Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Lao PDR officials have stated on many occasions that the government made a decision in 2004 to accede but that the country needs time to prepare to meet the treaty’s obligations. In December 2012, Lao PDR reiterated that it would work toward accession but did not provide any timeline.[1]

In July 2011, Lao PDR provided a voluntary Article 7 report. The report notes that landmines may be used, possessed, or traded, if sanctioned. The report states that there has been no survey regarding mined areas and that there are no specific warnings posted for mined areas, only warnings for areas with unexploded ordnance (UXO). It does not provide any information regarding its stockpile but does state that a small quantity of antipersonnel mines is held for training in mine detection.[2] Lao PDR had previously said that its voluntary Article 7 report, when submitted, would allow the international community to “understand the facts and reality on the ground.”[3]

The Lao government has cited the treaty’s mine clearance obligation and deadline under Article 5 as an obstacle to accession. Lao PDR also expressed concern regarding the possible diversion of resources from UXO clearance activities to a focus on antipersonnel mines.[4]

In March 2010, a representative of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) told the Monitor that the only concern the country has regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is implementation of Article 5. He noted that Lao PDR is the country with the worst contamination by explosive remnants of war in the world, and as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is concerned it may not be able to comply with both conventions’ obligations at the same time due to limited resources.[5]

Lao PDR sent observers to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012 where it made a statement on its efforts toward accession to the Convention. It also attended the Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation & Assistance in June 2013 in Bangkok.

On 3 December 2012, Lao PDR voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the sixth consecutive year it has voted in favor of the annual resolution, after abstaining in all previous years.

Lao PDR is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer

In 2008, Lao PDR acknowledged that it has used mines in the past “to protect its borders.” It also said that the government does not export antipersonnel mines although it holds a small stockpile.[6] Lao PDR’s voluntary Article 7 report states that it has not used antipersonnel mines for more than two decades and that the country has no production facilities.[7]

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 18 March 2009. It was among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the entry into force of the convention on 1 August 2010.

Lao PDR stated in April 2013 that it intended to either establish a new law or amend existing laws in order to “prevent and suppress activities prohibited to a State Party” and reflect its national implementation obligations.[1] Lao PDR has also indicated that the relevant articles of its penal code may be amended to reflect its obligations under the convention.[2] In September 2012, Lao PDR informed States Parties that it has prepared a 10-year plan for the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[3]

Lao PDR submitted its annual updated Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 March 2013, covering calendar year 2012. Under national implementation measures, the report lists laws and decrees related to the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine action in the Lao PDR with responsibility for implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4]

As the most heavily contaminated country in the world in terms of cluster munition remnants, Lao PDR’s support was a crucial element in the success of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Lao PDR participated extensively in the Oslo Process and advocated strongly against proposals to weaken the treaty text.[5]

Lao PDR has continued to play a leadership role in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2012, Lao PDR became coordinator of the Committee on Clearance and Risk Reduction Education. At the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, Lao PDR made several statements including on such issues as national implementation measures, transparency measures, international cooperation and assistance, universalization, clearance, and victim assistance.

Lao PDR also actively participated in the intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2013 where it coordinated the session on clearance and a technical workshop on clearance and made statements on universalization, victim assistance, transparency measures, and national implementation measures.

During the 2013 intersessionals meetings, Lao PDR stated that it knows “all too well” the devastating impact of cluster munitions and expressed deep concern at Syria’s use of cluster munitions, which it condemned.[6]

Promotion of the convention

Lao PDR has undertaken many efforts to promote the universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which it views as “one of the key aspects of the Convention that can assure its legitimacy.”[7]

Lao PDR has promoted the universalization of the convention within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 2012, it urged states to join the convention during international meetings that were held in Lao PDR, including the Ninth Asia-European Summit.[8] It also invited states to join the convention at UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2012, as it also did in 2011.

