Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State not party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on Resolution 67/32 in December 2012, as in previous years

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Attended, as an observer, the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012


The Republic of India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2012, India reiterated its long-held position by stating, “We support the approach enshrined in Amended Protocol II of the CCW [Convention on Conventional Weapons] which addresses the legitimate defence requirements of states with long borders. However, we are fully committed to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines.”[1]

On 3 December 2012, India abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has on similar annual resolutions since 1997. India has previously offered the same explanation each year, stating it “supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel mines” and that the “availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.”[2]

India sent an observer to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2012, where it stated that “The humanitarian ideals espoused by the Ottawa Convention have universal appeal.”[3] However, India also stated it would continue to address “the humanitarian suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines in consonance with its legitimate national security concerns.”[4] India did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.

India is party to the CCW and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It submitted its annual Article 13 report for Amended Protocol II.[5]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

India is one of the few countries still producing antipersonnel mines. India states that all production is authorized and controlled by government agencies.[6] Officials have not responded to a request for updated information on whether it is producing antipersonnel mines since 2011.

During 2010 and into 2011, the Indian Ordnance Factory Board produced M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines. The quantities produced are not known.[7] In 2007–2008, India produced at least five types of mines, including two types of antipersonnel mines (AP NM-14 and AP NM-16) and two types of antivehicle mines (AT ND 1A and AT ND 4D), as well as the APER 1B mine (a type unknown to the Monitor).[8]

India has repeatedly stated that it has had a formal export moratorium of unlimited duration in place since May 1996.[9] It has previously stated that it favors an outright ban on transfer of antipersonnel mines even to States Parties of CCW Amended Protocol II.[10] Five Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have reported Indian-made mines in their stockpiles: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mauritius, Sudan, and Tanzania. India has previously denied that any transfer of mines to these countries took place.[11]

In 1999, the Monitor estimated that India stockpiled between four and five million antipersonnel mines, one of the world’s largest stockpiles.[12] India has neither confirmed nor denied this estimate. In March 2008, Brigadier Vijay Sharma, former Deputy Director of the Directorate of Military Operations, stated that India does not possess mines that can detonate in the presence of mine detectors and does not possess—nor is it designing—any mine with antihandling characteristics.[13] An address by a military commander to army sappers (engineers), reported by the press in September 2010, stated, “After India became a signatory to a UN convention on landmine [sic], we are compulsorily putting a steel rod measuring a few inches in each mine so that it can be detected during demining operations.”[14]



India’s last major use of antipersonnel mines took place between December 2001 and July 2002, when the Indian Army deployed an estimated two million mines along its northern and western border with Pakistan in Operation Parakram.[15] This was probably the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world since the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and first signed in 1997.

In April 2010, in response to a Right to Information Act (RTI) request, India stated that the army had not laid any mines during 2008 or 2009.[16] Officials did not respond to an updated request regarding any use since 2011. Indian officials have also previously stated on many occasions that “There is no minefield or mined area in any part of India’s interiors” but have acknowledged that “minefields are laid, if required, along the border areas as part of military operations.”[17] However, in past years, injuries from mines planted near military bases within Jammu and Kashmir state have been reported.[18]

Some Indian Army officials have said that infiltration of Kashmiri militants across the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistani- and Indian-administered sections of Kashmir is the main rationale for mines laid along the LoC, as well as the international border.[19] The Monitor has previously reported mine use in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir.[20] Civilians continued to be killed and injured by mines in Kashmir in 2012 and early 2013 (see Casualties section).

Non-state armed groups

During 2012 and the first half of 2013, no use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is known to have occurred in India. There have been reports of use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that appear to be command-detonated.

In a previous response to an RTI request on mine use by NSAGs, a Ministry of Home Affairs official, referring to the NSAG Naxal, wrote, “The naxal affected area are prone to IEDs planted by naxal operation.” He further noted that detection and disposal of IEDs is carried out by the state police/Central Armed Police Forces allotted to the affected states. Army units have not been tasked to deal with Naxal-related problem.”[21] Also, in an April 2010 response to an RTI request on mine use by NSAGs, an Indian Army official stated that NSAGs had used IEDs against the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir state, and that government forces had recovered mines.[22] No further details about the types of devices and circumstances of their recovery were specified.

