Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 7 September 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 March 2011.

BiH has declared its ratification law under national implementation measures for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1] In September 2013, a government representative informed States Parties that “all the necessary legislation is in place.”[2] Previously, officials indicated that BiH was considering national legislation to enforce the ban convention.[3]

BiH submitted its initial Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 20 August 2011 and provided annual updated reports in 2012, 2013, and on 13 June 2014.[4]

BiH actively participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, making strong contributions based on its experience as a country affected by cluster munitions and declaring a national moratorium on cluster munition use prior to the conclusion of the process.[5]

BiH has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It has participated in the every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013 where it made statements on clearance and victim assistance. BiH has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in April 2014. BiH participated in a regional workshop on implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Zadar, Croatia in April 2014.[6] BiH served as the convention’s coordinator on victim assistance in 2012 and 2013 together with Afghanistan.

BiH has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

Interpretive issues

In July 2011, the director of the department of conventional weapons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the ministry’s views on a number of issues important for the interpretation and implementation of the convention. On the prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts during joint military operations or “interoperability,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “under the same Article 21, para 3, we may engage in joint military operations with non-states Parties that might engage in activities prohibited by the Convention, however our personnel or nationals should not provide assistance with activities prohibited by the Convention.”[8]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the “transit of cluster munitions across, or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, the national territory of States Parties is prohibited by the Convention.”[9] The ministry, however, noted that it does not have “access to or information on weapon types” stockpiled in European Union Force (EUFOR) military bases “on our territory.”[10] In May 2013, a Ministry of Defense official said the ministry has not inquired about the status of any foreign cluster munitions stored on EUFOR military bases in BiH.[11]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also stated that it considers “investment in the production of cluster munitions to be prohibited.”[12]

BiH is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, and transfer

Yugoslav forces and non-state armed groups used available stocks of cluster munitions during the 1992–1995 war. The various entity armies inherited cluster munitions during the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In its initial Article 7 report, BiH declared, “There are no production facilities for CM [Cluster Munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”[13]

BiH has acknowledged that it produced cluster munitions for a period of 11 years and stated in 2007 that production had ceased.[14] BiH produced KB-1 and KB-2 submunitions for the Orkan multi-barrel rocket system, artillery projectiles, and mortar bombs.[15] The production capacity included the ability to manufacture KB-series submunitions and integrate them into carrier munitions such as artillery projectiles and rockets.[16] According to Jane’s Information Group, the Ministry of Defense has produced the 262mm M-87 Orkan rocket, with each rocket containing 288 KB-1 dual-purpose submunitions.[17] Jane’s also lists BiH Armed Forces as possessing KPT-150 dispensers (which deploy submunitions) for aircraft.[18]

Stockpile destruction

BiH once possessed a stockpile of 445 cluster munitions and 148,059 submunitions.[19] This includes four M-93 120mm mortar projectiles containing 92 submunitions that were discovered after the 2011 completion of stockpile destruction.[20]

Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by BiH[21]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, BiH is required to destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019.

In September 2012, BiH announced that “We have fulfilled all obligations relating to Article 3” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions “by destroying all known and reported stocks of cluster munitions in 2011.”[22]

Almost all of the BiH stockpile of cluster munitions was destroyed in 2011, a total of 441 cluster munitions and 147,967 submunitions. From August to December 2011, three types of stockpiled cluster munitions and their submunitions were destroyed: 52 M-93 120mm mortar bombs, 56 M-87 262mm rockets, and 321 BL-755 bombs.[23] From 20 May to 30 June 2011, BiH destroyed 12 M-87 Orkan 262mm rockets and 74,721 KB-1 submunitions.[24] BiH reported destroying the stocks of 16,128 KB1 submunitions from the 56 M-87 Orkan 262mm rockets in 2012.[25]