In April 2013, a cluster bomb survivor and a clearance technician from Lao PDR participated in an awareness-raising “speaking tour” across the United States (US) organized by the NGO Legacies of War.[9]

Lao PDR has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Lao PDR has expressed its views on several important matters related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. In June 2011, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official informed the Monitor, “With regard to your question on relations with states not party to this convention, we are aware of the different interpretations of the Article 21. For us it is clear that we strongly support the full prohibition of cluster munitions, including those activities during the joint military operations, transiting, foreign stockpiling and investment in the production of cluster munitions.”[10]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its Article 7 report, Lao PDR declared that it “has no stockpiles” of cluster munitions and indicated that it is not retaining any cluster munitions for training and research.[11] Lao PDR also declared that it had no production facilities to decommission.[12] Lao PDR has stated that it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.[13]

Historic photographic and testimonial evidence shows that the former Royal Lao Air Force used US-supplied cluster munitions during the Indochina War.

 

Contamination and Impact

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history during the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s, which left it with the world’s worst contamination from unexploded submunitions. The extraordinary intensity of that bombing has tended to obscure the extent of contamination by other explosive remnants of war (ERW), and Lao PDR also has extensive air-dropped and ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

Lao PDR continues to state that cluster munitions contaminate approximately 8,470km² and that overall contamination by UXO covers up to 87,000km² (around 35% of the Laotian territory).[1] Such estimates, however, are based on bomb targeting data that clearance operators have found bears little relation to actual contamination on the ground. After more than 15 years of UXO/mine action, Lao PDR has not yet conducted sufficient survey to produce a credible estimate of the total area contaminated in the country, or the 46 poorest districts that are a development priority. The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) has reported that 10 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are “severely contaminated” by ERW, affecting up to a quarter of all villages.[2]

Cluster munition remnants

The United States (US) dropped over two million tons (two billion kg) of bombs between 1964 and 1973,[3] including more than 270 million submunitions. Lao PDR has reported 571,929 unexploded submunitions were destroyed between 1996 and June 2012[4] (a lower figure than it reported the previous year[5]) but there is no reliable estimate of the extent of contamination remaining.

Clearance teams have found 29 types of submunitions.[6] Unexploded submunitions accounted for just over half (55%) of all items cleared in 2012.[7] UXO Lao, Lao PDR’s largest clearance operator, reported in 2011 that during 15 years of operations, submunitions had accounted for 49% of all items cleared.[8]

The NRA identifies submunitions (known locally as bombies) as the most common form of remaining ERW contamination and responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[9] Submunitions are also said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[10] UNDP reports that as a result of submunition contamination “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive.”[11] The extent of their impact has given rise to calls for a survey and clearance strategy that gives priority to tackling cluster munition remnants.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

Clearance operators have encountered at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR but the extent of residual contamination from other ERW is not known.[13] A partial survey by Handicap International (HI), published in 1997, continues to be used as a primary source of reference despite being acknowledged as out of date.[14] It found that 15 of the country’s then-18 provinces (all those it surveyed) had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO. These reportedly range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 2,000lb general-purpose bombs and sometimes bigger items.[15] Other major causes of incidents are artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, and air-dropped bombs.[16]

Mines

All sides in the war laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,[17] and clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.[18] The remote location of many of these areas means that mines had little impact and made up only 0.2% of the more than 80,000 items of ERW cleared by operators in 2012.[19]

Official figures presented in 2010 show landmines are responsible for 17% of victims since 1998—almost as many as bombies (20%)—although few mine victims have been reported in recent years.[20] The NRA, however, has stated that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”[21]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, has an inter-ministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 17 government ministries.[22] Until 2011, the NRA came under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. A decree issued in June 2011 appointed a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for rural development and poverty reduction as chairman of the board together with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs;[23] a further decree in November 2011 appointed Deputy Prime Minister Asang Laoly as principal supervisor of the NRA board.[24] In November 2012, Bounheuang Douangphachanh, a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office and chairman of the National Committee for Rural Development and Poverty Eradication was appointed chairman of the NRA board.[25]

