Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, as well as directives from Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey submitted its tenth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2013, covering calendar year 2012.[2] The report includes voluntary Form J with information on casualties and victim assistance.

Turkey participated in the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012 where it made statements on transparency of information and mine clearance. Turkey also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2013 where it made a statement on compliance and requested an extension to meet its Article 5 obligations.

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey had not submitted its annual report required by Article 13 as of 1 October 2013.

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the transfer of mines in January 1996. Its production facilities were then closed.[3] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported mines from Germany and the United States (US).

Use

Turkish Armed Forces

Even prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, the chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.[4] However, there have been serious allegations of at least two instances of use by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23^rd Gendarmerie Division Command that indicated that on 9 April 2009 members of the Turkish Armed Forces emplaced M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province.[5] Turkey did not announce that an investigation into this incident was underway until May 2012.[6] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were [sic] undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones.”[7] It remains unclear if further mines from this alleged mined area remain in the ground as Turkey’s report only indicated the destruction of one mine.

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca on 27 May 2009.[8] The Turkish army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 the Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before the detonation.[9] An investigation by the chief prosecutor in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish commander.[10] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff military prosecutor’s office.[11]

According to media accounts, a report on the incident in September 2010 provided to the Military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the placement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish martial court.[12] General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.[13] In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning.[14] In February 2012, the Turkish General Staff’s martial court continued hearing the case against two generals and four other officers.[15] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months of imprisonment due to “causing death and injury by negligence.” Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict, not a final decision, and that “the work on producing the reasoning of this decision is still underway.”[16] No mention was made of a violation of the ban on antipersonnel mines in the court’s proceedings, findings, or judgment.

Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must take every measure to prevent the use of antipersonnel mines, including the application of penal sanctions. The ICBL has previously called on Turkey to thoroughly investigate the use allegations, to report to States Parties on its findings, and undertake measures to prevent further use.[17] It has also emphasized the need to establish the origin of the mines used, which could have been lifted from the ground and re-laid or could have been taken from stocks retained for training purposes, and to clarify what specific law or laws had applied during the trial.[18] Several States Parties and the ICRC have expressed their deep concern about these allegations of mine use since they were reported in 2010.

PKK/Kongra Gel

Turkish officials have continued to accuse the PKK/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.[19] According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report, 16 persons were killed and 66 wounded in 2012 by landmines laid by the PKK/Kongra Gel. Turkey’s Article 7 report did not differentiate between civilian and military casualties or incidents caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor do they distinguish between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs.[20] The Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the use of antivehicle mines or command-detonated antipersonnel explosive devices.

In the past, the Turkish General Staff published information on mines recovered without specifying the types and locations of the mines.[21] The Turkish General Staff no longer lists this information on its website. Turkey did not specifically report on recovered mines and their disposition in previous Article 7 reports.

The Monitor was not able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK/Kongra Gel or of specific incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines.

The PKK/Kongra Gel have admitted to the use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices that can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[22] In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the PKK had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey announced in December 2011 that its stockpile destruction program was completed on 21 June 2011. It had missed its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for over three years. Turkey had previously reported that its munitions disposal facility had not been officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[23]

Turkey stated that in 2004, when it became a State Party, it had a stockpile of 2,973,481 antipersonnel mines. In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy. In its Article 7 report issued after the announcement of the completion of the destruction program, Turkey stated that 2,938,060 mines had been destroyed in total.[24]

In the past, Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in 2007 it reported that M18 mines were removed from its stockpile destruction list due to their “specific technical features” and “will not be used as victim activated.”[25] In 2008, officials said that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed.

