Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.[1]

Iraq has not indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically is being pursued or if existing laws are considered adequate.[2]

Iraq submitted its third Article 7 transparency report covering calendar year 2009.[3] The report contains detailed information from northern Iraq, apparently for the first time.

Iraq attended the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia in November–December 2009, where it made statements on victim assistance, mine clearance, and stockpile destruction. Iraq also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in June 2010.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and retention

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 Coalition invasion. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign.[4] In its initial Article 7 report in 2008, Iraq reported that the Al Qaqa Factory that “produced anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines before the 2003 war…has been completely destroyed during the 2003 war and there is no intention from the side of the Iraqi Government to reconstruct this facility.”[5]

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012. In June 2010, Iraq reported that there are no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in any part of the country except for northern Iraq. It reported a total stockpile of 690 antipersonnel mines in northern Iraq: 580 PMN mines, 60 Valmara-69 mines, and 50 VS-50 mines.[6]

In its May 2009 Article 7 report, Iraq did not include any information on stockpiles or destruction.[7] In its initial Article 7 report submitted in July 2008, Iraq stated that it did not hold stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, but said, “This matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.”[8] Landmine Monitor has previously noted that Iraq was believed to stockpile, at some point, mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines.

Seizure of mines

In May 2010, the Internal Affairs Department reportedly seized a weapons cache containing 106 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in southern Wassit governorate.[9] In this reporting period (since May 2009), far fewer mines were reported seized or found by US forces compared to previous years.[10] In December 2009, US forces reported the seizure of an unspecified numbers of “mines” in a cache of weapons.[11] In February 2010, US forces reported finding a landmine, among other weapons, during a search of an area where two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found.[12] The Iraqi government has not reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports. The jurisdiction over and arrangements for antipersonnel mines collected by multinational forces is not clear.

Mines retained for research and training

In its Article 7 report covering 2009, Iraq lists a total of 698 antipersonnel mines retained for training and development purposes. This includes 535 mines held for training in northern Iraq and 25 mines held for training by the “unexploded bombs” school (15 mines) and the “military engineering school” (10 mines).[13] All of these mines are described as containing explosives only and “no detonator.”

The other 138 retained antipersonnel mines are held by the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG). These mines contain explosives, but the report notes that the mines “are in a neutralised state and cannot be functioned, as one or more of the components/mechanisms have been removed.”[14]

The report also lists 335 antipersonnel mines held by MAG that do not contain explosives, and 60 antipersonnel mines that do not contain explosives transferred to the Muthanna training center under the authorization of the Ministry of Interior.[15]

In its first Article 7 report provided in July 2008, Iraq indicated it would retain 1,234 antipersonnel mines.[16] In its second Article 7 report submitted in 2009, a total of 297 mines were listed as retained, but the change in number was not explained. The change from 297 retained mines reported in 2009 to 698 mines reported in 2010 is also not explained.

Iraq has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004 and again at the Second Review Conference in 2009.

Use

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. There have never been confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Coalition forces.[17]

Non-state armed groups

For the second year in a row, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor could not find any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by the insurgency. Civilians continued to be killed by mines laid in previous years.

Insurgent forces have continued to use command-detonated IEDs in large numbers, causing numerous casualties. But according to the US military, the number of IED attacks in Iraq has dropped drastically from 23,000 in 2007 to about 3,000 in 2009.[18]  

An IED that is victim-activated—one that explodes on contact by a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently referred to in media reports as “landmines.”

Policy

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009.  The ratification process has not been able to proceed due to the political deadlock surrounding the results of the March 2010 elections and the resulting inability to form a new parliament.[1]

Iraq did not attend any of the international or regional meetings on cluster munitions in 2009 or 2010 through July. On 18 March 2009 at a Special Event on the Convention on Cluster Munitions held at the UN in New York, Iraq stated that the Cabinet had recently approved signature of the convention and that the necessary legal procedures were underway.[2]

After limited participation in the Oslo Process diplomatic meetings to develop the convention, Iraq attended the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 as an observer, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008, also as an observer.[3] In Oslo, Iraq welcomed the adoption of the convention and stated it would sign as soon as possible, after the completion of national and constitutional processes.[4]

Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. One source reports that Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984 during their border war.[5]

Coalition forces used large numbers of cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched  artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions were used in the conflict.[6] In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[7]

The current status of production facilities is not known, but production capability was likely destroyed in 2003. Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs called the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[8] It was also involved in joint development of the M87 Orkan (known in Iraq as Ababil) with Yugoslavia.[9] 

Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[10] Jane’s Information Group has listed it as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[11] The current status of the stockpile is not known.

