Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.

In May 2012, a government official informed the ICBL that Iraq has drafted legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and expected to introduce it in parliament.[1] Iraq had not previously indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically was being pursued or if existing laws were considered adequate.[2]

In 2012, Iraq submitted its fifth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering calendar year 2011.

In November-December 2011, Iraq attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. Iraq provided an update on victim assistance, indicating that it was in the process of finalizing a new strategy.[3] Iraq also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in May 2012 and made an intervention concerning clearance and victim assistance.[4] In October 2010, Iraq hosted a conference on the national strategy for mine action in coordination with donor countries in Baghdad.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 conflict. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the coalition bombing campaign in 2003.[5] Iraq reported that it has no intention to reconstruct its production capacity.[6]

For the third year in a row, there were not any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government or insurgent forces. No allegations of any mine transfers from Iraq have surfaced since the 1990s.

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines was 1 February 2012.[7] In June 2011, Iraq stated that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[8] In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2011, Iraq reported that an additional 50 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the Kurdistan region.[9]  

The manner in which Iraq has reported on the number of mines it retains for training and research purposes has been inconsistent and confusing. It appears that at least 45 mines were retained in the Kurdistan region for training purposes since the end of the stockpile destruction programs. Adding to this confusion is a claim in its most recent Article 7 report wherein Iraq states that 793 mines were retained for training after the mines were recovered during clearance operations.[10] The Monitor cannot sufficiently assess the manner by which Iraq implements Article 3 based solely on the information provided by Iraq in its annual transparency reports.

In previous Monitor reports, substantial but decreasing numbers of antipersonnel mines were recovered by foreign and Iraqi forces from caches. The Monitor has not found any information regarding seizures during the current reporting period. Iraq also reported that it destroyed 4,295 antipersonnel mines from mined areas in 2011.[11] The Iraqi government had not previously reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009 and ratified on 14 May 2013. The convention will enter into force for Iraq on 1 November 2013.

The ratification package was referred to parliament shortly after Iraq signed the convention, but was delayed by elections and other legislative priorities.[1] On 15 October 2012, the Council of Representatives (parliament) approved Law No. 89 on ratification of the convention and the law was published in the Official Gazette.[2]

Iraq deposited the instrument of ratification with the UN in New York on 14 May 2013, making Iraq the 83rd State Party to the convention. At the time, Iraq’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York issued a statement that described the ratification as “part of efforts by Iraq to carry out its obligations to treaties and international conventions related to disarmament and support the position of Iraq to get rid of the negative effects of cluster munitions at the humanitarian, economic and social relations because of [the] former regime’s wars.”[3]

It is not known if specific legislative measures will be undertaken to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq’s initial Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions is due by 30 April 2014.

Iraq participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but attended both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer only.[4] In December 2008, Iraq pledged to sign the convention as soon as possible after completing national and constitutional processes.[5] It subsequently signed the convention at the UN in New York in November 2009.

Iraq has continued to engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Iraq has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, where it made a statement affirming, “we are here to take an active part among the international community to tackle the problem of cluster munitions.”[6]

Iraq has participated in all of the convention’s intersessional meetings held in Geneva, including in April 2013 where it did not make a statement.

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability and other civil society groups have campaigned in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including its ratification. On the second anniversary of the Convention’s entry into force, campaigners held a national conference attended by survivors, parliamentarians, and other government representatives.[7]

Iraq is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. According to one source, Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984.[8] In May 2011, Iraq stated that “[t]here are no facilities that produce cluster munitions in Iraq.”[9] Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs: the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[10] It was also involved in joint development of the M87 Orkan (known in Iraq as Ababil) with Yugoslavia.[11]

Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[12] Jane’s Information Group has listed it as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[13] The current status of the stockpile is not known.

Iraq has stated on several occasions that it does not stockpile cluster munitions. In a May 2012 letter, Iraq stated that it does not have a cluster munitions stockpile.[14] In May 2011, a government official stated “the Iraqi Army does not possess any stockpiles of cluster munitions at the present time.”[15]

Coalition forces used large numbers of cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States (US), France, and the United Kingdom (UK) dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions were used in the conflict.[16] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[17]

In June 2011, Iraq stated that its civil defense team had destroyed 20,819 “cluster items” from 2009–2010, and the Ministry of Defense had destroyed 6,265 “cluster items” in 2010.[18]

Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded submunitions, the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition, and the subsequent internal conflict that continues today, albeit less intensely. The resulting contamination has severely affected Iraq’s oil industry reconstruction and production as well as its agriculture.[1]

Mines

The mine contamination in Iraq is among the worst in the world, but Iraq has yet to determine the extent. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004–2006, identified 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,730km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and a population of 1.6 million. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2010 but the findings have not been released.

