Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003.

Afghanistan has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1] A draft regulation prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of mines and cluster munitions was prepared in 2013 and was still in process as of April 2014.[2]

Afghanistan has submitted 11 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports; most recently in April 2014, a report covering calendar year 2013.[3]

Over the past decade, Afghanistan has participated in every Meeting of States Parties and all intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013 in Geneva. It attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004 and its Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, but its delegation to the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 was denied a transit visa enroute. Afghanistan’s statements intended for the Maputo conference were uploaded to the treaty’s website.

Use

There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by Coalition or Afghan national forces. However, use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed groups continued in 2013 and in the first half of 2014, resulting in further casualties.

Non-state armed groups

The Taliban has made extensive use of victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan as have other armed groups that oppose the Kabul government and the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, such as the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami.

In the first half of 2014, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded an increase in incidents caused by victim-activated IEDs compared to the same time period in 2013. It stated that the majority of IEDs used in Afghanistan are victim-activated, most via pressure plates.[4]

UNAMA shares the view of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that victim-activated IEDs function as antipersonnel mines and are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, while command-detonated IEDs are not banned.[5]

In 2014, UNAMA reported that the majority of pressure plate IEDs are still set to detonate when walked on or driven over and frequently contain up to 20–25kg of explosives, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine.[6] As a result of this design and configuration, the explosive weapons “effectively act as a massive antipersonnel landmine with the capability of destroying a tank;” “civilians who step on or drive over these IEDs…have no defense against them and very little chance of survival…A significant number of IEDs are encountered with explosive weight of approximately 2–4kg specifically designed to maim or kill individuals on foot.”[7] Reportedly some pressure plate initiated IEDs use carbon rods instead of metal contacts to make the explosive device difficult to detect. In other cases insurgents use an arming device that allows them to switch on the pressure plate when targets are in the area.[8]

In October 2012 on the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the use of victim-activated explosive devices and said it uses command-detonated explosive devices.[9] The Taliban have continued to claim responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[10] The Taliban also claimed responsibility on 7 November 2013 for the deaths of three security officials who stepped on a landmine laid by the Taliban in Khost Province.[11]

In July 2013 a media survey by the Monitor identified 404 antipersonnel mines reportedly recovered by Afghan or combined forces between June 2012 and July 2013. According to seizures reported by the media in Pakistan, antipersonnel mines from Afghanistan continue to be transferred into the country[12] (see Pakistan’s Monitor profile).

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. In recent years, there were no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007, eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[13] It reported the destruction of 525,504 stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 2003 and 2007.[14] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as of April 2007, and later reported that it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines in calendar year 2007.[15]

Afghan security forces regularly recover weapons, sometimes landmines, in their operations.[16] In 2013, it reported that a total of 8,013 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2013 from stocks recovered during military operations, surrendered during disarmament programs, and discovered by civilians.[17] Since Afghanistan’s stockpile destruction deadline, it has discovered and destroyed 81,674 antipersonnel mines in previously unknown stockpiles.[18]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. It has reported that “mine bodies used in these programmes have had their fuzes removed and destroyed and are no longer capable of being used.”[19] In June 2011, the chief of operations of the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[20] All mines retained by Afghanistan are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[21]

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 8 September 2011, and became a State Party on 1 March 2012.

In April 2014, Afghanistan informed States Parties that the Ministry of Justice has reviewed national implementation measures for the ban convention and advised that existing law should be amended.[1] Once the review is completed, draft legislation will be sent to the cabinet and then parliament for review and approval.[2] A committee of representatives from the Department of Mine Clearance, the ICRC, and mine action NGOs has been providing input on the national implementing legislation.[3]

Afghanistan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 August 2012 and provided updated annual reports on 19 May 2013 and 27 April 2014.[4]

Afghanistan participated in most meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but despite actively supporting the ban objective it did not endorse the Wellington Declaration that would have committed it to participating fully in the formal negotiations of the convention; it also did not attend the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, not even as an observer.[5] Afghanistan did attend the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 only as an observer, but unexpectedly signed the convention near the end of the conference after the representative announced that he had received instructions and authorization to do so.[6]

Since 2008, Afghanistan has played a positive and active role in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Afghanistan attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011, 2013, and April 2014.

At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Afghanistan made an intervention on international cooperation and assistance, while at the 2014 intersessional meetings it made statements on national legislation, victim assistance, clearance, stockpile destruction and retention, and international cooperation and assistance.

Afghanistan has voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s cluster munition use, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but it is not party to the CCW as it never ratified the convention.

Interpretive issues

Afghanistan has not yet provided its views on several important issues related to its interpretation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 have outlined US interpretation of the convention as it relates to Afghanistan (see section on Foreign stockpiling). In a December 2008 State Department cable, the US outlined its concern over how Afghanistan would interpret the convention’s prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling, as well as Article 21 on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party to the convention.[8]

Use, production, and transfer

In its initial Article 7 report, Afghanistan declared that it has no “production industry” for manufacturing cluster munitions.[9] In September 2011, Afghanistan stated that it “does not use, produce, or transfer Cluster Munitions in the country.”[10]

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989, while a non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[11] US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 bomblets in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country between October 2001 and early 2002.[12] The Monitor is not aware of additional attacks involving the use of cluster munitions since that time.

Stockpiling and destruction

In September 2013, Afghanistan informed States Parties that concerning Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Afghanistan has destroyed all its Cluster Munitions stocks before the CCM entered into force.”[13] In October 2013, it stated that concerning cluster munitions, “Afghanistan is pleased to have destroyed all weaponry of this kind within its military stockpile.”[14] In April 2014, Afghanistan again stated that it destroyed all stockpiles of cluster munitions before the convention entered into force and no longer has a stockpile.[15]

As in the previous year’s report, the April 2014 Article 7 report stated that Afghanistan “has not officially announced” the completion of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but reported that “the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.”[16] This would appear to indicate that there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, but additional stocks abandoned in the past by the government may continue to be discovered.

Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports have contained information under stockpile destruction indicating significant destruction in 2005–2011 and further destruction in 2012 and 2013.[17] Given the government’s statements that there are no longer any stocks, these destroyed items are likely cluster munitions that were abandoned by other combatants in the past (and recently discovered) and/or cluster munition remnants destroyed in mine action and clearance operations. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions.

In 2008, Jane’s Information Group listed Afghanistan as possessing KMG-U dispensers and RBK-250/275 cluster bombs.[18] Standard international reference sources have listed Afghanistan as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[19]

Foreign stockpiling

Some International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions, but the current status of any possible stockpiles is not known. According to the December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[20] In February 2011, an Afghan human rights group called on the US government and NATO to reveal if it they had stockpiled or used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since the 2002 conflict.[21] In 2011, an ISAF spokesperson told media, “ISAF conducts operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. All weapons, weapons systems, and munitions are reviewed for legality under international law.”[22] A spokesperson for the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) said, “We have no evidence of NATO/US using cluster munitions [in Afghanistan] since 2002.”[23] For several years, ISAF has had a policy against using cluster munitions.[24]

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: GOOD[1]

Mines

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition intervention in late 2001 which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Continuing survey in Afghanistan added 51.8km² of antipersonnel mine hazards to the mine action database in 2013 but the end-year estimate of 240km² was 11% lower than a year earlier, maintaining the rate of decline of the previous year.

Remaining contamination as of end 2013[2]

Areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines account for 45% of the total contaminated area and impact around 40% of Afghanistan’s total mine/ERW affected population. Some 40% of antipersonnel mine contamination is concentrated in Kabul and the six other provinces that make up Afghanistan’s central region (Bamyan, Kapisa, Logar, Parwan, Panjsher, and Wardak).[3] Antivehicle mines also pose a distinct problem. Although far fewer in number, mined areas containing only antivehicle mines are spread across some 236km² and the minimum metal content of many of these mines further complicates detection.

Improvised explosive devices

Aside from factory-produced mines, much the biggest threat to civilians continues to come from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed by non-state armed groups. The 5km² that Afghanistan identifies as contaminated by IEDs applies only to “legacy” IEDs (i.e. those placed in areas that are no longer of military significance), but the impact of newly laid devices is far greater. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has reported they caused 2,890 civilian casualties in 2013 (962 killed and 1,928 injured), 14% more than in 2012 and accounting for one third of all civilian casualties from the conflict. UNAMA attributed the increase in part to the placing of IEDs particularly in areas frequented by civilians, such as markets and public roads, where they did not appear to target a military objective.

The number of civilian casualties from victim-activated, pressure-plate IEDs (fitting the treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine) dropped 39%, the UN reported, killing 245 civilians and injuring 312. The decline was offset by an 85% rise in civilian casualties resulting from radio-controlled devices, which killed 257 civilians and injured 892 in 2013.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

Afghanistan reported 19 cluster munitions contaminated areas covering 7.27km² at the end of 2013, a reduction of three areas and 0.37km² from the level of contamination identified in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension report submitted in late 2012.[5] These are contaminated with US BLU 97 submunitions and block access to grazing and agricultural land.[6] Contamination by submunitions is more extensive as operators continue to encounter scattered remnants in other areas, but operator reporting forms do not disaggregate UXO and cluster munitions so these do not show up in Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) data.[7]

Other ERW

Afghanistan contends with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as some abandoned explosive ordnance. Random items of UXO are scattered over much of the country and will continue to be found for decades, but concentrated contamination recorded as battlefield areas now account for a little under 10% of total contamination.

Despite the shrinking battlefield area, ERW casualties rose by 63% in 2013, according to the UN, which documented 114 civilian deaths and 229 injured. A major concern is the contamination left on firing ranges used by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), underlined by reports of a sharp rise in casualties on firing ranges and former bases in 2013 and 2014, partly as a result of the accelerated closure of bases by international forces leaving Afghanistan. MACCA reported around 70 people have been killed or injured by UXO on these ranges since 2012 although media reports say the figure is likely to be much higher.

ISAF has identified 184 ranges, many of which are unmarked, as well as 231 “sites of kinetic engagement,” or battle strike locations, but has yet to supply a complete list of ranges.[8] US press reports say the military rejected a MACCA request to fence off a range located beside Bagram airbase as too expensive and unrealistic.[9] In discussion with MACCA, ISAF and NATO agreed in 2013 to conduct clearance and hired a commercial company, formerly EOD Technology (EODT) but now Sterling Global Operations, to survey the ranges.[10]

Mine Action Program

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by MACCA.[11] From 2001, this was a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management supported by an UNMAS project office.[12]

As of January 2014, MACCA had a total staff of 191, reduced from 339 in 2012 as a result of cuts particularly in the staffing of area mine action centers (AMACs), now named MACCA regional offices. By March 2013, the number of international staff in the UNMAS project office had fallen to four (from eight in 2012), providing oversight and advisory support to MACCA, administering donor funds provided for clearance and coordination through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), and monitoring and evaluating project implementation.[13]

MACCA’s restructuring is taking place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had “entrusted interim responsibility” for coordinating mine action to the UN.[14] In 2008, a government Interministerial Board assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), which reports to the Office of the Second Vice President. As of January 2014, the DMC had 15 staff located in the MACCA offices.[15] Since 2012, discussions have continued among key stakeholders on the best formula for managing mine action. Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request said the aim was to “absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.”[16]

Afghanistan is in the process of drafting a mine action law aimed specifically at fulfilling the requirements of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As of February 2014, a technical committee comprising concerned ministries and MACCA had reviewed the draft law and was due to send it to the Ministry of Justice to be included as an annex to a 2005 law on firearms and explosive materials.[17]

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). The most active international NGOs are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust. Since 2012, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has had a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.[18]

Strategic planning

Afghanistan’s clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 is set down in the Article 5 deadline extension request it submitted in March 2012 and revised in August of the same year. The request foresees clearance of all antivehicle mines and battlefield areas as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidated the then 4,442 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects would be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.