Additionally, a number of SAKR rockets and CB-250 bombs modified to deliver chemical and biological agents were found by UN weapons inspectors in the arsenal of Iraq.[12]

Contamination and Impact

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War (first Gulf War), and the conflict that has continued since the 2003 invasion by the United States-led Coalition. Since then, attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices have occurred regularly against civilians, the military, and the police, with much of the ordnance used having been plundered from the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP in 2009 observed the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”[1]

Mines

The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering an estimated 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. Moreover, there is substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent conflicts; this is not reported in the ILIS, which was based on community interviews.[2]

A second phase of the ILIS, covering the remaining five governorates, started in 2008 and community surveys were completed in 2010.[3] Preliminary results as of September 2009 had indicated that of nearly 3,000 communities visited only 86 remained contaminated. More than 1,000 communities were previously affected, but contamination had since been cleared by local actors (for example militias or police), military forces, and/or humanitarian demining operators.[4]

Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².[5] Iraq’s initial Article 7 transparency report claims that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another 1 million mines ahead of both the first Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

A 2009 UNDP/UNICEF report commented that “landmines are only a part—and a minor one at that—of Iraq’s total explosive remnants of war problems, however. Far larger are the dangers posed by the millions of cluster bombs … used, as well as unexploded ordnance and abandoned munitions.” The report notes the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[7] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munitions contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[8]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), however, has also found cluster munition remnants in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq that were dropped in 1991 to support a Kurdish uprising against the government and have posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[9]

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq also has extensive UXO remaining from past conflicts and continues to accumulate contamination from continuing conflicts in the north, where Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups in 2010.[10]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, including bunker buster bombs and tank-fired shells that were used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[11] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, the DU munitions are thought to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrap yards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

After the US-led invasion of Iraq, mine action was assigned to the Ministry of Planning, overseeing a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) set up as regulator and coordinator. By 2007, however, this mechanism had become inactive and the government shut it down in June 2007. Responsibility for mine action was transferred to the Ministry of Environment (MoE), which took over in March 2008 and set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in place of the NMAA.[13]

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a database. As of March 2010, the DMA had some 90 staff.[14] The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south. However, the DMA’s development has been hampered by the lack of any regulatory framework establishing its mandate.[15]

A “Mine Action Strategy 2010 to 2012” published by the MoE in February 2010 said the Ministry of Defense would be responsible for “Planning and Implementation of: Survey; Demarcation, and clearance of minefields.” The document said this “includes the operations implemented by International and National companies in which the MoD will be part of their administrative boards through a liaison officer.”[16]

An inter-ministerial coordination mechanism involving senior representatives of the ministries of defense, interior, and environment convened “on an ad hoc basis” in September 2009. The committee was designed to function as a policy-making body, with the DMA acting as the implementing body coordinating mine action. The committee met again in March 2010, but in August 2010 the Prime Minister issued a directive establishing a coordination committee for mine action including these three ministries together with the Ministry of Agriculture and representation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).[17] 

In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense imposed a ban on mine/UXO clearance pending a review of security issues relating to the mine action sector and to vet operators. In August 2009, the ministries of defense and environment signed a Memorandum of Understanding which identified the responsibilities of each and provided a basis for proceeding with the preparation of a 10-year strategic plan to be implemented in three phases covering 2010–2012, 2012–2015, and 2015–2019.[18]

The MoE distinguished two types of demining activities: investment projects and non-investment projects. Investment (commercial) projects would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. If the Ministry of Defense was unable to implement a project, the MoE, acting as consultant, would prepare tenders for survey, clearance, and quality assurance (QA) of the project. The MoE would also initially refer non-investment projects to the Ministry of Defense and if it did not want to take control the MoE would proceed, assigning the work to NGOs and commercial companies. The MoE planned to subcontract QA to an NGO or commercial company that was not engaged in clearance in Iraq. UXO clearance within cities would come under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and clearance outside cities would fall under the Ministry of Defense.[19]