In the meantime, a non-technical survey (NTS) of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk confirmed hazardous areas totaling 70.03km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450.1km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.[2] More recently, a multi-agency NTS of Thi Qar province was completed in 2011. The Directorate of Mine Action has not released the results.

Despite the lack of data from these unreleased findings, there is known to be substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts which were therefore not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[3] Iraq’s initial Article 7 report claimed that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another 1 million mines ahead of both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[4] In addition, security forces continue to find substantial caches of abandoned landmines.[5]

Cluster munition remnants

Submunition contamination is significant but the extent is unknown. A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[6] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[7] Cluster munition remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken for the creation of access to oilfields, the development of infrastructure, and for humanitarian reasons.[8] In the north, coalition air strikes around Dohuk in 1991 left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[9] In 2010, a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[10]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq has extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining from past conflicts; it also continues to accumulate contamination from ongoing conflicts in the north, where in 2010 and 2011 Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups (NSAGs).[11] Security forces have also continued to find substantial caches of weapons and ordnance accumulated by NSAGs.[12]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance; the DU ordnance includes “bunker-buster” bombs and tank-fired shells used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[13] Britain acknowledged in 2010 that it used 1.9 metric tons of DU ammunition during the 2003 war.[14] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, DU munitions have been claimed to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components since the US-led invasion in 2003. In the three northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), mine action was managed until 2012 by (IKMAA) in the Erbil and Dohuk governorates and by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) in the Sulaymaniyah governorate. In April 2012, under KRG Decree 1010, the two organizations merged, leaving IKMAA as an umbrella organization with four mine action offices in Duhok, Erbil, Garmian (formerly under GDMA), and Slemani (Sulaymaniyah).[16]

In central and southern Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority assigned responsibility for mine action to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, which worked through a National Mine Action Authority. By 2007, this mechanism had ceased to function and in 2008 the cabinet transferred responsibility to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA).[17]

As of October 2011, the DMA, given responsibility for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database, had a total of 124 staff in its headquarters in Baghdad. Throughout 2011, however, it had no director general. It is supported by the Regional Mine Action Center-South (28 staff) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south.[18] 

In practice, however, national security concerns meant the ministries of defense and interior continued to exercise key responsibilities, which severely limited the role of the DMA. In August 2009, the ministries of defense and environment signed a Memorandum of Understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[19] The agreement said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD [Ministry of Defense] will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[20]

In May 2011, a prime minister’s order established a Higher Committee for Mine Action (HCMA) under the Prime Minister’s office comprising the ministers of defense, environment, interior, and oil, together with representatives of the KRG and National Security Council. The HCMA, which has met twice since it was set up, is intended to create a policy framework and strategy for mine action. It is supported by a Technical Committee with the National Security Council’s Directorate for International Policy functioning as its secretariat. No supporting legislation has yet been drafted.[21]

Land Release

Land release is reported to have accelerated significantly in 2011 and 2012, particularly through southern oilfield clearance by commercial companies,[22] but lack of reporting by the DMA, RMAC-South, or most operators in central and southern Iraq means it is not possible to make a meaningful determination of its extent. In KRG areas, where authorities have consistently maintained reporting on the progress of mine action, the amount of land released by clearance was little more than half the level of 2010, and the number of UXO items destroyed about one-quarter.

