Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.

In May 2012, a government official informed the ICBL that Iraq has drafted legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and expected to introduce it in parliament.[1] Iraq had not previously indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically was being pursued or if existing laws were considered adequate.[2]

In 2012, Iraq submitted its fifth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering calendar year 2011.

In November-December 2011, Iraq attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. Iraq provided an update on victim assistance, indicating that it was in the process of finalizing a new strategy.[3] Iraq also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in Geneva in May 2012 and made an intervention concerning clearance and victim assistance.[4] In October 2010, Iraq hosted a conference on the national strategy for mine action in coordination with donor countries in Baghdad.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 conflict. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the coalition bombing campaign in 2003.[5] Iraq reported that it has no intention to reconstruct its production capacity.[6]

For the third year in a row, there were not any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government or insurgent forces. No allegations of any mine transfers from Iraq have surfaced since the 1990s.

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines was 1 February 2012.[7] In June 2011, Iraq stated that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[8] In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2011, Iraq reported that an additional 50 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the Kurdistan region.[9]  

The manner in which Iraq has reported on the number of mines it retains for training and research purposes has been inconsistent and confusing. It appears that at least 45 mines were retained in the Kurdistan region for training purposes since the end of the stockpile destruction programs. Adding to this confusion is a claim in its most recent Article 7 report wherein Iraq states that 793 mines were retained for training after the mines were recovered during clearance operations.[10] The Monitor cannot sufficiently assess the manner by which Iraq implements Article 3 based solely on the information provided by Iraq in its annual transparency reports.

In previous Monitor reports, substantial but decreasing numbers of antipersonnel mines were recovered by foreign and Iraqi forces from caches. The Monitor has not found any information regarding seizures during the current reporting period. Iraq also reported that it destroyed 4,295 antipersonnel mines from mined areas in 2011.[11] The Iraqi government had not previously reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

 

Policy

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009, ratified on 14 May 2013, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2013. Iraq cited its 2012 ratification law in its initial Article 7 report provided in June 2014.[1] It is not known if specific legislative measures will be undertaken to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2]

Iraq participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, but attended both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer.[3] In December 2008, Iraq pledged to sign the convention as soon as possible after completing national and constitutional processes.[4] It subsequently signed the convention at the UN in New York in November 2009.

Iraq has continued to engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. Iraq has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013, where it made a statement on Universalization. Iraq has participated in all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in April 2014.

Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[5]

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability and other civil society groups have continued to campaign in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its initial Article 7 report provided 27 June 2014, Iraq declared that it does not produce cluster munitions.[6] Previously, in 2011, Iraq informed the Monitor that “There are no facilities that produce cluster munitions in Iraq.”[7]

Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs: the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[8] It was also involved in joint development of the M87 Orkan (known in Iraq as Ababil) with Yugoslavia.[9]

In the Article 7 report, Iraq declared that it does not stockpile any cluster munitions, including for research and training and research purposes.[10]

Under the stockpiling section of the report, Iraq lists 92,092 munitions destroyed from 2003–2013 (prior to the convention’s entry into force) and 6,489 munitions destroyed in 2013, but these are likely cluster munition remnants destroyed in the course of clearance.[11] Previously, in June 2011, Iraq stated that its civil defense team had destroyed 20,819 “cluster items” in 2009–2010, and the Ministry of Defense had destroyed 6,265 “cluster items” in 2010.[12]

In the past, Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[13] Jane’s Information Group in 1996 listed Iraq as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[14] A type of rocket–delivered dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunition of Chinese origin, called Type-81, was found and documented by American deminers in Iraq in 2003 and the United States (US) military’s unexploded ordnance identification guide lists the Chinese 250kg Type-2 dispenser as being present in Iraq.[15]

Use

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. According to one source, Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984.[16]

Coalition forces used large numbers of cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The US, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.[17] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[18]

 

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: POOR[1]

Mines

The Republic of Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions, left by internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led Coalition, and the violence that has persisted ever since the subsequent outbreak of insurgency.

Iraq is believed to be one of the world’s most heavily mined countries but is still working to produce a comprehensive estimate of the extent of the problem. Available data does not distinguish between mines and ERW.

