Mine ban policy overview

Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Government officials did not make any statements in 2012 or the first half of 2013 on Libya joining the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]

In October 2011, two Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials informed the ICBL that there is support for joining the Mine Ban Treaty, but the matter must wait until the new government is established and for the legislative body to consider accession.[2] Libya’s signature of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty on 9 July 2013 indicates that the government is now ready to join international treaties.

On 3 December 2012, Libya abstained from the vote on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 supporting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Libya has abstained from every pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1998.

On 28 April 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), then the opposition authority in Libya, issued a statement formally pledging that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.” The statement also said that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”[3]

Prior to being removed from office in 2011, the government of Muammar Gaddafi showed interest in the Mine Ban Treaty but made no effort to join it; Libyan officials often criticized the treaty and called for it to be revised.[4]

Libya participated as an observer in the Mine Ban Treaty’s Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012 but did not make any statements. Representatives from NGOs in mine action attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2013.

Libya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, trade, and stockpiling

Prior to 2011, Libya consistently stated that it had never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and that it no longer stockpiled the weapon.[5] Yet abundant evidence has emerged showing how, under Gaddafi’s leadership, Libya accumulated a stockpile of hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and used tens of thousands of mines during the 2011 conflict.

As the Gaddafi government progressively lost control of the country in 2011, massive weapon and munitions depots containing mines were abandoned by government forces and left unsecured.[6] Local and international mine action organizations have worked with Libyan authorities and the UN since mid-2011 to collect and destroy abandoned ordnance, but it is unclear how many landmines were removed by anti-government rebels, civilians, and others.

In mid-February 2012, the post-Gaddafi government in Libya began to destroy the stockpile with the destruction of nearly 20,000 landmines.[7]

Use

The first reports of pro-Gaddafi forces using mines emerged in late March 2011 in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west. In 2011, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed the use of five types of mines in six separate locations and reported that three types of mines had been found abandoned at three other locations. The Brazilian T-AB-1 antipersonnel personnel mine was frequently used by pro-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 conflict, and its low metal content makes it particularly challenging for detection and clearance efforts.[8] The Belgian NR413 antipersonnel mine has also been found in Libya.[9]

Remotely delivered “parachute mines” were delivered by surface-fired 122mm Grad rockets into the port area of the city of Misrata by Gaddafi forces on 5 May 2011. The markings on these Chinese-produced Type-84 scatterable antivehicle mines indicated a 2009 manufacture date.[10]

Mine Types identified in Libya during the 2011 conflict

Prior to 2011, Libya last used antipersonnel mines during its 1980–1987 war with Chad. Libya is contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance from World War II, as well as from wars with Egypt (1977) and Chad (1980–1987). Minefields are said to exist in desert, port, and urban areas; however, no nationwide survey has ever been conducted. Some facilities are protected by minefields, such as an ammunition storage area outside of Ajdabiya that HRW confirmed is partially surrounded by a minefield marked solely by a deteriorating fence.

Libya has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In September 2012, Libya informed States Parties that it is “committed” to promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions and making it universal, but did not provide any information on the steps it is taking to accede.[1]

Since July 2012, Libya has been governed by the elected General National Congress (GNC). The Monitor is not aware of any statements by the GNC with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2]

The former government of Libya participated in three regional conferences held during the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that developed the convention, but attended the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 only as an observer and did not join in the consensus adoption of the convention.[3] Libya did not attend the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008. It participated in a regional conference on cluster munitions in Pretoria, South Africa in March 2010 and attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 as an observer, but did not make any statements.

Libya attended the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012 as observer and made a statement. For the first time, Libya participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2013, but did not make any statements. A representative from Libya’s embassy in Togo attended a regional seminar on the convention in Lomé in May 2013.