The NRA’s structure and role was set out in an “agreement” released in November 2012 defining it as the “secretariat for the Party Politburo and the Lao government for the overall management and consideration of policy matters, planning, projects and coordination of the implementation of the Lao PDR National Strategy for the UXO sector for the entire country.”[26] Its role includes setting policy, coordinating and regulating the sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management (QM). It also has the mandate to serve as the technical focal point for matters relating to international weapons treaties.[27] The NRA has four sections: Administration and Finance; Planning and Cooperation; Quality and Standards; and, Operations and Information. This includes a single QM team. UNDP supports a technical advisor and a program and finance advisor. Sterling International LLC, funded by the US Department of State, provided a technical advisor supporting QM and operations at the NRA, a second supporting UXO Lao, and a third advisor providing support to both organizations as required.[28]

UXO Lao, the largest clearance operator working in nine provinces, is a civilian government body and had primary responsibility for coordinating and regulating all UXO/mine action, including clearance, until 2004.[29] A draft decree drawn up early in 2012 provided for oversight of UXO Lao to be transferred from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to the same minister in the Prime Minister’s office who is responsible for the NRA. Donors expressed concern at the lack of consultation and the risk of a conflict of interest, emphasizing the need for a clear distinction between regulator and operators.[30]

Lao PDR embarked in 2011 on “Safe Path Forward II” (SPF), a plan for 2011−2020 finally approved by the government on 22 June 2012. The strategy identified six general goals, including reducing the number of casualties each year from 300 to less than 75[31] and releasing an average of 200km² a year, more than four times current rates of clearance and land release.[32]

The government has also set new priorities moving the UXO clearance sector from a humanitarian to a more development-oriented program more closely integrated with government socio-economic development plans. Announcement 93, published by the government in November 2012, said all provincial and district development projects affected by UXO must undergo survey and clearance before implementation and must also allocate funding to cover the cost.[33] The NRA, as of June 2013, was still in the process of consulting with provincial and district authorities about how this announcement could be implemented.[34]

In 2012, the government approved a revision of its 2011−2020 strategy, SPF II, calling for release of a total of 2,000km², about four times the average annual rate of clearance.[35] In 2013, the NRA was drafting a new multiyear workplan intended to align the UXO clearance sector with broader development goals. These identify 64 priority areas planned to become small rural townships, 167 focal sites to consolidate and “stabilize” remote rural communities, and more than 1,680 priority projects.[36] It hoped to present the workplan by the end of the year.

A concept paper on the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions also says “the Government of Laos will assume funding responsibilities for certain elements of implementation as defined in the workplans.”[37] However, the NRA reported the government would consider providing financial support “depending on the quality of the budget request from the sector and the availability of funds.”[38] It said national funding would also support plans by the army to set up a humanitarian demining team.[39]

As of June 2013, the NRA had accredited 18 operators, six humanitarian organizations and 12 commercial companies. Among the humanitarian organizations, HALO Trust received accreditation and trained clearance teams in 2012 but only became fully operational in 2013. The NRA recorded clearance by only half the accredited commercial companies in 2012.[40]

The Army set up a humanitarian demining unit with 15 staff in February 2012 which received explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training at the UXO Lao training center funded by the United States Department of State. The NRA said it would receive accreditation and operate subject to NRA quality assurance.[41] The NRA reported that China also offered training for 30 mine action personnel in 2013 that would be drawn mainly from the army and UXO Lao. The government has directed the Army to develop a humanitarian mine action capacity, and consideration is being given to a Ministry of Defense proposal to train some 500 military personnel in five divisions.[42]

Evaluations

An assessment undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) for the NRA in a bid to increase efficiency and accelerate land release, found that although Lao PDR ranks as one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, one-third of all clearance tasks and 94% of technical survey tasks conducted between 2009 and mid-2011 did not find any items of ERW. A further one-fifth of all 2010 tasks, and one-third of tasks undertaken in the first half of 2011, found fewer than four items. The assessment observed that Lao PDR’s national standards call for an emphasis on rigorous survey in operations in order to avoid unnecessary clearance, but found a “vast difference” in how operators interpreted national standards and decided when an area should be subjected to technical survey or clearance. The GICHD noted that local communities have a strong influence on tasking and that operators sometimes fully cleared land without any evidence of contamination.[43]