The MAPA program for the Afghan year 1392 (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014) prepared by MACCA and implementing partners targeted clearance of 712 hazards covering a total of 78km², including 483 antipersonnel mined areas covering 24km², 195 antivehicle mined areas covering more than 43km², and 34 ERW hazards over a total area of 10km². If fulfilled, the plan would result in 17 districts being cleared of mines, but achieving those targets depended on receiving funding at the levels projected by the implementing partners preparing the plan.[19]

Land Release

Following years of accelerating clearance, the total amount of land released through clearance of mined and battle areas fell for the second successive year in 2013, by 28%. Some of the fall-off in the pace of land release is accounted for by the shrinking amount of battle area contamination and clearance. More significantly, a steady rise in clearance of mined areas recorded from 2008 to 2012 reversed in 2013 when operations were hampered by lower levels of donor support and the amount of mined land cleared dropped 22% from the previous year to 60km².[20]

 Mine clearance in 2009–2013 (km²)[21]

Survey in 2013

The “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) which MACCA started in 2012 continued during 2013, implemented by HALO (21 teams), MCPA (21 teams), DAFA (five teams), and OMAR (two teams), which visited a total of 23,344 communities. Their survey resulted in a net addition of 27km² of contamination to the database, identifying 527 previously unrecorded hazards totaling 38km² and affecting around 45,000 people, and canceling 127 areas totaling 10.5km². Survey teams found 22,695 of the communities visited in 2013 to be free of known mined or battle areas but also conducted spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks destroying more than 13,000 items of UXO.[22]

MACCA and operators had planned the MEIFCS as a two-year resurvey of all Afghanistan’s 398 districts but have had to recalculate the duration to allow for a far greater number of communities than expected—in some districts triple the number recorded in the official gazetteer that was the reference point for planning the survey. More than half the communities surveyed in 2013 did not appear in the gazetteer. By the end of the year, teams had completed survey in 64 districts, bringing the total surveyed to 135 out of a total in the country of 398. Implementing partners have also held back from conducting survey in more than 30 districts because of insecurity, an issue that may delay completion or curtail the extent of the survey.[23] Five members of a HALO survey team were abducted in June 2013. They were released unharmed but their vehicle was not recovered.[24]

Mine clearance in 2013

Afghanistan remained one of the most strongly funded mine action programs in the world in 1392 (2013−2014) but delays in funding and resulting interruptions in operations took their toll on productivity. Implementing Partners cleared 60km² in 2013, down by more than a quarter from 77km² the previous year, although the 19,181 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2013 only dropped marginally (by 6%).[25]

The uncertain outlook for donor support has raised serious doubts about the ability of the MAPA to deploy sufficient capacity to fulfil Afghanistan’s clearance targets. The number of personnel employed in mine action has dropped from a peak of 14,300 in 2011 to around 8,800 as of May 2014 and looked set to sustain further significant cuts in the coming year.[26]

As an example of this pattern, ATC, a long-established Implementing Partner, reported in mid-2013 that it had no projects in hand and had to stand down all but a core of staff needed to maintain its headquarters.[27] MDC reported laying off 29 teams and 488 staff at the end of 2013 due to lack of funds.[28] OMAR was one of the few that expected to maintain its capacity of 890 staff with the same level of donor support in 2014 as the previous year.[29] HALO, the biggest operator in Afghanistan, finished 2013 with total staff of 2,793, much the same capacity as at the start of the year, but a fall-off in funding through the middle of the year and a corresponding reduction in staffing contributed to a drop of around 13% in area cleared. Other factors contributing to lower productivity included the more remote location and the more difficult terrain of many tasks remaining to be addressed.[30]

Despite the bleaker funding outlook, HALO has support from the United Kingdom (UK) government Department for International Development (DfID) up to 2018 for demining Herat province and multi-year commitments from other donors which it believed would suffice to maintain capacity in 2014. It also operates a weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD) program that destroyed 749 tons of explosives and explosive items, including 1,652 antipersonnel mines and 253 antivehicle mines recovered from communities or seized by Afghan security forces. HALO also conducted some 7,872 spot EOD tasks destroying 528 antipersonnel mines and 18 antivehicle mines and is seeking support for its role in the Afghanistan Peace and Integration Process under which it has taken on and trained more than 300 reintegrees.[31]

EODT completed a two-year contract intended to clear high- and medium-priority mined areas in Kandahar, one of the most conflicted areas of Afghanistan, funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but, as of writing, the UAE had not committed to support additional projects. Operations by HALO in insecure Logar province demonstrated the continuing scope for progress in mine clearance despite the risks of insurgency in many parts of the country[32] but Implementing Partners also continued to work extensively through community-based demining (CBD) teams, adding 111 new teams in 2013 and standing down 96, leaving a total of 57 operating at the end of 2013. CBD operations cost US$15.3 million in 2013, accounting for one-fifth of mine action spending.[33]

Mine clearance in 2013[34]

Quality management

Since reductions of staff in 2012, MACCA has conducted external quality assurance through a seven-person unit in Kabul and 40 staff in its regional mine action offices, conducting fewer on-site visits and placing more emphasis on monitoring project management application and quarterly reviews of each project. The downturn in field visits combined with pressure on Implementing Partners to cut costs spurred some operators to voice concerns about declining standards. MACCA reported conducting 2,087 field visits to monitor demining, survey, risk education, and victim assistance operations in 2013 and said there was no evidence of a drop in standards. MACCA was exploring the possibility of expanding its field monitoring capacity by training provincial staff of its parent institution, ANDMA.[35]

Safety of demining personnel

One deminer was killed and 21 injured in demining incidents in 2013, compared with three killed and 13 injured the previous year.[36] HALO reported that a deminer was killed by a PMN mine in Baghlan province in the course of clearing mines on sloping terrain. Three other HALO deminers were injured, two in Takhar province and the fourth in Baghlan province. All of them occurred on mountainous, steeply sloping land.