Five-year summary of clearance

Survey in 2011

A NTS of southeastern Thi Qar governorate was conducted in 2011 on behalf of the DMA by a range of NGO and commercial operators, including Danish Demining Group (DDG), The Iraqi Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), G4S, Arabian Gulf and Al-Safsafa with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The survey reportedly identified 98km² as confirmed hazardous area (CHA).[23] The DMA did not respond to requests for details of the results. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Iraq noted the contamination found by the Thi Qar NTS was substantially less than in the ILIS and it planned to undertake further NTS in the southern governorates of Basra, Maysan, and Muthanna in 2012.[24]

DDG reported canceling 7.43km² through NTS in 2011 and releasing a further 0.26km² through technical survey (TS).[25]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2011

Compared to 2010, mine clearance in the northern Kurdish governorates (conducted by IKMAA, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and companies contracted by GDMA) dropped 44% in 2011 to 5.68km². GDMA led the way, reporting clearance in its area of operations of only a quarter of the mined land cleared in 2010, although the number of UXO items cleared was one-third higher than the previous year because spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks were more emphasized.[26]

IKMAA, operating with a total of 35 teams, including 15 manual demining teams (120 deminers), two EOD teams, 12 mechanical and two mine detection dog teams, increased the amount of clearance of mined area by more than half compared with 2010, to 1.1km², but destroyed fewer mines. It attributed higher clearance numbers to better planning and task assessment. IKMAA’s battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD also resulted in destroying 17% more UXO items. After focusing in the past on humanitarian mine action, IKMAA was contracted by Kalegran Oil Company in September 2011 to clear 0.6km² and provide permanent marking on another 1.16km². IKMAA also reported negotiating with the KRG Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction on undertaking clearance to support construction of a highway between Choman and Haj Omran on the Iranian border.[27]

MAG, after fluctuations in funding and personnel numbers in 2010, continued working with 301 staff in 2011 and achieved higher area clearance results. MAG also reported a 31% increase in UXO items cleared through roving tasks, to 93,101 items, in addition to the 8,298 cleared through mine and BAC. Overall, MAG accounted for by far the highest UXO clearance of any operator in Iraq. However, MAG also foresaw a significant decrease in donor funding in 2012 and the likelihood of a cut in personnel numbers.[28]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2011

In southern Iraq, the only international NGO actively clearing in 2011 was DDG, which conducted only BAC in Basra governorate working with a total staff of 181, including 73 technicians in eight EOD and two BAC teams, together with two TS and 10 community liaison teams. DDG reported lower area clearance in 2011 than the previous year but higher numbers of UXO items destroyed. With recruitment of additional staff in November 2011 and the deployment of seven large-loop detectors, DDG expected higher productivity in 2012.[29] The national NGO Iraq Mine Clearance Organization was active in the south but did not respond to requests for data.

The army and Civil Defense are reportedly active on mine clearance and EOD respectively,[30] but neither organization, nor the DMA, reported on the extent of their activities.

Most clearance in central and southern Iraq, however, has been conducted commercially under contract to the oil industry. Shell reported battle area surface clearance of 6.54km² by al-Safsafa (6.54km²) and Taaz (1,112m²) in 2011 and subsurface clearance of 2.37km² by al-Safsafa (1.69km²), Taaz (0.7km²) and IMCO (51,702m²). The default depth for subsurface clearance was 0.5m, but operators went deeper on specific tasks to a maximum of 6m. Operators cleared a total of 4,112 ERW, including 930 submunitions, 1,297 mortar shells, and 1,008 explosive projectiles.[31] Hans Nijkamp, Shell Vice President and head of operations in Iraq, was quoted in June 2012 as saying clearance was proceeding at a rate of 70,000m² a day.[32]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The DMA provides no data on mine clearance, and incomplete reporting on mine clearance by operators makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations. However, Deputy Environment Minister Kamal Latif stated in 2012 that Iraq will not meet its 2018 clearance deadline.[33]

The significant lack of information available on mine action in Iraq itself points to weakness in the institutions and management of mine action that raise concerns about the government’s appreciation of what is required to fulfill its treaty obligations as well as the mine action program’s ability to meet them.

More than four years after adhering to the treaty, and thus nearly half-way towards its initial Article 5 deadline, the government of Iraq has yet to put in place a functioning mechanism for directing, planning, or upholding the standards of mine action. Although the KRG’s more experienced mine action program has conducted survey and manages clearance in the north, in central and southern Iraq the survey needed for clearance planning has barely started and clearance continues without effective coordination or oversight.