Mines retained for research and training

On becoming a State Party in 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[26] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2012, Turkey reported that it currently retains 15,041 mines.[27] In December 2012, Turkey informed States Parties that it retains mines “solely for the purpose of training in mine detection, clearance and destruction techniques.”[28] Turkey’s 2013 Article 7 report indicates that 59 mines were consumed during 2012, of 98 mines transferred for training purposes.[29]

Turkey continues to retain the largest number of antipersonnel mines among States Parties. In December 2012, it repeated that the “large size, as well as the different types of mine action units, necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes.”[30] Between 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2012, Turkey reported consuming a total of 959 retained mines for permitted purposes, 850 in 2005 and 109 over the eight years.[31] In December 2012, Turkey defended its large number of retained mines by stating, “Article 3 recognizes the specific and different needs of States Parties by not fixing numbers or ceilings for mines retained for training purposes.” It added that a minimum of 700 of the retained mines would be used for training personnel for clearance of the minefields bordering Syria.[32]

In December 2012, Turkey repeated that it is “considering reassessing the number of mines retained for permitted purposes.”[33] It made similar statements in 2010.[34] Similarly, in May 2006, it stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[35] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[36]

 

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In October 2012, Turkey said that it was involved in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions and noted its engagement on cluster munitions at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), stating, “We share the humanitarian concern behind the international efforts to limit the use of cluster munitions.”

In a March 2009 letter, Turkey similarly stated that it shared the “humanitarian concerns behind the efforts limiting the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” but “for the time being, [it was] not considering to sign the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions” as its primary aim was to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, to which it is a State Party.[1]

Turkey is party to the CCW and supported efforts to conclude a draft protocol on cluster munitions. It is not known if Turkey is reviewing its position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions following the November 2011 failure of the CCW to agree on the draft protocol.

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process, but participated only as an observer in both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and in the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 and did not sign the convention.[2]

Turkey has continued to show interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It attended an international conference on the convention in Santiago, Chile, in June 2010. Turkey has attended every meeting of States Parties of the convention as an observer, including the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, but it has never made a statement at these meetings. Turkey participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2013 for the first time, but it did not make any statements.

Turkey voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 15 May 2013 that strongly condemned “the use by the Syrian authorities of...cluster munitions.”[3]

Turkey is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey, a CMC member, works to garner domestic support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In June 2010, a government official informed the Monitor that “Turkey does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[4] In August 2011, another official told the Monitor, “Turkey no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[5]

In March 2009, Turkey stated that it “is not making use of cluster munitions.”[6] It is not known if Turkey used cluster munitions in the past.[7] A United States (US) Department of State cable from February 2008, made public by Wikileaks in May 2011, states that “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all out war.’”[8]

In the past, Turkey has produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions; it currently has a stockpile.

According to its website, the Turkish company Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) produces an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile which contains self-destructing M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[9] MKEK has also produced, under license from the US, M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions.[10] It is unclear if this latter projectile is still in production.

The firm Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[11] Turkey sold 3,020 of the TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007.[12]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each with 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[13] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) launchers.[14] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In October 2004,the US announced its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons(JSOW), each with 145 submunitions.[15] In September 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[16]

Slovakia reported the export of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[17]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996.[18]

 

Contamination and Impact

Mines

The Republic of Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Mines were laid in 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in order to prevent illegal border crossings; additionally, mines were laid around security installations.[1] According to Turkey, all the mines laid along its borders with Bulgaria, Georgia, and Greece have been cleared.[2]

In its Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2013, Turkey identified a total of 3,514 mined areas covering 213.59km². This estimate is provisional as another 346 suspected mined areas have yet to be investigated, of which 279 are on the border with Iraq. The main mine-affected area is on the border with Syria (190.5km²), with small amounts on the borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. A further 704 mined areas, covering a total of 2.62km², have been identified around military installations inside the country.[3]

Turkey mine contamination[4]

Landmines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[5] Turkey’s Armed Forces General Staff reported finding 92 PKK mines in the first seven months of 2011, but it did not specify whether they were victim-activated devices or command-detonated.[6]

During the 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus, Turkish Armed Forces laid minefields to create a barrier on the northern side of the buffer zone that divides the island, and also in areas adjacent to the buffer zone. The UN identified 26 minefields laid by Turkish forces in the buffer zone.[7] Cyprus reported in 2011 that one minefield remained in the buffer zone after clearance of 78 mined areas and 26,000 mines.[8]