Land Release

The total amount of land released rose by more than one-third to 60.4km² in 2012. Humanitarian operators accounted for 70% of the total area but the increase was largely a result of a revival in clearance by commercial operators who had been hit by global financial cutbacks in the previous three years. Land released by humanitarian operators edged up 8% in 2012.[44]

Five-year summary of clearance

 

The progress of UXO clearance in 2012 attracted persistent official criticism for being too slow, inefficient, and falling far short of the targeted clearance of 1,000km² in the five years to 2015.[45] Donors voiced growing concern over the absence of any clear NRA policy for survey, the lack of government consultation in framing policy for the sector, and the possibility that the operators they fund for humanitarian clearance may be drawn into tasks that support commercial interests. Some donors said these policy uncertainties would affect decisions on the future level of funding for the sector.[46]

Survey in 2012

The NRA identifies survey as a priority and in 2011 initiated a non-technical survey, the “District Focused Approach for the Management of the UXO Threat” (DFA), starting with a pilot program in three provinces implemented by HI, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). It planned that the survey would eventually be extended to cover 85 UXO-contaminated districts in Lao PDR, but aimed to complete survey of the 41 most-contaminated districts in 2013.[47] The program halted in August 2012 after the NRA did not endorse plans for HI and MAG to continue the survey beyond the initial districts they had covered.

The NRA reported that the results of the DFA pilot surveys would be incorporated into a standard survey methodology but as of June 2013 had not decided on a strategy. This has raised concerns among some stakeholders about the long delay in achieving a realistic estimate of the extent of the ERW problem and in establishing a baseline against which to measure progress. After plans for a meeting on the issue in May 2013 were postponed, the NRA planned to conduct a workshop on survey with operators in a matter of months to consider options.[48]

In 2012 and 2013, NPA continued conducting the Cluster Munition Remnants Survey, described as a quick technical survey, working in southern Saravane, Sekong, and Attapeu provinces. HI, after completing the DFA in Nong district of Savannakhet province in December 2011, started a general survey in Sepon district in December 2012 and expected to complete it in August 2013.[49] MAG completed its DFA survey of Boulapha district of Khammouane province and was preparing to proceed with Mahaxay and Nhomalath districts but did not receive NRA authorisation to continue.[50]

Battle area and roving clearance in 2012

UXO Lao, the biggest operator in Lao PDR with about 1,100 staff working in nine provinces, reported a small rise in the amount of land it cleared but a 47% rise in the number of items it destroyed in 2012. As in 2011, UXO Lao, alone among operators, reported cancelling a little over 5km² through technical survey. Although tasks are undertaken in response to local requests forwarded by district and provincial authorities, the result reflects an effort by UXO Lao to move from past practice which focused more on clearing land than on clearing contamination; this resulted in costly clearance of large quantities of land with no items of ERW as identified in GICHD’s assessment (see above).

MAG, one of the biggest NGO operators with 381 staff as of mid-2013, reported that from mid-2012 it had adopted an evidence-based approach to clearance and would undertake full clearance only on areas where preliminary survey by community liaison teams had resulted in strong evidence of contamination. Clearance teams had also moved from only clearing up to the perimeter of individual tasks to instead following the footprint of a cluster munition strike. MAG reported in mid-2013 that it was reviewing its survey procedures and exploring the possibility of moving from survey of individual tasks to a bigger area, possibly an entire village.[51]

Battle area clearance in 2012[52]

NPA, working in 2012 with 190 operational staff in 10 teams, concentrated primarily on applying its cluster munition remnants survey in Sekong, Saravan, and Attapeu provinces. In 2012, NPA surveyed 13.91km², identifying 90 confirmed hazards covering 5.89km² and destroying 2,516 submunitions. It also cleared 26 cluster munitions hazards covering 1.55km², destroying another 2,370 submunitions. NPA added two more teams in January 2013 and was due to add another three later in the year, reporting a significant acceleration in the progress of survey operations.[53]

An expansion of capacity was also expected in southern Savannakhet province. HI, which worked with three teams, added one deminer per team in 2012 and planned to double the number of teams, submitting an application for a revised Memorandum of Understanding to the NRA in June 2012. As of June 2013, HI had not received approval. HI participated in the DFA by surveying Nong district and providing support to the survey team with a mobile EOD team that destroyed items identified in the process of survey. This resulted in a sharp increase in the number of spot tasks and items destroyed.[54]

