The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Germany produced, imported, and exported mines. Production was renounced in April 1996, and a 1994 export moratorium was made permanent in 1996. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically entered into force on 9 July 1998. In April 2012, Germany submitted its 14^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.

Germany destroyed its stockpile of 1.7 million antipersonnel mines in December 1997. Germany initially retained 3,000 mines for training and development purposes, which was reduced to 2,130 mines by the end of 2011.[1] On 3 March 2011, 22,716 antipersonnel mines were transferred from Turkey to a company in Germany in order to be destroyed.[2]

In 2011 and 2012, Germany served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on stockpile destruction. Germany served as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Technologies for Mine Action (1999–2000) and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on Mine Clearance (2000–2002) and General Status and Operation of the Convention (2006–2008).

Germany attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November–December 2011 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012. At both meetings, Germany made a number of statements including on stockpile destruction and retention, the treaty’s implementation support unit, cooperation and assistance, and on its progress to clear unexploded ordnance, including antipersonnel mines, from a former military training base at Wittstock.

Germany is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

 

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 8 July 2009. It was among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010.

Germany’s War Weapons Control Act was amended in June 2009 to provide for national implementation of the convention’s prohibitions and includes penal sanctions for violations of up to five years imprisonment.[1]

Germany submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 27 January 2011 and provided annual updated reports in 2012, 2013, and on 30 April 2014.[2]

Germany participated throughout the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its position evolved significantly to support an immediate and comprehensive prohibition on cluster munitions.[3]

Since the adoption of the convention in Dublin in May 2008, Germany has played a leading role in advancing the work of the convention. It hosted an international conference on the destruction of cluster munitions in Berlin in June 2009 and served as co-coordinator on stockpile destruction and retention in 2011–2012.

Germany has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013, where it made several statements, including on stockpile destruction and international cooperation and assistance.[4] Germany has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in April 2014.

In 2014, Germany provided financial support for the organization of a workshop on implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for governments from Southeast Europe held by the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) Centre for Security Cooperation as part of a symposium on mine action in Zadar, Croatia from 22–26 April 2014.[5]

Germany has continued to promote universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, it called on all states that have not yet done so to join the convention without delay.[6] In July 2014, the German Federal Foreign Office informed the Monitor that the Foreign Office remains committed to promoting the convention’s standards and continues to raise the matter of accession to the convention in ongoing bilateral consultations with states not party.[7]

Germany has condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions on several occasions since October 2012, including at the ministerial level.[8] At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013, Germany stated that “unfortunately these hazardous weapons – stigmatized in public opinion – are still being used as well against civilians in many parts of the world. We are deeply concerned about reports that cluster munitions have been used in the conflict in Syria.”[9]

Germany has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning Syria’s cluster munition use, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[10]

Germany is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

In 2012 and 2013, Germany expressed its views on a number of important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, including the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, the prohibition on transit, the prohibition on investment in cluster munitions production, and the retention of cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

During the negotiations of the convention, Germany advocated strongly for provisions on “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party). In June 2012, the German Federal Foreign Office reaffirmed to the Monitor that prior to the convention’s entry into force “clear orders” were issued for the German Armed Forces that “forbade German soldiers from using cluster munitions themselves, and from requesting or ordering the use of cluster munitions.” The instructions also “further prohibited the transport of cluster munitions using Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] vehicles and/or personnel. Ordering or assisting such transport was also banned.”[11]

Germany’s implementation legislation prohibits the transit of cluster munitions.[12]

Germany has yet to express clear views on the prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, but United States (US) diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 show that Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions stored by the US in Germany.[13]

Germany’s implementation legislation, the War Weapons Control Act, does not explicitly prohibit investment in cluster munition production. In June 2013, the Federal Foreign Office reaffirmed its position, previously expressed to the Monitor, that “the Federal Government expects the German private sector including financial institutions to implement their voluntary commitments aimed at disinvesting in business segments related to CM [cluster munitions]. It is following the relevant developments closely.”[14]