A landmine impact survey (Iraq LIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004–2006, identified 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,730km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and 1.6 million people. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2010, but the findings have not been released. However, non-technical survey (NTS) of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 70km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.[2]

Iraq’s Article 7 transparency report for 2013 estimated contamination totaling 1,838km² based on varying degrees of survey. This included 1,207km² of mined area in the six central and southern provinces (Basra, Diyyala, Kirkuk, Missan, Muthanna, and Wassit) and another 311km² of SHA based on the ILIS. However, according to an introduction to the report, NTS of three southern governorates alone had found contamination totaling 1,456km². They included Basrah (1,273km²), Missan (71km²), and Wassit (112km²).[3]

In northern Iraq’s four Kurdish governorates, the Article 7 report records 96km² of CHA and almost 224km² of contamination identified by what it termed “preliminary technical survey,” a form of enhanced NTS intended to provide more precise data on contaminated areas.[4]

Cluster munition remnants

Submunition contamination is significant but the extent is unknown. A UNDP/UNICEF report in 2009 commented that the highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War.[5] Cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[6]

Non-technical surveys of five central-southern governorates recorded a total of 173.1km² of cluster munition contamination heavily concentrated in Muthanna (121.9km²) with lesser amounts in Thi Qar (40.3km²), Basrah (10.4km²), Nissan (0.17km²), and Wassit (0.98km²). Operators report clearing BLU-61, -63, and -97 and PM1 and Mk118 submunitions along with M42 dual-purpose munitions.[7]

In the north, coalition air strikes around Dohuk in 1991 left contamination that has posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[8] In 2010, a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[9] Little data is available on either the location or the results of cluster munitions clearance in 2013.

Cluster munition remnants are a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken to open up access to oilfields and develop infrastructure as well as for humanitarian clearance.[10] However, a lack of reporting on the location or results of clearance operations leaves uncertain the extent of any progress in addressing Iraq’s contamination.

Other explosive remnants of war

Iraq has extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining from past conflicts and continues to accumulate contamination from continuing conflicts in the north, where Iranian and Turkish aircraft and artillery have bombarded areas suspected to house Kurdish non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in 2010 and 2011.[11]

Moreover, since 2010 Iraqi civilians have run the gauntlet of escalating improvised explosive device (IED) detonations. The UN reported 1,057 Iraqis were killed and 2,326 were wounded in attacks in July 2013, at that time the highest monthly casualty figures since 2008.[12] In 2014, the UN reported that IEDs were placed in the vicinity of schools and hospitals causing damage to them.[13]

Non-technical surveys of five governorates reported 249.5km² of battlefield and UXO contamination mainly in Basrah (127.3km²), Wassit (61km²), Thi Qar (31.1km²), and Nissan (27km²).[14]

UXO contamination includes a variety of munitions, including air-dropped bombs and rockets, ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, and depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, including “bunker-buster” bombs and tank-fired shells used by US and British forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[15] Britain acknowledged in 2010 that it used 1.9 metric tonnes of DU ammunition during the 2003 war.[16] In addition to the hazard posed by UXO in general, DU munitions have been claimed to be responsible for high levels of radiation found in scrapyards around Baghdad and Basra and which was reported in a joint study by the ministries of health, environment, and science.[17]

Mine Action Program

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components. In northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), mine action is managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which in 2012 united with the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA). In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) to replace the National Mine Action Authority that had been attached to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation but had become inactive and was closed down by the government in mid-2007.[18]

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south.[19] However, the DMA’s role has been weakened by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate. Other issues that the mine action community identifies as obstacles to effective planning, management, and regulation of the sector include the division of responsibilities between different ministries, poor communication between ministries, the absence of a functioning mechanism for coordinating policy, and corruption.[20]

In May 2011, a Prime Minister’s order established a Higher Committee for Mine Action (HCMA) under the Prime Minister’s office comprising the Ministers of Defense, Environment, Interior, and Oil, together with representatives of the KRG and National Security Council. The HCMA was intended to create a policy framework and strategy for mine action. It was supported by a Technical Committee with the National Security Council’s Directorate for International Policy functions as its secretariat. However, in 2012 the HCMA’s functions passed to the National Security Council (NSC). The Ministry of Environment had not previously been a member of the NSC but was expected to attend meetings on mine action.[21]