Libya also endorsed the Lomé Strategy on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which expresses “grave concern over the recent and on-going use of cluster munitions” and calls for the immediate end to the use of these weapons.^[4] Libya voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 15 May 2013 that strongly condemned “the use by the Syrian authorities of...cluster munitions.”[5]

Libya is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Libya is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

The former Libyan regime possessed a stockpile of cluster munitions. The current disposition of this stockpile is not known, including information about the types, quantities, and degree of central government control.

In the past, Jane’s Information Group listed Libya as possessing KMGU dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and RBK-500 aerial cluster bombs, presumably of Soviet/Russian origin.[6] It also possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[7] From the 2011 conflict, it is now also known that Libya had stockpiled RBK 250-PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, MAT-120 mortar bombs containing submunitions, and an unidentified type of rocket-delivered cluster munition with dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.

In June 2011, Spain confirmed that it had transferred a total of 1,055 MAT-120 cluster munitions containing 22,155 submunitions to Libya in 2006 and 2008.[8]

Use

During the 2011 conflict, government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi used three different types of cluster munitions at locations including Ajabiya, Misrata, and in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan.[9] DPICM-type submunitions were also ejected from ammunition storage bunkers at a military depot near the town of Mizdah, which was attacked by NATO aircraft 56 times between April and July 2011.[10]

There has been no evidence of cluster munition use in Libya by countries that were involved in the NATO military action, including by the United States (US) and other states that have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In its formal response to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, NATO confirmed that it did not use cluster munitions in the Libya operation.[11]

Previously, Libyan forces used aerial cluster bombs, likely RBK bombs of Soviet/Russian origin, containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions, at various locations during its intervention in Chad during the 1986–1987 conflict.[12] On 25 March 1986, US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk20 Rockeye cluster bombs; on the night of 14–15 April 1986, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on the airfield at Benina.[13] On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb) and an explosive ordnance disposal expert subsequently identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[14]

Contamination and Impact

Libya is contaminated with mines, cluster munition remnants, and a wide array of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of internal and international armed conflict in 2011, as well as earlier conflicts with neighboring countries. As of mid-2012, ERW were believed to pose the main threat to the population.[1]

Mines

Before the 2011 conflict, Libya faced contamination from mines left by the desert battles of World War II and by conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980−1987, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. In the aftermath of the 2011 conflict, it emerged that mines had also been emplaced around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.[2]

The conflict in 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of Colonel Muammur Qaddafi was marked by use of antipersonnel and/or antivehicle mines by government and rebel forces. The only reported instance of mine use by rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.[3] The most commonly-used type of antipersonnel mine was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 442). Antivehicle mines used by government forces have included Chinese Type 72SP and Type 84 mines (scattered by rockets over the port city of Misrata), Belgian PRB-M3 and PRB-M3A1 antivehicle mines, as well as minimum-metal mines. Sea mines were also used by government forces in the port of Misrata.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

The 2011 conflict saw use of at least three types of cluster munitions. These include the Chinese dual-purpose Type 84 cluster munition, which also functions as an antivehicle mine, and the Spanish MAT-120, which holds 21 submunitions. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has reported tackling Russian PTAB cluster bombs[5] and international media reported the presence of a fourth cluster-munition type that has remained unidentified.[6] The extent of contamination by submunitions is unknown.

In addition to items used in hostilities, demining organizations have encountered both Type 84s and MAT-120s as a result of destruction of ammunition storage areas. “Street museums” set up by local residents in Misrata and other locations displayed cluster munitions among a wide array of other items of ordnance, but by March 2012 the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) reported all but one major museum in Misrata had shut down.[7]

There may also be some residual contamination from World War II. On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb). Subsequently, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expert identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[8]

Other explosive remnants of war

Libya emerged from the conflict with extensive contamination by a wide array of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO), although the precise extent is unknown. Heavy contamination by UXO or AXO has been reported around towns that became battle grounds between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces stretching from the western Nafusa mountains to Zintan (southwest of Tripoli); in and around Misrata, Zlitan, and Bani Walid to the east and southeast of Tripoli; Sirte, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and near Ajdabiya, all along the coast of the Gulf of Sidra; as well as Benghazi and Tobruk near the border with Egypt.[9]