In 2011 and 2012, motions submitted to and rejected by the German parliament called for Germany’s national implementation legislation, the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) of 2009, to be amended to include a comprehensive ban on direct and indirect investment in cluster munition producers.[15]

Facing Finance and other German NGOs have campaigned for a comprehensive ban on financing in cluster munition production. A 2013 updated report on worldwide investment in cluster munitions by NGOs IKV Pax Christi (now PAX) and FairFin lists German financial institutions investments in cluster munition producers.[16]

Use, production, and transfer

According to the Federal Foreign Office, Germany has never used cluster munitions.[17] Germany unilaterally renounced the use of all types of cluster munitions on 29 May 2008, one day before it agreed to adopt the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin.[18]

In the past, German industry was very active in the production and export of cluster munitions. According to the Federal Foreign Office, Germany stopped production and transfer of cluster munitions in 2005.[19]

In its initial Article 7 report, Germany declared that “all former production capabilities were dismantled prior to 2008.”[20] The last known export was in 2004–2005 when Germany sent a quantity of M26 rockets with submunitions to Slovakia.[21]

The company Diehl GmbH and numerous subcontractors were involved in the production of M26 rockets for the 227mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) as part of the MLRS European Producers Group.[22] Lenkflugkörpersysteme GmbH produced the MW-1 dispenser (that deploys submunitions) for aircraft.[23]

The company Rheinmetall produced several types of 155mm artillery projectiles containing dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[24] These were produced for the German Armed Forces as well as for export customers including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy (co-production), and Norway.[25]

Germany also imported cluster munitions from the United Kingdom (UK) and the US.

A consortium of Diehl, Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme GmbH (GIWS), and Rheinmetall produce the SMArt-155 artillery projectile, a weapon that employs two submunitions but is not considered a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions because it meets the five technical criteria set out by negotiators as necessary to avoid the negative effects of cluster munitions.[26] This has been produced for the German Armed Forces and for export customers Australia, Greece, Switzerland, and the UK.[27] The consortium granted licensed co-production rights to Alliant Techsystems in the US for the SMArt-155, and Alliant has marketed the munitions in the United Arab Emirates. According to the NGO Actiongroup Landmine.de (now Facing Finance), more than 25,000 SMArt-155 projectiles have been produced.[28] Facing Finance has estimated that between 2000 and 2003, Germany acquired 9,000 SMArt-155 howitzer projectiles.[29] As of July 2014, Diehl’s website advertised the production and sale of SMArt-155 artillery projectiles, but it stated that “being point-target ammunition, SMArt® 155 is not part of the Oslo Convention.”[30]

Stockpiling and destruction

Germany once possessed a total 553,549 cluster munitions containing 62,958,626 submunitions, including weapons destroyed prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As of 31 December 2013, Germany had destroyed 513,770 cluster munitions and 62,748,768 submunitions. Its remaining stockpile awaiting destruction consisted of 49,228 cluster munitions and 10,148,170 submunitions.[31]

Stockpile cluster munitions destroyed by Germany (as of 31 December 2013)[32]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2018.

Germany has often expressed its intent to complete stockpile destruction by the end of 2015.[33] In September 2013, Germany informed States Parties that it is on track to complete the destruction of its remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions in 2015.[34]

In April 2014, Germany reported that 93% of its stockpile had been destroyed by the end of 2013.[35] In 2013 alone, a total of 69,334 cluster munitions and 7,858,532 submunitions were destroyed.[36] As of 31 December 2013, a total of 39,108 cluster munitions of four different types and just over 10 million submunitions remained to be destroyed, as shown by the following table.

