Egypt
Mine Ban Policy
Mine ban policy overview
Mine Ban Treaty status |
State not party |
Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record |
Abstained on Resolution 67/32 on 3 December 2012, as in all previous years |
Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings |
Attended the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2012 |
After a popular revolution caused the collapse of the government led by Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, the country was ruled by a military council, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Elections to select a new parliament took place in November 2011.[1] Mohammed Morsi was elected president on 24 June 2012 and deposed by a military coup a year later, on 3 July 2013.
Policy
The Arab Republic of Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Egypt has often stated its reasons for opposing the treaty, including that antipersonnel landmines are seen as a key means for securing its borders and that responsibility for clearance is not assigned in the treaty to those who laid the mines in the past.[2] In December 2012, Egypt objected to the “particularly imbalanced nature of that instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations.”[3]
Egypt participated as an observer in the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2012, but did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013.
Egypt signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981 but never ratified it. It attended, as an observer, the Fourteenth Annual Conference of State Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines in November 2012.
In a February 2013 letter to Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Kamel Amr, Human Rights Watch urged the new government to reconsider its stance on antipersonnel mines and undertake an interdepartmental review of the policy on joining the Mine Ban Treaty that has prevailed so far. No reply had been received as of September 2013.
Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
Egypt has stated that it stopped production of antipersonnel mines in 1988 and stopped exports in 1984.[4]
At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2004, Egypt’s Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister stated that “the Egyptian government has imposed a moratorium on all export and production activities related to anti-personnel mines.”[5] This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a moratorium on production.[6] The Monitor is not aware of any official decrees or laws to implement permanent prohibitions on production or export of antipersonnel mines. In December 2012, Egypt said that it “imposed a moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines in 1980.”[7]
Egypt is believed to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no details are available on the size and composition of the stockpile, as it is considered a state secret.
In July 2012, a retired military engineer, General Mohamed Khater, who was formerly in charge of mine clearance in the engineering corps, reportedly stated that the Egyptian Armed Forces laid a minefield in 2011 on the country’s border with Libya, presumably when forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi lost control of the border to anti-Gaddafi resistance fighters.[8] The Monitor has not been able to verify this claim.[9]
[1] Before it was disbanded, the parliament adopted a series of recommendations of its defense and national security committee to the government; these included tasking the armed forces to prepare a study for landmine clearance (and its costs to be allocated in the new government’s general budget) in order to study Egypt’s position on the existing related international conventions regarding clearance and compensation from those who laid mines, and also to accelerate the mine clearance operation in the northern coast of Egypt (including marking of areas not yet cleared). Nermen Abdelzaher, “The Parliament Agreed on the Defense and National Security Committee Recommendations to the Government,” Al Ahram (daily Arabic newspaper), Cairo, 8 May 2012.
[2] Egypt explained its abstention in voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 65/48 in December 2010 as, “Egypt views this convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian consideration related to APLM [antipersonnel landmine] and their legitimate military use for border protection. Most importantly, the convention does not acknowledge the legal responsibility of States for demining APLM they themselves have laid, in particular in territories of other States, making it almost impossible for affected States to meet alone the Convention’s demining requirements….The mentioned weaknesses are only complemented by the weak international cooperation system of the Convention which remains limited in its effect and much dependent on the will of donor States. The mentioned weaknesses of Ottawa convention have kept the largest world producers and some of the world’s most heavily affected States outside its regime, making the potential for its universality questionable and reminding us all of the value of concluding arms-control and disarmament agreements in the context of United Nations and not outside its framework.” Statement of Egypt, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution on the Ottawa APLM Convention, L.8,” UNGA First Committee, New York, 27 October 2010.
[3] Statement of Egypt, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution on the Ottawa APLM Convention, L.8,” UNGA First Committee, New York, 2 December 2012, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com12/eov/L8_Egypt.pdf.
[4] Statement of Egypt, Mine Ban Treaty Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 22 September 2006; and statement of Egypt, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution on the Ottawa APLM Convention, L.8,” UNGA First Committee, New York, 27 October 2010.
[5] Statement of Egypt, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December 2004.
[6] Egypt told a UN assessment mission in February 2000 that it ceased export of antipersonnel mines in 1984 and ended production in 1988, and several Egyptian officials over the years also told the Monitor informally that production and trade had stopped. However, Egypt has not responded to repeated requests by the Monitor to make that position formal and public in writing. The Monitor has therefore kept Egypt on its list of producers. Egypt reportedly produced two types of low metal content blast antipersonnel mines, several variations of bounding fragmentation mines, and a Claymore-type mine. There is no publicly available evidence that Egypt has produced or exported antipersonnel mines in recent years. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 957.
