Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004.[1]

Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010.[2] The act is comprised of 29 articles divided into four chapters. Chapter four includes Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the prohibition on antipersonnel mine use and stockpiling, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, victim assistance, and transparency reporting. It also includes penalties for violations.[3]

Sudan submitted its tenth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in April 2013.[4]

Sudan participated in the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, where it made a general statement and spoke on mine clearance and victim assistance. Sudan attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2013, where it spoke on compliance and mine clearance.

Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified it.

Production and transfer

Sudan has declared that it “never produced” antipersonnel mines.[5] It has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[6]

Use

There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, but there were several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Sudan in 2011, 2012, and 2013 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm.

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that in the southern part of the country antipersonnel mines are available for use, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations, which it has denied responsibility for.

In 2011, reports emerged of new mine-laying in South Kordofan State in the Nuba Mountains near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the northern branch of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) now called SPLM-N.[7] UN reports stated that both the SAF and the SPLM-N were reported to have laid antipersonnel mines in strategic areas of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan State.[8]

During 2012, the following mine use allegations were reported in South Kordofan:

·         On 1 March 2012, a British journalist visited the town of Taroji in South Kordofan that had been taken over by SPLM-N two days earlier on 28 February, where he found and photographed three crates containing a total of at least 100 antipersonnel mines in a structure previously used by Sudan government forces to store ammunition.[9] Locals said the hills surrounding Taroji had been mined by Sudan government forces.[10]

·         In April 2012, the Small Arms Survey, a Swiss NGO, reported that the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and/or Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) seized antipersonnel mines after occupying a Sudan Armed Forces base in Heglig.[11] Geneva Call said JEM denied seizing any antipersonnel mines.[12] The South Sudan Mine Action Authority announced that an investigation committee would be sent to the field to investigate these allegations.[13] The outcome of the investigation was not known as of September 2013.

·         In May 2012, the Small Arms Survey saw and photographed two identical batches of antipersonnel landmines, identified as Iranian-made MK-4 (also known as No. 4) mines. The first batch was reportedly captured during fighting in Taroji in February 2012, while the second batch was reportedly seized by the SPLM-N from the SAF garrison in Heiban in June 2012. The Small Arms Survey said it “could not determine whether the SPLM-N intended to destroy the anti-personnel mines.”[14]

·         In August 2012, SPLM-N fighters at Jebel Kwo military base (located near the village of Tess in Southern Kordofan) showed weapons, including Iranian antipersonnel mines, to two Irish Times reporters that the fighters said they had captured from government forces.[15]

·         In December 2012, while inspecting equipment in Belila (Blue Nile state), the Small Arms Survey documented several No. 4 Iranian landmines that the SPLM-N reportedly captured from SAF during the civil war.[16]

In August 2013, the South Kordofan state secretary for JEM, Eng. al-Rehema Ismail Fedail, reportedly accused the government of Sudan of planting landmines in North and South Kordofan states, identifying several newly-mined locations including Um ‘Djamena, southern al-Dabekr, southern Abu Zabad, and al-Tamjoyah, in addition to al-Dashol and Abu Janok areas.[17]

The ICBL has expressed “grave concern” at allegations of antipersonnel mine use by armed forces of the Republic of the Sudan in Southern Kordofan and urged the government of Sudan to clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines.[18] It has called on Sudan to clarify if it has new contamination resulting from antipersonnel mine use and urged the government to allow international NGOs to continue mine action operations across the country.[19]

In May 2012, a representative of the government of Sudan stated that with respect to use allegations reported in February 2012, it would “carry out an investigation” and “declare the findings” in its next annual Article 7 report.[20] At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Sudan publicly committed to investigate the allegation.[21]

However, the Article 7 report provided in April 2013 contains no new information with respect to the use allegation in South Kordofan state. In December 2012, Sudan said the mine use allegations were “not accurate” as they come from “rebel groups” and urged that information concerning new mine use be shared with the government’s national mine action center.[22]