Insurgency and criminality continued to pose the main threat to deminers, although the number of security incidents dropped from 53 in 2012 to 39 last year. Eight mine action staff were killed and four injured in security incidents in 2013, compared with six killed and 10 injured in 2012. Mine action teams suffered a number of abductions by anti-government elements or criminals, also losing 13 vehicles, 92 detectors, and 23 VHF radios.[37]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2012), Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023.

Afghanistan’s extension request, prepared by MACCA and Implementing Partners and assessed by the ICBL as the most comprehensive produced by any country so far, underlined that the program had the capacity to complete clearance of known mined areas but that its ability to do so depended primarily on sustained donor support. Little more than one year into the extension period, donor fatigue for funding Afghanistan’s mine action threatens to undermine any prospect of achieving those targets and potentially the coherence of the program.

In 1392 (ending in March 2014), the first year of the extension, donors provided a total of more than US$71 million, a drop of only 3% from the previous year and sufficient to keep Afghanistan as the world’s biggest program, but the request had projected the program’s financial needs at almost $85 million; the shortfall, combined with delays in delivery (notably from the US, the biggest donor) had a disproportionate impact, delaying deployment of demining teams and reducing the amount of clearance in 2013.

Funding for humanitarian clearance has fallen more sharply in 1393 (2014−2015) leaving the program, as of May 2014, close to 40% short of the level targeted in the extension request (see Support for Mine Action section below). The downturn resulted partly from cuts in support from the US linked to the decision of the outgoing government of President Hamid Karzai not to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, although the US was reportedly considering providing substantially higher levels of support for commercial companies to clear US military firing ranges. The shortfall raised the possibility of more cuts in MACCA staff coordinating Afghan mine action and some Implementing Partners, leaving the program insufficient capacity to implement its extension request targets.[38]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2013

MACCA reported release of three areas affected by cluster munitions totaling 0.37km² in 2013. Of the total, according to MACCA data, two operators—HALO and MCPA—cleared 0.05km² and destroyed one submunition. HALO, however, reported clearing 2,318m² and destroyed 220 submunitions. IPs report tackling submunitions on demining and battle area clearance (BAC) tasks, although some operators only record them as UXO. HALO, for example, reported clearing 21 submunitions in the course of mined area clearance, 80 submunitions in the course of BAC, and a further 236 items in spot EOD tasks.[39]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022.

MACCA has not recorded clearance of cluster munitions separately from other types of UXO but Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request provides for clearance of all ERW, including submunitions, by 2020.[40]

Support for Mine Action

The MAPA obtained funding totaling US$74 million for the Afghan year 1391 (ending March 2013) and $71 million for 1392 (ending March 2014), including $52 million pledged bilaterally and $19 million pledged through the UN VTF. The Afghan government provided $2.56 million in 2013 for clearance of Aynak copper mine, a project being undertaken by MDC.[41]

International donors in Afghan year 1392 included the US, UAE, Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Japan, Canada (Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA), the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, Sweden, European Union, Ireland, Denmark, PATRIP (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan Regional Integration Programme), Italy, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Belgium, Austria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Lithuania.

The extension request targeted $77 million in mine action expenditure in Afghan year 1392, but as of May 2014, the program had not attracted support from a number of previously important donors, including the European Union, and had secured funding amounting to only $30 million with initial pledges for another $17 million leaving the program at least 38% short.[42]

Recommendations

·         MACCA should provide an update on funding available for 2014 (Afghan year 1393) and in prospect for 2015 (Afghan year 1394) and the implications for MAPA capacity and implementation of the work plan and timelines set out in the Article 5 extension request.

·         MACCA should consider the implications of funding shortfalls on its ability to fully complete its Article 5 obligations and adapt its strategic plans accordingly.

Summary action points

·         Develop, adopt, and implement a national disability plan, with a monitoring structure included.

·         Expand access to physical rehabilitation needs, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to receive rehabilitation is difficult for survivors.

·         Ensure that meaningful participation of survivors is increased at all levels.

·         Prioritize physical accessibility, particularly for services and for government buildings.

Victim assistance commitments

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Afghanistan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The Monitor identified 1,048 casualties due to mines, victim-activated IEDs, and ERW in Afghanistan for 2013. The total included 483 civilian and deminer casualties of mines/ERW recorded by MACCA and 557 casualties of victim-activated IEDs recorded by UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), as well as eight foreign military casualties reported in the media.[1] The 2013 casualty total represented a decrease from the 1,422 casualties[2] due to mines, victim-activated IEDs, and ERW identified in Afghanistan for 2012.

The vast majority (99%) of recorded casualties in 2013 were civilians. Far fewer military casualties were identified in 2013 than in previous years, though that may not be entirely representative of a trend due to changing availability of data.[3]

Children (486) made up 47% of the total civilian casualties where the age was known, including 70 girls. In 2012, children (432) accounted for 34% of civilian casualties. Another 547 civilian casualties in 2013 were adults, including at least 64 women.[4]

In 2013, there were 21 demining accidents resulting in 22 deminer casualties; one deminer was killed, 14 were severely injured, and seven deminers had minor injuries. This was an increase in comparison to 2012, when Afghanistan had 16 casualties (three killed, five severely injured, and eight with minor injuries) from 19 demining accidents. In 2013, the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) made efforts to reduce the number of accidents by raising the issue with key actors and implementers to address the root causes of accidents. Approximately 70% of demining accidents occurred in first six months of the year and around 40% of all accidents occurred in the first quarter of 2013.[5]

