Colombia

Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures

National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002

Article 7 reporting

Submitted in 2013 covering calendar year 2012

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001.

National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.[1] In relation to the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia has also passed laws on victim assistance, land restitution, and civilian humanitarian demining operations. Law 1421 of 2010 permits NGOs to conduct humanitarian demining operations in the country.[2] On 13 July 2011, the Colombian Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) published the draft regulatory decree of Law 1421.[3] On 10 October 2011, the President of Colombia, through the Ministry of Defense, approved decree 3750 which promulgated Law 1421 regulating demining by civil society organizations.[4]

Colombia submitted its 13th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2013, which covered calendar year 2012.[5] Under national implementation measures, Colombia listed Law 1448 of 2011, the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Victimas y de Restitución de Tierra), in its 2012 report.[6] The section remained unchanged in its 2013 report. In the 2011 report, Colombia listed its “main operational results” against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) during 2010, including the number of demobilizations and captures.[7]

Colombia attended the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, where it made several statements. Colombia also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.

Colombia has continued its activity in support of the Mine Ban Treaty at the highest levels. It hosted the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena in November–December 2009. Colombia served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in 2011. Colombia is part of an informal working group of States Parties from Latin America that monitors implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan.[8]

Colombia is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted a CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 annual report.

The Colombian Campaign against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) has continued its work to increase awareness of the country’s mine problem and its solutions.[9] It has called on the government to use military demining teams to clear coca crops because civilians employed by the Colombian government to eradicate the crops have become casualties due to explosive devices.[10]

The Colombian NGO Fundación Arcángeles partnered with the ICBL and the UN Mine Action Service to again hold a global “Lend Your Leg” campaign from 1 March until 4 April 2013. The activity, which involves people making the symbolic gesture of rolling up a pant leg in support of efforts against landmines and in solidarity with victims, was inspired by the Remangate (“Roll-up”) activity first organized by Fundación Arcangeles in Colombia in 2011.

In 2012, Colombian music star Juanes joined the Convention’s Special Envoy, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, to participate in a high-level group in support of the Mine Ban Treaty’s universalization.[11]

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998 and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.[12]

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines.

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 18,531 antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.[13]

Since 2007, Colombia has retained a total of 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes. It declared a total of 586 MAP-1 mines retained for training purposes in its 2009 Article 7 report. In the 2010, 2011, and 2012 reports, Colombia did not provide a number but declared “no change in the quantity of retained antipersonnel mines” since 2009.[14] Colombia has not destroyed or consumed any mines in training activities since a total of 300 retained mines were destroyed in three separate events in 2006.[15] In March 2007, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) said that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training.[16]

Colombia has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties. However, in May 2011, it informed the Monitor that the 586 retained mines were “used for training the humanitarian demining units [of the armed forces], in the use of equipment for mine clearance.” In the event it was to destroy these mines, Colombia said it would account for this change in its Article 7 report.[17]

Antipersonnel mines discovered during mine clearance are destroyed on site and not kept for training purposes.[18]

Transfer and production by non-state armed groups

There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but the Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are experts in the production of explosive devices. Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) manufacture antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are both victim-activated and remotely-controlled.

Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content; the reports also include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore-type directional mines, as well as IEDs. The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.[19]

Use by non-state armed groups      

FARC has continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. Government forces continued to recover mines from the ELN, which has been documented as an antipersonnel mine user. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia until its disbandment in 2006.[20]

In August 2012, the ELN again called for peace talks with the government, but the vice-president stated that the ELN should halt mine use before commencing peace talks.[21] In September, the ELN confirmed that the landmine issue must be an element of peace talks and that it was willing to collaborate to facilitate demining activities in certain areas in the southwest of the country.[22]

FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. Peace talks between the government of Colombia and FARC continued in Havana in the first half of 2013. The CCCM has called for a special agreement to be reached to demine areas along Colombia’s border areas and southern provinces where the fighting with the FARC has been most intense.[23]

Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their campsites or bases, on other paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as paths to main transit routes along mountain ridges) and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.[24] NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts, causing casualties among coca eradicators.[25] In 2012, the ICBL expressed concern to the government of Colombia regarding the use of civilians to undertake coca eradication when these areas are increasingly known to be mined.[26]

The areas of Colombia where armed conflict has been intense and landmines have been planted often coincide with areas from which internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled and to which they are now seeking to return. In September 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that, according to the Restitution Unit, the government has recorded landmine incidents in approximately 70 percent of the municipalities where IDPs have filed land restitution claims.[27]

Media reports and statements by the armed forces show how the Colombian Army has continued to recover mines from FARC and the ELN in its operations in 2012 and the first half of 2013. According to media reports, in August 2012 the Colombian army found 20 antipersonnel mines reportedly planted by FARC in Tolima and Arauca.[28] A dozen antipersonnel mines allegedly belonging to FARC were discovered in September 2012 in a minefield in Cordoba[29] and in a military raid of a FARC camp in Norte de Santander.[30] In October, four antipersonnel mines were found by the army in different departments.[31] An antipersonnel mine and five IEDs reportedly laid by the ELN were also discovered by the army in the same month.

In November 2012, the Colombian Army discovered nine antipersonnel mines reportedly planted by FARC in the departments of Narino,[32] Antioquia,[33] La Cordillera,[34] and Buenaventura.[35] The army also discovered an antipersonnel mine laid by the ELN in Casanare.51

In December 2012, nine landmines attributed to FARC were discovered in Caqueta[36] and Norte de Santander.[37]

FARC and the ELN continued to use landmines in 2013, with the greatest number of media reports appearing between June and August. Relatively few incidents were reported during the first half of 2013, although in April the Army discovered two weapons caches in Albania in the department of Caqueta containing a total of 7,345 antipersonnel mines.[38]

In June 2013, the Colombian Army located a minefield near a home in village of Crucero near Tulua in Cauca;[39] found and destroyed seven IEDs in the municipalities of Sardinata, Teorama, and Tibú in Norte de Santander[40]; destroyed 31 IEDs in the municipalities of Jambalo, Morales, and Suarz in Cauca department[41]; destroyed 14 IEDs installed by the FARC in the departments of Cauca, Antioquia, and Meta[42]; reportedly found 18 explosive devices belonging to FARC in Antioquia and 2 IEDs belonging to FARC in Calamar, Guivare[43]; and destroyed eight IEDs in the departments of Bolivar, Santander, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and Meta.[44]

In July 2013, the army destroyed six explosives found in the rural area near Patio Bonita village in the municipality of Buenos Aires in the department of Cauca[45]; destroyed four IEDs that had been laid by FARC at La Punta in the municipality of Tumaco in Narino department and in the village of Plan de Zuniga in the municipality of Caldono in Cauca department[46]; and destroyed three IEDs “belonging to Captain Mauricio Front of the ELN” in the village of Amalfi Areiza in Antioquia.[47]

In August 2013, in less than a week, 70 IEDs were found by the army in the town of La Paz in the Cauca department, and a minefield containing eight explosives was found in a rural area near the village of Bolo Blanco in the municipality of Pradera in the department of Cauca.[48] Also in August 2013, the army found and destroyed a mined area of five IEDs “installed by narco-terrorists of Antonia Santos Mobile Column of the FARC” in the village of El Placer, Sardinata municipality.[49]

 



[1] For details on penal sanctions and other aspects of Law 759, see Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 6 May 2005; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 255.

[2] Statement of Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[3] “Presentación borradores de los documentos del decreto reglamentario de la Ley 1421 de 2010 y Estándares Nacionales de Desminado Humanitario” (“Presentation of draft documents of the Decree Law 1421 of 2010 and National Standards for Humanitarian Demining”), 15 July 2011, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Noticias/2011/Paginas/110715a.aspx.

[4] Ministry of Defense, “Decreto Número 3750 de 2011” (“Decree Number 3750 of 2011”), 10 October 2011, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Documents/Decreto_3750_2011.pdf.

[5] Previous reports were submitted on 25 April 2012, 30 April 2011, 30 April 2010, 30 April 2009, in April 2008, in April 2007, and on 29 June 2006, 6 May 2005, 11 May 2004, 27 May 2003, 6 August 2002, and 15 March 2002.

[6] See Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 25 April 2012.

[7] See Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2011.

[8] Statement of Guatemala, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 24 June 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[9] CCCM was established in 2000 and has local sections in 22 of the 32 departments of Colombia.

[10] Anastasia Moloney, “Colombia’s coca clearers face landmine danger,” Alertnet, 30 November 2011, www.trust.org/alertnet/news/colombias-coca-clearers-face-landmine-danger/.

[11] Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit press release, “International music superstar Juanes joins high level push to ban landmines,” 25 May 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/press-releases/PressRelease-Juanes-25May2012.pdf.

[12] Interviews with Eng. Sergio Rodríguez, Second Technical Manager, INDUMIL, 5 July 2000 and 24 July 2001. As of 2001, INDUMIL was still producing Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines. Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

[13] In addition to these 18,531 mines destroyed, the government has reported three other destructions of a total of 3,404 antipersonnel mines. Over the years, there have been many inconsistencies and discrepancies in Colombia’s count of stockpiled mines and their destruction. The Ministry of Defense sent a letter to the Monitor in September 2005 to clarify many of the problems. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 302.

[14] “Colombia no reporta novedad con respecto al informe anterior” (“Colombia does not report any change with respect to the previous report”), Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2013.

[15] In 2003 and 2004, Colombia reported it retained 986 mines for training. It reduced that number to 886 in 2005 when it decided the larger number was not necessary. It destroyed 300 more mines in 2006 (100 each in March, September, and December), but the number has not changed since December 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 267–268; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 302–303.

[16] The coordinator said the decision was made primarily because the majority of mines laid in the country are of NSAG design and do not correspond to the MAP-1 mines used for demining instruction. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, Coordinator, Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Bogotá, 16 March 2007.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Amb. Alicia Arango Olmos, Permanent Mission of Colombia to the UN in Geneva, 13 May 2011.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Presentation by the Colombian Armed Forces, “Desarrollo Compromiso con la Convención de Ottawa” (“Development Commitment with the Ottawa Convention”), Bogotá, 6 March 2006. Antipersonnel mines and IEDs manufactured by armed groups are constructed out of everything from glass bottles to plastic jerry cans. The explosive used is normally ANFO (made from fertilizer), but sometimes is a conventional explosive such as TNT. The mines are initiated by pressure-activated syringe fuzes (chemical initiation), battery-operated fuzes, and electric fuzes activated by both pressure and tripwires. These mines often have high levels of metal fragmentation in them.

[20] The Monitor has not seen reports of mine use by paramilitaries since 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 300; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 264; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 324.