Strategic planning

The DMA reports that it has prepared a draft strategic plan for 2014, but as of May 2014 the plan still awaited approval by the Supreme National Council for Mine Action. The DMA expected the strategy to be adopted by the end of 2014.[22]

The draft plan gives priority to clearance of contaminated land near population centers, agricultural land, oilfields, clearance that reduces poverty, creates employment opportunities, and promotes rural development. Operational priorities include completing NTS in all governorates by the end of 2015. The plan provides for clearance of the 10 least-contaminated governorates to be conducted mainly by civil defense units over four years to 2018 and for clearance of the five most-contaminated provinces, including those bordering Iran, to be undertaken by a combination of army demining regiments, civil defense units, and NGOs.[23]

Land Release

Comprehensive data on the results of mine clearance in Iraq are not available. In the northern Kurdish governorates, IKMAA reported release of a total of 11.6km² of mined and battle area, of which 5.2km² was released without clearance. In central and southern Iraq, the DMA reported clearance of 35km² in six governorates in 2013, of which 34km² was in Basrah, but the DMA did not specify mined or battle area clearance or the operators involved.[24]

IKMAA operated with more than 100 staff in 15 demining and three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, leading a sector with 17 commercial and NGO operators.[25] MAG is the largest of the NGOs with more than 189 deminers supported by mechanical assets and mine detection dogs.[26] In central and southern Iraq, clearance is conducted mostly by 19 commercial companies working on behalf of oil companies and by the army and civil defense.[27] Organizations undertaking humanitarian demining, including national operator IMCO and international NGO Danish Demining Group (DDG), engaged mainly in battle area clearance.[28]

Mine clearance in 2013

The KRG released a total of 9.81km² of mined area in 2013, fractionally less than the previous year and releasing more through survey. IKMAA expected to accredit significant additional capacity in the north in 2014, paving the way for accelerated survey and clearance.[29] MAG cleared about half as much mined area in 2013 as the previous year, but cleared more battle area than in 2012, keeping the total amount of land it released through clearance at about the same level.[30]

The scope, results, and quality of demining in central and southern Iraq are not known. A comprehensive overview of commercial company clearance is unavailable. The army has reportedly undertaken extensive clearance on a 129km-long Shatt al-Arab irrigation waterway rated as a priority by Basrah governorate authorities, but details of the project were not publicly available.[31]

However, plans for the army to set up four regiments of deminers to conduct clearance of Iraq’s heavily contaminated border with Iran were stalled by the growing security challenge linked to reviving insurgency in central Iraq. Operators reported that the military’s preoccupation with security issues also caused delays in demolitions of cleared ERW, which only the army is authorized to conduct.[32]

Mine clearance in 2013[33]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The DMA does not report comprehensively on the results of mine clearance, and incomplete reporting on clearance by operators makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations. In 2012, the Deputy Minister of Environment Kamal Latif predicted that Iraq would not meet its 2018 clearance deadline. Nothing has occurred in the two years since to challenge that conclusion.[34]

Iraq has passed the halfway mark to its initial Article 5 deadline but has yet to put in place a stable national mine action structure or with effective authority to direct, plan, or uphold the standards of mine action. The KRG’s more experienced mine action program has conducted survey and manages commercial and humanitarian clearance in the north. But in central and southern Iraq, authority over mine action is split between different ministries. The DMA and operators have made progress in conducting survey needed for planning and clearance, but many governorates remain to be surveyed and stakeholders report clearance continues without effective coordination or oversight.

Support for Mine Action

The DMA reported a budget of IQD14.56 billion (US$12.23 million)[35] in 2013, but it had no information about expenditure on mine action by the ministries of defense, oil, and industry, which conclude contracts separately with commercial demining companies that have conducted most of the clearance in recent years. The DMA’s proposed budget for 2014 was ID13.41 billion ($10.74 million).[36]

IMCO received funding of $10 million from the US Department of State in 2013. It expected to receive about a quarter less in 2014 but this reflected reduced expenditure on security and it expected funding for operations would be higher.[37] DDG received funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)of $1.8 million for 12 months ending by June 2014, and $2.4 million from the Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom for the 12 months to July. As of March 2014, DDG had received no further funding commitments and the program faced the possibility of closure in mid-2014.[38]

Recommendations

·         Iraq should present its mine action strategy detailing available capacity and its proposed deployment.