On 29 August 2013, a delegation of the SPLM-N, comprised of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Alhilu and Secretary General Yasir Arman, signed the Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, thereby agreeing to prohibit the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, to cooperate in humanitarian mine action activities, and to destroy its stockpiles. Upon signing, Alhilu said, “In compliance with our pledge, we will destroy all AP [antipersonnel] mines in our possession as soon as possible. These mines were captured during military operations.”[23]

The SPLM-N is the third armed opposition group from Sudan to pledge non-use of antipersonnel mines after JEM in April 2012 and the SPLM/A in 2001.[24]

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan reported completion of destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied.[25] At the Second Review Conference in 2009, Sudan stated that a total of 10,656 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (possibly a typographical error from the 10,566 mentioned above).[26] However, Sudan declared in April 2012 and again in April 2013 that a total of 13,371 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in Khartoum in 2007.[27]

In 2009, Sudan reported the discovery of arms caches including antipersonnel mines at various locations of southern Sudan that were subsequently destroyed in Blue Nile state in 2008.[28]

Mines retained for training purposes

In its April 2013 Article 7 report, Sudan stated that it is retaining a total of 1,938 mines, the same amount as reported since 2009.[29] In 2009, Sudan reported a reduction in the number of mines retained for training from 4,997 to 1,938 mines.[30] Each year since 2009, Sudan has reported the transfer of 75 “Type 35” plastic mines from the SAF to the UN Mine Action Office “for training purposes,” but the total number of mines retained for training has remained unchanged.[31] Sudan has not disclosed the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at Mine Ban Treaty Review Conferences held in 2004 and 2009.

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1]

In September 2012, Sudan informed States Parties that it has “renewed” its commitment to the convention and has “respected” the ban on cluster munitions. Its representative did not indicate the precise status of its position on joining the convention.[2]

In April 2012, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that “consultations are going on in Sudan and countries of the region to discuss accession” to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and further “discussions with legislative bodies and authorities” were necessary. The official stated that Sudan “expresses its full support to the convention and promises to accede once its consultations are completed.”[3] Sudan has expressed its intent to join the ban convention since 2010.[4]

Sudan participated in the Oslo Process that produced the convention and joined the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[5] At the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008, Sudan stated its intent to sign as soon as possible after logistical and national measures had been completed.[6]

Sudan has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has attended every meeting of States Parties of the convention as an observer, including the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012 where it made a statement on universalization. Sudan attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011 and 2012 but was not present at those held in April 2013. Sudan did not attend a regional seminar on the convention in Lomé, Togo in May 2013.

Sudan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981 but has never ratified, so it is not party to the CCW.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has no indications of any past production or export of cluster munitions by Sudan. However, it appears that in the past Sudan imported cluster munitions from a number of countries.

Information on Sudan’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not publicly available. Jane’s Information Group reports that KMG-U dispensers, which deploy submunitions, are in service with the country’s air force.[7] Sudan also possesses Grad, Egyptian-produced Sakr, and Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[8]

Use

Sudan’s military has repeatedly denied using and stockpiling cluster munitions, but recent allegations of use and contamination of cluster munition remnants indicate that it has used and may still stockpile the weapons.[9] In May 2012, an unnamed Sudanese military spokesperson reportedly said, “We don’t use cluster munitions in South Kordofan, we have no ties to such weapons. There is no need to use these kind of weapons to begin with, the fighting is in open space, the renegades don’t have concrete fortifications.”[10]

Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 reported two allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in the first half of 2012 in Troji and Ongolo in Southern Kordofan, a state bordering South Sudan that has seen fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army North (SPLM-N) and the Sudan Armed Forces since June 2011.

On 1 March 2012, an independent journalist found dud explosive submunitions in the town of Troji that Human Rights Watch (HRW) identified as Chinese Type-81 dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM).[11] Local residents said that the government of Sudan had attacked Troji with cluster munitions on 29 February 2012 one day after the SPLM-N took control of the town. The Monitor was not able to independently confirm when the cluster munitions were used or by whom.