[21] “La guerrilla tiene una deuda moral con la población civil colombiana: Angelino Garzón” (“The guerrilla has a moral debt to the civilian population of Colombia: Angelino Garzón”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 29 August 2012, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=13046; and Luis Jaime Acosta and Helen Murphy, “Colombia's ELN rebels offer peace talks, refuse ceasefire first,” Reuters Canada, 27 August 2012, ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE87Q0VZ20120827.

[22] Open letter from the ELN signed by ELN Commander in Chief Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, 10 September 2012 See also www.genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2012_El_ELN_y_el-DIH_ Evento_ Seminario_Taller.pdf.

[23] See: www.scribd.com/doc/144741973/Demining-Agreement. See also: Anastasia Moloney, “Landmines maim and kill Colombia’s children, rural communities,” Reuters, 26 June 2013, www.trust.org/item/20130626060528-f3oey.

[24] Email from Matthew Hovell, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 14 April 2010.

[25] See, for example, Chris Kraul, “Land mines take a toll on Colombia’s poor,” Los Angeles Times, 6 March 2010, articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/06/world/la-fg-colombia-mine6-2010mar06; CCCM, “Problemática de los erradicadores manuals de cultivos ilícitos víctimas de minas antipersonal” (“Problem of illicit manual crop eradicators landmine victims”), June 2011; and “Landmine injures 12 coca eradicators,” Colombia Reports, 7 October 2011, colombiareports.co/landmine-injures-12-coca-eradicators/.

[26] The call was based on the findings of a 2011 ICBL visit which concluded that the Colombian manual eradication program was putting civilians at risk from mines and noted that the government had not been able to effectively protect citizens from this risk. The ICBL therefore recommended that civilians not be recruited to take part in the Colombian manual eradication program and called on the Colombian government to end the involvement of civilians in this program. The ICBL also called on the Colombian government to redouble its efforts to recognize and certify coca eradicator survivors as mine victims to ensure access to a full range of victim assistance. ICBL, Conclusiones de la Campaña Internacional para la Prohibición de las Minas Misión de Cabildeo a Colombia: Del 9 al 15 de octubre de 2011” (“Conclusions of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ Lobbying Mission to Colombia: From 9 to 15 October 2011”), February 2012, www.scribd.com/doc/84171874/ICBL-Mission-Colombia-Oct2011-Espagnol.

[27] HRW telephone interviews with Restitution Unit official, 16 January 2013 and 8 March 2013; “Los grandes desafíos” (The greatest challenges”), Semana (magazine), undated, www.semana.com/Especiales/restitucion-tierras/, accessed 19 May 2013; and HRW, “Colombia: The Risk of Returning Home,” September 2013, www.hrw.org/node/118404/section/6 - _ftn96.

[28] Four antipersonnel mines were found in the department of Tolima, while the other 16 were found in Arauca. All were attributed to FARC by the army: “With four antipersonnel mines pretended to attack against the civilian population,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 13 August 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=334955; and “Explosive experts neutralized 16 death traps from the Farc,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 29 August 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=335743.

[29] “Army destroyed a mined field prepared by the FARC,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 24 September 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=336813.

[30] “Army locates hideouts from the FARC with arms and explosives,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 2 September 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=335886.

[31] The explosives planted by FARC were discovered in the departments of Valle del Cauca, Tolima, and Antioquia, while those belonging to the ELN were laid in Norte de Santander, Narino, and Antioquia. “Explosives from the FARC were destroyed in Valle del Cauca,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 1 October 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=337202; “Army increases operations at the Southern area of Tolima,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 8 October 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=337458; “Counter explosive Military Working Dogs from the Army located three mines,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 16 October 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=337803; “Counter explosive experts neutralize three mines from the FARC and ELN,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 18 October 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=337928; and “Land mines installed by the ELN and the FARC were destroyed” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 30 October 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=338469.

[32] “Four explosive artifacts were destroyed by the Army.” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia. 21 November 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=339639.

[33] “Army destroys two tatuco type improvised explosive artifacts and two antipersonnel mines.” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 12 November 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=339095.

[34] “Bomb cylinders and four antipersonnel mines located.” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia. 27 November 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=339865.

[35] “Desactivan artefacto explosivo en zona rural de Buenaventura (“Explosive artifact deactivated in the rural zone of Buenaventura”), El Pais, 30 November 2012, www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/desactivan-artefacto-explosivo-zona-rural-buenaventura.

[36] “Eight mines were destroyed by the Army in Caqueta,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 18 December 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=340754.

[37] “Army destroyed explosive artifacts,” Emisora del Ejército de Colombia, 18 December 2012, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=340752.

[38] In the first cache, 2,345 antipersonnel mines were discovered; 5,000 in the second. Both caches were found with five days of each other. See “Putumayo tendrá centro de rehabilitacion para victimas de minas antipersonal” (“Putumayo will have a rehabilitation center for victims of antipersonnel mines”), La F.M., 27 May 2013, www.lafm.com.co/noticias/putumayo-tendra-centro-de-138488; and “Ejército halló y destruye 5,000 minas antipersonal de las Farc” (“The Army found and destroys 5,000 antipersonnel mines from the FARC”), La F.M., 10 May 2013, www.lafm.com.co/noticias/ejercito-hallo-y-destruye-5000-137353.

[39] “Siete artefactos explosivos improvisados fueron neutralizados por el Ejército” (“Seven improvised explosive devices were neutralized by the Army”), Army News Agency, 20 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/siete-artefactos-explosivos-improvisados-fueron-neutralizados-por-el-ejército.

[40] “Fuerza de Tarea Vulcano continua asestando Fuertes golpes contra las estructuras del narcotrafico” (“Vulcan Task force continues delivering heavy blows against drug trafficking structures”), Officina de Prensa Fuerza de Tarea Vulcano (Vulcan Task Force Press Office), 1 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/node/952.

[41] “Acciones terroristas de las Farc con explosivos fueron frustradas por el Ejercito” (“Terrorist actions of the FARC with explosives were thwarted by the army”), Oficina de prensa Fuerza Tarea Apolo Apolo Task Force Press Office), 11 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/node/1097.

[42] “Acciones militares dejan la destruccion de 14 minas anti-personal” (“Military Actions leave the destruction of 14 anti-personnel mines”), Army News Agency, 23 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/acciones-militares-dejan-la-destrucción-de-14-minas-antipersonal.

[43] “Ejercito neutraliza acciones terroristas de las Farc en el pais” (“Army neutralizes terrorist actions of the FARC in the country”), Agencia de Noticias de Ejercito, 3 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/node/964.

[44] “Neutralizadas acciones terroristas en el Pais” (“Terrorist actions neutralized in the country”), 9 June 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/node/1086.

[45] Oficina de Prensa Fuerza Tarea Apolo (Apolo Task Force Press Office), “Las Farc no enfrentan a la Fuerza Publica: su terrorismo se limita a sembrar indiscriminadamente artefactors explosivos” (“The FARC does not confront the public forces: its terrorism limits itself to indiscriminately planting explosive devices”), Agencia de Noticias de Ejercito, 30 July 2013, www.cgfm.mil.co/CGFMPortal/faces/index.jsp?id=21525.

[46] “Ejercito neutraliza acciones terroristas de las Farc” (“Army neutralizes the terrorist actions of FARC”), Agencia de Noticias de Ejercito, 9 July 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/ejército-neutraliza-acciones-terroristas-de-las-farc.

[47] “Ejercito propina golpe al Eln en Amalfi, Antioquia” (“Army strikes a blow to the ELN in Amalfi, Antioqia”), Oficina de Prensa de la Decimocuarta Brigada (Press Office of the 14th Brigade), 10 July 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/ejército-propina-golpe-al-eln-en-amalfi-antioquia.

[48] “250 kilos de anfo y un campo minado fueron descubiertos por el Ejercito” (“250 kilos of ANFO and a minefield were discovered by the Army”), Oficina de prensa Fuerza de Tarea Apolo (Apolo Task Force Press Office), 2 August 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/250-kilos-de-anfo-y-un-campo-minado-fueron-descubiertos-por-el-ejército.

[49] “Fuerza de Tarea Vulcano frustra atentado terrorista en Sardinata” (“Vulcan Task Force thwarts a terrorist attack in Sardinata”), Oficina de Prense Fuerza de Tarea Vulcano (Vulcan Task Force Press Office), 15 August 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/fuerza-de-tarea-vulcano-frustra-atentado-terrorista-en-sardinata.


Last Updated: 02 September 2013

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

Signatory

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, and intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2013

Key developments

Ratification process underway

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

As of 1 July 2013, Colombia’s ratification legislation for the convention was awaiting a Constitutional Court review to ensure its compliance with the Constitution of Colombia.

Law 1604 approving ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions was enacted on 12 December 2012, concluding a lengthy process of legislative approval.[1] The House of Representatives approved the draft ratification legislation, Bill 244, on 15 November 2012, after it received Senate approval as Bill 174 on 30 August 2012.[2] Civil society has been consulted in the course of process to ratify the convention.[3] Colombia has provided regular updates on its ratification efforts throughout the process.[4]

Law 1604 incorporates the Convention on Cluster Munitions into domestic law, but separate implementation legislation is also planned.

Colombia participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that produced the convention and said that its decision to join stemmed from its concern about the “humanitarian impact” of cluster munitions.[5]

Colombia has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It attended the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012 and made two statements. Colombia attended intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in April 2013, but did not make any statements.

Colombia has not made a national statement to express concern at Syria’s cluster munition use, but it voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 15 May 2013 that strongly condemned “the use by the Syrian authorities of…cluster munitions.”[6]

The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) promotes the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including its ratification. On 1 August 2012, CCCM representatives and landmine survivors visited the Colombian Congress and promoted ratification of the ban convention with key politicians, including the President and Vice President of the Second Commission of the Chamber of Representatives.[7]

Colombia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Colombia provided its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention in a March 2010 response to a Monitor questionnaire.[8] The government “absolutely rejects and prohibits any manner of transfer or storage of foreign cluster bombs in Colombian territory,” as well as “military operations with states not party to the convention in which they carry out exercises or actions prohibited by the Convention.” It also prohibits investment in production of cluster munitions. In addition, “Colombia considers that the countries that are still not a part of this convention can take steps toward honoring the spirit of the convention.” Colombia reaffirmed its position on all these interpretive issues in a May 2011 response to the Monitor.[9]

Production and transfer

In May 2011, Colombia affirmed in a letter to the Monitor that it has never produced cluster munitions.[10] In the past, it imported them from Chile, Israel, and the United States (US). In March 2010, Colombia stated that it “has not transferred Cluster Bombs to a third state.”[11]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of a total of 191 cluster bombs to Colombia in 1994 (55 250kg cluster bombs, four air-dropped 250kg cluster bombs, and one fin stabilizer for a CB-250kg cluster bomb) and in 1997 (132 250kg cluster bombs).[12]

Past use

In May 2009, Colombia’s Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos acknowledged that the Colombian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” but noted the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”[13]

In an April 2012 letter to the Monitor, a Ministry of External Relations official stated that the Colombian Air Force decided to stop using cluster munitions after an evaluation found that they did not meet the operational requirements or needs of Colombia.[14] According to the letter, every military operation carried out by the Colombian Air Force includes a process of evaluation, planning and execution, based on the requirements under international humanitarian law. The letter states that a background check and review of historical records are being undertaken to investigate the use of cluster munitions, in order to comply with the ban convention on the clearance of remnants if there are any. The letter noted that to date there have been no reports of accidents caused by cluster munition use.