Explosive remnants of war

Turkey is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance (UXO), but has not identified the affected areas. Human Rights Foundation reports, cited by Landmine Action in 2005, claimed that the areas most affected were Batman, Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, and Van.[9] There is no evidence of any problem with cluster munition remnants.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Key institutions and operators

Turkey does not yet have a national mine action authority or mine action center (MAC). The Minister of National Defense, Vecdi Gönül, told parliament in March 2010 that the ministry had set up a Top Project Board (TPB) to oversee mine action, and a Project Implementation Board (PIB) to act as a national MAC. The TPB would include representatives of the ministries of agriculture, finance, foreign affairs, internal affairs, and rural affairs, with other ministries participating when necessary. The Ministry of National Defense was said to be preparing a directive setting out the respective responsibilities of the TPB and PIB.[10] Turkey told the Twelfth Meeting of State Parties that the board had been established to identify precise coordinates of mined areas and use the data to create digital maps.[11]

Officials reported in March 2013 that the preparation of a draft law establishing a MAC was in its “final stages.” They said that once completed, the draft would be sent for review by the Prime Minister’s office and then to parliament, but added that officials were not working to meet any timetable.[12]

In the meantime, Turkey informed the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that an Interministerial Coordination Board (IMCB) within the Ministry of National Security that had begun working on 26 October 2010 was “meeting regularly and practically functioning as the National Mine Action Authority.” Turkey said the board would:[13]

·         Comprise, among other institutions, the Prime Minister’s office, the ministries of national defense, foreign affairs, finance, education, health, energy, national resources, agriculture, interior, transport, environment, and culture;

·         Issue instructions to and coordinate all government agencies involved in mine action;

·         Discuss key issues, ranging from appropriate mine clearance methodologies, risk education, and planning local infrastructure to preserving cultural assets; and

·         Elaborate Turkish mine action standards.

Turkey’s Article 5 extension request says it plans to complete clearance of all mined areas by 2022, including its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria as well as mined areas around installations inside the country. Turkey gave priority to clearing the Syrian border, estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area. Officials observe it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[14] Delays in 2013 in implementing plans for demining the Syrian border left the prospects for early progress uncertain..

Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common border.[15] Turkey’s President ratified Law No. 5903 on the demining of minefields along the Syrian border on 16 June 2009, giving both the lead role as well as the responsibility for inviting tenders for demining to the Ministry of National Defense. If this process did not work, the Ministry of Finance would have the minefields cleared by means of “service procurement.” If this method also failed, the law said the government would invite companies to tender for demining in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.[16]

The law also provided for the possibility of “requesting the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency” (NAMSA).[17] Turkey said in June 2011 that it had concluded a “sales agreement” with NAMSA providing for quality management and technical support.[18] A NAMSA advisor in Ankara provided technical support on such issues as tendering procedures and contract management.[19] Officials told the Monitor in March 2013 that NAMSA was no longer involved in the tender process, but it would conduct quality control and assurance after clearance.[20]

Turkey announced in 2011 that tenders would be invited for clearance of the 911km-long Syrian border, divided into six separate areas, with a total mined area of 212km².[21] Officials reported that demarcation of the border in some of the six areas is disputed by Syria and work would start in the east, where the border was not disputed and the terrain is flat. The government had initially planned to set a deadline of June 2011 for tender submissions, but later extended it. Officials told the ICBL in May that Turkey’s intention was still to start clearance in 2011.[22]

However, Turkey told standing committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012 that bids would be submitted only by 15 June 2012 for the first Syrian border clearance project, involving a 527km stretch between Cizre and Çobanbey. Clearance would continue until 2016. Bidding for the second Syrian border project, involving 384km of border between Çobanbey and Denizgören, would begin only after “validation of the contract” for the first section. Clearance of the second section would continue until the end of 2016.[23] Eleven demining companies reportedly bid for the first project but, in July 2013, the Ministry of National Defense reportedly canceled tenders for clearing the border because of developments in Syria.[24]