International organizations have reported encountering air-dropped bombs of up to 3,000kg; 107mm (Radima), 122mm (GRAD), and 130mm rockets; surface-to-air missiles; sea mines and torpedoes as well as rocket-propelled grenades; a variety of mortar, tank, and artillery shells; and small arms and anti-aircraft ammunition.[10] International NGOs engaged in urban clearance reportedly found much less UXO in some areas (Misrata) than might have been expected from the intensity of fighting.[11]

NATO said its forces used 7,642 air-to-surface weapons during its seven-month air operation lasting until the end of October 2011[12] and in 2012 gave the UN detailed coordinates of 313 sites of possible UXO, including strikes by aircraft (303), helicopters (six), and naval warships (four), although it failed to provide details of the specific ordnance used or fuzing mechanisms and render-safe procedures.[13] EOD teams have reported clearing a number of large NATO bombs, including one of 900kg.[14]

Additional contamination resulted from air strikes on ammunition storage areas which scattered UXO over surrounding areas and from sabotage by retreating pro-Qaddafi forces.[15] Schools and hospitals, precisely because they were not targeted by NATO, were often used by pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces, which left large amounts of AXO and UXO behind when they departed.[16]

Libya’s transitional authorities and demining organizations also faced a challenge securing huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Qaddafi regime which provided a source of explosives for use in improvised devices.[17] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) concluded that the “vast” hazard presented by uncontrolled ammunition, weapons, and ERW in Libya will require “concerted efforts for decades to come and significant financial support ranging in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.”[18]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Under the former regime of Col. Qaddafi, the Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defense reportedly cleared areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit is said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.[19]

Since the change of regime, mine action has felt the effects of wider political turmoil as well as competing claims of a role in the sector by multiple institutions. Principal among these is LMAC, mandated by a decision of the Minister of Defense in December 2011 to coordinate mine action, support efforts to control ammunition storage areas (ASAs), and decommission weapons, while the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army has jurisdiction over arms and ammunition and a role coordinating a range of operations.[20] Other institutions include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Programme for Demining and Rehabilitation of Lands, which was set up in 2004 and revived by the ministry after the change of regime, and the Ministry of Interior’s National Safety Authority, which before the revolution was responsible for EOD.[21]

As fighting between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces gathered momentum, JMACT became operational in April 2011, liaising closely with the Chief of General Staff of the Army and working in partnership with international NGOs, initially from Benghazi, but later from a main office in Tripoli with sub-offices in Benghazi and Misrata. As demining operators became established in Libya, JMACT provided initial coordination, directing teams to areas needing clearance and collecting operational reports from partners, including DCA, DDG, HI, Information Management and Mine Action Programs, the ICRC, MAG, NPA, FSD, and UNICEF.[22]

LMAC was reportedly in existence as early as May 2011, comprising some personnel who reportedly had been involved previously in mine action and who now are engaged in organizing the monitoring of some ammunition storage areas seized from the government.[23] Germany provided funding to support LMAC in establishing a head office in Tripoli with regional branches in Benghazi, Zintan, Misrata, and Sabha,[24] becoming the main focal point for humanitarian demining NGOs in the course of 2012, but mine action sector sources said the breakdown of centralized government as a result of the regime change in 2011 has limited the extent of LMAC authority outside Tripoli.[25] In 2012, LMAC continued to report to the Ministry of Defense and was engaged mainly in registering and coordinating international and national operators, some operational planning and information management.[26]

Land Release

Incomplete reporting and lack of consistency in available data make it difficult to determine accurately the extent of clearance or items destroyed. Operators reported little clearance of landmines in 2012, reflecting the focus on the greater threat posed by other ERW, stockpiles of ordnance, and the widespread access to small arms and ammunition since the conflict of 2011–2012. Most mine action appeared to be a mixture of surface battle-area clearance (BAC) and emergency spot clearance.