On 24 May 2012, The Independent newspaper in the United Kingdom published photos of a failed cluster munition in the settlement of Ongolo that residents said had been dropped from a government aircraft on 15 April 2012.[12] HRW identified the weapon as a Soviet-made RBK-500 cluster bomb containing AO-2.5RT explosive submunitions.[13] Again, the Monitor was not able to independently confirm definitively the new use of cluster munitions or by whom.

The incidents resulted in increased international attention, including calls by the CMC and others for Sudan to investigate the allegations, but Sudanese officials offered denials in a number of venues.[14] At the intersessional meetings of the convention in April 2012, its representative stated, “Sudan is not a producing country and does not own stockpilings, [sic] and did not use it before, neither in the far past, nor the near one. So any accusations to [sic] my country in this field are groundless.”[15]

A network of citizen journalists, Nuba Reports, reported that on 18 April 2013 at 10:20 in the morning two cluster bombs were dropped from aircraft on the village of Lado in Southern Kordofan. According to the report “some of the internal explosives in the cluster bombs did not explode” and were scattered in the village.[16] The Monitor has not been able independently to confirm this report. Numerous independent sources have documented the presence of cluster munitions remnants that indicate Sudanese government forces sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan between 1995 and 2000, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.[17] Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5.[18]

 

Contamination and Impact

Mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in the Republic of the Sudan is primarily the result of more than 20 years of civil war that ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 which ultimately led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.[1] Recent armed violence, including the use of antivehicle mines in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the Abyei region, has added to existing ERW contamination.[2]

Mines

As of May 2013, 257 suspected hazardous and contaminated areas covering 38km² remained in 10 of the 18 states that comprise Sudan. The 10 states are: Blue Nile, Central/East/North/South/West Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan. Almost 80% of the suspected and confirmed contaminated areas are located in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Kassala; both Blue Nile and South Kordofan are inaccessible because of ongoing conflict. Of the 10 states, only Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan have confirmed mined areas, totaling 63.[3]

Contamination in Sudan as of May 2013[4]

Note: A minefield is an area contaminated with antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines with a clearly defined polygon. The polygon of minefields is developed as a result of technical survey. SHA refers to an area suspected of having a mine/ERW hazard. An SHA can be identified by an impact survey, other form of national survey, or a claim of presence of explosive hazards. A dangerous area refers to an area suspected to contain mines/ERW that is reported as a result of mine accident/ERW investigation by mine risk education teams, local population, or military personnel.[5]

Additionally, non-state armed groups operating in White Nile state (Sudan) and Upper Nile state (South Sudan) have been accused of using landmines in these states. Landmines in the border states threaten the lives of pastoralists, farmers, and traders who regularly cross the border as they practice their livelihoods.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

In June 2011, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) reported there were nine remaining areas thought to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions, while 81 areas had been released.[7] In April 2012, Sudan’s Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva stated it had never used cluster munitions.[8] The National Mine Action Center (NMAC) has not provided updated information on the reported nine open areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants.

No. of cluster munition-contaminated areas in Sudan as of June 2011[9]

In May 2012, a cluster bomb was reportedly discovered in the village of Angolo in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan.[10] The government of Sudan has denied using cluster munitions in South Kordofan.[11]

Other explosive remnants of war

In the Darfur region, ERW pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and rifle projectiles, mortars, and grenades.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement set out the legal framework to establish UNMAO to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance (QA) of all mine action activities in Sudan, including support to the development of NMAC through June 2011.[13]

The NMAA was established by Presidential Decree No. 299 on 24 December 2005. Following the decree, the National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed and then approved by the High National Mine Action Committee and passed by the council of ministers of the Government of National Unity on 6 August 2006.[14]

On 9 January 2011, South Sudan voted for independence.[15] As a result, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) ended when South Sudan became a recognized State in July 2011, which also resulted in the closing of UNMAO.

