rights were limited in 2012. The law prohibits discrimination in accessing public buildings but there was no law requiring access to information and telecommunications for persons with disabilities.[88] Some improvements in physical accessibility were noted but these were limited to urban areas[89] while most survivors were based in rural and/or mountainous areas where there were no improvements to physical accessibility.[90]

Throughout 2012, PAICMA and victim assistance NGOs set out to make mine/ERW survivors aware of their rights under the Victim’s Law.[91] Additional, clearer information was needed, however; as of the end of the year, there was still confusion and misinformation around the law’s implications for survivors.[92]

Colombia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 5 May 2011.

In 2012, the Republic of Colombia received US$15.6 million of international assistance from nine donors. The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) accounted for 72% of all international assistance.[1]

In November 2011, the EU announced it would be providing €6 million ($8.4 million)[2] for mine action across a period of three years, from 2011–2014.[3] This three-year EU contribution supports El Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) in monitoring humanitarian demining, coordinating victim assistance and risk education; the contribution also supports providing logistical support to the Organization of American States (OAS). The contract between the EU and the government of Colombia includes 24 tasks under four main activities: information management, land release, victim assistance, and risk education.[4] However, the contract was not finalized until November 2011 and, as a result, the 2011–2014 EU funding for mine action in Colombia was not reported until 2012.[5]

International government contributions: 2012[6]

Of the $15.8 million provided in 2012, only 33% was allocated to mine clearance operations. As of September 2013, HALO Trust still had not begun clearance operations, despite receiving accreditation in April and seeking mandatory insurance coverage for their 80 deminers. The accreditation process and timeline are described in the mine action section of the Colombia profile. Most of the funding for clearance was provided by the US through the OAS for the Colombian Army. The EU funding is for various capacity building and survey activities through PAICMA.

Five donors (Canada, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the US) provided $2.7 million to the ICRC and national and international NGOs for victim assistance in 2012.

Thematic totals

Summary of contributions in 2008–2012[7]