Quality management

In northern Iraq, IKMAA and GDMA conducted quality assurance (QA) of operators in their respective areas of operation in 2011. IKMAA operated eight QA teams that conducted 1,318 QA visits, sampling 22,482m², and reportedly finding 59 explosive items. GDMA operated 12 two-member QA teams which conducted 2,432 visits. Both authorities renewed accreditation for operators already present and accredited a total of seven new commercial companies.[34]

Safety of demining personnel

In central and southern Iraq, demining incidents and casualties were not reported.

In northern Iraq, IKMAA reported four missed-mine incidents, including one resulting in detonation, but no casualties resulted. A deminer reportedly sustained minor injuries from an antipersonnel mine detonation in November 2011.[35] GDMA reported 10 accidents involving mines and UXO but gave no details of casualties.[36]

Risk Education

UNICEF coordinates national and international NGOs in providing risk education (RE) in support of IKMAA and GDMA in the north and the DMA in central and south Iraq. Its main partners in 2011−2012 included Bustan Association, Handicap International, Iraq Alliance for Disability Organization, Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), Iraqi Red Crescent Society, the ICRC, and demining operators including MAG, IMCO, NPA and Rafidain Demining Organization.[37]

In northern Iraq, IKMAA and GDMA worked with UNICEF on developing an RE curriculum for schools and published a range of RE posters, booklets, and card games. IKMAA teams delivered RE directly to people and communities identified as at-risk, including children, shepherds, nomads, and herb collectors, as well as through broadcasting messages on local radio and television.[38] GDMA conducted RE sessions in 128 villages in 2011 and 25 schools as well as conducting summer school programs in four areas. GDMA noted that RE activities generated 35 reports on the location of UXO items for clearance teams.[39]

The government approved an RE strategy for Iraq as well as RE standards in January 2011; since then UNICEF has given priority to developing a work plan and to building capacity to implement it. The target audience for RE initiatives was both high- and medium-impacted communities in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleymaniyah, and the southern governorate of Missan, working through community focal points and media. UNICEF reported that it was working with the DMA and the Ministry of Environment on developing messages for central and southern Iraq.[40]

Among the challenges to RE, however, UNICEF included the inadequate commitment of national and regional governments to mine action in general and their weak leadership in supporting RE, as well as the lack of a single database, poor information exchange, and the slow accreditation of organizations willing to undertake RE. Ministries were not fulfilling their roles and responsibilities and the national capacities available “do not meet international commitments.”[41]

Summary action points based on 2012 findings

·         Develop a sustainable mechanism to collect information on ongoing mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in southern and central regions of the Republic of Iraq. It is certain that there were many more casualties in Iraq in 2012 than those that were identified.

·         Increase participation of survivors and their representative organizations in the planning and coordination of victim assistance and disability issues throughout all of Iraq.

·         Increase awareness about disability and survivors’ rights and needs among medical practitioners, rehabilitation staff and services providers throughout Iraq to improve referral services and quality of care.

Victim assistance commitments

Iraq is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Iraq has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2012, the Monitor identified 84 mine/ERW casualties in Iraq.[1] Of these, 52 occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) with the remaining 32 in central and southern Iraq. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) established a casualty data collection mechanism for the first time in 2011 but more than half (56%) of casualties identified in central and southern Iraq for 2012 were identified through media reports; no casualties from the DMA were included in Iraq’s annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2012.[2] In 2012, information on just 14 casualties was collected through this system.[3]  

Civilians made up the majority of reported casualties (50) with just four casualties confirmed among security forces.[4] Children made up at least 48% of civilian casualties for which the age was known (21 of 44), similar to 50% of the casualties identified in 2011.[5] Of the total child casualties, most (17) were known to be boys; at least one was a girl.[6] Nearly two thirds of child casualties (13) were caused by ERW. As in previous years, men made up the single largest casualty group, representing 48% of civilian casualties for which the age was known. No casualties were identified as women in 2012. There were seven casualties among deminers,[7] a decrease from the 20 casualties in 2011 and similar to the five casualties identified in 2010. All seven casualties among deminers occurred in Kurdistan; six were caused by accidents with antipersonnel mines and one by an accident with ERW.[8]

It is certain that there were many more casualties in Iraq that were not identified. This is due to a combination of factors, including the limited capacity of the DMA’s casualty data collection mechanism; according to the DMA, “there is no accurate data for mine and ERW casualties in Iraq.”[9] Media coverage of casualties is far from comprehensive, and the available casualty data for central and southern Iraq does not include military casualties.[10]