Since then, NMAC coordinates all mine clearance activities, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies.[16] At the request of the government of Sudan, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC.[17] UNMAS technical advisors assist in risk education, victim assistance, survey and clearance operations, data and information management, and resource mobilization. UNMAS focuses on coordination, and technical advice and assistance to the national mine action authorities, UN entities, and partners. UNMAS serves as the UN focal point and cluster/sector lead while facilitating resource mobilization and support to implementation. UNMAS support in Sudan is received through the Voluntary Trust Fund.[18]

In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities. ODO comprises 13 international staff and 38 national staff, while there are 15 international staff and 73 national staff working for TDI. There are sub-offices in North, South, and West Darfur states. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed between the Sudanese government and the formerly-armed rebel group known as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), created the states of Zallingei and El Daen in Darfur in March 2012, raising the number of states in Darfur to five. Subsequently, ODO established offices in Zallingei and El Daen. UNAMID contracted TDI in 2012 to assess, survey, mark/identify, and clear contaminated areas with six multi-tasking clearance teams in all five states in Darfur. TDI replaced Mine Tech International. The extent of TDI activities is dependent on the availability of security forces and on receiving permission from the government of Sudan and from the UN Special Representative for Political Affairs.[19] Darfur mine action is funded completely through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.

In 2011, fighting in Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan over the disputed border area caused the complete destruction of the town of Abyei and surrounding villages, the displacement of over 100,000 people, and additional mine and UXO contamination.[20] In response, the UN Security Council authorized a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) “to monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan People’s Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei area” just prior to South Sudan formally declaring its independence from Sudan in July 2011. UNISFA was also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide security to the oil industry’s infrastructure in coordination with the local police. The resolution, however, did not include a mandate for peacekeepers to conduct mine clearance operations, as did the UNMIS mandate that ended in July 2011.[21] In November 2012, Security Council Resolution 2075 expanded the UNMAS role to include identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. UNMAS enables the work of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism along the 2,100km international border between South Sudan and Sudan. It also provides training to UN and national observers and facilitates access on the ground by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.[22] In May 2013, the UN Security Council increased the number of peacekeepers in Abyei and noted concern in the resolution that a residual landmine and ERW problem in Abyei hampered the return of displaced people.[23]

In 2011, fighting began in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states amid disputes over oil exports and payments, border demarcation, and citizenship rights. International access to the two states is very limited.[24]

Two international mine clearance NGOs have closed down their operations because they faced substantial government administrative restrictions that impeded their operations.[25] Dan Church Aid (DCA) closed its operations in 2012.[26] In June 2012, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provide humanitarian aid to leave Kassala, Gadaref, and Red Seastates in eastern Sudan.[27] Following months of negotiations with the HAC and donors, MAG decided to close its operations in Sudan and left in early 2013.[28]

In May 2013, there were three national operators comprising 11 clearance teams, including nine teams from National Demining Units, one team from FPDO, and one team from JASMAR that NMAC planned to deploy to the eastern states where MAG and other international NGOs were ordered to stop working. NMAC also planned to deploy national teams to South Kordofan and Blue Nile stateswhen security improved.[29]

Land Release

In 2012, Sudan cleared some 0.55km² of mined areas and 0.62km² of battle area.[30] This pales in comparison to the 2010–2011 period when annual land release averaged 25km². The low output is attributed to the loss of funding from assessed peacekeeping funds when the mandate for UNMIS ended in July 2011 at South Sudan’s independence and in 2012 when MAG and DCA closed their operations as described above.[31]

In May 2013, Sudan reported it had released 7.4km² of contaminated area since January: 6.3km² (84%) released through survey; 672,050m² through battle area clearance (BAC); 242,565m² cancelled by technical survey; and 202,211m² of mined area released through clearance. Most of the land release occurred in Kassala state.[32]

In June 2013, Sudan reported they planned to cancel 14.3km² through non-technical survey and release 23.7km² through technical survey and clearance by 2019.[33]

Five-year summary of land release[34]

Mine clearance in 2012[35]

Sudan cleared more than 0.55km² of mined areas in 2012, with the destruction of 451 antipersonnel mines and 87 antivehicle mines. Clearance has not been disaggregated between the different operators.