In April 2012, BiH informed States Parties that four M-93 120mm mortar bombs containing 92 submunitions discovered after the 2011 stockpile destruction would be “destroyed accordingly.”[26] In April 2014, the Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Survivors Initiatives that the four bombs and their submunitions were destroyed by open detonation by the Ministry of Defense, thus completing any remaining stockpile destruction obligations.[27] However, BiH did not declare destruction of the munitions in its 2014 Article 7 report, which covers activities in calendar year 2013.[28]

In its November 2013 Article 7 report and again in the report provided June 2014, BiH declared the discovery of 341 KB-1 submunitions in Pretis, Vogosca and four KB-2 submunitions in Krupa, Hadzici.[29] In April 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations stated the munitions are under its jurisdiction and would be destroyed.[30]

In June 2014, local media reported the discovery of a cache of 114 KB-2 submunitions behind a family home near Sarajevo.[31]

Retention

BiH initially declared that it would not retain any cluster munitions for research or training purposes as permitted by Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[32] In its June 2014 Article 7 report, BiH listed 20 KB-1 submunitions as retained by Norwegian People’s Aid for mine detection dog training purposes.[33] According to NPA, it is retaining 30, not 20, KB1 submunitions, which have been made fuze-less, for training of mine detection dogs.[34]

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: POOR[1]

Mines

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) primarily as a result of the 1992–1995 conflict related to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Most of the minefields are in the zone of separation between BiH’s two political entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS)—which is 1,100km long and up to 4km wide. In southern and central BiH, mines were often used randomly, with few records kept. Some of the affected territory is mountainous or heavily forested, but the fertile agricultural belt in Brčko district is one of the most heavily contaminated areas.[2]

The BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) reported total contamination of 1,219km² at the end of 2013, a reduction of some 3.5% on 2012, in 9,416 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). A general assessment completed in 2012 identified 540,000 people in 1,417 communities as affected by mines, of which 136 communities (152,000 people) were at high risk.[3] BHMAC’s next general assessment is planned for 2015.[4]

BiH was severely affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014. On 23 May, BHMAC met with the directors of the mine action centers of Serbia and Croatia to coordinate their response to the threat of mines washed into areas previously considered safe. The centers pledged to share information, emphasize risk education (MRE) in the flood-affected zones, engage in emergency marking once the floods recede, and raise awareness of the impact of the lack of funds for mine action.[5]

Within Bosnia, 70% of the flood-affected area is in the mine-affected communities of Doboj, Maglaj, Olovo, Una-Sana Canton, Brčko, and Posavina area.[6] The UN reported that some 800km² of SHA was affected by the floods; the United States (US) Department of State reported the figure of 320km².[7] Bosnian authorities reported that the floods had moved mines, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and had damaged minefield fencing and signs. At an ammunition depot in Orasje, some 250 tons of ammunition were reported as being under water on 25 May 2014. There was a mine explosion in Brčko on 21 May 2014; no casualties were reported.[8] Landmine Survivors Initiatives reported that more than 3,000 mine survivors were living in the flood-affected region.[9]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine action personnel worked with local crisis coordination centers to provide landmine survey and mapping support to the emergency response in Brčko, Orasje, and Samac, to conduct MRE, and to place 52 emergency mine signs in Domaljecac-Samac. In May 2014, NPA also responded to emergency explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Brčko and Samac, destroying five items of UXO and one antipersonnel mine.[10]

On 26 May, the US Department of State deployed its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of civilian EOD experts to Bosnia to “work with local officials of both the Serbian and BiH Mine Action Centers to survey landmine-contaminated areas affected by the recent widespread floods.”[11] The European Union (EU), including its peacekeeping force in BiH (EUFOR), deployed experts “to assess the impact of floods and landslides on the location of mines.”[12] Belgian First Aid, the Belgian Military Academy, and Vrije University Brussels’ Department of Electronics and Informatics deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle and operating team to BiH to assist survey efforts.[13]

UNDP disseminated maps of the flooded mined areas through its Bosnia website.[14] The ICRC and National Society reported it was working with BHMAC to provide MRE.[15]