Mine action activities by international operators continued to be restricted geographically as a result of the political transition in Libya and the sensitivity of local authorities and militias to allowing access to some affected areas. Against this background, little survey of mine and ERW contamination has taken place since the change of regime in Libya. UNMAS commissioned six international personnel to undertake a series of quick assessments of ERW contamination in 2012 but did not release any findings.[27] Difficulties experienced by some operators obtaining explosives for demolitions also meant that the number of items destroyed were significantly fewer than the number cleared and resulted in cleared items being stored in secured areas pending bulk demolitions. HI reported clearing a total of 33,641 items of UXO in 2012, but destroyed less than a quarter of that number.[28]

 Libyan volunteer groups reportedly conducted most of the ERW clearance in 2011–2012 and some were still active in 2013, particularly around Benghazi in eastern Libya, but no details of their identity or activities was available. UNMAS recorded 11 international organizations engaged in mine action in 2012, including two commercial operators, but the scope of their activities was restricted by the lack of a clear institutional framework for mine action and regional political tensions.

LMAC recorded BAC over 7.55km² in 2012 together with destruction of 9,887 mines (antipersonnel and antivehicle) and 134,525 items of UXO, more than double the items destroyed in the previous year.[29] UNMAS reported separately that operations by 11 international organizations resulted in destroying a total of 9,664 antipersonnel mines, of which 9,647 antipersonnel mines were attributed to one operator, SBF. UNMAS said operators also destroyed 221 antivehicle mines, but most destroyed items were projectiles, including mortars, artillery shells and rockets, and small arms ammunition.[30]

SBF, working with local partner, the AMAN Foundation, reportedly destroyed 6,523 antipersonnel mines from an area of 29,147m² that formed a narrow perimeter around Mitiga airport, and released a further 190,630m² on that task through technical survey. SBF and its partner also cleared 316,630m² of battle area at Ghod Roman, destroying 2,819 items of UXO. SBF had appealed for US$240,000 in 2013, in addition to confirmed funding of $680,000, to clear 400,000m² of battle area in 2013 but in September 2013 it suspended operations because of lack of funding.[31]

In 2012, DCA operated with three EOD teams which worked in Dafniya, Zliten, Misrata, and Bani Walid conducting BAC and spot clearance, but it withdrew from Bani Walid in February 2012 after two incidents when teams were stopped by unidentified armed personnel. Although DCA has not conducted mine clearance, it was asked to verify an area of Zliten where volunteers had cleared a large mine belt. In 2013, it has continued working in Misrata where it also planned to conduct an armed violence reduction program, including a project for ammunition storage.[32]

HI operated in 2012 with 25 staff in four EOD teams, two deployed in Misrata and two in Sirte, conducting a mixture of BAC, spot clearance, and ammunition stockpile destruction. HI reported releasing a total of 21.67km², but it was not immediately clear how much was through full clearance, visual inspection, or non-technical survey. In November 2012, HI started clearing the Misrata ASA and expected to continue working there throughout 2013. It also planned to seek funding for a mine clearance project in Misrata and to conduct assessments in other locations to be determined in line with LMAC priorities. HI also put emphasis on small arms and light weapons risk reduction through education programs in Tripoli, Misrata, and Sirte.[33]

MAG, among the biggest operators with 108 EOD personnel, conducted a range of survey and clearance tasks in 2012 including ASAs at Ajdabiya and Misrata as well as tasks around Zintan, Sirte, and Azizyah, where it was subcontracted to Sterling International. A total of 1.5km² was released through technical survey at Sirte, Misrata, and Zintan. In 2013, MAG has focused on clearing UXO from storage areas and nearby communities and expanded its mechanical capacity to increase efficiency in conducting these tasks. It has also provided interim safe storage areas for weapons and ammunition and supported training for military and police in ammunition storage management.[34]

