Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2012, India reiterated its long-held position by stating, “We support the approach enshrined in Amended Protocol II of the CCW [Convention on Conventional Weapons] which addresses the legitimate defence requirements of states with long borders. However, we are fully committed to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines.”[1]

On 3 December 2012, India abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has on similar annual resolutions since 1997. India has previously offered the same explanation each year, stating it “supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel mines” and that the “availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.”[2]

India sent an observer to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2012, where it stated that “The humanitarian ideals espoused by the Ottawa Convention have universal appeal.”[3] However, India also stated it would continue to address “the humanitarian suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines in consonance with its legitimate national security concerns.”[4] India did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.

India is party to the CCW and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It submitted its annual Article 13 report for Amended Protocol II.[5]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

India is one of the few countries still producing antipersonnel mines. India states that all production is authorized and controlled by government agencies.[6] Officials have not responded to a request for updated information on whether it is producing antipersonnel mines since 2011.

During 2010 and into 2011, the Indian Ordnance Factory Board produced M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines. The quantities produced are not known.[7] In 2007–2008, India produced at least five types of mines, including two types of antipersonnel mines (AP NM-14 and AP NM-16) and two types of antivehicle mines (AT ND 1A and AT ND 4D), as well as the APER 1B mine (a type unknown to the Monitor).[8]

India has repeatedly stated that it has had a formal export moratorium of unlimited duration in place since May 1996.[9] It has previously stated that it favors an outright ban on transfer of antipersonnel mines even to States Parties of CCW Amended Protocol II.[10] Five Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have reported Indian-made mines in their stockpiles: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mauritius, Sudan, and Tanzania. India has previously denied that any transfer of mines to these countries took place.[11]

In 1999, the Monitor estimated that India stockpiled between four and five million antipersonnel mines, one of the world’s largest stockpiles.[12] India has neither confirmed nor denied this estimate. In March 2008, Brigadier Vijay Sharma, former Deputy Director of the Directorate of Military Operations, stated that India does not possess mines that can detonate in the presence of mine detectors and does not possess—nor is it designing—any mine with antihandling characteristics.[13] An address by a military commander to army sappers (engineers), reported by the press in September 2010, stated, “After India became a signatory to a UN convention on landmine [sic], we are compulsorily putting a steel rod measuring a few inches in each mine so that it can be detected during demining operations.”[14]

Use

Government

India’s last major use of antipersonnel mines took place between December 2001 and July 2002, when the Indian Army deployed an estimated two million mines along its northern and western border with Pakistan in Operation Parakram.[15] This was probably the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world since the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and first signed in 1997.

In April 2010, in response to a Right to Information Act (RTI) request, India stated that the army had not laid any mines during 2008 or 2009.[16] Officials did not respond to an updated request regarding any use since 2011. Indian officials have also previously stated on many occasions that “There is no minefield or mined area in any part of India’s interiors” but have acknowledged that “minefields are laid, if required, along the border areas as part of military operations.”[17] However, in past years, injuries from mines planted near military bases within Jammu and Kashmir state have been reported.[18]

Some Indian Army officials have said that infiltration of Kashmiri militants across the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistani- and Indian-administered sections of Kashmir is the main rationale for mines laid along the LoC, as well as the international border.[19] The Monitor has previously reported mine use in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir.[20] Civilians continued to be killed and injured by mines in Kashmir in 2012 and early 2013 (see Casualties section).

Non-state armed groups

During 2012 and the first half of 2013, no use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is known to have occurred in India. There have been reports of use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that appear to be command-detonated.

In a previous response to an RTI request on mine use by NSAGs, a Ministry of Home Affairs official, referring to the NSAG Naxal, wrote, “The naxal affected area are prone to IEDs planted by naxal operation.” He further noted that detection and disposal of IEDs is carried out by the state police/Central Armed Police Forces allotted to the affected states. Army units have not been tasked to deal with Naxal-related problem.”[21] Also, in an April 2010 response to an RTI request on mine use by NSAGs, an Indian Army official stated that NSAGs had used IEDs against the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir state, and that government forces had recovered mines.[22] No further details about the types of devices and circumstances of their recovery were specified.