Turkey’s Article 5 extension request also sets out plans for a three-phase clearance of its eastern and southeastern borders, starting with the Armenian border and working south to the border with Iraq. Turkey said the European Union had agreed to finance two-thirds of the cost of the first two phases, amounting to €30 million. It said that work would start before the end of 2014 and last for two years, although a table of the timelines showed the first two phases continuing through 2017 and the third phase being completed in 2018.[25]

LAND RELEASE

Despite the approach of its Article 5 deadline, Turkey did not record any land release in 2012. In the past, Turkey used the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish Army to conduct some demining, using manual and mechanical means, as well as commercial companies.[26] In 2008, a German commercial company, Tauber, working in partnership with the Turkish company Tusan Corporation, won a demining contract by tender to clear the Nusaybin border gate between Turkey and Syria.[27] In March 2011, Nokta Yatirim Limited Company reported it had demined the ancient city of Karkamış in Gaziantep Province, clearing an area of 663,800m² and destroying 1,200 mines.[28]

Mine clearance in 2012

Turkey’s Article 7 report for 2012 showed an increase of 685 mines destroyed in 2012, compared with 244 mines in 2011, bringing the total number of mines destroyed in mined areas since the start of demining in 2004 to 26,021. However, in 2012 the number of mines Turkey reports as remaining to be cleared from mined areas went up by 759. Turkey provided no explanation for the change.[29]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under its original Article 5 deadline, Turkey was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011, Turkey disclosed that clearance of its border with Syria would not be completed until 2016 and, a year later, it acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of State’s Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.[30]

Turkey submitted a request in March 2013 asking for an eight-year extension until 2022, but also said this was “provisional” and only an “initial estimate” of the time needed.[31] It cited delays in setting up a national mine action authority, inconvenient weather, and insecurity among factors that had obstructed progress. But it also revealed that in the nine years since acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey had cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, three-quarters of it in one year (2011). Military teams had additionally removed 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release an area of contamination.[32]

The request provided the most comprehensive statement yet of Turkey’s mine contamination and its plans to tackle them, but shed no light on some key issues creating uncertainty over the prospects for fulfilling its clearance obligations. No budget has been allocated for clearance of mined areas inside the country, which have caused most of Turkey’s mine casualties. Clearance was expected to start after setting up a mine action authority and center, but, three years after first announcing plans for these institutions, the request gave no indication as to what had held up progress, or when they would become operational.

Other risk factors include delays and lack of transparency in processing tenders and awarding contracts. By the time it submitted the request, four years had lapsed since Turkey passed Law No. 5903 on demining minefields on the Syrian border, two years had passed since it first drew up a short list of companies for the work, and a year had passed since it took selected companies to the border to conduct a survey; and yet, the request offered no clarity on when the process will conclude and work can start, except that the government expected contracts to be awarded “soon.”

To meet its treaty requirements regarding areas under its jurisdiction or control, Turkey may also need to set out and implement plans for clearance of affected areas in northern Cyprus. Turkey does not claim either jurisdiction or control over this territory. Cyprus, however, in requesting an extension of its own Article 5 deadline, noted that it claims jurisdiction over northern Cyprus but cannot clear it due to a lack of control. In an aide memoire sent to all States Parties, Cyprus asserted that there is legal precedent to back the notion that Turkey has control and therefore legal responsibility over this territory.[33] The ICBL, in its comments on Turkey’s draft extension request, noted that this discrepancy left “unresolved the question of which State Party will address contamination” in this area and called on all States Parties to “look for a way to ensure that the mined areas in northern Cyprus are cleared as soon as possible for the benefit of the affected communities.”