·         Iraq should complete non-technical survey of central and southern governorates, where security permits, to establish a clearer baseline estimate of the extent of the landmine threat.

·         Clarity is needed on the structure and leadership of mine action, including Iraq’s national mine action authority.

·         Mine action is bedeviled by bureaucratic blockages in government ministries and customs. Action is needed to streamline procedures for registration and accreditation of demining organizations, which can take years to complete.

 

Action points based on findings

·         Further develop a sustainable mechanism to collect information on ongoing mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties and their needs in southern and central regions of the Republic of Iraq. It is certain that there were many more casualties in Iraq in 2013 than those that were identified.

·         Increase participation of survivors and their representative organizations in the planning and coordination of victim assistance and disability issues throughout all of Iraq.

·         Ensure equal access to all services and benefits for both male and female mine/ERW survivors.

Victim assistance commitments

Iraq is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Iraq has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2013, the Monitor identified 124 mine/ERW casualties in Iraq.[1] Of these, 56 occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) with the remaining 68 in central and southern Iraq. Following the establishment of a casualty data collection mechanism by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in 2011, the DMA became the main source of casualty data in central and southern Iraq for 2013 for the first time since the Monitor began recording casualties in 1999, reporting the majority (51 of the 68) of casualties identified there. Prior to the DMA providing the data, the main source of casualty data reported by the Monitor for most of Iraq was gathered from media scanning.

All but 11 of the casualties identified in 2013 were civilians.[2] Six of the civilian casualties were Iranian nationals. Children made up 28% of civilian casualties for which the age was known (16 of 57), a decrease compared to 48% of the casualties identified in 2012.[3] Of the total child casualties, most (14) were boys; two were girls.[4] More than two thirds of child casualties (11 of 16) were caused by ERW. As in previous years, men made up the single largest casualty group, representing 65% of civilian casualties for which the age was known. There were at least four casualties among women in 2013.[5] There were six casualties reported among deminers; this represented a decrease compared to the seven deminer casualties in 2012 and the 20 deminer casualties in 2011.[6] All reported casualties among deminers occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan; one was a Serbian national.[7]

Iraq included eight casualties from submunitions in their 2013 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reporting that were not noted as such in the data submitted by the DMA to the Monitor.[8]

It is certain that there were many more mine/ERW casualties in Iraq that were not identified. This is due to a combination of factors, including the capacity of the DMA’s casualty data collection mechanism which is improving but still limited. In 2013, the DMA indicated that “there is no accurate data for mine and ERW casualties in Iraq.”[9] Media coverage of casualties is also far from comprehensive in Iraq.

The 124 casualties identified in 2013 represented an increase in the number of reported annual casualties as compared with the 84 casualties identified in 2012. However, it was less than the 141 casualties identified in 2011.[10] Since the number of casualties in Kurdistan was similar across the two years (56 in 2013 and 52 in 2012), most of the increase can be attributed to the increase in the number of casualties identified in central and southern Iraq (68 in 2013 versus 32 in 2012). The increase in casualties recorded in central and southern Iraq is likely related to improved data collection for those regions, rather than an actual change in the number of casualties occurring.

The total number of casualties in Iraq remained unknown, though it was known that there were many thousands. By the end of 2013, 31,618 casualties were confirmed, including 13,423 casualties registered in Kurdistan (10,721 killed, 2,702 injured).[11] In central and southern Iraq, 17,072 casualties had been identified through December 2013 in four provinces that were completed through the Iraqi mine and ERW victim needs assessment launched in 2011.[12] Most of the casualties (92%) registered through the survey were men.