Cluster munition remnants

Aircraft of the former Yugoslav republic dropped BL-755 cluster bombs in the early stages of the 1992−1995 war, and there are indications that cluster bombs were subsequently used by NATO forces in Republika Srpska.[16]

The first phase of a general survey completed by NPA in 2011 identified 140 areas hit by air strikes and artillery, with an estimated total of 3,774 submunitions; additional contamination was located around a former ammunition factory at Pretis that was hit by a NATO air strike, scattering submunitions in the surrounding area. The survey identified 669 SHA polygons covering a total of 12.18km², of which 3.23km² is believed to be high risk. Some 5km² is contaminated by artillery-delivered submunitions, 3.9km² by BL-755, and 3.1km² by KB-1 submunition remnants.[17] SHAs were found in 39 municipalities, but 43% of the total SHA was located in the municipalities of Bužim, Cazin, Gornji, Tešanj, Travnik, Vakuf, and Vareš, with a total population of more than 226,660 inhabitants. Total cluster munition casualties recorded in BiH between 1992 and 2010 amounted to 42 people killed and a further 181 injured. Agricultural land and forest make up more than 82% of the total SHA, with land needed for housing and reconstruction accounting for another 15%.[18]

Other explosive remnants of war

Demining operations in BiH continue to clear scattered UXO. In addition, BiH has an area of more than 1km² in the vicinity of Zunovica, Hadzici where a Yugoslav National Army barracks and ammunition storage area was bombed in 1995. As of May 2013, the type of contamination had not been identified.[19]

Mine Action Program

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Demining Commission’s three members, representing BiH’s three majority ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats), propose the appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers, report to the council on mine action, approve accreditation of demining organizations, and facilitate cooperation between the FBiH and RS.

However, the principle of organizing BiH state-level bodies along ethnic lines has come under increasing scrutiny following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić and Finci case that the rights of two Bosnians of Roma and Jewish descent had been violated by being denied the opportunity to run for high-level elected office because they were not of the major ethnic groups.[20] A Demining Commissioner stated that efforts to establish a new Demining Law (see below) may either abolish the Demining Commission or add another member for “Others.”[21]

BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organizations.[22] BHMAC operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo and through two entity mine action offices—formerly autonomous entity mine action centers—and eight regional offices (Sarajevo, Pale, Travnik, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Brčko, and Bihać). The two entity offices coordinate the activities of regional offices in planning, survey, and quality control/assurance. Quality assurance inspectors are based in the regional offices.[23]

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities.[24] However, a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Civil Affairs with support from BHMAC and UNDP, first submitted to parliament in February 2010, failed to gain parliamentary approval in 2012. The law is said to face resistance from Bosnian Serb nationalist parties concerned about concentrating functions at the state level and from Bosnian Croat nationalists concerned about losing the ethnic quota on the Demining Commission,[25] as well as from demining personnel dissatisfied with the current BHMAC director.[26]

As of April 2014, the law had still not passed and according to a BHMAC official was unlikely to be reintroduced to parliament before the elections in October 2014.[27] A demining commissioner suggested the earliest a law could be passed would be in 2015.[28] This lack of a new legal framework has contributed to BiH’s repeated failure to meet its funding targets under its own mine action strategy. Moreover, in 2013 and through early 2014, BiH mine action governance received increasingly critical media attention. Newspapers called attention to the almost 12 years the BHMAC director has been in office.[29] There are currently no term limits on the position, one of the issues that the draft demining law has sought to address.[30]