In 2011, the Monitor reported on the case of alleged cluster munition use by the Colombian Air Force at Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame (Arauca) on 13 December 1998.[15] At the time, the incident was attributed to a car bomb detonated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), but a subsequent investigation showed that a World War II-era “cluster adapter” of US origin was used to disperse several 20lb (9kg) fragmentation bombs during the attack.[16]

In its April 2012 letter to the Monitor, the Ministry of External Relations noted that separate judicial processes concerning the events of 13 December 1998 were before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Justice and said “we do not find it appropriate to make pronouncements in the Monitor reports while the judicial process is still taking place and while there is not a clear definition of all the aspects related to the case. We estimate that to ratify that this weapon has been used by the military force, without first knowing a final court decision, would undermine the role of the courts in the determination of the judicial truth.”[17]

On 18 December 2012, the Inter-American Human Rights Court published its 30 November 2012 verdict on the Santo Domingo case, which found: (1) the ANM1A2 bomb meets the definition of a cluster munition; and (2) the bomb was used by the Colombian Air Force.[18] Under Section 210 of the verdict, the Inter-American Human Rights Court concluded, “taking into consideration the conclusions of the sentence of the Penal Court 12 and confirmed by the Superior Tribunal in its sentence of 15 June 2011, that the ANM1A2 device landed at 10:02:09 in the morning of 13 December 1998 fell on the main street of Santo Domingo, causing the death of 17 alleged victims and injuring 27 others.”[19]

According to the Inter-American Human Rights Court decision, Colombia has victims of cluster bombs and should be viewed as a state that should implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions provisions requiring victim assistance.

Together with Santo Tomas University, the CCCM conducted a detailed study on the characteristics of the bombs used in Santo Domingo that concluded they fall within the definition of a cluster munition in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[20]

Stockpiling and destruction

On 24 November 2009, Colombia announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of cluster munitions.[21] In total, Colombia destroyed 72 cluster munitions (31 ARC-32 and 41 CB-250K cluster bombs) containing 10,832 submunitions during 2009.[22]

In 2012, Colombia confirmed that it has not retained any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or development purposes.[23]

 



[1] The ratification legislation had to be re-introduced by Senator Juan Lozano Ramirez on 10 April 2012 after draft ratification legislation introduced in March 2010 passed the Senate but was delayed in the House of Representatives to the point that it expired.

[2] Draft ratification legislation was first introduced in the Colombian Senate on 25 March 2010 as Bill 234/10 and passed its second debate on 19 October 2010. It was then introduced to the House of Representatives as 176/10, but was archived before the first debate took place and because the time period necessary to debate and approve the legislation had expired, the legislative approval process had to be stated again. Statement of Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/statement_colombia_final.pdf.

[3] For example, representatives of the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) accepted an invitation to present their views on the draft legislation to a congressional committee on 3 October 2012. Letter from Pilar Rodriguez Arias, Secretary-General, Second Committee of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Defense and National Security (Comision Segunda de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Exterior, Defensa y Seguridad Nacional), 25 September 2012.

[4] See for example, letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012; and statement of Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/09/INTERVENCION-DE-COLOMBIA.pdf.

[5] For detail on Colombia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 58–59.

[6] “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/67/L.63, 15 May 2013, www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/ga11372.doc.htm.

[7] CMC report, “1st August CMC Global Day of Action: Campaign Actions,” 2012.

[8] Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM, 11 August 2010.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nohra M. Quintero C., Coordinator, Internal Working Group on Disarmament and International Security, 13 May 2011.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of External Relations, 26 March 2010.

[12] “Exports of Cluster Bombs Authorized in the Years 1991–2001,” official document by the General Directorate of National Mobilization (Dirección General de Movilización Nacional), Ministry of National Defense document provided together with letter from Brig. Gen. Roberto Ziegele Kerber, Director-General of National Mobilizaton, Ministry of National Defense, 18 May 2012.

[13] Carlos Osorio, “Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs” (“Colombia destruye sus últimas bombas de tipo racimo”), Agence France-Presse, 7 May 2009. In 2010, the Ministry of National Defense said that the Colombian Air Force last used cluster munitions on 10 October 2006 “to destroy clandestine airstrips belonging to organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in remote areas of the country where the risk to civilians was minimal.” Ministry of National Defense presentation on cluster munitions, Slide 11, Bogotá, December 2010.

[14] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012.

[15] The case was described in the draft ratification bill contained in the letter from Representative Iván Cepeda Castro to Albeiro Vanegas Osorio, Chairperson, Second Committee of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Defense and National Security, House of Representatives, April 2011. See also T. Christian Miller, “A Colombian Town Caught in a Cross-Fire,” Los Angeles Times, 17 March 2002, www.articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/17/news/mn-33272.

[16] Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights document, “Masacre de Santo Domingo, Colombia, Caso 12.416,” 22 April 2011.

[17] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012.

[18] Sentence C-259 of 2012, Section B2 “The launch of a ANM1A2 device on Santo Domingo,” Inter-American Human Rights Court, “Caso Masacre de Santo Domingo vs. Colombia,” Resumen Oficial Emitido por la Court Interamericana Sentencia de 30 Noviembre de 2012, www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_259_esp.pdf.

[19] “Por tanto, la Corte concluye, tomando en consideración las conclusions de la sentencia del Juzgado 12 Penal, confirmada por el Tribunal Superior en su sentencia de 15 de junio de 2011, que el dispositivo AN-M1A2 lanzado a las 10:02:09 de la mañana del día 13 de diciembre de 1998 cayó efectivamente en la calle principal de Santo Domingo, provocando la muerte de las 17 presuntas víctimas y las heridas de otras 27.” Sentence C-259 of 2012, Section B2 “The launch of a ANM1A2 device on Santo Domingo,” Inter-American Human Rights Court, “Caso Masacre de Santo Domingo vs. Colombia,” Resumen Oficial Emitido por la Court Interamericana Sentencia de 30 Noviembre de 2012, www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_259_esp.pdf.

[20] Santo Tomas University de Aquino and Camilo Serna, “Informe sobre el desarrollo de la Convencion sobre municiones en racimo aplicada al estado Colombiano observancia y resultados” (“Report on the development of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as applied to the Colombian State: Observations and results”), 2011.

[21] For details on Colombia’s stockpile destruction see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 135–136.

[22] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of External Relations, 26 March 2010. The CB-250K bombs were produced by Chile and each contains 240 submunitions. The ARC-32 bomb is apparently a 350kg weapon containing 32 anti-runway submunitions produced by Israel.

[23] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012; and statement of Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/09/Stockpile-destruction-Colombia.pdf.


Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The precise extent of the Republic of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, which is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs), remains unclear, though the national database contains information indicating that 31 of the 32 departments may be mine-affected. The most affected departments are believed to be Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Tolima.[1]

In 2012, the Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) received reports of 3,328 “events”[2] which include accidents from mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), mined areas, suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and military demining operations, in 27 of 32 departments.[3] Meta and Antioquia departments accounted for 25% of all events. Each event is recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at PAICMA and is marked for further investigation to confirm the suspicion.[4] At the end of 2012, over 80% of the events recorded from 2007–2012 still needed follow-up to determine what occurred in each location.[5]

Landmines are also used as a means to attack the security forces and control areas including coca plantations.[6]

Mines

Given the irregular nature of mine-laying and the continued use of mines, especially improvised mines, it is impossible to obtain a static picture of contamination. Colombia stated that a lack of reliable information that only can be obtained from a systematic non-technical survey (NTS) prevented it from including a complete operational plan in its Article 5 deadline Extension Request.[7]

In its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Colombia describes a complex situation with a substantial humanitarian impact resulting from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs laid by NSAGs.[8] Grant Salisbury, the Program Manager in Colombia for HALO Trust (the only NGO currently accredited to clear mines in Colombia) has commented that “Colombia is the first country that we’ve worked in, indeed the first country that I know of, where all the mines used are improvised [explosive devices] – every other country where we work, the vast majority of mines come from state factories.”[9]

The Organization of American States (OAS) has reported that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. Nuisance mines have been found in schools, water sources, pathways, and stream crossings in order to allegedly intimidate or displace the local population.[10]

On 19 April 2013, the Interagency Humanitarian Demining Group (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario), commonly referred to as the Instancia Interinstitucional, approved interventions by demining organizations in 381 locations in 11 municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, and Santander for clearance that correspond to “events”[11] in the database; these events include accidents from mines, IEDs and UXO, mined areas and SHAs. The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Battalion (Fuerzas Armadas del Batallón de Desminado Humanitario, BIDES) is conducting clearance operations in some of these areas.

Minefields approved by the Instancia Interinstitucional for clearance[12]

Department

Municipality

No. of Mine Fields

Antioquia

Sonsón

80

San Luis

71

Nariño

38

Cocorná

31

Carmen de Viboral

28

San Rafael

28

La Unión

5

Bolívar

Córdoba

34

San Juan Nepomuceno

16

Santander

Barrancabermeja

30

Sabana de Torres

20

Total

 

381

In September 2013, HALO became the first NGO to conduct demining in Colombia when it began clearance operations at the El Morro minefield in Antioquia Department.[13]

Other explosive remnants of war

Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombing.[14] Explosive devices and other ERW are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is trying to destroy coca plantations.[15] According to PAICMA, clearance operations in communities where mines have a strategic value can put a community at risk because the NSAGs view demining as a hostile act that gives the Colombian Army a military advantage.