In 2012 and the first half of 2013, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, continued to use command-detonated IEDs (which are not considered antipersonnel mines or prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty).[23] These were frequently reported as “landmines” in the media and specialized reports on the conflict. Indian authorities regularly are reported recovering material from armed groups for making explosive weapons.[24] In January 2013, an explosive booby-trap, placed by Maoists, killed three civilians.[25] Maoist cadres have deployed large numbers of command-detonated roadside bombs, some of which have caused civilian deaths.[26]

No NSAGs have declared a ban on mine use during the past four years.[27]


[1] Statement by Amb. Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, 14th Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 14 November 2012,$file/08+India.pdf.

[2] India’s Explanation of Vote on A/C.1/66/L.4, 28 October 2011, is identical to its statement in 2010 and 2009; no copy of India’s 2012 Explanation of Vote on A/C.1/67/L.8 was publicly available.

[3] Since the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, India has sent an observer to every Meeting of States Parties. It also attended every intersessional Standing Committee meeting after 2004, up until 2011.

[4] Statement of India, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2012,

[5] India submitted a CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report summary sheet on 1 April 2013 covering the period April 2012 to March 2013. As in previous years, all information was marked as unchanged from the previous year, with the exception of Form E: International technical information exchange, co-operation on mine clearance, technical co-operation, and assistance,$file/India_APII_2013.pdf.

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form D, 4 December 2006. However, as reported by the Monitor in 2007, some of the production process appears to be carried out by commercial entities. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 833.

[7] Email reply to Right to Information (RTI) request made by Control Arms Foundation of India, from Ordnance Factory Board, Ministry of Defence, 5 May 2011.

[8] Email reply to RTI request made by Control Arms Foundation of India on behalf of the Monitor, from Saurabh Kumar, Director, Planning and Coordination, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, 2 April 2009.

[9] Statement of India, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2012,

[10] Statement by Amb. Jayant Prasad, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006.

[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 467. The figure may no longer be accurate following the large number of mines planted along the Pakistani border in 2001 and 2002, or taking into consideration new production of mines.

[13] Control Arms Foundation of India, “Conference on the Indispensability of Anti-Personnel Mines for India’s Defence: Myth or Reality?” Conference report, New Delhi, 26 March 2008, p. 75.

[14] Shubhadeep Choudhury, “Pokhran debate will impact forces, says Army officer,” The Tribune, 21 September 2010, - 10.

[16] Reply to RTI request, made by Control Arms Foundation of India, from Lt.-Col. Rajesh Raghav, GSO-1RTI, Central Public Information Officer, Indian Army, 8 April 2010.

[17] Statement by Brig. S.M. Mahajan, Director of Military Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Fifth National Conference of the Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Indian CBL), 23–24 April 2008, New Delhi. This has been stated frequently in the past. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 834; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 898; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 716.

[18] In October 2011, a laborer stepped on a mine at the Khundru Army camp in Anantnag district. “Army porter injured in landmine explosion,” Press Trust of India, 19 October 2011,

[21] Email reply to RTI request made by Control Arms Foundation of India, from Sunil Kumar, Director (ANO), Indian Supreme Court, Naxal Management Division (ANO Wing), Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 3 June 2011.

[22] Reply to RTI request, made by Control Arms Foundation of India, from Lt.-Col. Raghav, Indian Army, 8 April 2010.

[23] The CPI-M and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.

[24] See, “Two Maoist couriers arrested with explosives cache,” Press Trust of India (Raipur), 25 August 2013,

[25] Deeptiman, Tewary, “Maoist tactics during Latehar gun battle evokes memories of acclaimed Bosnian war film,” Times of India, 10 January 2013,

[26] See, “Two villagers killed as Maoists blast landmine,” Press Trust of India/Latehar (Jharkhand), 8 January 2013,

[27] In March 2009, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation renounced mine use by signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, as did the Kuki National Organization in Manipur in August 2006, and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak/Muivah in Nagaland in October 2003. In October 2007, the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 18 organizations in Kashmir, issued a Declaration of a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines in Kashmir.