In 2012, eight local companies and NGOs filed a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor against the BHMAC director, alleging irregularities in tendering demining contracts and sale of official vehicles. Reports about the investigation reemerged in the BiH media in early 2014. The director was arrested by police in April 2014 which, along with the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), searched BHMAC premises and the director’s house.[31] According to a spokesperson of the State Prosecutor’s office: “The suspect is under investigation for activities related to demining and over suspicions that he abused his official position and made illegal profits.”[32] A BHMAC statement said, “The process of demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a large humanitarian undertaking, because it depends on donors and their grants and, due to that, we have to be completely transparent to the public…We hope that after this, negative media reports about BHMAC will end so that the process of humanitarian demining can be completed.”[33] A local demining NGO official said he thought it was “one of the most dangerous times for mine action in Bosnia” as the negative press is drawing attention from “the good things” mine action is doing.[34] “It’s not good for BHMAC to be in the papers in that way,” a BHMAC official said, “But in terms of operations, we are still going.”[35] A Demining Commissioner said, “Of course this is very bad for demining in Bosnia” and that it “is now up to us” to “remove the doubts” of donors by providing “explanations” and “increasing the pace and performance of obligations with capacities that we have. We cannot stand and wait, but we have to work and act, and each should be responsible for their actions.”[36] The director of BHMAC was conditionally released from custody on 9 May 2014.[37]

The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–2019 sets the target of becoming free of mines by 2019 and identifies seven strategic goals, including the elimination of the mine threat. BHMAC conducted the first of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012 and 2013 (the other two are due in 2015 and 2017, respectively).[38] The revision asserted lack of funding as “one of the major reasons” for BiH’s slow progress to completion of its clearance goals.[39] In 2014, BHMAC was elaborating new standing operating procedures for land release, including technical survey (TS), that were expected to accelerate cancellation of SHAs.[40]

National demining operators operational in 2013 included governmental actors (BiH Armed Forces, FBiH Civil Protection Agency, RS Civil Protection, and Brčko District Civil Protection Agency); local NGOs (UG Demira, Svijet bez mina, DOK-ING deminiranje, “Pazi mine Vitez,” Pro Vita, STOP Mines, Udruženje za eliminaciju mina, and UEM); and commercial companies (Amphibia, Detektor, N&N IVSA, and POINT). There are three international demining operators in BiH: two NGOs (INTERSOS and NPA) and one commercial company (UXB Balkans).

Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on building the capacity of the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining Battalion. NPA’s own strategic plan foresees withdrawal from BiH mine action in March 2015. However, given the slow progress of clearance in BiH, it is considering extending its mine action program, depending on donor support.[41] Handicap International (HI) ended its mine action activities in BiH at the end of 2012 and had closed down its office by March 2013.[42] HI withdrew from BiH as part of an effort to focus on countries with lower human development indices.[43]

In 2013, INTERSOS conducted mine clearance and MRE in Sarajevo and Mostar, with funding from Italian Cooperation and the city of Ilijas. INTERSOS also implemented MRE in Pale Praca Municipality, reaching 500 beneficiaries.  INTERSOS reported that it had “completed its mission in Bosnia” at the end of 2013, stating that “since many other local NGOs and international companies are active in the country, the presence of an international emergency NGO such as INTERSOS is no longer necessary.”[44]

Land Release

BiH released a total of 44.3km² of mined area in 2013, 57% of the amount achieved in 2012 and less than a third of the amount planned. Of the total, nearly three-quarters (33km²) was cancelled by non-technical survey (NTS). A further 9km² was released by technical survey (TS), more than in 2012, while full clearance accounted for almost 1.9km², also an increase on the previous year,[45] but only one-fifth of what had been planned. This is not an impressive return on more than US$20 million of funding. Moreover, at current rates of output, it may take several decades to clear BiH of mine contamination.

Mine clearance in 2009–2013 (km²)

Survey in 2013

BHMAC conducted general/non-technical and technical survey over a total area of almost 125km² in 2013, about 64% of the target (195km²), releasing 42km², most through non-technical survey (78%).[46] BHMAC reported that 14 organizations carried out 163 technical survey tasks over a total area of 11.83km², releasing 9.17km².[47] A total of 52 persons were employed in 22 survey teams in 2013.[48] In 2014, NPA noted that releasing large areas of land through non-technical survey is “becoming more and more difficult” and that applying other methods including targeted technical survey will make possible more efficient land release.[49]

Release of mined areas in 2013

Mine clearance in 2013

Twenty-eight organizations were accredited with BHMAC for demining at the end of 2013 with a total staff of 1,529, of whom 1,115 were deminers.[50] However, only 18 organizations participated in clearance operations in 2013. More than half of them engaged in small tasks, clearing less than 100,000m² during the year.