Since 2005, in Darfur, the ODO has achieved the following:[36]

1.      3,955 UXOs destroyed, as well as four antipersonnel and four antivehicle mines;

2.      3,051km² general mine assessment surveyed;

3.      21,149km of road assessment;

4.      438,618km² of sub-surface BAC;

5.      559km² of surface BAC and visual search; and

6.      1,621 villages assessed.

In Abyei, UNMAS has achieved the following:

·         assessed over 10 million square meters in Abyei and 25 nearby villages;

·         recovered over 838 ERW items;

·         surveyed more than 309km of roads;

·         verified and cleared 32km of road while assessing another 229km of routes used by UNISFA;

·         constructed and marked helicopter landing sites in Todach, Tajalei, and Noong; and

·         cleared the site of the 20 March 2012 mine incident which destroyed a UNISFA truck near Tajalei.[37]

Mine clearance has had a major impact on Sudan. It has opened land for farming and animal grazing as well as 30,000km of roads connecting towns and cities, allowing commerce to flourish. Development has followed mine clearance as houses, schools, and hospitals have been constructed.[38]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011, Sudan stated it was in a good position to be mine impact free by April 2014 and to clear the remaining 295 hazardous areas by the deadline if funding, approximately US$68 million, was available.[39] At the meetings in May 2012, Sudan said it needed funding to support 30 clearance teams “soon” to meet its Article 5 deadline, or it would have to request an extension.[40] In March 2013, Sudan submitted a request to extend its deadline until 2019, citing instability and lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile as the primary reason.[41]

It is also understood by stakeholders that the primary reason that Sudan did not meet its 10-year deadline is that, for most of those years, clearing mined roads and areas in what is now South Sudan was the priority under the CPA. Although Sudan benefited from the presence of UNMIS and from assessed funds for mine action from the peacekeeping operations, most of the money was spent clearing mines in present-day South Sudan.[42]

The government of Sudan has pledged $1.3 million per year for equipment, mine clearance, and NMAC operations in 2013.[43] The main risk involves access and security in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, as well as new unknown contamination in these two states as the result of conflict since 2011. Sudan plans to clear all the contaminated areas in the other states before 2016 when it is planned to begin clearance in Kordofan and Blue Nile.[44]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2012

NMAA does not distinguish between clearance of different types of ERW in its reporting and so is unable to confirm how much land was cleared of cluster munition remnants in 2011 or 2012, or how many submunitions were destroyed.

Battle area clearance in 2012

In 2012, Sudan conducted 0.62km² of BAC, most of it in Kassala and Red Sea states.[45]

Quality management[46]

NMAC is responsible for prioritizing, tasking, and post-clearance quality assurance (QA). QA teams are an integral part of the monitoring, accreditation, and license testing for all operators. They are based in sub-offices in Kassala, Damazeen, Kadugli, and Khartoum.

The QA teams are responsible for monitoring all humanitarian demining operations in the states they cover. Post-clearance monitoring includes sampling based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and National Mine Action Standards (NMAS). QA teams conduct a yearly inspection to ensure that each operator’s standard operating procedures, equipment, employee insurance, and employment contracts are up to date and in accordance with NMAS and in compliance with IMAS.

 

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary findings

·         As a result of armed conflict on its southern border with South Sudan, 2012 and 2011 casualty figures were the highest annual figures ever registered in the Republic of the Sudan; children represented 65% of all civilian casualties

·         Declining victim assistance funding in Sudan decreased economic inclusion opportunities for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and threatened the suspension of the victim assistance coordination mechanism

·         The establishment of a victim assistance program in Darfur improved coordination and increased available information about the needs of ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities

Victim assistance commitments

Sudan is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Sudan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

In 2012, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) recorded 108 mine/ERW casualties in Sudan.[1] As in previous years, males (men and boys) made up the majority of all casualties (100 or 91%)[2]; five casualties were women. Most casualties (60) were civilians. There were also at least five deminer casualties and five military casualties.[3] Four deminers were killed and a fifth injured in a single demining accident in Kassala state.