Cluster munition casualties

Between 1 January 2013 and 31 March 2014, there were eight casualties reported from unexploded submunitions in the provinces of Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Basra of central and southern Iraq; five people were killed and three were injured.[13] By the end of 2013, 3,019 casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in Iraq. At least 1,165 people were killed from cluster munition remnants and submunitions while 1,437 people were injured; the outcome of 417 casualties was unknown. Of these casualties, 388 occurred during strikes (128 killed, 260 injured).[14] Iraq’s survey of mine/ERW victims had identified 880 victims of cluster munitions (148 people killed, 732 injured) in five provinces as of March 31 2014.[15] Due to the level of contamination, it has been estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991, including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes, and that one quarter of these casualties were children.[16]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is estimated to be 48,000–68,000.[17] There were 15,173 survivors identified as of March 2013; 12,471 in central and southern Iraq and 2,702 in Kurdistan.[18]

Victim assistance since 1999

Since 1999, the availability of and access to adequate assistance for mine and ERW survivors in Iraq have been hampered by ongoing armed conflict and instability in the country. Between 1999 and 2003, international organizations, particularly the World Health Organization and the ICRC, worked to rebuild Iraq’s healthcare and rehabilitation systems that had been devastated by decades of previous conflict. Many rebuilt health and rehabilitation centers were then once again damaged or destroyed with the invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition in March 2003 and the related period of civil unrest. Continued armed violence prevented the rebuilding of services critical to survivors and contributed to the emigration of some 75% of qualified medical personnel; by 2008, healthcare had deteriorated and was considered to be in its worst shape in many years.

Starting in 2009, a slowly improving security situation allowed for some renovations to medical facilities and the building of new physical rehabilitation centers in south and central Iraq. Survivors were more able to access available services, and some survivors in central and southern Iraq that had the means to cover transportation costs could access free victim assistance services in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, through 2013 the volatile security situation in many areas continued to prevent many survivors in southern and central Iraq from having access to needed services. Persistent efforts by international organizations, international and national NGOs, and government ministries (especially the Ministry of Health) sustained the limited advances achieved since 2009 in regards to medical care and physical rehabilitation.

Since 1999, psychosocial support and economic inclusion programs have been extremely limited in southern and central Iraq with small scale projects organized by NGOs and the Iraq Red Crescent Society. In 2012, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs began a program to link persons with disabilities with employment.

In 2006, the DMA appointed a Victim Assistance Director to address the absence of national victim assistance coordination, but harmonization with relevant ministries remained essentially nonexistent until 2010 when the first national victim assistance meeting was held. Iraq had no victim assistance plan throughout the period. In 2011, the second annual national victim assistance meeting resulted in a set of recommendations for improving victim assistance, but no further steps were taken to develop the recommendations into a plan or to monitor their implementation.

The situation for survivors in Kurdistan has been significantly better than in the rest of Iraq throughout the period since 1999. Victim assistance services were coordinated by the two mine action authorities previously operating in the Kurdistan region, together with the regional Ministry of Health: the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA), which had merged into the IKMAA by 2012. Numerous NGOs operated in the region providing medical services, physical rehabilitation, and social and economic inclusion programs including several funded through the UN Oil-for-Food program up to 2010. Many of these programs have been sustained beyond the closure of this funding program with both national and international resources. Nevertheless, available services have been insufficient to address the needs of the many thousands of survivors in the Kurdistan region, a situation that has been exacerbated by the arrival of survivors from the south starting in 2009 and the influx of Syrian refugees beginning in 2012.

Victim assistance in 2013

In 2013, the DMA demonstrated an improved capacity to collect mine/ERW casualty data and victim assistance-related information, though this was still limited. The mine/ERW victim needs assessment was ongoing and the DMA maintained its casualty data collection system for central and southern Iraq. Ongoing injury surveillance and the development of a national disability registry continued, but were hindered by increasing levels of violence. In 2013, the national healthcare budget increased and the Iraqi and Kurdistan Ministries of Health assumed greater responsibility for the management and financing of physical rehabilitation.

Despite increased budgeting for and management of victim assistance services by the Iraqi government, the availability of all services needed by mine/ERW survivors remained limited and access to those services that were available was hindered even more than in other recent years in some parts of the country as armed violence rose to the highest level in 10 years. The influx of Syrian refugees in Kurdistan increased demand for healthcare and rehabilitation.