Overall, operators cleared a total of 1.89km², well below the 2009–2019 mine action strategy target of 9.27km².[51]

BHMAC attributed the shortfall to “lack of funding.”[52] It said it had planned mine action expenditure of BAM80.00 million (US$54 million), but actual spending had amounted to less than half that figure, reaching only BAM35.50 million ($24 million), of which BAM16.7 million ($11.36 million, or 81%) came from national sources and the balance from international donors.[53] Analysis shows that BiH provides a larger proportion of its national GDP to mine action than many other mine-affected countries.[54] Nevertheless, analysis by NPA shows that in the first five years of the 2009–2019 strategy, international donors contributed almost 95% of the planned funding commitments. In fact, the main shortfall has been in national funding: 35% short of the targets set out in the 10-year mine action strategy.

Mine clearance in 2013[55]

Quality management

In 2013, quality assurance inspectors issued 22 decisions to shut down work, four decisions ordering demining to be repeated, and one decision revoking demining authorization.[56] Tests of 342 detectors found 59 (17%) not working, an extremely high figure. Inspectors also tested 108 mine detection dog teams, passing 89 and failing three. They also evaluated six machines and the equipment and assets of 27 accredited operators.[57]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2008), BiH is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019.

There is broad agreement in the BiH mine action community that BiH is highly unlikely to complete clearance by 2019.[58] Government and NGO officials raised concerns that political problems at state level were preventing the development of an enabling mine action policy framework.[59] In 2013, as in all the years since it received the extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, BiH fell far short of its land release targets. As a result, five years into its extension period, BiH had achieved only 55% of the land release planned for this period and less than a quarter of planned clearance. It is facing decades of work to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. A representative of the Demining Commission admitted “doubt” that BiH could meet the “deadline by which we were required to clean BiH of mines.”[60]

The BiH government has stated that completion of clearance and land release will “largely depend” on availability of funding.[61] Operators are using less than half of available human resources; lack of consistent funding throughout the years “has a particularly bad effect on commercial and non-governmental” demining organizations.[62] BHMAC has expressed concern that timing donor awards to tenders in the autumn means that demining activities are interrupted by the winter, reducing the efficiency of clearance; ideally, tenders should be awarded in late winter to take advantage of the spring season.[63] According to BHMAC, closer donor monitoring of tasks they fund—put in place in response to concerns about mismanagement—also slows down task allocation.[64]

BHMAC hopes further funds will be made available by municipalities.[65] However, the BiH government acknowledges that a “financial boost” in the next five years is “improbable.” Thus BHMAC believes improved technologies and amendments to the standard operating procedures for mine action, to be adopted by the end of 2014, will help to accelerate TS and land release.[66] However, as expressed by one NGO representative, BiH “still has a really big chunk” of land that requires full clearance. It is uncertain whether improvements to survey methods will speed clearance of the core areas of contamination.[67]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2013

NPA, the only operator accredited in BiH for clearance and survey of cluster munitions, released a total of 2.35km² in 2013, 90% of this through non-technical and technical survey.[68]

Release of SHAs/CHAs containing cluster munition remnants in 2013

Note: U-SUBS = unexploded submunitions

In 2014, NPA expected to release about 3.1km² of cluster munition-affected land, of which about 2.1km² was to be through non-technical survey and the rest through technical survey and clearance.[69]

During 2013, BiH adopted chapter XVI of the BiH Mine Action Standard, regarding clearance and technical survey of areas contaminated by cluster munitions. It also drafted a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for general survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas.[70]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, BiH is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. The government has not assigned responsibility for clearing cluster munitions—this would require an updated Demining Law—but NPA is supporting BHMAC in deciding how to address the problem.[71]

NPA has begun training the BiH Army’s Demining Battalion in cluster munition clearance and hopes the government Civil Protection units will get involved soon.[72]