Among the commercial operators, UNMAS contracted Ukroboronservices of Ukraine to clear ERW to provide safe working areas at an ASA in Hun (southeast of Tripoli), destroy unserviceable ammunition, and place other ammunition stocks in explosive storage houses rehabilitated to provide safe storage. A second commercial company, Mechem, was contracted to provide three BAC teams and three EOD teams to conduct visual BAC and EOD at ASAs and other locations with explosive hazards. One of the EOD teams was assigned to support police and army engineers in and around Tripoli.[35]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2012[36]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2011

Pro-Qaddafi forces used cluster munitions in a number of locations, most visibly in the port city of Misrata in April 2011.[38] DCA reported clearance of mortar-delivered MAT-120 cluster munitions in Misrata[39] while Type-84 antivehicle submunitions were found by DCA in Dafniya and by FSD in Sirte.[40] Submunition remnants have made up a relatively small proportion of the ERW encountered by operators (see table above), but it appears that some reported UXO clearance included submunitions.

Safety of demining personnel

A DCA international deminer was killed by a Type-84 submunition in Dafniya in March 2012 in the course of clearing buildings of ERW.[41]

Casualties Overview

In 2012, there were at least 66 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in the State of Libya, based on partial data.[1] Children made up 36% (22 of 61) of all civilian casualties, a decrease compared to the percentage of child casualties (64%) in 2011. Most child casualties were boys (20); there was only one girl casualty in 2012.[2] Men were 58% (34 of 59) of all civilian casualties in cases in which the age was known, an increase compared to 2011 when men were 29% of all civilian casualties. Two casualties were women. Intentional engagement with ERW was the leading cause of casualties and among civilians where the age and gender were known.[3] Two foreign nationals from Niger were included among 2012 casualties.

All casualties for whom civilian or military status was known were civilians.[4] There were no casualties confirmed among military personnel or deminers in 2012, a decrease from 7 military and 8 deminer casualties identified in 2011.[5] In February 2012, the Libya Mine Action Center (LMAC) reported one deminer killed in an ammunition storage site explosion; he is not included in the overall total for the period.[6]

At 66, the total number of casualties identified for 2012 is a significant decrease compared with the 222 casualties in 2011.[7] This may be, in part, due to the lack of availability of casualty data to the Monitor. However, it also corresponds with the finding of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) that “the incidence of accidents has steadily declined during 2012.”[8]

The total number of casualties in Libya is not known; all available estimates pre-date the 2011 conflict, when many new casualties occurred. The Libyan Demining Association (LDA) and the Libyan Civil Defense Department had registered 1,852 mine casualties by the end of 2006.[9] Previous estimates were approximately 12,000, with the Libyan police reporting 11,845 casualties between 1940 and 1995 (6,749 killed; 5,096 injured) and the Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies reporting 12,258 (3,874 killed; 8,384 injured) between 1952 and 1975.[10]

Cluster munition casualties

The number of cluster munition casualties in Libya is not known. There were no casualties from cluster submunitions identified in 2012.

There was no available information on casualties during the cluster munition strikes that occurred in 2011. Media reports identified four casualties from unexploded submunitions between April and June 2011: three in Ajdabiya in the Al Wahat district and one in Misrata.[11] However, it was not possible to distinguish the devices that caused these casualties from other types of ERW. Two of the four reported submunition casualties, boys 10 and 15 years old injured in Ajdabiya, were also later reported to have been injured by a hand grenade.[12] The explosive item type of the remaining two casualties could not be confirmed and were recorded as ERW casualties by the LMAC.[13]

Victim Assistance

Libya is responsible for survivors of landmines and other types of ERW. The total number of survivors is unknown. Outdated estimates ranged from 5,000 to 8,000 survivors through 1995.[14]

Victim assistance since 1999[15]

Throughout the period since 1999, mine/ERW survivors were able to receive free medical care through the reasonably well-developed Libyan health care system. Between 2000 and 2008, Italy provided support through building renovations, training, and planning to the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center, the only physical rehabilitation center in the country. However, during the period, the center was unable to operate at full capacity due to a lack of qualified staff, materials, and a data management system. When Italy withdrew support in 2008, the center stopped producing prosthetics and orthotics.