Stockpile to be destroyed by Germany (as of 31 December 2013)[37]

Germany started destroying its BL755 cluster bombs in 2001 following reliability concerns. Destruction of DM612 155mm artillery projectiles began in 2007, and destruction of other types of cluster munitions followed in 2009.[38]

The destruction of Germany’s cluster munitions stockpile has been conducted at three locations in Germany: Nammo Buck in Pinnow, Spreewerk Lübben in Lübben, and Muniberka in Dietersdorf. The Article 7 reports describe the safety and environmental standards observed.[39]

In September 2013, Germany said that the destruction of its DM 632 projectiles would be completed by the end of 2014 and remaining stockpiles would be destroyed by the end of 2015. It said that “several technical obstacles had to be overcome in the development of destruction processes for some types of munitions. The completion of destruction for certain 155mm munitions, which was planned for the end of 2012, has had to be rescheduled to the end of this year.”[40]

In April 2013, Germany reported that it spent a total of €11.8 million on stockpile destruction prior to the entry into force of the convention and a further €29.6 million was allocated from 1 August 2010 to 2016, making a total of €41.4 million (US$53.2 million).[41]

Retention

In its April 2014 Article 7 report, Germany declared retaining a total of 657 cluster munitions and 59,555 submunitions for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training and research purposes.[42]

Cluster munitions and explosive submunitions retained in accordance with Article 3(6)[43]

During 2013, Germany consumed a total of 28 cluster munitions and 3,125 submunitions during EOD training.[44] In 2012, Germany consumed a total of 58 cluster munitions and 6,330 submunitions during EOD training.[45] In 2011, a total of 39 cluster munitions and 2,862 submunitions were consumed.[46]

Germany has retained the largest number of submunitions of any State Party. The CMC has expressed concern at the retention of such high numbers of cluster munitions and submunitions and asked if Germany’s training program is large enough to require the consumption of so many submunitions.

In 2014, Germany declared that “a review on consumption of retained [cluster munitions] with the aim of reduction is ongoing.”[47] In September 2013, it informed States Parties that “the calculations and plans for retention of selected items are kept under constant review, thus upholding the spirit of this convention without neglecting our responsibility for the safety and security of our men and women in current and future operations. Thus, we can ensure that we retain only the very minimum quantity of cluster munitions necessary for permitted development and training.”[48]

Previously, in September 2012 Germany informed States Parties that it planned to intensify EOD training in light of the increasing dangers faced by German Armed Forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and, as a result, said there would be “an estimated increase in consumption of individual submunitions of approximately 30% from 2013 onwards.” In addition, “Some types of submunitions, previously designated for training will not now be used for this purpose and will be instead destroyed, resulting in a further decrease in the numbers retained.” According to the presentation, “the complete stock of retained cluster munitions will be used up even earlier than 2020 as well as approximately 50% of the retained submunitions.” It stated that the quantity of the munitions retained based on EOD personnel training needs over a 10-year period means “on average…that two to four items of live munitions are expended during the course for each participant.”[49]

In June 2012, the Federal Foreign Office provided the Monitor with a list of criteria used by the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement to determine the number of cluster munitions to be retained for training.[50]

 

Contamination and Impact

The Federal Republic of Germany is contaminated with cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock, Brandenburg (in former East Germany) dating from the period of the area’s use by Soviet and Russian armed forces. In August 2014, Germany reported that an area of 11km² was suspected to contain single Soviet-era ShOAB 0.5 submunitions—almost three times the area than previously reported (4km²).[1] The contamination by UXO has been described as “extensive.”[2]

In June 2011, Germany reported that contamination at Wittstock was suspected to include antipersonnel landmines.[3] In December 2013, Germany reported that “the suspicion of there being anti-personnel mines present has not been substantiated.”[4]

Mines

Germany first reported its suspicion that it might be contaminated with antipersonnel mines covering an area of 125km² in June 2011 at the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance.[5] In 2012, Germany reported that the suspected contaminated area was approximately 10,000m² and located in the northeast of the property.[6] Germany had previously declared in its Article 7 reports covering the years prior to 2011 that there were no confirmed or suspected mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.[7]

Following a combination of non-technical and technical survey, in addition to clearance activities, Germany reported the following December that “The area is no longer seen as a suspected APM [antipersonnel mine] area.”[8]

Cluster munitions remnants

Germany is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants. In its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, Germany had declared no confirmed or suspected cluster munition contaminated areas.[9] In June 2011 at the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings, however, Germany declared for the first time that it suspected it had areas containing cluster munition remnants at the former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg.[10] It repeated the information at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meeting a week later, noting that the remnants were “principally found within the confines of a target range” located at the south of the training area.