[7] Statement of Egypt, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution on the Ottawa APLM Convention, L.8,” UNGA First Committee, New York, 2 December 2012, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com12/eov/L8_Egypt.pdf.
[8] Ashraf Abouelhoul, “Continue to look after smuggled weapons from Libya,” Al Ahram, 19 July 2012.
[9] Only one newspaper article carried the reported information and there has been no substantiation from observers on the ground in either Egypt or Libya. The Egyptian government has not commented on the matter.
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Policy
The Arab Republic of Egypt has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Since assuming office in June 2014, the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has not made any public statements regarding Egypt’s position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
In its last statement on the matter in September 2011, Egypt informed States Parties that it “supports all efforts aimed at protecting civilians and supporting victims of cluster munitions” but asserted that the convention’s negotiation “outside the framework of the UN will produce a deficient legal system that will be abused to use cluster munitions.” Egypt repeated its long-held arguments that the Convention on Cluster Munitions “will not hold states which are using cluster munitions responsible for their acts, or will not hold them to account for clearing contaminated areas.”[1]
When the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010, Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing its hope that these and other concerns would be addressed by the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015.[2]
Egypt participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and engaged in the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 as an observer but did not attend the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.[3] Despite its engagement, in October 2008 Egypt expressed concern with both the “substantive content” of the convention and “the process which led to its conclusion outside the framework of the United Nations.”[4]
Egypt has participated in some meetings related to the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011 and attended intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in 2011 and 2013 but not those held in April 2014.
Egypt has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[5]
Egypt is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Egypt signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons in 1981 but has never ratified it or any of its protocols.
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling
Egypt has said that it has never used cluster munitions.[6] But it is a producer, stockpiler, importer, and exporter of the weapon. Evidence has emerged that indicates Egypt exported or otherwise transferred cluster munitions to Syria in the past, most likely before the current conflict.[7]
In December 2012, the Syrian government’s first known use of ground-based cluster munitions was documented, including the use of 122mm cluster munition rockets bearing the markings of the SAKR Factory for Developed Industries and the Egyptian state-owned Arab Organization for Industrialization.[8] The SAKR Factory for Developed Industries produces two types of 122mm surface-to-surface rockets: the SAKR-18 and SAKR-36, containing 72 and 98 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions, respectively.[9]
In January 2013, officials of then-President Mohamed Morsi deferred media questions concerning Syrian government use of Egyptian-made cluster munitions, to the armed forces.[10] According to local media, retired Major-General Dr. Mahmoud Khalaf, an advisor at Nasser Higher Military Academy, denied that Egypt had manufactured “this kind of unlawful weapon” and stressed Egypt’s commitment to “international conventions.”[11]
The Helipolis Company for Chemical Industries produces 122mm and 130mm artillery projectiles, which contain 18 and 28 DPICM submunitions, respectively.[12]
Egypt has also imported a significant number of cluster munitions, primarily from the United States (US). The US provided at least 760 CBU-87 cluster bombs to Egypt as part of a foreign military sales program in the early 1990s.[13] Lockheed Martin Corporation was awarded a US$36 million contract to produce 485 M26A1 Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets for Egypt in November 1991.[14] Between 1970 and 1995, the US also supplied Egypt with 1,300 Rockeye cluster bombs.[15]
Additionally, Jane’s Information Group notes that KMG-U dispensers of Soviet-origin are in service for Egypt’s aircraft.[16]
[1] Statement of Egypt, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, as per conference interpretation.
[2] According to the statement, “Egypt did not sign the Convention till now due to a number of shortages in it, on the top of which is excluding several types of cluster munitions especially the munitions with advanced technology from the ban, and also the main countries that produce and use cluster munitions did not join the treaty, as well as the issue that the affected countries are the one [sic] that have to shoulder the main responsibility of clearing its lands of the cluster munitions.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt press release, “The Official Spokesman welcomes the coming into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, on 1st August, 2010,” 2 August 2010.
[3] For details on Egypt’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 197–199.
[4] Egypt’s explanation of vote, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 30 October 2008.
[5] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182,18 December 2013. Egypt voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.
[6] Statement by Ehab Fawzy, Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2007. Notes by the CMC/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
[7] Human Rights Watch (HRW) press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” 14 January 2013. In addition, a number of SAKR rockets were found in Iraq by UN weapons inspectors possibly indicating export activity. The SAKR rockets were the “cargo variant” but had been modified by the Iraqis to deliver chemical weapons. “Sixteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) S/2004/160,” Annex 1, p. 10.