The DMA had an annual budget of US$12 million to $15 million a year earmarked largely for humanitarian demining, although it had not been able to spend this amount. The DMA was asking governorates to identify their priorities for clearance. It also encouraged governorates to set up NGOs to undertake demining, with salaries paid by the MoE, as a means of generating employment and local ownership.[20]

Mine action in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah continued to function semi-autonomously under the Kurdish Regional Government and managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) in Dahuk and Erbil, and the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) in Sulaymaniyah and parts of Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. Both organizations accredit operators in their area of responsibility. The KRG passed a law merging IKMAA and the GDMA in April 2007 but the merger had not taken place as of August 2010.[21]

Land Release

The only reported clearance and release of mine and UXO-contaminated land in 2009 occurred in the northern Kurdish governorates under the control of IKMAA and the GDMA. Despite the far-reaching impact of ERW on the security, social welfare, and economic development of all Iraq, clearance operations in the center and south were halted by a suspension of operations imposed by the Ministry of Defense on 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and in order to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.[22] The Ministry of Defense partially lifted the suspension in May 2009 to allow operators to conduct non-technical survey and risk education, but the ban on clearance and demolitions of cleared items remained in place until August 2009. Even then, however, operations were restricted to accredited organizations, a process that proved slow, and no demolitions of cleared items by any organization except the military was possible until May 2010.[23]

In the north, IKMAA operated with 14 demining teams and two battle area clearance (BAC) teams,[24] while the GDMA coordinated operations by seven commercial companies,[25] as well as MAG and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).[26] MAG, with 13 demining teams,[27] and NPA were the only international NGOs conducting clearance in the Kurdish governorates in 2009, but NPA ceased its operations there by the end of the year and in 2010 was preparing to start a new demining operation in the south.[28] The GDMA accredited three more commercial companies in 2010: Madol, Onest, and Paraw.[29]

Among the NGOs operating in central and southern Iraq, Danish Demining Group (DDG) had 12 16-person demining and BAC teams and supported Rafidain Demining Organization while the Iraq Mine Clearance Organization received support from RONCO. International commercial operators active in Iraq in 2009 included G4S (six 12-person demining teams, six 12-person BAC teams, and a seven-person QA/survey team); MineTech International; and RONCO (13 international staff in program and operations management and 110 national demining/BAC/explosive ordnance disposal staff).[30] Two Iraqi commercial companies, Arabian Gulf Company and Alsafsafa Company, were registered in Basra.[31] Alsafsafa reported that it had 10 demining teams and had “cleaned” an area of 176,800m² on behalf of Baker Hughes, a US contractor working for South Oil Company.[32]

Five-year summary of land cancellation and release[33]

Survey in 2009

Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), funded by the US Department of State, completed the impact survey of five governorates by 25 survey teams in June 2010.[34] These areas could not be surveyed because of insecurity when iMMAP carried out the first phase of the ILIS in 13 other governorates in 2004–2006. Detailed analysis of the survey results was still underway as of August 2010, but iMMAP expected survey findings to be released within the third quarter of 2010.[35]

Basra-based DDG surveyed 397 tasks covering 14.45km² and identified almost 16,000 ERW but in view of the restrictions imposed on clearance and explosive ordnance disposal none of this land was released.[36]

In 2009, the GDMA started a re-survey of Sulaymaniyah and the Garmyan area bordering the former Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and former President Saddam Hussein’s army—with three survey teams to update information collected by the ILIS in 2007 and a UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) general survey completed in 2002. The survey covered a total area of 163km² and resulted in release of 3.7km². Technical survey of 87 mined areas covering 3.3km² resulted in cancellation of 0.78km².[37]

Mine and battle area clearance in 2009

The only humanitarian mine/UXO clearance in 2009 occurred in northern Iraq’s Kurdish governorates. The GDMA reported clearance of 197 mined areas and 7.5km² in 2009, almost one-quarter more area than in 2008. In addition, operators verified 24.18km² for oil companies. The GDMA noted it had received good financial support from the KRG,[38] which provided a budget of $18 million for mine action, risk education, and victim assistance.[39]