Last Updated: 30 August 2013

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The Republic of India has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

India did not make any statements regarding the convention in 2012 or the first half of 2013. In November 2011, India stated, “We share the international community’s concerns about the humanitarian impact of the irresponsible use of cluster munitions” but “believe that the use of cluster munitions is legitimate if it is in accordance with international humanitarian law.”[1]

India has called for “effective regulation rather than the prohibition on the use” of cluster munitions.[2] It has long expressed its preference for cluster munitions to be tackled through the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to which it is party. It is not known if India is reviewing its position on joining the ban convention following the CCW’s failure in November 2011 to agree on a draft protocol on cluster munitions.

India did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but attended a regional meeting on cluster munitions in Lao PDR in October 2008.[3] India has not participated in any international or regional meetings related to the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012.

India is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has not been able to verify any use of cluster munitions by India. The size and precise content of India’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known.

As recently as 2006, the India Ordnance Factories had advertised the capacity to produce for export 130mm and 155mm artillery projectiles containing dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions, which are equipped with a self-destruct feature.[4] These projectiles are the result of a transfer of production technology from Israel Military Industries and were slated to be produced at Khamaria Ordnance Factory near Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh.[5]

However, information from June 2012 raises doubts about whether this capacity has been active in recent years. In response to a Right to Information request, an official in the Ammunition Division of the Ordnance Factory Board stated that India did not produce any cluster munitions in 2011 and said that India does not produce 130mm and 155mm artillery containing DPICM submunitions, but that a 130mm version is under development.[6]

In addition to artillery projectiles, the Defence Research and Development Organization of the Ministry of Defence has produced a cargo rocket containing antitank/antimaterial submunitions for the 214mm Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system.[7] Other sources have claimed that warheads containing submunitions were developed for the Agni, Dhanush, and Prithvi missile systems.[8]

India has also imported cluster munitions. Jane’s Information Group lists India as possessing KMG-U dispensers, as well as BL-755, BLG-66 Belouga, RBK-250/275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[9] In February 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the Russian-produced 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launchers fitted with dual-purpose and sensor-fuzed submunitions; it was the third export customer for the system.[10]

The United States (US) announced in September 2008 that, at the request of India, it was intending to sell 510 CBU-105 air-dropped Sensor Fuzed Weapons.[11] The US has attached a term to the transfer, in compliance with Public Law 110-161 (26 December 2008), which requires that the submunitions have a 99% or higher reliability rate and stipulates that “the cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present.”[12] In December 2010, the manufacturer of the sensor-fuzed weapons stated it had been awarded a US$258 million contract to supply India with 512 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, and in February 2011 the manufacturer announced that it had started production of the weapons to meet the order.[13] The Indian Air Force was expected to receive the weapons in early 2013.[14] In February 2013, US arms manufacturer Textron included the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon at its display at an arms show in Bangalore.[15]


[1] Statement of India, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011,$file/4thRevCon_INDIA.pdf. India has often made similar statements in the past: statement of India, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 30 August 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV); and statement of India, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 12 April 2010. Notes by AOAV.

[2] Statement by Amb. Hamid Ali Rao, Permanent Mission of India, Conference on Disarmament, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 7 July 2008. He said that “until [cluster munitions] can be replaced by other alternatives which are cost effective and perform the required military tasks, [cluster munitions] will continue to find a place in military armories as both point target as well as area target weapons.”

[3] For more details on Indias policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 208–210.

[4] The 130mm projectile contains 24 submunitions, and the 155mm projectile contains 49 submunitions. India Ordnance Factories,

[5] “Ordnance Board to produce ‘cargo ammunition’ with Israeli company,” The Hindu (online edition), 6 August 2006,

[6] Response to Right to Information request submitted by Control Arms Foundation of India from T.J. Konger, Director and Central Public Information Officer, Ordnance Factory Board, Ministry of Defence, 6 June 2012.

[7] Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), p. 715.

[8] Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, January 2007), pp. 49–56 and 85–87; and Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems 42 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, January 2005), pp. 85–87.

[9] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 840. While there is no information about specific transfers, the manufacturers are the United Kingdom (BL-755), France (BLG-66), and Russia/USSR (RBKs).

[10] “India, Russia sign $500 mn [sic] rocket systems deal,” Indo-Asian News Service (New Delhi), 9 February 2006. Each Smerch rocket can carry five sensor-fuzed submunitions and either 72 or 646 dual-purpose, high explosive submunitions.