[8] See Brown Moses blog, “Evidence of New Grad Launched Cluster Munitions Used in Syria,” 15 December 2012; HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” 14 January 2013; and The Rogue Adventurer blog, “Sakr 122mm Cargo Rockets & Submunitions in Syria,” 15 January 2013. It is not known if the 122mm rockets were the SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 type.
[9] Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), p. 707. France declared that upon entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, France’s military retained six warheads for 122mm SAKR rockets containing 588 submunitions. France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 January 2011, p. 92.
[10] “Morsi mum on reports that Egyptian cluster bombs used by Syria,” World Tribune, 29 January 2013.
[11] For example, retired Maj. Gen. Sameh Seif el-Yazal said Egypt is “not providing the Syrian army or the revolutionaries with any weapons or ammunition, whether directly or indirectly, not even through a third party.” Max Elstein Keisler, “HRW: Syrian Regime Using Egyptian-Made Cluster Bombs,” The Algemeiner, 16 January 2013. See also “Egypt denies making cluster bombs for Syria’s Assad,” Al Bawaba, 15 January 2013.
[12] Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 582, 589–590.
[13] “Dozen + Mideast Nations Bought Weapons since Gulf War,” Aerospace Daily, 10 December 1991; and Barbara Starr, “Apache buy will keep Israeli edge,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 October 1992.
[14] US Department of Defense, “US Army Aviation & Missile Command Contract Announcement: DAAH01-00-C-0044,” Press Release, 9 November 2001.
[15] US Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” 5 November 1995, obtained by HRW in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995.
[16] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 838.
Mine Action
Contamination and Impact
The Arab Republic of Egypt is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexplored ordnance (UXO) from World War II. Most of the battles took place in the area between the Quattara depression and Alamein at the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.
The precise extent of contamination remains unknown and no credible estimate for mine contamination has yet been provided. An April 2009 assessment by the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) cautioned that accumulated data needed to be carefully analyzed in order to not misrepresent the overall mine problem as well as to avoid reporting areas for demining that had already been cleared.[1]
In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (Executive Secretariat) reported to donors than the army had destroyed 2.9 million mines while clearing 38km2 in five areas, leaving “more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area of 248km2.[2] This appears to be confusing mines and UXO. A government statement reported the existence of a further 5.5 million “mines” in the Sinai and the Eastern Desert.[3]
The government of Egypt has planned to link mine clearance and development of the northwest coast area. Most projects will require demining support before starting. Population movement and population increases have put increased pressure on land usage, placing an ever-growing number of people close to mined areas. Irrigation projects, a priority for Egypt, have experienced delays because of the need to clear mines and UXO.
Mine Action Program
There does not appear to be a functioning mine action program in Egypt, although nominally an Executive Secretariat has been created at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to serve as a coordination unit between civilian Egyptian government departments, the military, and civil society, with the support of UNDP in a project due to end in 2014.[4]
All clearance to date has been performed by the Egyptian Army. No results have been publicly reported over recent years.
In April 2013, a contract was agreed for Egypt to purchase an Armtrac 400 mine-clearance vehicle from the United Kingdom. The contract is said to be worth US$1.2 million.[5]
[1] UNMAT, “Egypt Mine Action Inter-agency Assessment,” 14–18 April 2009, p. 11.
[2] “Egypt Mine Action Project Northwest Coast: Phase I Accomplishments,” Presentation by Amb. Fathy El Shazly, Director, Executive Secretariat, Cairo, August 2010.
[3] Mohamed Abdel Salam, “First phase of demining in Egypt complete,” Bikyamasr (blog), 18 April 2010.
[5] See “Egypt orders new mine-clearance equipment,” DefenceWeb, 22 April 2013.
Casualties and Victim Assistance
Casualties Overview
All known casualties by end 2013 |
Estimated to be over 8,000 |
Casualties in 2013 |
69 (2012: 46) |
2013 casualties by outcome |
20 killed; 49 injured (2011: 41 killed; 5 injured) |
2013 casualties by device type |
21 antipersonnel mine; 36 undefined mine types; 12 ERW |
In 2013, the Monitor identified 69 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Egypt. All of the casualties were male; civilian casualties included 28 men and nine boys. Of the total, 37 casualties were civilians and 32 were military.[1]
The 69 casualties identified in 2013 represented a significant increase from the 46 mine/ERW casualties recorded in Egypt in 2012, when only one military casualty was recorded.[2]
In 2013, at least two incidents took place near the Libyan border in the Matruh governorate and involved migrants, one person from Syria and a Sudanese national, having crossed the border illegally.[3] Furthermore, the number of casualties having occurred in the Sinai region (North and South Sinai) has greatly increased compared to previous years, with 33 casualties in 2013 as opposed to five in 2012 and two in 2011. Most of these casualties were military and 69% of all military casualties occurred in the Sinai region.