The 84 casualties identified in 2012 represented a significant decrease in the number of reported annual casualties as compared with the 141 casualties identified in 2011, but was similar to the 82 casualties reported by the Monitor for 2010.[11] The greatest decline was in the number of casualties identified in central and southern Iraq through media sources (from 81 in 2010 to 18 in 2011). The spike in 2011 was attributed to an improved security situation which temporarily enabled increased media access to larger areas of the country, rather than an actual change in the number of casualties occurring.[12] Both Iraq Body Count (IBC) and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) found the number of conflict-related casualties in 2012 to be similar to numbers in 2011.[13] The number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in Kurdistan declined slightly, from 56 in 2011 to 52 in 2012.

The total number of casualties in Iraq remained unknown, though it was known that there were many thousands. By the end of 2012, 29,184 casualties were confirmed, including 14,546 casualties registered in Kurdistan (6,014 killed, 8,532 injured).[14] In central and southern Iraq, 14,638 casualties (2,167 killed, 12,471 injured) were identified in the first three provinces that were completed through the Iraqi mine and ERW victim needs assessment launched in 2011.[15] Most of the casualties (92%) registered through the survey were men.

By the end of 2012, 3,011 casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in Iraq. At least 1,165 people were killed from cluster munition remnants and submunitions and 1,437 people were injured. Of these casualties, 388 occurred during strikes (128 killed; 260 injured).[16] However, due to the level of contamination, it has been estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes, and that one quarter of these casualties were children.[17]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is estimated to be 48,000–68,000.[18] There were 21,003 survivors identified as of March 2013; 12,471 in central and southern Iraq and 8,532 in Kurdistan.[19]

Victim assistance since 1999

Decades of armed conflict devastated the formerly well-functioning medical system in Iraq. The 10 major hospitals and 15 primary health care centers renovated and supplied by the ICRC between 1999 and the start of the Iraq war in March 2003 were damaged again during the related period of civil unrest. Continued armed violence prevented the rebuilding of critical victim assistance services and contributed to the emigration of some 75% of qualified medical personnel; by 2008, healthcare had deteriorated to being in “worse shape than ever.”[20] The situation worsened as the growing number of mine/ERW survivors and other war-wounded increased the use of the deteriorating services available.

Starting in 2009, a slowly improving security situation allowed for some renovations to medical facilities and the building of one new physical rehabilitation center. Survivors were more able to access available services, and some survivors in central and southern Iraq that had the means to cover transportation costs could access free victim assistance services in Kurdistan. However, through to the end of 2012, the volatile security situation in many areas continued to prevent many survivors from having access to needed services.

In 2006, the national Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) appointed a Victim Assistance Director to address the absence of national victim assistance coordination, but harmonization with relevant ministries remained essentially nonexistent until 2010 when the first national victim assistance meeting was held. Iraq had no victim assistance plan throughout the period. In 2011, the second annual national victim assistance meeting resulted in a set of recommendations for improving victim assistance, but no further steps were taken to develop the recommendations into a plan or to monitor their implementation through the end of 2012.

The situation for survivors in Kurdistan was significantly better than in the rest of Iraq throughout the period. Numerous NGOs operated in the region providing medical services, physical rehabilitation, and social and economic inclusion programs including several funded through the UN Oil-for-Food program up to 2010. Victim assistance services were coordinated by the two mine action authorities previously operating in the Kurdistan region, together with the regional Ministry of Health: the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA), which had merged into the IKMAA by 2012. Nevertheless, available services were not fully able to address the needs of the large number of survivors in the Kurdistan region, a situation worsened by the arrival of survivors from the south starting in 2009.

Victim assistance in 2012

In 2012, efforts to improve the collection of victim assistance data continued from the previous year. The mine/ERW victim needs assessment was ongoing, the DMA maintained its casualty data collection system for central and southern Iraq, and a pilot injury survey by the Ministry of Health was expanded. However, steps taken in 2011 to develop a national victim assistance plan stopped making progress in 2012.

In 2012, high levels of violence prevented any significant improvements in access to or availability of services in southern and central Iraq. Persistent efforts by international organizations, international and national NGOs and government ministries (especially the Ministry of Health) sustained the limited advances achieved in previous years in regards to medical care and physical rehabilitation. The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) led to advances in laws, policies, and coordination concerning the rights of persons with disabilities in both central and southern Iraq and in Kurdistan.