The precise extent to which Colombia is affected by ERW is not known. In 2012, 6% of all recorded casualties from antipersonnel mines and ERW were from incidents involving ERW, compared to 4% in 2011.[16] For the period 2002–2012, it was estimated that 3% of all explosive ordnance incidents resulting in injury or death were caused by ERW.[17] The ICRC, however, based on its victim surveillance system and its integration into IMSMA, believes the true rate may be closer to 40%.[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2013

National Mine Action Authority

National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP)

Mine Action Steering Committee

Instancia Interinstitucional

Mine action center

PAICMA

International Mine Action organizations

OAS: for quality assurance; UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS): for quality management

National demining operators

Army (Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces)

International demining operators

HALO (accredited)

International risk education operators

ICRC, OAS, UNICEF, Geneva Call, Handicap International

National risk education operators

Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), Colombian Red Cross, Seeds of Hope, Restrepo Barco Foundation, Coporación Paz y Democracia, Pastoral Social Nacional, Valle de Puenza

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, CINAMAP is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

PAICMA, the technical secretary of CINAMAP, is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2009–2019 Integrated Mine Action Plan, with the overall strategy to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in affected communities.[19]

The Instancia Interinstitucional is the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining comprised of the director of PAICMA, the Minister of Defense, and the Inspector General of the army. It approves accreditations, national standards, tasks, and clearance priorities. The OAS and UNMAS are advisors to the Instancia Interinstitucional on accreditation and national standards.[20]

The BIDES known as Coronel Gabino Gutiérrez from Engineer Battalion No 60 of the National Army has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005, when it began clearance of 35 military bases since completed in 2010.[21]

The OAS, in an agreement with the government of Colombia, serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS reports to PAICMA and is responsible for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system on behalf of the Instancia Interinstitucional.[22] The OAS also serves as an advisor to the Instancia Interinstitucional in the accreditation of NGOs in Colombia.[23]

Through 2012, the OAS had equipped and certified 27 teams with 360 deminers from the army, and provided administrative and logistical assistance to sustain clearance operations in the municipalities of Granada, San Carlos, and San Francisco in Antioquia department; El Dorado in Meta department; Zambrano in Bolivar department; Carmen and San Vicente del Chucurí in Santander; and Samaná municipality in Caldas.[24]

Since 2010, UNMAS has been advising PAICMA on the legal and technical mine action framework to allow NGOs to conduct mine clearance. UNMAS also assists PAICMA in accreditation and monitoring procedures as well as management processes.[25]

Demining law and standards[26]

Mine action in Colombia operates in a heavily regulated legal framework. For several years, PAICMA, its partners, various parts of the government of Colombia, and stakeholders have been consumed with passing and interpreting laws and decrees. In a landmark vote, Congress passed Law No. 1421 in December 2010 that allows NGOs to carry out humanitarian demining.[27] Almost a year later in October 2011, in support of Law No. 1421, Decree No. 3750 established internal rules and procedures of the Instancia Interinstitucional to ensure that NGO humanitarian demining activities are conducted in accordance with international standards. The Instancia Interinstitucional is also responsible for approving demining tasks for NGOs based on local priorities and humanitarian principles after the NGOs are accredited.[28]

In January 2012, in an unexpected development, the Procuraduría General de la Nación[29] issued a legal opinion claiming that humanitarian demining in Colombia was a violation of international humanitarian law, as it would put deminers in danger.[30] As a consequence of this surprising opinion, HALO discontinued its NTS work, and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) suspended their operations in Colombia due to the uncertainty caused by the opinion.[31]

In June 2012, the Procuraduría issued a new directive on NGO demining that urged caution in tasking clearance in dangerous areas, and recommended that the army both increase its humanitarian demining capacity and adopt the same national standards for humanitarian demining as apply to NGOs. The directive also allowed NGO accreditation to proceed.[32] By 22 June 2012, HALO had submitted its paperwork for desk accreditation, the first step in the process.[33] A year later in April 2013, and almost three years after the law allowing NGOs to clear landmines was passed, the Instancia Interinstitucional accredited HALO and tasked them to clear mines in San Rafael Narino and San Rafael in Antioquia Department. However, further delay occurred when the Instancia Interinstitucional determined that the insurance requirements established in Decree No. 3750 of 2011 were inadequate and that a new decree was required.[34] This issue was resolved on 24 July 2013 when the President signed Decree No. 1561 into law.[35]

Also in 2012 and following Decree No. 3750 on Rules and Procedures, PAICMA, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Command (Commando General) approved national standards that regulate demining.[36]

Land Restitution Law

Land reform is arguably the issue at the core of the long Colombian conflict. Landmines have prevented displaced people from returning home and long absences from home have raised questions over ownership when they do return.[37] For example, a common situation is where people were forced to sell their land at low prices to NSAGs and upon return find their land occupied, or when internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home after mine clearance operations were completed to find their land was purchased by someone claiming to be the owner. On 10 June 2011, President Juan Manuel Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Law 1448).[38]

In July 2013, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the International Organization for Migration visited Colombia to research the relationship between mine clearance, land rights, and ownership as well as the possible impact on implementing the Victims and Land Restitution Law.[39] A report on the mission is due later in 2013.

Land Release

PAICMA has been unable to conduct a nationwide survey to determine the true extent of the mine problem because NSAGs use mines in some areas, making them inaccessible.[40] However, smaller and more localized surveys have been conducted. The army conducts clearance operations in government-controlled areas.

Non-technical survey

Surveys are a priority for Colombia in order to better define the scope of landmine contamination as well as to assist in planning and calculating the needed clearance capacity from both military and civilian sources.[41]

The surveys are providing initial indicators of the quality of the information in the national database that constitute events as well as what comprises an SHA and a confirmed mined area in the Colombian context.

In 2012, BIDES conducted 138 NTSs in eight municipalities in five departments. Of the 138 SHAs surveyed 62 (or 45%) were cancelled. HALO discontinued conducting NTSs in 2011 but will resume them as soon as all legal issues with the government of Colombia are resolved.[42]

Non-Technical Surveys in 2012[43]

Department

Municipality

Surveyed

*CHAs

SHAs canceled

% canceled

Antioquia

Granada

30

14

16

53

San Carlos

5

0

5

100

San Francisco

22

10

12

55

Bolivar

Zambrano

23

3

0

0

Caldas

Samana

42

15

27

64

Meta

El Dorado

2

0

2

100

Santander

Carme de Chucuri

4

4

0

0

San Vicente de Chucuri

10

10

0

0

Total

 

138

56

62

45

CHA = confirmed hazardous area

In order to gain a better understanding of the landmine problem at the vereda (community) level, from September–December 2012 PAICMA conducted a survey based on consolidated data from IMSMA reports, secondary reports within PAICMA, workshops conducted with local authorities, and information from NGOs and other national agencies. As a result of the Local Opinion Survey[44] in nine departments,[45] PAICMA was able to geo-reference 4,279 veredas, information not previously available. Of these 4,279 veredas, 12,745 (64%) were determined to be unaffected by landmines and IEDs. The results are similar to the NTSs conducted by BIDES and HALO, where high percentages of suspected area were also either cancelled or considered not affected.[46]PAICMA planned to conduct the same survey in the departments of Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Meta in 2013.[47]

Mine clearance in 2012

In 2012, BIDES cleared 98 “mined areas” with another 31 (covering 261,116m2) still undergoing clearance in four departments and nine municipalities in January 2013, while finding 175 IEDs and 15 items of UXO. BIDES continues to clear a significant number of suspected areas that do not contain any ordnance.[48]

Humanitarian mine clearance in 2012[49]

Status

Department

Mined Areas

Area cleared (m2)

IED found

UXO found

Completed

Antioquia

40

107,574

52

8

Santander

31

31,170

38

3

Caldas

23

33,545

52

3

Bolivar

4

32,828

1

0

Sub-Total

98

205,117

143

14

Ongoing

Antioquia

15

30,950

7

1

Santander

4

6,625

3

0

Caldas

8

5,447

20

0

Bolivar

4

12,977

2

0

Sub-Total

31

55,999

32

1

Total

129

261,116

175

15

Of the 98 areas cleared, 59 (60%), covering 148,946m2 (73%) of the land cleared, did not contain any hazards. From 2010–2012, 39% of the mined areas cleared and 25% of the land contained no hazards.[50]

In 2012, Colombia declared the municipalities of San Carlos in the department of Antioquia and El Dorado in Meta free from suspicion of mines.[51] Of 660 municipalities (out of a total of 1,100) suspected to contain SHAs, San Carlos was the first to be declared free of SHAs.[52]

In an announcement on 13 March 2012, Colombia’s President declared San Carlos “free of the suspicion of landmines,”[53] a term that does not appear in the International Mine Action Standards and is unique to Colombia. Surveys and clearance had begun in San Carlos in February 2009 with OAS assistance. Since then, a total area of 1.3km2 was released; of this amount, 155,425m2 (approximately 10%) was released through clearance while the other 90% was released through NTS. During clearance, 69 IEDs and unexploded munitions were removed.[54]

Colombia declared El Dorado, Meta free of suspicion from mines on 29 November 2012 after more than three and a half years of mine action consisting of NTSs conducted by the army’s humanitarian demining teams. The army cleared two CHAs measuring almost 21,000m2 in the community of Jesus del Rio.[55]

Humanitarian mine clearance in 2010–2012[56]

Year

Mined areas cleared

Area cleared (m2)

IED found

UXO found

2012

129

261,116

175

24

2011

74

329,950

194

9

2010

46

234,433

171

23

Total

249

825,499

540

56

As of May 2013, the BIDES consisted of nine platoons with 41 deminers and three national supervisors each, for a total of 369 deminers and 27 supervisors. The platoons operate independently as teams of 12 to 15 deminers, for a total of 27 teams. In its revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request of August 2010, Colombia reported plans to increase the number of demining platoons from nine to 14 in 2013. PAICMA and the Ministry of Defense continued discussions about increasing the number of teams in 2013, which depends on the Ministry of Defense being allocated additional funding from the national budget.[57] However, the number of platoons will only be increased to 10. It was also planned that all BIDES platoons would need to obtain accreditation against national standards beginning in September 2013.[58] As of August 2013, BIDES had cleared 279,000m2, exceeding the amount cleared in 2012.[59]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, and then on 5 August 2010 submitted a revised request. The operational plan plus the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at the equivalent of 17 NGO teams and US$25 million, both of which have not been met. During this period the government of Colombia also planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining platoons.[60] As of May 2013, the army had nine demining platoons and planned to add three more in 2013–2014, including one from the navy.[61]

The Extension Request projects that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[62] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan was to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities with contamination covering an estimated 15km2 by 2013.[63] So far, Colombia is far below these targets. At the end of 2012, BIDES had cleared 218 areas covering 768,000m2.

Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s Extension Request, Colombia will submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013.[64]

Quality management

OAS is the body with responsibility for the management and implementation of a national monitoring system for accredited demining organizations in Colombia. The OAS also investigates demining accidents, verifies community liaison activities, and does quality assurance on NTSs.[65] UNMAS supported both PAICMA and the members of the Instancia Interinstitucional to put in place the required national standards in line with international standards and to ensure that the entire quality management system reflects international norms. UNMAS is also assisting PAICMA and the OAS in the accreditation and monitoring procedures and processes and also provides field technical assistance as required for operations.[66]

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.

[2]An event may be initially reported as a suspect area, the location of a mine accident, or a single landmine encountered and destroyed by the army, it is essentially a suspected hazardous area (SHA) that requires non-technical survey (NTS) to determine if they can be canceled or require technical survey and/or clearance.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.

[4] Ibid., Form A, 30 April 2013.

[6] Ibid., Form I, 30 April 2013.

[7] PAICMA, “Colombia Facing the Challenge of Anti-Personnel Mines,” Bogota, 2009, p. 6, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co; and revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 13 August 2010, pp. 2, 32.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2013.

[9] Benjy Hansen-Bundy, “Landmines major obstacle for land restitution: NGO,” Colombia Reports, 12 March 2013.

[10] Email from Carl Case, OAS, 29 June 2012.

[11] An event may be initially reported as a suspect area, the location of a mine accident, or a single landmine encountered and destroyed by the army, is essentially a SHA that requires NTS to determine if they can be canceled or require technical survey and/or clearance.

[12] PAICMA, “Municipios o zonas del país susceptibles de ser intervenidos con tareas de Desminado Humanitario, identificadas por la instancia interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario” (“Municipalities and tasks identified by the Instancia Interinstitucional for humanitarian demining tasks”), 19 April 2013.

[15] Ibid.

[16] In 2011, PAICMA reported ERW were the cause of incidents involving 20 of 549 victims and in 2012 it was 31 of 494. PAICMA, “Victims from AntiPersonnel Mines and Unexploded Ordnance.”

[17] From 2002–2012, PAICMA reported ERW was the cause of incidents involving 269 of 8,925 victims. PAICMA, “Victims from AntiPersonnel Mines and Unexploded Ordnance.”

[18] Email from Matthieu Laruelle, Regional Coordinator for Latin America, ICRC, 23 July 2012.

[19] PAICMA, “Program: Who We Are,” accessed 20 June 2013.

[20] Email from Carl Case, OAS, 29 June 2012; and email from Marc Bonnet, Program Manager/Senior Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 23 September 2013.

[21] PAICMA, “Humanitarian Demining,” accessed 20 June 2013.

[23] OAS Annual Report, “Mine Action Colombia 2012,” provided to the Monitor by OAS.

[24] Ibid.

[25] UN, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” New York, August 2013, p. 7.

[26] This section is based on Law No. 1421, Decree 3750, the opinion issued by the Attorney-General’s office, a Technical Note from UNMAS on humanitarian demining in Colombia, 13 February 2012, all available at www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Accion/Paginas/Desminado.aspx; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 30 April 2012; and email from Helen Gray, Program Director, HALO, 31 May 2012.

[27] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2012; and email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 25 July 2012.

[28] Decreto 3750 del 2011 (Decree 3750 from 2011). Colombia has passed five laws and three decrees from 2000-2011 on regulating mine action.

[29] The Procuraduría General de la Nación is an independent Ombudsman and distinct from the Attorney-General of the country. According to its website, the primary responsibility of the Procuraduría is to monitor how public servants carry out their jobs and advise when they may be in violation of existing law and standards.

[30] Procuraduría, El Desminado Humanitario en Colombia” (“Humanitarian Demining in Colombia”), Bogota, December 2011.

[31] Interview with Helen Gray, HALO, in Washington, DC, 24 February 2012; and email from Marc Bonnet, UNMAS, 23 July 2012.

[32] Procuraduría, “El Desminado Humanitario en Colombia: Segundo Informe de Seguimiento” (“Humanitarian Demining in Colombia: Second Monitoring Report”), Bogota, June 2012.

[33] Email from Helen Gray, HALO Trust, 22 June 2012.

[34]Sesion extraordinairia de la Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, Acta No. 011” (“Special session of the Interagency Humanitarian Demining Group, Act No. 011”), Office of the Vice President, Bogota, 29 May 2013.

[36] Email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 25 July 2012. Colombia National Standards as of 26 July 2012.

[37] Alejandro Gonzalez, “Displaced Colombians seek to reclaim land,” Al Jazeera, 11 July 2013.

[38] Amnesty International, “Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law,” April 2012, p. 5.

[39] PAICMA, “Misión internacional visita Colombia para realizar estudios relacionados al Desminado Humanitario y propiedad de la tierra” (“International Mission to Colombia to study the relationship between Humanitarian Demining and land ownership”), 8 July 2013.

[40] Email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 25 July 2012. Colombia National Standards as of 26 July 2012.

[41] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Colombia,” October 2012.

[42] Email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 25 July 2012.

[43] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.

[44] The Landmine Impact Survey methodology includes a first step in identifying possible SHAs. Local leaders were interviewed as part of the process. PAICMA adopted a similar methodology for its survey.

[45] They are: Antioquia, Nariño, Bolívar, Tolima, Arauca, Putumayo, Caquetá, Santander, and Córdoba.

[46] HALO, “The HALO Trust Minefield Survey Report SE Antioquia, Colombia,” March 2012.

[47] Email from Helen Gray, HALO, Colombia, 31 May 2012; and HALO, “The HALO Trust Minefield Survey Report SE Antioquia, Colombia,” March 2012.

[48] PAICMA, “Desminado Humanitarian, abril 2013 (Humanitarian Demining, April 2013); and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2013.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Annex No. 2a, 30 April 2011; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Annex 1, 25 April 2012, pp. 42–44.

[51] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.

[52] Statement of Colombia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 21 May 2012.

[53] Ibid.

[54] OAS Annual Report, “Mine Action Colombia 2012,” provided to the Monitor by OAS.

[55] Ibid.

[56] See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Colombia: Mine Action,” 17 December 2012.

[57] Email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 10 July 2012.

[58] Email from Marc Bonnet, UNMAS, 23 September 2013.

[59] PAICMA, Estadísticas Completas (Complete Statistics), accessed 1 October 2013.

[60] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, pp. 57–58.

[62] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, p. 65.

[63] Ibid., p. 68.

[64] Decision by States Parties on Colombia’s Article 5 Extension Request, December 2010; and email from Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 26 July 2012.

[66] Email from Marc Bonnet, UNMAS, 23 September 2013.


Last Updated: 26 November 2013

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary findings

·         Declining international funding for targeted victim assistance programs reduced access to physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and economic inclusion programs for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and other persons with disabilities

·         Coordination for victim assistance for mine/ERW survivors was mainly replaced by efforts to coordinate the implementation of the Law of Victims and Restitution of Land (Law 1448, referred to below as the Victim’s Law); this shift raised concerns that the specific needs of mine/ERW survivors might be lost within the much larger group of armed conflict victims with divergent needs, such as displaced persons

·         Improvements were made in the registration process for mine/ERW victims, increasing the number of mine/ERW victims who should be able to access assistance under the Victim’s Law

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Colombia is responsible for a significant number of landmine and ERW survivors who are in need. Cluster munition victims have also been reported. Colombia has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and as a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties[1]

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2012

10,184 mine/ERW casualties (2,119 killed; 8,065 injured)

Casualties in 2012

496 (2011: 549)

2012 casualties by outcome

75 killed; 421 injured (2011: 98 killed; 451 injured)

2012 casualties by device type

465 antipersonnel mines; 31 other ERW

In 2012, the Presidential Program for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) recorded 496 casualties from antipersonnel mines and ERW.[2]

There were 279 military casualties in 2012.[3] Civilian casualties (217) made up 44% of the total, an increase compared to 37% in 2011 as well as to other recent years; civilians made up 34% of all casualties in 2010 and were 41% of all casualties in 2009 and 2008. Of civilian casualties, 30% (66) were children (45 boys; 21 girls). Continuing the trend of increasing child casualties observed in 2011, this was an increase of over 50% from the number of child casualties (44) in 2011, when they were 22% of civilian casualties. Child casualties in 2012 were more than double the number (28) of child casualties in 2010. There were 32 casualties among women, a 50% increase from the 22 women casualties in 2011. The remainder of the casualties, and the majority of recorded civilian casualties (65%), were men.

In 2012, there were 55 civilian casualties among manual coca eradicators employed by the Program for the Eradication of Illicit Cultivation (Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos, PCI).[4] This was a significant increase compared with the 21 casualties among coca eradicators in 2011 but similar to the number (58) reported for 2010. This was despite the fact that PAICMA continued to work with the PCI, as required by the Attorney General’s Office, to ensure that safety standards, a security protocol, and preventive education were developed and implemented during manual coca eradication.[5] Annual variations in the number of casualties were explained by the variability in the armed conflict in Colombia, which makes violence and the use of mines difficult to predict; in 2012 there was an intensification of the conflict and a change in strategies used. In addition, the number of coca plants under cultivation increased so there was a corresponding increase in eradication efforts.[6] The number of casualties among security forces (police or military) occurring during coca eradication in 2012 was unknown.[7]

From 2006 through the end of 2012, there were at least 342 civilian casualties recorded among coca eradicators; 42 died, 297 were injured, and it was unknown whether the remaining three casualties survived.[8]

The overall mine/ERW casualty total in 2012 represents a slight decrease (10%) in annual casualties as compared with the 549 casualties recorded in 2011. Between 2006 and 2010, the Monitor identified a trend of declining annual casualty rates, a decline that had been ongoing since the peak of almost 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006.[9] Since 2010, annual casualty totals have been fairly consistent, ranging between 496 and 549 casualties per year.

Between 1982 and the end of 2012, PAICMA recorded 10,184 casualties (2,119 killed, 8,065 injured).[10] Civilians accounted for 38% (3,880) of the total and children accounted for 26% (994) of civilian casualties. Casualties have been recorded in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments. The departments of Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, and Nariño registered the highest number of casualties and accounted for more than half of the total (54%).

Cluster munition casualties

As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre versus the Republic of Colombia), heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition strike in Santo Domingo, Colombia on 13 December 1998.[11]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 8,065 mine/ERW survivors in Colombia as of the end of 2012.[12] Of 608 mine/ERW victims registered within the Registry of Victims by March 2013, 51% were survivors with at least one type of disability, while 49% had no disability.[13]

Victim assistance since 1999[14]

Since monitoring began, mine/ERW survivors in Colombia have faced serious obstacles in accessing emergency medical attention, ongoing medical care, and physical rehabilitation because these services have been available only in major cities while most mine incidents occur in rural and remote areas, as well as in inaccessible conflict zones. In 1999, social and economic inclusion and psychological support for survivors was virtually nonexistent, even in most major cities, with the exception of two facilities in Bogota: the military hospital served military survivors and the Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC) served civilian survivors. Both facilities have consistently provided comprehensive rehabilitation services, including psychological support.

