Last Updated: 01 October 2012

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State not party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Voted in favor of UNGA resolution 66/29 on 2 December 2011, as well as for all similar resolutions since 1997

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Attended the May 2012 intersessional Standing Committee meetings


Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines, and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the treaty since 1997.

Georgia has participated in most Mine Ban Treaty meetings, including those in 2011 and 2012, although its last statement at such a meeting was in 2007, when it told States Parties that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty, that it “is well aware that the negative humanitarian impact of landmines far outweighs their military value,” and that it “tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat.”[1] In the past, Georgia has insisted that its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—prevents it from acceding.[2] In a meeting with the Monitor in June 2011, a Georgian government official stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was beginning to consider the mine issue.[3]

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and joined CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 22 December 2008. It had previously said it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons given for the Mine Ban Treaty.[4]

Campaigners in Georgia participated in the Lend Your Leg global action on 18 February 2012 when NGOs and the Ministry of Sport and Tourism organized a backgammon tournament with survivors of landmines.[5]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia does not produce, import, or export mines.[6]

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union.[7] The Ministry of Defense completed an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in 2010, but will not make information on the size and composition of the stockpile publicly available. The ministry does not plan to destroy its stocks, but commits to safeguard them in a way to avoid dissemination or transfer to another state or non-state actors.[8] 


Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[9] In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”[10]

Despite its repeated denial of past use, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006, mostly in the Upper Kodori Gorge area adjoining the breakaway region of Abkhazia.[11]Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007, but the Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations.[12] There were additional allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008. Each side denied the allegations, and investigations by Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines.[13]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia.[14] South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine ban and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor mine problem, and there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In May 2009, South Ossetian authorities reportedly recovered mines from a cache in Yeredvi village which they alleged were from Georgia.[15]


[1] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[2] Statement of Georgia, Mine Ban Treaty Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006. In an April 2010 letter to the Monitor, Georgia stated that it “has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munition Conventions, but the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region did not allow us to adjoin the mentioned conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.” “Updated information from the Government of Georgia for annual publication Landmine Monitor Report 2010,” (No. 8/37-02) provided by email from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[3] Interview with David Kapanadze, Senior Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[4] Statement by George Dolidze, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[5] ICBL, ““ICBL 2012 Global Action Report Lend Your Leg (LYL), 1st March – 4th April 2012,”  undated, p. 19,

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 25 September 2010, p. 8.

[7] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. In August 2007, Georgia said that it had recovered an undisclosed number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from a former Russian Army base in Akhalkalaki. Pavel Belov, “Russians Leave Cesium and Landmines Behind in Georgia,” Kommersant, 17 August 2007,

[8] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 31 March 2010.

[9] The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; and Note Verbale to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 17 January 2001.

[10] Statement by George Dolidze, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia made similar statements previously.

[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 826–827.

[14] For background on South Ossetia, see Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 2009, pp. 16–20.

[15] “Terrorist cache with arms found in S. Ossetia – minister,” Interfax (South Ossetia), 21 May 2009.

Last Updated: 25 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy


Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Georgia last provided its views on the convention in an April 2010 letter that stated: “The Georgian government has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munitions Convention, but the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region didn’t allow us to adjoin the mentioned conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.”[1]

Georgia participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2]

Since 2008, it has attended two meetings related to the convention: an international conference on the convention in Santiago, Chile in June 2010 and the convention’s Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012. Georgia did not make any statements at these meetings.

Georgia has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[3]

Georgia has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Georgia acquired Mk-4 160mm surface-to-surface rockets equipped with cluster munition payloads (each rocket contains 104 M85 submunitions) from Israel in 2007.[4] Georgian forces used these weapons during their conflict with Russia in August 2008; the Ministry of Defense said Georgia launched 24 volleys of 13 Mk-4 rockets each.[5]

On 31 August 2008, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that the Georgian Armed Forces used cluster munitions against the Russian forces near the Roki tunnel.[6] However, remnants of Georgian cluster munitions were also found by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in civilian areas in the north of Gori district, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[7]

Stockpiling and destruction

Georgia inherited a stockpile of air-dropped cluster bombs from the Soviet Union.[8]

In July 2011, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UNDP began a project to destroy obsolete weaponry, including 844 RBK cluster bombs and more than 320,000 submunitions, as listed in the following table.[9] The last of the RBK-type bombs and other weapons project were destroyed by open detonation at the Vaziani military firing range, 20 kilometers outside of Tbilisi, on 12 July 2013.