Several sources have estimated the total number of known casualties to be around 8,000. However, the period of data collection for these statistics is not reported. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported in 2006 that there had been 8,313 mine casualties (696 people killed; 7,617 injured; 5,017 were civilians) in the Western Desert since 1982.[4] Almost identical statistics were reported in 1998, but for the period 1945–1996.[5]
Victim Assistance
In 2010, there were estimated to be at least 900 mine/ERW survivors in Egypt.[6] By the end of 2010, detailed information had been collected on 686 survivors in the Matruh governorate.[7] This database was believed to include information on 91–95% of all mine/ERW survivors in the governorate.[8] No data was available on survivors based outside of Matruh.
Victim assistance coordination[9]
Government coordinating body/focal point |
Executive Secretariat (for Matruh governorate) |
Coordinating mechanism |
National Committee for Supervising the Demining of the North West Coast (National Committee): supervisory role for Executive Secretariat |
Plan |
None; project strategy for Executive Secretariat includes victim assistance objectives |
The National Committee technically provides oversight for all mine action activities undertaken by the Executive Secretariat, including victim assistance. These activities are restricted to the Matruh governorate; there is no victim assistance coordination for the rest of Egypt. The committee is comprised of representatives from 20 ministries, local officials from four governorates, and from several NGOs. Among the objectives of the Executive Secretariat’s second phase of its activities, which started in 2010, are to “support landmine victims of the north west coast,” to “complete and consistently update Victims Database [sic]” and to “mobilize more resources and expand victim assistance activities.”[10] The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Solidarity shared responsibility for protecting the rights of all persons with disabilities in Egypt.[11]
Service accessibility and effectiveness
Victim assistance activities[12]
Name of organization |
Type of organization |
Type of activity |
Matruh Health and Solidarity Department |
Local government |
Financial support for ongoing maintenance of mobility devices |
Ministry of Social Solidarity |
National government |
Coverage for all registered survivors in national pension system |
Executive Secretariat |
UNDP/government project |
Emergency evacuation procedures for explosion incidents; physical rehabilitation and prosthetics at the army-run Al-Agouza Center for Rehabilitation; income-generating projects |
Association of Landmines Survivors for Economic Development—Marsa Matruh |
Local Survivors’ Association |
Facilitating access to physical rehabilitation services and income-generating activities in Matruh governorate |
Protection |
National NGO |
Facilitating access to social benefits or employment for mine/ERW survivors; data collection on mine/ERW casualties |
Arab Doctors Union |
Regional NGO |
Physical rehabilitation for survivors in Matruh governorate |
There were no reported changes in the accessibility or quality of victim assistance services for mine/ERW survivors in 2013.[13]
In 2013, the ITF Enhancing Human Security did not continue its national rehabilitation sector capacity-building project launched in 2011 which had provided rehabilitation for Egyptian victims of conflict at facilities in Slovenia.[14]
In 2013, UNDP, in partnership with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Defense, launched the second phase of its pilot project to support the development of the North West Coast and Inland Desert which included mine risk education and victim assistance activities. Through this project, technical assistance was provided to four NGOs targeting victims of mine incidents. The NGOs implemented income-generation activities as well as networking and advocacy activities, including financial management, project management, strategic planning, and managing volunteers. UNDP reported that all loan installments due to date were successfully repaid by beneficiaries.[15] Local consultation prompted the project to launch a microcredit loan program focusing on women, benefiting a total number of a 100 female mine victims and female relatives of mine victims.[16]
No information was available on psychological or social support for mine/ERW survivors in 2013. However, the UNDP discerned that survivors often expressed feelings publically, including through the media, that they “continue to pay the price of a war they were never party to;” the UNDP also noted the need for ongoing participatory dialogue and for building and maintaining relationships with the Bedouin community to develop the capacities of survivors in identifying and resolving grievances by negotiation. It also asserted the need for the mine action program to develop flexibility in recognizing the concerns of the community “in a manner which still allows effective implementation of project activities.”[17]
Egypt had no legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities in education, access to healthcare, or the provision of other state services, nor are there laws mandating access to buildings or transportation; discrimination remained widespread.[18]
Egypt ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 14 April 2008.
[1] “Information collected by Protection and Mine Action and Human Rights Foundation in Egypt,” by email from Ayman Sorour, Director, Protection, 2 May 2014.
[2] Ibid., 4 October 2013.
[3] Ibid., 2 May 2014.