There were 35 child casualties of which 32 were boys and one was a girl; the sex of two children was unknown. These 35 child casualites represented 63% of all civilian casualties for which the age was known, a significant increase from the percentage (49%) in 2011.[4] The rate of child casualties in Darfur was significantly higher than in the rest of the country, representing 84% of civilian casualties for which the age was known (16 of 19), all of which were caused by ERW. In line with data from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), respondents to a recent survey in Darfur identified boys as the main at-risk group for ERW casualties in the region and indicated that accidents mostly happened while the boys were tampering with the ERW or herding/tending animals.[5]

Casualties were concentrated in six of the 17 states of Sudan, with the vast majority (73 or 67%) in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two states bordering South Sudan and the location of clashes between Sudanese and South Sudanese forces in 2012. The high number of casualties was caused by increased population movement as people were displaced by the conflict, and the incidence of casualties was exacerbated by the laying of new mines, as well as increased ERW contamination.[6] In South Kordofan, child casualties were 58% of the 31 civilian casualties reported.

The 108 mine/ERW reported casualties in 2012 were similar in number to the 122 reported for 2011.[7] The casualty figures for 2011 and 2012 were the highest annual figures ever registered in Sudan and followed a period of decreasing annual rates from 2005–2010. The recent increase was attributed to recent conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states that continued through both years.[8]

NMAC registered 1,879 mine/ERW casualties for the period from 2002 to the end of 2012.[9] The Monitor has identified 2090 mine/ERW casualties (648 killed; 1442 injured) between 1999 and the end of 2012.

Cluster munition casualties

In 2012, there were two cluster submunition casualties in South Darfur.[10] There were a total of 30 casualties from cluster munitions in Sudan through the end of 2012, 23 of which occurred in 2009 or before.[11]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 1,321 mine/ERW survivors in Sudan at the end of 2012.[12]

Victim assistance since 1999[13]

Years of conflict seriously damaged the healthcare system in Sudan, and for many people living in remote areas, the nearest medical facilities were long distances away. In general, throughout the monitoring period, the assistance available for landmine casualties was irregular and insufficient to address the size of the problem, though there were some improvements in physical rehabilitation and economic inclusion.

In 1999, Sudan had just one rehabilitation center, located in Khartoum. With support from the ICRC, the National Authority for Prosthetic and Orthotics (NAPO) developed a total of six satellite centers and mobile units by 2009. However, from 2007 to 2010, NAPO received reduced budget allocations from the Ministry of Finance, forcing it to suspend rehabilitation services for three months in 2010. It had also begun to close one center in Kadugli during 2009, which closed at the end of 2010, due to lack of technical staff. While rehabilitation services were free for mine/ERW survivors, a lack of funding and insufficient raw materials meant that waiting periods were long, while the cost of transportation and accommodation made the cost of accessing services prohibitive.

From 1999, little to no economic inclusion initiatives or psychosocial support for mine survivors were available; the situation improved significantly with increased international funding for victim assistance from 2007–2012. These programs were implemented by national organizations and coordinated by NMAC, with support from the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), within the framework of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011. In June 2011, UNMAO completed the handover of its victim assistance program to NMAC. The establishment of the National Disability Council (NDC) in 2010 increased opportunities for the coordination of victim assistance and disability issues at national and state levels.

Victim assistance in 2012

In 2012, poor security conditions prevented survivors in the states with the highest concentrations of mine survivors, Sudan’s southern states and the Darfur region, from accessing victim assistance services. The increasing number of casualties including fatalities (most of whom are men) left many families without a head of the household and therefore without the main source of income for these families. Most communities in Sudan lacked the capacity to address these needs.[14] The establishment of a victim assistance program in Darfur increased information available about the needs of ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities and increased economic inclusion opportunities. Declining funding for victim assistance in the rest of Sudan limited opportunities for mine/ERW survivors and were not offset by other programs.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2012, NMAC conducted a visit to the state of Kassala to collect data on casualties and the needs of victims from the local association of mine victims. Data collected was added to the IMSMA casualty database. NMAC also collected information on the beneficiaries of victim assistance projects undertaken by members of the Victim Assistance Working Group (VAWG) on an ongoing basis.[15]