In 2012 and the first half of 2013, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, continued to use command-detonated IEDs (which are not considered antipersonnel mines or prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty).[23] These were frequently reported as “landmines” in the media and specialized reports on the conflict. Indian authorities regularly are reported recovering material from armed groups for making explosive weapons.[24] In January 2013, an explosive booby-trap, placed by Maoists, killed three civilians.[25] Maoist cadres have deployed large numbers of command-detonated roadside bombs, some of which have caused civilian deaths.[26]

No NSAGs have declared a ban on mine use during the past four years.[27]

The Republic of India has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

India did not make any statements regarding the convention in 2012 or the first half of 2013. In November 2011, India stated, “We share the international community’s concerns about the humanitarian impact of the irresponsible use of cluster munitions” but “believe that the use of cluster munitions is legitimate if it is in accordance with international humanitarian law.”[1]

India has called for “effective regulation rather than the prohibition on the use” of cluster munitions.[2] It has long expressed its preference for cluster munitions to be tackled through the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to which it is party. It is not known if India is reviewing its position on joining the ban convention following the CCW’s failure in November 2011 to agree on a draft protocol on cluster munitions.

India did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but attended a regional meeting on cluster munitions in Lao PDR in October 2008.[3] India has not participated in any international or regional meetings related to the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012.

India is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has not been able to verify any use of cluster munitions by India. The size and precise content of India’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known.

As recently as 2006, the India Ordnance Factories had advertised the capacity to produce for export 130mm and 155mm artillery projectiles containing dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions, which are equipped with a self-destruct feature.[4] These projectiles are the result of a transfer of production technology from Israel Military Industries and were slated to be produced at Khamaria Ordnance Factory near Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh.[5]

However, information from June 2012 raises doubts about whether this capacity has been active in recent years. In response to a Right to Information request, an official in the Ammunition Division of the Ordnance Factory Board stated that India did not produce any cluster munitions in 2011 and said that India does not produce 130mm and 155mm artillery containing DPICM submunitions, but that a 130mm version is under development.[6]

In addition to artillery projectiles, the Defence Research and Development Organization of the Ministry of Defence has produced a cargo rocket containing antitank/antimaterial submunitions for the 214mm Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system.[7] Other sources have claimed that warheads containing submunitions were developed for the Agni, Dhanush, and Prithvi missile systems.[8]

India has also imported cluster munitions. Jane’s Information Group lists India as possessing KMG-U dispensers, as well as BL-755, BLG-66 Belouga, RBK-250/275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[9] In February 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the Russian-produced 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launchers fitted with dual-purpose and sensor-fuzed submunitions; it was the third export customer for the system.[10]

The United States (US) announced in September 2008 that, at the request of India, it was intending to sell 510 CBU-105 air-dropped Sensor Fuzed Weapons.[11] The US has attached a term to the transfer, in compliance with Public Law 110-161 (26 December 2008), which requires that the submunitions have a 99% or higher reliability rate and stipulates that “the cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present.”[12] In December 2010, the manufacturer of the sensor-fuzed weapons stated it had been awarded a US$258 million contract to supply India with 512 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, and in February 2011 the manufacturer announced that it had started production of the weapons to meet the order.[13] The Indian Air Force was expected to receive the weapons in early 2013.[14] In February 2013, US arms manufacturer Textron included the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon at its display at an arms show in Bangalore.[15]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of mine-laying by government forces on and near the northwestern border with Pakistan during the 2001–2002 stand-off between the two countries. Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.[1]

In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 report submitted in November 2005, India claimed that it had concluded mine clearance operations along its northern and western borders and that all arable land had been cleared and returned to its owners except land required “for operational purposes.”[2] Defence Minister Arackaparambil Kurien Antony repeated the claim in March 2008.[3]