Assessing victim assistance needs

As of the end of 2013, the DMA had completed the ongoing mine/ERW victim needs assessment survey in five provinces: Maysan, Wasit, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Basra, identifying 23,398 victims.[19] The survey, launched in 2011, planned to cover the 15 provinces of central and southern Iraq by February 2015 and was being carried out in cooperation with local governments, relevant ministries (including the ministries of health, labor and social affairs, and education), and NGOs such as the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.[20] The needs assessment was designed to identify victims (both survivors and family members of persons killed by mines and ERW), determine their needs, and connect victims to available assistance, including medical and rehabilitation services and disability pensions.[21] Complete results of the survey were to be distributed to relevant government ministries and NGOs and also to be shared internationally.[22] Partial results of the assessment were shared through Iraq’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2013.[23]

In 2013, the Ministry of Health continued to operate the national injury surveillance system, which recorded injuries caused by mine/ERW among other causes. The system registered survivors who sought emergency or ongoing medical care through a health clinic. The Ministry of Health also continued to update the national disability registry with data collected from rehabilitation centers.[24] The deteriorating security situation throughout the country impeded the DMA’s plans to follow up with mine/ERW victims identified through these systems.[25]

No specific needs assessment for mine/ERW survivors was undertaken in Kurdistan during 2013, although service providers, especially rehabilitation centers, collected data on an ongoing basis when survivors accessed services.[26] IKMAA supported data collection efforts by service providers in Soran and Duhok.[27]

Victim assistance coordination[28]

In 2013, two victim assistance coordination meetings were held for central and southern Iraq, hosted by the DMA. One meeting was held in Basra and one in Muthanna, with the goal of developing recommendations for a 2013/2014 annual strategic workplan. Recommendations focused on concrete actions to be taken by the DMA, the ministries of health, social affairs, planning, youth and sports, the Iraqi Red Crescent and other actors to ensure access by mine/ERW survivors to a range of existing government programs and to improve the quality of existing services, particularly physical rehabilitation.[29] The victim assistance workplan established for 2013 was carried out by the DMA, in cooperation with partners, though activities were limited due to a lack of resources.[30]

In 2013, a special committee of the Office of the Prime Minister was established to address the poor coordination among government departments responsible for the delivery of basic services to persons with disabilities in central and southern Iraq.[31] On 5 September 2013, the Iraqi parliament passed a law to establish an independent national disability commission that was intended to include all relevant stakeholders, such as victim assistance coordinators, from the mine action authorities.[32] As of March 2014, the national disability commission, to be headed by the minister for labor and social affairs, was still being formed.[33]

In Kurdistan, victim assistance was included in disability coordination[34] through the Inter‐Ministerial Council of Monitoring and Developing People of Special Needs, established in July 2012 to coordinate the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in the region.[35]

Physical rehabilitation in central and southern Iraq was coordinated by the Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation and Prosthetics & Orthotics (HCPRPO), a committee of the Ministry of Health, working closely with the ICRC. In 2013, the HCPRPO carried out quality assessments in rehabilitation centers and worked to develop standards for physical rehabilitation. A similar committee was formed in Kurdistan in 2012, with the support of the ICRC.[36]

Iraq did not provide any updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention in Cluster Munitions in September 2013, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013, or the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2014. Iraq reported casualty data and information about victim assistance services provided in central and southern Iraq and in Kurdistan, through form J of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report and form H of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2013.[37]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Mine survivors participated in the two victim assistance meetings held in central and southern Iraq in 2013 through the Iraqi Alliance for Disability (IADO).[38] Mine survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in the ongoing implementation of the mine/ERW victim survey.[39] Following advocacy efforts by IADO and other members of civil society, the representation and participation of persons with disabilities on the national disability commission was included in the law mandating its establishment.[40]

Disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) and survivors in Kurdistan implemented physical rehabilitation programs, peer support, and vocational training.[41]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[42]

Emergency and continuing medical care

Despite increased management responsibility by the Ministry of Health and increased national funding for healthcare, in 2013 Iraq still lacked sufficient equipment and human resources to deal with weapons-related injuries, such as amputations and shrapnel wounds. Emergency trauma care was available in most major cities but specialized treatment, such as reconstructive surgery, was often only available through private clinics that were too expensive for many mine/ERW victims and other war wounded.[43] The ICRC continued to strengthen the emergency response capacity of hospitals in violence-prone areas through training and supplies.[44]