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, “A paper on the problem of Landmines in Egypt,” 27 July 2006.
[5] Notes taken by the Monitor, Beirut Conference, 11 February 1999; Ministry of Defense, “The Iron Killers,” undated, pp. 3–4; and Amb. Dr. Mahmoud Karem, “Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Resolution on Anti-Personal Landmines,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Document, November 1998. Similar figures cited in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper on the Mine Ban Treaty, obtained 5 September 2004, were at the time believed to only apply to casualties occurring in the Western Desert since 1982.
[6] This estimate is not for a specified time period, though the implication is that it is for all time to the present. Mohamed Abdel Salam, “Egypt Seeks Cooperation in De-Mining Efforts,” Bikyamasr; and “Egypt intensifies demining efforts,” Bikyamasr, 4 February 2010.
[7] Egypt Mine Action Project North West Coast, “What is victim assistance?,” undated.
[8] Executive Secretariat, “Victim Assistance Strategy Paper,” Cairo, 2010, p. 28.
[9] Egypt Mine Action Project North West Coast, “About the Project,” undated.
[10] Ibid.
[11] United States (US) Department of State, “2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt,” Washington, DC, 8 April 2011.
[12] Egypt Mine Action Project North West Coast, “VA Strategy.” Egypt Mine Action Project North West Coast, “Protocol of Cooperation in the field of Victim Assistance,” 24 January 2011; email from Ayman Sorour, Protection, 11 April 2011; Executive Secretariat, “Victim Assistance Strategy Paper,” Cairo, 2010, p. 14; and see Arab Doctors Union.
[13] Telephone interview with Ayman Sorour, Protection, 2 May 2014.
[14] ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Ljubljana, 2013, p. 142; and ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2013,” Ljubljana, 2014.
[15] UNDP, “Egypt - Mine Action Project Quarterly Progress Report,” 1 January 2013–31 March 2013; UNDP, “Support to the North West Coast Development and Mine Action Plan - What is the project about?,” accessed on 30 June 2014; and UNDP, “From Victims to Activists,” accessed on 30 June 2014.
[16] UNDP, “From Victims to Activists,” accessed on 30 June 2014.
[17] UNDP, “Egypt - Mine Action Project Quarterly Progress Report,” 1 January 2013–31 March 2013.
[18] US Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014.
Support for Mine Action
The mine action program in the Arab Republic of Egypt has been stalled since 2009 following the completion of phase I. The start of phase II covering 2011–2015 was supposed to expand mine clearance operations, facilitate development in the region, strengthen the Executive Secretariat, and mobilize more resources; however, this was again delayed in 2012 due to lack of funding and political events in Egypt.[1]
Nonetheless, Germany, New Zealand, and Slovenia all reported contributions to Egypt’s mine action program in 2012. Slovenia’s contribution through the ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security went towards providing rehabilitation services to four children at the University Rehabilitation Institute in Ljubljana who were injured during political events in Egypt in January and February 2011.[2]
In 2011 and 2012 the government of Egypt contributed two million pounds (2011; $335,000) (2012: $327,000) to its mine action program.[3]
International contributions: 2012[4]
Donor |
Sector |
National currency |
Amount (US$) |
Germany |
Clearance |
€500,000 |
642,950 |
New Zealand |
Victim assistance |
NZ$600,000 |
486,300 |
Slovenia |
Victim assistance |
$32,957 |
32,957 |
Total |
|
|
1,162,207 |
Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[5]
Year |
National ($) |
International ($) |
Total budget ($) |
2012 |
327,600 |
1,162,207 |
1,489,807 |
2011 |
335,000 |
1,247,932 |
1,582,932 |
2010 |
N/R |
722,886 |
722,886 |
2009 |
483,647 |
N/R |
483,647 |
2008 |
N/R |
918,244 |
918,244 |
Total |
1,146,247 |
4,051,269 |
5,197,516 |
N/R = not reported
[1] Interview with Amb. Fathy el-Shazly, Executive Secretariat, in Geneva, 21 March 2012.
[2] ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 142.
[3] Average exchange rate for 2011: EGP1 = US$0.1675; Average exchange rate for 2012: EGP1= US$0.1638; www.oanda.com
[4] Germany, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, Form B, 23 March 2013; New Zealand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2013; and for Slovenia, ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 36. Average exchange rate for 2012: €1=US$1.2859 and NZ$1=US$0.8105. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.
[5] See Landmine Monitor reports 2008–2011; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Egypt: Support for Mine Action,” 10 September 2012 and interview with Amb. Fathy El Shazly, Director, Executive Secretariat, in Geneva, 21 March 2012.