In the meantime, HALO set up operations in Savannakhet, concentrating on training in 2012 and beginning operations from January 2013 in the Sepon and Vilabuly districts of Savannakhet with three survey/EOD teams and three clearance teams; each clearance team had a staff of 12. It expected to expand to seven survey/EOD teams and five clearance teams with a total of 135 personnel during the course of 2013.[55]

Solidarity Service International (SODI), working in the northern district of Khamkeut, also expanded, adding a mobile team for small battle area clearance tasks of up to 50,000m² for which it reports strong demand; these clearance tasks contributed to a one-third increase in the area cleared during 2012. In 2013, SODI expected to retain the same capacity of 63 staff (supported by village assistants clearing brush) but embarked on a review of survey and clearance operations to improve planning and task selection. SODI also planned to introduce a QM system to improve administration and operations.[56]

Roving clearance operations 2012[57]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

Given official estimates of thousands of kilometers of cluster munition contamination, Lao PDR does not expect to meet its Article 4 deadline. A revised version of Lao PDR’s SPF II 2011−2020 UXO sector strategy released in 2012—SPF II—aims to “reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by UXO to the point where the residual contamination and challenges can be adequately addressed by a sustainable national capacity fully integrated into the regular institutional set-up of the Government.”[59] Moreover, SPF II targets release of 2,000km² in the decade to 2020, a figure far in excess of current or foreseeable sector performance. In 2013, the NRA prepared to issue a multiyear work plan that would focus on 300 “development focus areas” in line with national socio-economic priorities.[60] In the absence of baseline survey data, however, Lao PDR remains unable to assess either the extent of its cluster munitions contamination or the progress made towards tackling it.

 

Summary action points based on 2012 findings

·         A mechanism for needs assessment of new survivors should to be integrated into the otherwise improved data collection on past casualties.

·         Intensive effort is required to improve access to services in remote and rural areas.

·         Resources need to be allocated for retrofitting of most buildings to make them physically accessible for persons with disabilities.

·         Legislation, policies and planning that could hasten developments in the availability and accessibility of services must be passed and implemented. In 2012 these remained stalled after several years at the approval phase.

Victim assistance commitments

Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) is responsible for significant numbers of cluster munition victims and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as landmine survivors, who are in need. Lao PDR has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The National Regulatory Authority for the Unexploded Ordnance/Mine Action Sector in the Lao PDR (NRA) reported 56 mine/ERW casualties for 2012. The majority of casualties (35) were adult: 12 females and 23 males. Child casualties included four girls and 17 boys. The 56 casualties recorded for 2012 continued the decrease from 99 casualties recorded for 2011 and 117 casualties for 2010.[1] As a product of establishing an active network of district and provincial focal points across the country to report and investigate each mine/ERW incident through a detailed survey process, the NRA-reported casualty data for 2012 had a high degree of accuracy, detail and was close to, if not entirely, complete.[2]

By the end of 2012, the NRA had identified at least 50,525 mine/ERW (including unexploded submunitions) casualties, including 29,506 people killed and 21,019 injured since 1964. The first phase of a nationwide casualty survey recording retrospective data was completed in 2008. It identified 50,136 mine/ERW casualties; of these, ERW caused the most casualties, followed by landmines and then unexploded submunitions. [3]  The NRA reported 702 mine/unexploded ordinance (UXO) victims from 2008 to 2013, of which 41% were children.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

Unexploded submunitions were reported to have caused 7,586 casualties in the period 1964–2012 (3,180 were killed; 4,373 injured; 33 outcome unknown).[5]

Victim Assistance

Lao PDR has estimated that there are some 15,000 mine/ERW survivors still living, including approximately 2,500 survivors of unexploded submunitions.[6]

Victim assistance since 1999[7]