[11] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “India: CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, Press release, 30 September 2008.

[12] Letter from Vice-Adm. Jeffrey A. Wieringa to Senator Robert C. Byrd, 26 September 2008. The law prohibits the export of cluster munitions that do not have a 99% or higher reliability rate.

[13] Craig Hoyale, “India signs Sensor Fused Weapon deal,” Flightglobal, 10 December 2010,; and Craig Hoyale, “AERO INDIA: Textron launches production of CBU-105 sensor fuzed weapon for India,” Flightglobal, 10 February 2011,

[14] Jay Menon, “IAF To Receive Sensor Fuzed Weapons In 2013” Aviation Week, 9 November 2012,

[15] Photographs from Aero India 2013 sent to Control Arms Foundation of India by a journalist at the event. Email from Binalakshmi Neepram, Director, Control Arms Foundation of India, 6 February 2013.

Last Updated: 23 November 2012

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact


India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of mine-laying by government forces on and near the northwestern border with Pakistan during the 2001–2002 stand-off between the two countries. Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.[1]

In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 report submitted in November 2005, India claimed that it had concluded mine clearance operations along its northern and western borders and that all arable land had been cleared and returned to its owners except land required “for operational purposes.”[2] Defence Minister Arackaparambil Kurien Antony repeated the claim in March 2008.[3]

India’s Engineer-in-Chief’s Staff Directorate reported in 2009 that “all mines laid during Operation Parakaram[4] were recovered/cleared (99.32%) by 2006.” It stated that the very few stretches where demining was not possible “due to terrain conditions” were fenced in accordance with “UN protocols.” According to media reports, in February 2010 the Indian Army had transferred to farmers more than 360,170m² of land along the Indo-Pakistan border near Akhnoor, 35km north of Jammu, after two months of clearance operations. The army said the landmines were laid during Operation Parakaram over an area of 2.3km² and that demining operations would continue to clear the remaining affected areas.[5]

Unofficial estimates cited in the Indian media, however, put the area still contaminated in 2007 at 160km2 of Jammu and 1,730km2 of Kashmir.[6] An army officer interviewed in 2009 said no official assessment had been made of the extent of remaining contamination but that such estimates could still be correct.[7] After landmine explosions in Jammu’s border district of Athua and near the Line of Control in Akhnoor in 2010, media reports cited local sources as saying that 10% to 15% of the mines laid in Operation Parakaram were never found.[8]

Military authorities acknowledge that areas prone to infiltration by militants are still mined but say the areas are clearly marked. However, they also say heavy rainfall, snow, mudslides, and avalanches can cause mines to move.[9]

Other explosive remnants of war

The extent of India’s problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW) is not known, but it contends with increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), notably in four states affected by Maoist insurgency (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkand and Orissa); media reports show this increased use of IEDs has resulted in extensive casualties.[10] In recent months, there have also been media reports of IED incidents or discoveries in Assam.[11] In its latest Article 10 report under CCW Protocol V on ERW, India declined to provide information on the extent of ERW contamination or steps it has taken to address the problem.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators


Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Authority


Mine action center


International demining operators


National demining operators

Army Corps of Engineers, Police

India has no civilian mine action program and no structured mechanism to address the problems from mines and ERW.[13] Its international point of contact for clearance activities is the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division within the Ministry of External Affairs. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.[14]

The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as IEDs placed by NSAGs.[15] Media reports indicate police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs in states dealing with insurgency.[16]

Land Release

India does not report publicly on its release of suspected hazardous areas. Its latest Amended Protocol II Article 13 and Protocol V Article 10 reports contain no information on any clearance within its borders.[17]

The government reportedly decided in mid-2010 that it would not deploy troops to areas affected by a Naxalite (Maoist) insurgency and would instead recruit some 1,100 retired army engineers to conduct mine clearance there. The engineers would work on contract and would be attached to paramilitary units, reports said.[18]

Army bomb disposal experts started the destruction of some 17,000 items of ordnance imported as scrap (probably from Persian Gulf countries) by steel companies based in the Punjab. The munitions included artillery shells, mortar bombs, rockets, grenades and detonators. Media reports indicate the munitions were found in 2004 but destruction began only in November 2010.[19]

Mine action by non-state armed groups

One NSAG, the Zomi Re-Unification Organisation, has reported to Geneva Call that it has marked a number of dangerous areas that had not been cleared by the Indian Army in northeast India.[20]


[1] The army reports the following numbers of mines seized in Jammu and Kashmir: 386 in 2000; 264 in 2001; 111 in 2002; 163 in 2003; 71 in 2004; 69 in 2005; and 59 in 2006 (to 30 April). Information obtained from,, accessed 23 September 2011.