There was no information available from the new Libyan government on economic and social inclusion initiatives or psychological support to survivors during the period. At several Meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Libya called on countries who had used mines in Libya to “provide…assistance to the victims, and to rehabilitate them.”[16]

All victim assistance, but especially emergency and ongoing medical care, was disrupted by the armed conflict that started in February 2011. International organizations responded to this disruption and assisted hospitals to resume care to the increasing numbers of new mine/ERW survivors. In August 2011, the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center resumed production of prosthetics and orthotics and, in 2012, remained the only fully functioning prosthetics and orthotics center in the country; the ICRC withdrew direct assistance to the center. Other organizations limited some activities or withdrew from the country. No victim assistance coordination or planning was possible in 2012; national and international efforts remained focused on providing immediate relief to the large numbers of war-wounded, including mine/ERW survivors, and rebuilding the health sector.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2012, the government was not able to differentiate the needs of mine/ERW survivors from the needs of all conflict victims in the country.[17] However, the ICRC assisted the LMAC to establish a casualty data management system. By the end of 2012, a total of 215 mine/ERW casualties which had occurred in recent years had been recorded.[18]

Victim assistance coordination[19]

On 1 December 2011, the LMAC was established within the Ministry of Defense to manage all mine action activities in the country.[20] Responsibility for victim assistance lay with the Ministry of Health and the MCCS.[21] There was no national plan for victim assistance in 2012. During the year, the interim government continued to develop mechanisms to address problems among the war-wounded, to provide for the evacuation of large numbers of injured for extended treatment in hospitals in other countries, and to provide monetary payments and preferential hiring for some government positions.[22]

In March 2012, owing to “the rapid recovery of the health sector,” support to the Ministry of Health by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other relevant stakeholders for the reconstruction of the Libyan health system came to an end. Under Ministry of Health leadership, a new coordination mechanism continued the development of the healthcare sector with support and collaboration from the WHO and other partners.[23] There was no information available on whether mine/ERW survivors, their representative organizations, or disabled persons’ organizations participated in this planning process.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[24]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2011, Libya had a well-functioning medical system. The availability of medical care decreased in 2011 as thousands of foreign medical professionals working in Libya returned to their countries of origin, and power cuts, lack of funding, and a lack of medical supplies prevented the remaining medical professionals from responding to the increased demand for emergency care from mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the conflict.[25] In 2012, the Ministry of Health assumed leadership for the reconstruction of the healthcare system with a focus on ensuring basic medical care throughout the country, including in rural and remote areas.[26]

In 2012, the government continued to provide for the evacuation of large numbers of injured to hospitals in other countries for extended treatment.[27] The ICRC also continued limited evacuation of mine/ERW survivors to ensure access to emergency medical care.[28] Merlin and the ICRC continued to provide medical equipment and supplies to treat the injuries of mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the armed conflict.[29]

In 2012, the ICRC provided training to address traumatic war injuries, such as those caused by mines/ERW, to doctors and medical personnel.[30] The ICRC provided direct support to hospitals and first aid stations; more than 600 emergency service personnel and ICRC National Society members were trained in emergency and first-level care, while 35 doctors enhanced their capacities to manage emergencies and handle trauma patients. Over 120 surgeons received war-surgery training and another five surgeons attended advanced courses abroad with ICRC sponsorship.[31] However, in January 2012 MSF suspended its surgical activities (begun in Misrata in 2011) due to the high number of torture victims being treated from detention centers, and then suspended all activities nationwide by August.[32]