The assistance provided to survivors in Lao PDR remained inadequate throughout the period.[8] Mine/ERW survivors represent a significant proportion of persons with disabilities in Lao PDR. Most survivors come from the poorer remote areas, belong to ethnic minorities, and are disproportionately disadvantaged by the existing limitations in the provision of services. In Lao PDR, financial constraints are the main barrier to accessing healthcare. Emergency medical care throughout Lao PDR remained inadequate to meet survivors’ needs for most of the period. However, progress was made with the development of a system of village health volunteers, in addition to an Asian Development Bank project with the Ministry of Health that improved primary health care services in northern provinces by 2008. More recently, World Education and the Ministry of Health improved the availability of healthcare to survivors significantly.[9]

Physical rehabilitation services, run by the government in association with the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), showed improvement. With a new outreach program introduced in 2010, they were better able to reach survivors in rural areas.

There was only limited psychosocial support for mine/ERW survivors; however, peer support increased. Social and economic reintegration programs for mine/ERW survivors, provided by NGOs, remained limited but had increased since 2009. Regulations protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination and requiring accessible buildings either did not have the force of law or remained in draft form for years without being implemented.

In 2013, it was reported that many survivors injured as long as 20 years ago or more still had not received any assistance.[10]

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2012, Lao PDR continued to lack sufficient information about survivors’ needs.[11] The second phase of the national victim survey, which started in June 2009, was intended to complete information on all survivors of incidents occurring since 2008, but the needs assessment component was not implemented.[12]

The NRA Survivor Tracking System, an ongoing system for collecting data on new casualties, was designed to provide an ongoing survey of the survivors’ needs. By June 2012, training workshops for provincial and district focal points had been held in all of the 10 provinces planned for survey. Data was expected to be collected on more than 15,000 survivors and entered into the NRA database.[13] Approximately 80% of expected survey forms had been collected by March 2013 and were pending input into the database in July. Once collection, input and analysis were completed, the NRA planned to distribute data and a summary to all operators, ministries, local and international NGOs, and donor countries.[14]

However, despite the tracking system, data collected on new casualties in 2012 lacked detail on survivors’ injuries and needs. The NRA shared data on survivors with civil society organizations that are members of the Technical Working Group on Victim Assistance (TWGVA) and upon request. Data was primarily requested in order to develop work plans and was provided to a range of international and national civil society organizations.[15]

Victim assistance coordination in 2012

In a slight reduction in contact from its meeting once every two months in previous years, the TWGVA met quarterly in 2012. TWGVA participants included the NRA, other relevant government agencies, national and international NGOs, and survivors—including World Education staff and those survivors volunteering for the Handicap International (HI) Lao’s Ban Advocates project. The meetings focused on data collection, the establishment of the Survivor Tracking System, coordination, and updates from operators and relevant government sectors.[16]

The Victim Assistance Strategic Plan, which had been under development by the NRA Victim Assistance Unit since 2008, was not used by the NRA or the TWGVA and was discarded. A revised plan was drafted in 2012.[17] In March 2013, the new Victim Assistance Strategic Plan was completed, translated, and submitted to the NRA Board for approval. The strategic plan addresses seven pillars of victim assistance: data collection; medical care; physical rehabilitation; psychological support and social inclusion; economic rehabilitation and education; legislation and policy; and coordination.[18] Lao PDR reported in April 2013 that the final draft of the victim assistance strategy was expected to be adopted and implementation was expected to begin ‘in the next few months.’[19]

Six position papers on the victim assistance pillars were in development since 2009. By mid-2013 the papers were not being used by the NRA and were not presented to its board for approval. Only the strategic plan was under review.

Victim assistance is one of the three main components of the NRA strategy entitled “Safe Path Forward II 2011–2020.”[20] The Safe Path Forward II was approved by the Office of the Prime Minister in June 2012.[21] Two of the six strategic objectives relate to victim assistance, including: reduce the number of UXO casualties from 300 to less than 75 per year; and ensure that the medical and rehabilitation needs of all UXO survivors are met in line with treaty obligations. The latter was assigned a series of actions that began to be implemented in 2012, including setting up and maintaining a Lao Victim Information System (LVIS), strengthening physical rehabilitation services, providing emergency medical response at the village level, and developing an effective rural transfer/ambulance system to medical facilities.[22] The strategy and its victim assistance component were included in Lao PDR’s Millennium Development Goals Compact of 2010.[23] A key indicator for progress under these Millennium Development Goals includes “the number of survivors receiving proper assistance.”[24] However further investment of resources from the government and development partners is required to achieve these targets.[25]