[2] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 23 November 2005.

[3]Ex-gratia sanctioned for 353 landmine casualties: Antony,” (New Delhi), 17 March 2008.

[4] After the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, Operation Parakram was launched in which tens of thousands of Indian troops were deployed along the border with Pakistan.

[5] “Army demines land, hands over to locals,” Press Trust of India,, 16 February 2010; “Army hands over land to villagers in Jammu and Kashmir,” Headlines India, 17 February 2010.

[6] Sarwar Kashani, “Kashmir in a death trap of landmines,” India eNews, 24 June 2007.

[7] Interview with army officer on condition of anonymity, Jammu and Kashmir, 14 May 2009.

[8] Archie Watts, “Landmine blasts create panic,” Tribune News Service, 7 March 2010.

[9] Landmine Monitor interviews in Baramulla and Kupwara districts, Jammu and Kashmir, March 2006.

[10] See, for example, reports that more than 150 members of security forces engaged in anti-insurgency operations in mine protected vehicles have been killed in the past two years: Vishwa Nowan, “Security forces asked to shun armoured vehicles in Naxal areas,The Times of India, 17 October 2011.

[11]Assam: bomb recovered from school playground,” IBNLive, 26 January 2012; and “Three powerful IEDs found in Assam,The Hindu, 1 August 2011.

[12] See Protocol V Article 10 Report for the period April 2011 to 31 March 2012.

[13] Interview with army officer speaking on condition of anonymity, New Delhi, 18 February 2008.

[14] Ibid., 30 March 2008.

[15] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13, Form B, 6 November 2006.

[16] See, for example, “Landmine Blast injures three jawans,” Statesmen News Service (Malkangiri), 11 December 2007.

[19] Alkesh Sharma, “Indian Army’s scrap munition disposal a learning experience,” Headlines India, 30 November 2010.

[20] Email from Katherine Kramer, Programme Director Asia, Geneva Call, 28 April 2010.

Last Updated: 27 November 2013

Casualties and Victim Assistance


Casualties Overview

Total known casualties by end 2012

3,143 (1,074 killed; 2,068 injured; 1 unknown)

Casualties in 2012

78 (2011: 51)

2012 casualties by outcome

11 killed; 66 injured; 1 unknown (2011: 13 killed; 38 injured)

2012 casualties by device type

12 antipersonnel mines; 7 victim-activated IEDs; 1 other ERW; 58 unknown devices

In 2012, the Monitor identified 78 casualties from mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Republic of India. Of the total casualties for which the age and sex were known,[1] 18 were men; including 10 military/security personnel. There were 69 civilian casualties including 41 child casualties, or 72% of civilian casualties for which the age was known, compared to 51% in 2011. Another 13 female casualties were recorded, including at least nine girls.[2]

The 78 mine/IED and ERW casualties identified in 2012 represented an increase from recent years. Such fluctuations in annual casualty figures are not necessarily indicative of trends and can be attributed to the challenges in collecting consistent and accurate data from media and local sources, since India lacks a systematic data collection system.

The cumulative number of casualties in India is not known. Between 1999 and 2012, the Monitor identified 3,143 victim-activated mine/IED and ERW casualties in India (1,074 killed; 2,068 injured; 1 unknown). Nearly half of these casualties were civilians.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but was at least 2,068 through the end of 2012.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts were made to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in 2012.

Victim assistance coordination

Government coordinating body/ focal point

None; for all persons with disabilities: the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment’s (MSJE) Disability Division

Coordinating mechanism(s)




India does not have any specific coordination mechanisms or national plans for mine/ERW victim assistance.