Of the casualty total for 2013, 465 mine and ERW casualties were reported by MACCA (133 people were killed and 332 were injured); 364 (78%) of these casualties were children. Of the 2013 MACCA total recorded casualties, 397 (85%) were due to ERW and the remaining 66 (14%) were due to mines.[6] Another two casualties (1%) were the result of abandoned improvised explosive devices. The MACCA total of 465 casualties was an increase of 26% (97) compared to 2012 when there were 363 casualties (91 killed; 272 injured), including 267 children.[7]

UNAMA noted that the increase in civilian casualties from ERW in 2013 corresponded to increased ground engagements between parties to the conflict. A possible second cause was the expedited pace of closure of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bases and high explosive firing ranges, as many of the ranges were not sufficiently cleared of ERW prior to closure.[8] In 2013, both the MACCA and UNAMA expressed strong concerns about a sharp rise in civilian casualties from ERW.[9] MACCA recorded 34 casualties that occurred on firing ranges in 2013 and 23 in 2012; the vast majority of these casualties were children: 91% in 2013 and 78% (18) in 2012. Of the 64 casualties from ERW on firing ranges recorded from 2010 through 2013, almost all occurred during livelihood activities including tending animals, household work, collecting food, water, or wood, hunting, recreation, and travelling; only two were due to tampering.[10]

For 2013 and 2012, the total number of victim-activated IED casualties reported with disaggregated data was far higher than those identified in previous years.  Of the 557 reported civilian victim-activated IED casualties reported by UNAMA in 2013, 245 people were killed and 312 injured. This was a significant decrease from the 913 civilian victim-activated IED casualties (393 killed and 520 injured) reported by UNAMA for 2012.[11] However, by mid-2014 UNAMA reported that the number of victim activated IED casualties was again increasing.[12]

ERW, landmines, and abandoned IEDs severely affected internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan. In 2013, IDPs (97) made up more than 20% of all civilian mine/ERW casualties recorded by MACCA.[13] There were an increasing number of IDP casualties during the period from 2010 to 2013 (97 in 2013, 94 in 2012, 45 in 2011, and 72 in 2010). This increase in casualties among this extremely vulnerable population likely resulted from an escalation of the conflict and ground operations between both national and international military forces and armed opposition groups as well as IDPs moving to live near hazard areas without knowledge of the risks or other choices of relocation. In early 2014, there were estimated to be around 176,129 IDPs still living near 434 known hazardous areas (in a radius of 5km²).[14]

MACCA data indicated that, between 1979 and 2013, there had been 22,546 mine/ERW casualties (people 4,389 killed and 18,157 injured), not including victim-activated IED casualties.[15]

Cluster munition casualties

Since 1980, 745 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[16] No cluster munition casualties have been recorded by MACCA since 2010.[17]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown, but in 2006 the number was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[18]

Victim assistance since 1999[19]

Access to victim assistance in Afghanistan was hampered by a severe lack of services, poor to non-existent infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. However, Afghanistan did make progress in victim assistance and disability issues, supported by significant international funds that were needed to improve services and conditions. A lack of coordination among donors funding services for persons with disabilities alongside other competing priorities for assistance was identified as a challenge. Over time, ministries demonstrated more national ownership of services for persons with disabilities, which were integrated into ministry policies and strategic planning with the assistance of MACCA technical advisors. National NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and survivors’ organization became increasingly active and participated regularly in disability coordination.

Movement restrictions (due to conflict, lack of roads, and the cost of transport) were persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country that continued through 2013.

Despite improvements, geographic coverage of healthcare remained insufficient, particularly in terms of physical rehabilitation. Physical rehabilitation services were almost entirely operated by international NGOs and the ICRC under the coordination of the government. Psychosocial support services increased from almost non-existent, as did peer-to-peer support, though they were still hardly available and remained insufficient to meet demand and needs. A community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network grew and became better coordinated. Economic reintegration projects were limited and conducted mostly by NGOs under the coordination of relevant ministries, while ministries paid some disability pensions to war victims and ran some vocational training. Inclusive education has increased since 2008.

Victim assistance in 2013

In 2013, no new centers were established, and no existing centers were closed. However, all organizations had a difficult time in funding their projects and activities.[20] This resulted in an overall decline in the number of projects being implemented and some organizations were unable to fulfill their planned projects and overall mandates due to a decrease in international financial support.[21]

Many donors reduced their funding due to political reasons, the changing security situation or other factors. Although resources were greatly reduced, there were still some donors who sustained their support for persons with disabilities in ways that included survivors.[22] In addition, there was a fear of funding shortages due to the reduced involvement of the international community in the country connected to the withdrawal of the international military forces by the end of 2014.[23]

In 2013, the MACCA and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)—increased financial support to victim assistance and disability-related projects to six national and international NGOs working in eight provinces.[24] With the funding, these NGOs implemented projects in the areas of physical rehabilitation, physical accessibility, mainstreaming centers, peer support, vocational training, inclusive education, awareness, advocacy, and capacity-building for persons with disabilities, their families, community, and related government staff.[25]

Afghanistan announced that in March 2013 some articles of the Law on the Rights and Benefits of Persons with Disabilities were amended to be “more in line with CRPD [Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities] principles”. Changes that were made to the law included additions which did not benefit all persons with disabilities equally, such as increased financial support for persons with war related disabilities.[26]

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, a list of disability and physical rehabilitation indicators was developed. It was undergoing the approval process by the Health and Management Information System (HMIS) department of the Ministry of Public Health as of September 2014.[27]

Child Protection units of the Ministry of Education (MoE) collected data from the field throughout the country which is reported to MACCA by the MoE Safety and Security Department.[28] Also, Afghanistan reported that, with the support of MACCA, a National Disability Referral Guide (NDRG) including software was developed to collect data from national and international disability stakeholders and develop a national referral system for service delivery.[29]

After a one year pause due to lack of funding (April 2012 to March 2013), Handicap International (HI) restarted its Community Based Mine Risk Education (CBMRE) project with teams in eight districts in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. This project identified people with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, and provided referrals to physical rehabilitation services (see Physical rehabilitation section below).[30]

Most service providers collected information on the needs of survivors for use in their own programs. All recent assessments were carried out at local or regional levels focusing on specific issues such as physical rehabilitation or accessibility. The last comprehensive disability survey was in 2005.[31]

Victim assistance coordination[32]

MoLSAMD is the focal point for victim assistance and broader disability issues. The MoPH and the MoE are involved in disability services and advocacy activities. The MoPH also coordinates training programs for physiotherapists and healthcare providers.[33] The work of these three key ministries is supported by MACCA technical advisors, who are funded by UNMAS.