National standards for victim assistance developed in 2007 remained in draft form pending the completion of the national victim assistance strategy.[26]

The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare holds primary responsibility for the needs of, and related services to, persons with disabilities through the National Committee for Disabled People (NCDP). They held monthly disability coordination meetings in 2012 to address coordination and linkages between service providers and line ministries. Due to the large number of mine/ERW survivors with disabilities in Lao PDR, the Ministry of Health also worked extensively on victim assistance and rehabilitation in coordination with international NGOs. The NRA acknowledged the need for a strong national disability framework that is inclusive of victim assistance and, in 2012, the NRA Victim Assistance Unit worked to build linkages between victim assistance and the broader disability sector through increased cooperation with the NCDP. The NRA included support of the NCDP into the new draft Victim Assistance Strategic Plan.[27]

Lao PDR reported on the international funding received by NGOs that provided victim assistance in 2012 in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, made statements on victim assistance at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo in September 2012 and also at the Convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2013.[28]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Survivors, persons with disabilities and their representative organizations participated in TWGVA meetings. Survivors provided input into the development of the survivor tracking system questionnaires through the TWGVA.[29] Throughout 2012 and into 2013, increasingly more survivors participated in the delivery of services, particularly those supported by the Quality of Life Association (QLA), including economic inclusion, peer support, referral through provincial survivor committees, and other sharing of information on available services.[30] The Lao Disabled People’s Association (LDPA) is represented on the NCDP and actively participated in national planning and policy development with regards to people with disabilities.[31]

Lao PDR has not included a survivor on its delegation at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Meetings of States Parties or intersessional meetings.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[32]

Emergency and continuing medical care

The Lao PDR health sector suffers from endemic problems of low state spending and lack of competent staff. Basic healthcare has remained inaccessible to a large proportion of the rural population.[33]

There was a continuing lack of access to health services in services in Lao PDR. The health care system remained underdeveloped and under-funded; health workers had inadequate skill levels. This directly contributed to shortfalls in the quality of services across the health system.[34]

World Education worked directly in seven provinces but was available to provide assistance to all new survivors across all provinces of Lao PDR and they reimbursed hospitals for the cost of survivors’ treatment through the requests of the NRA.[35] Coordination of services for new survivors was increased at the provincial and community level with the strengthening of the network of focal points in the community supported by the NRA.[36]

The quality of emergency care and continuing medical care increased as World Education made services more accessible to survivors through training and other capacity building as well as through direct funding of services for individual survivors by administering the United States (US) financed War Victims Medical Fund (WVMF). In July–August 2012, World Education did an internal evaluation which found that the quality of care had improved and that the level of training had increased.[37]

Physical rehabilitationincluding prosthetics

In 2012, rehabilitation services continued to be provided by COPE on a similar scale to the previous year. Financial and technical support continued for the five government-managed rehabilitation centers in the country.[38]

COPE covered all the necessary costs for those receiving treatment. However, many survivors were not aware of, or unable to reach, the available services. COPE continued “COPE Connect,” its outreach and community awareness raising project, in eight provinces in 2012; it trained local health professionals in identification and referral. Clinical assessment teams also travelled to remote and rural areas and referred people with disabilities to appropriate services.[39]

Assessments of the quality of services at three government-managed prosthetic and rehabilitation centers (Vientiane, Xieng Khuang, and Pakse) were conducted by the ICRC SFD in 2012. Findings at the three centers showed that between 63% and 85% of the services assessed met acceptable quality standards. Improvements to quality were reported to be underway; however, progress remained tenuous. ICRC SFD continued to support the development of local capacity within the national rehabilitation service through training programs in 2012.[40]

Production increased at the wheelchair workshop of the government-managed Centre for Medical Rehabilitation in 2012 compared to the previous year.[41]