India’s Engineer-in-Chief’s Staff Directorate reported in 2009 that “all mines laid during Operation Parakaram[4] were recovered/cleared (99.32%) by 2006.” It stated that the very few stretches where demining was not possible “due to terrain conditions” were fenced in accordance with “UN protocols.” According to media reports, in February 2010 the Indian Army had transferred to farmers more than 360,170m² of land along the Indo-Pakistan border near Akhnoor, 35km north of Jammu, after two months of clearance operations. The army said the landmines were laid during Operation Parakaram over an area of 2.3km² and that demining operations would continue to clear the remaining affected areas.[5]

Unofficial estimates cited in the Indian media, however, put the area still contaminated in 2007 at 160km² of Jammu and 1,730km² of Kashmir.[6] An army officer interviewed in 2009 said no official assessment had been made of the extent of remaining contamination but that such estimates could still be correct.[7] After landmine explosions in Jammu’s border district of Athua and near the Line of Control in Akhnoor in 2010, media reports cited local sources as saying that 10% to 15% of the mines laid in Operation Parakaram were never found.[8]

Military authorities acknowledge that areas prone to infiltration by militants are still mined but say the areas are clearly marked. However, they also say heavy rainfall, snow, mudslides, and avalanches can cause mines to move.[9]

Other explosive remnants of war

The extent of India’s problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW) is not known, but it contends with increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), notably in four states affected by Maoist insurgency (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkand and Orissa); media reports show this increased use of IEDs has resulted in extensive casualties.[10] In recent months, there have also been media reports of IED incidents or discoveries in Assam.[11] In its latest Article 10 report under CCW Protocol V on ERW, India declined to provide information on the extent of ERW contamination or steps it has taken to address the problem.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

India has no civilian mine action program and no structured mechanism to address the problems from mines and ERW.[13] Its international point of contact for clearance activities is the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division within the Ministry of External Affairs. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.[14]

The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as IEDs placed by NSAGs.[15] Media reports indicate police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs in states dealing with insurgency.[16]

Land Release

India does not report publicly on its release of suspected hazardous areas. Its latest Amended Protocol II Article 13 and Protocol V Article 10 reports contain no information on any clearance within its borders.[17]

The government reportedly decided in mid-2010 that it would not deploy troops to areas affected by a Naxalite (Maoist) insurgency and would instead recruit some 1,100 retired army engineers to conduct mine clearance there. The engineers would work on contract and would be attached to paramilitary units, reports said.[18]

Army bomb disposal experts started the destruction of some 17,000 items of ordnance imported as scrap (probably from Persian Gulf countries) by steel companies based in the Punjab. The munitions included artillery shells, mortar bombs, rockets, grenades and detonators. Media reports indicate the munitions were found in 2004 but destruction began only in November 2010.[19]

Mine action by non-state armed groups

One NSAG, the Zomi Re-Unification Organisation, has reported to Geneva Call that it has marked a number of dangerous areas that had not been cleared by the Indian Army in northeast India.[20]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

In 2012, the Monitor identified 78 casualties from mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Republic of India. Of the total casualties for which the age and sex were known,[1] 18 were men; including 10 military/security personnel. There were 69 civilian casualties including 41 child casualties, or 72% of civilian casualties for which the age was known, compared to 51% in 2011. Another 13 female casualties were recorded, including at least nine girls.[2]

The 78 mine/IED and ERW casualties identified in 2012 represented an increase from recent years. Such fluctuations in annual casualty figures are not necessarily indicative of trends and can be attributed to the challenges in collecting consistent and accurate data from media and local sources, since India lacks a systematic data collection system.

The cumulative number of casualties in India is not known. Between 1999 and 2012, the Monitor identified 3,143 victim-activated mine/IED and ERW casualties in India (1,074 killed; 2,068 injured; 1 unknown). Nearly half of these casualties were civilians.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but was at least 2,068 through the end of 2012.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts were made to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in 2012.

Victim assistance coordination

India does not have any specific coordination mechanisms or national plans for mine/ERW victim assistance.