Assessing victim assistance needs

As of March 2013, the DMA had completed the ongoing mine victim needs assessment survey in three provinces: Maysan, Wasit and Dhi Qar, identifying 14,638 victims.[21] The survey, launched in 2011, planned to cover the 15 provinces of central and southern Iraq by February 2015 and was being carried out in cooperation with local governments, relevant ministries (including the ministries of health, labor and social affairs, and education), and NGOs such as the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.[22] The needs assessment was designed to identify victims (both survivors and family members of persons killed by mines and ERW), determine their needs, and connect victims to available assistance, including medical and rehabilitation services and disability pensions.[23] Complete results of the survey were to be distributed to relevant government ministries and NGOs and also to be shared internationally.[24]

In 2012, the Ministry of Health continued to operate the national injury surveillance system, which recorded injuries caused by mine/ERW among other causes. The system registered survivors who sought emergency or ongoing medical care through a health clinic.[25] No figures were available for 2012.

In 2012, the Ministry of Health continued the national disability registry, launched in 2011, which collected data from rehabilitation centers and all relevant ministries and was to be used to develop a plan for improving services for persons with disabilities.[26]

No specific needs assessment for mine/ERW survivors was undertaken in Kurdistan during 2012, although service providers, especially rehabilitation centers, collected data on an ongoing basis when survivors accessed services.[27] IKMAA made casualty data available upon request from relevant government ministries and service providers.[28]

Victim assistance coordination[29]

In 2012, no national victim assistance meetings were held and no progress was made towards the development of a victim assistance plan for Iraq as a whole and not for Kurdistan or central and southern Iraq.[30] In May 2012, the merger of GDMA and IKMAA, underway since 2009, was completed to form a single mine action authority for the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. The merged mine action authority retained the name Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).[31]

In central and southern Iraq, DMA coordinated with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and NGOs, including survivors and their representative organizations, on an ad hoc basis and especiallyregarding the mine victim survey.[32] DMA also organized a training workshop on community based rehabilitation for all relevant victim assistance stakeholders.[33] IKMAA maintained regular coordination and communications with relevant victim assistance service providers in Kurdistan.[34]

Into 2012, there remained a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of different ministries to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors. The DMA developed a proposed coordination mechanism to clarify roles of all relevant actors, including ministries, service providers and NGOs. The proposed mechanism was “in the final stages of approval” in May 2012.[35]

In February 2012, the Iraqi parliament introduced a law to establish a national disability commission to include all relevant stakeholders such as victim assistance coordinators from the mine action authorities.[36] As of June 2013, the law had not been approved.[37] Within the Ministry of the Environment, an interministerial committee on human rights was formed in 2012 to promote the rights of mine victims, as well as the rights of persons with disabilities, within the framework of the CRPD. A representative of the DMA, responsible for victim assistance, was nominated as a member.[38] In Kurdistan, the inter‐Ministerial Council of Monitoring and Developing People of Special Needs was established in July of 2012, with responsibility for the implementation of the CRPD in the region. [39]

Physical rehabilitation in central and southern Iraq was coordinated by the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation and Prosthetics & Orthotics (HCPRPO), a committee of the Ministry of Health, working closely with the ICRC. A similar committee was formed in Kurdistan in 2012, with the support of the ICRC. In 2012, Iraq convened a national meeting on physical rehabilitation policies and strategies that included NGOs and the ICRC.[40]

Iraq provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012.[41] It did not provide updates at the Cluster Munition Convention or Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in April and May 2013.[42] Iraq also provided casualty data and information about victim assistance services provided in Kurdistan, through form J of its Article 7 report.[43]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Mine survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in the ongoing implementation of the mine/ERW victim survey.[44] No survivors participated in planning the victim assistance activities of the DMA.[45] Survivors and their representative organizations participated in a national conference regarding the national development plan post-2015. The need to develop services for persons with disabilities, including survivors, was discussed in the conference.[46]

For Kurdistan, the UN Human Rights Office recommended the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Council for Monitoring and Developing People with Special Needs that would include representatives of disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs).[47] DPOs and survivors in Kurdistan implemented physical rehabilitation programs, peer support and vocational training.[48] No information was available regarding the involvement of mine/ERW survivors in the implementation of victim assistance in central and southern Iraq.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[49]