Economic and social inclusion and psychological support

Psychological support was generally not available to survivors. However, World Education staff provided peer support in conjunction with other project activities. QLA continued to build capacity and, by early 2013, was managing its own internal operations and provided peer-to-peer psychological support and socioeconomic services for survivors in Xieng Khouang and Sekong Provinces.[42] Volunteers for the HI Ban Advocates Project also extended their provision of peer support for survivors.[43] Basic Needs provided some limited psychological social support to survivors.[44]

A project linking people with disabilities with employers was continued, run by the LDPA, with HI support. In 2012, job placement services to Savanakhet Province were expanded.[45] The Vocational School for the Disabled, Sikeud, also provided vocational training to survivors in 2012.[46]

In 2012, it was reported that there was a continued increase in the social inclusion of persons with disabilities including survivors, particularly those living in Vientiane and other cities.[47] In January 2012, the first national sporting event for persons with disabilities, involving over 200 people, was organized in Luang Prabang province.[48]

A new project was launched in 2012 to reduce the environmental and infrastructural accessibility barriers for people with physical disabilities in Lao PDR. The project, by the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) Japan in conjunction with LDPA, includes the development of the Multifunctional Centre to promote best practice in the construction of physical accessibility and a barrier-free living environment with sample ramps, bathrooms, and sliding doors on display.[49] The Multifunctional Centre was opened in November 2012.[50] Training of LDPA and NRA staff on rights advocacy and peer to peer support for cluster munition survivors was held by the HI Lao Ban Advocates Project in February of 2013. The project also raised awareness of survivors’ rights and needs throughout 2012.[51]

Civil society was still an emerging concept in Lao PDR, where a decree for establishing not-for-profit associations was first enacted in 2009. The developing relationship between state and civil society was also a complicating factor in progress toward fulfilling the needs of persons with disabilities; however, advancements were made in 2012.[52]

Laws and policies

A draft decree on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, prepared at the beginning of 2008, was submitted to the Ministry of Justice in July 2012 and was passed to the Cabinet in November 2012. However, the draft was returned to the Ministry of Labor with 12 points of recommendations for revision. By March 2013, it was still pending government approval.[53]

Regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the Lao National Commission for Persons with Disabilities protect persons with disabilities against discrimination; however, the regulations lacked the force of law. In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare established regulations regarding physical accessibility, and some ramps were built in Vientiane. Legislation adopted in 2009 requires that the construction of buildings, roads, and public places provide facilities for persons with disabilities. The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings built before its enactment. Some progress was made on physical accessibility; however, a lack of resources for infrastructure slowed the retrofitting of most buildings and limited government staffing prevented effective implementation.[54]

Lao PDR ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 25 September 2009. As of July 2013, Lao PDR had yet to complete its initial report to the CRPD, which was due in October 2011.

 

In 2012, 12 donors contributed more than US$41.2 million to support mine action in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), compared to 12 donors and $21.5 million in 2011. The $20 million rise in funding is largely the result of increases of $15 million from Japan, $4 million from the United States (US), and a multi-year €4.6 million/$5.9 million contribution from the European Union (EU). The contribution from Japan included ¥886 million/$11 million to the Lao PDR government for equipment.[1]

Australia, the EU, Japan, Norway, and the US together provided 86% of all international funding in 2012. Of the $41.2 million, $1 million went towards victim assistance and $1.35 million supported risk education.

The purpose of the EU mine action program is to support the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda of Lao PDR focusing on the newly defined local MDG objective to reduce the long-term negative impact of unexploded ordnance (UXO) on development in rural communities. The EU program issued its first call for proposals in September 2012 for €2.6 million/$3.3 million.[2]

Australia, Finland, and the US provided $1.28 million for victim assistance to international NGOs and the ICRC. Victim assistance funding included both rehabilitation and livelihood projects.[3]

In 2012, Canada halted its mine action assistance to Lao PDR that began in 1996. According to a Canadian media report, the Lao government has asked Canada to resume its funding, but reportedly has not received a reply.[4]

International contributions: 2012[5]

Summary of international contributions: 2008–2012[6]