Throughout the period, a series of laws have outlined the rights of mine/ERW survivors as victims of terrorism or conflict through a process termed the “Route of Attention,” which is the legal framework through which victims can access their rights to compensation, rehabilitation, and other components of assistance by registering as victims and having the cost of assistance paid for or reimbursed through special government funds. However, complicated procedures to register as a mine victim and delayed reimbursements have meant that many survivors could not access the care they needed, or had to depend on support from the ICRC and NGOs to facilitate access or pay for services.

In 2006, the ICRC began a mine action program in Colombia that included collecting data on mine/ERW casualties, helping survivors to access victim assistance, and strengthening the physical rehabilitation sector to improve the quality and accessibility of these services. In 2009, the NGOs Mercy Corps and the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (CCCM) worked to decentralize physical rehabilitation services by supporting the opening of four new rehabilitation centers and improving the capacity of prosthetic technicians during the three year period of the project.

Through the work of CIREC, CCCM, and others, more than 60 local disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) and survivor associations have been formed since 1999, increasing opportunities for peer-to-peer support as well as social and economic inclusion.

Government coordination of victim assistance began in Colombia in 2002 through the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, which was replaced in June 2007 with PAICMA. Throughout the period, victim assistance coordination has been variable and at times lacking in continuity, a result of changes and restructuring within PAICMA and changes with the legal frameworks that outline the rights and assistance available to mine/ERW survivors.

The Victim’s Law was approved in 2011; it is considered one of the most comprehensive legal instruments to address the needs of mine/ERW victims, along with other victims of Colombia’s armed conflict. The adoption of the law heightened expectations of immediate assistance among many survivors. The regulations needed to begin implementing the law were passed at the end of 2011.[15]

Victim assistance in 2012

Overall, there was less access to victim assistance in 2012 as international funding decreased for NGOs, who filled gaps in existing care and facilitated access by paying for transportation and accommodations.[16]

In 2012, governmental and non-governmental actors made concerted efforts to inform survivors and their family members of their rights and how to access comprehensive assistance through the newly regulated Victim’s Law. In addition, actors worked to identify and resolve barriers to access in the most mine- and ERW-affected departments of the country. These actions were expected to generate a long-term improvement in overall access to victim assistance but, for the most part, their impact was not yet apparent in 2012.[17]

Assessing victim assistance needs

As a result of the improvement of data collection efforts in recent years, NGOs and service providers said that mine/ERW victim registries in 2012 were more complete than in previous years, most especially for victims of recent mine/ERW incidents; this improvement in the registries was as a necessary step for mine/ERW survivors to access government-supported services and programs.[18]

However, as of the end of 2012, not all mine/ERW victims registered with PAICMA had been transferred to the registry managed by the Unit for the Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a Víctimas, or Victim’s Unit) due to a backlog in processing data.[19] Also, during 2012, victims of mines laid by criminal gangs were not covered under the Victim’s Law and thus not included in the registry of conflict victims. However, as of May 2013, the Constitutional Court of Colombia was reviewing the law to suggest amendments so that these victims would be included.[20]

In addition, survivors from remote areas, those who died as a result of the mine/ERW incident, and casualties of ERW remained undercounted.[21] There was a lack of awareness that victims of ERW had the same right as the victims of landmines to register for victim assistance.[22] It was also reported that there remained a lack of up-to-date information about the needs of victims from previous years, in part due to the lack of resources within departmental governments to access data held at the national level.[23]

In 2012, PAICMA began working with the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to adapt and expand the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database so it could be used as a tool to monitor the needs of mine/ERW victims and their ability to access their rights. PAICMA worked with the Victim’s Unit to align the monitoring system with the implementation of the Victim’s Law. In defining the needs of victims, PAICMA included consideration of the family members of a victim.[24] A pilot of the adapted IMSMA database as a victim assistance monitoring tool was planned for the department of Antioquia in the second half of 2013.[25]

In 2012, in order to collect and verify information about survivors of recent mine/ERW incidents, PAICMA worked with departmental governments in Antioquia and Putamayo, the PCI, the ICRC, the Organization of American States (OAS), Handicap International (HI), CIREC, Awa Indigenous peoples, and CCCM. All actors collected information in different geographic areas or sectors.[26] To facilitate the verification of incident and casualty details and to register new victims, PAICMA also worked with departmental offices of the National Institute of Health, municipal and department authorities, health centers, and NGOs. Casualty data was available through the PAICMA website and was regularly provided to relevant government agencies and NGOs.[27] PAICMA also continued to identify and report on available victim assistance services online.[28]

In preparation for a Landmine Impact Survey, PAICMA carried out a Preliminary Opinion Collection (POC) in 1,522 local communities across nine departments with suspected mine hazard areas. The study included questions about the availability of “victim assistance” for that community. Victim assistance was defined generally to include anything from emergency medical assistance to financial or social assistance. Just 13% of local communities indicated the availability of any victim assistance while the remaining 87% said they were not aware of any victim assistance being available.[29]

CCCM continued to organize meetings of survivor networks and/or individual survivors in the most heavily mine-affected departments to assess survivor needs and identify gaps in available services.[30] The OAS Mine Action Program in Colombia collected information on the needs of survivors in several departments and facilitated access to services for those most in need.[31]

Other NGOs collected information about the needs of survivors taking part in their rehabilitation and economic inclusion programs.[32]

In 2012, mine incidents and victim assistance services provided to survivors continued to be recorded within the Epidemiological Monitoring System (Sistema de Vigilancia Epidemiológica, SIVIGILA) in the department of Antioquia. During the year, PAICMA and the National Institute of Health worked to further define the information to be collected, and the procedure for information-sharing at the local and departmental levels; they selected the departments of Meta, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño, and Córdoba to introduce the system in 2013.[33]

Victim assistance coordination[34]

Government coordinating body/focal point

PAICMA

Coordinating mechanism

National Victim Assistance Committee and sub-committees at the national and departmental levels on information management, socio-economic inclusion, and psychosocial support with governmental and non-governmental representatives (mostly inactive); Executive Committee for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence (Comité Ejecutivo de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, or Executive Committee for Reparations)

Plan

“Comprehensive Route of Attention” for mine/ERW victims; National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence

PAICMA held departmental and municipal mine action meetings in 2012 to coordinate victim assistance. In addition, PAICMA formed a subcommittee to address the issue of child mine victims which included the participation of relevant government and non-government representatives.[35] The outcomes of these meetings included the development of new programs for accessing victim assistance or “routes of attention,” for addressing regionally specific geographic accessibility; and for the needs of children and adolescents; coca eradicators; and the Awa indigenous people. Victim assistance coordination meetings improved data collection and verification process. Coordination also resulted in the election of a national survivor representative for the Victim’s Law.[36]

In 2012, there was no progress in the development of a national plan for mine/ERW victim assistance. However, in 2013 PAICMA launched a process to develop the “National Plan for Comprehensive Assistance to Victims of Landmines, ERW and IEDs” with financial support from the European Union.[37]

In 2012, the victim assistance coordination role of the National Victim Assistance Committee and its sub-committees was replaced, for the most part, by the Executive Committee for Reparations and its subcommittees, which are also the coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the Victims’ Law.[38] PAICMA, as a member of the Executive Committee for Reparations, worked to include victim assistance actors in coordination at all levels. It participated in multisectoral coordination meetings of the following seven subcommittees for the implementation of the Victim’s Law: 1) Assistance and Care; 2) Information Systems; 3) Administrative Compensation; 4) Prevention, Protection and Guarantees of No Repetition; 5) Differentiated Approaches (focused on specific needs of persons with disabilities and indigenous populations as sub-sets of victims); 6) Rehabilitation (including physical and psychosocial); and 7) Restitution of Land.

CCCM participated regularly in meetings of the sub-committee on Prevention, Protection and Guarantees of No Repetition.[39] In September 2013, the CCCM was elected to participate in the national committee of victim participation, as one of six designated national organizations in defense of the rights of victims.[40] HI participated in sub-committees on Information Systems and Rehabilitation.[41]

Some concerns were raised among victim assistance actors about the shift away from specific coordination of mine/ERW victim assistance to the broader framework for conflict victims. HI found that the meetings of the sub-committees of the Executive Committee for Reparations did not have significant outcomes for mine/ERW victims due to their lack of visibility as compared with the much larger numbers of displaced persons and other armed-conflict victims.[42] The national NGO Pastoral Social found that the “disappearance” of dedicated mine/ERW victim assistance coordination, particularly at the departmental and municipal levels, resulted in decreased opportunities for local coordination and that national coordination mechanisms for the Victim’s Law lacked sufficient knowledge of varying local contexts.[43]

On the other hand, the ICRC saw improvements in intersectoral victim assistance coordination and felt that PAICMA’s work to ensure the visibility of mine/ERW and IED victims within the Executive Committee on Reparations, alongside the broader group of armed-conflict victims, was “crucial.”[44] The ICRC worked to ensure that the definition of victims of explosives was not limited to victims of antipersonnel mines but also included victims of ERW and IEDs.[45]

The coordination committees for the Victim’s Law contributed to the development of the National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence, adopted in August 2012.[46] The plan was supported by a strategy for implementation, guidelines, and a monitoring mechanism. The plan’s implementation has a budget assigned through relevant government entities.[47] Ongoing monitoring of the plan is the responsibility of each thematic subcommittee under the executive committee.[48] As of September 2013, the route of attention for mine/ERW victims was in the process of being adapted in line with the national plan for the implementation of the Victim’s Law.[49]

To promote the integration of mine/ERW survivors in the National Disability System, during 2012 PAICMA continued participating in meetings of the National Disability Council. PAICMA worked to ensure the inclusion of the perspective of mine/ERW survivors in developments relating to other persons with disabilities and connected survivors with the National Disability System at departmental and national levels.[50]

The Victim’s Unit also participated in meetings of the National Disability Council.[51] However, it was reported that mine/ERW survivors continued to remain outside of efforts by the National Disability Council and the Ministry of Health to address issues of disability.[52]

Colombia provided detailed updates on the progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2013, and through its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report submitted for calendar year 2012.[53]

Survivor inclusion and participation

In 2012, mine/ERW survivors, their representative organizations, and organizations working with conflict victims[54] participated in the sub-committee on victim participation and other sub-committees of the Executive Committee for Reparations.[55] The representative organizations also worked directly with the Victim’s Unit to develop the protocol for the effective participation of conflict victims.[56]