 

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Summary findings

·         Adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities were needed as a priority in the mine affected regions

·         The government ministry responsible for implementing services that uphold the rights of persons with disabilities was made aware of the Republic of Turkey’s victim assistance obligations

·         There was a need for planning and coordination of victim assistance in accordance with Mine Ban Treaty Cartagena Action Plan commitments

·         Physical accessibility plans were delayed throughout Turkey, and there was less accessibility in mine-affected regions than in other parts of Turkey, particularly major cities

Victim assistance commitments

Turkey is responsible for landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors. Turkey has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 69 new casualties in 2012 due to mines (including victim-activated improvised explosive devices, IEDs) and ERW in Turkey. Of the total, 39 were civilians; two thirds of civilian casualties were children (26: 25 boys and one girl) and one was a woman. Thirty casualties were security personnel.[1] The 2012 total represented an increase from the 59 new casualties identified in Turkey from IMFT reporting in 2011.[2]

Included in the total for 2012 were eight Syrian mine casualties (three people killed and five injured) in incidents in the Turkish border minefields while crossing from the Syrian side to Turkey. Two were Syrian opposition military personnel and the others were civilians, including three children (two killed and one injured). Syrians injured by mines along the Turkish border were treated at government hospitals in Turkey.[3]

The government of Turkey reported 82 mine casualties (16 killed; 66 injured) for 2012. No details on military status, sex, or age were provided in the reporting.[4]

In its Article 5 deadline Extension Request of March 2013, Turkey provided information on antipersonnel mine casualties occurring between 2004 and the end of 2012: 882 military personnel (260 killed; 622 injured) and 168 civilians (56 killed; 112 injured). Turkey also included, for the first time, disaggregated information on the age and sex of civilian casualties for a similar time period (10 years); of the total civilian casualties reported, 15 were female and 50 were children.[5] In contrast, Monitor reporting including IMTF data for the period from 2004 to the end of 2012 counted more than twice the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties; 377 civilian casualties of 979 casualties recorded in total.

The total number of mine/IED and ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey had reported 4,271 mine/ERW casualties, including 871 people killed and 3,400 injured, as of the end of 2012.[6] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people were killed (625 security personnel; 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people were injured (with the number of civilians compared to the security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[7] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed and 7,000 injured).[8]

Victim Assistance

More than 5,000 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984.[9]

Victim assistance in 2012

No significant changes in the accessibility or quality of services were reported for 2012. Mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities in affected areas did not have access to the same level of services as other persons with disabilities in larger cities in Turkey.[10] Survivors in some areas were becoming discouraged by the lack of developments in victim assistance.[11]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey were reported in 2012. There was no system in place to collect data on mine survivors or their needs. The IMFT collected the most comprehensive information available through media scanning and cross checking with other organizations and local sources.

The office of the Administration for Disabled People collected data on all persons with disabilities but did not distinguish the cause of disability or mine/ERW survivors.[12] The European Commission (EC) continued to report that a lack of broader data and research on persons with disabilities remained a barrier to informed policymaking in Turkey.[13]

The Diyarbakir Lawyer’s Bar Association and the Human Rights Association collected information on mine/ERW casualties in the affected regions; information collected included details on the needs of the survivors and families.[14]

In 2006, Turkey had reported that it was initiating a program of transition to an international injury classification system that would include mines and ERW.[15] No further progress on this transition was reported as of end 2012.

Victim assistance coordination

By 2012, the responsibilities of the Prime Ministry Association of Persons with Disabilities were transferred to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies and its newly established Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General, the government entity responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.[16] Human rights associations claimed the directorate was underfunded, including a national NGO working on advocacy for the rights of persons with disabilities.[17]

A delegation of the ICBL and IMFT discussed victim assistance with a Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy in March 2013, underlining Turkey’s victim assistance commitments, the links with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the related responsibilities of the ministry. The Deputy Undersecretary agreed that the role of victim assistance focal point role fitted with the work of the ministry’s department of persons with disabilities and also the social welfare department, which is responsible for pensions and other payments.[18]

In April 2012, the IMFT also visited the Minister of Family and Social Policy regarding the Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General and issues of rehabilitation, employment, and education for mine survivors, and also regarding the activities of the new directorate. The IMFT presented the need for a national action plan, corresponding with the Cartagena Action Plan, for the implementation of victim assistance commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty. The Minister indicated that work on victim assistance should be implemented under the new directorate.[19]