The MSJE coordinates assistance for all persons with disabilities by regulating physical rehabilitation services and various disability funds, and developing and implementing India’s legal framework as it relates to disability.[3] A new Department of Disability Affairs within the MSJE went into effect from May 2012. The government established the department to increase its focus on disability policy issues. The MSJE formed a committee in 2011 to draft new legislation for persons with disabilities to replace the present Persons with Disabilities Act (1995). In September 2012, the committee proposed a draft of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2012 to the ministry.[4]

India’s Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 report for the period from April 2012 to March 2013 did not include details of victim assistance provided, and India marked that the situation had remained unchanged since 2006.[5] As in past years, India stated that reporting on the protection of the civilian population from the effects of ERW was not applicable for India in its CCW Protocol V Article 10 report.[6] In 2010, India reported that “mine victims are assisted with rehabilitation inter alia through financial compensation employment and health care including by providing prosthetics.”[7]

Survivor Inclusion

Associations of mine survivors were included in the consultative process to draft the national Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill.[8]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[9]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Composite Regional Center


Rehabilitation Center in Poonch, Kashmir

Preetam Spiritual Foundation

National NGO

Support for prosthetics for persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, in Poonch, Kashmir

Hope Disability Center

National NGO

Outreach, referral, prosthetics and orthotics, rehabilitation

Jammu & Kashmir Landmine Survivors (JKLS)

Survivor Association

Support to survivors to obtain legal benefits from the government

Control Arms Foundation and Human Rights Law Network

National NGO

Legal support and advocacy for the rights of mine survivors and other persons with disabilities

Indian Red Cross

National Society

Emergency medical response and transport; referrals for mine/ERW survivors to rehabilitation centers

Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF)

International NGO

Psychosocial care to people wounded by violence and their families in Kashmir

ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD)



Training and materials for two training institutes; covered costs of treatment for destitute persons with disabilities at both institutes


International Organization

Support for emergency medical response and healthcare in regions affected by violence; provision of materials and training and support for accommodations and transportation for two rehabilitation centers on Jammu and Kashmir; support for the opening of a district rehabilitation center in Nagaland

In 2012, the ICRC continued to provide support for three prosthetic and orthotic centers in Jammu and Kashmir: the Artificial Limb Centre at the Bone and Joint Hospital, Srinagar, the Artificial Limb Centre at the Governmental Medical College, Jammu, and the Voluntary Medicare Society. The ICRC-supported centers assisted 23 mine/ERW survivors to obtain prosthetic limbs in 2012, compared to 50 survivors in 2011. Yet this was still a significant increase in contrast with the period 2000 to 2010, when just 95 survivors were served all together. The ICRC also supported a center in Nagaland and another in Chhattisgarh. Overall, the number of people receiving services at ICRC-supported centers in 2012 increased by 30% compared to 2011.[10]

The MSJE reported that the government had established 215 district disability rehabilitation centers throughout India. These services were concentrated in urban areas. The MSJE identified 100 more underserved districts in need of similar centers. The centers provide comprehensive rehabilitation services such as medical care, corrective surgery, prosthetics, educational, vocational training, and community awareness.[11]

However, access to rehabilitation remained difficult for the poorest people with disabilities due to a range of factors, including the lack of facilities in rural areas; most facilities not being fully operational because of insufficient equipment, materials, and professional staff; a lack of awareness of existing services and rights among potential beneficiaries; the need to cover costs for transportation as well as for accommodation and food during treatment.[12] The distribution of prosthetic limbs in mine-affected areas was reported to be “haphazard” and lacking planning to replace worn and damaged prostheses.[13]

There was reported to be an urgent need for a long-term rehabilitation policy addressing the needs of child survivors and children with disabilities in Jammu and Kashmir.[14]

While many survivors were reported to be receiving a monthly disability allowance, this was considered insufficient to live on.[15]

The government has stated at international meetings that mine survivors and families of those killed by mines are entitled to compensation.[16] Monetary compensation to landmine survivors and family members of people killed is distributed by the Ministry of Defence. However, many survivors have not been successful in applying for compensation.[17] A local activist was quoted as saying that a concrete rehabilitation policy for survivors was needed because, “The process of compensation is quite tedious. By the time it is complete, people are tired, insane or dead and only a handful of people have actually benefited.”[18]