In August 2012, PAICMA, working with the Victim’s Unit and the CCCM, convened elections for the national representative of victims of mines, ERW, and IEDs to an interim coordinating committee for the first year of the implementation of the Victim’s Law. Representatives of mine victim associations from the departments of Huila, Caquetá, Cauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Santander, and Cundinamarca participated in the elections.[57]

In an effort to address weaknesses in the effective participation of survivors and their representative organizations in previous years,[58] PAICMA launched a pilot program to strengthen the capacity of three survivor associations from Antioquia, Cauca, and Bogota. The program focused on developing leadership and communication skills.[59] A representative of one of the three associations noted that the project remained in a development stage as of September 2013, without concrete outcomes.[60]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[61]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2012

PAICMA

National government

Coordination; data management; awareness-raising for governmental and non-governmental actors on available victim assistance efforts and how to access them; capacity building for survivor associations

Introduced a pilot program to strengthen the capacity of survivor associations

Ministry of Social Protection

National government

Administration of the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA) to cover rehabilitative care for victims of conflict, including mine/ERW survivors; regulated physical rehabilitation

Ongoing

Ministry of Health

National government

Emergency and continuing medical care; maintain national rehabilitation standards through certification of prosthetics and orthotics providers according to Resolution 1319, with support from ICRC

Ongoing

National Apprenticeship Service (SENA)

 

National government

Vocational training; training course for prosthetics and orthotics technicians (started in 2011)

Ongoing

Medellin City Hall (Office of the Mayor)

City government

Psychosocial support and vocational training to survivors as part of its program for victims of conflict; coordination of municipal committee to improve access to victim assistance

Ongoing

CCCM

National NGO

Legal advice; referrals to services; awareness-raising on survivors’ rights and advocacy; economic reintegration

Despite decreased funding, responded to all survivors who solicited support

CIREC

National NGO

Physical rehabilitation, including mobile outreach to remote regions; social and economic inclusion through formation of survivors associations, peer support, income-generating projects, and capacity-building

Ongoing

Fundacion REI

National NGO

Physical rehabilitation and psychological support for mine/ERW survivors referred by HI and the ICRC

Ongoing

Pastoral Social

National NGO with link to international organizations

Psychosocial support, income-generating projects; transportation and accommodation to access services; advocacy

Reduced geographic coverage and number of beneficiaries due to decreased funding

Colombian Association of Antipersonnel Mine Survivors

Local survivor association

Peer support, referrals, and assistance to access services

Ongoing

HI

International NGO

Training for health professionals on attending mine/ERW survivors; raising-awareness of survivors’ rights and available benefits; formation of peer support groups; psychosocial assistance; facilitating access to services; income-generating projects; and inclusion of survivors in local government committees

Increased project coverage from five to 10 departments;  58% increase in number of beneficiaries from 2011; introduced recreational and sport program for improved social inclusion

Organization of American States (OAS)

International organization

Transportation and accommodation to access services; support for services not covered through government support or for people unable to register; psychological support; and economic inclusion activities with SENA

Ongoing

ICRC

International organization

Weapon-contamination victim data-gathering including mine/ERW casualties; materials and/or training support to eight physical rehabilitation centers and overall training program through SENA; emergency medical care and evacuation; accommodation, transportation, and food for survivors and family members to support access to services; covered cost of service for survivors unable to register for government support; micro-economic inclusion project; disseminated information on victims’ rights among communities and local authorities; improved protection of health services during armed conflict

Number of survivors receiving prosthetics reduced by half; decrease in number of unregistered survivors receiving support by 73% due to decreased need; other activities ongoing

Improvements in victim assistance that had been expected under the Victim’s Law were limited during 2012, with the national plan for the law’s implementation only having been approved in August. PAICMA reported improvements in departmental planning and coordination for the implementation of the Victim’s Law and expected that the impact would begin to be felt on the ground in the second half of 2013.[62] The ICRC noted some exceptions to the lack of progress, reporting improvements in access to emergency medical care and increased efficiency through which registered victims received reparations payments.[63]

In order to receive government support, survivors were assisted by PAICMA and numerous NGOs to register as victims of armed conflict and some improvements were seen in the number of people registering.[64] In 2012, just 105 survivors were unable to access government support because they lacked the proper documentation to register and instead received comprehensive assistance from the ICRC, as compared with 385 survivors in 2011.[65]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

In 2012, PAICMA worked with the Emergency Regulation Centers (Centros Reguladores de Urgencias y Emergencias, CRUE) to improve first response at the departmental level and to ensure that PAICMA is informed immediately following an incident so that victims can be registered and made aware of their rights “in real time.”[66]

The ICRC provided health facilities with emergency-treatment kits and also trained medical personnel and community-based first-responders in caring for the weapon-wounded, including landmine/ERW survivors. It worked with the authorities to improve the protection of health services during armed conflict or violence. The ICRC also helped with the emergency evacuation of people wounded by weapons.[67]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

In the departments of Antioquia and Norte de Santander, survivors noted some improvements in accessing physical rehabilitation or having the costs reimbursed by FOYSGA, the national healthcare fund responsible for paying for these costs.[68] However, in most parts of the country, the bureaucratic hurdles to having rehabilitation costs covered by FOYSGA remained the greatest obstacle to mine/ERW survivors seeking care.[69] Physical rehabilitation service providers lacked information about their obligations to mine/ERW survivors, forcing many survivors to undertake a long claims process for reimbursement. The CCCM worked with cases in which survivors ultimately failed to be reimbursed for rehabilitation costs.[70] The ICRC was recognized for playing a major role to fill gaps in rehabilitation for survivors.[71]

In 2012, a new rehabilitation center opened in the department of Caqueta, the result of a joint CCCM and Mercy Corps victim assistance project implemented from 2009–2011. It allowed mine/ERW survivors who previously had to travel to Bogota to access physical rehabilitation in their own region.[72] However, there remained a lack of rehabilitation centers, especially outside of major cities.[73]

The quality of physical rehabilitation improved in 2012 in the departments of Antioquia and Valle del Cauca with the introduction of a model of rehabilitation based on “Daily Life Activities” by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).[74] The Ministry of Health and the ICRC worked with various providers of physical rehabilitation services to improve the quality of care so as to meet national standards established in 2010; service providers failing to meet these standards would be forced to cease operations by the end of 2013.[75]

In order to address the lack of trained rehabilitation specialists, the ICRC supported the training of several Colombians at the University of Don Bosco in El Salvador, and the professional prosthetics and orthotics course started in cooperation with SENA in 2010.[76]

Economic inclusion

The availability of economic inclusion activities for mine/ERW survivors decreased in 2012 due to the drop in international funding for targeted victim assistance programs. PAICMA sought greater inclusion of survivors in mainstream income-generating programs.[77] However, the results of this were not evident as of the end of 2012. In 2012, victim assistance actors in the department of Antioquia, with support from PAICMA, published a resource on lessons learned from the socioeconomic inclusion for mine/ERW survivors in Antioquia to raise awareness of best practices in income-generating activities.[78]

CCCM provided seed capital to mine/ERW survivors in Meta and in Bogota to start or grow small businesses.[79]

Psychological support, including peer support

Professional psychological support to mine/ERW survivors, as part of a comprehensive rehabilitation program, remained limited in 2012.[80] A study by Doctors Without Borders (Medicos Sin Fronteras, MSF) of Spain found that insufficient funding for psychological support was “particularly acute, further undermined by unclear procedures, roles and responsibilities.” In addition, mental health services were generally only available in larger hospitals in urban centers.[81]

In 2012, as part of its program for victims of conflict, the Medellin city government trained members of the community, including the leaders of survivor associations, in the provision of psychosocial assistance for survivors as well as other victims of armed conflict.[82] Several NGO programs provided psychosocial support, including peer support, as part of assistance programs for survivors.[83] As in previous years, nearly all psychological support programs were provided by NGOs with international funding. These efforts, while numerous, were insufficient to meet the level of need and were hampered by decreasing levels of international support for NGOs.[84]

The Victim’s Law requires the Ministry of Health to develop a program of psychosocial support to conflict victims though this was seen as a long-term solution.[85] In 2012, the Victim’s Unit created a guide on the psychological support that should be available to registered victims and created a coordination mechanism for psychosocial support in the department of Cauca.[86] The plans and programs developed in Cauca were to be expanded to other departments.[87]

Laws and policies

Colombia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, though efforts to enforce these rights were limited in 2012. The law prohibits discrimination in accessing public buildings but there was no law requiring access to information and telecommunications for persons with disabilities.[88] Some improvements in physical accessibility were noted but these were limited to urban areas[89] while most survivors were based in rural and/or mountainous areas where there were no improvements to physical accessibility.[90]

Throughout 2012, PAICMA and victim assistance NGOs set out to make mine/ERW survivors aware of their rights under the Victim’s Law.[91] Additional, clearer information was needed, however; as of the end of the year, there was still confusion and misinformation around the law’s implications for survivors.[92]

Colombia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 5 May 2011.

 



[1] Unless otherwise noted, all casualty data is based on Monitor analysis of PAICMA, “Situación Nacional 1990–Febrero 2013” (“National Situation 1990–February 2013”), 28 February 2013, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Paginas/victimas.aspx, accessed 25 March 2013.

[2] Nearly all explosives that are victim-activated and that can be triggered by an individual are referred to as antipersonnel mines in Colombia. However, these casualties are not caused by industrially-produced antipersonnel mines, but rather by victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ERW. ICRC, “Weapon contamination programming Colombia Activities and results achieved in 2010,” Bogota, undated, p. 2, document provided to the Monitor by email from Matthieu Laruelle, Regional Advisor for Latin America, Weapon Contamination Program, ICRC, 20 April 2011.

[3] Of the 279 military casualties, 33 were killed and 246 injured. PAICMA did not identify any casualties among non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

[4] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, Advisor, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[5] Interview with Daniel Avila, Director, PAICMA, in Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[6] Ibid.

[7] In 2011, PAICMA initiated a process to access information on members of the armed forces who are involved in mine incidents during coca eradication. In 2012, the Center for Information on Antiexplosives and Arms Tracking (Centro de Información de Antiexplosivos y Rastreo de Armas, CIARA) within the armed forces was designated as the focal point to facilitate the exchange of information with PAICMA. However, as of March 2013, PAICMA still had not received casualty information with sufficient detail to be of use. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013; and by Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2012.

[8] PAICMA, “Eradicator Victims by Department and by Year” (“Victimas Erradicadores por Departamento y Año”), undated, provided by email from Milton Fernando García Lozano, Information Management, PAICMA, 13 September 2011; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2012; and by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[9] The Monitor previously reported the casualty total for 2011 to be 538. However, as of February 2013, the total had been revised upward to 549 as additional casualties were identified for that year. PAICMA, “Situación Nacional 1990–Febrero 2013” (“National Situation 1990–February 2013”), 28 February 2013, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Paginas/victimas.aspx, accessed 25 March 2013.