IKMAA, with 14 mine clearance and two BAC teams working at the end of 2009, reported clearing slightly less (14%) mined area and more than one-third less battle area than the previous year, although it added six demining teams in Dahuk governorate and added  five HSTAMID dual sensor detectors to its equipment inventory. The lower productivity appears at least partially due to requests from the government for support to oil exploration companies, electricity network rehabilitation projects, and construction projects, which it said usually necessitated taking teams off IKMAA-priority tasks.[40]

MAG faced funding constraints that led to a reduction in the number of demining, small arms and light weapons disposal, and community liaison teams and resulted in a one-third drop in area cleared in 2009, but it also reported improved coordination with IKMAA and the GDMA resulting in better focus on priority tasks. Although Iraq’s unexploded submunitions are concentrated in southern and central areas, MAG reported clearing submunitions in the north in 2009 and in Dahuk governorate in 2010.[41]

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2009[42]

* The figure includes 75 submunitions destroyed in the course of mine clearance operations.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 11 February 2018. 

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report expressed concern that mine action had not received enough  attention and stated “at the current slow pace of demining operations, it is clear the goal of an ‘Iraq free of the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’ will not be reached by the 2018 Mine Ban Convention deadline.”[43] The possibility of fulfilling its treaty obligations has been further compromised by the Ministry of Defense’s suspension of all clearance outside the Kurdish governorates imposed on 23 December 2008 and in force until 31 August 2009.

UNICEF and UNDP had emphasized that “it is clear that the current demining capacities in Iraq are far from meeting the requirements of the Mine Ban Convention” and called for “the urgent development of a nation-wide Mine Action Programme. This much-needed capacity increase can only be met by inviting international de-mining organizations to work in Iraq, as well as developing national Iraqi organizations and/or allocating and training more military resources for this purpose.”[44] Organizations seeking registration and accreditation to work in Iraq, however, have found procedures complex, unpredictable, and slow.[45]

Quality management

The GDMA worked with one QA officer, a deputy, and 20 QA monitors who accredited demining organizations and their machinery, conducted minefield assessments, and investigated accidents. In 2009, the monitors halted operations on 12 tasks because of safety concerns. The monitors sampled 460,367m² on 4.67km² of completed minefields, reporting 28 cases of critical non-conformity, finding 21 mines and 25 items of UXO on supposedly completed sites. As a result, monitors ordered an area of 214,162m² to be re-cleared before land was again sampled and released to landowners.[46]

Safety of demining personnel

The GDMA reported two serious accidents in its area of responsibility in 2009. A planning officer for NPA lost a hand in a mine accident, and a deminer for Khabat Zangana Company lost a leg in a mine explosion while walking in an unmarked area.[47]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) was implemented by international and national NGOs, coordinated by UNICEF, acting in support of IKMAA and the GDMA in the north, and by the DMA in the center and south.

UNICEF was working with the DMA, the GDMA, and IKMAA on finalizing a national strategy for RE in 2010, holding a workshop on strategy, standards, and guidelines in June 2010 involving implementing partners and representatives of government ministries. However, the program was said to face an array of major challenges from poor funding (and decreasing government allocations) for RE, limited local human and other resources, slow accreditation procedures, lack of government policy enforcing the roles of concerned ministries, and continuous changes at the policy-making level.[48]

IKMAA had two three-person RE teams, one in Erbil and the other in Dohuk, holding direct RE sessions for populations at risk, notably shepherds, nomads, and children, and organizing the broadcast of RE messages on local radio and television. The teams also delivered RE through community liaison supporting mine clearance operations. Among other risk reduction measures, IKMAA also reported marking an area of 48,190m² as part of an operation to open an access corridor for an oil company.[49]