The limited extent of submunition contamination and the rate of progress made in survey and clearance suggests BiH should be able to fulfill its Article 4 obligations within the initial 10-year deadline. BHMAC hopes it can complete clearance of all known cluster munition contamination by 2015.[73]

Support for Mine Action

National and international donors provided more than US$24.7 million of mine action funding in 2013, an increase on 2012 (US$22.05 million), which BHMAC said explained the slight increase in land cleared.[74] BHMAC stated that it expected a similar level of funding for 2014.[75]

Recommendations

·         Act quickly to restore public and donor confidence in BiH demining by establishing a solid policy framework for mine action through passing a new Demining Law and increasing national funding.

·         Secure ongoing commitment of funding from international donors, encouraging them to commit to long-term grants that enable efficient planning of clearance.

·         Develop new SOPs for technical survey and land release.

Action points based on findings

·         More progress needs to be made to improve the quality and sustainability of services for survivors and other persons with disabilities including by upgrading community-based rehabilitation (CBR) centers.

·         Discrimination based on the cause of disability persisted and needs to be addressed, as certain categories of civilians with disabilities were not receiving adequate assistance on an equal basis with others.

·         The national casualty database should be regularly updated as planned and shared with appropriate actors and government authorities so that the data is used to improve victim assistance coordination and access to services for survivors and other people with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. BiH has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V, and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2013, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reported 13 mine/ERW casualties in BiH: six boys, six men, and one woman. Boys made up half of all civilian casualties.[1] Twelve casualties recorded in 2013 were civilians and one was a deminer. The 2012 casualty total of 12[2] had been significantly less than the 22 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2011 but was similar to the 14 recorded for 2010.[3]

For the period 1992–2013, BHMAC recorded a total of 8,319 mine/ERW casualties: 1,833 killed, 6,039 survivors, and 447 unknown. From 1997 to the end of 2013, BHMAC recorded 115 casualties among humanitarian deminers.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

BiH reported having identified 230 cluster munition casualties according to preliminary data, out of which 44 civilians were killed and 181 were injured; one deminer was killed and four were injured. The data is not disaggregated by age or sex.[5] At least 86 casualties during cluster munitions strikes were identified in BiH in 1995.[6]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 6,039 mine/ERW survivors in BiH.

Victim assistance since 1999[7]

From 1999–2004, most victim assistance targeting mine/ERW survivors was provided by international NGOs without adequate coordination, often resulting in unsystematic service provision. Until 2003, no overall coordination mechanism existed. As post-conflict funding for NGO efforts began to wane after 2004, so did the international support for victim assistance. In 2009, a centralized database on survivors was developed from data provided by national and international NGOs, but the final database was found to be incomplete and inconsistent.

Medical assistance has been adequate since 2004, despite an overall dependence on international aid as a result of the conflict. Improvements have mainly been made in emergency response services, again due to international donor contributions. During the period, the quality of physical rehabilitation services remained variable, but overall satisfactory, despite incomplete rehabilitation teams, a lack of personnel trained to international standards, and a complex bureaucracy.

Government capacity to finance rehabilitation services has improved since 1999. State-run social centers and a network of CBR centers in 64 municipalities that have been created since 1998 provided psychosocial support as well as physical rehabilitation. These continued to endure a lack of capacity and community awareness. NGOs also provided this type of support.

Persistent gaps in economic reintegration remained during the entire period, partly due to high unemployment in general and unemployment of persons with disabilities at around 85%. Almost all of the economic reintegration activities were carried out by NGOs. However, the two entity governments—the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska—introduced specific funds for persons with disabilities in 2007 and in 2011. Disability legislation existed but was not sufficiently enforced. Services for disabled military persons and pensioners were better than those for civilians.

Services provided by NGOs decreased from 2009 through the end of 2013, mainly linked with the ongoing decline in international funding.