Medical services in Kurdistan were said to be improving, with free care for mine/ERW survivors.[45] Healthcare centers and hospitals were “overwhelmed” by the influx of refugees from Syria during 2013.[46]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

Access to physical rehabilitation services remained difficult for people living in remote locations for several reasons, including the cost, time, and distance of transportation, as well as a lack of information regarding services available. In several parts of the country, access was also impeded by increasing levels of violence.[47] In addition, due to the lack of qualified rehabilitation professionals, patients at all centers outside Baghdad (and Erbil in Kurdistan) faced waiting lists of one to three months.[48]

Within Kurdistan, access to appropriate rehabilitation services was significantly better than in the rest of Iraq and increased training for rehabilitation professionals was believed to have increased the quality of care.[49]

The ICRC continued working to increase access to rehabilitation by supporting the costs of transport and by providing raw materials to centers. The ICRC reported that the Ministry of Health progressively assumed more financial and management responsibilities in ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers.[50]

As part of its four-year project (2010–2014) to improve access to rehabilitation services, Handicap International (HI) provided training to rehabilitation providers at three centers in Kurdistan to improve the quality of care and promote a patient-centered approach. [51] Disability Information Points, managed by local DPOs in each of the three governorates of the Kurdistan region, continued to provide information about available services with the support of HI.[52]

Economic and social inclusion and psychological support

Economic inclusion activities continued to be carried out on a limited basis in Iraqi Kurdistan by NGOs[53] and by the ICRC in Kurdistan and central and southern Iraq.[54] The DMA referred mine/ERW victims (both survivors and family members of people killed by mines and ERW), along with other victims of armed conflict, for the provision of untaxed livelihood loans, free land, and adapted cars and financed group marriages for mine/ERW victims (identified through the mine/ERW survey.)[55] Also, as part of its program to support income-generating activities, thousands of female heads-of-households whose spouses were victims of conflict (including victims of landmines and ERW) continued to receive assistance from the ICRC to overcome government obstacles preventing women from registering for benefits and support for income-generating activities.[56]

In July 2013, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a 3% public sector employment quota for persons with disabilities.[57]

It was reported that many children with disabilities dropped out of public schools due to insufficient physical access to school buildings, a lack of appropriate learning materials in schools, and a shortage of teachers qualified to work with children with disabilities.[58]

While many hospitals had some capacity to provide psychological support to mine/ERW survivors immediately following their incident, Iraq lacked sufficiently-trained professionals to provide appropriate psychological support to mine survivors, most especially longer-term psychological support and follow-up trauma care.[59]

Disability organizations organized a hunger strike in front of government offices in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to protest inadequate government benefits for persons with disabilities in December 2012. The Kurdistan government promised to consider their demands but had not responded by the end of 2013.[60]

Laws and policies

Central and southern Iraq had no legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities.[61] In 2013, persons with disabilities remained among the most vulnerable people in their communities, facing numerous barriers to their full and equal participation in all facets of life. The situation of persons with disabilities living outside major cities was particularly difficult, due to a lack of access to basic services.[62]

Implementation of the 2012 decree that all public buildings should be made accessible for persons with disabilities was incomplete, and access to buildings as well as to educational and work settings remained limited in 2013.[63]

Iraq acceded to the CRPD on 20 March 2013.

 

In 2012, nine donors contributed a total of US$34 million for clearance, victim assistance, and risk education activities to the Republic of Iraq.[1] The United States (US) contributed $25 million—almost 75% of the total international assistance—which is an increase from 2011 when the US contributed 65% of all mine action funding to Iraq. Ireland discontinued funding mine action in Iraq in 2012.

Only the US, the Netherlands, and Slovenia supported victim assistance activities.

As in previous years, the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, the Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, and the General Directorate of Mine Action did not report making any financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program in 2012.

In August 2013, the US Department of Defense announced it had awarded a contract for $11.7 million to the American company General Dynamics to dispose of 49,387 rounds of improved conventional munitions and 5,192 cluster bomb units.[2]

International contributions: 2012[3]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[4]