MAG, accredited by both IKMAA and the GDMA, ran a training of trainers program for teachers in primary schools in coordination with the KRG’s Ministry of Education and also delivered this course to religious and village leaders to reach people outside the school system. Its community liaison teams also delivered RE to affected communities and vulnerable groups such as internally displace persons, nomads, shepherds, and women and children.[50] Handicap International (HI) was accredited by IKMAA in June 2010 and set up a program funded by UNICEF to operate two RE teams in Dahuk and Erbil.[51]

There are currently nine RE teams working under the DMA and the Regional Mine Action Center to deliver RE in the most affected communities in central and southern Iraq. UNICEF has also supported the development and reproduction of various RE materials including posters, leaflets, banners, and indoor games.[52]

Casualties[1]

Casualties in 2009

In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 78 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties. This represented a dramatic decrease (70%) in the number of registered annual casualties as compared with the 263 casualties identified in 2008.[2] In northern Iraq, the reduced number of casualties was explained by the end of drought conditions, which had caused increased population movements in the region.[3] In southern and central Iraq, where “most casualties go unreported,” it was unlikely to be related to an actual decline in casualties but rather to a decline in the collection and management of casualty data.[4]

In 2009, children made up 38% (23 of 61) of civilian casualties, 11 of whom were killed, 11 injured, and one for whom the outcome of the incident was unknown. Just five of the casualties were military and two were deminers who were injured.[5] Males made up the vast majority of casualties (91% of the casualties for which the gender was identified); just five female casualties were confirmed.[6] This was similar to previous years in which most registered casualties were civilian males.[7] As in previous years, most casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dahuk, in northern Iraq, since there was no data collection mechanism in southern or central Iraq.

The total number of casualties in Iraq is unknown. As of August 2007, there had been 21,492 casualties registered in the five National Mine Action Authority databases since 2001 (including casualties occurring before this time) but these figures were known to be incomplete and unverified. A large number of the casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah governorate (12,573).[8] While updated national casualty totals were unavailable, a 2009 pilot survey and anecdotal evidence provided some sense of the magnitude of the problem. In two of the 36 districts in southern and central Iraq, 417 previously unregistered casualties (117 killed and 300 injured) were identified in a period of ten days.[9] In the village of Said Jabar, near Basra, more than 400 of the 2,500 residents (16% of the population) had been injured or killed by mines/ERW.[10]

By the end of 2009, there had been at least 388 cluster munition casualties during use (128 killed and 260 injured). Another 1,672 casualties of cluster munition remnants were reported (747 killed, 921 injured, and four unknown) and unexploded submunitions caused another 934 casualties with no further details on use (410 killed, 507 injured, and 17 unknown).[11] However, due to the level of contamination, it is estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes.[12]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown but there are at least several thousand.

In 2009, there were no national efforts to assess the needs of survivors.[13] The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) carried out a pilot survey in two districts, one in the central governorate of Wasit and the other in the southern governorate of Basra, both on the Iranian border. The survey collected information on injury types and services needed. It was planned to expand the survey to all parts of the country, pending funding and an improved security situation, and to use results to develop a national victim assistance plan.[14] Service providers reported collecting information on survivor needs from their beneficiaries.[15]

Victim assistance coordination[16]

In 2009, coordination of victim assistance continued in northern Iraq. Four meetings were held during the year, led by UNDP and involving the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA), the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA), the Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization (WHO), and NGOs. Meeting outcomes included the development of an annual plan for victim assistance with monitoring to prevent duplication by victim assistance stakeholders.[17] As of the end of 2009, despite plans to merge IKMAA and the GDMA, the two entities remained separate.[18] In central and southern Iraq, coordination remained weak with no coordinating mechanism, though the Victim Assistance Officer at the DMA met with representatives from the Ministry of Health and the Regional Mine Action Center to discuss victim assistance initiatives.[19] In March 2010, a national conference was held on victim assistance, the first of its kind, to discuss the development of a victim assistance strategy. Participants included government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, and disabled persons’ organizations; just one landmine survivor participated.[20]

In central and southern Iraq, the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation, within the Ministry of Health, dealt with the coordination of physical rehabilitation issues, however, there was no equivalent for northern Iraq. The ICRC remained the only mechanism to coordinate rehabilitation at the national level.[21]