Emergency and continuing medical care

Despite some increased capacity by the Ministry of Health[50] and support from international NGOs to rebuild Iraq’s healthcare infrastructure,  many Iraqis still lacked access to essential healthcare through the end of 2012. The care that was available was of poor quality. Efforts to improve emergency and ongoing health care were hindered by the poor security situation and infrastructural challenges such as intermittent water and electricity supply.[51] The WHO continued to provide training in emergency medical response to medical professionals in Kurdistan.[52] The ICRC organized first aid workshops and trained doctors and medical students in war surgery and emergency room management.[53]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

Access to physical rehabilitation services remained difficult for people living in remote locations for several reasons, including the cost, time and distance of transportation and a lack of information regarding services available. In addition, due to the lack of qualified rehabilitation professionals, patients at all centers outside Baghdad faced waiting lists of one to three months.[54] Within Kurdistan, access to appropriate rehabilitation services was significantly better than in the rest of Iraq[55] but still hindered by a lack of information about available services and limited knowledge about disability by medical professionals. Poor referral and coordination mechanisms also limited access.[56] The ICRC continued working to increase access to rehabilitation by supporting the costs of transport and by providing raw materials to centers. The ICRC lobbied to increase the number of students receiving technical training in rehabilitation so that there would be an increase in the supply of trained professionals; it also established links with NGOs to help identify persons with disabilities in need of attention.[57] The ICRC reported that the Ministry of Health progressively assumed more financial and management responsibilities in ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers.[58]

Rehabilitation services and income-generating projects in Kurdistan continued to receive support from UNDP and the WHO.[59] As part of its four-year project (2010–2014) to improve access to rehabilitation services, HI provided training to rehabilitation providers at three centers in Kurdistan to improve the quality of care and promote a patient-centered approach. Disability Information Points, managed by local DPOs in each of the three governorates of the region, continued to provide information about available services with the support of HI.[60]

Economic and social inclusion and psychological support

Economic inclusion activities continued to be carried out on a limited basis in Iraqi Kurdistan by NGOs[61] and by the ICRC through the rehabilitation center in Erbil.[62] The ICRC expanded these activities to Baghdad in 2012.[63] Also, as part of its program to support income-generating activities, thousands of female heads-of-households whose spouses were victims of conflict (including victims of landmines and ERW) received assistance to register for benefits and grants to start small businesses through the ICRC.[64]

In southern and central Iraq, MoLSA began a new program in 2012 to find job placements for persons with disabilities; the Iraqi Red Crescent Society continued to provide seed support to mine survivors to start small businesses and to provide psychological support through door-to-door outreach.[65] As with medical care and physical rehabilitation services, Iraq lacked sufficiently trained professionals to provide appropriate psychological support to mine survivors during and after their medical treatment.[66]

In November, DPOs organized a hunger strike in front of the offices of the Kurdistan government in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to protest inadequate government benefits for persons with disabilities. The main demand was to increase the amount of the monthly pension received by persons with disabilities and expand coverage to persons with disabilities who were not receiving any pension.[67]

Laws and policies

Central and southern Iraq had no legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities.[68] In 2012, the Council of Ministers issued a decree that all public buildings should be made accessible for persons with disabilities but implementation was slow; at the end of the year, access remained very limited.[69] In January 2012, in Kurdistan, a law was approved to ensure the inclusion and full participation of persons with disabilities in public life.[70]

Iraq acceded to the CRPD on 20 March 2013.

In 2012, nine donors contributed a total of US$34 million for clearance, victim assistance, and risk education activities to the Republic of Iraq.[1] The United States (US) contributed $25 million—almost 75% of the total international assistance—which is an increase from 2011 when the US contributed 65% of all mine action funding to Iraq. Ireland discontinued funding mine action in Iraq in 2012.

Only the US, the Netherlands, and Slovenia supported victim assistance activities.

As in previous years, the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, the Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, and the General Directorate of Mine Action did not report making any financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program in 2012.

In August 2013, the US Department of Defense announced it had awarded a contract for $11.7 million to the American company General Dynamics to dispose of 49,387 rounds of improved conventional munitions and 5,192 cluster bomb units.[2]

International contributions: 2012[3]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[4]