In Darfur, NMAC and the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) took steps to establish a regional disability and casualty surveillance mechanism through the Ministry of Health. In 2012 and the first part of 2013, 247 people, including ERW survivors, other persons with disabilities, and healthcare staff from clinics in remote villages, were trained as data collectors.[16] As of May 2013, the surveillance system was operational and data collection had commenced.[17]

Victim assistance/disability staff of NMAC and ODO also incorporated relevant questions on victim assistance into the Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices, and Beliefs (KAPB) survey conducted in Darfur in 2012. The survey found that members of the community lacked information regarding how to report mine/ERW incidents and where to receive assistance.[18]

NMAC data on mine/ERW victims and their needs was shared widely with VAWG members, relevant government authorities, disability stakeholders, and donors; it was also shared on a monthly basis with the NDC. Information was used in the design and implementation of victim assistance and disability projects to identify remaining needs of survivors and the locations of existing projects, as well as for government planning purposes.[19]

Victim assistance coordination[20]

In 2012, NMAC continued to convene monthly meetings of the VAWG to share information on progress in implementing ongoing projects, to exchange information on experiences and best practices, to plan the best use of available resources, and to discuss issues such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), data collection, physical rehabilitation, and socioeconomic reintegration.[21] The VAWG included relevant government ministries and some 20 NGOs involved in implementing victim assistance and disability projects.[22]

NMAC and the ODO jointly established the VACWG in Darfur; monthly meetings were convened by ODO and the Ministry of Social Affairs as the main forum where all actors working in victim assistance and disability met to share information and experiences.[23]

The National Strategic Framework of Victim Assistance and the Victim Assistance Multi-year plan 2007–2011 had expired by 2012. Plans were in place to review and update the strategic framework taking into consideration the separation of Sudan and South Sudan and the development of a victim assistance program in Darfur.[24] Sudan requested international technical and financial support for this strategic planning process.[25]

The NDC also held monthly meetings of its seven committees and 13 specialized working groups.[26] The Victim Assistance department of NMAC, as well as other members of the VAWG, were active members of the NDC and participated in regular coordination meetings.[27] The Five Year Strategic Disability Plan 2012–2016 included six objectives designed to promote the rights of persons with disabilities in accordance with the CRPD and to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities in the community. The plan identified relevant government and NGO implementing agencies but did not include a budget.[28]

In 2012, as projected in the Disability Plan, State Disability Councils were established in 14 of 17 states; councils in the remaining three states were in the process of being established as of March 2013. Efforts were also underway to revise the 2009 Disability Act to align it with the CRPD. During 2012, the implementation of the Disability Plan was monitored through quarterly meetings in which representatives of the Sudan Council of Ministers, the National Assembly, the Ministry of Welfare & Social Security, Sudanese Disability Unions, and other NGOs participated.[29]

Sudan provided comprehensive updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, and at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2013. Statements noted progress made in integrating victim assistance into broader frameworks, most especially disability frameworks, and in the inclusion of survivors and their representative organizations in victim assistance.[30] Sudan also completed Form J of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2012 that included information about victim assistance implementation.[31]

Participation and inclusion in victim assistance

Towards the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan, the Ministry of Social Welfare issued a decree in 2010 recommending the involvement of all mine/ERW survivors associations in all decisions and activities related to victim assistance policies and plans.[32] Survivors, their representative organizations, and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) were included as members of the VAWG and the newly formed VACWG in Darfur.[33] In 2012, all economic inclusion and psychological support programs for mine/ERW survivors that were coordinated by NMAC were implemented by landmine survivor associations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. In Darfur, survivors and other persons with disabilities were involved in data collection.[34]

Sudan included a mine/ERW survivor on its delegation to the intersessional Mine Ban Treaty meetings in Geneva in May 2013.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[35]

Emergency and continuing medical care

No significant changes to the accessibility or availability of medical care were reported in 2012. Medical facilities in mine-affected areas were inadequate to address the emergency medical needs of mine survivors, who as a result required evacuation to hospitals in major cities.[36] While military mine/ERW survivors were covered by health insurance, many civilian survivors were not, making ongoing healthcare unaffordable.[37] Even for survivors who were insured, the National Health Insurance failed to cover a number of disability-related claims.[38]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