As of the end of 2009, a national strategic plan for victim assistance had not been developed.[22] The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 included as its third objective to “establish an integrated and capable program for mine/UXO victims rehabilitation and reintegration in the society.” Activities planned include a field survey in 15 provinces to register survivors, building a database using data obtained from field surveys and police stations, developing and disseminating a victim registration system, providing prosthetics to 20% of survivors, and providing vocational rehabilitation and appropriate employment opportunities to 10% of survivors.[23]

Iraq provided updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009 and provided casualty data through Form J of its Article 7 report.[24]

Survivor Inclusion

Survivors were not systematically included in the coordination of victim assistance;[25] they were involved in the implementation of victim assistance activities through NGOs.[26]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2009[27]

In 2009, there was an increase in access to victim assistance services, particularly physical rehabilitation, mostly due to a somewhat improved security situation[28] and also as an outcome of consistent support from the joint WHO-UNDP capacity-building project in northern Iraq and ICRC support throughout the country.[29] However, this increase must be seen in a context of an ongoing armed conflict in which the vast majority of survivors still had limited or no access to victim assistance services of any kind, particularly in central and southern Iraq.[30] It was believed that victim assistance services in northern Iraq would not be sustainable without continued international support.[31]

There was a slight improvement in access to emergency care with improvements seen in the emergency response of medical professionals in northern Iraq[32] and as a result of increased ICRC efforts to provide emergency care training and medical supplies to hospitals throughout the country.[33]

In the 13 ICRC-supported orthopedic centers, there was a 25% increase in prosthetics production, but this was not enough to address the needs of all survivors. There was also a significant increase in new patients accessing services, indicating that more people were able to gain access to rehabilitation centers. The increase in new patients was greater than the increase in production and wait lists increased in most centers. The construction of a new orthopedic center in Nasiriyah, in southeastern Iraq, was completed but not yet operational by the end of 2009; it was expected to increase access to services in 2010.[34]

The joint WHO-UNDP capacity-building project included a component to strengthen psychological support in northern Iraq but no improvements were seen in this area in 2009.[35]

Within the Iraqi government, victim assistance continued to be seen as a medical issue and throughout 2009, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs remained inactive in addressing the economic inclusion of survivors.[36] Some slight improvements were seen in the availability of economic inclusion initiatives in northern Iraq, as a result of NGO activities.[37]

The law prohibited discrimination of persons with disabilities but this was not enforced.[38] Legal reforms to improve the protection of rights for persons with disabilities were not seen to be a government priority and did not advance in 2009.[39]

As of the end of 2009, Iraq had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

In 2009 neither the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), the Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, or the General Directorate of Mine Action reported making financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program. According to UNDP, between 2004 and 2008 the government of Iraq contributed US$15 million annually to mine action, although only a small amount of it went towards service delivery, such as demining or victim assistance.[1] IKMAA, the RMAC, and the General Directorate of Mine Action did not respond to inquiries about government financial support to mine action.

International support, despite the absence of a national mine action strategy prior to 2010, has averaged over $35 million since 2006. In 2009, 10 donors contributed $34,652,872 for clearance, victim assistance, and risk education. In June 2009, UNDP and UNICEF reported that donors would expect the government of Iraq to begin co-financing mine action in the near future.[2]

The United States, Finland, Norway, and Australia contributed $3,232,107 for victim assistance in 2009.[3] Australia made its contribution through UNDP to assist all conflict victims, including mine/explosive remnants of war survivors.[4]

In 2010, the UN Mine Action Portfolio Iraq Country Team based its plans on continued international support at least until 2011.[5] Until legislation is passed and governmental mine action structures and responsibilities are clarified, funding for mine action from the government will be limited.[6]

The Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012 assumes international donors will fund clearance operations and that national authorities (ministries of defense, interior, and the environment), will contribute approximately $21.71 million over three years for victim assistance, risk education, strategic planning, and information management personnel.[7]

In a June 2010 assessment of US support to mine action in Iraq, the Office of the Inspector General for the US Department of State concluded that until the government of Iraq makes a sustainable commitment to clearing mines and explosive remnants of war, especially in the southern regions, progress towards clearing mines would be slow.[8]

International government contributions: 2009[9]

 

Summary of contributions: 2005–2009[10]