Cluster munitions destroyed in Georgia[10]


Quantity of munitions

Quantity of submunitions

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh, each containing 150 submunitions




RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M, each containing 30 submunitions




RBK-500 SHoAB-0.5, each containing 565 submunitions




RBK-500 AO-2.5RT, each containing 108 submunitions




RBK-500 PTAB-1, each containing 268 submunitions




RBK-500 PTAB-2.5, each containing 50 submunitions




RBK-500 PTAB-10.5A, each containing 30 submunitions









[1] Letter No. 8/37-02 from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[2] For details on Georgia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 205–207.

[3]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 68/182, 18 December 2013. Georgia voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[4] The transfer of the launchers was reported in, Submission of Georgia, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2007, 7 July 2008.

[5] “Some Facts,” attachment to email from David Nardaia, Director, Analytical Department, Ministry of Defense, 18 November 2008. The rockets would have carried 32,448 M85 submunitions.

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Human Rights Watch inquiry about the use of M85 bomblets,” 2 September 2008.

[7] For more information see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 206; and HRW, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 57. The Ministry of Defense of Georgia said in February 2009 that it is investigating the possibility of “failure of the weapons system.” During the conflict, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the upper Kodor Gorge and retook it from Georgian forces. Abkhazia has asserted that Georgia fired large numbers of cluster munitions with M095 submunitions from LAR-160 rockets in the Kodor Valley. Email from Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, 24 August 2009. The deputy foreign minister provided photographs of submunitions and containers. The M095 is described as an M85-type submunition. The Monitor has not been able to independently investigate and confirm this information.

[8] In 2004 and 2007, Jane’s Information Group reported that the Georgian Air Force had KMGU and RBK-500 cluster bombs, both of which can carry a variety of submunitions. The Ministry of Defense of Georgia told HRW in February 2009 that it still has RBK-500 cluster bombs and BKF blocks of submunitions that are delivered by KMGU dispensers, but that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction. First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia said its air force planes are not fitted for delivering these air-dropped weapons. See HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 207.

[9] While originally slated to destroy 1,085 bombs, a subsequent inventory of the stockpile resulted in the destruction of 1,288 bombs. Email from the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 3 May 2014.

[10] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014. The weapons destroyed also included 99 RBK-500 ZAB-2.5SM and 35 RBK-2050 ZAB-2.5 incendiary bombs as well as 310 BKF cartridges containing PTM-1G scatterable antivehicle landmines.

Last Updated: 24 August 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Georgia is contaminated with mines around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia.

Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the residual mine problem has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 suspected mined areas were located at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[1] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totaled more than 4.5km2 in estimated area.[2] Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO Trust cleared five of the minefields with a humanitarian impact and identified one additional small minefield.[3] It is not known if any of the other military areas have been cleared.

There is also an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[4]

Since the 1990–2 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. According to HALO, there has been persistent low-level mine-laying, primarily in areas between Georgian- and South Ossetian-controlled villages. Although HALO has been unable to gain sufficient access to South Ossetia to assess the mine threat fully, it noted at least 15 mine casualties reported in 2008–10. HALO has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but has not been granted access.[5]

Mine Action Program

There does not appear to be a functioning mine action program in Georgia.


[1] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[2] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 March 2010.

[3] HALO Trust, “Georgia, The Problem.

[4] Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[5] HALO , “Georgia, The Problem.