At the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Cluster Munitions Convention in September 2012, Germany reported that the suspected hazardous area (SHA) was some 4km² in size and located in the eastern center of the training area.[11] Germany reported the suspected contamination in its second Article 7 report submitted in 2013 and indicated that survey of the area was ongoing.[12]

In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report of April 2014, Germany reiterated that suspected cluster munitions contamination covered an estimated 4km².[13] However, in August 2014 Germany reported to the Monitor that, at 11km², the area suspected of contamination was considerably higher than the previously reported 4km², despite stating that “archive research” had “narrowed down the suspected area.”[14]

Mine Action Program

In early October 2011, ownership of the Wittstock former training range was transferred from the military to the governmental authority in charge of real estate—Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben (BImA).

As the new owner, the BImA developed a mine risk program in collaboration with local authorities which began implementation in 2012 and was focused on a “danger prevention plan” that was a described as a “crucial prerequisite” for further technical survey of the area.[15] Activities included risk reduction measures such as marking the perimeter and preventing civilian access to the area, instigation of a risk education program, and development of a strategic action concept designed to “create the necessary infrastructure for further targeted survey.”[16]

The program included plans for an initial survey of access routes, areas of suspected UXO contamination in neighboring locations, and necessary firebreaks using geomagnetic survey methods as a first step towards allowing construction of infrastructure it considered would be required for clearance personnel to safely clear the affected areas. Technical survey and clearance would be undertaken, if necessary, to clear the area in preparation for infrastructure construction, after which clearance of the remaining SHA could be undertaken.[17] The cost of clearance would be met by the BImA.

Once cleared, the site was planned to remain part of a “nature protection area” in the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, managed by the BImA as part of the Europa NATURA 2000 network.[18]

Survey in 2013

Germany reported that initial survey activities of the areas suspected of mine contamination had commenced in March 2013.[19] Following a combination of non-technical and technical survey, as well as physical clearance, no contamination was found and the area was reported free of mines in December 2013.[20]

At the Convention on Cluster Munitions Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction intersessional meetings in April 2012, Germany announced plans to conduct technical survey and, if necessary, some clearance during 2012 of a 40km-long and 50-meter-wide tract of land to ensure fire prevention and environment protection; during the same period it would also clear a network of paths and tracks to enable emergency management.[21] In April 2013, Germany reported a technical survey of the SHA was ongoing.[22] By August 2014, it was stated that preparations for a “technical investigation” were underway to survey and, if necessary, clear any cluster munition remnants. Technical survey of the first section of suspected area was envisaged to begin in 2015.[23]

Article 5 Compliance

Germany’s original deadline for destroying all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control would have been 1 March 1999 had Germany been aware of the contaminated area.

In April 2013—under the new procedure established for States Parties finding new mined areas after their initial clearance deadline had passed—Germany submitted an Article 5 deadline Extension Request until 31 December 2015, citing the need to conduct survey and the late identification of the affected area as reasons why clearance could not be completed prior to the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2013.[24]

Following the results of its survey and clearance activities in 2013, Germany withdrew its deadline request in November 2013.[25] As no mine contamination had been found, a clearance deadline was unnecessary.

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

Germany has not yet reported the clearance of any cluster munition remnants. Germany has reported that a “technical investigation” is currently under preparation and expected to commence in 2015.[26]

 

In 2012, the Federal Republic of Germany provided €18,507,427 (US$23,798,700)[1] in mine action funding to 20 countries and one other area through international and national NGOs, national mine action authorities, the UN, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, and the ITF Enhancing Human Security. This compares to €16.9 million ($23.6 million) in 2011. The combined contributions of €6.9 million ($8.9 million) to Afghanistan and Libya represent 38% of all funding from Germany in 2012.

Contributions by recipient: 2012[2]

In 2012, Germany contributed 92% of its mine action support to clearance activities and 5% to victim assistance. Another 3% was allocated to risk education and other global activities.

Contributions by thematic sector: 2012

Since 2008, Germany has consistently contributed approximately €17 million ($24 million) each year in support for mine action.

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[3]