Physical Rehabilitation, including prosthetics

In 2012, the ICRC ceased direct assistance to the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center.[33] It had supported their provision of rehabilitation services from August 2011 so that the center could be reopened and could respond to the increase in conflict-related injuries; before that, mine/ERW survivors had to be sent outside the country for physical rehabilitation. Also in 2012, the IMC continued to support the strengthening of physical rehabilitation at the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center and developed a community and mobile outreach service to increase access.[34] Merlin, an international organization, continued to provide physical rehabilitation services to mine/ERW and other war victims in the Nefusa mountains.[35] The Ministry of Health and the International Trust Fund: Enhancing Human Security (ITF) ended their project in January 2012. The ITF had provided additional immediate rehabilitation treatment for mine/ERW survivors outside Libya and had also provided support to strengthen rehabilitation capacities within the country.[36]

To address the long-term physical rehabilitation capacity in Libya, the ICRC signed an agreement with the University of Tripoli in September 2012 on the joint development and implementation of a prosthetics and orthotics degree program, aiming to increase the low number of prosthetics and orthotics professionals in Libya.[37]

Economic Inclusion

In 2012, the interim government provided the war-wounded, including mine/ERW survivors, with monetary payments and preferential hiring for some government positions.[38] There was no information available on economic inclusion initiatives for mine/ERW survivors in 2012.

Psychological Support

By June 2012, MSF established a network of psychologists in Misrata, provided training in war trauma and therapeutic tools, and supported their efforts to counsel members of the community.[39] MSF ended its psychological support activities in Libya in August 2012.[40] IMC continued its mental health and psychosocial support program in Benghazi, Misrata, and Sirte to increase access to war trauma counseling and develop long-term mental health capacity in the country.[41]

Laws and Policies

The rights of persons with disabilities were protected by a law passed by the previous government. As of the end of 2012, the interim government had not made any changes to existing disability laws or policies. Few public buildings were accessible to persons with disabilities.[42]

Libya signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 1 May 2008.

Unsecured and damaged ammunition, easily accessible weapons material, and explosive remnants of war (ERW), exacerbated by the 2011 armed conflict, continue to pose a considerable threat to the State of Libya and international security. The extent and scope of the problem has yet to be determined.[1]

In response to the problem, Libya received US$20.7 million in international assistance from 14 donors.[2] The European Union (EU) and the Netherlands provided $11.3 million. In 2011, Libya similarly received $19 million.[3]

The United States (US) did not support mine action in Libya in 2012, but since 2011 has provided approximately $40 million in assistance to locate and secure Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other weapons.[4] In an interview with Michael P. Moore from Landmines in Africa, Major General Walter D. Givhan, the US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs, and Operations, said, “In Libya, the US government prioritized securing MANPADS over landmines and while some of the funds made available for MANPADS destruction also covered landmine destruction and removal, the intent was to eliminate the MANPADS. This is understandable from a national security and national interest perspective: the United States is not going to be threatened by landmines in the ground in Libya, but US airplanes flying in Libyan airspace could be targeted by MANPADS in Libya.”[5] The US did not disaggregate its funding to Libya regarding MANPADS and landmines.

The Libyan Ministry of War Wounded, Martyrs and Missing Persons and the Ministry of Health contributed $1,307,058 and $150,172 respectively to the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security to provide for rehabilitation of 25 amputees at the University Rehabilitation Institute (URI) in Ljubljana, and for the URI to assess rehabilitation capacity in Tripoli and Benghazi.[6]

In July 2013, the UN reported that of the 10 humanitarian mine action projects valued at $10 million, only one was fully funded for the year, four were partially funded, and five had not received any funding resulting in a shortfall of $5.4 million. In addition, two victim assistance projects valued at $530,000 had not been funded as of July 2013.[7]

International contributions: 2012[8]