Last Updated: 26 November 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance


Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

At least 875 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties in 2013

1 (2012: 10)

2013 casualties by outcome

1 injured (2012: 1 killed; 9 injured)

2013 casualties by device type

1 antipersonnel mine

In 2013, the Monitor identified one new antipersonnel mine casualty in Georgia. This represents a significant decrease compared to the number identified in 2012 (10) and is similar to 2011 when no mine/ERW causalities were identified. In 2013, a 25 year old man was injured by an antipersonnel mine while looking for his lost cow in the vicinity of the Georgian-Armenian-Azerbaijani border.[1]

The ICRC and the Georgian Red Cross Society (GRCS), along with the ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC), collected casualty data. ICBL-GC had collected information on 921 mine/ERW casualties as of the end of 2013.[2] GRCS volunteers, supported by the ICRC, collected data on 1,261 mine/ERW victims as of the end of 2013.[3]

Cluster munition casualties

In Georgia, there have been at least 70 casualties due to cluster munitions; all were reported in 2008, including 61 casualties during strikes and nine due to unexploded submunitions.[4]

Victim Assistance

Georgia is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other types of ERW. Georgia has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[5] The total number of survivors in Georgia is unknown, though it is estimated to be more than 700.[6]

No significant changes in the quality of victim assistance services were reported for Georgia in 2013.

Assessing victim assistance needs

ICBL-GC regularly updates data on survivors in its information system and uses it to determine victim assistance activities.[7] The GRCS continued to collect data on the needs of mine/ERW casualties and their families with the aim of “gaining a comprehensive picture of those needs and formulating an effective response.” With ICRC support, data collection by the National Red Cross Society continued in Georgia, including in Abkhazia, to assess the socioeconomic needs of mine/ERW victims and formulate an appropriate response. An additional GRCS staff member was trained to update and maintain the mine-action database.[8]

The data collected was also used to identify individuals in need of prostheses for referral to the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR) in Tbilisi. The ICRC covered the costs related with prosthetic/orthotic devices, transportation, food, and housing for 81 mine/ERW survivors during treatment.[9]

Victim assistance coordination

There is no victim assistance coordination mechanism in Georgia. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs coordinates disability issues, including those related to the mine/ERW survivors who have official disability status.[10]

In 2009, the Georgian government approved the Action Plan on Social Integration of People with Disabilities 2010–2012. In the same year, the parliament created the State Coordinating Council focusing on disability issues.[11] It was determined that many steps were still needed to be taken to address the range of challenges faced by people with disabilities in Georgia.[12] A new action plan was adopted and the coordinating council was in place from March 2013.

As in past years, no inclusion of survivors or their organizations in planning, coordination, or implementation of services was reported in 2013.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[13]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2013

Rehabilitation Center for Persons with Disabilities


Prosthetics services




Prosthetics services



National NGO

Prosthetics services

Increase in overall prosthetic production and in number of survivors served compared to previous years

Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (DEA)

National NGO

Educational support for children and adults with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, socio-economic inclusion, legal advice, and awareness-raising



National NGO

Data collection; assistance to survivors and their families, psychosocial support, legal support



International organization

Data collection; economic inclusion, emergency assistance

Increased assistance to mine/ERW survivors

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

International organizations

Socio-economic support, including microloans


The ICRC monitored the situation in healthcare facilities across Georgia and provided technical and sometimes material support.[14]

There was an increase in government funding available for physical rehabilitation services for people with disabilities in 2012 that was reported to have improved accessibility of services.[15] There was also an overall increase in prostheses production in 2013, including an increase in the number of mine survivors served.[16] In 2013, the cost for mine/ERW survivors and other people with disabilities to access the services provided by GEFPOR was supported by the ICRC and government funding, including covering the cost of orthopedic and assistive devices as well as housing, food, and transport during the time of treatment.[17] In 2013, the ICRC also donated wheelchairs to two mine/ERW survivors while the NGO DEA continued to run its wheelchair-producing center which employs mine survivors.[18]

The ICRC continued to assist survivors through micro-economic initiatives in Georgia. In 2013, the ICRC supported 245 families affected by mines/ERW in pursuing small businesses and agricultural activities enabling them to maintain or regain economic self-sufficiency by developing sustainable livelihood.[19] In preparation for setting up their own micro-enterprises, 468 of those beneficiaries who had received income support learnt the basics of running a business.[20] The ICRC also distributed food and other essential items to households that had lost their breadwinners, and to victims of mines/ERW.[21]

The IOM and the ITF[22] continued cooperation in an economic inclusion project for mine/ERW survivors. Established in 2009, the project was implemented as a pilot program until 2012. In November 2012, a new phase of the project was launched and is due to run until 2015.[23] The project aims to improve the standard of living of mine/ERW victims and their families through enhanced employability, greater access to seed funding for starting/expanding their own business, and through improved socio-economic support. As of end of 2013, 149 beneficiaries were registered; small business trainings were conducted for the registered beneficiaries. Forty-three people received job counseling and four beneficiaries were referred to vocational skills development training.[24]