The standard one-time compensation payment from the government is US$1,500, which is inadequate to cover treatment and the future needs of survivors.[19] To pay for medical expenses, families often have to sell their land or livestock, resulting is worsening economic situations overall with no support for livelihoods.[20] In 2012, a local government official was reported as saying women rarely file compensation claims because they “are very shy and are not allowed to come so far,” and also that people in remote areas may not be aware of the compensation program.[21]

The government program for the universalization of elementary school education, the Education for All Movement (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, SSA), has provisions for paying special attention to children with disabilities.[22] However, SSA was not addressing the needs of child mine/ERW survivors in Poonch district.[23] There were no known economic inclusion initiatives such as livelihoods training or employment measures targeting, or inclusive of, mine/ERW survivors in 2012.

Psychosocial support for survivors continued to be limited, and declined in 2012. MSF provided psychosocial care, particularly for conflict and weapons victims in Kashmir.[24] However, MSF services in the Kupwara district of Kashmir ended in May 2012.[25]

India’s Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 protects the rights of persons with disabilities. However, discrimination remained pervasive, especially in rural areas. Legislation requires that all public buildings and transportation be accessible for persons with disabilities, though accessibility remained limited with few exceptions.[26]

India ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 1 October 2007.


[1] The age of 67 casualties and the sex of 48 casualties were recorded.

[2] Monitor Media monitoring 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. For casualty data from previous years, see previous Monitor country profiles for India at:

[3] MSJE, “About the Division.”

[4] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, p 58.

[5] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period April 2012 to March 2013), Form B.

[6] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for the period 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013).

[7] Statement of India, Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 29 November 2010.

[8] MSJE, “The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2011,” Hyderabad, 30 June 2011, p. 48.

[9] There are hundreds of service providers (most of which are public or private health or rehabilitation centers) delivering assistance to persons with disabilities in India. The organizations listed here have some specific focus on mine/IED/ERW survivors. ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” May 2013, Geneva, p. 296; ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” September 2013, Geneva, p. 58; ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), “Annual Report 2012,” May 2013, Geneva, p. 28; Hope Rehabilitation Center,; and Athar Parvaiz, “Explosives shatter lives in Kashmir,” Asia Times Online, 21 May 2013.

[10] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, September 2013, p 58; and email from Nicole Hogg, ICRC, 15 July 2013.

[11] United States (US) Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India,” Washington, DC, 17 April 2013.

[12] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, September 2013, p 58.

[13] Betwa Sharma, “Kashmiris, Disabled by Conflict, Battle for Compensation,” India Ink, 26 September 2012.

[14] Ashutosh Sharma, “Kashmir: Childhood Under Threat,”, 9 July 2013.

[15] Ashutosh Sharma, “Scarred lives: The child victims of conflict,” 3 September 2013; and Baba Umar, “Mines of war maim innocent,” Tehelka Magazine, Vol. 8, Issue 17, 30 April 2011.

[16] Statement of India, Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 29 November 2010; statement by Prabhat Kumar, Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 1 December 2009; and statement by Prabhat Kumar, Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24–28 November 2008.

[17] Baba Umar, “Mines of war maim innocent,” Tehelka Magazine, Vol. 8, Issue 17, 30 April 2011.

[18]The exploding reality,” The Hindu, 14 June 2013.

[19] Athar Parvaiz, “Explosives shatter lives in Kashmir,” Asia Times Online, 21 May 2013.

[20] Ashutosh Sharma, “The Bruised Childhood,” Greater Kashmir, 25 August 2012; and Athar Parvaiz, “Explosives shatter lives in Kashmir,” 21 May 2013.

[21] Betwa Sharma, “Kashmiris, Disabled by Conflict, Battle for Compensation,” India Ink, 26 September 2012.

[22]Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan,” accessed 11 November 2013.

[23] Ashutosh Sharma, “Kashmir: Childhood Under Threat,”, 9 July 2013.

[24] MSF, “Providing mental health services in Jammu and Kashmir,” accessed 11 November 2013.

[25] Nida Najar, “Doctors Without Borders Pull Back in Kashmir,” India Ink, 7 May 2012.

[26] US Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India,” Washington, DC, 17 April 2013; and US Department of State, “2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India,” Washington, DC, 8 April 2011.