In 2012, the number of mine/ERW survivors who received prosthetics through ICRC-supported NAPO rehabilitation centers decreased to just 25% of those who had received similar support in 2011; this was despite significant increases overall in the number of people receiving attention through NAPO.[39] Mine/ERW survivors in need of rehabilitation continued to face prolonged waiting periods to receive assistance due to the lack of both funding and qualified technicians; this was coupled with poor accessibility due to a lack of transportation and security risks.[40] Efforts were underway to open two new rehabilitation centers to address the demand for services.[41]

In 2012, the decline in funding available for victim assistance continued, significantly reducing the availability of economic inclusion programs targeting mine/ERW survivors outside of Darfur and resulting in the closure of one of the three programs operating in 2011.[42] In 2010, there had been six such economic inclusion projects.[43] The remaining two programs were limited to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In Darfur, economic inclusion opportunities for ERW survivors increased with the establishment of two new programs targeting ERW victims but inclusive of all persons with disabilities.[44]

Psychological support

The Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Commission supported the establishment of a psychological support unit in the Kadugli Hospital in South Kordofan, the state with the highest number of recent mine casualties. Mine victim associations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states provided peer support and helped connect victims to professional psychological support.[45]

In Sudan, the rights of persons with disabilities were guaranteed by law, though the law required amendment to comply with the CRPD, a process that was underway as of the end of 2012.[46] Legislation was not implemented effectively and many public officials lacked awareness of the law and the rights of persons with disabilities more generally.[47] Similarly, the employment quota for persons with disabilities was not fulfilled and the government lacked punitive measures through which to enforce it.[48] There were no laws or policies to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities; almost no buildings and public spaces were accessible.[49]

Sudan ratified the CRPD on 24 April 2009.

 

In 2012, three donors and the Common Humanitarian Fund contributed US$4.7 million for clearance operations in the Republic of the Sudan, a decline of approximately $1.3 million from 2011.[1]

The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is the sole source of funding for mine action in Darfur. In 2012, through assessed peacekeeping funds, UNAMID received $10.1 million for mine action.[2] Since 2008, it has received almost $53 million for mine action. The funding from UNAMID is by the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) for capacity development, operations, and to contract The Development Initiative (TDI) for survey and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.[3] ODO comprises 13 international staff and 38 national staff, while TDI has 15 international staff and 73 national staff. There are sub-offices in North, South, and West Darfur states.[4]

In 2011, the government of Sudan contributed $1.3 million to mine action, similar to their support in 2010 and 2011.[5] Sudan has committed $6 million to mine action for 2013.[6]

International contributions: 2012[7]

Since 2007, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has authorized the appropriation of annual mine action budgets for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) operating in Sudan, and the African Union/UN Hybrid operation (UNAMID) in Darfur. From 2007 until July 2011, the assessed budgets for UNMIS and UNAMID mine action were more than $190 million, including some 80% of the Sudan Mine Action Program over the five-year period. In 2011, the UNGA authorized $25.1 million for UNMIS and $10.3 million for UNAMID, representing 82% of the total mine action budget in Sudan.[8]

Some of the funds from the assessed peacekeeping budgets were used to contract commercial companies for landmine clearance and battle area clearance. With the end of the UNMIS mission in July 2011, funds were no longer available to contract commercial companies in the northern states in Sudan, excluding Darfur. The contracting of commercial companies has continued in South Sudan under the UN Mission in South Sudan.[9]

Summary of contributions (assessed peacekeeping funds for mine action): 2008–2011[10]

Since July 2011, Sudan has not received any funding through assessed peacekeeping funds as the UNMIS mandate ended with independence for South Sudan. Additionally, in 2013 international assistance appears to be much less after Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid both closed their mine action programs in Sudan after the government of Sudan restricted their travel.[11]

Summary of contributions (includes South Sudan): 2008–2012[12]