Turkey has never had government victim-assistance coordination. The Administration for Disabled People, under the Prime Minister, was previously the central government body responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The administration was established in 1997; however, until 2011 it had not followed, and had not been aware of, victim assistance issues.[20]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting on victim assistance is updated annually by Turkey, but only covers treatment received by survivors at military medical facilities. Article 7 (and Convention on Conventional Weapons Article 13) reporting did not include information on services available to civilian mine/ERW survivors at civilian facilities, or on survivors injured in previous years.[21] Turkey did not make statements on victim assistance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 or at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors reported that they were not included in the planning or implementation of services relevant to their needs.[22] The Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General had not engaged survivors and was not familiar with the issue of victim assistance or specific needs in mine affected areas.[23]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[24]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

A study of examples of surgical intervention after mine injures of varying severities by the Medical Association Diyarbakir emphasized the time-sensitivity of emergency medical care; the study emphasized that longer intervals between injury and surgery corresponded to more severe levels of amputation. Among the study group, the average time to receive first medical care was nine hours; 13 of 186 survivors recorded in the study died due to infection.[25]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access the free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. Those without social insurance can apply for a special “green card” to be eligible for services. However, in practice those persons with disabilities eligible for the green card medical insurance still contributed to part of their medical expenses, eliminating the availability of free services.[26] Regulations in the Healthcare Application Notice, issued by the Social Security Organization of Turkey, restricted access to medicines, equipment, and mobility devices for persons with disabilities, even when deemed necessary by medical professionals.[27]

Healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected region (other than the largest cities) are underfunded, have inadequate staff levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergencies or ongoing medical needs.[28]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established in other mine/ERW-affected provinces. There was also a need to establish facilities that could address the needs of child survivors. Holders of the green card could only apply for new prostheses every five years. This was detrimental to the rehabilitation of child mine/ERW survivors who require frequent replacements while growing.[29]

The Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center was the only such center for all mine-affected regions. By early 2013, it was still open but had effectively ceased to operate; this eliminated the only free option for prosthetics for civilian mine/ERW survivors. Use of the facility declined in 2008 when it began to provide services only to those having state provided healthcare “green cards” for the disadvantaged. In addition, the lack of assistance for transportation or accommodation expenses for survivors coming to the center from distant provinces limited access.[30]

In the absence of a free rehabilitation center, in order obtain prostheses, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities face complicated procedures to apply for poor quality prosthetics available through the national health system. Even this assistance is out of reach to many mine/ERW survivors due to the geographical distance and their poverty levels.[31]

Laws and policies

In 2012, a number of parliamentary questions were asked about the number of survivors and casualties and the support that they receive. The Ministry of Interior reported that military personnel received physical and physiological treatment in TAF-RCC as well as vocational training and employment opportunities. Military survivors have received salaries and employment opportunities via the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Interior.

Civilian survivors could apply for compensation through Law 5233, the Law on the Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against Terrorism. The Diyarbakir Lawyers’ Bar Association continued to help mine/ERW survivors access benefits to which they were entitled, such as compensation under Law 5233, and to promote victim assistance. Survivors have called for a review of the compensation process to ensure timely and appropriate outcomes.[32]

A need for specific policies to address the social support needs of child mine/ERW survivors was identified in 2009.[33] No progress was reported by the end of 2012.

The constitution permits positive discrimination for persons with disabilities; however, the principle is not adequately reflected in policy measures. Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in access to healthcare, employment, education, transportation, and in the provision of state services. The law was not enforced effectively.[34]

A strategy paper on accessibility for persons with disabilities was adopted, along with a related national action plan. Difficulties in accessibility to education, health, social, and public services and public places and transportation for persons with disabilities continued.[35] Turkey lacked a comprehensive strategy to fund commitments to create physical accessibility. Physical barriers to public buildings and all relevant facilities still existed. Deadlines for public institutions’ mandatory compliance to provide accessible services were extended or postponed.[36]

Turkey ratified the CRPD on 28 September 2009.[37] However, in 2012 Turkey had not yet established a national mechanism for monitoring implementation of the CRPD and its optional protocol.[38]