The meetings are not very regular and the only real activity in 2013 was publishing the CBR guidelines with the support of MACCA and other partners. Also, the network remains very weak.[34]

In 2013, MACCA’s senior technical coordinator at the MoPH, along with its victim assistance senior technical advisors to MoLSAMD and the MoE, carried out a study of eight victim assistance components in Afghanistan.[35] The outcome was an improved understanding of the scope of problems and challenges with corresponding recommendations. A detailed list of projects to be prioritized for seeking funding was developed based on the study.[36]

The MoPH is responsible for medical treatment and physical rehabilitation. Its plan of action consists of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS); physiotherapy services are included in both, while prosthetic services were only included in the EPHS. Although it is in the framework and action plans, physical rehabilitation including delivery of services and funding were not yet managed by the MoPH.[37] The MoPH Strategic Framework 2011–2015 counted improving disability services among its priorities, and the ministry’s focal point for disability, the Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Department (DRD), had an implementation strategy for the framework. MoLSAMD was responsible for the social inclusion of persons with disabilities through benefits and the pension system, while the MoE worked toward ensuring access to education. MACCA assists with overall coordination in the areas of disability and victim assistance.[38]

In September 2013, a specific coordination committee for victim assistance was established by MACCA. This victim assistance coordination mechanism aims to enhance the coordination of victim assistance within MACCA, government line ministries (MoPH, MoLSAMD, and MoE), MAPA implementing partners, and other victim assistance stakeholders working in Afghanistan. The VA [Victim Assistance] Coordination Group aims to hold bi-monthly meetings to review implementation of victim assistance and disability activities and to ensure that they are implemented in accordance with the Afghanistan Mine Action Standards for victim assistance and priorities identified by the relevant government ministries. Four VA Coordination Group Meetings were held between September 2013 and May 2014. Through the VA Coordination Group meeting, MACCA and UNMAS also presented the requirements for receiving donor project funding and its balance scorecard monitoring tool designed to systematically measure all mine action activities, as well as its implementing partner selection process.[39]

Several other coordination groups, including those noted above, regularly held meetings relevant to victim assistance and disability rights both nationally (from Kabul) and at the regional level. MACCA and the participating ministries reported that these meetings resulted in improved coordination and cooperation between actors; strengthened support and cooperation between the responsible ministries and other stakeholders; and improved advocacy and awareness-raising. Most victim assistance service providers and actors reported having attended most meetings.[40] The various coordination group meetings included the following:

·         DSCG meetings, led by MoLSAMD and supported by MACCA technical advisors, were held monthly in 2013, and additional meetings were held to address specific disability issues;

·         The Inter-ministerial Taskforce on Disability, chaired by the MoPH-DRD and hosted by MoLSAMD, met twice; meetings addressed coordination among different ministries on the implementation of disability legislation;

·         The Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce, coordinated by the MoPH, organized four meetings in 2013; the task force finalized the technical and non-technical standards for physiotherapy and orthopedic technologies, organized working group meetings to complete guidelines for health and rehabilitation services for persons with paraplegia, and finalized the EPHS guideline including its translation into local languages;

·         The Inclusive Child Friendly Education-Coordination Working Group (ICFE-CWG), chaired by the MoE, met monthly in 2013 to discuss issues relevant to children with disabilities, particularly inclusive education. An inclusive education policy was drafted, translated into national languages, and shared with MoE for review and approval by its scientific and academic council;[41]

·         The Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ACPD) under the secretariat of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) met on an as-needed basis to promote implementation of the CRPD.

In 2013, the process of developing a draft of the Afghanistan National Policy for Persons with Disabilities continued with a third draft completed by early 2014; this was to be shared once again with government agencies and stakeholders for further feedback. The Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan (ANDAP) 2008–2011 had not been revised; revision of the plan was pending the completion of the disability policy.[42] Guidelines for the constitution of National Disability Rights Commission were also developed. However, these were not yet put into practice by October 2014.[43] The commission would monitor and ensure the protection and promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities while also having the responsibility to monitor the progress of implementation of victim assistance obligations and commitments.[44]

It was reported that, although there was a lot of discussion taking place in the relevant ministries, the impact on the needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors, was limited and few practical effective results were seen.[45]

Afghanistan provided information on progress in and challenges to victim assistance at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meeting and Meeting of States Parties in 2014. Afghanistan was the co-coordinator for victim assistance for the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2013–2014. Afghanistan also presented victim assistance developments at the Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013 and Third Review Conference in 2014.[46] Afghanistan made extensive use of all sections of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2013, using form H to present victim assistance achievements, the overall state of assistance, ministry contacts, and the budget required to further implementation assistance. Afghanistan also included detailed reporting on victim assistance activities in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting for 2013.[47]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were included in the planning and provision of victim assistance. Persons with disabilities and their representative organizations were included in decision-making and participated in the various coordination bodies. However, it was sometimes reported their views were not fully taken into account.[48]