[10] While PAICMA data covers a range from 1982 through 2012, just two casualties occurred prior to 1990.

[11] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Case: Massacre of Santo Domingo vs. Colombia Sentence of 30 November 2012,” www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm?idCaso=397.

[12] PAICMA, “Situación Nacional 1990–Febrero 2013” (“National Situation 1990–February 2013”), 28 February 2013, www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Paginas/victimas.aspx, accessed 25 March 2013.

[13] According to the Victim’s Law, victims with disabilities—whether the disability predates the victimization or is a direct consequence of the victimization—are prioritized for assistance and reparations before other victims. Email from Johanna Miranda Bautista, Director General, Group of Persons with Disabilities, Victim’s Unit, 21 June 2013.

[14] See previous Colombia country profiles in the Monitor, www.the-monitor.org.

[15] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, Director, Handicap International (HI), 30 March 2012; and by Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2012.

[16] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Catalina Buesaquillo, Victim Assistance Program Coordinator, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013; by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013; and by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[17] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013; and by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013; and by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[19] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, Victim Assistance Program, CCCM, 28 May 2013. As of March 2013, Colombia’s Registry of Conflict Victims included just 698 victims of landmines and ERW. Email from Johanna Miranda Bautista, Victim’s Unit, 21 June 2013.

[20] Interview with Daniel Avila, PAICMA, in Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[21] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013; and by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013.

[22] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[25] Presentation by Ana Maria Arango, Consultant, GICHD, during a side event entitled, “Mine/Explosive Remnants of War Victim Assistance: what role for information management systems?” Lusaka, 12 September 2013.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[27] Ibid.

[28] PAICMA, “Mapa de Actores en Asistencia a Víctimas y Educación en el Riesgo” (“Mapping of Victim Assistance and Mine Risk Education Actors”), www.accioncontraminas.gov.co; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Marina Revelo Quiroga, Victim Assistance Program, OAS, 18 April 2012.

[29] PAICMA, “Estudio POC/ROE” (“POC/ROE Study”), 19 December 2012, provided by email by Uli Tietze, former Technical Advisor, PAICMA; and email from Uli Tietze, Independent Consultant, 20 February 2013.

[30] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[31] OAS, “Project Profile: Comprehensive Action Against antipersonnel Mines,” Portfolio 2013, www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/Desminado/Documentos/Portafolio2013/CO_Asistencia_vic_ing.pdf, accessed 4 October 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Marina Revelo Quiroga, OAS, 18 April 2012.

[32] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013; and by Jorge Enrique Quesada, Coordinator, Community Based Rehabilitation Program, CIREC, 2 April 2012.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] The elected representative was to represent all victims of mines, ERW, and IEDs among representatives of other categories of armed-conflict victims. Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[38] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013; by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013; and by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[39] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[40] Email from Camilo Serna, Operational Coordinator, CCCM, 5 October 2013.

[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Monitor translation of original Spanish: “A partir de la ley de víctimas y los cambios que esta ley ocasionó, la coordinación existente desde los comités de víctimas de minas se vio afectado, en algunos lugares  desapareció afectando el nivel de empoderamiento local que existía.” (“Starting with the Victim’s Law and the changes it brought about, the coordination that had existed through the mine victim’s committees has been affected, in some places it has disappeared, affecting the degree of local empowerment that existed.”) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013.

[44] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Adopted under Decree 1725, 12 August 2012.

[47] National Planning Department, “Documento CONPES 3726,” 30 May 2012, www.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Tkr7QU7Isso%3D&tabid=1475, accessed 5 October 2013.

[48] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[49] Email from Camilo Serna, CCCM, 11 October 2013.

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[51] According to the Victim’s Law, victims with disabilities—whether the disability predates the victimization or is a direct consequence of the victimization—are prioritized for assistance and reparations before other victims. Email from Johanna Miranda Bautista, Victim’s Unit, 21 June 2013.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013.

[53] Statement of Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012; statement of Columbia, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (calendar year 2012), Form J.

[54] Organizations working with victims of armed conflict in Colombia are referred to as “organizations in defense of the rights of victims” in the Victim’s Law.

[55] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[56] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[57] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[58] Previous annual country profiles for Colombia have noted that survivor participation has been ineffective for a variety of reasons. For more details see previous profiles at: www.the-monitor.org.

[59] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[60] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reinel Barbosa Cajica, Representative, Asociacion ADISMAM (ADISMAM Association), 11 October 2013.

[61] OAS, “Project Profile: Comprehensive Action Against antipersonnel Mines,” Portfolio 2013, www.oas.org/dsp/espanol/Desminado/Documentos/Portafolio2013/CO_Asistencia_vic_ing.pdf, accessed 4 October 2013; Council of Medellin, “Programa de Atencion a Victimas del Conflicto Armado” (“Assistance Program for Victims of Armed Conflict”), undated, programa-atencionavictimas.blogspot.com/, accessed 7 October 2013; responses to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013; by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013; by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013; by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013; and by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, September 2013, pp. 73–74; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, pp. 368–373.

[62] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[64] CCCM, HI, and ICRC all supported survivors in registering for government support in 2012.

[65] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, September 2013, pp. 73–74; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2011,” Geneva, May 2012, p. 65.

[66] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[67] ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, pp. 371–372.

[68] Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[69] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[70] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[74] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[75] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[76] Ibid.; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, September 2013, p. 73.

[77] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[78] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] MSF, “Las heridas menos visibles: Salud mental, violencia y conflicto armado en el sur de Colombia” (“Least visible wounds: Mental health, violence and armed conflicto in southern Colombia”), June 2013.

[82] Council of Medellin, “Programa de Atencion a Victimas del Conflicto Armado” (“Assistance Program for Victims of Armed Conflict”), undated, programa-atencionavictimas.blogspot.com/, accessed 7 October 2013.

[83] See Victim assistance activities table for more details.

[84] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.

[85] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013.

[86] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013; and by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[87] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[88] United States Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia,” Washington, DC, 17 April 2013.

[89] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013.

[90] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Catalina Buesaquillo, Pastoral Social, 5 April 2013.

[91] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Luz Estela Navas, CCCM, 28 May 2013; by PAICMA, sent via email by Diana Rocío Sorzano Romero, PAICMA, 27 March 2013; and by Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, 20 March 2013.

[92] CCCM, “Barreras de acceso a la ruta de atención de las víctimas en Arauca” (“Barriers to Accessing the Route of Attention for Victims in Arauca”), 7 October 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas Reyes, HI, 20 March 2013.


Last Updated: 27 November 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, the Republic of Colombia received US$15.6 million of international assistance from nine donors. The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) accounted for 72% of all international assistance.[1]

In November 2011, the EU announced it would be providing €6 million ($8.4 million)[2] for mine action across a period of three years, from 2011–2014.[3] This three-year EU contribution supports El Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (PAICMA) in monitoring humanitarian demining, coordinating victim assistance and risk education; the contribution also supports providing logistical support to the Organization of American States (OAS). The contract between the EU and the government of Colombia includes 24 tasks under four main activities: information management, land release, victim assistance, and risk education.[4] However, the contract was not finalized until November 2011 and, as a result, the 2011–2014 EU funding for mine action in Colombia was not reported until 2012.[5]

International government contributions: 2012[6]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount ($)

EU

Capacity building, risk education

€6,011,191

7,729,791

US

Clearance, victim assistance

$3,500,000

3,500,000

Canada

Clearance, victim assistance

C$1,225,723

1,226,336

Germany

Clearance, victim assistance

€818,178

1,052,095

Spain

Victim assistance

€735,000

945,137

Norway

Clearance

NOK2,000,000

343,755

Japan

Capacity building

¥23,637,416

296,134

Switzerland

Capacity building, victim assistance, advocacy

CHF234,648

250,238

Netherlands

Clearance

€175,000

225,033

Total

 

 

15,568,519

Of the $15.8 million provided in 2012, only 33% was allocated to mine clearance operations. As of September 2013, HALO Trust still had not begun clearance operations, despite receiving accreditation in April and seeking mandatory insurance coverage for their 80 deminers. The accreditation process and timeline are described in the mine action section of the Colombia profile. Most of the funding for clearance was provided by the US through the OAS for the Colombian Army. The EU funding is for various capacity building and survey activities through PAICMA.

Five donors (Canada, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the US) provided $2.7 million to the ICRC and national and international NGOs for victim assistance in 2012.

Thematic totals

Sector

Amount ($)

%

Capacity building

7,715,400

49.6

Clearance

5,099,276

32.7

Victim Assistance

2,737,161

17.6

Risk education, advocacy

16,682

0.1

Total

15,568,519

100%

Summary of contributions in 2008–2012[7]

Year

National contributions

International contributions

Total

($)

2012

2,444,002

15,568,519

18,012,521

2011

9,535,200

11,088,975

20,624,175

2010

3,869,000

12,122,933

15,991,933

2009

3,196,000

10,502,603

13,698,603

2008

3,016,000

9,139,472

12,155,472

Totals

22,060,202

58,422,502

80,482,704

 

 



[1] Germany Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Amended Protocol II, Form B, 22 March 2013; Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; Spain CCW, Protocol V, Form F, 31 March 2013; Japan CCW, Amended Protocol II, 28 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Fabienne Moust, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 19 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Section for Multilateral Peace Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 22 March 2013; email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, 13 July 2013; email from Rob Horvath, Manager, Leahy War Victims Fund, USAID, 2 August 2013; and, US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington DC, August 2013.

[2] Exchange rates for 2011: €1=US$1.3931. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012. The average euro exchange rate for 2012 is: €1=US$1.2859. If used, the €6 million EU contribution is equal to $7.7 million.

[3] Colombia Reports, “EU gives Colombia $75M in aid,” 3 November 2011.

[4] Email from Ulrich Tietze, Technical Advisor, EU, Bogota, 3 September 2012.

[5] PAICMA, Investment project “Implementation of the National Prevention of Landmine Accidents and Care for Victims,” (CODE BPIN: 0050-00247-0000), Management Report 2011 (PAICMA’s Annual Report to the Government of Colombia), p. 9; Average exchange rate from 2007–2010: COP1=US$0.00050, Oanda, www.oanda.com.

[6] Average exchange rate for 2012: C$0.9995=US$1; €1=US$1.2859; NOK5.8181=US$1; CHF0.9377=US$1; ¥79.82=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[7] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Colombia: Support for Mine Action,” 17 October 2012.