In 2014, catastrophic flooding affected a significant number of landmine survivors (about half of all known survivors according to early reports) and their families, some of whom lost their homes and other resources. The flooding disrupted victim assistance and other mine action activities, including emergency marking in many of the flooded areas. There was no specific assistance to mine/ERW survivors or other persons with disabilities during the response as the help provided to the affected population was not selective. In media statements, BHMAC urged special attention to the needs of mine/ERW survivors.[8]

Assessing victim assistance needs

The national database maintained by BHMAC includes results of a survivor needs assessment compiled in 2009. Data was available for use by victim assistance service providers on request. However, data lacked detailed information and was not usable for planning or analysis.[9]

Victim assistance coordination[10]

Coordination through the Landmine Victim Assistance (LMVA) Working Group, hosted by BHMAC, primarily consisted of information sharing by victim assistance actors. The main tasks of the LMVA Working Group were to promote the needs of survivors and the coordination, monitoring, and approval of the implementation of those victim assistance projects that received international donor funding. The group was also involved in the approval of statements for international meetings.[11] In 2013, there were three coordination meetings of the LMVA Working Group, as well as several individual meetings, with the aim of improving implementation of assistance to mine/ERW survivors.[12]

In 2013, as recommended by external actors, the Victim Assistance Sub-Strategy 2009–2019 was revised as the Victim Assistance Sub-Strategy 2014–2019, in consultation with survivors’ representative organizations.[13]

There is no body with a mandate to monitor the implementation of the sub-strategy, and NGOs were not actively monitoring it. BHMAC itself does not have a monitoring mechanism to follow the implementation of the sub-strategy and all information related to implementation of the sub-strategy was obtained from voluntary reporting of NGO activities. BHMAC is not authorized to monitor the government activities in regard to the implementation of relevant legislation. However, other actors in the government sector regularly report on the progress of the implementation of legislation.[14]

BiH made a detailed statement on victim assistance at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2013. BiH provided information on victim assistance in its Mine Ban Treaty and Convention and Cluster Munitions Article 7 reporting for calendar year 2013.[15]

Participation and inclusion in victim assistance

Mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were included in the LMVA Working Group and survivors were included in the implementation of services through NGOs.[16]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[17]

Medical care and rehabilitation

CBR centers continued to provide services to mine/ERW survivors but required renovation, upgrades, and an expansion of the services offered.[18]

Economic and social inclusion

Despite an overall decrease in the availability of economic inclusion activities, a number of projects were implemented in 2013. Economic inclusion projects were implemented by the Center for Development and Support and LSI.[19] The Center for Development and Support and LSI jointly implemented a “best practice model” for the employment of persons with disabilities project in Tuzla Canton.[20] In addition to assisting ongoing peer support beneficiaries, the LSI peer support program also reached 59 previously unassisted survivors for the first time in 2013, 40 of whom had not yet been registered in the national casualty data base. Part of LSI’s 2013 project was small business training focused on female mine/ERW survivors and women with disabilities.

The NGO Hope 87 launched a new e-learning program for mine/ERW survivors in October 2013.[21] In 2013, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland (ASB) began calls for tenders for livestock for mine/ERW survivors through a €1 million project on the socioeconomic empowerment of survivors funded through the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). In discussion with BHMAC, available information was analyzed on potential beneficiaries in 20 municipalities to be included in the project.[22]

Laws and policies

The National Council for Persons with Disabilities includes 10 representatives of persons with disabilities and 10 representatives of state and entity ministries. NGOs lobbied for improvement and implementation of the legal framework for persons with disabilities. Legislation was reportedly relatively well-regulated but was not actually implemented in practice. No representative organizations of mine/ERW survivors were on the council, though there were representative of disabled veterans organizations and civilian war victims’ organizations.[23] LSI was primarily responsible for building the capacities of the National Council for Persons with Disabilities; activities were finalized in 2013.[24]