Parents of children with disabilities were involved in MoE inclusive education training in Kabul, which resulted in increased enrollment of children with disabilities into mainstream schools.[49] Many NGOs had a significant proportion of employees who were persons with disabilities. Mine/ERW survivors were included in the implementation of peer support, rehabilitation, and other services. Persons with disabilities employed by MACCA supported the activities of the key ministries and were included in NGO activities that MACCA supported.[50]

The ICRC Afghan Physical Rehabilitation Project was managed by persons with disabilities. Through 2013, the rehabilitation project maintained a policy of “positive discrimination,” employing and training only people with disabilities. Service provision was entirely managed by survivors and persons with disabilities, including technical and administrative positions. The ICRC continuously consulted with and involved the survivors in the decision-making process as survivors were fully integrated into its operations. The positive discrimination policy also aimed to demonstrate that people with disabilities are an asset to society, not a burden.[51]

In 2013, HI closely worked with local Shura structures to involve persons with disabilities in community decision making process. Ten persons with disabilities were included as Shura members in Herat province.[52]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[53]

Emergency and continuing medical care

Obtaining appropriate and timely medical treatment in conflict-affected areas remained difficult for much of the population. Attacks on medical personnel and facilities further impeded services.[54]

ICRC-supported hospitals treated 2,023 weapon-wounded patients in 2013; some 47% (950) were injured by mines or ERW.[55] About half of the all weapon-wounded patients (over 1,000) in 2013 reached the hospitals in southern Afghanistan through an ICRC-funded transport system, which had a new referral procedure and improved monitoring.[56]

A report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in February 2014 found that the cost of healthcare was exacerbating the poverty of already very poor people in Afghanistan. Most of the population had access to basic public healthcare. However the quality was reported to be extremely low, resulting in many patients resorting to seeking higher cost private services paid for “out-of pocket” with borrowed money. This in turn resulted in a cycle of debt.[57]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation was not available in all provinces. Rehabilitation centers are concentrated in 12 of the 34 Afghan provinces and patients often are forced to travel long distances to access services. The annual production of mobility devices in the country indicates that the existing centers are insufficient to meet demand. In 2013, physical rehabilitation services were available through a network of 17 centers, seven of which are managed by the ICRC; the others were managed by NGOs, with the exception of two that were managed by the MoPH (in Kabul and Khost, “with negligible impact on the needs”).[58] The obstacles to rehabilitation were reported to be numerous; the ICRC listed the following: “ignorance, lack of compassion, dedication, accountability and professionalism among medical personnel, prejudices against disability, poverty, distances and transport difficulties, violence, ethnicity and political divisions.”[59]

The Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) was reviewed in 2013 and disability and physical rehabilitation were included in the revised EPHS, which was intended to make the rehabilitation services more sustainable. Through the new EPHS, disability and physical rehabilitation are better recognized by the health services providers and personnel.[60]

The ICRC reported that the number of new patients registered for rehabilitation increased by 12% from 7,929 in 2012 to 8,902 in 2013, while the total number of people assisted increased by 18%.[61] Delivery of prostheses in ICRC-supported centers also rose by 7% (to 4,335) in 2013 (61% for mine/ERW survivors).[62] Among the total number of newly registered amputees (1,203) at the ICRC-managed centers, approximately 45% (540) were mine/ERW survivors. However, in Helmand province, the most conflict-affected province in the country, the percentage of survivors was almost 70%.[63] Overall, the geographic coverage was unchanged and the quality of the services remained good. Following intensive training of physiotherapists and orthopedic technicians in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province, the assistance available was extended to persons with impairments and needs who had previously been referred to other centers.[64] Construction of a new rehabilitation center in Faizabad was suspended owing to technical problems.[65]

Geographical coverage improved in Kabul and Parwan provinces as a result of HI providing community-based rehabilitation services through local partners Serving Emergence Relief and Vocation Enterprise (SERVE) and Women Affairs’ Counsel (WAC) in March 2013. In 2013, HI also introduced new rehabilitation services in those provinces in the southern region of Afghanistan, including production of upper limb prosthesis and the construction and development of an advanced gait-training area for patients. Coverage was maintained in Herat and Kandahar province; the number of beneficiaries at HI’s Kandahar physical rehabilitation center increased by some 12% in 2013.[66]

In 2013, HI VA Teams in Kandahar and Helmand provinces identified and referred 354 persons with disabilities, including survivors, to HI’s Physical Rehabilitation Centre in Kandahar and to the ICRC Orthopedic Workshop in Lashkar Gah based on their location and needs. Out of those people with referrals, only about 60% managed to get rehabilitation services while for various reasons, including an inability to pay for transport or the high level of insecurity, the remaining 140 persons with disabilities referred could not access the rehabilitation centers.[67]

Social and economic inclusion and psychological support

In most ICRC rehabilitation centers, sport became a consolidated activity to effectively address physical rehabilitation and social reintegration. Throughout 2013, the ICRC continued to support the development of wheelchair basketball in Afghanistan. Teams existed in Kabul (men and women), Mazar (men and women), Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Maimana, with approximately 210 players nationally. In 2013, two national tournaments were organized (one for men and one for women) and the Afghan Paralympic Committee selected a national team to apply to attend official international competitions.[68]

The ICRC provided micro-credits for persons with disabilities and their families to become more self-sufficient, provided vocational training, distributed stationery kits to students, and supported home tuition for children.[69]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, has remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, though some national and international NGOs provided these services.[70] HI found that psychosocial support services were still almost non-existent.[71] The MoPH trained 200 psychological support counselors who began working in district hospitals. ALSO peer support activities and projects funded by MACCA/UNMAS in 2013 operated in Kabul, Herat, Bamyan, and Balkh to provide support and counseling sessions.[72] Survivor networks and disability NGOs including AABRAR, ALSO, Accessibility Organization for Afghan Disabled (AOAD), CCD, DAO, HI, and SCA, as well as the national skill development programs of MoLSAMD conducted a range of economic inclusion activities including vocational training and skill development.[73]