There was a continuing lack of psychological support and social reintegration activities in Georgia.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities; however, these provisions were not effectively enforced and social, educational, and employment discrimination against persons with disabilities remained a problem. In 2013, the government of Georgia developed a draft law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination which was adopted on the 2 May 2014.[25] Legislation required access to buildings for persons with disabilities and stipulated fines for noncompliance. However, very few public facilities or buildings were accessible.[26]

In 2013, the Office of the Human Rights Defender (ombudsperson) said that buildings, public transport, and streets were still not adapted for people with disabilities in towns and in rural areas of Georgia. The ombudsperson requested greater efforts from local authorities to improve accessibility.[27]

Georgia signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009 and ratified it on 13 March 2014.


[1]Red Bridge Landmine Blast Kills 25-year-old,”, 2 April 2013.

[2] Email from Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 28 July 2014.

[3] Email from Herbi Elmazi, Regional Weapon Contamination Advisor, ICRC, 25 July 2014.

[4] Human Rights Watch (HRW), A dying practice: use of cluster munitions by Georgia and Russia in August 2008 (New York: HRW, April 2009), pp. 40 and 57. Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46. Georgian cluster munitions killed at least one civilian and injured at least two more when they landed on or near the towns of Tirdznisi and Shindisi.

[6] Email from Narine Berikashvili, Monitor Researcher, 17 June 2010; and interview with Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 12 September 2013.

[7] Interview with Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 12 September 2013.

[8] Email from Nino Burtikashvili, Deputy Secretary General, Georgia Red Cross Society, 25 July 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 376.

[9] Email from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 376.

[10] Email from Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 2 August 2011.

[11] Coalition for Independent Living, “News,” undated.

[13]  ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014; emails from Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, 13 March 2013, and 22 April 2013; from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014; and from Madonna Kharebava, Executive Director, Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (DEA), 8 July 2014; ITF, “Annual Report 2013,” Ljubljana, 2014; United States (US) Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014; GEFPOR, “Statistics,” undated, accessed 2 August 2014; IOM Georgia, “Assistance for mine victims,” undated, accessed 2 August 2014; “Public Defender – No Facilities for Physically Disabled People in the Towns of Georgia,”, 11 April 2011; and “Environment Is Still Not Adapted for Disabled People,”, 19 February 2013.

[14] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, pp. 373–378.

[15] Emails from Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, 13 March 2013, and 22 April 2013.

[16] GEFPOR reported providing 353 prostheses in 2013, compared to 336 in 2012, 99 in 2011, and 151 in 2010. Of these, 58 prostheses were for mine/ERW survivors, compared to 78 in 2012, and 54 in 2011. GEFPOR, “Statistics,” undated, accessed 2 August 2014.

[17] Email from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 376.

[18] Email from Madonna Kharebava, DEA, 8 July 2014.

[19] Email from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014.

[20] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 375.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Formerly the ITF “for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, Slovenia.”

[23] IOM Georgia, “Assistance for mine victims,” undated, accessed 2 August 2014.

[24] ITF, “Annual Report 2013,” Ljubljana, 2014, pp. 60–62.

[25] Email from Madonna Kharebava, DEA, 8 July 2014.

[26] US Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014.

Last Updated: 22 November 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, Japan contributed ¥78.7 million (US$985,921) towards mine action in Georgia, and the United States (US) contributed $754,867.

As part of the ¥78.7 million ($985,921) contribution from Japan, ¥9.8 million ($123,000) went to the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation.[1] The remainder went to HALO Trust.

Georgia has never reported contributions to its own mine action operations.

International contributions: 2012[2]




Amount ($)


Clearance, victim assistance











Summary of international government contributions: 2008–2012[3]


Total contributions ($)















[1] Average exchange rate for 2012: ¥79.82=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[2] Email from Calvin Ruysen, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 17 July 2013; and Japan, Convention on Conventional Weapons, Amended Protocol II, 28 March 2013.

[3] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Georgia: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.