The Federation of BiH has a strategy for people with disabilities (2010–2014) and Republika Srpska has a strategy for persons with disabilities (2010–2015). However, the implementation of the entities’ strategies remained weak.[25] BiH’s initial report on the rights of persons with disabilities under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 2012 noted that “the area of social welfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not resolved well, it does not even provide minimum security to citizens and does not define a social minimum for persons with disability either.”[26] Some limited steps were taken in 2013 to harmonize the social protection systems of the Cantons of the Federation of BiH and introduce a social minimum for financial benefits. The implementation of the social protection legislative framework remains weak in both the Federation and Republika Srpska.[27]

Entitlement to rights and benefits for the disabled is still based on status, not on needs. There remained clear discrimination between different categories of persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities resulting from military service during the 1992–1995 conflict were given a privileged status above civilian war victims and persons who were born with disabilities..[28]

BiH has reported that “Bosnia and Herzegovina with its entities implements standard procedures related to care on persons with disabilities. In these government programs, cluster munitions victims are equal with other disabled people and they receive help that is regulated by legal acts of governmental institutions for this field. Discrimination in this matter does not exist.”[29]

Legislation at all levels prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. However, in practice there was discrimination against persons with disabilities in all the areas of employment, education, access to healthcare, transportation, and the provision of other state services.[30] In its initial reporting to the CRPD, BiH reported that “The most important mechanism in protection from discrimination is the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination.”[31] However, the European Commission (EC) reported that the anti-discrimination law is in place but does not include disability as a category for discrimination. The law allows for a broad range of exceptions and only limited steps have been taken to ensure its implementation.[32]

Persons with disabilities faced poor recognition of their rights and needs for accessibility. Physical accessibility is still a major problem in BiH and is not included in the priorities for addressing the challenges faced by persons with disabilities. There are no action plans to address the removal of physical barriers.[33]

BiH has legislation to ensure physical access to persons with disabilities. In the Federation of BiH, the law mandated that all public buildings must be retrofitted to provide access and new buildings must also be accessible. In practice, however, buildings were rarely accessible to persons with disabilities, including several government buildings. Republika Srpska had comparable laws for public accessibility, but few older public buildings were accessible. Human rights NGOs reported that many new public buildings continued to be built without access for persons with disabilities.[34]

BiH ratified the CRPD on 12 March 2010.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), both national and international contributions were less in 2012 than in 2011. In 2012, the government contributed BAM16.8 million (US$11 million), a reduction of approximately 20% compared to 2011.[1] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request in 2008, BiH committed to providing BAM20 million ($13 million) per year, and raising another BAM40 million ($26 million) from other local sources.[2] It has not met these targets by a large margin and, in 2012, fell even further behind.

The national funding raised in 2012, totaling BAM16.8 million ($11 million), came from 14 local sources, including the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the Ministry of Defense, the Bosnian Serb Republic (República Srpska, RS), the Brčko district, state utility companies, the state railway, and seven municipalities. The FBiH budget allocates funds to the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) and the army, while cantons contribute to local Civil Protection Agency demining operations. In the Brčko district and the RS, funding also goes through the local Civil Protection Agency.[3]

National contributions: 2012[4]

Summary of national contributions: 2008–2012[5]

In 2012, international contributions toward mine action in BiH totaled $9.1 million, a decrease of 27% from 2011. The largest contributions were from Norway (NOK17 million/$2.9 million), the United States (US) ($2.3 million), and Germany (€1.3 million/$1.69 million).[6]

International contributions: 2012[7]

Since 2008, international assistance to BiH has steadily declined by 63% (some $15.4 million), regardless of the fact that BiH is far off-track from meeting its Article 5 obligations by 2019 and will be unable to meet its obligations without international support. While national contributions have been steadier, despite the 25% decline in the US dollar value of its contribution in 2012, the combined annual expenses nevertheless fall far below the targets set in BiH’s Article 5 Extension Request that assesses annual funding needs from national and international sources combined as approximately BAM80 million ($52 million) per year.[8]

A decrease in all victim assistance services provided by NGOs continued in 2012, mainly linked with the ongoing decline in international funding; however, there were continued improvements in the quality and availability of state services.[9]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[10]