The MoE inclusive education project, technically and financially supported by UNMAS/MACCA, trained more than 2,500 school teachers in six provinces[74] and provided sign language and braille script teacher training in Kabul.[75]

Accessibility

Physical barriers remained one of the main obstacles to persons with disabilities and survivors accessing and receiving services. The majority of buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities, thereby excluding many from benefitting from education and healthcare.[76]

Disability NGOs continued working on physical accessibility in public facilities, particularly MACCA/UNMAS-funded physical accessibility projects in Kabul, Herat, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces implemented by AOAD to make public buildings and services accessible according to priorities set by the MoLSAMD.[77] AABRAR constructed ramps (accessibility ways) in 17 provinces.[78] ALSO completed the second phase of a physical accessibility project at the Blue Mosque in Balkh Province. However, an ALSO project to make 40 health clinics in Bamyan province accessible, supported by CPI, was suspended due to funding shortages.[79] DAO also worked with partners, building ramps in mosques and schools in Kabul.[80]

Persons with disability interviewed by HI highlighted that accessibility codes were not respected in construction of commercial markets, which impeded their ability to establish their own small businesses in recognized market areas.[81]

Gender

In 2013, women and children were marginalized and were not adequately targeted for the provision of services by the international donor organizations.[82]

HI’s March 2013 needs assessment in Kandahar found that women with disabilities were more marginalized than men with similar impairments.[83] It was found that women with disabilities “lacked awareness about their rights, abilities and opportunities.” Most depended upon family members to sustain their livelihoods.[84] HI also conducted a household disability survey in two districts of Herat province that revealed that almost a quarter of households were headed by a female and that over half of all heads of households were illiterate. As head of household, the rate of unemployment was far higher among women (65%) than male heads of households (22%).[85]

In 2013, the ICRC supported professional skills training of local prosthetic and orthotic technicians and physiotherapists in partnership with the MoPH; a third of the students (6 of 18) were women. More than half of ICRC students (14 of 26) supported for diploma study in physiotherapy were women.[86]

There were also reported to be more organizations implementing age- and gender-sensitive economic inclusion projects in 2013. ALSO provided training in tailoring as home-based work, which enabled women with disabilities to improve their income, in part because they were often prevented from working outside the home or due to physical, attitudinal, and cultural barriers.[87]

Laws and policies

The rights of persons with disabilities were promoted during 2013; however, there still remained much to be done in this regard.[88] The Law on the Rights and Benefits of Persons with Disabilities was amended[89] and published in Official Gazette Number 1099 on 18 March 2013.. However, the law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the CRPD. MoLSAMD accorded special treatment to families of those killed and injured in war, which was the only group to receive financial support for persons with disabilities.[90] Other provisions were applicable to all persons with disabilities regardless of the cause of their disabilities.[91]

When the National Disability Law on the Rights and Privileges of Disabled was amended, welfare payments for people with disabilities caused by war were raised and ranged from AFS1,500 to AFS5,000 (approximately US$30 to $90) per month; the quota of governmental scholarships reserved for persons with disabilities was increased from 5% to 7%; the quota of housing set aside for persons with disabilities was also increased to 7%. The land was to be provided free of cost for persons with disabilities (rather than with a 50% discount as was provided previously) and housing with a 30% discount (instead of a 20% discount).[92]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, which include healthcare and financial protection.[93] Despite intense lobbying efforts, the ACPD and DSCG did not succeed in pushing the government to develop implementation plans for the CRPD and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Action plans have not been developed and are delayed compared to what is recommended in the timeframes of those conventions’ instruments.[94] Several disability awareness- and CRPD-training sessions for health staff were held in 2013, including monitoring visits of health facilities, through which the level of awareness and understanding of disability rights increased.[95]

Afghanistan ratified the CRPD on 18 September 2012.

Since 2008, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has received more than US$500 million in international assistance for mine action. In 2012, it received $90.6 million from 18 donor governments and the European Union (EU), more than any other country both in the amount of the contributions and the number of donors. The United States (US) contributed $40 million in 2012, the same as in 2011, representing some 40% of the total international mine action assistance in Afghanistan. Six donors contributed more than $4 million each.[1]

In September 2011, in its continuing support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan that began in 1997, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) committed $25.83 million to mine action to conduct community-based mine action services in Kandahar province.[2] The UAE selected the US-based company EOD Technology to implement the project.[3] The first installment, paid in late 2011, was for $1,999,975.[4] In 2012, the UAE allocated $13,397,300 to the company, Sterling Global Operations to continue clearance operations in Kandahar province.[5]

Afghanistan also reported that $128 million was spent from April 2010 to 31 March 2012 to check for landmines over a total of 100km² in conjunction with development and construction activities. This included $42.6 million in payments to 21 international and national commercial companies from April 2011 to March 2012, which found four antipersonnel mines, 40 antivehicle mines, 23,000 items of unexploded ordnance, and 71,000 pieces of small arms ammunition while checking a total of 48km².[6]

The government of Afghanistan committed $4.1 million to mine action from December 2010 to July 2012, to be paid in quarterly installments. Of the $4.1 million, $94,435 is for clearance at the Eshposhta coal mine.[7] In 2012, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) reported that the government of Afghanistan had contributed $1.8 million to mine action.[8]

International contributions: 2012[9]

Victim Assistance

Victim assistance is integrated within the broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector.[10] Consequently, overall funding to victim assistance is under-reported. The US, Norway, Germany, and Italy reported direct funding from mine action sources to NGOs for victim assistance in 2012. Additionally, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that from the contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund earmarked for Afghanistan, $1,141,322 was allocated to victim assistance, of which approximately half came from earmarked funds from Italy. The remaining victim assistance funding through UNMAS came from contributions from Australia, Denmark, Germany, and Japan.[11]

Contributions for victim assistance: 2012

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[12]