The MSJE coordinates assistance for all persons with disabilities by regulating physical rehabilitation services and various disability funds, and developing and implementing India’s legal framework as it relates to disability.[3] A new Department of Disability Affairs within the MSJE went into effect from May 2012. The government established the department to increase its focus on disability policy issues. The MSJE formed a committee in 2011 to draft new legislation for persons with disabilities to replace the present Persons with Disabilities Act (1995). In September 2012, the committee proposed a draft of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2012 to the ministry.[4]

India’s Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 report for the period from April 2012 to March 2013 did not include details of victim assistance provided, and India marked that the situation had remained unchanged since 2006.[5] As in past years, India stated that reporting on the protection of the civilian population from the effects of ERW was not applicable for India in its CCW Protocol V Article 10 report.[6] In 2010, India reported that “mine victims are assisted with rehabilitation inter alia through financial compensation employment and health care including by providing prosthetics.”[7]

Survivor Inclusion

Associations of mine survivors were included in the consultative process to draft the national Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill.[8]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[9]

In 2012, the ICRC continued to provide support for three prosthetic and orthotic centers in Jammu and Kashmir: the Artificial Limb Centre at the Bone and Joint Hospital, Srinagar, the Artificial Limb Centre at the Governmental Medical College, Jammu, and the Voluntary Medicare Society. The ICRC-supported centers assisted 23 mine/ERW survivors to obtain prosthetic limbs in 2012, compared to 50 survivors in 2011. Yet this was still a significant increase in contrast with the period 2000 to 2010, when just 95 survivors were served all together. The ICRC also supported a center in Nagaland and another in Chhattisgarh. Overall, the number of people receiving services at ICRC-supported centers in 2012 increased by 30% compared to 2011.[10]

The MSJE reported that the government had established 215 district disability rehabilitation centers throughout India. These services were concentrated in urban areas. The MSJE identified 100 more underserved districts in need of similar centers. The centers provide comprehensive rehabilitation services such as medical care, corrective surgery, prosthetics, educational, vocational training, and community awareness.[11]

However, access to rehabilitation remained difficult for the poorest people with disabilities due to a range of factors, including the lack of facilities in rural areas; most facilities not being fully operational because of insufficient equipment, materials, and professional staff; a lack of awareness of existing services and rights among potential beneficiaries; the need to cover costs for transportation as well as for accommodation and food during treatment.[12] The distribution of prosthetic limbs in mine-affected areas was reported to be “haphazard” and lacking planning to replace worn and damaged prostheses.[13]

There was reported to be an urgent need for a long-term rehabilitation policy addressing the needs of child survivors and children with disabilities in Jammu and Kashmir.[14]

While many survivors were reported to be receiving a monthly disability allowance, this was considered insufficient to live on.[15]

The government has stated at international meetings that mine survivors and families of those killed by mines are entitled to compensation.[16] Monetary compensation to landmine survivors and family members of people killed is distributed by the Ministry of Defence. However, many survivors have not been successful in applying for compensation.[17] A local activist was quoted as saying that a concrete rehabilitation policy for survivors was needed because, “The process of compensation is quite tedious. By the time it is complete, people are tired, insane or dead and only a handful of people have actually benefited.”[18]

The standard one-time compensation payment from the government is US$1,500, which is inadequate to cover treatment and the future needs of survivors.[19] To pay for medical expenses, families often have to sell their land or livestock, resulting is worsening economic situations overall with no support for livelihoods.[20] In 2012, a local government official was reported as saying women rarely file compensation claims because they “are very shy and are not allowed to come so far,” and also that people in remote areas may not be aware of the compensation program.[21]

The government program for the universalization of elementary school education, the Education for All Movement (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, SSA), has provisions for paying special attention to children with disabilities.[22] However, SSA was not addressing the needs of child mine/ERW survivors in Poonch district.[23] There were no known economic inclusion initiatives such as livelihoods training or employment measures targeting, or inclusive of, mine/ERW survivors in 2012.

Psychosocial support for survivors continued to be limited, and declined in 2012. MSF provided psychosocial care, particularly for conflict and weapons victims in Kashmir.[24] However, MSF services in the Kupwara district of Kashmir ended in May 2012.[25]

India’s Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 protects the rights of persons with disabilities. However, discrimination remained pervasive, especially in rural areas. Legislation requires that all public buildings and transportation be accessible for persons with disabilities, though accessibility remained limited with few exceptions.[26]

India ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 1 October 2007.